

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS FILE

~~SECRET~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

8 June 1954

2003

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PBSUCCESS Future

1. The Bissell memo essentially recommends five activities.
 - a. Harassing and sabotage ops immediately using WSHOOPS assets;
 - b. Moving RROs into place;
 - c. Moving organizers into place;
 - d. PP program aimed at the Army; and
 - e. Supplying internal material needs by air drop.

2. The above steps conform essentially with the views of LINCOLN. In order, however, to provide a basis for more precise comparison, operational moves closely related to internal WSBURNT ops will be briefly listed. It should be noted that Hqs. through the cable traffic is already on notice of these moves. Bringing them together in one place, however, should be useful.

A. Organizers

(1) There are a total of 16 organizers to be moved, 4 plus a coordinator for the capitol, 8 for areas other than the capitol, e.g., Caesar, Goss, Bond, Hank, Frank, etc. and 3 to the Gravy areas surrounding the capitol. Despite the partial roll up of the internal organization, Calligeris' staff in WSHOOPS has been able to provide each organizer, with 3 exceptions, with the name of a contact believed unaffected by information obtained from SEMANTIC. The 3 exceptions are all men assigned to the capitol

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~

who left on 29 May before the SEMANTIC incident was an issue. There is no evidence that these men have been lost and Calligeris believes that the coordinator for the capitol who has now been thoroughly briefed will be able to locate the three men. This coordinator as well as the remaining organizers have already started toward their assigned posts or are ready to do so.

B. Radio Operators

One radio operator left on 27 May for his post at Caesar. The SEMANTIC episode, however, occurred before delivery of his set and other gear could take place so that efforts are still being made to enable him to become operational. The remaining six HROs are individually ready to go but details regarding the delivery of their sets, establishment of initial contact, etc. are not as yet resolved so it will still be a few days before they leave.

C. Sab Leaders

There are 26 sab leaders in all. They are slated to go in very soon in order to recruit the additional personnel needed to make up each team, which, of course, varies in relation to the target assigned. Each Sab Leader will take with him materiel sufficient for his assigned task or tasks. In addition to the above a special Sab Instructor was despatched on 3 June to Bond.

D. Special Teams

On 4 June 14 men with enough equipment for instruction purposes were despatched to the Caesar area to do some organizing and instruction. Two additional members of this group have been

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~

held in WSHOOPS as couriers. These were not members of any T/O but were made up of men who exfiltrated.

In the near future two teams of 5 men each are being sent to Mexico arriving on or about 13 June for entry into the western part of WSBURNT for specific sab missions. They plan to be at their targets on 16 June.

E. Shock Troops

This may be a misnomer at the moment but it is intended to convey relatively large groups, about 100 men each, with specific missions of attacking or blocking particular areas or enemy troop movements. They have begun to move to their staging sites on the Honduran border and within a week should be ready to move with such gear as they can carry. The time at which they will move will depend on factors within WSBURNT, but they will be on a readiness basis. It is not necessary to draw on these units for the harassing teams since these can be formed from individuals who have exfiltrated and were not counted on as part of the original planned number. (See "Hornets" below).

F. Hornets

These are teams, probably of 5 men each, made up of individuals who have exfiltrated into WSHOOPS on their own and without orders. There are roughly 150 of such individuals. The teams will consist in so far as possible of individuals from the same locale, will be trained quickly on simple elements of harassment, and then sent back after the preparatory steps set forth in the foregoing

paragraphs have been completed. Although consideration should be given in positioning these teams to their home areas, emphasis will have to be placed on the rear or western areas of the country. Their mission will be to hound the Communists, do some simple sabotage but to lay off soldiers unless actually attacked.

G. Air Support

SYNGARP now has two C-47 aircraft with crews at SOMERSET; one C-47 with crew at FJHOPEFUL; a Cessna 180 at Toncontin in Tegucigalpa with pilot; a Cessna 140 at SOMERSET without pilot; and hopes to have a P-38 soon with pilot and possibly two F-47s with pilots. All ground personnel as well as armorer are hired or spotted. In addition if desirable SYNGARP can have a B-24, though there is no plan to take advantage of this at the moment.

A capacity now exists, therefore, for leaflet or supply drops on a limited scale and in the near future daytime leaflet drops will be possible or escorted supply drops.

H. Movement of Materiel

At present very little materiel has been sent from WSHOOFS. Some 20 suitcases with pistols, SMGs, Ammo. and demo. gear have been carried into WSBURNT and 2 tons of equipment have been sent (5 June) black through DTFROGS on the way to WSBURNT. As already indicated some gear will enter with Sab. Leaders and more with the shock troops if, as and when they enter.

In addition there are some further plans:

(a) Having 5 tons flown by WSHOOPS AF (Col. Acosta) to N. Otepeque farm where it will be picked up and brought into WSBURNT overland;

(b) Sending 3 tons under cover of an Army arms movement to La Ceiba where a boat, already purchased, will move it for transshipment or pick-up off or near the mouth of the Mayagras River, just east of Bond.

(c) Flying loads of about 1000 lbs each by [] to strips within WSBURNT.

(d) [] has carried some gear and may carry some more on subsequent trips. He has a diplomatic passport.

(e) Shipping 6 tons from South Coast of WSHOOPS to WSBURNT coast. No boat has as yet been obtained for this operation and it is unlikely that it will be feasible. As a practical matter it can be seen from the above that air supply, as suggested in the Bissell paper, is the only method which can move a sufficient amount of materiel in a reasonably short period. This method is considered perfectly feasible and the capability exists.

3. Before recommending actual steps to be taken, consideration must be given to the necessities of the situation. In this connection it is believed that an amazing unanimity exists as to most, if not all, of the main points as far as LINCOLN, its field stations, the governments of

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~

KMFLUSH and WSHOOPS, the CALLIGERIS group and the Embassies in WSBURNT and WSHOOPS are concerned. Also, the Bissell paper, if representative of Hqs. thinking, seems to be in essential accord. The basic premise is that early action is vital or the CALLIGERIS group should be forgotten and a new long range KUBARK or ODACID approach should be substituted. Early action will be further elaborated below but in general it means as soon as reasonable operational readiness can be achieved, which granting air drops can be within the next week or ten days. The reasons for such early action are:

- a. Continued inaction will permit the regime to continue its internal roll up unopposed, which will not only weaken potential resistance but depress resistance morale to a dangerous degree.
- b. Any effort to reorganize internal organization beyond its present form would involve a long, complex building process which is out of the question so far as retaining external assets is concerned and provides no assurance that the time involved would not permit regime consolidation rather than a greater capacity to overthrow.
- c. All the evidence points to the fact that the internal situation is as ripe as it will ever be for forceful action. Radio, 32 campaign, leaflet drops, to mention some of the PP factors, plus long knowledge that a movement was underway has caused a maximum tenseness and anticipation. The arms shipment plus repressive measures forced on the regime have required it to clarify as never before that the issue is Communism or non-Communism. Failure to

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~

act during the past three or four weeks has already begun to create doubts as to the existence of an effective opposition which have been emphasized by an internal roll-up so far unopposed. Continued inaction would be fatal.

d. The only existing assets which CALLIGERIS has to mobilize internal action now are substantially ready in WSHOOFS. A failure to use them would result in either their loss or in a wholly abortive unsupported effort on their part.

e. Even assuming the complete failure of the CALLIGERIS assets, still action is urged. Such failure would be due either to an inaccurate estimate of the internal situation, inadequate performance by the CALLIGERIS elements or both. If the estimate is wrong, then little can be done. If the local citizenry doesn't want a change, no outside effort of KUBARK proportion will do the trick. If poor performance occurs, this is inherent in the quality of the people and won't be changed with time. The men are trained, have been brought to the right psychological pitch and have, from every available indication, the most favorable internal situation now.

f. From the point of view of the OAS conference it is strongly felt that action is essential. It is a fairly safe bet that WSBURNT will present a White Paper or its equivalent accusing at least the U.S. and probably the U.S. plus others, of intervention, supporting an invasion, fomenting revolution among other things. Moreover, it is a pretty safe bet that such allegations will be supported by considerable circumstantial evidence, if not more. What such evidence

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

might be is unknown but it would be unrealistic not to assume its existence. With this in mind a quiet WSBURNT would mean the need for a diplomatic, legal type discussion of the evidence or at least formal denials. If some turmoil exists in WSBURNT or if, mirabile dictu, Arbenz is no longer Mr. Big, the issue is much simpler. Evidence of internal dissatisfaction is the best proof that it is WSBURNTERS not outsiders who are the problem. "Take the beam out of your own eye" becomes an appropriate retort and the situation rather than argument should destroy the Commie allegations.

g. The effect of pre-election campaigning and political maneuvering will soon be felt. When it gets worse which may be soon PBSUCCESS could well become a political football or at least government support might be withdrawn. This would be the end, if the move had not already occurred.

h. The rains also are underway and as has often been pointed out will cause a serious problem by early July if not sooner.

4. Granting the accepted need for action, what should it be?

Essentially we are in accord with the five Bissell suggestions. An addition exists which Bissell could not include since the facts were unknown at LINCOLN and Hqs. until after he had written his paper. This is the evidence of exfiltrates who will make up the Hornets. Consequently it is unnecessary to use the men now assigned to Shock Troops for this purpose and the Shock Troops can be held ready to enter when the moment appears appropriate.

5. LINCOLN'S proposal to carry out the Bissell guidance is as follows:

a. Send in organizers, who in fact have gone.

YBAT/PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~

- b. Send in Sab Leaders who in fact have gone.
- c. Send in RROs who are substantially ready to go.
- d. Ready the Shock Troops for action when given the word.
- e. Send in the Hornets who should be ready in 3 or 4 days.
- f. Carry out all plans for sending in gear that are possible other than air supply.
- g. Have air supply ready to function which should be by 10 June.

6. Authority should then be given LINCOLN to undertake such leaflet or supply drops as it considers appropriate. Leaflet drops would probably be few but should be ready to do depending on situation, including authority to make daylight drops from the P-38 if the plane is obtained, is in good shape and can be properly rigged.

7. Supply drops cannot be fully anticipated but at the moment 10 plane loads in seven different areas are contemplated plus additional drops if trouble starts. The DZs have been selected (different from those known to SEMANTIC) carefully plotted and drawn. The gear has been packed and the chutes are at SOMERSET.

8. Authority for supply drops should begin not later than 12 June. Whether or not drops will then be made will depend on weather, existence of reception committees and other factors which can only be determined at the time. Drops may then continue for each of four nights. Thereafter, internal reactions will largely be the guide. If favorable, the shock troops will be despatched and the total effort under way.

YBAT/PBSUCCESS