

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 29 July 1954
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: List of those participating in briefing

White House, 29 July 54
4-5:30 PM.

1. Mr. Dulles - ~~White House~~
2. Mr. Barnes - lawyer + OSS. (TRACY BARNES)
3. [] - Military Intelligence General Staff, U. S. Army, WW II; Chief of Mission Korea during Korean war
4. [] - 3rd Marine Division, WW II; CIA Mission in Korea during Korean war; Chief PM in PBSUCCESS and Field Commander. Will talk on PM and Air operations.
5. [] - Army Signal Corps, WW II, OSS, CIA. Has been with CIA without break since OSS days. In project Chief Commo in field. Will talk on Commo training and field operations.
Staff Sergeant
6. Dave Phillips - bombardier, U. S. 15th Air Force, WW II shot down Wiener Nustadt. Newspaperman and lecturer. Will talk on Radio Liberation.
7. [] U. S. Army World War II, U. S. Army detailed CIA in Korea during Korean war. Will talk re living with Castillo Armas including negotiations in Salvador.
8. [] Military Intelligence 3rd Army, WW II, OSS, CIA. 8 years in Germany for CIA. [] will talk on high level Guatemalan Army defection essentially with []
9. [] - Military Intelligence WW II, [] Editor Neve Zeitung, American sponsored newspaper, Berlin, TIME correspondent [] Will talk on last 24 to 48 hours, essentially the period of the Diaz junta.
10. Frank Wisner - will talk on future plans

C. TRACY BARNES

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GUATEMALA BRIEFING

- (1) Entire briefing top secret and more. Danger in relaxing security after operation completed, particularly if successful.

Fortunate so far in keeping CIA out of publicity. / TIMES & Luce (TIME) /

- (2) Last August pursuant OCB action, initiated program to eliminate pro-Communist government in Guat. Action program approved December. Team assembled from Korea, Germany, Egypt, Chile.

(3) Plan contemplated:

- (a) Internal revolution, spark-plugged by Colonel Castillo Armas from Honduras -- most available Guat exile long subsidized by CIA. In several revolutions.
- (b) Defection of Guat Military at highest level.
- (c) Defection of individual Army garrisons at strong points.
- (d) Radio campaign from clandestine transmitters.
- (e) Subversion of individual Guat leaders, military and civilian.

/Changes during Ops -- importance of air/

Also parallel State Dept. Ops through O.A.S. to hold

conference to take steps vs "Communist Guat."

U.S.A. diplomatic pressures - Navy & Air reconnaissance, etc.

Program budgeted at approximately 3 million dollars.

Total spent slightly in excess.

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(4) U. S. government hand undisclosable. Established theory of fictional group of Anti Commie American businessmen interested in South America and desirous of eliminating Communism (not United Fruit). CIA dealt with Armas as representative this group. Somoza, Galvez, etc., might have made good guess -- but implicated.

(5) Operation presented problems over and above those of usual Banana Republic revolution.

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(6) Background.

Following fall of Dictator Ubico in 1944, pendulum swang far to left and Guatemala under left-wing leader Arevalo 1944 to 1951 when Arbenz took over. Arbenz able army officer but slowly came under complete influence of hard-core Communists, particularly Fortuny, Pellecer, Gutierrz, and others who trained in Communist school, frequent visitors to Moscow and satellites. /Prague School/

Arbenz controlled army; hard-core Communists took over labor unions, radio, major press organs, and dominated Indian peasantry who had little interest in Marx, et cetera. Foreign properties taken over, land divided up and Communist type state fast being organized. Some thirty abortive revolutions.

Time running against us and faced early probability of purge in Army, arming of the laborers, and further liquidation of the intelligentsia. Also critical situation Honduras (elections).

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(7) Via intelligence channels information obtained regarding Arbenz negotiation to purchase 5 million dollars worth of arms from Czechoslovakia. (Refer attempt trace these arms -- ran down wrong vessel (German flag)-- arrival of Alfhem at Puerto Barrios May 15). This arrival really blessing in disguise since publicity brought entire situation Guat to a head. However, resulted severe reprisals and due indiscretions one of our main chains within Guatemala completely liquidated (May 30) and danger that our entire network would be rolled up unless we moved rapidly.

Summer rains impending which would impede ground and air operations. Castillo forces augmented by defections following Alfhem incident but still the total of his forces on D-Day represented 80 bodies trained in guerrilla operations by CIA and approximately 400 men in all went over line on D-Day +. Necessary move immediately or lose psychological opportunity and control of assets. Reports from Guat and outlying regions indicated popular expectation built up by our radio and by events forced decision to move or lose entire initiative.

(8) Operation run --

Policy control: HQ Wash --

Wisner - Bissell

WH Division - Col. King

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Esterline, etc.

Ops Control and Field Coordination:

Lincoln HQ []

Field Control:

[]
[]

Somerset -- Sherwood

Guat City

Support:

[]
[]

- ① Change clean air comm in S. A. Show weakness
- ② Air power - Dangers to them
- ③ Coordinated action - So Defuse C. A.
- ④ Do some thing for Central America

