

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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~~SECRET/RYBAT/PDSUCCESS~~

24 March 1954

LINCOLN

KUGOWN

Material for Transmittal to Frances R. HEGARTY

1. Attached please find English language instructions and Spanish language materials for transmittal to Frances R. HEGARTY, according to the manner established in previous dispatches.

2. It is requested that you familiarize yourself with the attached materials.

JEROME C. DUNBAR

1 March 1954

Attachments

Distribution

2 - []
2 - Washington
3 - LINCOLN

~~SECRET/RYBAT/PDSUCCESS~~

March 23, 1954

1. We are very well pleased with the plans for the publication and the "La Voz del Ejercito" proposals. This gradual transition is very sound and should have maximum effect. The make-up plans, too, look good and we wish you all success in the endeavor. We are sending you several other military publications, from which you may get ideas and guidance for your own work.

2. We are sending this week an article entitled "The Army and the People." This article was written before we received word from you that you were preparing an article called "Youth and Army." This coincidence shows how close we are in our thinking. We would like to point out to you especially the importance of the last part of our article on "The Army and the People" and its concept of an army of public and popular service. Please discuss this concept in detail with your friends and get their reactions. We are quite certain that the old idea of an army that merely parades and shines its buttons and is a burden on the public treasury can no longer be sustained; a new army, if it is to be popular and effective, must spend its time in public works, such as disease control, road building, housing construction, etc., instead of spending all its time in garrisons. Particularly in a place like the target country, there is a "war against nature" to be won, just as much as a war against foreign enemies. Emphasize this "war against nature" concept to your friends and get them to pick it up in the form of concrete suggestions as to what kind of public works (in El Peten, in the lowland areas where malaria is prevalent, in linking up now remote areas by good communications, etc.) the Army could most fruitfully undertake. A series of concrete proposals in your publication ought to strike a very responsive public chord. We repeat that this idea of an army of public service seems to us very important to achieve our objectives.

3. In addition to the article on "Youth and Army," we strongly recommend articles on "Labor and the Army" and "Farmers and the Army." The approximate contents of these articles could be as follows:

a. "Labor and the Army." This article should stress especially that the laborers must defend the gains they have made in their individual condition by taking part in military service or by keeping close rapport with the Army, so that they can be sure that the Army will never again serve foreign interests, inimical to the interests of labor, as the target Army seems to be doing now. What the laborers win and achieve in their own branches of industry must be protected on a national basis; it must become an impossibility that the Army, which is necessary, becomes the instrument or other foreign power which is directed against the interests of labor. In addition this article on "Labor and the Army" should stress that the laborer, in his daily life, is an individual, concerned with his family and his private welfare, whereas in the Army he learns the other part of life, namely concern with the nation and its people as a whole; both things are required in a responsible citizen. Stress also that the Army is an educational institution, which can fit the laborer to rise to a higher post in civil life. Furthermore, point out that labor, being one of the pillars of the nation, has its right and its duty to have a voice and a share in that other pillar of the nation, the Army. The article should wind up saying that the interests of progressive labor and of a patriotic army are identical, and that the present situation of both labor and the Army being prostituted to Communism is intolerable. It should urge the workers to look on the decent, anti-Communist Army officers as their friends and should urge the workers to spurn all Communist efforts to recruit them into anti-Army, paramilitary associations; on the other hand, it should urge the Army to embrace the cause of the laboring class and thereby to vitiate the Moscow-controlled creation of a paramilitary force which is against both labor and the Army.

b. "Farmers and the Army." The chief theme of this article should be that farmers and soldiers have one vital thing in common: the defense of the soil. The farmer works his own plot of land and defends it against all intruders; the Army defends the entire national soil against all intruders. Thus there is a direct connection between the two groups, a natural alliance and a natural bond. It should be said that the honorable Army has the same feeling for the soil that the good farmer does. Here some promises should be made that the future Army will do infinitely more for the technical education of its enrollees from the farms, that it will teach them agricultural methods and will, particularly, assist as a body in rural road building, disease control, aiding in the harvest where necessary, etc. To the soldiers, it could be suggested that henceforth faithful military service would be rewarded by land grants. These land grants would not be, as they are now, in the form of huge tracts to high officers, but in the form of plots of a reasonable size to the private and the non-commissioned officer. At the close of this article, as at the beginning, emphasis should be laid on the mutual allegiance of farmer and soldier to the sacred native soil.

4. For [] "we deem it very important that it begin running soon a series of articles on military heroes, first of South American countries and finally of the target country. You will recall that the Foreign Minister of the target country at Caracas invoked the name of Bolivar. In other words, he was trying to appropriate a universally admired hero as a symbol of his discredited nation. We must immediately and vigorously counteract this, and more that we must appropriate unto ourselves all the desirable heroes. The first article in this series in [] should indeed be about Bolivar and it should give an educated guess as to what Bolivar would do if he were a military man in the target country right now. The conclusion, of course, is obvious: he would rise up and free the country. The Bolivar article should, then, describe briefly what made Bolivar rebel and it should construct a very close parallel between the situation Bolivar found in his time and in his country and the situation that now exists in the target country. In other words, the issue should be so stated that the spirit and the legends of Bolivar is naturally and wholly behind our movement. This pattern should then be followed in the case of other distinguished military fighters for freedom in South America and in the target country. At the end of a period of several weeks, we have to be in the position of saying that all these great men of antiquity are behind us and that if they were in our shoes today, they would act as exactly as we propose to act. Please emphasize the importance of this "acquisition of ancestry" to your friends. It is a familiar and indispensable technique with the enemy, who has now appropriated to his Communist ends, in the Soviet Union, all the great heroes of Soviet military history, no matter how Tsarist they may have been. This "acquisition of ancestry" not only will inspire our following, but it will give an aura of legitimacy to whatever we undertake. Be sure that these articles are accompanied by good pictures and be sure that in every case a striking, even if somewhat forced, parallel is drawn between the deeds of the ancient hero and the deeds on which we are about to embark. The choice of the heroes, of course, should be strictly in the field of those who were liberators and it should not include men who were distinguished by their sheer military prowess or by their military feats on the behalf of reaction. These articles should not be scholarly at all, but they should refer to well-known facts in the lives of the heroes. Please pay particular attention to the selection of stirring quotations and exhortations from the heroes, quotations that can be applied to the present situation. Where these heroes had failures later in life, gloss over those; dwell only on the victorious highlights of their careers.

March 23, 1954

1. As you know, the Communists make very effective use of the device of "Reinsurance." They approach businessmen and warn them that, unless they make precautionary payments to Communist Party coffers, the Party, when it gets into full power, will probably deal very harshly with them. On the other hand, so say the Communists, if the businessmen do contribute to the Communist Party or buy ads in Communist newspapers and the like, these same businessmen might be able to retain both their property and their influence under the Communist regime. This device of reinsurance of course goes much further than mere businessmen. At the end of the war in Europe, it was a familiar experience for people to produce real or phony evidence that they had never been Nazi collaborators or Nazis. Many people had carefully accumulated or manufactured such evidence before the defeat of Nazi Germany.

2. We now propose to apply this principle in our work. Specifically, what we suggest is that both your publication and the radio program write scripts and articles suggesting to the target audience that a day of retribution may come in the future and that it would be a good thing, as a precaution against that day, for them to be on record that they were never Communist or pro-Communist. The article and the radio script should then urge the people to write letters to a postal box that you set up in your area; these letters would state that the sender, a target national, was never pro-Communist. The article or the radio broadcast should instruct the people to sign these letters in a fictitious name and to keep a carbon copy or an exact hand-written duplicate of the letter at home. When the day of retribution comes, these people will be able to produce the carbon or other copy of the letter they mail to your postal box and will thus be able to prove that they had given early evidence of their opposition to Communism.

3. To implement this it is recommended that you actually set up such a postal box. We cannot tell how many letters will actually be written or how many will get through the target country's censorship. In any event, if you do receive real letters then the program should broadcast the names (the aliases, that is,) used in the letters. Even if no letters are received, subsequent broadcasts, after perhaps an interval of ten days, should broadcast some fictitious aliases, as having been used in letters received.

March 22, 1954

1. One important distribution medium that we have thus far been overlooking is balloons. We understand that toy balloons are locally procurable and that hydrogen to inflate the balloons is also available in your area. It strikes us as a rather natural assignment for some of the young bloods in your organization to buy balloons in sufficient quantity and enough hydrogen to inflate them, and then to proceed to the border to launch them against the target area when the wind is right.

2. As attachments to the balloons we suggest three types of materials:

a. Printed propaganda leaflets, small enough in size so that one balloon could carry from 12 to 25 of them. These leaflets should be printed on very thin paper.

b. Glass beads or totems that will be appealing to the Indians. These could serve a double purpose if they could be shaped like a simple liberation symbol.

c. For a larger size balloon, it would be highly desirable to attach square or rectangular white pieces of cloth, with an inscription approximately as follows: "Keep for your safety!...I was never pro-Communist!.. I surrender...Keep for the emergency." These squares of cheap cotton cloth could presumably have the legend stamped on them with a rubber stamp or put on with a simple stencil and paint.

3. We attach especial importance to the distribution of the white cloths of surrender. These could have a considerably demoralizing effect on the pro-Communist finders of them.

4. Please advise whether there are available in your area the technical facilities to carry out this program. If not, we will endeavor to supply the necessary materials.

5. The comments of your friends on this general proposal will be much appreciated. Please advise soonest. Do not actually begin these operations until we give the green light. The timing of the white cloth operation is especially sensitive and should be carefully studied before action.

EL EJERCITO DEL PUEBLO

Un ejército se saca del pueblo de su patria. El pueblo ofrece a sus hijos para un servicio abnegado y peligroso, de manera que el ejército es realmente una parte del pueblo mismo. Los ciudadanos tienen la obligación, de sostener al ejército, comprar su equipo y asegurar su mayor eficacia, y eso lo hacen con una parte de los impuestos que pagan. En un sentido más profundo, el ejército y el pueblo están vinculados íntimamente, el pueblo forma y sostiene al ejército, y por ello de él espera defensa y salvación en tiempos de peligro externo o interno; confía esta función al ejército para que la seguridad de una vida apacible siga guardada por una fuerza organizada y vigilante. Por estas razones, cada soldado honrrado siente y mantiene una lealtad profunda y perdurable hacia su nación y hacia sus conciudadanos.

Y desdichado el ejército que sea deficiente en esas normas de dignidad y pundonor. Hay muchos tipos de traición en que pueden caer jefes, oficiales, clases y soldados, que son diferentes a la cobardía en batalla o a la desertión frente al enemigo. El ejército que descuida su eficacia y es negligente en las normas necesarias de entrenamiento y vigilancia, es culpable de traición; el ejército cuyos oficiales y soldados buscan provecho particular, más bien que servicio público, es culpable de traición; el ejército que sostiene un régimen político inicuo, que respalda la tiranía y la opresión contra el pueblo, es culpable de traición a ese mismo pueblo.

El peor ejército es el que se vende al comunismo nacional o extranjero. Al hacer esto, un ejército, se alista en la lucha de una jerarquía pequeña contra el pueblo, por que un ejército al servicio del comunismo y bajo su control, se emplea en tiempos de paz como un instrumento para la esclavización del pueblo, y en tiempos de guerra como un resguardo contra la liberación del pueblo por la derrota del régimen comunista que lo esclaviza. Un ejército que se vende al comunismo, ya no es ejército, y sus miembros ya no son oficiales ni soldados. Tal ejército firma mansa y vergonzosamente su propia sentencia de muerte al rendirse al yugo de los perpetradores de la anarquía y de la disolución social - los comunistas - y abandona su función verdaderamente militar. Tal ejército se hace meramente una orda de mercenarios miserables dedicados a destruir la

seguridad pública en lugar de protegerla.

Pero aún sin venderse al comunismo, aún bajo mejores circunstancias, todos los ejércitos han tenido hasta ahora sus defectos. El ejército convencional es una organización que espera, que espera el momento extranjero. Eso quiere decir que se pasan largos años en el entrenamiento y en la preparación, contra la eventualidad de que haya que emplearlo. Inevitablemente, hay despilfarro y pérdida en este procedimiento, y los ejércitos convencionales hasta ahora no han sabido superarlo. Lo que pasa es que, para prepararse para la emergencia, los ejércitos se apartan de los procedimientos normales, apacibles y progresivos de la vida civil. Así una cantidad fija de la energía del pueblo, que se concentra en el ejército, se pierde durante largos períodos. Todo esto no desprestigia la función noble y la necesidad vital de los ejércitos, ni el honor de cualquier persona que sirva fielmente en la institución armada, sino es un hecho que nos hace considerar cómo los ejércitos, sin sacrificar su función de defensa, pueden siempre servir más eficazmente al interés popular en los dichos tiempos de paz.

Creemos que el ejército de nuestra patria puede abrir un camino para superar este problema. Primero, por supuesto, debe zafarse de la garra terrible del comunismo, y debe liberarse de los traidores que le sujetan. ~~Gauan~~ Cuando se haya hecho eso, y confiamos en que se hará, con esfuerzos unidos, nuestro ejército podrá realizar un mejor servicio al pueblo guatemalteco, único en los anales militares. Lo que queremos decir concretamente es esto: Nuestro ejército debe ser tan eficaz en los tiempos de paz, como puede serlo durante los desdichados días de guerra. En lugar de esperar la emergencia, nuestro ejército debe alistarse en las grandes batallas contra las fuerzas ciegas de la naturaleza que hay que librar en nuestra patria. Específicamente, los cuerpos de Sanidad y de Ingenieros de nuestro ejército deben agrandarse de manera que nuestros soldados, mientras reciben experiencia amplia para el combate, puedan simultáneamente servir al pueblo que tenga necesidad de atención médica y necesidad de caminos, edificios, puentes, y muchas cosas más. El ejército, en tiempos de paz, sin descuidar su pericia militar, debe trabajar lado a lado con el obrero de nuestra patria y debe ayudarlo en sus esfuerzos por despejar los bosques, traer mercancía al mercado, luchar contra enfermedades, combatir el analfabetismo. etc. Queremos un ejército que tenga utilidad civil así como militar sin

menoscabo de ninguna de ambas funciones. Para Guatemala, queremos y lograremos un ejército de paz, un ejército que esté verdaderamente siempre con el pueblo; con el pueblo en la paz, y con él en la guerra.

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EL COMUNISMO EN EL EJERCITO.

Ya hemos recibido prueba final e innegable de que los jefes del ejército guatemalteco son comunistas. No se sabe cuan extenso sea su entrenamiento en lo ideológico, pero claro está que su entrenamiento en la práctica está bien adelantado. Como todo el mundo sabe, uno de los credos básicos del comunismo es el amor libre o la repartición de mujeres. Este principio, por lo menos, ha sido aceptado a fondo como regla de conducta por algunos jefes del ejército guatemalteco. Al seguir esta regla comunista, los jefes del ejército guatemalteco lo han hecho con toda la destreza militar.

El mejor ejemplo de esto se presentó hace poco tiempo en las fuerzas armadas de Guatemala. De conformidad con su papel de líder, el Coronel Carlos Enrique Díaz, Jefe de las Fuerzas armadas, dió ejemplo al ejército. Primero, planeó con cuidado su campaña. Luego hizo un reconocimiento táctico de las fuerzas y de las debilidades de la vida del Coronel Luis A. Girón, Jefe de la Fuerza Aérea, y, encontrando la situación propicia a un ataque, proyectó su asalto. Después de la preparación obligatoria de la artillería; caricias y alcohol, el Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas ganó la batalla y la Sra. de Girón se entregó. Esta batalla fué librada en la cama conyugal de la casa del Coronel Girón. Así el Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas dió un reto agitado al resto de sus hombres.

Se debe notar que hasta en esto los Jefes militares de Guatemala observaron un respeto fino para la cadena de autoridad. Como se sabe igualmente bien, el ministro de la Defensa, Coronel José Angel Sanchez, antecedió a su subordinado, el coronel Díaz, en el mismo campo de batalla. En estos asuntos, se debe pagar omenaje también a la Sra. de Girón por haber comprendido tan a fondo los principios comunistas y haberse puesto tan francamente a la disposición de las Fuerzas Armadas.

Parece, si embargo, que la instrucción de los jefes militares a kis de gradi inferior sigue algo inadecuada. Se informa que durante la batalla de la Casa Girón, planeada tan brillantemente y llevada a cabo tan galantemente por el Coronel Díaz, el Coronel Girón llegó de repente a la escena, mientras adelantaba la batalla. Nos dicen que el Coronel Girón aún no suficientemente versado en la doctrina comunista, se opuso al plan de campaña de su jefe y obligó al Coronel Díaz a que sediera.

ejecutó una retirada extremadamente rápida y bien concebida, probandose así maestro de la defensa tan bueno, como de la ofensa. En su ignorancia, el Coronel Girón hizo tres disparos sobre Díaz, cuando éste se iba, mostrando así la necesidad de más instrucción política.

Esta instrucción se administró al Coronel Girón en forma de arresto durante treinta días. Durante este período, el Ministro de la Defensa y el Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas tuvieron ocasión amplia de dar un ejemplo sin igual a sus hombres. Hay algunos informes, sin embargo, de que el Coronel Girón todavía no está suficientemente instruido y que tal vez querrá desafiar el concepto sagrado de la doctrina comunista que permite que se comparta la esposa con los superiores. En ese caso, podemos asegurar que la "sabiduría" del Partido Comunista, triunfará sobre la ignorancia de un mero Jefe de la Fuerza Aérea.

Al tiempo que esto se escribe, no se sabe si el Presidente Aebenz se abstenga de dar ejemplo también en este campo de esfuerzo comunista. Se informa, sin embargo, que el Sr. Presidente, proyecta otorgar una condecoración especial a los Coroneles Sanchez y Díaz para recordar su valor en las batallas sucesivas de la casa Girón.