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NLE MR Case No. 2002-49

Document No. 2

1 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: International Radio Broadcasting by Radio Free Asia

1. Attached is the study on international radio [redacted] which I mentioned to you on the telephone and to which you told me you saw no objection. There is a summary of the study on page 8 which may suffice for your purposes.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Attachment
Subject memo.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2002

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INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING

BY RADIO FREE ASIA

The Problem:

To determine the future course of international radio broadcasting by Radio Free Asia (RFA), a part of the Committee for a Free Asia (CFA).

Background:

CFA has been broadcasting since September 1951 from San Francisco, relayed via leased facilities of RCA Communications Company in Manila, P.I. CFA presently broadcasts in three Chinese dialects and in English. Programs consist of selected news, commentaries, special features and music. Programs are broadcast four hours a day, six days a week and are targeted at the Southeast Asia Overseas Chinese and the China mainland. The programs are principally anti-Communist propaganda, except for news and music.

Discussion:

Programs Are Not Heard - Present broadcasts are on a weak (10 k.w.) signal which cannot regularly be heard anywhere in Asia. Although the broadcasts are not heard, they have served a real purpose in that the production of them has enabled RFA to build an especially efficient staff, about half of it Chinese. However, CFA has proposed for some time that it be equipped with facilities which provide a stronger signal, and is now urging that this be done or the broadcasts be terminated. It is clear that further expenditures for programs that are not heard can no longer be justified simply in terms of training.

Sponsorship - In October 1952, after months of negotiation, [redacted] approval from the Department of State to proceed with a small expansion program to install near Manila a 100 k.w. shortwave transmitter, [redacted] on condition that Asian sponsorship for the station be obtained and the broadcasts targeted at mainland China and the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. It was State's position [redacted] that other (the non-Chinese) audiences in South-east Asia were being adequately covered by indigenous and international broadcasts. (C)

EO 12958
3.4(h)(1)-25

Following this decision CFA was asked to explore the problem of sponsorship. CFA now advises that it is not feasible to attempt Asian sponsorship - specifically Chinese sponsorship - of a station in the Philippines. Sponsorship appears to be impractical for the following reasons: (1) it would entail political dangers in the Philippines, where Chinese are disliked and are convenient political whipping boys; (2) it would entail serious danger of loss of control to the sponsors, if they are sponsors in fact rather than in name only; (3) it would increase the opportunities for Chinese (KMT or Communist) penetration; (4) if the sponsors merely lend their names, it is inevitable that the American (even though "unofficial") character of the operation will become well known, exposing the U. S. to ridicule (for an unsuccessful attempt at deception) and intensifying Asian suspicions of U. S. interference in the affairs of free nations.

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2.

[redacted]
[redacted]
CFA Proposal for Expansion - In line with State's approval of a "modest expansion," CFA now recommends [redacted] 100 k.w. short-wave transmitter [redacted] be installed in Manila for use in broadcasts [redacted] from Radio Free Asia. It proposes that the targets remain the same - Mainland China and Chinese in Southeast Asia. [redacted]

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(C)

[redacted] The coverage area anticipated by CFA engineering staff is shown on the attached map.

Evaluation of CFA Proposal - In view of the time that has elapsed and the events, described hereafter, that have occurred since last October, a re-assessment of international broadcasts to Mainland China and Overseas Chinese in Southeast is now required.

A) The Mainland as a Target - [redacted]

[redacted] CFA called upon RFA to limit broadcasts to the China mainland to the following target groups, believed to be the only reasonably assured audiences: "(a) short-wave radio broadcast monitors; (b) communications personnel; (c) key military and other officials whose duties require or permit occasional listening to all types of broadcasts, and (d) the officialdom reached indirectly via the foregoing."

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[redacted]
[redacted] By means of group-listening centers, nation-wide radio monitoring networks (which combine radio dictation-speed broadcasts with reception units which receive and disseminate the information by newspapers, billboards, and word of mouth), and wired loudspeakers, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been able to enlarge the audience for its own programs without resort to sizeable increase in home-owned radio receivers. Chinese production of these radio receivers is in fact estimated at a maximum of 20,000 per year with replacement parts perhaps limiting even the number of those sets which are effective. The Chinese Communists have thereby been able to minimize the numbers of its population who might have in their possession facilities for listening to Western broadcasts. At the same time, through a variety of means including registration and licensing of sets but most often by fear campaigns, the PRC has been able to make listening to Western broadcasts a very risky business. That the Communists cannot totally foreclose on the opportunity for clandestine listening is, however, indicated by the growing numbers of "monitors" and military personnel who use radio for point-to-point contact. Since many of these groups use headphones for listening, the opportunity for clandestine listening does exist to some extent. [redacted]
[redacted]

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It cannot be determined that there is no listening audience on the Mainland of China or that the listening audience has necessarily decreased since July of last year. However, the impending activations of the two new VOA 1000 k.w. transmitters on Okinawa and the Philippines and the anticipated increased power of Formosan broadcasts to the Mainland indicate that the additional power of a 100 k.w. RFA transmitter located in Manila is not needed. It is further quite clear that there is little which RFA can say to the Mainland - and particularly as an American group - which cannot be said by VOA or by Formosa. The line which Stalin's death makes most applicable to the PRC -- that Malenkov has succeeded to a position of influence over the Communist movement to which not he, but Mao alone, is entitled -- can as well be used by VOA as by RFA. Better in fact; for if there is any hope for Mao's defection, it is more likely to come when VOA, expressing official U.S. policy, makes the reward seem great enough.

B) The Overseas Chinese as a Target - There is no doubt that the Overseas Chinese constitute a significant target of psychological warfare. They own much of the wealth of Southeast Asia and they have a latent but potent political power in their ability to forward or retard the progress of Communist infiltration in Southeast Asia. They are in some ways a unique target. They share the prejudice accorded minority groups in most countries. They are largely of the same economic class - small businessmen and skilled laborers. They come from one of three or four southern provinces of China. They maintain a common interest in affairs on the Mainland of China. Their significance to the development of Southeast Asia is far out of proportion to their numbers.

Of all of the targets of Southeast Asia accessible by radio, they may be said to be one of the most logical. A group of some 9.6 million, they can be reached by programs in a minimum of dialects. They are likely to be able to afford radios. As a race-conscious group, and as a minority, they lend themselves to community radio listening devices. (The International Broadcasting Service of the Department of State estimates, for example, that in Singapore about 60% of the registered radio sets, some 60,000 as of 1951, are possessed by Chinese and that the number is increasing yearly.) In Manila, they own 8%. And the Embassy at Bangkok appears satisfied that the majority of Chinese in Thailand have access to radio.

These factors [] support RFA's proposal of last summer for the establishment of an international broadcasting program limited to Overseas Chinese and, peripherally, the remaining audience (largely officialdom) on the China mainland. The development of an effective program was predicated on the assumption that, by developing a continuous program with a strong competitive signal, we could develop a habit among the Overseas Chinese of listening to the RFA programs. The relative paucity of programs directed specifically at Overseas Chinese audiences, either internationally or nationally, made the assumption seem reasonable.



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4.

A major consideration at that time also was that the Overseas Chinese, while cautiously moving away from support of the Communist regime, had not indicated any sizeable growing loyalty to the Nationalist Government on Formosa, the otherwise logical source of psychological warfare broadcasts to this target.

Many of the considerations which originally led to [] an RFA Overseas Chinese program are still valid. As Appendices E012958 I and III show, there are few continuous broadcasts of interest 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs to Overseas Chinese, although more internationally than nationally. (C)

C) Capabilities for Reaching Target - But the situation has improved in the past year. VOA is now devoting 2-1/2 hours per day specifically to the Overseas Chinese. The Thai broadcasting service (government-owned) which has not heretofore carried Chinese programs is now broadcasting 1-1/2 hours per day to the Chinese. Radio Rediffusion in Hong Kong has been increasingly cooperative with the USIS in carrying VOA programs for local (Chinese) audiences. Radio Malaya reaches Malayan Chinese (about 2.8 million in all) with Chinese programs in seven dialects for 15 minutes to one-half hour each per day. Radio Singapore, which carries a few Chinese programs, along with many entertainment and music programs, has become the most popular radio of Chinese audiences in Thailand.

The most significant new developments to be taken into consideration are, however, two of a technical nature and one of a political nature: (1) VOA within a few months will have the facilities for reaching both Mainland China and the Overseas Chinese communities with a strong signal. The three 35 k.w. transmitters in Ceylon and the two 1000 k.w. transmitters on Okinawa and the Philippines will make possible, technically, a fully effective VOA Chinese program. This development is coupled with realization by VOA that successful programs, though perhaps aired centrally, must be developed locally. The Hong Kong and Manila offices of VOA already have done considerable work in local taping of programs and this practice is being extended to other areas having Overseas Chinese populations. (2) The Nationalist Government of China will shortly have additional transmitting facilities capable of emitting strong signals to Mainland China and, if desired, to the Overseas Chinese. (3) The Kuomintang Overseas Chinese Conference of a few months ago demonstrated the progress of the Nationalist Government in securing the loyalty of significant groups of Overseas Chinese. A growing disillusionment with the PRC among Overseas Chinese, enlarged by the reports of the extortion rackets, the three anti-movement and similar Communist exercises, has made the need for an "in-between" means (such as RFA) of reaching the Overseas Chinese less necessary. We can assume that State Department policy toward the Far East will take an increasingly favorable outlook toward Formosa-sponsored propaganda activities.

In this connection, Radio Free China (Formosa) has approached the local representative of CFA on Formosa asking for assistance

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for improving its radio programs, particularly in the psychological field. [REDACTED]

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3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs

[REDACTED] Cooperation with Radio Free (C)

China would make possible CFA-Influenced broadcasts to South China on a strong signal and, if desirable, to Overseas Chinese. Such broadcasts could be made without CFA attribution and therefore without CFA picking up a Nationalist, KMT label which would prejudice its operations in other Asian countries. It would make possible the broadcasting of an imaginative dark gray or black type program into the Mainland which cannot be gone under CFA or RFA attribution. (For example, phrases such as "Down with Mao Tse-tung, Long live Chou En-lai" could be broadcast from Radio Free China on the same frequency as Radio Peiping during pauses by the Peiping commentator. Radio Free China's signal into South China would probably be strong enough to override Radio Peiping. Imaginatively developed broadcasts on the same frequency could produce other interesting results.)

D) Value of International Broadcasts to Free Asia - The primary factor in re-evaluation of the proposed use of RFA as an international broadcasting instrument lies in the medium itself and in its relationship to CFA activities as a whole.

We have reviewed very carefully all of the evaluation reports of the past year by USIS officers in the Far East, India, and Pakistan, to determine the views of field officers (whose views usually differ strikingly from the views of the home office of VOA) on the success of radio activities in their area and on the prominence which radio should play in the total psychological warfare effort.

The consensus of the field officers is perhaps most clearly shown in the Appendix IV taken from the report on the Conference of Public Affairs Officers, held in Bangkok, November 10-14, 1952. This report clearly demonstrates the advantages of local over international radio.

The Embassy evaluations stress over and over again the necessity for developing materials suited to a limited and specific target. This aim can be reached best in radio by the local taping of radio programs, which VOA is doing on an ever-increasing basis. But the more specifically designed a given program is for a specific target, the less reason to diffuse it via international broadcasts to other, differing target groups and the more reason to develop either local radio as an outlet for this purpose or to develop an even better method of communicating the desired idea.



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E) Value of National Radio -

CFA could and should influence indigenous broadcasting. Radio Malaya, for example, would be glad to use appropriate material which CFA could provide through its several offices in Asia, and pointed specifically to its use of CFA's tape recordings of the recent Buddhist World Fellowship Conference in Japan, which evoked favorable response from Radio Malaya's Buddhist audience. Burma will have a new station on the air soon and it is reported it can be persuaded to cooperate with CFA. Radio Pakistan has indicated interest in getting programming assistance from American radio experts. In Japan and the Philippines, there are opportunities for inducing U.S. radio advertisers to cooperate on public service programs. Japan alone, with over 9 million set-owners, in itself offers an opportunity for national radio effort which could absorb the energies of a sizeable CFA staff. Throughout Asia, the need for training programs in support of national radio is extensive; E.G., VOA has been forced to establish schools to train technicians for its Ceylon transmissions.



F) The Future of Radio in Asia - RFA contends that, whatever its effectiveness in Asia today, radio is a "coming" medium in that area. It states that the colonial powers did little to stimulate the growth of radio in India, Burma and Indonesia. It cites evidences of the intentions of the present governments of those countries to stimulate indigenous radio and to use it for its national psychological effect. It also points to USSR and PRC broadcasts to Southeast Asia as indications of Communist belief in the future of radio there. It concludes that the U.S. should ride this wave of the future, and that RFA international broadcasts are one effective way of doing so.

However, even if it could be determined positively that radio will develop into a powerful medium in Asia, it does not follow that the most profitable way to capitalize on such a development is to invest in additional international broadcasting facilities. Rather, the most promising course of action would appear to lie within the individual countries. By working with and gaining acceptance by indigenous broadcasters now, and "growing up" with them, the "voice" of the U.S. will be come more effective as (and if) radio in Asia realizes the bright future which RFA predicts for it.

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G) Other Considerations - In addition to the foregoing, the following factors should be weighed in this evaluation:

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1) During last August and September, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RFA was the only "going" CFA operation. CFA senior representatives had been in the field only two or three months and were still laying the groundwork for their activities. Now, the situation is entirely different, CFA's field projects are already paying off, particularly in Hong Kong and Burma. For example, CFA is now responsible for five bookstores, has produced one movie which has received enthusiastic response from large Buddhist audiences in Ceylon and Burma, has caused establishment in Burma of a central authoritative Buddhist organization for the purpose of spreading anti-Communist teachings throughout Burma, etc.

With the recent opening of offices in Ceylon and Pakistan, and the imminent establishment of offices in Bangkok and Saigon, the promise of CFA as [REDACTED] unconventional, but effective, [REDACTED] is greater than ever. Thus, there is no longer the need for RFA as the "one thing" CFA can point to with pride.

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3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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2) Also during last August and September the morale of the staff of CFA was at its nadir, due to factors connected with the presidency of Alan Valentine. Affirmative action with respect to RFA was felt to be necessary in order to hold the entire CFA staff together. This situation has been remedied.

3) [REDACTED]

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4) Finally, CFA's principal objective is to bring into being, stimulate and assist Asian groups in the formation of self-sustaining and dynamic "democratic cells" which themselves will oppose communism and strengthen the political, social and cultural structures of their own nations. The success of CFA field representatives in the past six months in getting this concept across has been an important factor in winning Asian acceptance of CFA. But RFA is not and can not be animated by that concept. It is probable that the greater RFA's success in becoming a "voice" in Asia, the more difficult it will become for CFA field representatives to maintain or expand Asian acceptance of CFA as an enlightened U.S. organization interested primarily in helping Asians to help themselves.

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8.

Summary

RFA's international broadcasts to Mainland China and the Chinese in Southeast Asia are not now reaching the target areas. Either sufficiently powerful transmitting facilities should be provided or the broadcasts should cease. If sufficient power is provided, the broadcasts could be made in the name of RFA or they could be made in the name of a sponsoring group. [REDACTED]

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Furthermore, and most important, the reasons for having the broadcasts appear to be less compelling than the reasons for terminating them, which are:

1) Present and planned free world radio transmissions to Mainland China are adequate in terms of the audience to be reached.

2) Increasing radio coverage, both indigenous and international, is being given to the Chinese in the free countries of Southeast Asia.

3) It is the opinion of almost all State Department public affairs officers in the target areas, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that international radio is, comparatively, an ineffective medium in Southeast Asia.

4) To the extent that radio in Southeast Asia is, or becomes, an effective medium, it can best be utilized on the indigenous, rather than international, level. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

5) RFA's [REDACTED] concepts and modus operandi conflict with those of CFA, and it is no longer needed by CFA, as it was last summer, as a symbol of activity and hope.




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APPENDIX I

INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

The attached summaries "A" through "F", derived from the most recent FEIS Program Schedule of Foreign Broadcasting Stations (dated 15 January 1953), contain schedules of international broadcasts targeted at those areas of interest to CFA - the Far East, India, Ceylon, and Pakistan. Other international broadcasters, whose schedules are not given, include Australia, Ceylon, the French in Indo China, the Viet Minh, the UN Radio in Japan (run by the Far East Command and directed at North Korea and North China), the North Korean government, and even Indonesia. The power of the signals from these broadcasters varies, and certain of them have limited targets; but it would appear that persons in the Far East equipped with short-wave receiving sets have a variety of programs from which to choose if they are willing to turn the dial often enough. The content, however, would consist largely of varying interpretations of news and occasional music.

It is difficult to make a reasonable comparative analysis of Communist and non-Communist international broadcasting, inasmuch as target audiences vary considerably. It appears that the Communists utilize their facilities as much for communicating the "party line" to their own adherents as to propagandizing the non-believer. VOA has, of course, a special need for international broadcasting which the Communists do not have, i.e., to break through the Iron Curtain.

A comparison of international broadcasts, even if possible on any revealing basis, still would not offer sufficient evidence as to which side is winning the radio war, since the use of local radio is not taken into consideration. And with respect to the total psychological effort, radio is only one medium, and not the most effective, of many.



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ATTACHMENT "A"

VOA BROADCASTS TO THE FAR EAST AND NEAR EAST
AS OF NOVEMBER 30, 1952

Sources: IBS Memorandum dated December 10, 1952 prepared by IBS-NY, Howard Hotchner, Network Service Manager, entitled "Daily IBS Broadcasting"

IBS/E SM-167: "VOA Listening and Impact on Communist-dominated China and Among Overseas Chinese"

FAR EAST

<u>Target</u>	<u>Hours per Day</u>	<u>Dialects</u>	<u>Total Hours per Day</u>
Mainland China	3:00	Mandarin	
	1:30	Cantonese	
	:30	Swatow	
	:30	Amoy	
			5:30
Overseas Chinese	1:00	Mandarin	
	:30	Cantonese	
	:30	Swatow	
	:30	Amoy	
			2:30
		Total Chinese	8:00
Burma	:30	Burmese	Total Burmese :30
Indonesia	:30	Indonesian	:30
Japan	:30	Japanese	Total Japanese :30
Korea	1:15	Korean	Total Korean 1:15
Malaya	:30	Malaya	Total Malayan :30
Thailand	:30	Thai	Total Thai :30
Vietnam	:30	Vietnamese	Total Vietnam :30
Soviet Far East	2:00*	Russian	Total Russian 2:00
	*1:30 represents re-broadcast of European Russian program		
General	1:45**	English	Total English 1:45
	** plus one weekly 30 minute program to the P.I.		

NEAR EAST

India	:30	Hindi	Total Indian :30
Pakistan	:30	Urdu	Total Pakistan :30
General N.E. & Africa	1:00	English	Total English 1:00
			TOTAL PER DAY 18:00



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ATTACHMENT "B"

BBC BROADCASTS TO FAR EAST AND NEAR EAST

<u>Target</u>	<u>No.Hrs.</u>	<u>Dialect</u>
Indonesia	:30	Indonesian*
Japan	:30	Japanese*
Vietnam	:15	Vietnamese*
	:15	French*
Overseas Chinese and China	:30	Mandarin*
	:15	Cantonese*
Malaya	:15	Malaya
Thailand	:30	Thai
Burma	:15	Burmese
India	:30	Hindi
Pakistan	:45	Urdu
General	<u>1:30</u>	English
TOTAL PER DAY	<u>6:00</u>	

* Relayed by Radio Singapore

In addition to Tamil, Sinhalese, Marathi, and Bengali programs of 30 minutes each once a week.

In addition, BBC has a general overseas service which is beamed to Southeast Asia, India and other areas of the Far East most of the day in English.



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ATTACHMENT "C"

RADIO MOSCOW BROADCASTS TO THE FAR EAST AND NEAR EAST

<u>Target</u>	<u>No. Hrs. Per Day</u>	<u>Dialect</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Japan	3:00 (some repeated by Radio Pyongyang)	Japanese	3	
Korea	3:00 (some repeated by Radio Pyongyang)	Korean	3	
China	3:00	Mandarin	3:30	
Mongolia	1:15	Mongolian	1:15	
Vietnam	1:00	Tonkinese	1:00	
Overseas Chinese	:30	Cantonese	<u>1:30</u>	12:15
Indonesia	1:00	Indonesian	1:00	
India & Pakistan	:30 :15	Bengali Hindustani	:30 :15	
SEA and Near East	:30	English	:30	
General Far East	3:00	English	<u>3:00</u>	<u>5:15</u>
			Total	17:30



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ATTACHMENT "D"

COMMUNIST CHINA TO FAR EAST AND NEAR EAST

<u>Target</u>	<u>No. Hrs. Per Day</u>	<u>Dialect</u>
Japan	:30	Japanese
Korea	1:00	Korean
Japan and Korea	1:30	English
Japan (by Radio Free Japan)	4:00 (from China)	Japanese
Indonesia	1:00	Indonesian
Vietnam	:45	Tonkinese
Thailand	1:00	Thai
Overseas Chinese	:45	Hakka
	:45	Amoy
	:45	Cantonese
	:45	Chaochow
	:30	Mandarin
(Dictation-speed news)	6:00	Mandarin
Hong Kong and Macao (by Kwangtung Regional Service)	:30	Cantonese
Burma	1:00	Burmese
Mongolia	:30	Mongolian
Formosa	4:00 (approx.)	



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ATTACHMENT "E"

MALAYA - RELAYS OF BBC PROGRAMS VIA
BRITISH FAR EAST BROADCASTING SERVICE

	<u>Target</u>	<u>No.Hrs. Per Day</u>	<u>Language</u>
Program A:	FE, SEA	7:30	English
Program B:	Indonesia	:30	Indonesian
	Japan	:30	Japanese
	Indo-China	:15	Vietnamese
	Indo-China	:15	French
	----	3:00	Mandarin, Cantonese, Thai, Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, Bengali
Program C:	Burma	:15	Burmese
	Burma	8:00 (approx.)	English



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ATTACHMENT "F"

ALL-INDIA RADIO

<u>Target</u>	<u>Hours Per Day</u>	<u>Language</u>
Indonesia	:45	Indonesian
Indians in FE and SEA		Hindi Tamil
Burma	1:00	Burmese
Chinese	1:30	Mandarin Cantonese



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APPENDIX II

RADIO RECEIVERS

Attachment "G" is a report on radio receivers in the Far East, taken from the only sources on this subject apparently available: World-Wide Distribution of Radio Receiver Sets, Report No. A-99, October 1, 1951, and Geographical Distribution of Radio Sets and characteristics of Radio Owners, Report No. A-100, October 31, 1951 - publications of the Program Evaluation Branch, International Broadcasting Division, Department of State. A rather thorough review of USIS evaluation reports for the past year reveals information which would change this estimate only for the Philippines, where a recent survey has estimated there are at least 300,000 receivers. (Source: VOA Evaluation Summary for August 1952, #22). USIS has in fact undertaken the distribution in the past year of some 600 sets in the Philippines for group listening purposes. The U.S. Embassy in Thailand, reporting on the Overseas Chinese radio audience, estimated that the great majority of Overseas Chinese there had access to, if they did not own, a radio set. (Source: Dispatch 249, September 27, 1952 from Bangkok.) An increase in the ownership of sets in Malaya, as well as official use of rediffusion speakers, is indicated by the fact that approximately 1,600,000 pounds worth of receivers (approximately 70,000 sets) was imported into the Federation and Singapore in the past 18 months. Some of these were no doubt for export. (Source: VOA Evaluation Summary for September 1952, #23.)

The figures on radio reception indicate that in most areas of the Far East radio is still a perquisite of wealth. However, the use of rediffusion speakers, particularly by businesses and organized groups, in areas where there are privately-owned stations, and by the government in areas of government monopoly of radio, suggests that radio listening is much larger than the figures suggest and that the potential for radio in the Far East is even greater. Japan constitutes even now a radio audience of some 50 million people.

Radio reception on the Mainland is covered in the basic report to which this is attached. The most recent summary of available information on this subject appears in a draft OSI/CRR dated 2 March 1952 entitled "Foreign Radio Broadcasting Reception Potential in Communist China," which was used in preparation of the basic report.



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ATTACHMENT "G"

DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIVING SETS IN THE FAR EAST

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Total Sets</u>	<u>Total Sets Per 100 Persons</u>	<u>Receivers Equipped For Short Wave</u>	<u>% Chinese Listeners</u>	<u>Date Latest Report</u>
China	455,845,000	1,000,000	less than 1	200,000	20%	1950
Formosa	7,648,000	80,000	1	36,000	45%	1951
Hong Kong	2,060,000	100,700	5	50,000	95%	1951
Indo China	27,460,000	43,000	less than 1	39,000	95%	1950
Japan	84,000,000	9,519,500	11	223,200	2%	1951
Malaya	6,245,000	104,900	2	82,000	100%	1950
India	356,892,000	574,200	less than 1	516,800	90%	1950
Pakistan	75,687,000	70,500	less than 1	56,800	81%	1951
Ceylon	7,639,000	40,100	1	36,400	91%	1951
Burma	18,489,000	25,000	less than 1	25,000	100%	1951
Indonesia	72,000,000	150,000	less than 1	150,000	100%	1951
S. Korea	20,189,000	184,000	1	2,000	1%	1950
N. Korea	9,102,000	100,000	1	unknown	unknown	1948
Philippines	19,707,000	160,000	1	152,100	95%	1950
Thailand	18,480,000	69,900	less than 1	48,900	70%	1951
Total	1,141,443,000	12,221,800		1,618,500		

Source: Worldwide Distribution of Radio Receiver Sets, Report No.A-99, October 1, 1951, and Geographical Distribution of Radio Sets and Characteristics of Radio Owners, Report No.A-100, October 31, 1951 - Program Evaluation Branch, International Broadcasting Division, U.S. Department of State.



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APPENDIX III

LOCAL RADIO

Broadcasting facilities in each country of the Far East are described below:

Thailand

There are two stations, both government-owned, one run by the Publicity Department of the government, one by the Post and Telegraph Department. They censor scripts and refuse to permit outright anti-Communist propaganda but have been cooperative with USIS with respect to the utilization of other materials. From December 1, 1951 to May 31, 1952 USIS placed 21 productions - 7 hours of broadcast time - per month on these stations. Three were hour-long programs based on American history and literature. Others included discussions, interviews, question and answer programs, and news.

In November 1952 the Thai stations inaugurated 1-1/2 hours of Chinese programs per week, for which USIS may have been responsible. (Sources: USIE Semi-annual Evaluation Report for December 1, 1951 - June 30, 1952, FBIS Station and Program Notes, 4 March 1953, "D. 861 June 30, 1952 from Bangkok.")

Hong Kong

There are two local stations, the privately-owned Radio Rediffusion and the BBC-affiliate, Radio Hong Kong. Each broadcasts to an audience of approximately 500,000 (assuming ten listeners per set), Radio Rediffusion by a system of wired speakers in homes and businesses, Radio Hong Kong by medium wave. The audience of both is about 92% Chinese. (Source: D. 878 of _____, 1952 from Hong Kong: "VOA and the Overseas Chinese Radio Audience in Hong Kong.")

In the last six months of 1951 USIS in Hong Kong secured 330 hours of broadcasting time on Radio Rediffusion and 346 hours in the first six months of 1952. In the same period the number of hours of USIS material broadcast over Radio Hong Kong, was only 12-1/2 and 14. Although both radios continue to solicit USIS programs, British policy in Hong Kong has affected this outlet as it has affected all psychological warfare activities there. VOA is not permitted to broadcast news over Radio Hong Kong, which carries only BBC news. (Source: D.1717 February 18, 1952 from Hong Kong - USIE Semi-annual Evaluation Report.)

Philippines

The Philippines have four broadcasting systems covering the Manila-Luzon area, one government-owned. In addition they have several provincial stations and systems. Many of the stations are university-owned and many have primarily a religious content. Among these is the Far East Broadcasting Company, American-owned Christian station, which broadcasts not only to the Philippines but worldwide.

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The USIS in the Philippines originates or rebroadcasts on local stations an average of 90 broadcasting hours per month and between June 1 and November 30, 1952 placed 452 broadcasting hours of VOA transcriptions on Philippine stations. Approximately 10 hours a month of VOA Chinese transcriptions or scripts have also been played. USIS has begun to place its productions with provincial stations as well as with those located in Manila. (Sources: D. 738 January 9, 1953 from Manila - Semi-annual Evaluation Report, June 1 - November 30, 1952, FBI's "Broadcasting Stations of the World" dated 1 September 1952.)

Japan

Japan broadcasting stations serve approximately 50 million listeners by medium wave. The government-owned radio system, the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan (NHK), a public corporation supported by listening fees, has two national networks of 133 stations. Also, 17 private, commercial stations are now in operation in 15 principal cities. USIS placed about 65 hours of packaged programs produced in Japan or by VOA on these stations in the last six months of 1952 (amounting to about 2,000 station hours). In addition, the stations rebroadcast by medium wave about 25 hours of VOA short-wave broadcasts. USIS indicates, however, that the potential for local broadcasting exceeds the results to date and that USIS has been held back only by lack of studio facilities and personnel. In support of this the USIS reporting officer cites the expansion of one station's programming plans when it became aware of the availability of VOA material. CFA's own initial success with Japanese radio would confirm USIS's view. (Source: D. 1343 of 23 January 1953 from Tokyo - USIS Semi-annual Evaluation Report.)

Indonesia

The Indonesian radio system is government-owned. USIS has been able to place only music - and that unattributed - on this system. Radio Indonesia has, however (a matter of possible interest to CFA) requested that USIS arrange for exchange programs with stations in the U.S. USIS has felt this outside of its charter. There are, incidentally, apparently no Chinese programs on the Indonesian radio. (Source: D. 816 of July 18, 1952 from Djakarta - USIS Semi-annual Evaluation Report.)

Burma

The Burmese radio is also government-owned and controlled. The only other radio in Burma is the Karen insurgent radio, Radio Kawthulay. The government radio here also appears to carry no Chinese programs. During the last five months of 1952 USIS placed 12 programs of 15 minutes each on the Burma Broadcasting Service, over and above music transcriptions. USIS was only recently equipped, however, with facilities for local recordings. (Source: D. 846, December 17, 1952 from Rangoon - USIS Semi-annual Report for period ending November 30, 1952.)



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Malaya

The government-owned "Radio Malaya" has three networks, "Red," "Blue," and "Green," the first two concentrating on English and Malayan, the last on Chinese programs. The Green Network carries programs daily in the following dialects - Hakka, Cantonese, Mandarin, Foochow, Amoy, Hainan, and Teochew. (Source: FBI's Program Schedule of Foreign Broadcasting Stations January 15, 1953.)

We have no reports at hand concerning the ability of USIS to place programs on Radio Malaya. CFA's recording of the Tokyo Buddhist Conference was, however, carried over Radio Malaya and well received.

Pakistan

Radio Pakistan is government-controlled. Although USIS has placed only six hours of non-music programs on Radio Pakistan, this does not indicate lack of cooperation from Pakistan authorities. The most recent evaluation of USIS activities in Pakistan states that the Embassy has received approval from the Controller of Broadcasting for a cooperative program of radio shows. The Controller specifically indicated that such assistance was desirable in order to counteract Communism in Pakistan. He agreed to give the Embassy as much cooperation as possible, including supplying announcers for the programs. (Source: D. 647 of January 6, 1953 from Karachi - Submission of USIS, Pakistan, Semi-annual Evaluation Report.)

India

Indian radio is also government-controlled. Although All-India Radio has used VOA music transcriptions freely, it declines to broadcast American "spoken work" programs. There was some indication a year ago that this rule might be relaxed in favor of non-political cultural and educational programs, but we have no recent report at hand confirming this development. (Source: D. 2441 of April 2, 1952 from New Delhi - USIS Semi-annual Evaluation Report, June 1 - November 30, 1951.)



Ceylon

The government also controls the radio in Ceylon. It is not clear whether the government utilizes USIS programs on its home services but it does relay some VOA broadcasts in Hindi and Urdu. (Source: D. 342 December 11, 1952 from Colombo - USIS Semi-annual Evaluation Report.)

Formosa

Formosa has a major government-controlled radio system and several ostensibly commercial stations which, it can be assumed, are in fact government-controlled.

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APPENDIX III

4.

USIS has no difficulty placing programs on the Formosan radio although they emphasize "Americana" rather than anti-Communist material, of which there is enough already. (Source: D. 13 July 12, 1952 - USIS Semi-annual Evaluation Report for January 1 - May 31, 1952.)

Indo-China and Korea

These two "war" areas are omitted from this report.

CONCLUSIONS

USIS experience to date, confirmed by local CFA reports, indicates that there are many opportunities for CFA to work with and influence local radio.



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APPENDIX IV

"Report of Fourth Annual Public Affairs Conference for Southeast Asia, held in Rangoon, November 10-14, 1952"

Excerpt from D. 455 of December 2, 1952 from Amemb Rangoon - PAO Conference

"There followed some discussion of VOA. Discussion brought out the view that there should be more local production of radio programs, both for local broadcast and for sending to VOA to be broadcast from New York. Most field officers agreed that by far the best means for reaching local populations through radio is standard wave broadcasts. At present, the short-wave broadcasts are not being heard by enough people because of the shortage of short-wave receivers, and the Manila medium-wave relay was not covering the area adequately. It was further brought out that if funds could be made available for increased local production in the local language, this would in effect be a form of subsidy or help to local radio stations now in the countries which are struggling with building their audiences and are trying to improve the content of their programs. Moreover, as cooperation with the small stations grows, USIS could influence their output more. Regional tailoring of the local programs could also take into account differences in attitudes and targets within the country, and would permit closer aiming at specific targets. It was also pointed out that many groups want to listen only to entertainment, and that this is a very expensive operation when done by short wave, and is relatively expensive when done in New York for some Far Eastern country. Much more would be accomplished if USIS would help furnish on long-wave, privately-owned stations, entertainment with a propaganda twist.

"There was some discussion of arranging travel and rotation of local nationals. ... It was pointed out that after remaining in the U.S. for some years, most aliens lose their contact with the idiom and accents of their own language... It was affirmed that many inaccurate phrases were still being used by VOA, including some which gave connotations wholly undesirable from the viewpoint of our objectives."



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