

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. HGG-A-337

VIA: AIR

SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH

DATE: AUG 5 1953

FROM : Chief of Station, Guatemala

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operating

SPECIFIC - KUFIRE-KUGOWN Operating Conditions

Reference: HGG-W-227

1. Attached is a memorandum entitled as above which we hope will give Headquarters an understanding of our problems. We welcome any suggestions and would appreciate Headquarters views on proposals made therein.
2. Wherein we mention the various personnel and activities we have not made reference to Eliot P. RAZMARA because we know nothing of his activities, he never having reported to this station although he was sent out on a project where in he would be under the supervision of this station. (See HGG-A-333).

Vincent E. Ogden

1 August 1953

Enclosures:

Memo as described above (in trip)

WEO/cmh

Distribution:

3-Wash w/att (in trip)

1-Files w/att

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: RUFOUR-RUFIRE Operating Conditions

A. Communications

A principal need of this station is a sufficiently rapid means of communication to other [] stations, particularly those in [] except in the case of [] with which station we have lateral pouch traffic, all communications, both pouch and cable, are transmitted via Headquarters. Communications to those stations via Headquarters are in general satisfactory for routine matters. Our principal need is for lateral pouch communications to other stations in other than routine matters. This is brought about by the fact that we need to have other stations receive via pouch RUFOUR and operational material in sufficient time to be operationally useful. If a story breaks in this country which can be exploited by re-publication or through other outlets in controlled, or even uncontrolled outlets in other countries, the material would be out of date and of no further value if it must go via Headquarters. The present procedure inevitably results in delay. In order to meet this problem and effect a change in procedures which would afford us to have lateral pouch communications to other stations and thus overcome the local chief of ODACID's original objection to such communications, we call to the attention of Headquarters the following:

On 16 February 1953 (see SCURT 770) we called Headquarters' attention to the fact that since the issuance of WH Field Notice (actually it should have been a WH Field Memorandum) 26-52 on 7 November 1952 several WHD stations had not complied and had directed lateral communications to this station. We stated that we had discussed the matter with the local chief of ODACID and that we felt the original requirement of no lateral communications should be observed except in those cases when the information (intelligence or operational) was of such importance and urgency that in the opinion of the Chiefs of Station it should be transmitted promptly and observance of the general policy (original requirement) would delay its receipt to an extent that its usefulness would be impaired and/or a cable would be advisable. It was stated in that message that the same policy was to be applied to communications originating in this country and a request was made that Headquarters issue the appropriate instructions soonest. In reply by cable, Headquarters stated, on 24 February 1953, that Headquarters was re-affirming Field Notice 4-52 to all stations and that specific non-compliances should be reported to Headquarters. This was done by WH Field Memorandum 18-53, dated 25 February 1953. Neither that Field Memorandum nor the cable of 24 February acknowledged in any way our recommendation that lateral communications be authorized in other than routine circumstances.

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We were at a loss to understand Headquarters actions after making such recommendation, and on 25 February, after receipt of the cable of 24 February referred to above, we sent dispatch HGG-A-178 which pointed out that it appeared that "Headquarters was not in agreement with the proposal to have lateral communications to and from the Guatemala station and other MID stations." In HGG-A-178 we restated our view that we felt that we should have lateral communications under the indicated circumstances. We stated that if our interpretation of the cable of 24 February 1953 was correct, i.e., that Headquarters was not in agreement, Headquarters was requested to reconsider and issue a new WH Field Memorandum couched in language which would meet the principle stated in our cable, SOCAT 770. It can be seen from the preceding that we recommended lateral communications, that Headquarters gave no indication of accepting our recommendation, that not being satisfied we requested a reconsideration (25 February 1953) and as yet we have not had an acknowledgement of our dispatch. We felt that we had taken all appropriate action. We continued to comply with instruction in Headquarters' cable of 24 February 1953 (DIR 42257, See HGG-A-193, HGG-A-194), and Headquarters in HGG-W-146 stated that it was believed the situation had been corrected, however if further violations occurred, Headquarters desired to be notified.

2. On 28 April 1953 (See DIR 02075) Headquarters directed that this station clip certain press articles and send them to [] including [] That message also stated that at this station saw any articles which backed up DIR 49902, this station would clip, photograph or ditto and send them to [] stations. There was no specific direction in DIR 02075 that such material should be sent via lateral pouch, but recognizing that the longer the delay the less useful the material would be, it was decided that it should be sent by lateral pouch. That was done. Our actions apparently resulted in [] to Headquarters with a copy to Guatemala, (obviously the communication referred to in paragraph 6 of HGG-W-227, dated 1 July 1953), desiring to know whether WH Field Notice 4-52, dated 28 January 1952, and WH Field Memorandum 18-53, dated 25 February 1953, had been rescinded.

With reference to paragraph 6 of HGG-W-227, dated 1 July 1953, requesting that Headquarters be advised as to our current situation regarding communications and inquiring as to whether we feel that "the former restrictions should or could now be eliminated, if they have not been," the preceding review of the situation gives Headquarters our position with regard to communications. We request that Headquarters issue the appropriate instruction to all field stations that:

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- a) Routine pouch material will continue to be sent to and from Guatemala via Washington.
 - b) If in the opinion of the Chief of Station (Guatemala or any other MID station) the material to be transmitted (intelligence or operational, HUSCON or INSURE) is of such importance and urgency that it should be transmitted promptly and the forwarding thereof via Headquarters would delay its receipt to an extent that its usefulness would be impaired and/or a cable would be advisable, the material should be sent via lateral pouch.

The new WH Field Memorandum should, nevertheless, reiterate the instruction contained in paragraph 4 of WH Field Notice 4-52.

3. It is fully appreciated that Headquarters probably will not see the logic of having two systems of communication to and from this station. Frankly, we don't either, but we used the acts of other MID stations, that is, their forwarding of lateral communications to this station, which acts were not in compliance with WH Field Notice 4-52, as a means of getting a "foot in the door," and we were successful in arguing the local chief of ODACID out of his previous position of no lateral communications. Now our Chiefs of Station should be in a position to interpret the policy as liberally as they like. At the same time, we are in a position to counter any possible complaints on the part of the local chief of ODACID, who, we are satisfied, will not agree to complete reversal of his policy.

4. Aside from the previous which relates to courier pouch material, we desire to make the following observations regarding communications:

Guatemala is a special case because of the extensive infiltration of Communist influence in the government. It is obvious that all possible efforts to counteract this situation and shore up the problem should be made; that successful counteraction of Communism in Guatemala will have the effect of diminishing the Communist influence in other countries, particularly in Central America. Present regulations prohibit the use of any channel of communications excepting the courier pouch and cables. The use of cables in most instances is prohibitive for most HUSCON material, because of the expense involved (both personnel time and costs of transmission) which is too great and the material, if usable by most outlet media, must be in its original printed form. It must also be timely. It is seldom that usable newspaper clippings can be forwarded by courier pouch and be received in time for effective exploitation. For example, there are only two courier pouches each week from this station and both are in a northbound direction. Lateral pouches go to [] and then northward to [] countries. By the time material could

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arrive in [] countries, it would no longer be timely. Then if we consider the time involved in the receiving station in getting the material to an outlet and the outlet's preparation of the propaganda item, the item, in most instances, will be looked upon by the public as history.

As we see it, the following would be a satisfactory way of overcoming this problem:

1. Each station [] would subscribe to each of the principal Guatemalan independent papers with copies to be sent daily by air. These subscriptions could be in the name of the local Embassy employee at each post with the post office box address used by each Embassy. In fact, it could be readily admitted by each Embassy that the copies were being received but the indicated method would avoid attracting the attention of Guatemalan postal authorities to the identity of the actual recipient. If this method were not considered satisfactory by each Embassy, it might be possible to arrange for subscription through cut-outs. The newspapers to which we would recommend subscription are El Imparcial, Libre and La Hora. Each station would receive the papers daily.
2. This station, upon noting particular items which contain material suitable for exploitation could be called to the attention of the respective station items of such nature or suggest that those stations be on the alert for items in those papers relating to a particular subject or theme. We could also furnish "fill-in" material which would no doubt make the articles more interesting, aggressive and effective.
3. After a period of time, when the system has been tried to determine its practicality, we could extend the plan to cover the official Diario de Centro America and semi-official Nuestro Diario. Material in those papers, of course, would be of the type which could be used as basis for criticism showing the line that the government, through them, is following.

Of course the success of such a program would be dependent on the receiving stations' abilities to cause publication and we would have to be in possession of information as to whether each station has outlets which could be used; otherwise, our cables calling attention to particular items, suggestions or themes would be a waste of money, time and effort.

It is urged that Headquarters obtain the views of the [] stations and advise this station after determining whether such a plan would be feasible and if so, as it relates to each of the stations. If it appears feasible, even as to one station, Headquarters could then issue instructions for its implementation.

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Cover and Personnel

The document known as Stoso 1 provides in paragraph 9(b) that our clandestine operations will be conducted in a manner carefully designed to avoid any unfavorable reflection on ODACID establishments; (KUBARK) representatives under (ODACID) cover will not personally involve themselves in any clandestine operations from an (ODACID) post which might reflect unfavorably upon that post or upon any (ODACID) establishment. The principal ODACID officer impressed that principle upon me many times after my arrival, and I will not be exaggerating when I say that for the entire first year of my assignment here I never had a private conversation with him in his office that I didn't receive a lecture on security. Frequently his lectures lasted as much as thirty minutes beyond the time required to complete the business at hand. Since that time he seldom mentions the subject of security, although I am fully confident that it is a matter ever present in his mind.

We frequently discuss the current situation in Guatemala, and very frankly I have yet to leave a conversation with him having a sufficiently clear idea of what he said to afford me to feel that I could accurately dictate a memorandum of conversation. He consistently talks in vague generalities and with innuendos and insinuations which leave me (and I am sure the majority of his officers) completely confused. Attempts to pin him down to a yes or no answer show that this is practically impossible. Some would say that it is the sign of a good officer. Perhaps so when the occasion requires, but not so when it involves guidance to his officers whom he must trust to accomplish a mission.

For more than a year he was insistent in the view that I should not take into my confidence the Military and Air Attaches, but after impressing upon him that the morale of those officers was not good, that I was confident they were not fooled in any way as to my true identity and after receipt of a cable instruction from Headquarters that I should contact the Air Attache on a specific matter involving operations, I did reveal my identity to the Air Attache and subsequently so advised the chief ODACID officer. He expressed his approval of the action taken by me. I then told him that I intended to reveal my identity to the Army Attache unless he objected. He said he did not object; that it was up to me to do so if I desired. I told him I did so desire and I would. I did.

It is of course recognized by Headquarters that operating in Guatemala is a delicate matter. We have much to lose by compromise of any personnel. The principal theme of the government is "foreign intervention", and we can be certain that any evidence obtained will be exploited to the fullest. Obviously good sources cannot be developed without taking some risks. My cover is sufficiently established to afford taking the risk of directly developing

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indigenous agents, and I expect to do so although I am fully aware that the chief of ODACID would not be in agreement. He has many times stated that I should not have contact with indigenous agents, and in deference to his views I have heretofore substantially complied with his wishes. If Headquarters has any objection to my taking such risks and assuming responsibility therefor under the circumstances, I would appreciate being advised.

With reference to the security aspects of our projects, we agree that no so-called special operating security techniques such as [] and [] between agents and the station are employed. On the other hand we feel we do employ adequate security measures in making contact with so-called [] personnel. Hediger (presently) and Hunkins (prior to his departure) have both contacted me by phone with my approval when they desired to do so or at prearranged times. Under such circumstances they have been under instructions never to give their names on the phone. Naturally they had to ask for me by name. Particular phraseology has been employed by prearrangement such as: If I were invited to have a cup of coffee and I agreed, we would meet at one place. If I said no, I was tied up and couldn't make it but maybe we could get together later, he would call later. If he or I suggested that we have a hamburger, we would meet at another place. Such type of conversation is perfectly innocuous and in neither such instance would we meet in a public restaurant or eating place or have either coffee or a hamburger.

I have believed that here it was much safer for everyone concerned to employ this kind of technique, something normally done in the locality, than to attempt [] or other special operating techniques which in fact can be more dangerous. I do have direct contact with so-called [] personnel but these contacts are under circumstances which are explainable to anyone, government official or other, who might become knowledgeable of the association. Every effort, however, is made to keep such contacts to a minimum and private without at the same time making an appearance of being secretive.

There have been no reports on surveillances of ODACID or station personnel with the exception of HEDIGER, and we are not certain that surveillances of him are taking place. He has been suspicious on several occasions that such was the case. On one occasion he literally chewed and swallowed one of his reports in apprehension of being caught with it, but was not picked up, and we are not certain that the person who appeared to be interested in his activities at the time actually was interested or had any authority to act against him. There have been unconfirmed reports on occasions that the ODACID installation entrance was under surveillance from a distance, and we consider this probably true, but we believe that such surveillances were primarily for the purpose of determining what indigenous persons were making contacts at the installation. During times of crisis in the government such as that which took place on the occasion of the Salama incident on 29 March

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1953, the Guardia Civil agents were stationed at the door of the installation and on several occasions ODACID employees were required to identify themselves, the Guardia Civil agents suspecting them of being persons whom they sought.

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We have only one [] at this time, namely Donald C. HEDIGER. For a long time HEDIGER has been engaged in the clipping of propaganda material and preparation of that material for possible KUGOWN dissemination with the approval of Headquarters. Much of his material has been forwarded to Headquarters as KMPORCEP. As of late, under the directions of the Chief of Station, he has been developing and handling new contacts for the purpose of establishing media for the outlet of black KUGOWN material and for the making of a survey of the labor situation with a view towards its penetration and establishing a means of elimination of the Communist influence in that important field. We feel that at the present time his abilities are being placed to the fullest advantage.

With reference to the question of whether the Chief of Station should be given some other cover, it is believed that to do so would inevitably result in the creation of a security hazard which would not be warranted. Under the circumstances maintaining files of KUPIRE and KUGOWN material outside the ODACID installation would be extremely hazardous. Although such material of necessity has to be taken out of the station premises on occasions for reading and discussing with covert agents, such action creates a security hazard. If we did not do so, however, our accomplishments would be much less. Although we feel that it is necessary to keep the Chief of Station in the ODACID installation, we hope and expect to make specific recommendations with regard to the assignment of personnel with particular abilities which could possibly result in our more effectively accomplishing

C. Operational Plans

with reference to paragraph 4 of HGG-W-227 wherein it is stated that a large variety of anti-Communist news is printed and presumably some of the publishers might be approached for possibilities for replacing the operation which formerly worked with HUNTERS, we agree that much anti-Communist news is printed. A major portion of that news actually originates in the ODACID installation. It is believed that the ODACID installation is doing a relatively good job on getting out its material. By reason of the fact that it originates in the ODACID installation and is disseminated more or less semi-covertly, I am inclined to feel that it does not take as aggressive a position as might be otherwise the case because of the extreme caution and reserve on the part of the chief ODACID officer who exercises every precaution to avoid being accused of meddling in local politics through propaganda means or otherwise. Nevertheless, the propaganda goes to the point in most instances and is effective with the reading public, principally of the city (the main anti-Communist strength is in Guatemala City as was evidenced by the Congressional elections of January 1953).

I feel that with the present dissemination of anti-Communist material which relates to the international Communist movement, there is little to be gained, from an over-all point of view, by our getting into that field. What we need, of course, is more local exposure of Communism, although getting such exposure in local papers is an extremely difficult task. I feel that local independent newspapers which take the anti-Communist position are doing about as much as they feel they can do without running into serious difficulties with the government. In that connection it is suggested that Headquarters obtain a copy of ODACID despatch, dated 15 May 1947, entitled "Legislation on Press and Radio Activities in Guatemala," to which there was attached a translation of Decree #372 entitled "Ley de Emision del Pensamiento por Medio de Difusion." If a careful study of that law is made, I believe Headquarters will be convinced that it is one of the major causes of the growth of Communism in this country. It was stated in the referenced despatch that the law was undoubtedly rigorous and perhaps unnecessarily harsh in many of its provisions, and that practically no one supposed that it would be applied in its entirety. It was also stated that even though administered with the greatest of care to avoid any miscarriage of justice, the law remained a weapon which could be used against a newspaper or broadcasting station in statements not in accord with the government's policies. The despatch also stated that in fact the majority of the criticism of the law at that time was that it was not a law for utilization from day to day, but a club held by the government which when least expected would be most vigorously used against the offending newspaper or author.

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It should be noted that the mentioned law covers dissemination of all kinds of printed matter, that copies must be promptly submitted to government offices, that the identity of the printing shop must be shown, etc. etc. With the existence of such a law and the methods of intimidation employed by the government, it is readily understandable why persons having local capital invested in their printing establishments apparently are not willing to vigorously attack the government.

The government's longtime policy of employing Marxists, Communists and fellow travelers in its propaganda media, official and semi-official, has created the impression that to oppose Communism is to oppose the government. There appears to be no doubt that many government officers who are not in fact sympathetic to Communism as such are nevertheless opposed to anti-Communist propaganda because they believe that its primary purpose is to create difficulties for the government and eventually bring about its downfall. These very people are even more dangerous than the publicly declared Communists. With the existence of such a law in Guatemala and the intimidation techniques of the government, it appears most unlikely that any local newspapers will step vigorously into the field of attacking the moral character of government officials, Communists and non-Communists, fellow travelers on planes such as graft and exposure of their personal lives. Such press tactics are illegal under the mentioned law. If any local paper were induced to undertake such propaganda tactics I have no doubt that sufficient guarantees would have to be taken to insure such people against loss. I am very doubtful that even if a full guarantee were given to a publisher against loss by reason of such activities, even then it would be unlikely that the publisher would be willing to undertake such a program because of the personal hazard resulting from the gangster-like tactics employed by the government.

We are endeavoring to develop outlets for exposure material and it is our intention to feed the outlet as much material as possible of an exposure nature, but no assurances can be given that even if such an outlet is developed it will result in the kind of effects which Headquarters would expect under American type laws relating to libel and slander.

It therefore appears that from a propaganda point of view our principal means of curbing the development of Communism as it relates to this country is to employ exposure tactics in the other American republics, tighten the curtain around this country and employ economic warfare tactics. This country can be used as the whipping boy to stir up more anti-Communist feeling in other Latin countries, particularly those of Central America. Central Americans in general by nature are jealous of Guatemala as all of Latin America is jealous of the United States. To propaganda-wise expose developments in Guatemala and to increase the problems of the

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country in the economic sphere will, in my opinion, eventually arouse sufficient elements in the army to such an extent that they will move to correct the situation. Economic warfare tactics must, of course, be very cautiously and discreetly applied until the situation reaches a point where it is reasonably certain that a major move in the economic field will bring about the downfall of the government.

With the present operating handicaps of this station as outlined in this memorandum and the present number of personnel assigned, it appears obvious to me that we will not gain substantial ground in the propaganda field without the assignment of additional personnel and the employment of streamlined tactics as recommended in the section of this memorandum relating to communications. With reference to the matter of additional personnel, we need additional personnel principally to do research work on our files and glean from them exposure material which can be disseminated in other countries. It is necessary that [

] have good outlets for the material and that we have sufficient and able personnel to get the material to those stations and subsequently to the outlets. It is impossible for the present personnel of this station to do the necessary research work. The assignment of additional personnel to this station under ODACID cover will probably not be agreeable to ODACID. It may be possible, however, to devise some means of having additional personnel spend as much as three months on occasions in this country not specifically assigned to the ODACID installation but having ODACID cover, and spending part of their time traveling to other Central American and neighboring countries. It is thought that for temporary periods, as much as three months, such persons might stay in this country and have access to ODACID and our files and do the necessary research to gather useful material, supplemented by that which we may be able to obtain from sources to fill in the desired picture. While in the other countries they could gain knowledge as to the possible types of material which could be used and identities of available outlets and could subsequently prepare their material in a manner especially suitable for the outlet for which the material would be intended.

These persons should, I think, be three in number, should be experienced in political and psychological warfare, particularly in the press field, and should be good research men. It probably would not be advisable to have them based in any particular country with their families because of personal problems arising in their being away from their families much of the time and the usual inconveniences of living in these countries on a temporary basis. If they are not permanently based at some ODACID installation, they, of course, could not spend sufficient time in the area to have their wives and/or families accompany them. At the same time, they could tell plausible stories to the persons with whom they would come in contact.

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We, of course, could not have such personnel examine files in the ODACID installation without the knowledge of the local chief of ODACID and without his approval. I would appreciate Headquarters reaction to my proposal that I discuss the matter with him to see if he would be agreeable to undertaking such a method of operation. Obviously ODACID headquarters will not approve such a proposal without consulting him.

With reference to paragraph 7 of HGG-W-227, we realize that we have not been punctual fairly frequently in complying with requests from Headquarters for particular information. We nevertheless feel that we have done our best under the circumstances and within the limits of our physical abilities. All the personnel of this station are extremely interested in their work, have done the best they can and I assume responsibility for any failure on the part of this station to meet the requirements of headquarters.

With reference to the statement that neither ODACID nor the station has any contacts in labor and rely entirely on the press for all labor information, you are advised that one ODACID employee has a principal assignment of following and reporting the information concerning the labor movement and, of course, his principal source is the press and local American officials and businessmen who have contacts with or, by reason of their work, have knowledge of activities within labor. Insofar as is known, the mentioned ODACID official has no contact with indigenous labor leaders.

We have for some time been interested and endeavoring to develop a suitable operation to gain detailed information concerning the labor movement, and we have, since 1 July 1953, developed what we consider a source who is in a position to furnish relatively accurate information concerning the labor movement, leaders thereof, etc., and he is in the process of preparing an extensive report on the situation and recommendations as to how it may be separated from the Communist influences. The first portion of his report is some 53 pages in length and is presently being translated (See HGG-A-330). We have handled the potential development of this contact on an operational development basis and are as yet not prepared to draw up a project in the matter for approval.

With reference to paragraph 8 of HGG-W-227 wherein it is stated that another agency had commented that 1) coverage has been inadequate and below the minimum needed to evaluate this dangerous and difficult situation and 2) more information is needed on the inner workings of BGGYPSY activities and important parties and more information is needed on WSBURNT activities directed toward other countries, and that there is insufficient information on virtually all types of clandestine activities, it is desired to state that probably the viewpoint of that agency is correct. We, nevertheless, feel that with the personnel at hand and considering

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the difficult operating circumstances we have done as well as we can. We are mindful of the needs in those fields, and in view of the criticisms, which apparently are supported by Headquarters, we will step up our activities in the RUHRE field, if such is the desire of Headquarters. We would like to state, however, that if we step up our activities in that field with our present personnel, RUHRE activities will necessarily suffer. We would like to recommend that Headquarters make a survey of the indigenous agents of other stations who are identified with EGGYFSY and labor activities in their respective countries to determine if there is a possibility of arranging for such indigenous agents to come to this country for residence with a view toward participating in and gathering information concerning EGGYFSY and labor activities.

Incidentally, in connection with the over-all critique, it is desired to point out that the chief of ODACID in this country prides himself on the fact that his mission is recognized in ODACID headquarters as supplying the best reports on matters of interest to ODACID of any station in the area, and he has stated that the reporting from his mission is probably the best in all Latin America. His views in that connection were confirmed to me personally by an ODACID official who recently passed through the country. I should like to point out to Headquarters that I have always been of the view that I should work as part of a team and in cooperation with ODACID officials. I realize at the same time the necessity of getting credit for RUBARK for that work which we perform. When there is not time to perform all functions which would result in our getting credit for information we acquire, I have made such information available locally to ODACID officials and such information is included in their reports without credit to this station.

Our failure to obtain credit is based on the attitude of the chief ODACID officer that no report from this post should refer to [] as a source of information. On many occasions information has been supplied by us which has been referred to in ODACID despatches as having been received confidentially or from a confidential source without further identification. We receive requests daily from ODACID officials that we check our files to find information, and on many occasions the information contained therein is not actually set forth in an ODACID despatch but is used more or less as guidance and as data to determine whether particular statements which are proposed to be made in ODACID despatches are on the proper line.

I recognize that we get no credit for this work, but I feel that using ODACID cover we must of necessity cooperate, and that having the same over-all interests and purposes of combatting the situation in this country, it is our moral duty to do so. It is regrettable that we cannot have sufficient personnel to do everything we would like.

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