

## CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

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2003

SECRET/RYBAT

## Routing Form

Doc. No.: HULW-439

Date:

7 JUN 1954

Indicate title of person to take action and that of the originator. Place comments there under by numbered paragraphs. Initial in center of page and draw a line across the page and forward. Each recipient is to repeat above procedure until action completed and ready for filing. This cover-sheet must be retained with enclosure.

TO:

CIR  
DC/P

FROM:

Concur

DATE:

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e/PP

w/w

Exec

DC/P

C/P

C/PP. // To the extent to which [ ] proposals are practicable, they have already been carried out by us, mostly by SHERWOOD. Some are obviously impracticable, e.g. his idea to spread a rumor that the communists want to send Guat troops to Indochina: it is too obvious that if the communists want to commit Guat troops, they want them in the Americas. Apart from that, the fear of having to fight U.S. troops is undoubtedly much more real than the vague possibility of Indochina. The rumor about the Soviet military mission could be revived only if the U.S. mission would actually withdraw ( I am all for it ). The recommendations concerning an embargo are contrary to established policy, I understand. [ ]

8 June

e/PP - Concur / given h/c /

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→ PP files

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VIA AIR  
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HUL-W-439

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~RYBAT~~

1 JUN 1954

TO : Chief of Station, Lincoln

DATE

FROM : Chief, WH

SUBJECT { GENERAL KUGOWN  
SPECIFIC Military themes suggested by [ ]

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

The attached memorandum is forwarded to you for your information and whatever action you deem appropriate.

[ ]  
OLIVER G. GALBOND

Attachment

26 May 1954

Distribution:  
2 - Lincoln

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~RYBAT~~

7 JUN 1954

~~SECRET~~ COPY

24 May 1954

Since the majority of the officers of the Guatemalan Armed Forces have been considered anti-communist and generally pro-U.S. in the past, it is believed an opportune moment to exploit the possibility of creating a split among them due to the recent shipment of arms to that country from behind the iron curtain. It is believed by the undersigned that this shipment will create some discontent and suspicion among the officers towards the high ranking military leaders and the present government. This situation should be exploited immediately to arouse widespread discontent, suspicion and doubt among the officers and enlisted men.

It is assumed that at least 60 to 75% of the officers can be considered anti-communist and generally pro-U.S. It is also assumed that the majority of the Guatemalan population is anti-communist and will support any army action against the government.

A split among the armed forces can be brought about by the following action:

1. Inform the Army and Air Force officers that the U.S. Army and USAF Air Missions will be kicked out of the country and will be replaced by Soviet missions; that these missions will eventually take control of the Army and Air Force with the purpose of dissolving the Officer Corps since they are anti-communist. He must be made to feel that within a year or two he will be out of a job. He must be made to feel that the information is authentic.
2. Create the impression among the officers and enlisted men that the top military leaders have sold their country to the Soviets. Spread the rumor that Diaz's trip in South America was to meet with top Soviet leaders.
3. Spread rumor that the arms are not for the military but will be used to arm peasants as shock troops for the communists.
4. The assassination issue of Colonel Arana should be immediately revived.
5. Religious issue should be exploited to maximum - mass prayers in open to ask liberation from the Soviet infiltration; appeal to the Army Officers to protect their country from this communist invasion.
6. Superstition and lack of education among the Indian enlisted men should be exploited by creating fear and insecurity among them. Their

C O P Y

families should be made to fear that their sons may be sent out of the country to fight in Indochina, etc.

7. A split among the Guardia Civil is also necessary and can be followed along similar lines as indicated above.

It is necessary to reach four or five well-placed officers at first. The information passed to them must be authentic as possible, so that it will tie partially with information that might already be known to him. It must come direct to him from sources that would probably be in a position to know - such as U.S. Service Attaches, Army or USAF Mission Chiefs, or possibly even neighboring diplomatic missions.

University students and market women can be used to advantage to spread rumor and gossip among the population. Market women would be very effective in reaching soldiers' families.

During my recent trip to Guatemala many prominent business and professional men urged that the U.S. impose immediate economic sanctions against Guatemala in order to bring about the collapse of the government. These men felt that the threat of economic collapse of their country would arouse the people so much that they would rebel against the government. They also felt that the majority of the army officers would join in opposition to the government.

The undersigned believes that an immediate embargo of Guatemala by the U.S. Government coupled with a well-planned program to split the armed forces into opposing forces could cause an immediate rebellion against the present government.

In order for this plan to be successful it is necessary for immediate action to be taken in order that present discontent among the armed forces can be properly exploited.

(signed) [ ]