

30 July 1954
EST. DATE

1. **OBJECTIVE:** To exploit immediately 100,000 Guatemalan Communist documents for intelligence and propaganda purposes. To obtain and exploit important data now existing in the files of the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry and other Guatemalan Government agencies. To provide record and filing procedures instructions to the embryonic Guatemalan Government intelligence unit (Comite Nacional de Defensa Contra el Comunismo) and set up a records and file system for the Guatemalan Intelligence Service.
2. **GENERAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE:**
 - a. The Project results from a CIA responsibility under NSC 5412, NSC Directive on Covert Operations, 15 March 1954 (see 3a, b, c, d, e), NSC 142-2, Review of Basic National Security Policy, 30 October 1953 (secs. 1(a), b, 1(d)) and NSC 144-1, U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, 18 March 1953 (section 10). The referenced provisions are available in the CS Policy Book (TS 93000).
 - b. On 19 July 1954 (See TS64323, dated 24 July 1954) DD/P and DDD were advised that Guatemala was, in the judgement of the Department of State, the top priority country in Latin America for covert operations conducted by CIA.
 - c. The above policy is reflected in Missions A and B, Section 2a(1) and in Section 2d(2) of the Covert Operations General Plan-Gold War (TS89000), and in the following approved WHD Operational Planning Objectives stated in Appendix 3 (WH) of Annex B (TS 89000-B) of that Plan, which this project is expected to accomplish in part: a, b, c, d, f; 2a, 4a, 5a, 7a.
 - d. This project was not included in the WH/FFY 1955 Program, as the opportunity for it arose after the Program was submitted.
 - e. This project originated in Headquarters.
3. **SITUATION:** With the fall of the Communist-oriented Arbens regime in Guatemala, a considerable amount of documentary evidence of Communist activity, techniques, propaganda, etc., in that country became available. Much of the data apparently is suitable for exposing various Communist propaganda claims as false, and for making other countries, especially in Latin America, aware of Communist dangers and methods. Exploitation of this material, additionally, provides an opportunity to assist in the organization and operation of a new Guatemalan intelligence service and thereby to develop it into a possible asset.
4. **PROPOSAL:** To send a task force, consisting of nine CIA staff personnel to work in conjunction with four State Department personnel, and one USIA person, and with indigenous personnel to form a "Social Research Group" (Grupo de Estudios Sociales) to carry out the objective, with support of Washington Headquarters of CIA, Department of State, and USIA. The Chairman of the Group in the field, and Coordinator of Washington action will be CIA personnel.
5. **OPERATIONAL OUTLINE:**
 - a. **Tasks:**
 1. To arrange for movement of personnel to field and set up shop.

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- 2) To develop a complete spirit of cooperation between State Department, USAID, and CIA personnel, and also indigenous personnel who become members of the group.
 - 3) To determine concisely the exact priorities of information requirements, and propaganda exploitation.
 - 4) To obtain as complete access to the documents as possible.
 - 5) To obtain clerical personnel and other assistance from the Guatemalan government for preliminary sorting of the material.
 - 6) To provide record and filing procedure instructions to indigenous personnel.
 - 7) To scan the material for intelligence and propaganda material.
 - 8) To reproduce selected materials for transmittal to Washington.
 - 9) To mount, assist and/or direct propaganda activities on behalf of the Guatemalan government, exploiting available documents.
- b. Key Personnel: All personnel will be selected US staff persons with qualifications required for the assigned tasks on the team.
- c. Indigenous Personnel: Indigenous personnel will be appointed by the Guatemalan government, largely for clerical duties.
- d. Target Groups: Propaganda target groups will include Guatemalans supporting the present government, and potentially supporting it; Latin Americans, and other free world audiences who may have received some negative influences from Communist and other anti-US propaganda during the recent change of government in Guatemala.
- e. Duration: The project in its present form is expected to run for three months. However, at the end of two months, a complete summary of progress to date will be written and a recommended modification of the structure of the Group as it is to continue will be suggested.

6. SECURITY:

- a. Cover: The personnel are all going to Guatemala as members of an overt study group to be called "Social Research Group" (Grupo de Estudios Sociales).
- b. Knowledgeability: The host country is witting of official United States interest in this group, but not of CIA interest as such.
- c. Operational Security: The greatest risk to this operation is a counter-coup which might replace the present government with one less sympathetic with United States interests and desires.
- d. Risks: In the unlikely event of a successful counter-coup by unfriendly elements in Guatemala, the activities of this project would add somewhat

to the propaganda mission that could be used against the United States. However, information received as a result of the project is expected to more than off-set any negative propaganda effect in event of such a coup. No significant risk is involved regarding reaction in the United States.

- e. Personnel Disposal: Staff personnel will return and assume former assignments or be reassigned as appropriate. Indigenous personnel are all Guatemalan government employees and no disposal problem as regards this project.
- f. Disaster Plan: None.

7. COORDINATION:

- a. Relation to other projects. This project in time precedes the next PW project (ESPLANADE-K) for Guatemala, but has no direct operational relationship with it. PBHISTORY will use station facilities, but will not otherwise affect station operations. ~~KMFORGET~~ facilities will be used and other stations will be supplied materials as possible and appropriate, through Headquarters PW mechanisms.
- b. Significance within over-all program in area. It is expected that the Communist effort to blame the United States for the Guatemalan revolution will be counteracted to some extent, and that proof of Communist tactics and activities in Guatemala will be found and publicized as a result of this project.
- c. Extent of Coordination:
 - 1) This project has been discussed in the field by a preliminary team which went to Guatemala to examine available documents. The Chief of Station is scheduled to come to Washington for a debriefing and at that time any necessary additional coordination will be worked out. The project is to place in the field a team which will be directed by a chairman. The chairman will coordinate his activities with the Chief of Station.
 - 2) The State Department and USIA are to participate in this project by supplying personnel to the Social Research Group to represent the interests of these two agencies in the selection and exploitation of documents. The State Department will supply four persons and USIA, one or two persons. These persons will be subject to the direction of the chairman in the field.
 - 3) Coordination of the activities of the Social Research Group with the Guatemalan government will be accomplished by the chairman for the most part through the Comite de Defensa contra el Comunismo, but also through personal contacts with the Minister of Propaganda and with the President of Guatemala.

8. CONTROL:

- A. Nature of Control: Control is to be exercised over Staff personnel by usual administrative and employment procedures. Control over indigenous personnel will be exercised through Guatemalan government employment procedures.

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- b. No administrative plan is required.
- c. Dispatch reports will be made from week to week on progress made, and urgent developments will be cabled to Headquarters.

9. BUDGET DATA:

a. Total overall CIA funds required for three months - FY 1955

Salaries (average GS-11)

Overtime (average \$1.60 per hr. 20 hrs per week per individual)

Rental of two automobiles including gas, oil and maintenance, \$45.00 per week per vehicle)

Travel and Per Diem

Two Auto-Stat machines and supplies (reproduction)

One portable microfilm Model "E" and supplies

Two Dictaphone machines complete

Local Procurement office supplies

Office furniture (if no available locally from US Government installation)

Estimated Costs of Operational expenditures as distinguished from Administrative expenditures which includes purchase or procurement of documents from Government and non-Government sources

3,000.00

b. CIA funds required are available from FBSUCCESS allotments for FY 1955. See Memo of 4 August 1954 (DD/P-1-1685) from []

- c. Non-CIA funds are not required.
- d. Foreign currency required will be handled through the Station according to regular procedures for the Station.
- e. Funding. Responsibility for expenditures in Guatemala and accountability will be assigned to the Chairman of the Group. The Station will advance the necessary funds to the Chairman for field expenses. Headquarters expenses will be handled according to the normal financial procedures.
- f. Financial History - None.
- g. Future Requirements. In October the Chairman and team will return to Washington and make recommendations concerning future activities and requirements.

10. SUPPORT DATA:

a. Field Team

- 1 Chief of Team
- 2 FI Officers
- 1 PP Officer
- 2 Micro-photographers
- 1 RI Analyst
- 1 Reports-Administrative
- 1 Secretary

9 (Sub-Total)

Headquarters Support

- 1 FI or PP Officer
- 1 Secretary-Administrative

11 (Total)

(Headquarters Personnel to be assigned Guatemala Desk, Branch III, RI Division)

- b. Material: The following material available commercially is required:
 - 1 Recorder for micro-filming documents and files
 - 1 Portable Typewriter - for stenographic services
 - 2 Auto-Stat machines for quick reproduction of documents
 - 2 Dictaphone recorders and reproducers for stenographic services
 - Supplies, paper, film, developer, etc.
- c. Communications. Station communications facilities will be used. Frequent use of cable facilities for operational queries is expected. Interested Headquarters staff members will be encouraged to visit the field unit, particularly if long, involved problems arise which might unnecessarily hold back the work of the field analysts.
- d. Other CIA support. RI personnel will be required for micro-filming and for providing a record and filing procedure and training in these activities to the Guatemalan representatives who will work with these documents and the records which are expected to become the basic records for a Guatemalan intelligence service. The CIA Library will number and film documents for the purpose of making loan copies for future requestors. FDD will read and process the documents for intelligence they may contain, and will translate and issue reports based on those documents of particular use.
- e. Support required from other United States agencies. USIA will assist in the propaganda exploitation of the documents. The Department of State, DRA/CIR will do intensive research and sifting of the documents for all possible political and Communist party implications, and will issue reports on the findings. These services are available and agreed to by those agencies.

11. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

- a. Current status. Operational.
- b. Commitments. An informal agreement has been reached between State and USIA and the CIA on cooperative sorting, selection and exploitation of the

documents found.

- c. Effectiveness. Not yet applicable.
- d. Anticipated results. It is anticipated (1) that considerable material that can be exploited for propaganda purposes will be found and used to show the Communist character and connections of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala; (2) that documents can be selected to form a valuable intelligence record concerning events and persons important in Guatemala during the past several years, and concerning the operations of Communists and Communism in the Western Hemisphere; (3) that assisting the Guatemalans set up an intelligence unit will provide opportunities for gaining intelligence and PP assets for future use in Guatemala.
- e. Evaluation. Not yet applicable.
- f. Policy questions. No new policy questions are involved.
- g. Congress. There may be some interest in the documents by Congressional committees investigating Communism in the Western Hemisphere.
- h. Extra-agency action. No "farming out" is expected or contemplated.
- i. Proprietary companies. No proprietary company is contemplated.
- j. Special considerations. The present situation in Guatemala with the recent fall of the Communist-oriented regime and the availability of documents left by Communists and Communist organizations presents a unique opportunity to gain information about Communist activities, penetration, methods and techniques. The opportunity to assist the new government set-up an intelligence unit also presents unique operational opportunities which can only be exploited by immediate action.
- k. Liquidation. Withdrawal of personnel and turning unused materials over to station will liquidate this project. No special problems are anticipated.