CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
2003

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19 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DULLES:

Briefly, the attached material describes the operation and successes of P.B. History which was the propaganda exploitation of Communist documents captured as the result of the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala.

Based upon a previously aggreed to joint action plan, a team of 8 CIA, 3 State Dept and 1 USIA members worked with the CIA subsidized Comite de Defensa Nacional contra el Communismo of Guatemala. Documents were seized, sorted and exploited locally and internationally through various channels and media as quickly and as effectively as possible. Conservative estimates are that the team reviewed a total of 500,000 documents. This excludes duplications, battered and illegible material, books, magazines, pamphlets, etc. Of this overall total, 50,000 documents were microfilmed, 2095 were autostated and 300 miscellaneous papers forwarded to interested agencies in Washington.

Very few of the documents discovered were of the hot, top level, damaging type which might have been successfully exploited on an international basis. Hence, most exploitation was local and in other Central and South American countries where the impact and results noted were excellent. It is concluded that while there were not many sensational exploitations, the many propaganda releases locally and in the U.S., the commencing of the basic training of the Comite's personnel, the outlining and government acceptance of a permanent Guatemalan Intelligence Service, and the obtaining of valuable research material, all combined to make PB History a successful project.

The sum of [ ] which was allotted to the project proved to be more than adequate for the two months' operation.

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I have all of the material referred to in [ ] case you wish to look at it.

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DD/P 1-4319

Executive

6-5199

11 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans) [ ]

SUBJECT: PBHISTORY

REFERENCE: Transmittal memo dated 29 October 1954, to DD/P, with attached Final Summary Report of PBHISTORY Project

1. The following brief summary of the attached PBHISTORY report was prepared for your information.

2. After the downfall of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, all possible efforts were made to exploit, as rapidly as possible, the documents left by the fleeing Communist leaders. Speed was vitally important from the propaganda viewpoint, because of the perishability of the documents, particularly since they were in world news competition. In addition, many of the documents were of a purely local nature and the only chance to secure rapid publication was to utilize the widest number of publication outlets as soon as possible. This approach precluded the idea of compiling the documents in a booklet, such as the slim grey book. Unfortunately, the documents themselves were of such topical nature and, in the main, of such low-level intelligence and propaganda interest, that they did not lend themselves to an impressive bound volume.

3. The preparation of such a booklet, considered to be of interest primarily to United States Government sources, would have necessitated long translation and publication delays and, in view of the extensive publicity on the matter created by the Kersten Committee--whose representatives relied heavily on PBHISTORY for documents and advice--the time and cost were considered excessive. Also, from the inception of the project, the Department of State was delegated the task of preparing scholarly research type volumes; hence, no thought was given, by this Agency, to duplicating their effort. The Department did produce "Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala" attached. This booklet did not include PBHISTORY documents as such although, undoubtedly, they were consulted in its preparation.

4. It is felt that the most effective possible use was made of the PBHISTORY documents, as indicated in the attached final summary report of the subject project. CIA on a regular basis has continued to emphasize through KUGOWN operations appropriate aspects of the Guatemalan revolution. The most recent operations in this sense are regarding the Cruz Wer and upcoming Rosenberg trials in Mexico and the flight of Arbenz to Switzerland.

Attachments

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

DD/P 1-3124

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DEPUTY DIRECTOR, (PLANS)

DATE: 29 Oct 1954

FROM : AC/WH

SUBJECT: PBHISTORY

Attached is the final summary report of subject project in which, because of your participation, you may be interested.

[redacted]

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DD/I 1-31240

FINAL SUMMARY REPORT

OF

PBHISTORY PROJECT

I. BACKGROUND

Immediately following the downfall of the Communist-dominated Arbenz regime in Guatemala, this Agency dispatched on 4 July 1954 a special two-man Commie expert team to investigate the possibility of exploiting documents which were left by the fleeing Communist leaders. Their recommendations (Attachment A), presented in Washington on 20 July 1954, resulted in the sending of a joint agency team to Guatemala which was headed by a CIA official and which was composed of CIA, State and USIA members. On 4 August 1954, after a series of conferences, a joint action plan (Attachment B) was agreed upon by all agencies and a team, composed of 8 CIA members, 3 State members and 1 USIA representative departed for Guatemala. Prior to the team's arrival in Guatemala, arrangements had been made between the CIA representative and President CASTILLO, with the Ambassador's concurrence, to give the team full cooperation in coordination with the Guatemalan counterpart, the Comite de Defensa Nacional contra el Comunismo, which is subsidized by CIA. The team would operate overtly in Guatemala -- but without publicity, as research specialists and would be known as the Social Research Group.

II. OBJECTIVES.

General

The primary PBHISTORY goal was to immediately exploit the documents gathered by the Guatemalan Comite for intelligence and propaganda purposes. Also, the PBHISTORY team was to initiate a records and files procedure for the Comite to serve as the basis for its new Intelligence Service.

III. OPERATIONS.

General.

a. Upon arriving in Guatemala the team discovered that the Guatemalan government had just completed organizing their Comite, composed of 25 officials and administrative assistants, and had assigned to them

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the task of assisting the U.S. team in exploiting the documents and of giving administrative assistance when needed. The team chairman, under State cover, immediately contacted President CASTILLO who offered the fullest high level government support to the joint Comite-team project. With this beginning, the Research Group turned to the task of physically sorting the assembled masses of documents, papers, magazines, newspapers and books. When the project was finished it was conservatively estimated that more than 500,000 documents, not including several hundred thousand duplicate copies and illegible or semi-destroyed papers and masses of Communist propaganda, books and leaflets had been reviewed. Of this material, 2095 documents were considered to be of sufficient importance to warrant autostating; 50,000 more documents of secondary importance were microfilmed; small numbers of original documents, most of them duplicates, were forwarded for technical study or as propaganda samples.

While the documents were being studied in Guatemala, CIA members of the team were assisting the Guatemalan Comite in developing a basic file and records system which would serve them once their organization was formally organized. Also, the PBHISTORY chairman, in collaboration with the Station chief and the Comite leaders, developed the organizational framework for the new Guatemalan Intelligence Service. It was expected that the Comite would evolve as the new Service since the idea for a new anti-Communist organization had been supported and desired by CASTILLO.

b. Propaganda. PBHISTORY, after initiating its analysis work, immediately began the propaganda exploitation of documents which would graphically unmask former leaders as Communists and expose the extent to which the Communists had controlled the Arbenz government. The principal channels through which these documents were released were the Comite leaders themselves, the Government Press Ministry, the local USIA officer and propaganda outlets as arranged by Headquarters. During the entire project there was a steady stream of documents which found good play in the local press. (See Attachment C) Less international play was received due to the local interest of many of the documents. In addition to the use of documents themselves, a newsreel was made of the documents at the Comite headquarters. This documentary short played in movie houses throughout the country to obviously responsive audiences. A two-man team, armed with a good share of PBHISTORY documents, was sent on a propaganda mission to principal countries of Latin America to show the end result of what Communism means - even in Latin America. Also, special documents were taken to the Ambassador in Honduras for use there. Documents were furnished to Representative HILLINGS, Chairman of the Latin American Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Communist Aggression, headed by Senator KERSTEN, while Representative HILLINGS was in Guatemala. Also, the PBHISTORY chairman assisted in providing Representative HILLINGS with reliable, and qualified anti-Communist

Guatemalans to testify before his Committee in Washington. He recommended that President CASTILLO make a tape recording of his anti-Communist activities instead of sending to Washington a less effective written statement. In Washington PBHISTORY documents were distributed as follows: 64 to Senator KERSTEN; 21 to Ambassador LODGE; 32 to the FBI; 2,031 autostat copies, 50,000 microfilm documents and 531 original documents to the State Department; and 1,657 autostat copies, 50,000 microfilm documents and 192 original documents to USIA. Copies of pertinent articles, photos and documents were sent out to WH field stations. (For complete details of the propaganda operations see Attachment D, prepared by LANGEVIN, PP Case Officer.)

c. Intelligence. To assist in developing an entirely new Service for future intelligence activities, the PBHISTORY chairman, in collaboration with the Station chief, who had previously offered guidance along these lines, developed an organizational outline and an operations charter for the Guatemalan Comite. (Attachments E and F.) During the PBHISTORY project, the Comite was unable to form an operational arm which was capable of exploiting the few leads which were developed from the documents. This was due to lack of sincere CASTILLO support of the Comite. It is believed that CASTILLO, during the formative days of his government, did not have fullest confidence in the Comite and that he relied for intelligence mainly on a number of dubious volunteer and spot-payment informants. The Comite did instigate personal searches of the Communist asylees as they departed from Guatemala but few revealing documents or papers were found, although a goodly number of travel documents, useful for CIA, were picked up. Without authority to arrest or to conduct house searches, the Comite was severely hampered and limited in obtaining leads for additional documents. Items of possible current intelligence value which were forwarded from the field to Washington were given to the interested desks, staffs, or special study sections. Copies of documents, where appropriate, were forwarded to other government agencies, other than those associated with PBHISTORY. Provisions were made to carefully record and file material not adapted for immediate exploitation.

d. RI Work. The task of physically organizing the Comite documents was delegated to the RI members of the team who, within a short time, had set up a system whereby the unsorted mountains of paper were given a preliminary sort, analyzed and, according to their importance, either destroyed or copies for PBHISTORY use and given to the Comite. After a two-week period a selected number of Guatemalans, supervised by PBHISTORY members, were capable of performing the preliminary sort, leaving the majority of the PBHISTORY team free for analysis and copying work. Once the analysis team swung into full work, it was necessary to call for a two-man microfilm team to photograph many valuable research documents. Once this sorting and analysis work was fully under way, considerable attention was given to the Comite archive section. Full instructions on how to card and file, carried out on a daily basis, were given. Close supervision was given to procedure detail to assure that the system would be retained after the departure of the majority of PBHISTORY personnel. In a special session PBHISTORY leaders were given a full briefing on archive procedure by [redacted] For full details see Attachment G(prepared by [redacted] RI Case Officer).

e. Personnel. The CIA personnel assigned to this project were all familiar with the area and were bilingual. Other members of the team, from State and USIA, were similarly qualified. Although policy matters with the Guatemalan leaders were handled by the team chairman, all members of the team worked closely with the Guatemalan Comite personnel. Language facility and general professional ability on the part of the U.S. team created a friendly and favorable impression with the Guatemalans, who were quite receptive to the criticisms and suggestions as offered by team members. This cooperative spirit on the working level greatly aided in the rapid and successful termination of the project.

Communications. Because of the highly topical nature of the project's material and necessity of obtaining rapid response for operational matters, station cable facilities were utilized to a great extent. This method allowed for rapid exchange of information which was essential in such matters as the document preparation for Senator KERSTEN and Ambassador LODGE.

Equipment. Due to delays in shipment of correct photographic supplies, there was an initial delay in the flow of documents to Washington. Once this situation was corrected, a steady stream of autostated and microfilmed material was delivered within the minimum time limit.

Finances. The sum of [redacted] which was allotted to the project proved to be more than adequate for the two months operation.

IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

General

a. The low percentage of valuable documents precluded any large scale intelligence operation since few leads were obtained. However, the development of a new Guatemalan intelligence service, if followed up by CIA, will undoubtedly give this organization a valuable long term asset.

b. Propaganda. The unusually cooperative press in Guatemala and the efforts of the Ministry of Propaganda, plus the aid of the local USIA representative, enabled PBHISTORY to saturate the Guatemalans with the idea that the Comite had confirmed what had been denied by the pro-Communists - that the ARBENZ government was dominated and controlled by Communists and that, at last, ARBENZ himself was completely identified with the Reds. Also, the Comite was left with a mantle of respectability, as differing with the low talent reputation of the local police. Internationally, the job was more difficult since few top secret documents were found, few stories were worthy of honest world news coverage.

c. Intelligence. Because of the vacillating political situation, the Comite was never given the full green light by CASTILLO to go ahead with their operations arm until the latter part of September. Although this had the serious disadvantage of not exploiting the departure of the asylees, it did have the advantage of not permitting a group of untrained, unrestricted officials from initiating operational activities which might have easily backfired and greatly depreciated the reputation of the Comite during its infancy. The Comite leaders were, and still are, unusually receptive to suggestions made for their future organization.

d. RI. Although the most basic system has been given and explained to the Comite for their records control, one RI representative has been assigned to actually work in the archive section during the period 1-30 October.

e. Liaison. The liaison aspects of the PBHISTORY project were generally quite favorable. Relations with the Guatemalan Comite, both leaders and employees, were excellent. It should be noted that the members of the Documents Committee were notably successful in creating and maintaining correct and friendly relations.

A successful working relationship was developed with the Minister of Propaganda, who proved helpful in distributing propaganda material to the local and international press.

With members of other Government agencies, it is to be noted that the State members on the team were helpful and cooperative. Only a minimum of contact was made with State officials in their local establishment, after the initial introduction and approval from Ambassador PEURIFOY. In regard to the assistance from USIA, the local officer on many occasions proved a good source of support and advice on a number of propaganda matters.

The Station chief and other station personnel were extremely cooperative and, aside from important administrative assistance, aided greatly in maintaining good relations with Comite leaders and other officials close to CASTILLO.

f. Attachment H contains a report on the PBHISTORY material reviewed. All material autostated has been classified according to the nature of the documents.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. In any other future operation similar to PBSUCCESS, provisions should be made so that an organized document team, reinforced with strong police and army elements can enter into the area where vital documents might be found. An even better solution would be to have selected two-man units inside the target area attempt to get the documents during the confusions of any last ditch fighting.

b. Any propaganda exploitation of documents should be accomplished as soon as possible after the downfall of the defeated Communist government to take fullest advantage of world press play. PBHISTORY entered into the field too late to capitalize on the world press, and for the most part had to be satisfied with local or limited international play.

c. Certain captured documents, however, which do not yield themselves to immediate exploitation, should be withheld to give the propaganda play a chance to extend over a period of several weeks and to provide various choice sources with "exclusives" which aid in furthering the project's propaganda assets.

d. It is imperative that CIA send soonest to Guatemala an experienced case officer with Station cover to continue to press home the official constitution of the Comite and to give basic training to their intelligence officer candidates. CASTILLO has already mentioned to the PBHISTORY chairman that he would like to send a selected group of Comite trainees to Washington for training with the FBI. It behooves CIA to have the trained case officer available to forestall such a training program as envisaged by CASTILLO.

e. CIA should designate a bilingual RI representative to assist the Comite archive section for a 60-day period beginning 1 November 1954, to assure that the basic card and filing system recently introduced is carried out as projected. Without this additional training it is quite doubtful that an efficient Intelligence Service can be developed since all of its administrative staff lack totally in proper records technique.

VI. SUMMARY

In the future, any inter-agency documents task force will have the benefit of traveling a more defined path of operation. In the case of PBHISTORY or any similar project, the real success of immediate Propaganda-Intelligence exploitation depends upon hot, top level, damaging documents. PBHISTORY uncovered few of these. The mystery still exists why the Communists did not

burn or destroy more documents than they did. Although no traces were found of correspondence on such matters as the Alfelm/Polish shipment of arms and correspondence between agent contacts in other countries, PBHISTORY has furnished a wealth of material taken from the all-powerful Communist labor, youth or political groups. Researchers will have obvious answers to the Communist takeover, the extent of its domination and downfall in Guatemala.

The experience of three different agencies working in the field under one agency head proved to be quite workable since the principle of cooperation as to mutual information priorities had been carefully worked out before the team was dispatched to the field.

The cover problem was minimized by the fact that no Guatemalans, with the exception of Comite members, were allowed into the interior of the Comite's working area. Also, special security arrangements were made so that the majority of the team entered and departed via a rear Comite entrance only once a day.

Although bulk of the PBHISTORY material did not provide for many senational exploitations; the many propaganda releases both locally and in the United States; the commencing of the basic training of the Comite's personnel; the outlining and government acceptance of a permanent Guatemalan Intelligence Service; and the obtaining of large amounts of valuable research material; all resulted in making PBHISTORY a successful project.

Attachments:

A. Report of Burke and Metzl from Guatemala
B. Basic PBHISTORY Plan
C. Clipping Books
D. Details Propaganda Operation of PBHISTORY
E. Organization Charter prepared for Comite by PBHISTORY
F. Organization Charts prepared for Comite by PBHISTORY
G. Details RI Phase of PBHISTORY
H. Categorical Breakdown PBHISTORY Photostat Material forwarded to Headquarters

Attachment A

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APPENDIX A

Recommendations of 5 July 1954 to COS for Ambassador

1. Energetic anti-communist action is needed urgently and is sorely lacking:

a. Communist Party men continue to hold the government positions they held under Arbenz, e.g., Inspectores del Trabajo and of the DAM, etc.

b. Communists who took asylum in Embassies have left those Embassies and returned to active life in the city, some under assumed names.

c. The frontiers are open and the escape of communists is not blocked.

d. Men responsible for the torture and murder of anti-communist under Arbenz have not been arrested even though their identities are known. It is reported that a Col. Prera of the Guardia Civil blocked these arrests.

e. The CGTG is still active. The closing of its central office is not enough to curb the activities of its communist leaders and communist members who are accustomed to clandestine activity.

2. The Junta should designate and fully empower a man with whom we can deal in the elimination of communists from all positions of influence in Guatemalan government and society; in their arrest, detention and interrogation; in the seizure and study of key documents in the communist conspiracy; and in the effective denial of the claim of communists to the right of asylum and salvo conducto.

3 There is urgent need for:

a. A central repository of information on the Communist Party, its members, fronts and related groups.

b. A secure, capable, energetic, anti-subversive squad in the Guardia Civil.

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c. A thorough check of all:

1) Offices (headquarters) (national, regional, municipal, etc.) of the CP, the CGTG, the peasant federation, all communist fronts;

2) Government offices dominated or strongly influenced by communists;

3) The homes and offices of all leading CP members, and of all their relatives and friends where they may have cached documents,

in order to be sure that the Junta has in its possession all important documents and records which will

1) Clearly evidence the foreign direction of the communist movement;

2) Specifically identify not only all leading foreign and local communists involved but all CP members and collaborators, so that they can be rendered ineffectual and can be prevented from making a renewed bid for power.

Attachment B

PROJECT SUMMARY
PRISTOHY

Introduction: The following project summary is being submitted in accordance with the verbal request made by Mr. Frank Wisner, DD/P. Your comments and approval are requested for earliest project implementation.

Purpose: To exploit immediately 100,000 Guatemalan Communist documents for intelligence and propaganda motives. To provide record and filing procedure instructions to the Guatemalan representatives of the group, which will serve as the basis for a records and file system of a new Guatemalan Intelligence Service.

The task force will include elements of State Department, USIA and CIA, the latter to hold the chairmanship of the group. The Ambassador will provide general instructions for the group for the joint benefit of the United States and Guatemalan Government. Suitable cover name suggestions have been submitted to the Ambassador for an overt title for this task force.

Tasks: The State Department, USIA and CIA will state concisely their priorities of information. This is necessary to utilize the minimum number of persons and enable the maximum amount of rapid document exploitation. In order to achieve our objective, a complete spirit of cooperation and knowledge of mutual information priorities is absolutely essential. This principle of operation has been agreed upon by the three U.S. government agencies involved. Priority lists of the three groups are attached.

Relations with the Guatemalan individuals, who will be working under the guidance of the task force, will be directed or coordinated by the PRISTOHY chairman. Complete control cannot be openly exercised; however, through demonstration of the services which the task force can perform for the Guatemalans, it is considered that fullest cooperation will be obtained.

All efforts will be made to obtain important data now existing in the Government ICOMM and other Guatemalan Government agency files.

Immediate efforts will be devoted to ascertain any international implications which can be utilized by friendly, neighboring, anti-communist governments for their intelligence or propaganda exploitation.

Procedure: Action will be initiated soonest to ascertain the availability of the documents to the PRISTOHY team and what the restrictions, attitudes of the current Guatemalan Government will be. Immediate requests will be made for the Guatemalan Government to provide clerical personnel who will be needed to assist in the immediate and monumental task of preliminary physical sorting.

Once it is ascertained that fullest support is assured by the Guatemalan Government and the sorting has progressed to the point where analysis is possible, all US task force personnel will commence their scanning activities. From this point on, the highest degree of cooperation will be needed, since the priorities of the groups involved will vary and overlap.

Another factor to be considered in the use of the documents has been the time factor, as opposed to operational needs. The PBHISTORY chairman will endeavor to strike as fair a balance as is possible between these two factors. He has no preconceived intentions to particularly favor either the propaganda or the operational aspect.

For immediate document exploitation by the agencies represented, use will be made of autostat photographic equipment. Microfilm equipment will be used with those documents which lend themselves to mass reproduction. It is considered this process will be used primarily to supply a permanent record of name lists, bound volumes of official correspondence, or a series of chronological papers. RI has been requested to furnish personnel capable of handling this task. They have agreed pending approval C/FI.

Work on the project is to commence with the arrival of the personnel to be indicated in a following paragraph. Pending final project and State Department documentation, PBHISTORY personnel are prepared to leave o/a 1 August. Travel orders are currently being readied and State Department was advised on 28 July of the CIA personnel who would be leaving.

At the end of each week a progress summary report will be submitted to Headquarters. It is not contemplated devoting any of this short period to detailed progress or operational reports since a minimum of secretarial help is planned. It is believed that time is of the essence. Frequent use of cable facilities for operational queries is expected. Interested Headquarters staff members will be encouraged to visit the field unit, particularly if complicated or long and involved problems arise which might unnecessarily hold back the work of the field analysts. These visits could be constructive since additional requests and information priorities could be modified.

At the end of the second month the chairman and various other project personnel will be replaced. A complete summary of progress to date will be written and a recommended modification of the PBHISTORY structure as it is to continue will be suggested.

The attached administrative plan is based on the consideration that the team in itself will be self sufficient. It is felt that best relations can be maintained from an administrative viewpoint with both the Embassy and our station if only emergency calls are for their support and assistance. Therefore from both a personnel and equipment

standpoint the group as planned is thought to be complete enough to accomplish its task without interrupting and overburdening the operational or administrative activities of the Embassy or our station.

SUMMARY: Without the full support of the Guatemalan Government this project will be faced with long "Wanana" type of delays. Also it must be realized the Guatemalans themselves will be faced with various political pressures which will cause them to exploit the documents in manner which our team may consider inept or disastrous, from either an operational or propaganda viewpoint. Headquarters must be prepared for such eventualities. The chairman has already warned the State and USIA representatives of this possibility. The reported value of the documents is not being underestimated, however, it is reasonable to suppose that a large percentage of the material is valueless. Every effort will be made to achieve the most rapid exploitation — keeping in balance the operational-propaganda aspects.

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT PLAN

Joint CIA-State-USIA Team

I. The CIA team will consist of the following:

A. Field Team
- 1 Chief of Team
- 2 FI Officers
- 1 PP Officer
- 2 Micro-photographers
- 1 RI Analyst
- 1 Reports-Administrative
- 1 Secretary

9 (Sub-total)

B. Headquarters Support
- 1 FI or PP Officer
- 1 Secretary-Administrative

11 Total

(Headquarters Personnel to be assigned Guatemala Desk, Branch III, WH Division)

II. Estimated costs of Operations for three months:

Salaries (average GS-11)

Overtime (average $1.60 per hr. 20 hrs. per week per individual)

Rental of two automobiles including gas, oil and maintenance-$45.00 per week per vehicle

Travel and Per Diem

Two Auto-Stat machines and Supplies (reproduction)

One portable microfilm Model "R" and supplies

Two Dictaphone machines complete

Local procurement office supplies

Office furniture (if not available locally from US Government installation)

Estimated costs of Operational expenditures as distinguished from Administrative expenditures which includes purchase or procurement of documents from Government and non-Government sources.

Administrative Support Plan - Contd.

VII. Delegations of authority

A. The Chief of CIA team is designated as the Disbursing and Accountable Officer for all CIA funds expended in the Field.

B. The Chief Admin., WH Division, is designated as the Disbursing and Accountable Officer for all expenditures at Headquarters in support of the team.

C. Any additional funds required over and above those approved herein will be first approved in writing by the DD/P or C/P.

IV. Funds for use of CIA team in the Field:

The sum authorized herein for Operational expenditures in the Field will be advanced to the Chief of Station, Guatemala, to be made available to Chief of CIA team. The Station will maintain separate account for these funds, and the Chief of CIA team will submit receipts and/or documents to support his expenditures through the Chief of Station to Headquarters.

See attached [illegible]
Envelope for "Attachment C".

Attachment D

Secret

Attachment "D"

PBHISTORY

Final Summary of KUBOWL Activities

I. Objectives

The objectives of the KUBOWL program of [illegible] were [illegible]:

a. To indicate to the people of Guatemala the extent of Communist penetration through the publication and dissemination of documents uncovered by the [illegible] team.

b. To publicize the above internationally, [illegible] throughout Latin America.

c. To create a position of importance in the country for the Comite Nacional de Defensa Contra el Comunismo, to [illegible] it with the proper prestige, to make it an authentic [illegible] of information on communist penetration in the Western Hemisphere, and to obviate possible detrimental criticism (that the Comite would grow into a small Gestapo, etc).

II. Operations

a. The press was the principal media used to publicize, to people of Guatemala, the extent to which Communist penetration had reached in the Republic. Photostatic copies of exploitable documents, sifted by members of the team, were sent to all newspapers. In some instances there were individual documents to be published with only a caption; in others, there were series of autostated papers on which editors [illegible] a lengthy article.

The initial press release from the Comite explained its origin, its functions, and its objectives (see Attach "E"). A series of photographs taken by the KUBOWL team indicated the volume of documents and propaganda.

The method of release followed this general pattern: All members of the team sifting documents were instructed to pass all documents that might be exploitable to the [illegible] officer. The acceptable documents were photostated or autostated. Appropriate captions or stories were written in [illegible] and translated into Spanish. The document was attached to a [illegible] press release sheet and addressed to the newspaper which seemed the most logical for the publication, or to all newspapers, if the document was of sufficient interest. The complete package was

then sent by messenger to the proper newspaper office, or mailed directly. Other documents were prepared in the same manner and given to the Minister of Propaganda, to be handed out in a series of press conferences, or to be doled out to individual reporters from his office. All such documents, of course, were approved by the local members of the Comite prior to their release.

The second local method was through a short, documentary-style film produced by the Comite. This film was completely produced by the PBHISTORY KUGOWN officer. Six minutes in length, it contained appropriate titles, musical background and narration by the three announcers of "Radio Liberation". The basic cost of the film was met by the Comite, although the more expensive item of sufficient copies was taken care of by PBHISTORY.

The film, "Despues Descubrimos La Verdad" ("Later We Discover the Truth") was shown, and is still showing, in the theaters of Guatemala City, rotating from one theater to another so that all will sooner or later show it. Once it has made its round of the capital, it is scheduled to be sent to the provinces, so that eventually it will be shown in every theater in the Republic. One copy of the film was utilized by the Minister of Propaganda for private showings. Later a copy was sent to KUSIA in Wash where 48 prints have been made in all Spanish & Portuguese sound tracks for distribution in the WH countries.

Radio, of course, was considered an unsuitable media for stories based on documentary evidence, and as a result, radio propaganda was limited to the "news" angle as repeated by commentators.

A display window in downtown Guatemala City was used to offer the public a display of Communist propaganda.

b. International, especially Latin American coverage, was attempted through two press conferences of Guatemalan representatives of the various news services, the first when they were given a press release prepared by PBHISTORY, and the second, when they were given a series of the heretofore exclusive and important documents (For results, see below).

PBHISTORY released "Gray Book" documents in a manner that they could be properly revealed in the United States by Senator Kersten. The Associated Press carried a story on his disclosures.

Individual releases, or individual "exclusive" documents, were prepared for visiting correspondents and local representatives of foreign newspapers.

Through the cooperation of USIA, plastic matrixes of PBHISTORY photographs were made [illegible]. These were attached to a lengthy press release on the work of the Comite and the description of some of the documents uncovered. PBHISTORY prepared these, even to the point of addressing the individual air mail envelopes, and handed these over to the Minister of Propaganda to be sent to ninety(90) principal newspapers throughout Latin America. Copies also went to Madrid, Rome, Paris, etcetera, and Spanish language newspapers in the United States. English versions were mailed to several important newspapers in the United States and in England.

PBHISTORY originated the project in the Ministry of Propaganda of sending a two-man team through Latin America to publicize the true situation. After considerable delay and political wrangling, the team left. They carried with them a copy of PBHISTORY film, and propaganda kits composed of photostatic copies of documents, examples of Soviet propaganda sent to Guatemala, and atrocity photographs.

PBHISTORY furnished the local propaganda authorities a constant supply of propaganda kits and document reproductions to be given out to visiting newspapermen and officials.

When Congressman Hillings visited this country, he was supplied with propaganda kits, photographs, and a special six-page "report" from the Comite outlining its activities and its viewpoints of Communist penetration, as learned from analysis of the documents.

PBHISTORY arranged with the Minister of Propaganda to extend invitations to newsmen from neighboring republics to visit Guatemala, and for a certain number to be sent from the country. PBHISTORY documentation was used to implement the reports of these newspapermen.

Local officers of USIA were provided with some fifty (50) reproduced documents for immediate forwarding to their headquarters and ultimate use throughout the regular USIA channels to Latin America.

A copy of the PBHISTORY film was sent, along with the original negative, to USIA Headquarters so that appropriate scenes could be immediately released to commercial newsreel companies servicing the Latin market.

An NBC television cameraman was given the opportunity of filming the Comite's activity.

In some instances the press releases sent to various countries contained an addendum prepared by PBHISTORY to make the story hotter for publication. For example, the regular release for Chile was augmented by a description of correspondence between Chilean and Guatemalan Communists.

PBHISTORY supplied as many appropriate documents as could be uncovered to SKIMMER for possible inclusion in a white paper.

Summaries of PBHISTORY releases printed locally were supplied to the USIA Latin American wire services.

III. Results and Analysis

a. Results of the firm propaganda objective ("to indicate to the people of Guatemala the extent of Communist penetration") were highly satisfactory. Press coverage was extensive. It was noted, however, that editors made little embellishment of even the most provocative documents, unless suggestions, captions or stories written by the propaganda officer went with the photostatic copy. When any document was accompanied by an explanatory story, the entire text was invariably used. All "general" photographs —— of the stacks of documents and propaganda, etc. —— were published.

The PBHISTORY film made a visible impression on viewers, and was applauded heavily by audiences.

There is no doubt that the people of Guatemala were informed satisfactorily as to the graphic and documentary proof uncovered by the Comite.

b. Results of obtaining placement of newspaper stories in the world press regularly by PBHISTORY were unsatisfactory. This was due to the fact that only one international news service (Reuters) carried the initial press release after it was given to them in a press conference by the Minister of Propaganda. They felt the story was not "spot" news, and consequently did not value it to the point of cable traffic.

Plans for a PBHISTORY staged "raid" on Comite headquarters by "Communits trying to destroy the papers which would implicate them" were abandoned when it was found that too many indigenous persons would have to be in the act. Such an operation would have undoubtedly hit the international cable services, but was too risky considering all factors.

Coverage to Latin America on the USIS wire service, of course, was extensive. Anti-Communist declarations of Rodriguez Beteta, a PBHISTORY delegate, in Santiago, Chile, received nice play on the United Press circuit. Visiting newsmen included PBHISTORY angles in their stories to home newspapers. "Vision" magazine carried a story on the Comite, almost word for word as it was prepared for the correspondent by PBHISTORY through the Comite.

Several Guatemalan diplomats leaving for new Latin American posts were supplied with PBHISTORY propaganda kits, as well as groups of visiting editors from the U.S.

Press releases accompanied by plastic matrixes were sent to newspapers throughout America

The PBHISTORY commercial newsreel film shots have been made in 48 copies through USIA facilities and are being distributed to all WH countries. The National Broadcasting Company used shots of PBHISTORY on its coast-to-coast facilities 14 August.

c. Results of the third objective ("to create a position of importance for the Comite") were considered eminently satisfactory. In all releases it was stressed that the Comite not only was chasing Communits, but was also looking for the documentation that would reward valiant anti-Communists. It was also emphasized that the Comite was working on the record of Red penetration for the benefit of future threats in the Americas, etc.

There is no doubt that the Comite is now a well-known entity in Guatemalan life.

Summary: Three factors retarded propaganda action. (1) That less explosive documentation than was expected was found; (2) lack of an action arm and lack of dependability of indigenous persons belonging to the Comite; and (3) the fact that the Comite became a political football ------ members of the Comite were reluctant to aid CASTILLO too much, and CASTILLO was leary of the potential power of the Comite, and thus did not give it his full support.

Even so, the general RUCOWN results of the project were satisfactory and undoubtedly worth the expenditure of funds and time spent.

Attachment E

E

Conceptos Básicos de Organización y Operación

para

El Comité de Defensa Nacional Contra el Comunismo

El Comité será una organización de inteligencia completamente separada; cuya función principal es proteger al pueblo del Comunismo local e internacional y de elementos subversivos. El jefe de esta organización será responsable de sus actividades solo al presidente de la República. El Comité coordinará sus actividades muy de cerca con las de la Fuerza Armada G-2 y las de la Policía Secreta, para así tener beneficio completo de la información que esas organizaciones puedan desarrollar en el curso de sus actividades normales. Estas organizaciones de ahora en adelante cesarán cualquier operación de inteligencia contra el Comunismo, con excepción de un contra espionage dentro de sus mismas filas. El Comité por su parte limitará sus actividades de inteligencia a cosas promovidas por los comunistas o grupos de similares. No reemplazará no superpondrá su autoridad sobre la Policía Secreta o Las Fuerzas Armadas G-2; pero sí hará disponible a ellos informaciónes acerca de las actividades comunistas descubiertas por este Comité y que sean de interés para los mismos.

El Comité en sus operaciones iniciales limitará sus actividades a Guatemala, y será organizado en zonas geográficas para facilitar dichas actividades. Sin embargo, se prevé la necesidad que el Comité en el futuro creará una sección internacional, especialmente interesada en personalidades Comunistas, eventos y movimientos que tienen implicaciones directas o alguna relación con las cercanas repúblicas de Centro Amériba. Debido a la pequeñez de los países de Centro América y de las facilidades de movimientos de parte de los comunistas estas actividades internacionales del Comité son consideradas como esenciales.

Dichas actividades principiarán cuando haya personal entrenado.

El Comité no asumirá la responsabilidad de hacer justicia a los comunistas, pero suministrará su evidencia a los tribunales de Justicia, donde decidirán la culpabilidad de los supuestos comunistas. El Comité recomendará, sin embargo, al Presidente que casos concernientes a los comunistas deberán tener leyes especiales para asegurar su pronta y legal resolución. Dar poderes al Comité con la autoridad de juzgar, sería violar su principio de solo ser un grupo de investigaciones y en corto plazo sería un objetivo de ataque, ya que no se prestaría a un régimen democrático.

El personal elegido por el Comité será minuciosamente examinado e investigado y cuando el tiempo lo permita entrenado profesionalmente para así formar un cuerpo de oficiales de suma responsabilidad con quien la ciudadanía Guatemalteca esté deseosa de cooperar y respetar.

Para evitar envolvimiento político, los fondos para los agentes y operaciones confidenciales del Comité necesariamente deberían venir de los presupuestos Confidenciales y Ejecutivos del Presidente. No así los gastos generales de empleados y mantenimiento que pasaron al presupuesto general de la nación. Sin embargo, una comisión especialmente escogida de tres hombres nombrados por el Presidente, serán los encargados de estudiar el presupuesto general del Comité al ser éste sometido anualmente. Aunque asuntos confidenciales y actividades del Comité no serán reveladas; cosas como salarios oficiales y gastos generales y sumas de operación serán debidamente examinados. Esta inspección hará mucho por eliminar crítica indebida al Comité por gastar fondos sin los controles comunmente puestos sobre todos los otros ministerios y agencias del govierno.

De gran importancia es el hecho que el espíritu del Comité debe ser en todo tiempo apolítico. Debe esforzarse tan pronto como sea posible para [illegible] nacional y no rebajarse a ser un instrumento

político usado para crear o mantener individuos inescrupulosos. Todos los intentos que personas y agrupaciones políticos hagan por infiltrarse al Comité en actividades políticas serán reportados de inmediato al Ejecutivo para que se les apliquen las sanciones o amonestaciones del caso. Es fundamental por la misma existencia del Comité su apoliticidad reconocida por -- los Jefes del Comité -- El Jefe Supremo -- y por todos los miembros del Gobierno y otros Líderes Políticos.

Para llenar su misión de proteger al pueblo de Guatemala del Comunismo y otras fuerzas subversivas, el Comité debe desarrollar tan rapidamente como sea posible sus recursos de información dentro de las que serán Organizaciones Campesinas, Sindicatos y Partidos Políticos. También se harán penetraciones en el sistema educativo y en todos los ministerios del Gobierno y agencias afiliadas a éste. Se harán también penetraciones en grandes compañías privadas importantes a la economía de la nación. Estos objetivos aunque son obviamente importantes, fueron esencialmente los mismos grupos que los Comunistas habían pervertido con mayor éxito y donde se puede contemplar que ellos tratarían de entrar de nuevo.

Para llevar a cabo estas penetraciones, el Comité organizará redes de agentes quienes por su profesión y origen estarán más apropiados para su asignación particular. También se tentará descubrir conocidos Comunistas o simpatizadores aquí o en el exilio.

Para llevar a cabo dichos programas, es obvio esperar que sin experiencia de parte de los mismos oficiales del Comité, la reclutación con éxito será un trabajo muy delicado y minucioso si se quiere hacer correctamente. La tendencia a reclutar rapidamente deberá ser suprimida. Y si el Comité después de un período de tiempo espera tener éxito en estas operaciones, deberá poner especial cuidado en la selección de sus oficiales, para poder exigir su

eficiencia. El chequeo del origen y el entrenamiento rudimentario deberá tener lugar antes de que a un oficial del Comité le sea entregada la responsabilidad de a su vez reclutar agentes para el Comité. La pequeñez del país hará demandas no usuales a los oficiales del Comité, quienes en muchos casos podrían ser objetivos de ridículo, dudas y ataque público. Sin embargo, el grado de inteligencia, preparación escolástica y coraje personal de los elegidos como oficiales del Comité convencerán efectivamente a la gente de Guatemala de la seriedad del trabajo del Comité. Ciertamente el propósito de su trabajo anti-comunista es vital más que cualquier otro trabajo público hecho por un oficial público en el país.

Como concebido el Comité será organizado en una manera clásica común a todas las buenas agencias extrangeras de inteligencia. El principio de las responsabilidades geográficas será claramente definida y los administradores centrales ayudarán a los encargados de las zonas geográficas. El mismo Comité quedará tan centralizado como sea posible para conservar el apoyo del personal y administración. Específicamente todas sus oficinas estarán en un edificio aunque sus oficiales sean asignados a departamentos fuera de la ciudad de Guatemala.

Como operación típica del caso la siguiente hipótesis de Historia puede ser un ejemplo: En Enero de 55 un candidato a las investigaciones oficiales del Comité es abordado por un oficial de dicho Comité. Después de 30-60 días de un chequeo completo, entrevistas, exámenes físicos y mentales y de lealtad, el candidato es aceptado. Durante los siguientes 60-90 días se le da entrenamiento básico. Durante el período, él es asignado (por el propósito de demostración) a la sección número uno de la División de la Ciudad de Guatemala. Su primer tarea es conseguir una penetración en un sindicato de profesores anteriormente dominado por los comunistas. Se le da dicha asignación porque anteriormente muchos de los individuos en

el sindicato. El nuevo oficial con su entrenamiento y experiencia pasada, dentro de un corto período es capaz de hacer contacto con Fulano de Tal, una persona de conocida responsabilidad, que tiene la confianza de los antiguos profesores Comunistas que están secretamente en contacto con Rafael Tischler y quienes están ansiosos de crear de nuevo dominación Comunista en el sindicato de maestros ya con ótro nombre.

A este punto en Junio de 1955 el oficial entrega por escrito su plan de operación a su agente superior que lo aconseja y autoriza para hacer el trabajo, haciéndole ver el costo de la operación, el riesgo y el tiempo envuelto y los chances de buen éxito que tendrá. Si el plan es aprobado, el Oficial podrá proceder a reclutar a Fulano de Tal y principiar sus actividades de inteligencia. Al principio en Julio de 1955 las asignaciones serán pequeñas y sin mucha importancia -- de acuerdo con la experiencia del agente. Sin embargo, después de 3-6 meses el agente progresará hasta el punto donde ha adquirido la confianza de los comunistas y después de una serie de reportes aprobados, el Comité podrá hacer los arrestos apropiados en Diciembre de 1955 y pasar la información conseguida a las cortes especiales de prosecución Comunista. El agente mencionado es entonces asignado otro cargo, si no ha sido descubierto, o relevado de más trabajo y el Oficial es entonces obligado a reasignar o reclutar otro agente capaz de llenar el requisito requerido.

En el ejemplo anterior, el oficial de acuerdo con su plan de operaciones le será dado adecuado apoyo financiero, tendrá el uso de los archivos centrales y en crecimiento del Comité para chequear nombres, podrá comprar equipo especial si es necesario, y podrá recibir consejo e instrucción de sus superiores referente a cualquier situación especial que pueda sobre venir.

Este método de operación, después de pasado un tiempo, se hace extremadamente efectivo y claramente sobre pasa el presente, inadecuado y

anticuado método de policía ahora usados por las varias agencias Guatemaltecas encargadas de operaciones de inteligencia. La inmediata llave a este último recurso es tranquilidad política que permitirá llevar a cabo el consumo del tiempo para el entrenamiento de oficiales.



FONDOS CONFIDENCIALES EJECUTIVOS
REVISADOS POR GRUPO ESPECIAL

ADMINISTRACION



OPERACIONES



RUTA DE DOCUMENTOS



Attachment F
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given to CASTILLO

COMITE



Ranchero
OBSERVACION
INVESTIGACION
ADOCTRINAMIENTO
BENEFICIO
NUEVO
PASOS HACIA
UN NUEVO SISTEMA
DE INTELIGENCIA
TRABAJO
CONTRA
COMUNISMO

Attachment G

Attachment "[redacted]"
"G"

Page 1

Brief Summary of Activities

Objectives

1. [illegible] the objectives to be obtained through [illegible] the primary aim was to devise a procedure [illegible] the collection, sorting and reproduction of the [illegible] material for immediate exploitation. The secondary aim of the activity was to establish a records system [illegible] which the Nazis Holocaust and Germany centre of Communismo could produce, [illegible] and utilize materials of interest and train the personnel [illegible].

Procedure

2. The first step was taken by providing the material according to [redacted] organizational source, [illegible] illegible papers and those of which there were numerous extra copies. In addition to documents, the material included large quantities of books, pamphlets, posters, [illegible], etc. Within the organizational arrangement, the salvaged material was then divided into those logical patterns to which each group sent itself. These patterns took the form of geographic, subjective and organizational arrangements. The material, which had been organized into some understandable form, was reviewed for [illegible] value.

3. Out of the [illegible] documents, 2095 documents determined to be of immediate value were automated. Three automatic machines were in constant operation. One of these machines was borrowed from the local [illegible]. Maximum efficiency was not always obtained owing to delays in the procurement of proper paper and solution from headquarters.

4. The material which was not determined to be of immediate interest was microfilmed. Approximately [illegible] microfilmed documents were forwarded to headquarters. While a major portion of the time only one microfilm machine was kept in operation. However, when the local political situation became [illegible], a second camera was borrowed from the Assistant Air Attaché, and both of these machines were kept in full operation.

5. In addition to automation and filming, some 750 positive projection prints were made for local and international newspaper exploitation. [illegible] the darkroom facilities also were available to [illegible] personnel by the Assistant Air Attaché.

6. After reproduction, the original documents were forwarded to the central file unit which had been organized for the Comite. Here the documents were reviewed by local personnel, and those which were to be retained were classified according to a numerical system which had been drawn up for the use of the Comite. The documents were classified, indexed and carded. The main index, as of the fourth week of file room operation, contained approximately 16,900 reference cards. The file unit consists of analysis, numbering control, typing, filing and an index and a name check team. Thus phase two of the records objective was realized.

7. The third and final phase was not put into complete operation owing to the uncertain political and financial status of the Comite. A plan capable of housing future records and which will allow for expansion, was drawn up for the Comite's use by PBHISTORY (see ~~Attach-~~ Para 10 ~~ment~~ A document flow chart showing control points was submitted by [redacted] Headquarters' representative (see attach "F")

Results and Analysis

8. Although the personnel of the records unit contributed actively to phase two of the operation, their experience is not sufficiently extensive to successfully conduct the detailed functions of phase three. Headquarters is therefore advised strongly that additional guidance of a records nature be made available to the Comite in their future work.

9. Phase one was successfully terminated in that it provided Headquarters with a notable volume of information in a minimum of allowed time. The effects of phases two and three, although they give the appearance of a successful operation, cannot be accurately measured as time and experience will be necessary to establish a self-sufficient organization.

Attachment "E"

SECRET

ANNEXES C
CT 2

1o File system to be used by Comite

Archival

100 Administrative

100-1 Name Checks
100-2 Minutes
100-3 Personnel
100-4 Logistics
100-5 Security

200 Personalities

300 International

1-5 Central American Countries

400 Ciudad de Guatemala

500 Area "A"

500-1 Dept. of ----
500-2 Dept. of ----
500-3 Dept. of ----

500-12 Dept. of ----

600 Area "B"

600-1 Dept. of ----
600-2 Dept. of ----
600-3 Dept. of ----

600-11 Dept. of ----

SECRET

Attachment H

HGG-A- 1368

SECRET

SEP 28 1954

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, Guatemala

PBHISTORY

Subject: PBHISTORY Material Reviewed

1. Attached is a report on the PBHISTORY material reviewed. The material mentioned has been divided into seventeen sections with subdivisions, according to the nature of the document, the writer, or the addressee.

2. It is believed that this report may be of interest to the Department of State and USIA, and extra copies are being forwarded for that purpose.

Francis T. Sykes

jpk

Attachment: Report in quintuplicate

27 September 1954

Distribution:
Wash. 3 w/att. in quint.
Files 1 w/att.

SECRET

COPY

35-6-4-041

NATURE OF MATERIAL REVIEWED

With the termination of the project the total number of documents reviewed by the team is conservatively estimated at approximately 500,000. Of this overall total, 50,000 documents were microfilmed, 2095 were autostated, and approximately 100 miscellaneous papers were forwarded to the interested agencies in Washington. Not included in the above estimate is a substantial percentage of duplicate documents or those which are [illegible] tattered or unreadable condition and were eliminated in the preliminary sorting. Not included were several hundred thousand books, pamphlets, posters, magazines, and newspapers.

The bulk of the material is documentary; this contains no appraisal or evaluation. Most of the autostat documents contain, however, the suggested general use: Research, Intelligence, Propaganda, Biographic. The tremendous bulk of material precluded the analysis of each individual document.

The autostat material consists largely of personal and official correspondence of leftist and revolutionary personalities and organizations. Included are their local labor, student, political affiliations. The correspondence between these local Communist-sponsored or controlled organizations and those of many other Communist groups in other countries is abundant.

A limited amount of material was obtained from the Foreign Ministry. Because of the sparcity of the documents, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the development of the Government foreign policy.

The Government programs as they were carried out through its sponsored Agrarian, Labor, Political, Social Security, and Educational syndicates are quite clearly shown through the combined correspondence of these organizations. The voluminous files of all these groups clearly indicate the Communist devotion to duty and their appreciation of organization in a normally badly organized Latin country. The documents are largely in Spanish, with only a handful in other languages.

Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) and Partido Comunista de Guatemala (PCG)

a. Party

Documents #6, 16, 18, 19, 20, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 100, 225, 286, 245, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, [illegible], 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 438, 452, 559, [illegible], 594, 595, 601, 603, 620, 642, 643, 654, [illegible], 655, 741, 752, 806, 809, 810, 812, 887, 889, [illegible], 926, 927, 928, 931, 934, 937, 938, 939, 951, 965, 972, 986, 987, 995, 996, 1015, 1035, 1042, 1066, 1067, 1069, 1073, 1074, 1076, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1092, 1096, 1134, 1135, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1167, 1259, 1260, 1265, 1370, 1371, 1389, 1403, 1413, 1420, 1427, 1428, 1450, 1462, 1464, 1477, 1478, 1484, 1485, 1486, 1487, 1525, 1529, 1539, 1540, 1544, 1548, 1576, 1725, 1774, 1780, 1782, 1783, 2017, 2034, 2076, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082.

b. Liberia Futura

Documents #808, 994, 1950.

c. Tribuna Popular

Documents #220, 1481, 1772.

C. Other Political Parties

a. Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca (PRG) and Partido Socialista (PS)

Documents 722, 162, 317, 418, 430, 655, 877, 975, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 1064, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1170, 1412, 1418, 1423, 1426, 1429, 1430, 1432, 1434, 1449, 1467, 1468, 1469, 1471, 1474, 1482, 1589, 1617, 1623, 1653, 1654, 1735, 1736, 1737, 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741, 1742, 1747, 1750, 1751, 1752, 1753, 1767, 1784, 1785, 1786, 1787, 1788, 1789, 1795, 1796, 1797, 1798, 1799, 1801, 1802, 1803, 1804, 1807, 1808, 1810, 1819, 1893, 1918.

b. Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR)

Documents 342, 519, 564, 801, 943, 998, 1031, 1057, 1062, 1129, 1228, 1414, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1419, 1421, 1422, 1491, 1492, 1493, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, 1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870, 1872, 1873, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1877, 1878, 1880, 1881, 1882, 1883, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1891, 1892.

c. Partido Renovación Nacional (RN)

Documents 316, 431, 627, 1616, 1800, 1975.

d. Partido Integridad Nacional (PIN)

Documents 375, 1923.

[illegible]

[illegible] (AFC)

[illegible] 357, 368, 373, 415, 681, 970,
[illegible]

Youth Groups

a. Local - Juventud Revolucionaria Guatemalteca (JRG), Alianza de la Juventud Democrática de Guatemala (AJDG), etc.

Documents #28, 29, 30, 767, 768, 830, 935, 941, 971, 301, 1510, 1672, 1732, 1759, 1811, 1930.

b. International - World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

Documents #484, 481, 525, 560, 1230, 1706.

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8 October 1954

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