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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

~~2003~~
7 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT: Staff Study: To Improve CIA/CS Manpower Potential
Thereby Increasing Operational Capability

1. In view of your interest in the critique on the "Unconventional War" in Korea and the deficiencies of the Agency during that conflict and my remarks to you about the state of our readiness to cope with such problems; if I am not too presumptuous, perhaps you would be interested in noting the attached study on this subject.

2. This study was prepared at the request of the DD/P in order to determine from my experiences, both in Korea and PBSUCCESS, what might be done to improve the Agency's operational capabilities. When I staffed the paper for coordination, General Balmer, C/FI and C/DD/P-ADMIN concurred in the general concepts recommended. The C/PP dissented on the grounds that in any emergency we could always depend on the Armed Forces for personnel. I do not concur in the latter view and consider it very unrealistic and a failure on the part of the Agency to provide advance preparations to meet its own foreseeable requirements. In any event, this study never got off the ground.

3. I wish to reiterate how much I appreciated your kind words at the recent decoration ceremony and my pleasure in having my wife and son meet you on that occasion.

[]
SA/CWP/PPC

Attachment:
TS# 105953, copy 2

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147361

1 OF 1 COPIES

7 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Report and Staff Study

1. Thank you very much for sending these papers to me. I greatly enjoyed reading the report on "The Unconventional War in Korea", and found it most constructive in spite of the fact that the pseudonyms and cryptonyms and necessary repetition made rather heavy reading. I hope that in sanitized form, cleared of pseudonyms and cryptonyms, this valuable report is made available to various individuals and agencies interested in training for such operations.

2. I also enjoyed very much your Staff Study on how to improve CIA/CS manpower potential. Your idea is certainly an original one but I can well understand the hesitation at adopting the reserve concept.

3. Thanks again for making these paper available to me.

SIGNED

[]
General, USA (Ret)

Enclosures

- T.S. 147361 Cy #1
- T.S. 105953 Cy #2
- T.S. 146686 Cy #1 and #2 w/ attachments

AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADE TO
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

46-12-3-4 (hook) #2

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATION	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
HQ	PPC	Staff Study Reserves	C	DATE: Oct '54 through 14 Jan '59
	DDP	Personnel		CLASS: S
		PBSUCCESS		NO. 1
		Man Power		LOCATION: HS/CSG
		Cadres		2175 ✓

IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)

Staff Study ^{by} C, Subject: Staff Study re Improvement of CIA/CS Manpower Potential Thereby Increasing Operational Capability. 30 pages plus 2 annexes.

ABSTRACT

This study establishes CIA's dependence on the military services for manpower and recommends solutions to this problem. Attached to the study are drafts, transmittals and ~~annexes~~ **COMMENTS.**

14 January 1959

Tracy

In support of my comment re "ad hoc'ing" of special situations, in view of historical proof of their persistence in the past and promise of repetition in the future, I would appreciate it if you could take time to read Annex "A" and Annex "B" of the attached as a possible systematic approach to special problems on a continuing basis.

I believe Korea should have been a special task force during the war as much as PBSUCCESS was and Indonesia, Syria and others present or to come. My proposal does not impinge upon the Area Divisions but instead provides them the support and outside experience which should be appreciated. Most of all it provides for a staff component to serve DDP/COP, DD/P and in turn the DCI, in monitoring and doing the many chores involved in order to better enable higher authority to guide and decide as required.

Though I prepared this study at Frank Wisner's request in 1955, much of it remains to be implemented. Dick Bissell received a copy at the time of its submission.

Attachment: Staff Study
(TO improve CIA/CS manpower
potential thereby increasing
operational capability)

ES/CGG-2175

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WORKING PAPER

DRAFT - []
19 November 1954
X8466

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/COPS

SUBJECT: Staff Study re Improvement of CIA/CS Manpower
Potential Thereby Increasing Operational
Capability

1. Pursuant to your oral directive to [] to conduct a staff study on the above subject, attached herewith is his working paper, which has been informally coordinated with the interested staff elements.

2. In general, the study has been found acceptable in principle and considered a reasonably sound initial approach to a comparatively broad subject. The activation of the essential provisions of this study would logically involve practical alterations in detail. However, it is believed to contain sufficient guidance to constitute the basis for immediate implementation.

3. It will be noted that the pace and scope of the reserve program, although established by DDP and interpreted by COPS, calls for a gradual recruitment of personnel on an as needed basis. Expansion to the ultimate maximum would logically wait until circumstances warranted such effort. The study precluded provision for military and contract staff agent personnel on the basis that the essential problem was related primarily to Career Staff Personnel. Thus, the estimate for maximum manpower requirements for planning purposes concerns primarily Career Staff Personnel and reserves to augment this cadre. If military and contract staff agent personnel were to be included in order to visualize the over-all require-

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ment for U. S. personnel, it is estimated that 5,000 should be added, giving a grand total of 20,000 for the full strength of the Clandestine Services.

4. The proposed establishment of a Combined Operation Staff has been fully endorsed for future operations of a highly specialized nature as it provides for the integration of the three basic functions essential to such operations; namely, FI, PP and Support or Administration. The placement in the office of DDP/COPS, while not a physical consideration, as its location could be in any of CIA's buildings, presents a logical solution on the basis of the highly sensitive nature of its activities and the need for status in order to fulfill its responsibilities in respect to the Senior Staffs and Area Divisions. The operational nature of this Staff places it outside the character of PPC and is therefore not recommended as a function of PPC on the premise that to be most effective, plans and policy programming should remain apart from actual operations. It is, however, strongly recommended that the Combined Operations Staff be constituted as proposed in the Study and be assigned to no one Senior Staff element in order to ensure its effectiveness in achieving a close integration of all the functions and services which would be vital to its contribution to the Clandestine Services. Considerable thought has been given to the wartime need for a central, combined operations staff and the establishment of such a small staff as envisioned above would be a definite stride in the direction of acquiring experience and guidance for such an eventuality.

5. Upon coordination of the Study with DDP/Admin and the Deputy Chief, Plans and Analysis, Office of Personnel, it became apparent that

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CIA would ultimately establish a reserve personnel section within AD/P to service the entire Agency as a central point of administrative control. Therefore, in the interim, DDP/Admin has suggested that the functions of the CS Reserve Section, as defined in the Study, become the temporary responsibility of the Administrative Officer assigned to the Combined Operations Staff until such time as they may be transferred to the appropriate section established by AD/P.

6. In consideration of the foregoing comments, it is my recommendation that the general concepts and basic principles involved in this Study be approved for activation with full recognition that procedural details must be resolved as the program unfolds. Aside from the possibility of providing manpower support for existing special operations, the implementation of this program should be contemplated as preparation for future situations.

C/PPC

Enclosure - Staff Study

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SUBJECT: Persons Consulted And
Sources of Impressions And
Opinions Gained In Preparing
Manpower Capability Study

1. WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING:

Upon the successful conclusion of PBSUCCESS a special briefing was conducted by CIA in the White House for the President, Vice President and members of the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was my impression from the tone of the questions asked and the free comments of many of the persons present at this briefing, particularly the President and Vice President, that they were very pleased with the professional and unique capabilities of CIA as demonstrated in PBSUCCESS. There appeared to me a feeling among many of these officials that CIA had the technique to meet many of the Cold War problems as well as the weapon to seize the initiative from the Soviet. Thus, I felt an attitude of mind existed among these officials that was favorable toward the future conduct of similar operations to PBSUCCESS.

2. DCI: During my many long conversations with the Director on matters related to PBSUCCESS in which Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes were present, we mentioned the importance of exploiting and profiting from many lessons learned in conducting this special operation. Mention was made of a permanent Joint Task Force concept that would continue the study of special operations and be in readiness to meet such situations without awaiting for emergencies to develop. I do not recall the Director's comments at the time but I do recall his sympathetic attitude toward the subject and particularly his desire that we profit from the experience gained in PBSUCCESS.

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3. DDCI:

In conversations with the DDCI during the PBSUCCESS operation, I recall his statements to the effect that CIA ought to be better prepared to meet such situations in the future and by all means CIA should profit by this valuable experience gained in PBSUCCESS. In discussing the pilot situation with regard to the requirement suddenly developed in PBSUCCESS for sterile fighter and cargo pilots other than JEDEFLECT pilots, the DDCI expressed the opinion that CIA should be prepared for such situations by having persons of this category on a string under some cover arrangement.

4. SA/PPC/DCI, Mr. Richard BISSELL:

Upon the conclusion of PBSUCCESS in July 1954, in Mr. Bissell's office with Mr. Barnes and other PBSUCCESS personnel present, Mr. Bissell stated that CIA had learned a great deal from PBSUCCESS and that there would be many cases in the future which would require similar semi-covert aggressive action of a special task force nature. The discussion which followed had to do with the possibilities and feasibility of organizing a permanent watch committee or staff element to study and plan for such special operations. No firm views were expounded although there appeared to be a meeting of minds on the subject of profiting from PBSUCCESS by establishing a system and procedures for future operations of this nature. Mr. Bissell expressed the thought that perhaps these special operations should be separated from the regular or normal CS operations to avoid contamination of the latter and provide for the "one shot" nature of the special operations. My next opportunity to review the subject with Mr. Bissell, took place in a PPC briefing on the approach to the problem through the manpower capability study. At this time his comments were more along the lines of the "fourth force" concept in which he stated

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considerable reliance would have to be placed on the Armed Forces for personnel although he recognized that there was merit in attempting to develop a CIA civilian reserve component. Upon completion of the Study a copy was forwarded to Mr. Bissell for review and comment. As of this writing no response has been received except from his assistant, [] , who expressed the possibility that the Study might provide general procedures for the "fourth force" organization.

[] was personally in favor of the reserve proposal and the Combined Operations Staff, although he was not certain that the best place for this staff would be under DDP/COPS and had no alternative suggestion to offer at the moment.

5. DDP/COPS, Mr. Richard HELMS:

On 19 September 1954, when I reported in to Mr. Helms for assignment of duties, he requested that I utilize the experience gained in PBSUCCESS and Korea to study the organization of the CS in order to determine the feasibility of providing a standby cadre or reserve pool of specially selected personnel who would be in readiness at all times to support existing operations or to meet crash situations as in PBSUCCESS. I was authorized to take whatever time required to thoroughly study the problem and come up with a study that had been carefully staffed out in all particulars. For this purpose I was to be attached to PPC although continued on the PBSUCCESS T/O. The subject of a Joint Task Force type organization was discussed in connection with the above specific subject and Helms agreed that it should be considered and left the matter to be resolved during the course of preparing the study. On 20 October 1954, after having devoted a month to research and re-orientation on the DDP complex and reviewing the main subject with interested staff officers, I reported back to Helms that as an isolated subject matter, I considered my original

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too confining and requested redefinition of the directive. directive/ The answers to the special cadre or reserve manpower pool was thought by me to be contained within the larger problem of CS operational requirements and manpower capabilities or otherwise stated as "manpower operational capabilities". I added that the cadre or pool to be effective should be included either in the existing system of the CS or part of a subsystem within the overall CS system. Mr. Helms concurred in this approach and so authorized the redefinition of the verbal directive as per the aforementioned. No further discussion was held with Mr. Helms prior to the submission of the Staff Study on the above.

6. C/PPC, General BALMER:

Upon assignment to PPC and reporting to General Balmer, the latter authorized my full use of his staff and reference material in preparing the Staff Study. During the course of staffing out and conducting research on this Study, General Balmer was frequently consulted and briefed on the development of same. The personal views of General Balmer are expressed in his covering memorandum on the Study to the DDP/COPS.

7. Former C/PP, Mr. C. Tracy BARNES:

During the many hours of close association with Mr. Barnes on the PBSUCCESS Project and afterwards, just prior to his departure for Germany, we discussed the future of such special operations and the ways and means whereby the Agency might be better prepared in the future to cope with them. I felt we had a harmony of views in respect to the need for devising specific procedures and possibly a Joint Task Force concept, out of the way of regular operations, which would be in readiness before serious situations were allowed to become critical crash assignments. Mr. Barnes was particularly interested in the possibilities of forming a Joint Operations Staff and considered the

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experience in PBSUCCESS as a significant demonstration of how closely integrated FI and PP should be and important it is to conduct both functions in a combined manner. He expressed interest in the civilian reserve proposal and thought that PBSUCCESS would never have been such a strain on the Agency if it had ample qualified reserves to draw upon. He visualized reserves of pilots, crewchiefs, mechanics, paratroopers, sabotage instructors, small boat operators, radio programmers, creative writers, artists, and etc, more than enough in reserves would ensure the chances of having the few available when needed. Mr. Barnes' ideas and thoughts on this entire subject were very helpful in providing guidance in the preparation of the Study. It is regretted that he departed before it was completed as his review of the Study might have been helpful to the DDP.

8. SA/DDP/PP, Mr. Kermit ROOSEVELT:

After having read the Staff Study, Mr. Roosevelt discussed its contents with me for a lengthy period. Although I presume the DDP will receive his views personally and direct, as a matter of comment I felt Mr. Roosevelt had a complete grasp of the subject and many pertinent thoughts on the various aspects of the Study. He acknowledged the need for being more alert to serious situations which might require a special task force if they became critical and thought this was basically the job of the Area Divisions. He agreed that in certain instances it might be advisable to assign some competent officer for this specific task to an Area Division to study and plan for any contingency that might arise although he doubted the value of a special staff or committee, sitting full time in this role. As to doctrine and future operations, Mr. Roosevelt felt that there having been only two such special operations thus far and they were at complete variance with each, ^{other,} that it was doubtful any pattern could be established or any doctrine developed at this time to guide future situations. He

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acknowledged, however, that history was replete with many instances of revolts, coup d'etats and other efforts made to overthrow governments or seats of governmental authority and that the British system provided for special operations of this nature. My impression was that Mr. Roosevelt felt that the merits of the Staff Study could only be determined by higher authority and then on the basis of policy; policy determination as to how much CIA should or plans to do in the Cold War and thereby determining how much attention or effort should be devoted to preparations along this way of thinking. If a "fourth force" concept of a separate CIA force prevails then he thought the proposals in the Staff Study might prove helpful but if the present course was to be continued without change then there would be little justification for a special operations system apart from existing procedures.

9. C/PR, []

The views and reservations of [] on this Study are contained in a separate memorandum attached to the Study. Although I only had one interview of about thirty minutes with [] on this subject, I felt that he was very much in favor of a single, FI/PP operations staff, but did not look upon special operations as being particularly "special" enough to be worthy of even a small, combined staff on a permanent basis. He appeared in favor of a solid reserve backing up the CS but did not think well of a civilian reserve as proposed in the Study. Although it was clearly expressed in the Study and covering memorandum that the civilian reserve would not in any way remove or preclude the military from providing reserves as needed, [] preferred placing reliance on the latter completely to attempting a civilian reserve effort of selected persons by CIA. The reasons for and the advantages contained in the proposed "Special Casual Unit" appeared completely unnecessary as in his opinion both Career Staff

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and outsiders brought in on contract could be assigned under existing procedures. The only objective comment that I can make is that it is in PP where the greatest deficiencies exist today for special operations and preparations for a Hot War and that the Study proposing means of correcting these weaknesses has fallen so far short of the C/PP's concurrence.

10. DC/PP, []

During the course of staffing out the Study I had a number of long conversations with [] in various aspects of the subject. I ascertained that he felt very strongly that CIA should have firm relations with the Armed Forces and that they should be the reserve strength for CIA in any special operations requiring personnel beyond the capabilities of the Agency. He did not think it advisable to have a standing group or reserve pool of PM on hand at all times. His answer or thought on this subject was that CIA should be able to call on the Marines or the Special Forces of the Army if and when such personnel were needed. [] also thought that CIA could augment its capabilities by periodically training certain personnel in the other components of CIA outside of DDP, although he recognized that this "robbing Peter to pay Paul" procedure would handicap the other components but considered this simply a matter of establishing priorities of interest. On the subject of a joint or combined operations staff, [] thought that PP was presently able to handle many of the special operational requirements and that FI would support them in a servicing role. In any event he did not foresee the need for such a special staff on a permanent basis. Although I recognized the similarity of [] views with [] I continued the Study along the lines indicated because of what appeared to me to be the weight of logic on the side of the civilian reserve in addition to the military or apart from and the merits of the special operations

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system over the heretofore and current improvisation of such operations on a crash basis.

11. PP/CO, []

On the occasion of my initial interview with [] with [] present, the main principals of the Study were reviewed at length. [] stated he had long advocated a joint or single operations staff consisting of FI and PP and felt very firm about the manpower shortage of PP in terms of special operations and preparations for a Hot War. Although he felt that reliance could be placed on the military for certain types of personnel in an emergency he recognized that many of PP's specially qualified personnel would have to come from civilian life. The civilian reserve proposal seemed favorable to him at this time and he expressed no firm views regarding the Combined Operations Staff, reserving them until he had read the Study. I left this interview with a feeling of general harmony of views. However, I learned that the next day had been devoted to going over the Study with [] and other PP Officers. That evening I was informed by [] that although PP had no serious objections to the reserve concept they did dissent on the need for the special operations system and particularly the Combined Operations Staff as being outside PP. He also stated that PP did not concur on the assumption in the paper that the present allocation of personnel was "satisfactory", inferring PP believed their allocation should be larger at this time. The following day I prepared a proposed covering memorandum for the C/PP to send with the Study to COPS in which I indicated what I had construed to be PP's position as described by [] above. I showed this memorandum draft to [] who stated it appeared very strong in writing but was essentially correct. I then suggested that he pass the Study to [] with the above draft indicating that I would appreciate

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his restating PP's position in any manner he so desired. About ten days later [] returned the Study with a separate memorandum setting forth his reservations as indicated above.

12. PP/CIC, []

Prior to my interview with [] I requested [] to review the Study and provide his personal comments. After having read the Study I discussed it with him in detail. He qualified his ability to make comment on the basis that he was unaware of the policy or intentions of higher authorities to conduct special operations and was relatively unacquainted with PBSUCCESS. It was his impression that the Study would probably receive quicker reading and action if it were reduced in size by breaking into several main subjects, i.e.; reserve program, Combined Operations Staff and the Special Casual Unit. He concurred, however, in the discussion on the weakness of CIA's dependence on the military, as he seriously doubted whether CIA would ever reach the point of being able to depend upon drawing the types of qualified personnel required for CIA's highly specialized operations. He was particularly doubtful of what kind of response CIA would receive from the military in the event of an emergency or Hot War. Although he recognized some help would be forthcoming from the military in emergencies whether for Cold or Hot War, he did not think it prudent for CIA to depend entirely on these resources and therefore thought that such a reserve program as proposed in the Study should be instituted by the CS. Although there was probably merit in his comments regarding the size of the Study, I did not break it down on the basis that each of the main parts were inter-related and parts of, what I thought, a closely integrated subject matter.

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13. PP Staff, []

The first person I interviewed in initiating my staffing of the problem was [] who requested [] to provide me a full briefing on the PM side of the subject. [] responded by organizing a small committee composed of himself, []

[] Considerable time was devoted to analyzing the problem in terms of PM's situation. The deficiencies in the current structure of the CS were carefully noted and discussed in detail. Many of these deficiencies appear in the Study after having been staffed out with others. This committee aided me materially in defining the questions, the answers to which would provide the solution to the problem. The blueprint for action was established and many of the suggestions were later incorporated in the Study. With this as a start I proceeded to develop the problem and returned with the Study to [] at the time I was in contact with [] [] read a copy of the Study and briefly indicated interest in it, however, I did not ask him for specific comments after I learned the initial position of the C/PP as above.

14. PP Staff, []

Although [] had been among those present at the above committee meeting, I did not confer with him again until the Study was completed. I asked him to review it and give me the benefit of his candid opinion. [] obliged by making a thorough review of the Study. He had a great deal to say on many aspects of the Study but in general appeared to be in agreement on the principles involved. He thought the Study did not reflect strongly enough the inadequate preparation personnel-wise of PM during the Cold War period. As for the Combined Operations Staff, he thought that a small staff for this purpose was not enough that the entire operations of both FI and PP should be combined and special operations would be a small part thereof.

He thought well of the civilian reserve proposal but again it was not enough, a regular formal reserve program was needed, tied in closely with the Armed Forces and the latter should be more definitely clarified in terms of how much help and what kind would they be willing to provide. He took exception to the statement that inferred that CIA personnel served more devotedly in Korea than the military personnel who were ordered there. I stood on the statement as a general comparison and am prepared to defend it. [] comments were piercing and thoughtful and in the main were either over procedural details or over the matter of understatement,

15. PP/AMD/Air, []

Both of the above officers were helpful in planning the reserve program and providing other suggestions. The hypothetical case of AMD being authorized to develop an air reserve potential was discussed at length. They agreed that it would be completely feasible to develop contract reserves among commercial pilots, crew chiefs, mechanics, jumpmasters, cargo handlers, dispatchers, meteorologists as well as balloon handlers and snatch pick-up specialists. Thinking in terms of the maximum along the lines of the "Flying Tigers", they thought CIA could develop such a fighting potential among civilian, Air Force trained reserves. It was also believed that a commercial reserve cargo flight could be easily developed in an unwitting manner to fill the needs now being serviced by JBDEFLECT. They were highly doubtful that the Air Force would be able or willing to provide CIA the several hundred pilots that might be needed in a Hot War and, therefore, thought CIA should plan in the Cold War for its own requirements thus having such a potential in being for such situations as PBSUCCESS.

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16. PP/AM/MOB, []

The problems confronting the Maritime Section in both Cold and Hot War were thoroughly reviewed with [] Maritime operations appeared to be the most difficult of all to maintain in a current state of readiness. The assets that are required for special operations or a Hot War are not justified otherwise on a current basis. Further the importance of maritime operations is not generally appreciated nor is it realized how much of the earth's surface is water and how many countries lend themselves to this type of operation. The advances in high speed, small boats and midget submersibles remain unexploited by CIA to date. It was believed that many of Maritime problems and potential advantages could be realized in an extensive reserve maritime capability both as to personnel and sea-craft. Unquestionably considerable advantage would be gained over the present static situation if only a small, balanced reserve were developed consisting of; small boat operators, navigators, engineers, radar operators and ship repair or maintenance personnel. In discussing the availability of this type of personnel, [] expressed no doubt in being able to find and recruit whatever number is decided upon. He pointed out the decline in the Merchant Marine in recent years and the related effect on maritime personnel as being available for reserves and part time or temporary duty.

17. PP Staff, []

Throughout the preparation of the Study, [] who had served on PBSUCCESS, was very helpful in providing suggestions and guidance as well as editing the Study. His position in PBSUCCESS required him, among other duties, to go out and recruit pilots and air mechanics under a cover arrangement. This actual experience under pressure was very valuable as it clearly indicated what could be done if the recruiting were for reserves and not under pressure. [] shared the views

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of [] above regarding what could be done in developing air reserve potential if the will and energy were devoted to the task. The many problems related to this endeavor were discussed and one by one either eliminated by adjustment or considered as drawbacks which did not seriously impair the overall value of an air reserve. [] was in the planning committee which established the Materiel Development Board. He felt that there would be a number of special techniques developed by this Board which would require teams of specially trained personnel to handle them. Many of these techniques would only have occasional value in current operations, therefore, would not warrant the full time employment of staff personnel. However, if the reserve program were adopted this would enable the Board to select and train reserves for these techniques and provide the means of conducting experimental operations without drawing on regular staff personnel. This suggestion was incorporated in the Study as it also provided for the specialists in reserves requested specifically by the C/PI.

18. C/OTR, []

One of the earliest contacts and interviews made on behalf of this Study was with [] He devoted over an hour to the general discussion of OTR's problems, pointing out many deficiencies in the present system and possible remedies for them. The idea of a standing reserve pool at [] as originally proposed, did not meet Baird's approval and he outlined the obvious weaknesses involved; morale could not be maintained, would become a pool of cast-offs, could not be expected to have proper types for all occasions and would constitute a repetition of past bad experience along this line. [] had many good suggestions to make in how to go about the research on the subject and what were the main problems. He particularly pointed out the importance of looking at the picture from the broad point of view before getting into details. He thought CIA/CS should

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constantly be aware of possible Hot War requirements and relate them as much as possible to the Cold War plans and operations. He did not think well of the scheme to train CIA personnel of other components in CS techniques because it would soon become a matter of "robbing Peter to pay Paul" and seriously dislocate the other functions of the Agency, presuming they are also important. The prospects of developing a ~~military~~ ^{civilian} reserve and providing two week training periods on a yearly basis was discussed briefly. [] I agreed that it could be done and would want to have it planned out in order to schedule such training carefully. This training could be handled for both witting and unwitting reserves. Regarding the lack of adequately trained senior staff personnel to supervise combined missions or serve in a Hot War situation, [] I stated training was not the problem but having the right personnel made available was the bind. The proposal for a high level, sort of command and general staff type, two week course for senior personnel, appeared entirely feasible by [] I who added that he thought there was definitely a need for the training of senior personnel in combined operations and relations with the military and State, both Cold and Hot War situations. If requested to do so and assured the right kind of personnel could be made available the establishment of the course would present no unsurmountable problems. I have been unable to date to forward a copy of the final Study to OTR but shall do so at the first opportunity as undoubtedly [] [] comments would be helpful to the DDP.

19. OTR, [] []

During the staffing of the problem, I interviewed [] [] regarding the training of senior staff officers in command and combined operations. I found that [] [] has long advocated that this be done and has presented recommendations to this effect. His views were mostly pertaining to the selection and preparation of senior

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CIA personnel for possible future assignments with the military.

He deplored the present situation stating that a Hot War would find

CIA unprepared to properly staff its critical top assignments with

the result that they would have to be filled by non-CIA trained

military officers or untrained CIA personnel. [] shared []

views above and went further by adding that all senior personnel

qualified for military assignments should also complete the reserve

"Command and General Staff" course now offered at Ft. Myer.

20. DDP/C-ADMIN, []

One of the first persons I interviewed after receiving the assignment

to make this study was [] I reviewed the problem with

him and he appeared completely informed on the background of many

previous attempts through committees to resolve this particular problem.

The problem was related to the stresses and strains developed in the

PBSUCCESS project and [] urged that they be kept in mind as

pertaining to the ultimate proposals on this problem as he strongly

felt that proper systematic preparation and advance planning should

minimize crash situations and afford the opportunity for exercising

greater care and more effective results administrative-wise. He did

not concur in the existing proposal to simply establish a pool of

PM personnel on a standby basis in event of possible need. He did

believe that there were ways that these needs could be met and pre-

ferred a flexible system which would tie them into specific needs to

ensure the right types were available at the right time. []

discussed the reserve problem and felt that CIA has long needed some

program of its own without placing full reliance on the military

for every situation which arose and without draining the other

elements of CIA of their personnel. He authorized my calling on

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his staff for any assistance which I might require and added³ he would be available personally if I needed any specific administrative guidance.

With this complete offer of assistance I then worked with several of his officers mentioned below. Upon the completion of the Study, [

] reviewed it carefully in my presence. Whereas, he concurred in principle on the overall aspects of the Study and assured me of his support once it came before COPS, he suggested that the functions of the DDP/ADMIN/CRS (reserve section) be handled temporarily by the Support Officer of the Combined Operations Staff until such time as the AD/P established a central reserve section for all of CIA as that would be the logical place for this function or unit. He concurred in the estimate of maximum manpower requirement for planning purposes pertaining to the CS Career Staff Personnel, but suggested that the total of American citizens, including contract agents and military personnel should be at 20,000, allowing a 5,000 margin for the other types not included in the Study. He considered the reserve program, the Combined Operations Staff and the Special Casual Unit as sound proposals administratively with the above modification. He was particularly interested in the Combined Operations Staff and recognized that in effect it constituted the establishment of the PBSUCCESS Headquarters, support staff, (headed by Mr. Esterline) on a permanent basis. [] remarked that he would want to place a good Administrative Officer on this staff to represent DDP/Admin in all support matters related to reserves or special operations.

21. DDP/ADMIN, []

[] devoted several hours at different times during the course of the study to assist me on administrative matters and provided many helpful suggestions. His views on the final Study, which he read, were similar to [] thought that there would be certain special operations which could be forecasted sufficiently in

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advance to permit their inclusion in the Support Planning Cycle, thereby, aiding materially in the proper advance preparation for the various support requirements involved. He considered the reserve program as fundamentally sound and as necessary for the proper functioning of the CS in the Cold War and as vital to a Hot War situation. He deplored the tendency by certain officers in DDP of thinking in terms of raiding the other elements of CIA whenever additional or special individuals were required, and added that as a general practice it would soon seriously disrupt the smooth functioning of the Agency as a whole.

22. DDP/ADMIN, []

In order to analyze the present composition and administrative procedures of the CS, I was referred to [] [] briefed me on the current situation and reviewed the problem as related to personnel administration. He made a number of helpful comments and assigned [] to assist me in making a statistical analysis of the DDP complex and working out administrative procedures for the Study.

[] devoted a number of hours to the subjects I had requested information or statistics and a great deal of his effort is reflected in the final Study.

23. I/R, []

During the course of the study I reviewed the DNLENA problem with [] [] formerly Chief of Mission, [] in Korea. We discussed the needs for a CIA civilian reserve and a standing staff to support special field operations. [] recalled how CIA attempted to handle the Korean Mission as though it were one of many normal operations. The Area Division was not properly staffed nor was the DDP complex prepared to cope with the police action that grew into the fourth largest war. He agreed that the Korean situation was unique and should not have been handled as a routine operation in the Division.

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In discussing a Combined Operations Staff in connection with Korea, it was readily apparent that it would have provided a support function not only for the Mission but for the overburdened, understaffed Area Division. If a reserve program had been in effect it is most unlikely that the extreme shortages in personnel would have existed. The problem at that time was not necessarily the lack of personnel but the unwillingness of staff personnel to accept Korea as an assignment. There was considerable talk during and after Korea by many responsible senior officers that CIA should profit from its experience and be better prepared for the next Korea. As a personal comment and not quoting [] I seriously doubt if CIA has profited at all from Korea or that the experiences there have even been catalogued let alone studied for lessons for the future. It now remains to be seen whether PBSUCCESS will be allowed to fade into the background in the same manner. Perhaps it was coincidence that I had been selected to conduct PBSUCCESS, at any rate I can certainly state with conviction I nor neither/the officers that I selected from the Korean Mission could have or would have undertaken PBSUCCESS were it not for the confidence and experience gained in Korea.

24. C/FI, []

Coincident with a memorandum prepared by the DDP setting forth the need for a standby PM pool for emergency support of existing or special operations, [] I also submitted a memorandum indicating FI's need for certain types of specialists or special duty personnel to meet the periodic but not permanent requirements of the field. I contacted [] on this subject of FI needs as related to the subject of the Study. After reviewing the subject, it became apparent that FI's problem was not so much a matter of reserves of regular personnel but a special reserve or ready potential to meet the above mentioned specific requirements. [] assigned []

[] of FI Planning Staff to assist me in obtaining FI's views and

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coordination. After completing the Study and reviewing it with Mr. [] the latter took the Study to [] and reviewed it with him. [] reported back to me that [] had no major reservations and thought that it might provide for FI's requirements as originally stated. [] confirmed my query whether this constituted informal concurrence in principle. I have since learned through Mr. [] that in discussing the Study with [] that he said he had concurred informally in principle but that he intended to non-concur on the Combined Operations Staff once it is submitted to him for formal concurrence. I have not discussed this with [] but I was surprised to learn of his intentions as [] agreed that FI should have a coequal role or at least a joint role with PP on special operations as certain of these operations would involve a major FI role.

25. FI Staff, []

After my initial interview with [] as above, I worked entirely with [] on FI's relationship to the problem. [] was very helpful and made a number of suggestions which were later incorporated in the Study. We discussed FI's role in Special Operations and I pointed out that FI made a major contribution to PBSUCCESS through the defection program which was completely aside from the supporting, but essential role of intelligence. [] cited several examples known to him personally where special operations would have to depend on FI assets to a major degree. He cited his experience in the days before the Red putsch in Czechoslovakia wherein his intelligence assets could have saved the country if there had been the will to do and organizational procedures such as exist in CIA today. It became evident in discussions with [] that the premise of a Combined Operations Staff for special operations was valid and that such operations would be prejudiced if considered solely as PP type operations. The other features of the Study, the reserves and FI's relatively minor Hot War requirement

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and the Special Casual Unit appeared to pass his scrutiny and in general he expressed the thought that FI would be able to profit by this procedure. FI's interest in the reserves would be to recruit and develop the types of specialists and other personnel that they would need on a temporary basis and the Special Casual Unit would provide for their care and administration while "on duty" status with the Agency.

26. AD/P, Plans and Analysis Branch, []

Early in the preparation of the Study, I called on [] who was at that time in charge of planning for CIA's personnel mobilization matters. I spent several hours with [] reviewing primarily the matter of reserves. He pointed out the long standing need for CIA to develop its own reserve strength and the fallacy of placing full reliance on the Armed Forces. By this he meant CIA had to depend on the Armed Forces for special commitments beyond its capacity to fulfill but that these situations would be most extraordinary as now contemplated and that CIA should not continue to depend on the military for its normal expansion and retraction of operations. He shared the doubts that CIA could place full reliance on the military in a Hot War and keep its present charter or be expected to effectively fulfill its mission. He considered the idea of the CS depending upon the other elements of CIA to meet its emergency personnel requirements as fundamentally unsound and would soon break down the efficiency of the Agency as a whole. It was his firm view that CIA should start now to develop its own civilian reserve to meet all foreseeable requirements up to and including a Hot War. A corollary problem was mentioned as one that he was currently working on pertaining to the completion of agreements with the Department of Defense for the assignment of all CIA military reserve personnel to CIA mobilization assignments. He said that if they were able to conclude this agreement it would also provide for CIA contract reserve personnel who also have military reserve status.

A second corollary problem pertaining to CIA reserves who would be subject to military conscription or draft, involved making arrangements with the Selective Service Board for their exemption providing they are accepted by CIA at the time for active duty assignments. This latter arrangement appeared quite feasible, whereas, he thought the best they could do for military reservists would be to earmark them for a joint review by CIA and the military service involved to determine greatest need and the preferences of the individual. [] I thought it was very fine that DDP was making such a study of maximum requirements and of a reserve program as he was presently preparing a study to support the issuance of a CIA regulation establishing the responsibility on each component element of CIA to do just what DDP was doing in this instance. This regulation is now ready for the Directors approval.

[] later reviewed the final study and commented that it provided the general principles and requirements and that he concurred with it on the basis although he took exception to certain details and procedures which he agreed could only be worked out in final form after the principles had been accepted.

27. PPC Staff:

Without reviewing the individual comments of all the PPC officers who have been consulted on this problem and who have read the final Study, I might add that the following were particularly helpful with many ideas, suggestions and criticisms: [] on guidance; [] on policy; [] on the Cold War Planning; and, [] and [] on Hot War Planning.

28. RESEARCH:

Having been entirely in the field since my employment in the Agency, the first step toward making this Study was to acquire an intimate knowledge of the Agency and particularly the Clandestine Services.

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I attended orientation and re-orientation courses and studied all the basic manuals, policy books and the organizational structure of the CS. I reviewed the Planning Cycle System and read available Cold and Hot War Plans and related plans and studies. Through the assistance of

[] I accumulated all the available past reports, studies and committee notes pertaining to this general subject matter and studied each one carefully. Aside from this research and consulting the above staff officers, I drew upon my own experiences of six years on the War Department, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, and seven years with this Agency in the field, [

] in Korea during the war and as the responsible operations officer for PBSUCCESS.

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WORKING PAPER

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DRAFT - [] x 8466
26 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/COPS

SUBJECT: Staff Study re Improvement of CIA/CS Manpower Potential
Thereby Increasing Operational Capability

1. On 20 September 1954, you assigned [] to this staff for purposes of preparing a study pertaining to the feasibility of establishing a ready manpower pool of specialists to support special and/or current operations on an as needed basis. After conducting a thorough study on this subject, it was reported to you on 20 October 1954, that the proposal was impractical as an isolated subject and that the solution was believed to be within the framework of the broad subject of manpower operational capability. Accordingly, you redefined the original directive to encompass the broader subject of CIA/CS' manpower situation in terms of developing means of increasing operational capability. It was understood that this broader approach would result in providing a workable solution to the original problem and would be completed in general form on or about 20 November 1954.

2. The above study was undertaken as objectively as possible and consisted initially of reviewing all available records and reports on the subject and conferring with all Senior Staffs, OTR, AD/P and SA/PC/DCI. The PPC Staff was consulted frequently and concurred in the position assumed in the study. Upon completion of the study's "working paper" it was again reviewed with the same staff elements on the basis of determining informal reactions to the provisions adopted in this paper. It was acknowledged that the breadth and scope of the subject matter would require considerable study by all concerned before formal concurrence or coordination would be consummated. However, in an effort to provide DDP/COPS with the benefit of the views of those concerned after having reviewed the study, it was coordinated simply on the basis of whether the staff elements were in agreement with the general principles set forth therein. Accordingly, the following views were obtained:

a. C/FI: Concurred in principle and considered the proposals as a feasible means of providing FI with specialists on a reserve basis as required and originally proposed.

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b. DDP/Admin.: Concurred in principle and considered the proposed Combined Operations Staff as a practical solution to a long-range approach to special operations from an administrative point of view. DDP/Admin. suggested that the C S Reserve Section, advanced by the study, be considered the interim responsibility of the Administrative Officer assigned to the Combined Operations Staff until such time as AD/P provided such service through establishment of an Agency wide reserve section. The incorporation of the Combined Operations Staff within the Office of DDP (COPS) was considered particularly desirable in view of the peculiar and highly specialized nature of its duties.

c. AD/P (Deputy, Plans and Analysis Branch): Considered the reserve plan as practical for the Clandestine Services and consistent with a proposed regulation to establish maximum requirements and reserve programs by all component elements of the Agency. The only dissensions were on details rather than content or substance.

d. C/PP: Although the reserve program was considered practical and desirable, PP did not concur on the concept of a separate Combined Operations Staff for special operations. The assumption that present allocation of personnel is satisfactory was not concurred in by PP, which held the contrary view. It was held that PP, as presently composed, is capable of fulfilling all functions assigned to the Combined Operations Staff. The present personnel allocation of only 15% for PP was considered inadequate to meet its current Cold War requirements.

3. It will be noted that the only exception to the integrated proposals contained in this study was advanced by PP. The non-concurrence of C/PP on the principle of the integral position of the Combined Operations Staff was taken with full cognizance of the reasons advanced in the study for establishing such an element, namely: The highly sensitive nature of its duties; the importance of special operations as distinguished from general operations; the need for the closest possible impartial integration of functions and services and the fact that PP would not predominate in all cases; the need for a particular staff element to study and monitor reserve requirements throughout the Clandestine Services for the DDP (COPS); the need for an inter-intra functional

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and service staff element to administer the Special Casual Unit instead of a single senior staff element administering for all three.

4. The Study has endeavored to weigh the over-all situation confronting CIA/CS in terms of manpower requirements for both current Cold War and Hot War situations. From such deliberations it was possible to determine reasonable courses for personnel action. The Study adopted as an assumption that the present allocation of personnel was satisfactory on the basis that the original directive which established the study intended to derive means of increasing the Clandestine Services capabilities within existing manpower ceilings. Under this assumption it was possible to proceed to new areas of consideration such as the Special Casual Unit and a reserve program. To have done otherwise would have constituted an undue interpretation of the intent within the original directive and exceeded the competency of the officer assigned to conduct the study. Nevertheless, by adopting this assumption as a basis for projecting maximum requirements, it is believed to have served a useful purpose if it has resulted in the illumination of a disproportionate distribution of present personnel as indicated by PP above.

5. Owing to the magnitude of this Study and the impracticability of resolving all procedural details without first obtaining DDP's concurrence on the general principles proposed therein, it is believed that the Study should be examined initially on this basis or as a proposed course of action pertaining to the general subject. It will be noted that the Study logically proceeds from the general to the specific and results in two main subjects, a reserve program and a special operations system, which are then integrated in a reasonable, complementary manner to present a final picture of how to increase CIA/CS manpower operational capabilities. The following PPC comments may be of interest with respect to the three elements proposed in this Study:

a. A Reserve Program: While it is believed important to recognize the weakness of dependence upon the military services for reserve manpower and the need for a CIA/CS civilian reserve program, it is also important to realize that the establishment of a CIA program as visualized by this Study in no way precludes or eliminates the potential reserve available at all times in the military services. On the contrary, it is believed that the creation of civilian reserves selected and screened by CIA would lessen dependence on the military and eventually would reserve

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the military for emergency or extraordinary situations beyond the capabilities of CIA's maximum effort to provide its own requirements. Further, the pace and scope of the proposed CIA/CS reserve program would be set by DDP, this permitting either a gradual buildup based upon immediate requirements or, if the situation warranted the effort required, the reserves could be steadily increased to maximum proportions in an estimated period of eighteen months. The time required to build up the reserves of course becomes commensurate with the effort devoted to the task. The "estimated maximum manpower requirement for planning purposes," established within PPC and contained in this Study, pertains solely to Career Staff Personnel and does not encompass all American citizens who might be required in other categories such as military and contract staff agent personnel. DDP/Admin. estimated approximately 5,000 would be reasonable for these personnel, which would place the maximum for American citizens at about 20,000.

b. A Combined Operations Staff: The proposal for establishing a small element within the DDP (COPS) echelon, without independent status or identity, to fulfill the duties of staffing out special operations, administering the Special Casual Unit and monitoring the reserve program from the point of view of special requirements, has been endorsed in principle by PPC and all Senior Staffs less PP. Considerable thought and past study have been given to the practicality and desirability of combining FI and PP operations into one joint operations staff. Both FI and PP concurred in principle, and PPC indicated the practicality of the step as essential in event of a Hot War. The subject was reviewed and considered premature action on the basis that the merger then in progress should be permitted to develop further before attempting such a radical consolidation of operations. Thus the principle of joint or combined operations had been established as desirable but not practical at the moment. The proposed establishment of a small, highly specialized combined operations element without separate staff or echelon status except that which would be derived from being in the Office of DDP/COPS, appears to be practical at this time as it would become a contributory factor in a special field of operations not presently delegated to any one senior staff element but encompassing all three. Therefore it is

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believed that there is merit in this proposal and that its establishment would provide useful experience in the event it is later decided to combine all operations of FI and PP.

c. A Special Casual Unit: The proposed establishment of this unit, utilizing the present FBSUCCESS T/O, for purposes of providing the administrative means of assembling and holding special personnel for specific or contingency requirements is considered a practical solution to the original need for such mechanism. The manner in which it is designed to provide the T/O slots for the Combined Operations Staff and the latter forming the headquarters element of the Unit, is evidence of the integral nature of the proposed special operations system. The existence of the Combined Operations Staff would provide the close personal direction of all individuals assigned to the unit in order properly to guide their training and preparation for later operational deployment.

6. In consideration of the foregoing comments and the dissenting view, in part, as expressed by the C/PP, it is my recommendation that the general concepts and basic principles involved in this Study be reviewed for a decision by DDP. Aside from the possibility of providing manpower support procedures for existing special commitments, it is believed that the implementation of the special operations system proposed therein should be contemplated as preparation for future situations requiring such action.

C/PPC

Enclosure - Subject Staff Study.

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