

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ~~SECRET~~
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Air Pouch

2003

HUL-A-190

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9 March 1954

LINCOLN

Operational

Political Situation in El Salvador

1. Reference is made to the divergence of views on whether the government of El Salvador would permit black flights, etc., on its territory in support of CALLIGERIS.
2. Your detailed analysis of the local political situation with regard to this problem is requested. It is realized that you obviously cannot discuss the specific issue whether the government would permit black flights with anyone, either in the government or in the Embassy, and you of course will not do so. However, from your appraisal of the views and general practices of Osorio, his personal staff, the leading government figures and of general public opinion, you should be able to furnish a useful appraisal. The following questions may guide you in making this appraisal:
 - a. Is Osorio's anti-Communist policy purely defensive, or does he feel that unless the Communist menace on his west is removed, it will ultimately unsaddle him?
 - b. Is Osorio's internal position such that he could undertake a vigorous foreign policy, or do internal considerations compel him to bide his time against Guatemala?
 - c. What is Osorio's feeling about CALLIGERIS? Does he have other Guatemalan favorites?
 - d. What leading Salvadorans are influential with Osorio on the above issues, and in what directions do they tend?
 - e. Specifically, what is the present influence of Colonel Bolanos?

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3. Based on the above, what political or KUGWON actions do you recommend to strengthen Osorio's willingness to help CALLIGERIS, if he is willing, or to make him willing to help if he is not so now? For example, would it be useful for the press to set up an even greater clamor about the danger from Guatemala? Would it be useful for the press to accuse the government, by implication, of neglecting that danger? Is such press pressure feasible?



4. It is understood that these questions are to be answered on the basis of your present knowledge and that neither Embassy nor Salvadoran views are to be specifically solicited. Security hazards are too great. Nor, of course, is any KUGOWN action to be initiated on this issue.

5. LINCOLN will review your comments most carefully and keep you advised. The importance of this matter is apparent. Please submit your comments by earliest possible pouch.

JEROME C. DUNBAR

JCD/JTN/eaf
9 March 1954

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