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ANNEXES

FOREWORD:

The Project was compartmentalized as much as possible for reasons of security and efficiency. Every effort was made to keep all key personnel adequately informed of what they needed to know in order to properly fulfill their assigned duties.

In general, it is believed that the system employed proved essential and valuable. However, upon the de-briefing of Project personnel, after completion of the mission, it became apparent that as a result of their respective compartmentalization from the overall operations, they frequently expressed views and opinions which were not particularly accurate. These de-briefings, however, are considered valuable as they reflect conditions in the field during operations and the comments of individuals concerned for future consideration.

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ANNEX A

SECURITY

by

PBSUCCESS Security Officer, Mr. [ ]

PREFACE

On 10 December 1953, the Security Officer assigned to the Project was advised of the proposed assignment by the Chief, Special Security Division, Security Office, at which time the basic elements of the project were outlined. On 17 December 1953, in an interview with the [ ] two basic concepts were set forth and agreed upon. It is believed that these two concepts were the keynote to the subsequent developments of the Project with regard to the security and operational support furnished by the Special Security Division and the Security Office. These two major concepts were:

(1) The establishment of a Project Headquarters on a military installation in [ ] and procurement of sufficient "safe house" and other sterile facilities in the same area, but in such a manner that the entire project could be completed and yet maintain a "plausible denial" of the U.S. Government interest in the overthrow of the pro-Communist regime of Colonel Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman of Guatemala.

(2) The utilization of the security representative as a Staff member whose advice and guidance would be required during the day-to-day developments of the operational aspects of the project. This would require the security representative to have a detailed and intimate knowledge of all aspects of the project including the objectives and operating methods of the PP, PM, FI and administrative staffs.

ESTABLISHMENT OF LINCOLN HEADQUARTERS

At the instigation of [ ] arrangements had been made for the utilization of the second floor of [ ] Only the Commanding Officer and his Executive Officer were aware of the true purpose of the project. An outline of the cover story had been furnished to the Security Officer prior to his departure from Washington on 26 December 1953.

COVER STORY

The cover story was modified in certain respects and embellished in others and put into writing in the form of a regulation which was required reading for all persons assigned to LINCOLN. A copy of this cover story is attached as Exhibit I to this report. It is believed that this cover story served its purpose adequately in view of the fact that there was no major security compromise of the project, in spite of the fact that the project personnel were working and living in close proximity to [ ] who had a normal curiosity with regard to the activities taking place within the LINCOLN offices.

Individual discussions were held with various members of the project in order to assist them in implementing the cover story. It is to be noted that among new employees of the Agency, it is somewhat difficult to convince them that a cover story will be accepted as true by friends and

acquaintances, providing they take sufficient time to learn the cover story and are able to repeat it with some degree of proficiency and in a convincing manner. No difficulty along this line was experienced with regard to personnel who had previous experience with the Agency. From a security standpoint, it is highly undesirable to assign to a project of this sensitivity clerical personnel who have had no prior experience in the Agency, and it is even more undesirable when such personnel are relatively young and as yet immature with regard to self-reliance. Although this situation did exist to a minor degree with regard to some of the employees assigned by Headquarters, no major security compromise was encountered. However, the assignment of such personnel created administrative problems which interfered to some degree with the efficiency of the staff. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that in future projects only experienced clerical personnel be assigned who have some knowledge of covert operations.

#### MILITARY LIAISON

[ ] was contacted and appropriate arrangements were made to provide LINCOLN personnel with special passes to allow their entry and departure from the base without providing the [ ] with a list of LINCOLN personnel. All personnel were briefed with regard to regulations on a military base and were urged to comply with these regulations. During the course of the project, no complaints were received from [ ] with regard to the conduct of LINCOLN personnel while on the post.

It is the recommendation of the Security Officer that a letter of appreciation be forwarded to the Commanding Officer of the [ ] and that mention be made of the excellent cooperation received from the Office of [ ]

#### PHYSICAL SECURITY OF BUILDING [ ]

Necessary locks were placed on the only entrance to the LINCOLN offices and keys were issued to the personnel. A two-way mirror was installed as an additional security precaution. The Chief of Support maintained a duty log to insure the presence of a staff member in the offices on a 24-hour basis. In addition, the Communications Section maintained personnel in their area on a 24-hour a day basis.

#### TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

One of the most urgent needs of the project at the time of its inception was the immediate availability of sterile vehicles for the use of staff members. As LINCOLN is located approximately [ ] adequate transportation facilities were necessary. In addition, persons assigned to the safe houses needed sterile vehicles for their transportation.

Through the services of a cleared consultant of the Special Security Division, a total of five vehicles were obtained on a rental basis. Three of these vehicles were assigned to the safe house installations and two were assigned to LINCOLN headquarters. All of these vehicles were obtained in the name of the cleared consultant and insurance in the amounts of \$100,000 and \$300,000 was obtained to insure adequate protection in the event of accident. All personnel utilizing the cars were briefed on the action they were to take in the event of an accident.

There were two accidents involving these vehicles during the course of this project. One of the accidents involved a vehicle which was procured as a stand-by automobile during the period 30-31 January 1954. The agent



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assigned to stand by with this vehicle did not follow instructions and at the time of the accident it was determined that he had been drinking and was not on duty. Recommendations have been made by the Security Officer in regard to this individual case. However, there was no security compromise as a result of this accident.

The only other accident involved a vehicle assigned to one of the safe houses, and the damages were minor in nature. No security compromise resulted from this accident.

#### SAFE HOUSES

Three safe houses were procured by the Safe House Procurement Officer with the assistance of the Special Security Division, prior to the establishment of the LINCOLN headquarters. All three houses were obtained in a secure manner and all of these houses were located in [ ]

#### Site A

It was originally contemplated that one of the safe houses would be utilized to house the principal indigenous agent and a LINCOLN staff member who acted as Special Coordinator between the indigenous agent and the Chief of Project. The Special Coordinator used an alias and was ostensibly a representative of "The Group." The Group was ostensibly a group of American businessmen who were willing to finance the indigenous agent and his organization in their efforts to overthrow the Communist regime in Guatemala. The safe house used for the above purpose was referred to as Site A.

#### Site B

Another of the safe houses, Site B, was originally intended as a residence for certain indigenous personnel who had been brought into the United States to assist the PP staff in making propaganda broadcasts on tapes for ultimate use on the clandestine radio station in Central America. Due to developments over which LINCOLN had no control, including [ ] on the part of a Western Hemisphere Division agent, [ ] it was necessary to revise procedures and utilize Site B as a conference site where certain basic discussions were held between "The Group" and the two senior representatives of the indigenous forces known as "The Junta."

Site B proved very satisfactory for this purpose and it was at this site that a firm and clear working relationship was developed and agreed upon between The Group and The Junta.

#### THE GUYOL INCIDENT (Site B)

It is believed significant at this point to mention the incident surrounding the assignment of Maurice H. GUYOL, a female staff agent, to Site B. Upon arrival in the [ ], GUYOL did not follow instructions but used her [ ] in obtaining the keys to the site. She also employed a domestic and, as it later developed, obviously furnished this domestic with too much information. GUYOL remained at Site B for a period of only 17 days, but during this time she made many complaints and by her attitude created a great deal of administrative difficulty. She was either unable or unwilling to work under the direction of the project's Special Coordinator and complained that there were too many responsibilities being placed on her shoulders. A 1953 automobile was obtained for her personal use and she stated that she could not drive such a vehicle. Arrangements were then made to procure her

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a 1954 vehicle, which did not appear to satisfy her either. The situation finally became untenable and it was necessary to suggest to her that she return to Washington. She became emotional and inferred that she would have to contact her friends in the National Security Council who, according to her statement, had requested her services. With the consent of the Chief of Project, necessary arrangements were made to have the Chief, WH, recall GUYOL to Washington. It was apparent that GUYOL was neither professionally nor emotionally qualified to handle an assignment of this nature.

#### FBI Report on Site B

During the period of the conferences between The Group and The Junta there was a great deal of traffic going and coming at odd hours. On 18 February 1954, LINCOLN received information to the effect that the FBI had made a report to the effect that the neighbors were suspicious of the activities at Site B. It is significant, however, to note that the information furnished by the neighbors and "a confidential informant of the FBI" was almost precisely a detailed statement of our cover story and in no way compromised the project. Although it has never been resolved by LINCOLN, it is the opinion of the Security Officer that the FBI's confidential informant in this instance was the son of the housekeeper hired by GUYOL. His name was [ ] an investigator for the State's Attorney's Office in [ ]

At the time Site B was procured, it was not realized that the close proximity [ ] would create serious difficulties with regard to transcribing radio broadcasts. One of the rooms of this safe house was soundproofed but even this action did not sufficiently improve the situation. As a result of the report from the FBI and the undesirability of the location from a technical point of view, it was decided to dispense with this site.

#### Site C

This site was obtained for the purpose of using it as a residence for personnel who would be brought to the country for the purpose of assisting in the preparation of written propaganda for the PP program. Due to various delays experienced by the project, it was finally decided to dispense with this site. Site C was used on several occasions for meetings and made an excellent place [ ] Guatemalan personnel assigned to the PP program.

#### Sites D and E

In March, 1954, it was decided to acquire other safe sites and dispense with those which had been originally obtained. This decision was made for both security and technical reasons. Sites A, B and C were all located in residential neighborhoods within close proximity to the neighbors. None of the houses was large enough to handle a sizeable PP staff and housekeeping personnel. The [ ] winter season was drawing to a close and it was decided to obtain two large safe houses to the north of [ ]

Site D, a large house with spacious grounds and a detached two-apartment dwelling, was obtained in March. One of the apartments was used as a recording studio and there were adequate facilities for all personnel assigned to this particular endeavor.

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In April, 1954, Site E was obtained in C 2 and was used as a residence for male personnel. This site was also intended for the use of the Principal Junta agent.

Both Sites D and E proved to be eminently suited for the purposes of this project. Some problems arose with regard to the housing of the Junta personnel in view of the fact that there were both male and female members to be housed. To insure proper decorum, arrangements were made to house the male personnel at Site E and the female members at Site D.

Both Sites D and E were acquired using cleared cut-outs and all necessary security precautions were taken to preclude a compromise.

#### BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS

All staff personnel were briefed on the cover story upon their arrival at LINCOLN. In addition, cover stories were developed for the various staff employees who were going to be travelling in Central America under alias. Upon their return from such trips they were debriefed with regard to the latest details on immigration procedures in the various countries.

#### CAT Pilots

A cover story was developed to be used by the CAT pilots which would cover almost every contingency, including capture by Guatemalan authorities. This cover story explained the presence of the pilots in Central America and also provided them with a plausible reason for flying aircraft in the Nicaragua-Honduras area.

#### RECRUITMENT OF PILOTS

During the latter part of April it became apparent that crews were necessary for the C-47 aircraft. Through contacts of the Security Officer, prospective pilots, co-pilots and cargo kicker crews were selected for contact by the Air Operations Officer under an appropriate alias. Details were worked out with regard to cover stories and a contract was written both in Spanish and in English. Arrangements were made to have the willing prospects travel to Havana, Cuba, where contracts were signed, ostensibly on behalf of the principal agent of the Junta.

Subsequently, it became apparent that fighter aircraft would be necessary to support the FM ground forces. Contracts with fighter pilots were made by the Security Officer using an alias and two American fighter pilots were sent directly to Nicaragua to support the operation, with contracts being signed upon arrival.

#### ESCORT SERVICE

The Special Security Division provided qualified security agents to accompany the classified material being shipped from Headquarters to FJHOPEFUL via LINCOLN. A great many trips of this nature were made during the six-months period.

Also during the course of the project, the Special Security Division provided a Spanish-speaking agent to escort the principal Junta agent from LINCOLN to New Orleans and return on one occasion and from LINCOLN to Mexico via New Orleans and Texas on another occasion.

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The trip to Mexico seems particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that the principal agent became seriously ill and, due to this illness, he was at times irrational. The presence of a Spanish-speaking agent travelling with our principal agent appears in this instance to have been a very fortunate precaution.

#### SURVEILLANCE AND COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE

During the course of the project, nine Latin Americans, some of whom were Guatemalans, were brought into the United States via Miami. Upon each arrival careful check was made to determine whether or not the persons arriving were under surveillance.

Probably the most sensitive entry and departure which was handled by LINCOLN was the case of Colonel Carlos CASTILLO Armas, who was brought into the Miami area under an alias on 29 January 1954. On 30 January the so-called "White Paper" was released in Guatemala, which paper included a picture of CASTILLO Armas and a reproduction of his falsified documentation which he had just used to enter the United States. Fortunately, no questions were raised by the Immigration and Naturalization Service authorities. In order to facilitate his departure, the Security Officer obtained for CASTILLO Armas false documentation as an American citizen and obtained transportation for him back to Honduras via the Panama Canal Zone.

During the entire time that these matters were being handled, every precaution had been exercised to insure the complete security of CASTILLO's movements, particularly during his discussions with [ ] and certain staff members of LINCOLN who were known only by aliases.

#### DOCUMENTATION

Documentation was one of the greatest problems facing LINCOLN and was consistingly an irritating detail that required a great deal of devious maneuvering to accomplish.

One of the most serious weaknesses in the documentation of an agent is the fact that it is apparently impossible to obtain an American passport in alias through channels of this Agency. Through contacts of the Security Officer assigned to LINCOLN, passports in true names were obtained within 45 minutes after a phone call had been made to the contact in the Passport Division in Washington. It was learned that this was a preferable method of obtaining a passport in true name than going through the channels established by the Agency, which resulted in a delay of two or three weeks before a passport could be issued. Clearly, the decision had to be made by the Security Officer of the project as to whether or not the rules and regulations of the Agency would be adhered to and the administrative channels followed, or whether the project would take priority. As one of the recommendations of this report it is strongly suggested that the whole question of documentation be explored with a view to expediting procedures and considering the feasibility of obtaining U.S. passports in alias. The facilities as demonstrated by Central Processing Section within Headquarters are totally inadequate insofar as supporting a project of any urgency whatsoever. With regard to project PBSUCCESS, two or three weeks were impossible delays and could not be tolerated. In many instances two or three hours were considered crucial to the problem at hand. It is the considered opinion of the Security Officer as a result of six months experience on project PBSUCCESS, that certain administrative support functions handled by Headquarters are simply not geared to support of this nature within a reasonable length of time, is Central Processing Section.

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COURIER SERVICE

The Security Office assisted the Administrative Support Section in establishing an unofficial courier system between LINCOLN and operations in Nicaragua. This proved to be a rather difficult problem in view of the fact that the President of Nicaragua had cancelled all permits for visitors to his country. It was necessary to have certain highly classified material and recording tapes carried by a courier who could meet a contact at the airport in Nicaragua during the brief stop on the flight between the United States and Panama. Subsequently, arrangements were made to obtain special entry permits [ ] for four of these couriers who made an average of three or four trips each week to and from Nicaragua. A schedule had to be arranged to insure that the couriers did not go through the target country. With the assistance of the Air Operations Officer, who was later assigned to the [ ] special permits to enter that country were obtained for a number of persons under both true name and alias.

LETTER DROP FACILITIES

[ ] A total of eight post office boxes were obtained and serviced daily [ ] for cover mail purposes during the course of the project. Some of these facilities were changed during the course of the project for security reasons, but there apparently was no security compromise in the handling of the mail. One box was obtained for the receipt of personal mail by certain of the project personnel. Another box was obtained for the receipt of registered mail from Headquarters. One post office box was used as a two-way facility for the receipt and forwarding of mail to the unwitting pilots recruited in [ ] [ ]. A post office box was obtained for the receipt of mail forwarded from New York and addressed to one of the female indigenous personnel residing at one of the safe houses. One post office facility was established as a backstop for the receipt of newspapers forwarded from Central America and another box was obtained under the alias of one of the staff personnel assigned to a safe house. In addition, one box was obtained for receipt of personal mail forwarded from New York intended for two of the indigenous male agents residing at the safe house and one box was obtained in the true name of a staff agent assigned to the project on a temporary basis and whose cover story was such that he could use his true name.

Also, letter drops were established and serviced by the Special Security Division in New York and Washington, D.C.

One live mail facility was established in [ ] [ ] for the CE officer of the project whose assignment required his operating under alias in the target country. This address was used as a backstop for any inquiries that may have been initiated to determine the accuracy of his statements regarding temporary residence in [ ] [ ]

NEWSPAPERS (Acquisition of Central American Papers)

To have a reasonably current and accurate PP program, it was necessary that newspapers from Central America be obtained in the most expeditious manner possible. Accordingly, inquiries were made on the best method of procuring these newspapers and it was determined that the use of the air waybill system would be the most practicable solution. In order to have some backstopping to this procedure and provide a plausible reason for ordering these newspapers, a post office box was obtained in the name of the International Survey Associates. This fictitious concern was ostensibly conducting

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advertising and research surveys of various Central American newspapers on behalf of a number of large U.S. firms interested in growing new markets in Latin America. Each one of the [ ] was issued explicit instructions on the method of forwarding newspapers via air waybill on a daily basis addressed to the International Survey Associates; however, each bundle of newspapers, representing both the anti-Communist and pro-Communist sentiments in the countries concerned, was marked "WILL CALL - PLEASE HOLD." In this manner, the various consignments of newspapers could be picked up at the airport upon arrival, thus expediting delivery to the PP staff. In the event some of the papers were late in arriving, they would automatically be forwarded to the Post Office where they would be picked up at the time the box was serviced. In this manner, newspapers from Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras and Mexico were obtained within twenty-four hours of publication.

Spanish language newspapers published in Havana, Miami and New York also were obtained on a daily basis as well as the New York Times.

These newspapers plus the press service dispatches and constant monitoring of certain Latin American radio stations provided the PP staff with current and accurate information on which to base their production.

SECURITY PERSONNEL

On 17 December 1953, [ ] was assigned as Security Officer for PBSUCCESS and was authorized to use his wife, Mrs. [ ] as secretary until such time as she might go on maternity leave which had previously been authorized. The Security Officer arrived at LINCOLN on 28 December 1953 and his secretary reported to duty at LINCOLN on 29 December 1953.

Prior to the arrival of the Security Officer, the Special Security Division had assigned [ ] to the LINCOLN area to furnish operational support to the Station. [ ] remained on assignment in the LINCOLN area until April 1954.

Miss [ ] replaced [ ] as secretary to the Security Officer on or about 1 March 1954.

[ ] was assigned to FJHOPEFUL as Security Officer by the Special Security Division on or about 15 March 1954 where he was charged with responsibility for the security of PBSUCCESS operations.

[ ] was assigned as Assistant Security Officer on or about 9 February 1954. On 28 May 1954, [ ] resigned from the Project and from the Agency to accept employment in private business.

[ ] replaced [ ] as Assistant Security Officer on or about 28 May 1954 and remained until completion of the Project.

LINCOLN maintained no list of names of the various Special Security Division personnel whose services were utilized in the escort activities, although it is estimated that more than fourteen different agents took part in the many supply flights from Headquarters to FJHOPEFUL via LINCOLN.

POLYGRAPH SUPPORT

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CLEARANCES

During the course of the Project, actually from 2 January 1954 to 30 June 1954, LINCOLN requested and received:

- 88 Provisional Operational Clearances
- 70 Operational Clearances
- 24 Provisional Covert Security Clearances
- 11 Covert Security Clearances

TOTAL 223 Clearance actions.

The majority of these clearances were issued during the first three months of the Project. In addition, 61 Special Inquiry and Information Inquiry type of cases were initiated by LINCOLN and completed by Headquarters. There were only 14 cases in which derogatory information required the cancellation of the clearance request.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It was the desire of the Chief of the Project to have the Security Officer in a position to maintain a direct channel of communication with the Security Office in Headquarters on matters pertaining to clearances and other security matters. For reasons which were never made quite clear, this direct channel was never achieved. It would appear, from the LINCOLN Security Officer's point of view, that information copies of requests for clearances were furnished to the Security Office. However, Security could take no direct action on a request from the Security Officer assigned to LINCOLN. In other words, the LINCOLN Security Officer would make a request to Headquarters for a Covert Security Clearance on an individual and "slug" the cable for the attention of the security office. For the first two and one-half months of the Project, security did not even receive copies of these requests. It is not known who instructed the cable secretariat not to furnish security with a copy of a cable which was slugged for their information. Although it was never explained to the Security Officer why this condition should prevail, this type of procedure caused additional work which was totally unnecessary. A clearance request went to the Western Hemisphere Division where they, in turn, would write up a request to either the Security Office or to Staff C.

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In many instances, the Security Officer at LINCOLN would request a specific type of clearance and in about 10 days another type of clearance would be issued. On a number of occasions, Covert Security Clearances were requested for Americans who were going to be used in Latin America and for certain Latins who would be used in the United States. In view of the fact that the request had to go to Western Hemisphere Division, for reasons never clear, they would make a decision as to what type of clearance should be issued. In other words, person or persons unknown in WHDivision would make a decision on the type of clearance needed contrary to the request made by the LINCOLN Security Officer.

During the latter part of the Project, Security did receive information copies of cables slugged "SECUR." The Security Officer was assigned to the Project for the purpose of handling, among other things, the initiation of appropriate clearances on indigenous and American personnel. To handicap the Security Officer by not allowing him a channel of communication with his office in Headquarters does not appear to make good sense. All messages emanating from LINCOLN had to be initiated by either the Chief of the Project or the Deputy Chief of the Project. Under this procedure there could be no unilateral communication between the LINCOLN Security Officer and the Headquarters office that could have been considered as "uncontrolled traffic." It would appear to have been much more practical to allow the Security Officer of the Project to have forwarded through the Chief of Project action copies of requests to his office in Headquarters with an information copy to the Project supporting staff in Headquarters. In this manner, persons not familiar with clearances and the terminology used in security work would not become involved unnecessarily in these matters. In essence, there were persons in Headquarters handling clearance requests whose existence was not justified. If the request could have gone directly to the office which took action and an information copy furnished to the Project supporting staff, it would have expedited the clearance action and precluded a great deal of misunderstanding. Misunderstandings did develop in view of the fact that there were persons handling security matters in Western Hemisphere Division who were not themselves qualified in the security field. Therefore it is recommended that consideration be given in the future for the Security Officer assigned to a Project to have a channel of communication to the Security Office in Headquarters to expedite and coordinate clearance requests and other matters of security.

Unless the Security Officer is made a staff member of a Project and is aware of the detailed operations on a day-to-day basis, he cannot furnish proper support and guidance. As a final statement, it is believed that Project PBSUCCESS is ample evidence and sufficient proof that the utilization of a Security representative as a staff member is a sound method of operating.

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ANNEX A

Attachment

9 January 1954

"Official Cover Story - LINCOLN Station Personnel"

1. The following cover story applies to all LINCOLN Station personnel and may be used on C ] You should read this cover story carefully and, if additional clarification or implementation of the cover story is needed, you will contact the Security Officer for advice and guidance.
2. You are an employee of the C ] This unit was established under the C ] which is an Agency within the Department of Defense. The unit to which you are assigned is actually a field "task" force sent out to make the initial exploratory survey to establish a field administrative office. In other words, your unit was sent to C ] to set up a field office to handle the administration and paper work necessary for supporting the technicians, engineers, chemists, biologists and geologists who will be arriving at a later date if the budget is approved. At this time, only sufficient funds have been advanced for the unit to set up an administrative office and make necessary arrangements to establish contact and channels of communications with various universities, manufacturing research laboratories, and various industrial and chemical concerns.
3. Your specific duties are the same as in any government job. If you are a clerical employee, you are a typist, secretary, administrative assistant, etc. If you are a staff employee, you are an "Administrative Officer," "Finance Officer," "Research Analyst," "Logistics Officer," "Plans and Support Officer," etc. A title in the government usually doesn't (a), indicate the actual duties of a person, or (b) make sense to other government employees or persons outside the government.
4. How did this take place and just what is this unit all about? The Department of Defense is the largest department in the government and has under its jurisdiction the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and a large number of agencies. Officials high in the Department of Defense recognized the need for an organization to do certain research and survey work that was of interest not only to the Army, Navy and Air Force, but also of interest to other government agencies within the defense establishment. Most of this research is in the field of technical subjects relating to such things as mineral deposits and the testing of these deposits for possible use in industry or as possible sources of energy. Marine deposits (sand, coral, etc.) found in tropical and semi-tropical climates are also being collected and analyzed for various reasons. Various types of plant life and marine life will also be collected for study and one result of this research could help in the military survival tests. For example, great progress has been made in the field of military survival research by determining that many types of shell life and tropical plants are edible and can sustain the life of soldiers or sailors who are stranded in these places or cut off from normal food supplies.

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5. Of course a great deal of this research in the fields of biology, geology and chemistry is naturally classified. This is not at all unusual. The fact that such research would develop information which we would not wish the rest of the world to know is accepted by all persons.

6. You must remember that you are not one of the technical people nor are you an expert in any of these fields. You do have a general knowledge of the purpose of the unit and generally know of some of the items of interest to the technical people, but most of it is "Greek" to you. If you are a Staff Member, your job is to assist the technical people in getting their reports on paper and properly distributed as well as aiding them in maintaining a flow of technical reports, editing, and the vast amount of paper work necessary for such a venture. The clerical personnel assist in typing these reports, making copies, duplicating material for distribution, etc.

7. In the simplest of terms, you are working with a Defense Department Unit to which has been assigned members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and other Agencies, in order to conduct a survey to obtain basic information and samples to be used for research work in the fields of geology, chemistry, biology, and other technical fields ranging from geomagnetism to the energy radiation of various rare elements. It would be well for you to remember the terms used in this Regulation and if you are not sure of your cover story, you will contact the Security Officer and he will assist you in putting the story into language best suited to your individual case. The field is a technical one and you are not supposed to have any technical knowledge, and as a rule people that you meet will not be particularly interested once they learn of the technical nature of the work.

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ANNEX A

SECURITY

FJHOPEFUL - BY [ ]

[ ] served as Security Officer at FJHOPEFUL from 20 March 1954 to 7 July 1954, during which time the following security matters were handled.

Upon arrival, he was advised by the Acting Chief of Station, FJHOPEFUL, that the Military Police guard at the main gate was to be withdrawn. Through the cooperation of the Chief of [ ] arrangements were made whereby the tour of duty of this guard force was extended for an indefinite period.

At the time he arrived at FJHOPEFUL, packaging of categories 2, 3 and 4 materials was in progress. This packaging was supervised from a security standpoint, and security advice was rendered from time to time. It is noted that packaging which was to have left Washington sterile was not always so. Arrangements were set up for the destruction of excess wrappings and materials by burning or, in the case of certain items, by jettison. As storage and working areas were vacated, they were sterilized prior to being abandoned.

Sterilized airplanes were inspected by the Security Officer and the Air Operations Officer both internally and externally prior to any operational use to insure maximum sterilization. The security officer maintained a continuous security check as each plane was inspected from a security standpoint prior to each flight. The security officer was present during all loading and at each takeoff and landing. Upon completion of the air operations phase of this project, previously cleared air force personnel from [ ] were brought to the operational site at [ ] where they painted appropriate identification markings on the planes to permit their return to the United States.

A recreation program was set up whereby P/M and Deflect personnel were provided with outside recreation in such a manner so as not to jeopardize security of the project. The security officer accompanied these groups whenever they left the base in order that he might handle and backstop any problems which might arise.

All personnel who were used by PBSUCCESS were security briefed upon arrival and departure and personal baggage of personnel moving back was sterilized. The Security Officer checked Deflect personnel prior to each flight to insure sterilization and their cover story was gone over periodically for review and adjustment.

Utilizing facilities of the Chief of [ ] arrangements were set up whereby passports and tourist cards which had been permitted to expire could be validated at such a time as personnel were ready for return to the United States.

When necessary, action was initiated to secure appropriate security

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clearances for individuals who, due to their position, might possibly have gleaned knowledge of some phase of the project.

Throughout the time he was at FJHOPEFUL, efforts were made to keep things on a need-to-know basis and to keep conversation on a social level. It is his feeling that security at FJHOPEFUL was, through the fine cooperation of all concerned, maintained at a high level.

A constant night patrol was maintained on the base and, while possible, 24-hour security coverage was maintained in the working area.

Since security and morale are closely allied, it is his opinion that handling of personal mail should be given high priority. Upon arrival at FJHOPEFUL it was found that some personnel were using a [

] post office box. This mail moved rapidly. However, Deflect personnel and others who, due to operational necessity, could not use the above facility waited weeks before receiving mail, and it was often months old. It is recommended that in future planning for projects of this kind, handling of mail be made a phase of initial planning.

It is also his opinion that much of the packing and sterilization which was done at FJHOPEFUL could have been done more satisfactorily using facilities in the United States with FJHOPEFUL being used as a storage and transfer point. Use of a U. S. site would have permitted better sterilization and at a substantial saving.

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ANNEX B

PARA-MILITARY

PART ONE -- by PBSUCCESS PM Officer, Mr [ ]

I. GENERAL:

A. This report is to serve three purposes: To record the operation from its outset to its finish; to summarize the factors adding to and detracting from the success of the operation; and to list those errors made, avoidable in future operations.

B. The outline to be followed will be informal and in chronological order as follows:

1. Staging and Pre-Operation Preparations.
2. The Operation.
3. Comments.

II. STAGING AND PRE-OPERATION PREPARATIONS:

A. The Background of the Situation Prior to the Staging

1. Approximately 85 of CASTILLO Armas' personnel had received training in Nicaragua, 75 of these under the guidance of PIVALL. PIVALL graduated 30 sabotage leaders, 6 shock troop leaders, 16 organizers, 4 staff personnel and 79 incompetents. Exactly 13 radio operators graduated under the guidance of [ ]

2. Eighty-nine tons of equipment were prepared in three forms at FJHOPEFUL. Forty-three tons were waterproofed for burial. Fifteen tons were packed for drop. Thirty-one tons were prepared for shock troop use. Prior to the staging period the entire burial and shock troop equipment had been moved to Honduras [ ]

4. The personnel situation: We were operating under the belief that we had 267 men in Honduras and Salvador for use as shock troops and specialists, outside of the training personnel that had been sent to Nicaragua.

5. Plans:

a. Our plans were based on the belief and strong proof that a large percentage of the people inside Guatemala were opposed to Communism and were willing to fight against Communists, and the belief that the CASTILLO Armas organization was a good one and that CASTILLO Armas had strong organizations in each of the 9 target areas. Each of these target areas was to be organized by a trained organizer to the point that each target area could be

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conquered by its own inner organization, with the realization that the amount of organization within the Army unit would be the key to the amount of bloodshed necessary.

b. In addition, shock troops were prepared in the following manner:

Puerto Barrios -- 116 men under the leadership of Colonel TORRES, to move from Macualizo to Tenedores to Entre Rios, in order to seal off the Puerto Barrios area.

Jutiapa -- 46 men under FERNANDEZ to move from a point 15 miles west of Metapan through Asuncion Mita to Jutiapa and subsequently to the capital city.

A force of 70 men under Colonel CHAJON was to move from Florido to Carta Blanca and be in position in Zacapa at H-Hour.

A force of 96 men under NEIDERHEITMANN was to move from Copan Ruinas to Camotan to Jocotan to Vado Hondo to seize Chiquimula. They were to hold at Chiquimula until it could be seen whether Zacapa or Jutiapa forces needed aid.

A force of 106 men under Colonel MENDOZA was to move from Nuevo Ocotepeque to Esquipulas to Quezaltepeque. They were to hold at Quezaltepeque and if no aid was needed at Zacapa or Jutiapa, they were to move to San Luis Jilotepeque to Jalapa to Palencia to Guatemala City.

PEREZ with 16 men was to break away from TORRES' group and take Morales in order to back up the block of Puerto Barrios.

#### B. Staging and Preparation for the Operation

1. Just prior to D-Day the Communists made a concerted drive against our inner organization. Thousands of people, including key leaders of the Army and civilians were jailed or otherwise incapacitated.

2. Based on the fact that we believed the inner organizations were much more extensive than the portion jailed, we decided to launch the organizers and sabotage leaders to the undamaged portion of the inner organization.

3. All organizers and sabotage leaders were launched by 10 July. It is not known the percentage of these men that reached their destination, but there are many reasons to believe that a large percentage were intercepted at the border.

4. Twenty-two pre-D-Day drops were attempted. No definite light patterns were received on these drops. Portions of the arms were used later at Canales, Palencia and Quezaltenango.

5. Resident radio operators were launched, and later contact was made with Zacapa, Puerto Barrios, Guatemala City and Quezaltenango. One Quezaltenango radio operator and one Guatemala City radio operator did not come up. A radio operator formerly scheduled for Jutiapa was converted to a tactical radio operator.

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6. Approximately 100 men crossed into Honduras from Jutiapa just prior to D-Day. In light of the recent roll-up of our inner organization, it was decided to use these men as harassment teams to agitate the rear of the enemy in order to determine if such agitation would ignite the inner organization to the point of a premature D-Day, at the same time hoping that an organized D-Day could be launched when practicable.

7. On assembling the shock troops, however, it was found that the total of CASTILLO Armas' available men was approximately 165. We used the 100 men scheduled for harassment teams in order to fill out our shock troops and depended on pre-D-Day air drops to provide the agitation desired to stir up the inner forces. In addition, Nicaraguans, Costa Ricans, Hondurans and any other interested parties that wanted to join our shock troops were recruited.

8. A pre-D-Day movement of arms into Guatemala was not as successful as desired due to the Alfhem alert, delay in movement to Honduras and other troubles too numerous to mention.

9. Two days before D-Day, the decision to request permission to go was made. The facts bearing on the case were weighed and the field decision to request permission to go ahead was made in spite of the fact that in many cases we could not follow the original plan. One of the most weighing factors was the belief that the history of failing organizations is based more on failures to act than on failures from acting. A report on the factual condition of the situation was withheld with the realization that if the full situation were reported, pressure from above LINCOLN might have caused a delay in operations. A firm belief was shared by all that further delay would only call for a deteriorating situation.

### III. THE OPERATION:

On the evening of the 18th all shock troops crossed the line at first darkness as scheduled. Throughout the 19th reporting was sketchy. On the 20th TORRES passed Tenedores. NEIDERHEITMANN captured Camotan after a short fight with only one casualty. MENDOZA took Esquipulas with no fight. At this point we picked up 400 recruits for the MENDOZA group. CHAJON was reported at Carta Blanca. PEREZ departed the FERNANDEZ group. The Gualan sabotage team cut the rail bridge between Zacapa and Puerto Barrios. Indications are that communications cuts from Jutiapa to Guatemala City, San Jose to Guatemala City, Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City and Zacapa to Guatemala City were successful at this time. [ ] bombed tanks at San Jose and Retalhueh.

On the 21st CHAJON was resupplied four miles out of Gualan, indicating that he was not where he was supposed to be. He was resupplied during the daylight hours. FERNANDEZ joined MENDOZA and his instructions were to break away when Quezaltepeque was taken and go to Jutiapa. MENDOZA was moving toward Vado Hondo. NEIDERHEITMANN captured Jocotan after a small fight with the local garrison. TORRES captured one half of Puerto Barrios and controlled the communications from Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City. PEREZ captured Morales, Bananera and Los Amates. [ ] bombed the tanks at Puerto Barrios.

On the 22nd CHAJON sent an advance party into Gualan, which party became engaged with the opposition. He took the remainder of his forces to support the engagement and after winning, he remained in Gualan. The same day the La Ceiba boat, apparently off course, as they were scheduled to land to a reception party near Santo Tomas, landed above Puerto Barrios and immediately

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became involved in a fire fight. The exact efficiency of this group can only be determined by the fact that every Puerto Barrios military communique from this day on mentioned this group of 27 men and grossly exaggerated their size. The last nine men were captured on the night of the 28th. NEIDERHEITMANN and MENDOZA joined at Vado Hondo. CASTILLO Armas joined them there, and the FCP moved to Managua. The fighter aircraft ran their first tactical mission, hitting the Guatemala City tanks on this date. TORRES was still containing the Puerto Barrios group. PEREZ occupied Morales. Reports from TGW indicated Canales and Quezaltenango uprisings among the populace, and the two chiefs of the Chiquimula Garrison were captured by surprise at Vado Hondo.

On the 23rd CHAJON met a superior force at Gualan consisting of the majority of the reinforced Zacapa Command. His radio operator was incapacitated and the radio destroyed, CHAJON retreating to a point near La Union. MENDOZA and NEIDERHEITMANN attacked Chiquimula without air support. The attack was successful except for remnants of the garrison which held out at the Cuartel. Thirty-two men and two officers were captured. The men reported that the Army did not desire to fight CASTILLO Armas. One of the officers joined our forces. TORRES fled from Puerto Barrios under duress. PEREZ was still holding Morales on the 23rd. The fighter support on that day hit the Zacapa Garrison, exploding an ammo storage dump, and bombed a bridge between Chiquimula and Jutiapa.

On the 24th air support was launched against the garrison that was holding out in the Cuartel at Chiquimula and against artillery installations within range of the town. An unsuccessful try was made to resupply a reported 500 men organized at Jutiapa. PEREZ was forced to retreat into the mountains near Morales and the Puerto Barrios commander dispatched a large group toward the Zacapa area. Air search along the Puerto Barrios-Zacapa corridor was made a daily secondary mission for fighter aircraft from this point forward.

On the 25th the Zacapa Garrison counter-attacked Chiquimula. This counter-attack was withstood by a junior officer, Antonio BETETA, with 200 men. MENDOZA was brought into the fight as support and was reported as having left in the face of the enemy. BETETA reports 500 enemy dead, probably an exaggerated report. BETETA's weapons placement and leadership won the day. The Guardia de Honor was reported moving from Ipala toward Quezaltepeque. Air search and opportune strike flights were run on a continuous basis from this point forward. A small drop was made to a group at Jalapa. Immediately thereafter the recipients attacked the Jalapa Garrison. The air section hit four trains full of re-enforcements, destroying three of them. Matamoros was hit. El Jicaro bridge was destroyed and the Zacapa to Chiquimula road was strafed and bombed to prevent re-enforcement from Zacapa. Two hundred fifty enemy troops were reported at La Union. Recruits continued to flock to the Liberation Army. The reported strength was 1100 at Chiquimula.

On the 26th the Zacapa Garrison again counter-attacked Chiquimula. On the same day our air support surprised them assembling at the line of departure and they were easily routed. The Jalapa group was resupplied and immediately the enemy commander reported that he was under attack by 1500 rebels. It is believed that the appearance and equipping of this group caused the immediate holding up of the Guardia de Honor in its advance into our rear from Ipala to Quezaltepeque and caused the enemy commander to delay throwing his reserves in at Zacapa-Chiquimula. The air section hit the Zacapa marshalling yards, hitting one passenger train carrying troops, hit the Jutiapa bridge and strafed TGW.

Intelligence reports that TGW went off the air at that time and that Quezaltenango radio shifted frequency to TGW frequency, Quezaltenango radio ostensibly becoming TGW. Through YDIGORAS Fuentes offered 300 men to cross against Jutiapa from Salvador. He was lined up with an air drop which was to occur on the night of the 30th. He was given operation money and dispatched to Salvador to make the arrangements. (Eventually, when the final Junta was formed, YDIGORAS was informed that he was not to cross the border under any circumstances.)

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All radios were ordered to concentrate on communications cuts, as evidence was on hand to substantiate the fact that PT/16 was causing confusion, which was coneractable only by phone and telegraph. Proof that the teams must have acted on orders comes from a Guatemalan Army emergency order the following day to protect the lines against the rebels at all costs.

On the 27th CASTILLO Armas attacked Zacapa and on receipt of enemy fire and without air support due to weather fell back to Chiquimula. The fighter support assigned to hit the tanks at San Jose struck a ship of unknown origin reported by [ ] to be carrying arms to Guatemala.

On the 28th a 200-man feint was launched at Ipala for the purpose of deception, and at total darkness all forces were pulled down to the road for the final attack on Zacapa. The air section that day hit the Zacapa fort, getting secondary explosions, making us believe an ammo dump was hit. Matamoros was bombed again. TGW was strafed and bombed. The Jalapa group was launched toward Zacapa and CHACON was resupplied and instructed to move to Zacapa the following morning.

On the 29th all ground forces and air support commenced the attack on Zacapa. The advance party entered Zacapa. Zacapa officers were conferred with and arrangements for the Zacapa truce were made by Major OLIVA. The MONZON agreement was completed, and our forces were ordered to hold up. The final disposition of troops was 1500 of CASTILLO Armas' men surrounding 700 Zacapa soldiers at Zacapa, with a reported 4500 men of the Guatemalan Army below Quezaltepeque and 1500 Liberation Army above and to the left of Quezaltepeque at Jalapa.

#### IV. COMMENTS:

Certain lessons, some newly learned and some paramilitary axioms ignored for the sake of expediency, should be recorded for KUBARK/KUHOOK study and prevention or inclusion in future operations.

##### A. Planning

As can happen in any military or paramilitary operation, PBSUCCESS Headquarters was massive, while the implementing staff was necessarily restricted to a very few. Twenty men can easily think up more things to be done than three men can put into practice. The end result is either a necessary discarding of ideas or a valiant but imperfect implementation of the plans handed down. In this case, because of the loyalty and untiring devotion of KUHOOK field personnel to the project at hand, the latter case proved true. In the event the above is unavoidable in the future, care should be taken to arrange the planning/implementation time ratio giving the implementation phase its proper precedence. Again, since the KUHOOK field personnel did devote itself to the job, the defect was not seriously detrimental but could have been one more possible asset to the opposition.

##### B. Headquarters Direction

It is believed that one of the keys to the success of the operation was LINCOLN's willingness to delegate command to the field at the crucial operational moment. LINCOLN direction was completely constructive and avoided hand-tying, operation-crippling restrictions sometimes found in this type of project.

LINCOLN laid down the rules of conduct of the operation before the operation, confining its direction to those new situations which developed as the operation progressed. This should serve as a model for the future.

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C. Timing Errors

Unfortunately, three incidents completely removed the element of surprise:

1. The propaganda program, one of the most effective arms of the project's paramilitary machine, was exposed prematurely in this writer's opinion. The first leaflet drop caused the opposition to spring into action right at the moment when the inner organization was necessarily the most active -- organizing, equipping, recruiting, etc. To quote SOMOZA: "In my country I have much opposition, mostly underground. I cannot afford to continually oppress that opposition, but at the first sign that it is ready to act, for instance with the type of forewarning that your leaflet drop gave to ARBENZ, I would do exactly what he did -- incapacitate the entire organization if possible."

In fairness to the PP Section, any criticism of this leaflet drop is "Monday Morning Quarterbacking." All field personnel, including the principal agent and his staff, were elated at the first news of the successful drop, and it was only when the serious consequences occurred that the act was criticized.

It is believed that the most effective leaflet drops during the operation were those following a successful paramilitary blow.

2. The premature paramilitary actions in connection with the attempt to stop the Alfhem arms movement aided the enemy in preparing counteraction to the movement. By not accomplishing the destruction of the arms and yet exposing routes of ingress and launching points, we practically negated proposed arms and specialists' movements due to occur within the following three weeks.

3. A request for a June 16 crossing and a June 18 H-Hour was delayed on June 16 to a June 18 crossing, again giving the opposition extra days of preparation after certain exposing preparatory moves had been made.

The result of the above errors was a dearth of coordination of underground support to the operation.

D. Value of Training

One major factor in the success of shock troop movement and combat was the calibre of unit and sub-unit leaders. Our leaders proved more effective than those of the opposition in the ground skirmishes and in the two major battles engaged in. It is believed that this effectiveness was gained in paramilitary training received under U. S. direction.

In addition to lifting the morale and confidence of the troops, the military efficiency of the unit leaders was shown when the first counterattack against our forces was withstood solely because of a junior officer's wise weapons placement and command presence under fire. Although very seldom in the future will we be able to train hosts of troops when working behind the Iron Curtain, it should be a prerequisite of our KUHOOK programs that we withdraw unit and sub-unit leaders for at least a month's leadership training. By this means we regain the edge lost through lack of capability to organize in the open.

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E. Air Support

Air support provided the clincher to the operation. Air was used strategically to substitute for the vacancy left by the roll-up and subsequent disorganization of the majority of the inner organization. By this method, bridges were cut, reinforcements harassed, resupply by shipping stopped, troop movements interrupted, gasline supply virtually destroyed, and arms and ammo supplies destroyed.

The psychological effect of fighter air support was tremendous and added to the myth that CASTILLO Armas' Army was an organized, unbeatable force.

Air support was confined to strategical, semi-tactical and supply support. Close-air support was not feasible for several reasons:

1. No trained air-ground liaison teams.
2. Inefficient tactical communications system.
3. The nature of the fighting was such that unstable positions, undefinable lines and the fast aircraft being used prevented orientation by the pilots.

It should be noted here that the sole close air support employed was by a Cessna 180 and by a C-47 circling the combat area with 30-pound fragmentation bombs and home-made TNT-nail and scrap iron bombs.

F. Communications

We were not prepared for a tactical communications net. Six tactical radios and the FCP radio occupied a full schedule for the base setup we employed. Team to FCP to team communications at times took twenty-four hours because of staff traffic and blanks in communications due to atmospheric conditions. At times, the round trip traffic was only two hours, but this was not dependable.

Use of code is impractical in a tactical net, due to the time involved and also due to the garble factor. In this operation certain immediate action messages, FCP to Air Support, were garbled. The most damaging were those in which an error or a garble occurred in coordinates. An intelligent guess by a commo officer or an air operations officer's surmise as to what was meant does not suffice. Resupply runs were made under just such circumstances when time did not permit cable clarification. In at least one such instance, it is known that the

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team was on the ground and that the drop occurred nine miles North of the team area. Usually, garbles were more prevalent when the operator or commander was under fire.

Having the agent pads and Chief of Operations separated by radio from air support was a serious error rectified early in the operation. Until rectified, air requests were sometimes received after the ground action had occurred. Allowances had been made for this possibility by placing special air request pads in agent hands with the base pad at air operations, but this left air operations working in the dark as to the ground situation. When rectified, we were able to support the operation more properly.

Before rectified, however, we were forced to use voice code using C personal communications to C In these cases, at times, six to eight hours could be cut from the time necessary for an air request to be honored.

V. SPECIAL SUBJECT:

In every business there is a special group of persons who comprise the "scoffers," the "disbelievers" -- men content to bury their complete lack of usefulness under the guise of lack of faith in success.

Our organization has its share. Some have drifted from project to project and from division to division -- confusing assumed "professionalism" with plain lack of energy or ability to do more than point out weaknesses in other people's thinking.

In most cases these people are only dead wood. Usually, their most damage to an operation is confusion of the issue for a short period. However, on this project I can point out four specific instances in which support functions were warned by such characters not to offer requested support as "this project is doomed to failure."

The possible effects of tolerating such persons in an operational organization are too obvious to list here.

It is hoped that this situation can be pointed out to KUBARK heads as an existing condition, true not only in this project but also in others with which the writer has had experience.

VI. Recommendations for all field personnel considered as having performed in an efficient manner are being presented in separate reports. I wish at this time, however, to place in the body of this report my personal opinion that the key man to the success of this project is Vincent C. PIVALL. C ]

PIVALL's firm adherence to orders enabled LINCOLN to rely on the fact that plans were being carried out within the realm of possibility and that Principal Agent attempts to alter those plans were minimized. The preservation of KUBARK interests was

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considered a solemn duty by PIVALL and it showed up in the results of his work.

His professional knowledge and direct manner of dealing with the indigenous personnel gained him, and KUBARK, their respect and spirit of camaraderie necessary to good guidance on operations of this type.

In addition, PIVALL's analytical and objective thinking and reporting spotted for LINCOLN many defects in the old CASTILLO Armas organization, useful in planning the operation.

It is recommended that his services would be valuable in a KUHOOK staff position within WHD if he is to remain in WHD. If released from WHD, it is recommended that KUHOOK staff consider him for training assignments or a field project assignment after completing a KUHOOK training course [ ] .

It would be a serious KUBARK/KUHOOK loss to lose this man through disinterest on the part of KUBARK or through allowing him to become de-motivated.

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ANNEX B

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PART TWO by Assistant PM Officer. [ ]

Departure from LINCOLN was made early in June with several purposes in mind to be accomplished upon arrival [ ] They were:

- a. Bring the shock troops to a state of preparedness which would permit the initiation of the campaign at an early date and at the same time would permit support of a premature uprising which might be caused by any one of a number of actions within the target country.
- b. Organize five-man "Hornet" teams for the harassment of the enemy in localities far removed from the obvious area of activity.
- c. Launch the remaining resident radio operators to their respective points.
- d. Move all shock troop equipment to selected staging areas near the border.
- e. Move by all possible methods, land, sea and air, arms to the inner organizations.
- f. Bring sabotage plans to the final stages. Ready the sab leaders for launching to their areas.
- g. Prepare [ ] for launching to his targets.
- h. Check the final military plans and modify them to suit the latest analysis of the situation.

Upon arrival, and after meeting with Mr. [ ] and PIVALL as well as with all the leaders of the CASTILLO Armas organization, it was obvious that much of the above would be very difficult to accomplish in the short time which remained. It was apparent that CASTILLO Armas had very little knowledge of the numerical strength of his own organization. At various times he claimed to have from 300 to 500 men [ ] It was on the basis of these figures that the decision to form the five-man teams was made. During the attempts to form these groups CASTILLO Armas made a number of excuses as to why this could not be done. It was finally apparent that he undoubtedly did not have the men that he claimed to have and a list of all men [ ] was demanded by name. He submitted a list of men far below the number that we had hoped was present. The list contained 150 names. This not only did not permit the formation of the five-man teams, but it also did not furnish the required numbers for the shock troop organization. This information came only a week before the intended D-Day.

Upon the receipt of this information, my first inclination was to relay the shocking facts to LINCOLN with an urgent plea to postpone the initiation of the campaign. After much careful consideration, however, it was my decision that due to the possibility of gathering considerable

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sympathizers along the way, we could launch the campaign as planned. I felt that any relaying of such information would have the effect of detracting from and dampening the enthusiasm of the CASTILLO Armas organization as well as having the effect of possibly postponing a campaign which might bog down hopelessly if not permitted to begin on schedule.

Much of the preparation for the campaign was made very difficult by the turn of events within the target country. The crack-down after the first leaflet drop made arms ingress almost impossible. Most of our methods broke down completely and we had to rely on such methods as [ ] and his plane delivering arms to his personal finca. We were able to send individuals across the line with arms in suitcases and bags. It is not known at this time how much of that was effective. We tried every method imaginable and we are confident that some of them worked. Even the launching of the radio operators was extremely difficult and hazardous for them. We are sure that a number of them were picked up and of those who did get to their respective areas, only a few came on the air.

PIVALL had done a fine job of preparing the sabotage leaders and all were eager to get in and begin their work. There remained the problem of getting the proper equipment in for them to work with. Some was sent in through [ ] and some was taken in by hand. While mentioning PIVALL, it might be added that he had done wonders in organizing CASTILLO Armas' staff into the proper sections. All hands had the utmost respect for PIVALL and his command presence as well as his language qualifications made him invaluable.

In looking over the final military plans, it struck me that the movement of our [ ] troops by way of Gualan would not only give the enemy adequate warning of the movement but the concentration of Communist personnel at Gualan would hinder our advance to such a degree that the [ ] enemy forces might stage a successful counter-attack. It appeared that a pincers movement on [ ] would be more likely to succeed. A plan was worked out to bring an additional force from Copan Ruinas down through Camotan and Jocotan for an attack upon Chiquimula and thence to [ ] The mission of this force was 1) to aid in the capture of [ ] in the event that the [ ] team experienced difficulty, and 2) if [ ] fell to us early, to move rapidly through the Jalapa area to the capital. In the latter case, the [ ] forces would protect the rear of this column. CASTILLO Armas' staff took to this plan with alacrity and it was decided that the CP would be with this group.

Much of my time was taken up with interviews of personnel newly arrived from Guatemala, both military and civilian. Upon the arrival of [ ] and, following an interview with him, I recommended that he be placed in command of the [ ] force, replacing [ ] I felt that as [ ] had been in command of the garrison of [ ] at one time, along with his higher rank and greater experience, he should be commander of this very important force.

Another arrival was Colonel [ ] I was very much impressed with his force and bearing and recommended him for some command. In this case it was command of the force which was to cross from Nueva Ocotepeque.

In the absence of the five-man teams for harassment, it was decided to utilize the talents of [ ] in this line. He had been most anxious to do something other than deliver arms to his finca and claimed to be able to perform bombing missions with his Cessna 180. I was frankly skeptical

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about the accuracy of such bombing, but he convinced me that it was feasible. PIVALL constructed bombs of TNT blocks surrounding concussion grenades, armed so that they would detonate upon impact. [ ] took off on his initial flight of this type, headed [ ] He had with him two men, for as a "bombardier," He flew in almost on the ground toward the gasoline tanks at San Jose. As he approached the tanks, he pulled into a semi-stall and the bombardier threw the bomb. His first attempt was a direct hit and the tank burst into flame. He then flew to Retaluehus and did the same thing to the SHELL and ESSO tanks there. He ran out of bombs but "strafed" the [ ] tanks with a Madsen gun, successfully puncturing them and then set them afire with grenades. [ ] flew another of these missions to [ ] His audacity was illustrated by his calling the field tower at [ ] saying that he was an air force plane wishing to land. The tower gave him the proper instructions and he came in to his bombing mission on the [ ] tank. He received much AA fire as he tried to bomb an AT-6 on the runway of the field. In eluding the fire he dived into a group of trees and caught a branch of one of them in his control surfaces. He had to land at the first available field [ ] to remove it.

[ ] was very anxious to perform very hazardous missions at all times and was invaluable to our efforts.

Our safe house facilities in [ ] included a house where the staff of CASTILLO Armas could function as a unit. There we had maps, tables, conference rooms and briefing rooms. PIVALL and I met there every day early in the morning and worked there all day with the staff. PIVALL worked in another safe house, too, which served as a storehouse for our supplies. He worked with his sabotage leaders there. The latter house was located high on the mountainside outside of the city. Upon the arrival of the FCP radio personnel we activated another safe house about halfway between [ ] This house was ideal for the radio station as it was well into the suburbs and comings and goings were not noticed. After this house was opened, we spent much of our time there.

Upon the arrival of [ ] the final touches were put on the plans and very shortly after his arrival the campaign was initiated. It should be noted here that the entire organization of CASTILLO Armas had completed confidence in [ ] and in his leadership. So far as I could tell, none of his decisions were ever questioned and for that matter, neither were any of mine, before he came. CASTILLO Armas made the same plea for strong air attacks to [ ] that he had made previously to me. He was not given any assurance whatsoever that air support would be forthcoming other than for air delivery of supplies, which we felt would be a sure thing. All of the personnel who came out of the country to us [ ] were of the firm opinion that, should powerful air blows be delivered on the city in the early phases, the campaign would not be a long one. The consensus of opinion was that if several bombs were dropped - on the Guardia de Honor, on La Aurora Air Field, on the Base Militar and possibly one other one on a selected target - the Government would fall immediately. Colonel [ ] brother [ ] insisted that the Government almost fell with the first leaflet drop.

Just before the arrival of [ ] our [ ] organizer returned to [ ] He had been captured by several soldiers who recognized him from a former association in the army. He was tortured but escaped to return with valuable information. People were coming and going along the border at this time without interference, particularly in the [ ] and [ ] areas.



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One of our big problems was the movement of men and supplies [ ] We had cooperation with the [ ] representative in Honduras to the extent that he agreed to send a truckload of arms into the country [ ] However, this did not work out. We did send several loads of arms in specially constructed private automobiles with false compartments. We had no cooperation from the President there.

Movement of shock troops to the staging areas began in small numbers. Receiving parties were sent ahead and when we received word that the areas were ready, movement was initiated. Movement was very slow and in very small numbers. Finally, when time became short and D-day approached, more speed was necessary and troops were moved in larger and less clandestine groups. This movement caused a flood of newspapermen to descend [ ] Making operations all the more difficult. Final movement of the shock troops brought the operation fully into the open as it became necessary to move the troops by commercial, chartered airplanes. This was necessary in order to assemble the troops at the staging areas at the proper time for the attack.

Difficulty was encountered in the plans for the seaborne operation for BOND for which we had purchased a boat at La Ceiba on the north coast of Honduras. The boat was loaded with equipment which was delivered to La Ceiba through the cooperation of [ ] who, incidentally, was of tremendous help in many ways. [ ] transported equipment in his [ ] planes for us to many points and into fields which were not well-suited to his planes. A group was dispatched to La Ceiba to man the boat but discovered it to be missing. Presumably the boat had made a run to the islands for cover purposes. Finally the team caught up with the boat and boarded it for the operation. It is not entirely clear at this date what developed from this operation. It is known that the boat was picked up, but more than that is not known.

Communications were good with the exception that at night all contact was lost between [ ] and SHERWOOD, thereby causing a terrific pile-up of messages in the morning and a consequent bogging down of those messages. There was considerable time lag between the sending of messages from the field and their reception at [ ] For this reason, it was decided to move the [ ] back to [ ] in order to give more adequate service to the field. With respect to answering some messages which came in from the field, it was frequently impossible to gain contact with the field stations for some hours. More urgent messages would follow and some of the original messages went unanswered.

With regard to security, it is obvious that many of the desirable security measures which would normally be employed in a truly clandestine operation were disregarded in this instance. In order to accomplish the job, much of the clandestinity had to be abandoned. We had to move openly in the [ ] to and from safe houses, thereby undoubtedly identifying ourselves with the organization of CASTILLO Armas. It can be said, though, that this movement was kept to an absolute minimum and that some of it was absolutely necessary to accomplish the task. The safe house where the FCP was located was by far the best and kept the most clandestine.

After the movement to [ ] the FCP functioned much more efficiently and was able to offer the desired support to the field. The fact that the KUHOOK staff worked right with the Air Ops facilitated this support, in addition to keeping everyone informed as to the field situation - which situation had not existed prior to this time.

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COMMENTS

Other than the numerous small lessons learned during the campaign, there are, in my opinion, two main lessons to be learned from the overall situation. First, at the very outset of the planning for an operation of this type, a decision should be made as to the importance of its success. Upon reaching this decision, the amount of power to be utilized and the method of employment of this power should also be decided. This power (and in this case it was air bombardment) should not be withheld. It should be utilized at the very beginning of the operation. It is my considered opinion that if the air power which was used in the final phases of the operation had been used on the first day in the same manner, the campaign would not have lasted 48 hours. Undoubtedly, a few lives would have been lost in the bombing, but many more lives could have been saved by shortening the campaign. This opinion is based upon both the reports of persons who came from Guatemala and my previous knowledge of the Latin people.

Secondly, I believe that the KUGOWN program could have been better coordinated with the KUHOOK program. By this I refer to the leaflet drops. The reaction to these drops was terrific. The results, however, were definitely detrimental to the KUHOOK effort, and the reaction of the staff of CASTILLO Armas C J as one of dejection. It was the opinion of all of us, including C J that it would have been well if the field had been consulted before the decision to make the drop had been made. The leaflet drops caused a crackdown within Guatemala which would have come eventually when the movement of our troops to the border was noticed, but it came at a time when we were still able to make delivery of arms, radio operators and sabotage personnel into the country. After the crackdown, it was virtually impossible to accomplish this. C J pleaded with us to permit no more leaflet drops as every one reduced the effectiveness of his air operations. The overall effect of such KUGOWN activity cannot be underestimated, but it is recommended that in the future they be coordinated with the KUHOOK activity so that they can be mutually supporting.

With regard to communications, as in operations in which I have been involved in the military service, much of the planning is based upon split second contact between units and command by radio. I have never seen this contact work out completely as planned, even with highly trained operators. In this case, with indigenous operators and difficult conditions, while the results were amazing, they did not work out as planned. Only in the final phases did the radio commo begin to work properly.

Finally, while an operation of this type is most difficult to keep clandestine, it would have been much more easily accomplished if the enemy had not been fully alerted some weeks before D-day. Had not martial law been proclaimed and the curfews, police patrols, etc., not been in effect, our movement and sabotage plans would have been much more likely to succeed. It is not known at this time how much of our sabotage was completed, but so far not much of it has been reported.

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ANNEX B

PART THREE - A. by Assistant PM Officer, C  
B. by Assistant PM Officer, C

J  
J

A. C J departed LINCOLN 15 February 1954 for FJHOPEFUL, arriving there on 16 February where he reported C J Chief of Station. Then C J inspected materials on hand and set up the original packaging station.

Materials on hand at FJHOPEFUL consisted of approximately 175,000 lbs., including rifles, ammunition, both 9 mm and 7.62, pistols, 20 mm cannons, hand grenades and a few miscellaneous items. These materials were sterilized, cleaned and placed in fireable order before packaging for caching, or advance shipment to the front. Personnel arrived the latter part of February to assist in packaging preparation of these materials.

During this period approximately 250,000 lbs. of equipment was received, including mortars, 47 mm and ammo, 9 mm and 7.62 ammo, rifles, sub-machine guns, LMG, hand grenades, fragmentation and concussion, TNT, demolition charges (shaped). Also included in the equipment received were rations, medical supplies, equipment, parachutes and other miscellaneous items which were to be included in the kits, as prescribed by LINCOLN. All these materials were opened, inspected and sterilized (if needed) for further shipment or packaging. Packaging of these items were for caching which consisted of cleaning and oiling all fireable weapons, wrapping in cloth, sewing in burlap and dipping in tar, the tar acting as the preservative for burial purposes. At the height of the operation there were approximately 12 people, including C J inspecting, packaging and wrapping the above-mentioned materials and loading aircraft leaving FJHOPEFUL for Honduras.

Other work included the supervision of tying down these loads as well as the distribution of materials to each area. During this time we were steadily receiving more supplies and equipment for SHERWOOD which was also dispatched to their respective destinations. Also, at this time approximately 6 or 7 C-124s were unloaded which brought the above-mentioned 200,000 lbs. of equipment into FJHOPEFUL. This entailed working from 12-18 hours, 7 days a week, for the full crew of men there.

The packaging of material was completed around the first of April, at which time the first three men of the packaging crew were released to return to the United States and the last three men were released 31 May, at which date they left FJHOPEFUL. During this time C J acted as Chief Assistant in supervising and packaging, loading and unloading and tying down of aircraft loads. During the stay at FJHOPEFUL approximately 275,000 - 300,000 lbs. of materials were shipped to Honduras and other destinations. Approximately 30,000 lbs. of communications gear was shipped to SHERWOOD for setting up their station.

On 2 June orders came through to move to Somerset, the advance base, for the purpose of dispatching bundles and supplies to the troops. also making up of new drop bundles to meet requirements from LINCOLN. C J and C J proceeded to Somerset, arriving there the night of 2 June, at which time they remained for 2 days with C J at the local air

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base. [ ] reported in to [ ] and were given the assignment of preparing 50 new air drop bundles consisting of rifles and ammunition, in addition to the 115 bundles on hand. During this time shipments were received of supplies and equipment from FJHOPEFUL and the loading and storage of this was supervised at Somerset.

On approximately 16 June the first flight took off from Somerset with 9 bundles. Prior to this first flight the crews and kickers, both indigenous and American, had been given several preliminary flights for familiarization with kicking of bundles and behavior of the aircraft, this being under the supervision of [ ] For the next 8 days there was loading and unloading of aircraft because of lack of reception parties in the DZs which ran until approximately 21 June, at which time signals were received from the ground to drop.

Upon arrival of the P-47 fighters, a job of armor was placed on [ ] and [ ] as well as the other work on the cargo ships; this work consisted of arming 50 cal. machine guns and loading ammunition for same, fusing and racking bombs of 250#, 500# GP and 260# and 120# (6 - 20# bomb clusters) fragmentation bombs at which time some difficulty arose as to the detonation of the bombs, believed to have been from the arming and wiring of same. It was found that bombs were fused properly; all equipment was checked; afterwards results were favorable. At this time [ ] and [ ] wired the safety and arming wires to the fuselage of the airplanes, making sure that if the bombs were dropped, they would explode or would be known positively to be duds. During this time results were 100% detonation.

Upon the arrival of the bomb expert, all bomb racks, firing selenoids were checked; arming procedures were checked and found to be correct. After checking each pilot out on a cockpit check, no more trouble occurred.

During this time, being rather short-handed, [ ] and [ ] worked approximately 23 hours a day, working both cargo and fighter planes to keep them flying. On approximately 30 June the cease-fire came into effect, at which time our operations came to a very abrupt halt.

[ ] placed an armed guard on all aircraft and supply outbuildings and American personnel were not allowed to go near the aircraft or to take any supplies or materials other than a few personal effects from the warehouse. This ban was lifted on 2 July, at which time the evacuation of Somerset took place in the afternoon. Then the first shipload of mortar ammo which was left over, departed Somerset with three passengers, namely [ ] and the mortar expert. This left the final loading of the remaining two aircraft in the hands of [ ] and another man (Jim).

[ ] arrived at FJHOPEFUL at midnight 2 July and departed there 3 July, reporting to LINCOLN on 4 July.

#### COMMENTS

Complete support was received from FJHOPEFUL in the procurement of packaging materials and extra help from personnel assigned to that base. Support given by [ ] was a tremendous help in the procurement of materials, on short notice, needed for completion of packaging requirements.

It was found that the single wrap of muslin cloth was not sufficient to prevent some of the tar that penetrated the outer wrap of burlap from getting onto the weapons. The amount that penetrated was not enough in most cases to render the weapon unserviceable.

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Very good cooperation was received from the indigenous personnel of Somerset in loading and unloading aircraft there.

Cooperation and support of all branches of PBSUCCESS personnel at Somerset was exceptionally good.

The pilots and crews of the aircraft seemed to lack a sense of security as to discussion of flights, places they had been, also the work that they were doing. Several times it was necessary in public eating places to call their attention to the fact that they were not to talk of their activities in which they were engaged. This was noticeable most especially from the crews as there was more contact with them than with the pilots.

a. The P-47 pilots were not familiar with the bombs, bomb releases of their aircraft, this being especially true of C

These two men had quite a bit of trouble with bombs that did not explode. It is believed that they were dropping them with the chemical release and not arming them. Jerry (not C) was very aggressive in his actions and runs, very truthful in target hits and missed and probably has a better record of this operation on hits and damage done than the other two.

b. The C-47 pilots were much interested in the monetary returns received from their flights and drops as were their kickers.

c. The four indigenous kickers and one ground crew man were exceptionally good in their work. There were very few complaints from these men, they worked hard and did the very best job that they could possibly do considering that there was a language barrier between them and the crew.

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B. [ ] arrived [ ] on 3 June on the last planeload of bundles and equipment. A very small building was available in which to store bundles. The building was connected to the [ ] building. It was approximately 25' x 35' and contained 95 bundles, 400# each, 30 bundles of 250# each, approximately 150 boxes of leaflets, 200 parachutes and a small supply of C-47 parts. Working area was fairly secure. [ ]

[ ]

When we arrived, there was a total of 125 bundles in the building. In the next few days more equipment arrived to be packed. Also 8 kickers, 4 American and 4 indigenous, arrived. In the following 3 days 60 more bundles were packed and stored outside under canvas. The 8 kickers were then trained and a few practice drops were made at the end of the air strip, after dark. After the training was completed, pre-D-day flights were started. No drops were made until D-day and then were made regularly 3 and 4 times daily. After about a week of operations they were running out of bundles. A few more supplies were then received which were packed into 15 bundles. Besides all these bundles, drums of gasoline, boxes of 9 mm and 7.62 ammo and food were being dropped.

When we were not busy packing and loading the two C-47s, we were helping load the F-47s with ammo and bombs. No one knew much about this and I knew even less than anyone but shortly everyone was sort of an expert on fusing a bomb and working over a 50 cal. gun.

There was a house in town where I stayed when the opportunity presented itself. There was no trouble locating a good place to eat and we ate good American-style food.

All in all, security was good with the exception of a few times when non-Agency personnel had to be told to keep silent.

Everyone I worked with did an excellent job and I enjoyed working with them. Everyone leaving this operation should now be a jack-of-all-trades. The experience received will be very useful in the future. I think the operation was very successful and well worth all the time and effort put into it. I feel that everyone who worked on this operation should be very proud that he was asked to help do this big job.

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ANNEX B

PARA-MILITARY

PART FOUR - by FM Operations Officer, Vincent C. PIVALL

The following is a summary of the course of events from the time PIVALL was dispatched to [ ] 11 January 1954, to the end of activities against Guatemala.

The synopsis will attempt to shed light on all phases, that is: Training, organization, security, operational matters and the effect which the overall training had on the final phase and success of the project. This report is divided into three phases: (1) From PIVALL's departure to the White Paper; (2) Training period; (3) Setting up of the para-military organization of CASTILLO Armas [ ] Phases 2 and 3 are considered the most important as far as KUHOOK activities are concerned. They deal mostly with training and organizational setup.

PHASE I

Upon PIVALL's arrival in [ ] a semi-organization for para-military activities had been set up. A total of fifteen men were on hand as the advanced training element. The equipment had not arrived and selection of the training site had not been settled.

Originally, training was to begin by 14 January but up to that date no facilities had been made available.

After considerable negotiations with [ ] authorization was given to commence movement of personnel and equipment to [ ]

First difficulties encountered were movements of equipment and personnel while taking into consideration the most strict security measures. After an unsuccessful attempt to have [ ] furnish a boat for transfer and movement, negotiations with a private concern were made to rent a suitable launch. Cover story was that a crew of engineers were to work on private experiments for [ ] This story was maintained throughout entire project.

On taking over [ ] the only facilities made available were a barn and an inadequate water well. A complete training site had to be constructed. Two living quarters, mess hall, sanitary units and showers were built along with development of suitable areas for training activities. During this period evaluations, observations, complete interviews and background studies were made of the trainees. Food and building materials were shipped on a daily basis and continued until approximately 22 January.

On or about 22 January food shipments were discontinued, (reasons unknown to PIVALL at that time) although daily messages were air dropped stating all was fine and that an attempt by [ ] was being made to purchase a boat to enable the project to discontinue use of the rented launch. No attempts were

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made to pick up our distress messages telling that absolutely no food was available and that serious conditions existed on the island although a pre-arranged method for pick-ups of messages had been made. (A rig had been constructed solely for this purpose.)

During this critical period SARANAC had one serious malaria case, an appendicitis case, a hernia patient and two VD cases. No medical items had been included in the entire shipment of equipment. Every effort was made to justify the conditions to the trainees. It was certainly one of the darkest periods as far as the trainees were concerned and it is mentioned here only because PIVALL was never allowed to forget it by the trainees who had experienced it. After a week of such conditions, a small boat arrived with small quantities of foodstuffs and building materials. PIVALL immediately returned [ ] to inquire about the disorganized logistics.

On arrival at [ ] all newspapers were carrying the accounts that CHACO DELGADO had passed on to the Guatemalan government.

As [ ] was in the United States, PIVALL immediately began liaison with [ ] requesting a new location. Arrangements were made and all equipment and personnel were evacuated that same night without incident or problems.

Again, the new location was without adequate facilities and work was begun immediately to construct suitable billets, training sites, etc.

During the brief stay [ ] some training had begun, primarily to develop a small cadre for future use as instructors.

A half-day training and work schedule had to be implemented. Labor units worked in the mornings and group instruction took place during the afternoons. Individual instructions were held after supper.

During this early training period only one major problem was on hand. It had been reported that the advance element would be comprised of CASTILLO Armas' top leaders who were to be semi-trained or experienced, and to bear in mind that they were to be the revolt's organizers. This was truly an underestimate. In fact, of the first twenty-seven trainees arriving at SARANAC, only four had the possibilities, or were considered capable, of becoming organizers or leaders. This later slowed down normal training operations because separate groups had to be maintained.

Schedules were revised and instructions changed to meet the requirements for the conditions originally set up. Three groups were established which consisted of officers, sab trainees and troops. Three complete running schedules, independent of each other, were drawn up. During the second phase of the training, sab trainees and troops were made interchangeable.

COMMENTS:

1. Security prior to the "White Paper" had been extremely lax on the part of the personnel working in [ ] This was primarily because no control was maintained over the personnel. No serious precautions or attempts at compartmentation had been undertaken.

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Compartmentation was unheard of among the principal factions and contacts in most cases were made overtly. A cutout system was never employed.

2. No adequate facilities were maintained for complete security regarding incoming or outgoing correspondence. Safes were not made available and file folders were available for inspection by anyone. All personal folders were made interchangeable among the principals -- C J, DELGADO and C J. The "need-to-know" principle was never practiced. All conversations, even those regarding the highest operational matters, were discussed "openly" with absolutely no regard for security.

3. It is felt that because of the above lax security DELGADO was able to secure and photograph a large number of documents.

#### PHASE II

On receiving word to reactivate training at SARANAC, all efforts were then concentrated on the training program.

By the early part of March a total of 65 trainees were at SARANAC.

The following schedule was adopted and carried out with full force:

- a. Classes for officers were held from 0700 to 1800 hours and from 1930 to 2230 hours.
- b. Classes for Sab personnel were identical.
- c. Classes for the troops were the same except for guard and KP duties.

During the first three weeks, theory and blackboard problems and instructions were in order. Classes organized for officers concentrated primarily on the following courses:

- a. Troop leadership.
- b. Command and staff problems.
- c. Map reading and terrain evaluation.
- d. Basic infantry tactics.
- e. Deployment of troops in guerrilla warfare.
- f. Guerrilla tactics.
- g. Effective use of fire power.
- h. Supply problems and aerial resupply.
- i. First aid.
- j. Attack on, and control of, cities.

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k. Security

1. Nomenclature, care and cleaning of all weapons.

m. Tradecraft problems.

Subjects on which stress was placed were: Deployment of troops, effective use of fire power, aerial resupply, map reading, troop leadership and guerrilla tactics. Security was stressed in tradecraft instruction. Also included were lectures on cutout systems, contacts, surveillance, CE, CI, etc. After the theory and blackboard instruction, live problems were conducted.

Officers were then assigned definite jobs and placed as group leaders. A continual rotation to various duties was mandatory for each officer to familiarize him with other duties in addition to his squad duties. Such duties as Sanitation, Mess, Adjutant, First Aid (Medical Officer), Instructor, Liaison, Staff Control, etc., gave each officer a wealth of experience.

During the same period Sab training was also conducted in full force. Selected Sab trainees totaled approximately 30, with an eventual prospect of using the best 20 for operations. The training commenced with preliminary theory instruction. During the course of training it was discovered that most of the trainees were limited in mathematical calculations and a simplification method had to be employed. Stress was on photograph targets, rather than mathematical calculation. Included during this period were simulated charge positions, actual handling of charges and detonators, electric wiring, handling and demonstrations of electric and non-electric caps, time calculations and improvised charges.

During the second week actual participation in sab problems was conducted by the trainees, permitting the student to attain the necessary confidence in handling explosives.

The third week was a continual nightmare for the trainees. Strict problems were conducted mostly at night. Stress was on target approach and coordinated attacks. A model village was erected in the midst of the jungle approximately six kilometers from SARANAC. It consisted of several small houses, rail track sections, small generators, automotive parts and gas and oil drums. Approach to target was consistently changed with simulated action being conducted while trainees were at work. Observers were always on the spot for checking of sab personnel or teams.

The third element, the foot soldiers, were instructed in care and cleaning of weapons, firing techniques, patrol and recon procedures, methods to overcome terrain difficulties, security, individual survival, first aid, map study, etc.

By late March and early April the three groups were working together in an effort to establish coordinated attacks. Constant critiques were in order. For final exercises a three day CPX was conducted.

On many occasions SCRANTON student tactical radio operators were utilized in training, sab and field problems.

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COMMENTS:

1. During the entire Phase II period, PIVALL bore in mind the necessity for developing "organizers" and in some respects viewed it with skepticism for the following reasons:

- a. The caliber of personnel sent to SARANAC was not what it was expected to be.
- b. Of the 99 trainees, only about ten were qualified as organizers.
- c. Most of the men were of the "hood" type and could only be utilized in regular troop units, guerrilla or sab teams.

2. For the above reasons the term "instructors" was designated to what was originally intended to be organizers. According to later results the organizers had been selected and were either living covertly or overtly in their designated targets.

3. Logistics: This was, above all, the biggest headache. It took anywhere from one complete day to two days for the purchasing of foods and materials to maintain the camp actively. Goods had to be purchased in [ ] because of their laxness in security. Personnel had to be detached with a considerable loss of valuable man-hours.

4. Security: Overall excellent. Guards were posted on a regular tour of duty. During the period several stragglers were made captive and turned over to SALAMANDER. On one occasion, two "gun runners" were apprehended who later turned out to be principals in the attempted assassination of [ ]. It was also during this phase that PIVALL requested the transfer of [ ] to [ ] because of their laxness in security.

5. Liaison: Liaison was maintained with [ ] and SALAMANDER on a very good relationship, discussing periodically matters as directed by LINCOLN, procurement of documentation, local authority support, etc. Relationship with top [ ] officials was on such a confidential basis that it enabled PIVALL to obtain considerable first-hand, high-level information with regard to internal and external government machinations. This is evident from cable correspondence maintained during that period.

6. Training: On completion of training, it was felt by PIVALL that results obtained could be considered excellent for the following reasons:

- a. Ideological motives were chiefly involved rather than materialistic.
- b. Trainees were extremely eager and willing to learn. Their willingness to endure the hardship of training and their constant cooperation made it extremely easy to handle and instruct the men.
- c. The majority had been at one time or another political prisoners or tortured by the opposition.

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- d. PIVALL took advantage and exploited the "Sentimentalism," a Latin trait, at every opportunity.
- e. Trainees were made to feel "highly superior" in relation to the opposition troops by constantly indoctrinating them in the fact that they would be better trained, have superior weapons and fire power, and were led by highly efficient officers.
- f. Morale during the period of training was always high. Every effort to attain the best recreational facilities was made. Disagreements among the men were referred to PIVALL and were always settled by boxing matches.
- g. The SARANAC slogan was "We were born to die for God and Country." This was the premise by which the men and officers lived and trained and which was kept uppermost in their minds day and night.

### PHASE 3

After closing SARANAC, PIVALL returned to LINCOLN for reorientation, instructions and further preparations before departing to rejoin the CASTILLO Armas organization in Tegucigalpa.

On May 6, 1954, PIVALL departed with instructions to act as the KUHOOK advisor and assist CASTILLO Armas in every possible way. The first few days were spent in just making observations and assisting wherever possible. To PIVALL's amazement, no semi-military organization had been established. A request to correct this situation was forwarded to CASTILLO Armas and he was asked to assign one of his top military aides to PIVALL in order to begin organizing and building a staff. Colonel [redacted] was assigned and made Chief of Staff at PIVALL's request. A definite military organization was then established, with G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 sections to insure the preliminary working stage for staff study, assignments, etc. Job assignments were then given to all officers to insure that all available resources were put to use in the best interest of the movement. Up to this time no such organization had existed despite repeated assurances by CASTILLO Armas.

Other sections organized were: A training center for the instruction of new arrivals, security section, and CI and CE working units.

Shock troop units, as well as Sab and instructor assignments, were organized.

Operations forwarded by LINCOLN were studied and necessary changes made because of rapid and constant changes in the internal situation in Guatemala.

Several separate operations were established which later had a strong bearing on the success of the project. These operations were those at Copan Ruinas, Nueva Ocotepeque, Morales and "La Siesta." For comments on results see Attachment 1.

It is extremely difficult to give a complete and full report of the successes and defeats of all military operations as well

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as the Sab actions because of the lack of information and confirmations. All information on the successes and defeats mentioned in the Attachments are as a result of debriefings with the exception of "La Siesta" operation. The latter information was received on the monitored radio reports passed on by [ ]

2 Attachments

ATTACHMENT I

On June 16, 1954, all shock troops were in position. Those included, other than C ] were C ] and the C ] troops.

Each of the above operations will be dealt with separately in an attempt to focus some light as to their successes or failures.

I. C ] SHOCK TROOPS.

The assignment of Bond Shock troops was to strike on the night of D-Day with the ultimate goal of completely sealing the exit of government troops that might attempt to assist or to control the rail line between C ] and C ]

As far as can be determined and in the debriefing of one member of that force, the C ] troops arrived at and did block the tunnel located approximately six kilometers from C ] and also set up a block at Pierda Parada located on the Atlantic Highway on D + 1. From reports, several small guerrilla groups were sent to the outskirts of C ] for harassment purposes. These positions were maintained for approximately three days.

Information received from monitored calls confirmed that opposition troops had been continuously flown from Guatemala City to Bond with the primary objective of re-establishing the connection between C ] forces with those of C ]

Approximately four days after D-Day, a sizeable enemy force counter-attacked and disorganized the C ] shock troops. The troops dispersed and commenced retreating which eventually terminated at Los Corrideros, Honduras.

II. C ] GROUP

This group consisted of approximately 30 organized men and had the mission of taking and holding C ] located between C ] and C ]

The group was quite successful and on D-Day captured C ] and Bananera, holding both for three days until the break-through of the enemy forces from C ] During this period C ] the leader, had organized and reinforced his group totalling approximately 120 men.

Failure to achieve further success, according to PEREZ, was due to the lack of supplies. After a delayed action the group gave way and retreated, but not until they had caused considerable damage and casualties to the enemy forces. C ] retreated to his jumping off base, Los Tarros, Honduras, with approximately 100 men.

His request for more supplies was granted and immediate steps were taken to consolidate the C ] shock troops with the C ] group with the primary object of retaking C ] which has an airfield, by 30 June, and commencing movement toward C ] with the objective of attacking and capturing it.

[ ] On the eve of 29 June this force was on the outskirts of [ ] fully equipped, and ready to attack when word was sent of the peace negotiations, and to remain in position until further notice.

### III. [ ] GROUP

This group totaled 27 men who sailed from [ ] to an area approximately above Santo Tomas which is located below and Southwest of [ ] Their primary mission was to harass [ ] This action was planned and coordinated so that they landed approximately D + 1.

According to monitored radio reports the group made a successful landing. The ship was discovered and captured on the day of landing, but minus its cargo and men. Reports further indicated that this group was fighting a winning battle against the enemy forces because the enemy [ ] Commander, Colonel Bolanos, was consistently requesting additional reinforcements from Guatemala City to cope with the small force. It was not until nine days later that it was reported that [ ] group had finally been defeated and that nine members had been captured. It was also reported that all were executed.

This group did not have a TRO. Several attempts were made to localize this group from the monitored reports but every one failed. It was therefore impossible to give them an aerial resupply or to aid them with air support.

It is felt that this group was the most courageous and sustained the enemy, limiting their objective in reestablishing the [ ] connections by continuously defeating and harassing the city and keeping those elements occupied during the other battle phases.

### IV. [ ] SHOCK TROOPS

The primary mission of this group was in accordance with original plans. Only one change was made and that was to bypass Gualan by detaching a small group and blocking the small element that existed in Gualan.

According to the debriefing of the TRO, this plan was in order until a battle began between the enemy forces and the small detachment. The detachment requested aid from the shock troop leader who, with his force, was on his way to [ ] The troop leader temporarily changed his plans and returned to Gualan and captured same only after a fierce battle.

On taking Gualan, the shock troop staff moved into the cuartel to reorganize and build up their troops for continuation of their march to [ ]

During this period, it was presumed by the TRO, that request for reinforcements had been dispatched to [ ] by the Gualan commander prior to his defeat, because the following morning a sizeable force was detected coming from the direction of [ ]. A battle commenced and lasted for approximately 50 hours with the complete annihilation of Castillo Armas' forces in Gualan. The only force not caught in this was [ ] detachment which had been deployed south of Gualan near Choyo.

The TRO was asked if any blunders were committed that might have resulted in the defeat. Subject stated that it was his honest belief that if troops had had enough rest that circumstances might have been different. He further stated that the trek across the mountains and the continual push by the commander to meet his dead-line resulted in only having fatigued troops. They were completely exhausted, even before commencing the fight, and the fighting continued for three straight days without them having the benefit of rest or sleep.

The later successes of [ ] can be attributed to the tremendous losses sustained by the enemy due to both the battles of Gualan and the last ditch stand of [ ]

#### V. COPAN RUINAS AND NUEVA OCOTEPEQUE

These two forces can be included in the same movement, although their jumpoff points were distinctly apart. Both forces merged at Quezaltepeque for the eventual attack of Chiquimula.

The success of Chiquimula can be attributed to many situations, with only a few mentioned here:

The successful aerial resupply of these forces, the fact that the Advanced CP was here and the majority of the high level staff were together, the successful aerial support and the checking of a possible pincer movement by enemy forces coming from [ ] to Chiquimula and a southern movement from Ipala. A force totalling 100 men were dispatched to check this latter group with success on the part of Castillo Armes' troops. Pivall had maintained constant enemy OB situations from monitored radio reports and principally dispatched troops to this area to avoid a rear attack of the Chiquimula forces.

The capturing of a considerable quantity of munitions, weapons including 81mm mortars intact with large quantities of shells, was indeed evidence that the majority of troops had been dispatched from [ ] in an early attempt to defeat troops there rather than at the strategic [ ]

The [ ] movement never developed because of the intervention by the [ ] troops. [ ] These forces were merged with the Nueva Ocotepeque



ATTACHMENT II

SAB ACTIVITY

During the action, Sab activity was in action at the following points:

- a. Rail and communications between Entre Rios and Tenedores.
- b. Rail and communications between Tenedores and Morales and between La Libertad and Morales.
- c. Rail and communications NE of Gualan and NW of Gualan.
- d. Rail and communications NE of [ ] and NW of [ ]
- e. The San Francisco Bridge, located below Tenedores.

The above sab activity was coordinated to assist all troops.

Other Sab operations were as follows:

- a. [ ] It was reported that destruction of the oil storage tanks, which was to have been the signal to begin activities, did occur on D-Day at approximately 2020 hours, just ten minutes before the exact time of plans.
- b. TGW. It was never reported whether an attempt or actual activity occurred against TGW. Although the station continued to broadcast, it was reported that TGR and other hookups had been grouped to enable the continuation of broadcasts also utilizing the Quezaltenango transmitters.
- c. All possible telecommunications in or around the capital by three separate teams.
- d. Rails and communications leading to El Salvador.

The Sab activity successes have been the most difficult to determine. Whether attempts or actual action was accomplished on selected targets is problematical because of the inaccurate reports, the tight security maintained by the enemy forces during the stage, and because of lack of information.

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ANNEX C

AIR OPERATIONS - PART ONE

by

PBSUCCESS Air Operations Officer Lt. Col. [ ]

The following report is submitted for two purposes. To record the air operations, summarizing all factors adding to or detracting from the success of the operation, and to list shortcomings to be used as a guide in planning future operations.

SOMERSET AIR OPERATIONS

1. Planning

A. The original plan for providing air operational support for PBSUCCESS was broken down into three categories, phase one, the initial stockpiling of equipment; phase two, the delivering of equipment to advance bases [ ]; phase three, the aerial resupply of troops in the field.

B. Approximately D minus thirty days it was decided that tactical air support of the ground forces might be required. General Cabell concurred in the concept of having a fighter aircraft support unit in being in the event it was required. At this time the fourth phase, fighter support, was initiated.

C. On or about D minus thirty the concept of utilizing tactical support of ground units was approved. At this time every effort was made to acquire, through clandestine methods, the necessary aircraft and equipment required to provide this support.

2. Stockpiling and [ ] Deliveries

A. Phase one and two were conducted in accordance with the overall air operational plan and were completed within the allowable time table. Comments: Adequate planning was provided and phases one and two were accomplished with no major difficulties.

3. Aerial Resupply [ ] (Phase Three)

A. Many difficulties were experienced by the air operations section in complying with request to provide aerial resupplies. The main problems encountered were the provisions of sterile air crews required to fly the aircraft. The original plan envisaged, utilized [ ] air crews for all overflights. Approximately D minus thirty Headquarters reversed their decision and would not authorize [ ] air crews to be used. Air Operations immediately started a civilian recruiting program through cutouts to hire sterile air crews. The recruitment of these air crews was completed approximately 1 June.

B. The sterile air crews under the direction of Bob Stewart [ ] moved out from Miami on 4 June by devious routes. All air crews were in place at SOMERSET by 7 June. On or about 11 June air operations at SOMERSET

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were established and in readiness for phase three operations. The air crews were given a very brief course in dropping techniques and each crew member was provided the opportunity of making at least two practice drops.

C. The air crews selected were highly qualified civilian pilots with ATRs and an average of approximately 6,000 flying hours per pilot. These pilots were considered all-weather pilots.

D. The phase three air resupply was flown without one major difficulty insofar as pertained to the aircraft and crews. The major difficulty encountered was the lack of reception committees at the designated drop zones. Approximately 18 overflights were made without once finding a reception committee at the DZ. A thorough debriefing of the air crews indicated that each crew had definitely located and pinpointed the DZ and the reception teams were definitely not there.

E. Bad weather encountered in the area of operations somewhat handicapped the operation. This was not considered a major problem for the C-47 aircraft except when the target area itself was completely closed. The SOMERSET beacon was always in operation and the air crews had no difficulty in returning to their base.

4. Tactical Fighter Aircraft Ground Support

A. The recruitment of qualified fighter pilots was one of the major difficulties encountered in providing fighter air capabilities. Due to security limitations it was extremely difficult to contact civilian pilots to recruit fighter pilots. To recruit fighter pilots it was necessary to resort to asking transport pilots if they knew of any friends who were qualified fighter pilots and could be used for planned operations. Prior to departure only two fighter pilots were interviewed and hired.

B. The fighter aircraft available for the start of air tactical operations consisted of two combat ready F-47s and one P-38 undergoing overhaul. The F-47s were delivered to SOMERSET by the

These aircraft arrived in combat ready condition and the machine guns were immediately armed and these aircraft used for escort work enabling the C-47s to run daylight air resupply drops.

C. On approximately D plus 5 a requirement was laid on air operations to fly semi-tactical missions over Guatemala City with fighter aircraft. Several missions were run over Guatemala City. Machine guns were fired into the air, aimed toward hills in the background of Guatemala. The fighter aircraft flew very low over the buildings of the city. Enemy anti-aircraft and automatic weapons fire was encountered during these low level strafing phases. Our fighter aircraft received several hits on each mission. Priority requests were submitted by SOMERSET to Headquarters requesting authority to shoot back. This request was denied at this time. At a later date SOMERSET operation received authority to fire back, but only at specific anti-aircraft or automatic weapon positions.

D. The above diversionary tactical flights were stopped by urgent air support requests from our ground forces in the Chiquimula-Zacapa area. At this time we were down to one tactical fighter. Our second fighter had been damaged and made a crash landing at SOMERSET and the P-38 fighter was still undergoing overhauling. Every effort was made to obtain the third F-47 from [redacted] refused to allow us to use his aircraft. Urgent requests were submitted to LINCOLN Headquarters for additional fighter aircraft. A few days later one additional F-47 arrived at SOMERSET. Just

prior to arrival of this aircraft our one F-47 blew out a tail wheel tire so we were still down to one aircraft available per flight. Again urgent requests were submitted to LINCOLN Headquarters to supply us additional tail wheels and tires. It was learned that the two additional F-47s at FJHOPEFUL also had flat tail wheels and could not be delivered at SOMERSET. Within a few days the two F-47s arrived from FJHOPEFUL and an extra tail wheel arrived at SOMERSET. Four F-47s were then available at SOMERSET. The P-38 was finally finished and this aircraft was available and combat ready. On the next mission over Guatemala City (the dive bombing of Mataroros) one F-47 received a direct hit through the left wing, rupturing the gas tank and knocking a three-inch hole in the main spar. This aircraft was then out of commission leaving the P-38 and three F-47s available for tactical ground support of our troops. On the first mission the P-38 was flown it received a direct hit in the tail assembly requiring replacement of the entire tail section. This plane remained out of commission until the end of hostilities.

E. Bad weather was a major problem for fighter aircraft. No radio facilities were available for homing. Every mission departing SOMERSET was a calculated risk. At this time of the year the weather is very bad in Nicaragua and at no time could we get a forecast for 4 hours later. The fighter pilots demonstrated exceptional bravery in conducting tactical operations under these adverse conditions. Many tactical support missions were conducted where the pilots made instrument flights to the target and instrument flights back to SOMERSET. With exceptional flying ability and lots of luck, no aircraft were lost as a result of the weather. It is strongly recommended that in any future operations of this nature, provisions be made for having electronic homers installed in the fighter aircraft.

#### 5. Difficulties Encountered

A. The major difficulties encountered during phase three, aerial resupply, and phase four, tactical air support were:

- (1) Shortage of qualified armament and ordnance personnel.
- (2) Shortage of qualified mechanics to maintain the aircraft.
- (3) Shortage of qualified fighterpilots to offset combat fatigue.
- (4) Shortage of adequate communications (air to ground) equipment.
- (5) Shortage of tactical operational ready fighter aircraft.
- (6) Lack of all-weather electronics equipment in the aircraft.

#### SUMMARY:

The success of the air operations section at SOMERSET is credited to the outstanding performance of all personnel assigned to this project. During the 30-day period of operations every man, other than the air crews, was called upon to work a minimum of 18 hours per day. During the remaining 6 hours they were not authorized to leave the area. (In fact all men were so tired that they did not leave the flight lines to sleep). All personnel followed orders and instructions to the letter. There was not one incident which required disciplinary action. Never, in the experience of the undersigned, has such a clear demonstration of loyalty and sincere will to win been so clearly demonstrated.

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ANNEX C

AIR OPERATIONS - PART TWO

by

AMD Assistant Air Operations Officer Lt. Col. C ]

The air operations personnel for phase four PBSUCCESS arrived at SOMERSET on 6 June 1954. Our operations at the air field were located on the east end of the field C ] area and consisted of one building approximately 40 by 200 feet. We were authorized the use of approximately one fourth of the building for storage and a small area for office space. The building and aircraft parking area were approximately one mile from C ]

This presented a taxi and parking problem for our aircraft. This was solved by clearing an additional taxi way crossing around the fox holes and machine gun positions from our area direct to the runway. Our area was very congested when we had the three C-47s, the fighters, the Cessna and the P-38 all on the ground at the same time. ]

Approximately 90% of the equipment and supplies that were to be used in the airdrops to our forces were in place in the storage building upon our arrival at SOMERSET. However, approximately 60 bundles still had to be packed from the equipment brought to SOMERSET from Honduras.

At the beginning of the operation we had two air operations officers, two packers and loaders, one mechanic and one interpreter-courier. Of course, we had considerable help from C ] at SOMERSET. Our staff later beefed up with two additional packers and one armament specialist and an additional air operations officer.

Arrangements had to be made for quarters, messing and transportation for all personnel including air crews. The air crews began arriving 7 June. At first we tried to keep the crews together at safe houses, but due to inadequate water facilities, no cooking facilities, poor sanitary conditions we gave it up and distributed the air crews in the various C ]

] An escape and evasion plan was worked out for the air crews with the native kickers instructed to lead air crews into Honduras in the event that an aircraft was forced down.

Arrangements were made to keep a control tower operator on duty at all times when our aircraft were operating. A system of code names was used with the control tower operator and the aircraft, so that anyone monitoring the frequency could not identify the air traffic with our location. The C ]oming beacon was kept in operation during the periods when our aircraft were out on missions. C ]

]supplied weather information for our operations. A code system, using the lights on the aircraft, was used by the pilots upon their return from a mission at night to identify themselves as a friendly

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aircraft to the tower operator. The tower operator would then turn on the runway lights as soon as the aircraft was identified as friendly.

Every effort was made to get the P-38 in commission. [ ] not flown the plane for some time and had disconnected the outboard gas tanks. Without the use of these gas tanks the aircraft would not have sufficient range to get to the target and return to SOMERSET. The wing panels had to be removed and the fuel tanks removed and cleaned. [ ] experienced a great deal of trouble getting the aircraft into commission. Finally it was ready for test flight when just before take off the electrical system caught fire delaying the use of the aircraft for several more days. [ ] the aircraft was put into commission and made several flights; however, it received heavy battle damage in the tail section on the flight to San Jose. A new tail section had to be installed on the aircraft and although the local [ ] did a terrific job of getting this aircraft into commission, all fighter action ceased the next day. The P-38 was not used again in the operation although it did make a successful test flight after the new tail section had been installed. Arrangements were also completed to transfer the Cessna 180 and Cessna 140 to Honduras.

The packers were busy night and day preparing the rifles and ammo that had been returned from Honduras for air drops.

Arrangements were made with [ ] SOMERSET, for meals when personnel did not have time to go to [ ] which was quite often. The sanitary conditions were so poor that several of our personnel became sick at the beginning of the operation and we had to have canned food flown up from FJHOPEFUL. [ ] did everything that he could to improve the sanitary conditions. He did go out buy special food such as eggs and gave the crews breakfast at 3 and 4 am. [ ] bought special food to prepare lunches for the flight crews.

With the personnel scattered in various hotels and often flying on staggered schedules and with commo facilities approximately 13 miles from the air base, transportation was quite a problem. This was solved by renting automobiles and getting local driver's licenses for the operators.

An office and briefing-and-debriefing room were set up in [ ] field quarters. One of the first projects was to spray silver paint on the C-47s. Although the US Air Force insignia had been removed and the metal polished, the paint was applied as a precautionary measure against recognition of the fact that the aircraft had recently had the [ ] markings. The paint and spray equipment was borrowed from [ ]

The air crew started arriving on 7 June. The first mission after our arrival was a leaflet mission on 8 June. The crews were briefed as to the cover story and the local situation. The pilots were checked out in the aircraft and organized into crews with their kickers. Field Command Post supplied two Guatemalan kickers for each crew. They were used to move the bundles from the cabin of the aircraft to the two kickers in the door. The two in the door discharged the cargo when the green light was given by the pilot.

Pilots were given instructions in the tactics of clandestine over-flights. Arrangements were completed to make practice drops on the end of the airfield to train the crews and also test the bundles prior to dropping them in Guatemala. The drops were made just after dark so that the parachutes would not be observed. The high experience level of the pilots was a big asset in that

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they caught on to the techniques of drops to a reception team with very little difficulty and they were quite accurate. The pilots were also given the opportunity to make a few practice instrument letdowns at SOMERSET.

Several attempts were made to work out a system to drop leaflets from the fighter aircraft since Headquarters disapproved the use of the leaflet bomb and time did not permit the local manufacture of a leaflet dropping device. Attempts were made to drop leaflets from the cockpit of the Fighters. As you can imagine this proved very unsatisfactory---poor coverage at best. The leaflet bombs would break before the pilots could get them out of the cockpit and the leaflets would all fly back into the cockpit. Also, the aircraft had to be slowed to below 200 mph before they could open the cockpit -- and if you will recall from the reports, the anti-aircraft fire was pretty accurate around Guatemala City.

The pre-D-Day cargo over-flights were routed in from various directions so that the opposing forces could not determine the location of our airfield. Three F-47s arrived in combat ready condition. These aircraft were turned over from the air mission to [redacted]. We, in turn, bought two of the aircraft and tried, on several occasions, to borrow the third fighter from [redacted] but were unsuccessful until the last few days of the fighting in getting the third fighter from [redacted] wanted to keep this third fighter on the ground in combat-ready condition to defend SOMERSET air field and [redacted] in case of an attack. During the early phase of the operation the F-47s were also used to make firing passes over the cities to let the people know that CALLIGERIS had air power available to his forces. The spare parts for the F-47s arrived by C-124 at SOMERSET. The air mission personnel handled the unloading and the turning over of the spare parts to [redacted] at SOMERSET. The [redacted], in turn, made these spare parts available to us for use in our operation. However, the one thing that we needed most for the F-47s, the tail wheel tires, were not sent down along with the rest of the spare parts for the F-47s. As a result a shortage of tail wheel tires for the F-47s made it so that when a fighter would land we would immediately have to take the tail wheel off that fighter and put it onto the next fighter so that it could get off on a mission. This was solved, however, by the arrival of several tail wheels and tires from FJHOPEFUL.

The armorer who was recruited in Miami arrived in SOMERSET and was dissatisfied with the general setup of the operation and with the pay. It soon became apparent he would be more of a liability than an asset so it was decided to return him to the United States. During the time when we were trying to get the P-38 into commission and trying to get spare parts for the F-47 the air mission personnel were very hostile towards us. They even discouraged the [redacted] from helping us. The air mission personnel were disappointed because [redacted] were selling us this P-38 and the air mission personnel had put in a good bit of time trying to get it back into commission. They did not feel that it was right for [redacted] to sell the P-38 to a couple of Americans who were down in Nicaragua for mercenary reasons. However, this was all smoothed over and [redacted] turned out to be a big help indirectly to our operations [redacted]

[redacted]  
Bombs and machine gun ammunition arrived in sufficient quantities to

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keep the operation well supplied. I think it was on two occasions that we had to borrow bombs from [ ] but this was caused by our trying to keep no more on hand at SOMERSET than was absolutely necessary and because we expected an inspection team to arrive most any day. We tried to fly bombs up from FJHOPEFUL just before they were needed or at least keep a small stock pile at SOMERSET. As the operation grew, we had to arrange for more and more space in the one available building so the [ ] personnel were doubled up again. These people certainly gave us as fine [ ] as support as we can expect to get in any operation that is undertaken in any other country.

A bomb hoist would certainly have been a big help. The [ ] fork lift was used as an improvised bomb hoist. It was time consuming and quite a job to use a fork lift to maneuver a 500# bomb into position under the belly of an F-47 so that the bomb could be hung on the bomb shackles. The operation outgrew the storage facilities available so we had to set up outside storage areas. Large tarpaulins were used to hide the identity of the equipment.

[ ]

The fighter pilots were checked out and briefed into the operation. A common radio frequency was installed in the fighter and cargo planes so that they would have inter-plane communications. Code words were used to keep the traffic to a minimum. We were unfortunate in having one of our fighters crash at SOMERSET during landing upon the return from a mission. The aircraft skidded off the right side of the runway and was apparently damaged very little. [ ] gave an order that this aircraft had to be removed from the runway area prior to daylight [ ] There was a storm and driving rain in the area while they were trying to get the fighter upon its wheels and time was running short, so [ ] towed the fighter off which resulted in severe damage to the left wing of the aircraft. This aircraft was used for spare parts during the remainder of the operation. The U.S. Air Mission armorer trained [ ] who in turn trained and assisted our personnel in loading and arming bombs and loading and adjusting the machine guns in the fighters. An armor specialist was rushed from the States, but he arrived only a few days before the operation ended. The mountainous terrain, poor weather conditions, lack of a radio-homing device in the F-47s, the relatively long flight to and from the target area with no alternate airfield if SOMERSET closed down with weather, made the fighter operations a little difficult. It caused the fighter pilots who were not familiar with the area to be apprehensive about the missions. Nevertheless, as the pilots became familiar with the area they became more aggressive about going on missions even when the weather was doubtful, which was quite often.

[ ] could see our fighters taxiing out for take off and, of course, the fighters had the bombs swinging from the bomb shackles. To remedy the chance of the bombs being recognized, we painted the bombs silver in hopes that the people at [ ] would think that the bombs were actually gas tanks or an integral part of the aircraft.

[ ] men were a tremendous help in assisting in the unloading of the cargo that was continually arriving from FJHOPEFUL.

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The ground commander at Chiquimula called for air strikes so often and was so desirous of having aircraft in the area above the front lines that we decided to load frag bombs on the C-47s and use the cargo kickers to drop the bombs from the door of the C-47 when the pilot gave the green light. The cargo kickers would pull the pins on the bombs just before they rolled them out the door. The 260# frag bombs and the small frag bombs were used in this manner and from all reports the results were quite effective.

The request came in from the field for gasoline and food. Food was purchased on the local market and packed for dropping. Gasoline was purchased in 55 gallon drums. A good number of the drums had to be sterilized before they were dropped. The riggers made drop slings to go around the drums so that the parachutes could be hooked to the drums. One landing was made at Chiquimula airfield with a load of gasoline. The field was too short and too rough to be used for continual landing operations.

One fighter was hit over Zacapa and managed to get to Chiquimula before crash landing. The pilot was not hurt although the aircraft was a complete loss. The pilot was returned to our control. A search was underway using two C-47s and one F-47 before we received word that the fighter had crashed in Guatemala.

CALLIGERIS was flown from Chiquimula to SOMERSET and from SOMERSET to El Salvador in one of our C-47s. [ ] and Col. Mendoza were the pilots and the Guatemalan cargo kickers went along as guards. The remaining two C-47s were used to return equipment and personnel to FJHOPEFUL.

#### COMMENTS

##### A. COMMUNICATIONS:

Headquarters: It was approximately [ ] miles from the airfield to SHERWOOD. At the beginning we had one courier. This caused delay in messages to and from Headquarters. This was partially solved by adding additional couriers; however, I recommend that in future operations radio communication facilities be available on the air field with the air operations.

Air Borne Communications: There were no serious problems in the air borne communications after the VHF crystals were received.

Communications with the Field Command Post: Before the Field Command Post moved to SHERWOOD it was not unusual to receive a request for air support six hours after the time the support was to have taken place. This problem was helped considerably when the FCP moved into the same office as air operations at SOMERSET. This made an ideal arrangement as far as close support for the ground forces by the air section.

##### B. PERSONNEL

The small group of air operations personnel could not have possibly given the support that it did without the aid of the [ ] A minimum of a radio technician, armament specialist and at least one mechanic per fighter aircraft should be in place before operations start.

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C. [ ]

D. Packaging of Bundles to be Air Dropped:

The average bundle to be air dropped was entirely too heavy. The A bundle weighed over 400 pounds limiting to a maximum of three the number which could be stacked in the door and dropped in one pass over the drop zone. Then the aircraft had to circle until the other bundles could be moved to the door and be discharged. This proved to be very time consuming in the drop zone area and was quite a task for the kickers--to handle 400# bundles in a moving aircraft. Also, these bundles must have been some problem to the personnel on the ground in that they had to move them from the drop zone. I recommend that the bundles not weigh over 200# in future operations unless it is a resupply drop such as was taking place at Chiquimula where our forces had trucks on the drop zone.

E. General:

The Field Commander and Air Operations Officer worked in close harmony throughout the entire operation and I personally feel that they both did a superior job and deserve a great deal of credit for what they accomplished. I feel very proud to have worked as a member of their staff and to have had the opportunity to work for PBSUCCESS.

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ANNEX C

AIR OPERATIONS - PART THREE

by

AMD Assistant Air Operations Officer Captain [ ]

FORWARD

It must be clearly understood that the remarks which follow are intended as a critique and analysis and are not to be in any way construed as criticism. PBSUCCESS is now complete and its accomplishments are a matter of record; however, in addition to fulfilling the goals originally set, I believe much value can be gained from PBSUCCESS by an objective critique and analysis of all aspects of the operation. The main body of this report will consist of comments on various categories among which will be included my own duties and responsibilities as Assistant Air Operations Officer.

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. Communications:

In an operation of this sort communications are naturally one of the key items. From what I have seen the Office of Communications has wholeheartedly supported this project and given it superior support from an equipment stand point and from the stand point of the competency of the communications personnel involved. The somewhat serious deficiencies which did arise appear to have been due to last minute or uncoordinated changes in operational plans which precluded proper communications planning implementation. Items which caused trouble, such as shortages of code clerks and operators at key points and delays in getting messages from the commo centers to the recipients, are certainly items which should have been avoided if the requirements had been known in time and properly allowed for. In a project of this type it is often essential that the sender of a message know when and if the message was received by the addressee, e.g. the way LINCOLN was set up all concerned should have known that within a matter of minutes after a message was decoded it would be in the hands of a responsible staff officer and consideration being given as to action required. This was not the case with the field or with Headquarters; consequently, LINCOLN which was guiding the operation, frequently did not know if its messages had been received and were being considered for action. This was particularly crucial as LINCOLN was in the middle, between the field and Headquarters, with messages constantly coming in from one or the other requiring knowledge of what both were doing. The same thing appears to have been true as regards communications between the Field Command Post and SOMERSET in that requests for support from FCP were received at SOMERSET after the time specified in the request for the support to take place. Conversely, FCP would request support and not know until quite a time later whether the support had been forthcoming. The time lags in all communication nets should be subject to determination and known to all concerned. The heavy reliance upon cable traffic on a project of this type makes it imperative that all personnel involved be thoroughly versed in the use of Cablese to reduce commo load and also in the techniques of cable clarity. Regardless of the length of a message or the time of transmission it is utterly useless if its meaning is not clear or if its meaning is subject to interpretation. The handling

of cable traffic at LINCOLN appeared especially effective and the method used to file cables for reference was very good. The amount of incoming and outgoing cable traffic was tremendous and it is believed a survey of this traffic to establish guidance for future operations would be of great value. It is assumed that the Office of Communications will make a detailed analysis and report on the communications aspects of PBSUCCESS.

B. RECRUITMENT OF AIR CREWS:

The recruitment of air crews proved to be a very special problem in view of the time factors involved and also due to the problems inherent in the nature of air operations. Last minute restrictions on the use of [ ] crews and the approval for tactical air support made recruitment of air crews a matter of utmost urgency and in the time allowed the necessary contacts could not be properly established. This time factor plus the security factor made it a difficult task to recruit air crew members. As a result we ended up trying to recruit pilots and mechanics who could leave immediately, if not sooner, on a somewhat shady sounding proposition to an area where a known shooting war was going on. Naturally, in view of the time element, we were not in a position to screen a group of prospective recruits and pick out the best and concentrate on them. We were almost forced to take anything that came along which is a far from ideal situation. Going at it in this manner, first impressions weigh very heavily and the person doing the recruiting must be a competent air man familiar with the requirements of the work and capable of judging the qualifications of the recruits. The story used in recruiting the unwitting air crew members was that the person doing the recruiting was a representative of the exile Guatemalan government which was attempting to regain power in Guatemala. The anti-Commie aspect of the employment was stressed along with the monetary benefits which, in my opinion, were quite substantial, but proper. Pilots were offered \$2,000 a month with the minimum guarantee of two months which gave them \$4,000 plus a \$250 per successful mission bonus. Mechanics were offered a salary of \$1,000 per month with the minimum of two months work and no bonus. All personnel involved were given travel expense money to go to Managua and were authorized \$10 a day per diem. The recruits were told that the contracts would have to be signed in Managua which made it a little harder to sell because they were more or less buying a pig-in-a-poke and were being told to take the expense money and if they didn't like it when they got there, they could return to Miami, but due to the time element they would have to sever whatever ties they had here quickly and take a chance on some unknown situation. They were also told that half of their money would be given them in advance and the balance placed in the bank in escrow in Nicaragua. This was not particularly appealing in that they would never know if they were going to get the money out and back to their families. If contracts could have been signed here, half the money given to them here, and the remaining money placed in escrow in the United States I believe it would have been much easier to get personnel. The usual approach was to get the name of a prospective pilot or mechanic or kicker from a cleared or uncleared contact, as the case may be, such as [ ]

[ ] in Fort Lauderdale who would give names of people who he felt were qualified and who might be available. The person doing the recruiting would then contact the individual using an alias and give the aforementioned story. Previous contacts and meetings had taken place in motels or rooms in a small hotel and it was recommended to me that this be continued. After several dealings of this type I found myself disagreeing with it and in the future would recommend a different procedure as follows: As one of the main things which seems to be needed is to lend an aura of respectability to the employment and to put up a good front, it would seem to me much more advisable to get a room in one of the largest hotels in Miami or even out on Miami Beach. This not only lends some

substance to the person doing the recruiting, but also appears better from a security viewpoint as a hotel of that type you are more easily lost in the shuffle and it does not look strange to have a number of people coming up and asking for you and then going up to your room. Long distance calls, room service, and things of that nature stand out in a small place making it seem more advisable to do it on a big-time basis in a large establishment. The cloak-and-dagger, furtive type of dealing must be eliminated as much as possible as it only stands out in the mind of the prospective recruit and makes him much harder to deal with. Most of the recruits with the proper experience are at least in their thirties and as a consequence have families, obligations and even though the money is attractive and the cause seems just, a little something extra is needed to push them over and it is believed that a real show of confidence and frankness will do much to overcome any qualms that a recruit may have. One thing which proved a little difficult was establishing the initial contact with the prospective recruits. The recruiter would call and the recruit would not be home so they would ask where they could leave a message. Unless the man doing the recruiting is established full time in a hotel, some kind of cut-out is necessary. The use of actual home phone under a real or assumed name seemed inadvisable. One gimmick tried was a phone-answering service, the number of which was left at the recruit's home and where he could call and leave a message. Again it left an aura of shadiness--nobody knew just where you were--"I can't be located, I'll call you, don't call me" type of thing--which should be avoided if possible. Also the factor of the times when the recruits are available to be interviewed, the standing-by for phone calls, the need to see them off if they do accept the contract, all make it necessary that the person doing the recruiting do it almost on a full-time basis if there is any urgency, or on a part-time basis if done far enough ahead of time so that it can be stretched out and not interfere with normal duties. The existing situation where it was tried to sandwich recruiting in with the normal 25-hour day schedule made it almost impossible to conduct it properly and a great many messages were missed and people not contacted due to the unavailability of the person doing the recruiting. As a side note I feel it should be added that taking prospective recruits and their families to dinner and entertaining them a little proved very valuable in that the wife was able to hear herself what the pitch was and to make her decision which in all cases heavily influenced the decision of the husband-recruit. Asking married recruits to meet you at some small motel in the wee hours of the night is not very conducive to getting the right kind of people of getting their families to accept their employment. Along these same lines, the objections of the wife were the main thing that killed off many good prospects. Again it is felt that a large, classy hotel and a good dinner with a frank discussion of all elements involved by a personable individual will swing the deal in most cases.

C. POLICY GUIDANCE

In a project of this type it is most important that all possible policy be firmly established and that a method is available to all concerned to obtain policy clarification or additional guidance. Soon after the operation began, 18 June, it became evident that operational control of all field elements would have to be given to the Field Commander who would then operate under existing policy and be given all possible policy guidance. One of the complications was that when additional policy guidance was requested by the Field Commander it was at times difficult for LINCOLN and, most assuredly it was even more difficult for Headquarters, to properly furnish such policy guidance in view of the fact that detailed, intimate knowledge of the situation in the Field was not present. Along these same lines many policy

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problems could have been anticipated and worked out ahead of time if LINCOLN and Headquarters had known a little more fully what the plans of the Field Commander were. It must be made clear at this point that this was no fault of the Field Commander's in that his situation was somewhat the same and he was not too sure just what the status of his forces and their requirements were. There appears to have been throughout a feeling at many levels that when things looked bad it would be better not to say anything--something along the lines "there is no use of upsetting all those above". I feel that this resulted in many cases in LINCOLN and Headquarters making policy decisions or attempting to foresee policy complications without a true knowledge of the situation. This attitude of withholding bad news may have been fully justified, but in any event it is regrettable. In order to make proper operational decisions and certainly in order to write policy as detailed and as clear a picture of the operational situation as can be had it most necessary. It is realized that this is at times a complicated and most difficult problem which certainly makes it all the more worth a detailed analysis and a serious attempt at improving things of this nature. Many things such as the procurement and stock-piling of bombs and ammo and getting P-51s in a standby status pointed up the need for foreseeing various policy modifications and changes which, if accepted, would require much time and difficult coordination to implement. Therefore, all possible and practicable steps should be taken to get everything all lined up in the event that the policy decision is made along the lines which are being prepared for. This at times becomes most expensive and may result in what appears to be a waste of effort, but when time is of the essence as in programs of this type, especially after things really start rolling, there is no alternative except to prepare for all contingencies and have as much as possible on a standby basis.

One of the worst things which can happen is policy vacillation. Due to the time elements involved and the complex structure with possibly two or three countries involved and several individuals in each, policy must be as clear as possible and changes made carefully and with due consideration to all their effects. Vacillating or indecisive policy guidance not only has a disruptive effect on the morale of all concerned, particularly under operational stress, but it also seriously hinders operations by bringing about undesirable situations which themselves engender the need for more policy guidance, which in turn accentuates the disruptive effect of policy vacillation. A side issue of this point is the rather evident need for an operation of this type to be run on a team work basis. In order for this to be done all concerned must participate in policy matters as much as possible in line with their responsibilities and capabilities. The pros and cons of policy must be open to question and the reasons for the policy should be known as much as possible by those who have to implement. Then if there is disagreement or lack of comprehension of the policy it must still be adhered to in spirit and in letter.

D. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STAFF OFFICERS

In a project of this type and particularly at LINCOLN the staff officers played an important role in providing assistance to those in charge of the project. The time element involved in the operation and the tremendous flow of traffic made it imperative that staff officers be available at all times to handle matters in their field of responsibility. It goes without saying that the staff officers should have as detailed an understanding of all elements of the project as is possible and a sincere desire to accomplish the job. Professional competency is, of course, a basic prerequisite, but even more important is the exercise of initiative and the ability to present

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one's own views and to listen to those of others. The staff officer must be constantly on the alert for anything which will in any manner effect his responsibilities (i.e. A PP, FI or even an Administrative or financial matter could in many ways effect Air Operations) and consequently all traffic must be reviewed and analyzed to determine its effect on the sphere of responsibility of the staff officer concerned. Conversely, the effect upon other operations or spheres of responsibility of an individual staff officer's actions should be pointed out to the staff officer concerned so that he can analyze the effect on his responsibilities and take the necessary action or work up compromise measures. All aspects of the program are naturally intricately woven together and must be treated as such. Consequently, the staff officer must have a knowledge of all aspects of the program and a sympathy for the problems of others. All actions taken must be for the good of the project as a whole and not aimed only at one particular aspect with no thought given to the over all effect. This again becomes the responsibility of the staff officer to insure that this holds true and to bring to the attention of those in charge of the project any matters which he feels will not maximize the chances of the project to be successful. The only justification for the existence of a staff officer is to guide, advise and support others.

#### E. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT AND FINANCE

The administrative and financial support on PBSUCCESS was outstanding and the main reason for this was that it was operated truly as a support element. All too often in governmental activities the administrative and financial support loses sight of the fact that it is primarily a support element and attempts to become a control element. An important part of the work of administrative and financial support is to see that the government gets its money's worth, but this is not the primary reason for administrative and financial support sections. Basic justification for this type of support is exactly that--to give all required administrative and financial support toward the success of the project. This may sound very elemental, but it is so often overlooked with consequential, detrimental effect that it should be stressed and full advantage should be taken of every opportunity to encourage the proper type of support. Simple administrative and financial rules and regulations are certainly necessary and the need for compliance with them seems obvious. In the case of PBSUCCESS it is felt that the administrative and finance regulations were very effective and were adhered to in a most satisfactory manner. The importance of the multitude of details which were accomplished ranging from the provision of office supplies to furnishing almost a million dollars in advances should not be underestimated. Aside from the actual contribution of such details to the successful completion of the project, the value of permitting staff personnel to concentrate on operational matters while feeling certain that no serious lapse will occur in the administrative and financial matters, is incalculable and must be given full weight. To sum this subject up it should be emphasized that in order for any project to succeed the support approach must be "how will we do it" not "why we can't do it". The entire approach of PBSUCCESS support was aimed at getting the job done, and it got done.

#### E. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

As was proper most of the intelligence work was done long before my arrival at LINCOLN; therefore, I am not familiar with how much was actually available and how much could or should have been available. However, I can certainly say this much, that all intelligence I ever needed was available. In fact, it was not not only available to me but any information I requested

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was presented for me in the exact manner that I desired. One thing along this line which did worry me and of which I am still not certain is whether or not the proper intelligence was available at the Field Command Post or at the Air Operations section. ~~C~~ ~~J~~ e.g. whether the relatively late introduction of tactical air and the passing of command to the FCP introduced any intelligence support problems is not known, but it could have easily done so.

F. SECURITY

The cover story and physical security measures at LINCOLN appeared very effective. The concept of having the Security Officer as an integral part of the staff seemed particularly valuable in that security problems were anticipated and/or handled as they arose during the day by day development of the program.

G. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

The logistic support of PBSUCCESS was particularly successful and is indicative of what can be done when all the personnel involved are interested and anxious to get the job done. Much of the logistics support required was on a urgent priority basis and was done by airlift. The procurement and movement to Panama of large quantities of support items such as bombs, ammunition and various types of armament was handled at Headquarters in a most expeditious manner and clearly reflected the professional competency and spirit of cooperation of all concerned. Further movement of supplies from ~~C~~ ~~J~~ was accomplished by a relative few number of people and toward the end only one aircraft and one crew were available for this support. Again the relatively late introduction of tactical air introduced serious problems which were overcome by the combined efforts of all concerned. A sober view of how thin our personnel and assets were stretched clearly shows the amazing job done by our people in the field, but at the same time is a bit frightening in that a relative minor breakdown would have caused serious complications. Again, the need for professional people whose only desire is to get the job done and who can anticipate requirements and cope quickly with difficult problems is clearly indicated. A method for procuring needed supplies and transporting them rapidly with a minimum of red tape and administrative delays is absolutely essential in a project of this type. It is foolish to state that all requirements should be planned and properly processed when the operational situation is such that the thing has to be played by ear. One thing that must be remembered is that while getting too many supplies may be wasteful, not getting enough may be catastrophic.



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ANNEX C  
AIR OPERATIONS - PART FOUR  
AIR STATISTICS

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ANNEX C  
AIR OPERATIONS  
PART FOUR - AIR STATISTICS

C-1	14 June	1800-0035	BG-0558 Z1	7-4, 2-B	Lights 3 miles west of Dz. Made drop on lights. (Drop later reported compromised.)
C-2	14 June	1831-0100	BG-0558 Z1	3-4, 3-B	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-3	15 June	0235-0850	AF-8434 Z2	6-4	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-4	15 June	0236-0851	AF-8434 Z2	8-G	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-5	15 June	2000-0205	AF-8434 Z2	6-4	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-6	15 June	2005-0215	AF-8434 Z2	8-G	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-7	16 June	0605-0840	CG-4550 Z3	5-B, 2-E 2-F	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-8	16 June	0410-0840	CG-4559 Z3	3-F, 6-E	No reception. Returned with cargo.

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C-9	16 June	2015-0156	CF-0264 Z4	1-B, 2-A	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-10	16 Jun	2020-0145	CF-0264 Z4	8-A	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-11	17 Jun	1930-0120	CG-68850 Z9	5-A, 3-A, 4-G	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-12	17 Jun	-0040	CG-68850	Not Reported	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-13	18 Jun	0345--943	AF-7727 AF-8050 Z9	5-A, 3-A FG	No reception. Returned with cargo.
C-14	18 Jun	0430-1005	AF-7727 AF-8050 Z9	5-A, 5-G, 2-E	Weather in area too low. Returned with cargo.
C-15	18 Jun	2117-0210	BF-6906 Z8	5-A, 3-A 4-G	Dropped to light pattern. (12 bundles)
C-16	18 Jun	2120-0225	BG-7863 BG-7263	Bundles of letters 5-A, 5-G, 2-E	Dropped to blinking light and pattern. (12 bundles)
C-17	19 Jun	0500-0945	BG 688502 BG 890538	7-D, 4-F, 1-G	No reception team (mandatory drop order) Nine bundles in DZ, 3 bundles NE of DZ 200 yds.

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C-18	19 Jun	0502-0955	BF-8902	5-B,5-G 1-E,1-F	Letter L painted on top of house. 12 bundles dropped - all in DZ. Four passes - no opposition.
C-19	19 Jun	1555-2013	CG-3746	5-G,1-E 3-A	Dropped leaflets over El Progresso. No reception team. Returned with cargo.
C-20	19 Jun	1558-2015	CG-3746	5-G,1-E 2-A	Dropped leaflets over El Progresso and Asogion. No reception team. Returned with cargo.
C-21	20 Jun	1145-1738	CG-5634 CF-9243 Jutiapa	5-G,1-E 6-A,5-	No reception team at CG-5634. "M" Panel and reception team at CF 9243. Delivered 4 Bundle. No reception at Jutiapa. Returned 5G, 1E, and 6A.
C-22	21 Jun	1525-1045	CF9243 Prim CF8420 Sec	5G, 1E, 5A	Reception team at CF 8750 waving white cloth. Delivered cargo. One "A" chute steamed.
C-23	21 Jun	130-1048	CF-8420	5G, 1E, 2A	Reception team located and cargo dropped to approximately 50 men at DZ.
C-24	21 Jun	705-2105	CF-8321 CF-8750	1A, 1B, 1D, 1F	No signals at CF 8321 but team present. Dropped cargo. No signal or team at CF 8750. Returned with bundle.
C-25	22 Jun	0350-0855	DE-6525	2A,2B, 2G, 1E, 200 lbs	No reception. Returned with cargo. food
C-26	22 June	-1535	CG-8875 Gualan	1A,2G,2	Dropped on air field. Team spread white drums gas sheet. Truck waiting. Dropped all cargo on 4 passes.

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C-27	22 Jun	1500-1905	Gualan DE-6522	1-4, 8-G 2 gas drums	No signal at DZ. Dropped on DE 6522 and crowd seen gathering bundles. [ ] states his intel net picked up msg that Guat troops had re-captured Rios prior our drop and we supplied enemy troops.
C-28	23 Jun	CF-8750 Jocotan CF-8321	0500-1010	64, 2F	No reception team at CF-8750. Dropped to CF-8321. DZ marked with white wtu. Thirty-man reception party waiting.
C-29	24 Jun	CF-6716	0615-1205	8G, 2bx 9mm ammo, lbx 7.62 ammo	Dropped to two DZ's in main body. Observed our troops loading cargo into truck.
C-30	24 Jun	1200-1710	CG-1575 Gualan	5-A, 4-G, 2BX 7.62 ammo, lbx 9mm ammo.	No signals or panels found. Cargo returned.
C-31	25 Jun	0520-1030	Chiquimula	8 drums gas, 6bx 7.62mm ammo	Cargo delivered to CF-7013 and CF-7211 SE of Chiquimula. Both DZ's marked with panels.
C-32	25 Jun	0525-1130	CG-1572	5-4, 4-G, 2 bx 7.62, lbx 9mm ammo	Dropped two bundles to ten men near DZ waving towels. Returned 4-A, 3-G and ammo.

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
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1520-2050 Road North of 2 1/2 lb frags dropped from No Chiq-  
 Chiquimula 2/260 lb frags umula along road and rr to Zacapa.  
 525-2015 CG-1575 5-A, 1-G, 2Bx Minimum of 100 people on LZ  
 7.62, 1Bx 9 waving to h/c. Cargo delivered.  
 num ammo  
 510-1020 CG-1575 10-G Clouds obscured primary LZ.  
 CF-6717 Dropped cargo on three wpts  
 at Chiquimula.  
 3810-1300 Land Es- 8 drums gas- Equipulas strip deserted.  
 quipulas olone, 48/20 Landed at Chiquimula and un-  
 pd. frag bombs loaded cargo.  
 1555-2115 Zacapa Area 2 1/2/20 pd frags Dropped frags on hill at CF  
 6633, along rr station and near  
 bridge at CF 6736.  
 0510-1030 Zacapa area 10 drums gas Dropped cargo to reception team  
 at Chiquimula air strip.  
 0512-0930 Zacapa area 10-G bundles Dropped cargo to reception team  
 at Chiquimula air strip.  
 1115-1650 CF-9825 11-C Two bundles to four men dis-  
 CG-1575 playing X at CF 9825. Nine bun-  
 dles to 12 men waving white  
 flags at CG 1575.  
 0410-0910 Cargo drop 3-A, 3-B, 250 Weather poor, circled one hour 1 1/2  
 Chiquimula pds food min before getting into pass,  
 cargo dropped airfield.  
 0415-0815 Cargo drop, 9 drums gas Weather poor. Dropped cargo in  
 Chiquimula five passes all on LZ.

C-33 25 Jun  
 C-34 25 Jun  
 C-35 26 Jun  
 C-36 26 Jun  
 C-37 27 Jun  
 C-38 27 Jun  
 C-39 27 Jun  
 C-40 27 Jun  
 C-41 28 Jun  
 C-42 28 Jun

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C-43	28 Jun	0420-0925	Land Chiquimula	200 rds ammo, 6 mortars, 1mg pans	CADICK returned SOMERSET. Field rough and will be used only in priority requirements.
C-44	28 Jun	1210-1730	DE-7906 Message to CF-9825	3-4, 3-3, 2400 rds 7.62, first aid kits 10 rifles & ammo to CF-9825.	Cargo delivered after searching area 1 hour 15 min. Medical kits,
C-45	28 Jun	1330-1845	Chiquimula	100 rifles	Cargo dropped airfield. Spotted 3 bldgs with large red crosses in Zacapa.
C-46	29 June	0515-1045	Zacapa CF-5937	1-4, 2 frag 150 lbs. 12 frag 20 pds.	No reception team CF-5937. Dropped frag bombs on Zacapa; dive bombed truck -hit. Bundle dropped advance forces Chiquimula.
C-47	30 June	0515-1015	Esquipulas Air Field	Return CALLI- GERIS SOMERSET	CALLIGERIS returned SOMERSET. Stated pilot ok that crash landed Chiquimula. Aircraft complete loss.
C-48	30 June	0710-1146	DE-4008	6-A	Searched area one hour 18 min. No reception located. Returned with cargo.
C-49	30 June	1245			



MISSION


MISSION NO	DATE	PILOT	FLT. T.	TARGET	CARGO	DAMAGE
F-1 (P-6)	19 Jun	[REDACTED]	0531-0940	BG 688502	1 bundle leaflets	Ftr. cover C-17, C-18, then leaflets over Guat City. Fired MG in air.
F-2 (P-7)	19 Jun	[REDACTED]	0532-0950	BF 8902, Guat City	Leaflets	Same as F-1 above.
F-3	19 Jun	[REDACTED]	1620-1930	CG 3746	50 Cal ammo	Ftr. cover C-19, C-20. Buzzed Jutiapa. Minor damage ground fire. Gear collapsed on landing. A/C out for duration.
F-4	19 Jun	[REDACTED]	1620-1930	CG 3746	50 Cal ammo	Ftr. cover C-19, C-20. Buzzed Jutiapa, El Progreso and Asuncion. Minor damage from ground fire.
F-5	21 Jun	[REDACTED]	0550-0945	CF 8750	50 Cal MG	Ftr. cover C-22, C-23. Forced light plane to land Esquipulas. Minor damage sustained small arms fire.
F-6	21 Jun	[REDACTED]	1425-1555	Adam	MG	Engine trouble
F-7	22 Jun	[REDACTED]	0530-0930	Guat City gas tanks	Strafing	30 holes, approx. loss of 60,000 gallons. Repairs will take two weeks.
F-8	22 Jun	[REDACTED]	1120-1445	Armed recon Chiquimula	3 -250 lb.	Attempted knock out bridge near Zacapa. All 3 bombs duds.
F-9	23 Jun	[REDACTED]	0540-0915	Zacapa, Gualan	3 - 250 lb.	Hit Zacapa Fort with 2-250's. Hit NW section. Both exploded. 1-250 on RR Station was dud.
F-10	23 Jun	[REDACTED]	0700-1030	Armed recon Chiquimula and Gualan	1 - 500 rd.	Weather poor, got lost. Dropped bomb accidentally on hill SW El Jicaro.



File No.	Date	Target / Description	Weapon / Details	Result / Notes
F-11	23 Jun	RR Bridges So. and No of Chiquimula	3 - 250 lb.	Hit rr bridge south Chiquimula. 1 bomb hit north end. Damaged beyond use. 1 bomb completely destroyed rr Station at Gualan.
F-12	23 June	CF 855500 DEH06, DEH339	1 - 500	Dropped on Gualan Station and tracks.
F-13	24 June	Chiquimula	1 - 500	Dropped bomb edge on RR south town.
F-14	24 June	Chiquimula	3 - 250 lb	Bombed reported auto weapons in graveyard. Cargo plane reported burning at graveyard, airport and oil tanks.
F-15	25 June	Train - Chiquimula	1 - 500 1 - 250 1 - 260 frag.	Dropped 3 bombs train west of El Jicaró. All duds. Train strafed.
F-16	25 June	Finish El Jicaró train. Matamoros, Gas tanks, Guat City.	1 - 500 2 - frags	Divebombed Matamoros. Three bombs exploded in center.
F-17	25 June	Same as F-16	1 - frag 1 - 250 1 - 500	Bombed rr bridge at CF 3327, (El Jicaró) with excellent results. Jettisoned 2 bombs 5 miles east of Guat City.
F-18	26 June	CF 6834 area	1 - 500 2 - 260 frags	3 bombs placed adjacent outside train of five trains in marshalling yards, Zacapa. Estimated 1 train knocked out.
F-19 (P 38)	26 June	CG358452 CG3347	2 - 500 lbs	Bombs jettisoned in sea at 13°18'W.
F-20	26 June	CF 6834 area	1 - 500 2 - 260 frags	Blew passenger train pulling into Zacapa Station. 3 bombs on RR station and train.


F-21	26 June	1125-1345	Chiquimula Za-1-500 capa area 2-250's gas tanks, Guat City	Bombs jettisoned at 12 48'N, 87 55' W.
F-22 (P38)	26 June	1400-1640	Bridge at OG 3646	1st bomb missed. 2nd hit base, making big crack in concrete structure.
F-23	26 June	1410-1810	Zacapa area	Bombed and strafed artillery spotted on hill at CF 7034. Clobbered military jeep on road to Guat City, CF 6634. Made bomb run on 4A Battery Guat City, BG 7477.
F-24	27 June	0515-0600	C-37 Zacapa Area	C-37 Dropped on hill at CF 6633 and near bridge CF 6763. F-24 Mission aborted. Bombs jettisoned sea. No location given.
F-25 (P38)	27 June	0545-0910	Fuel stor- age San Jose Commo, Guat City	1st pass on tanks, bomb release didn't work. 2nd pass a near miss.
F-26	27 June	0610-0915	Cover Zac- apa	Bad weather, bombs jettisoned in ocean. No location given.
F-27	28 June	0455-0940	Air strike targets op- portunity, Zacapa area	Bombed CF 6735, large gray bldg. Apparent- ly ammo dump. Big secondary explosion. 2 250's dropped on reported gun positions CF 6935 and CF 6934.
F-28	28 June	0605-0900	Targets of opportunity, Zacapa area	Blasted small trestle on spurline Zacapa and mg positions on hill.

F-29	28 June	0730-1045	Targets of opportunity, Zacapa Area	1 - 500 frag clusters	Bad weather, ceiling too low. Bombs jet-tisoned in ocean off Somerset.
F-30	28 June	1450-1710	Radio and Matamoros in Guat City	1 - 500 2 - 250	Weather low. Radio towers in bottom over-cast. Bombs landed 20 yds from bldg. Strafed gas tanks - none exploded.
F-31	28 June	1450-1710	Radio and Matamoros in Guat City	1 - 500 2 - 250	Direct hit Matamoros. Secondary explosion. Pilot observed big fire in fort.
F-32	29 Jun	0730-1050	Zacapa, Pto Barrios alternate	2 frag clusters 1 -250 frag	Bombed with 1 frag cluster enemy troops at woods CF 6834. 2nd 250 in center Zacapa airport to knock out field pieces. 3 bombs dropped east Zacapa bridge on small ridge.
F-33	29 Jun	0845-1215	Zacapa area, Pto Barrios alternate	2 clusters 1 - 250 frag	Crashlanded near Calligeris Hqs. Pilot sent Oc-tepeque, Honduras. Pilot all right. Aircraft complete loss.
F-34	29 Jun	0950-1315	Zacapa	1 - 250 frag 2 frag clusters	Bombed and strafed area.
F-35	29 June	1235-1445	Zacapa Patrol	1 -250	Unable get in due to weather.



C-47 CARGO MISSIONS

- Unsuccessful - No reception
- Successful supply drop
- Landed and discharged cargo



FIGHTER BOMBER MISSIONS

- Leaflets and Fighter display
- Strafing
- Bombing and strafing

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ANNEX D

SHERWOOD COMMO BASE

PART ONE by Mr. [ ]

On 24 March 1954 a decision was reached to establish a black radio broadcasting station in [ ] This particular phase of PBSUCCESS was designated SHERWOOD. [ ]

Mr. [ ] departed LINCOLN on 25 March for FJHOPEFUL and proceeded from there on 26 March via [ ] loaded with equipment, for SOMERSET. No complications were encountered upon arrival. Heavier pieces of gear were stowed at SOMERSET and the remainder of the equipment was moved to SARANAC. [ ]

On 27 March PIVALL and [ ] arranged for a meeting with [ ] through SALAMANDER. [ ] however, was not available and a meeting was held with [ ]. Therein began the long and frustrating negotiations for a SHERWOOD site. [ ] did not reject the principal request but had many direct and unanswerable questions pertaining to the functions and sponsors of the PBSUCCESS complex. Actually, [ ] had little authority and eventually did create the impression (and this was at the first meeting) that he could do nothing for us without consulting [ ]. The first meeting terminated with [ ] promising an answer to our request within three days. [ ]

Four days passed and no answer. Queries to meet again and/or obtain a reply were met with a typical "manana" or "momentito" reply. Short conversations with [ ] were held on several occasions. Most of these conversations were of a leading and explanatory nature concerning the security of the broadcast operation. Bold and actually forceful assurances that a broadcast of this nature could not be definitely located brought about another promise that a site would be provided. [ ]

SARANAC was offered as a site. This was not acceptable primarily because of training activities which were not compatible with black broadcasting. [ ]

[ ] was offered. Now, this site was actually ideal both from the standpoint of security and applicability to other phases of commo operation. There was one, and a tremendous one, disadvantage to this location - logistical. As it turned out there were no sea-going craft capable of moving the necessary equipment to the island. [ ]

In the meantime, two additional personnel [ ] arrived. We were now ready to effect installation and go into immediate operation, if and when a site was located. [ ]

Our effort seemed to bog down. Fortunate (?) and as it later turned out, to our advantage was [ ]. Within two days of [ ] and short curt talks with [ ] and [ ], SHERWOOD was given the green light and numerous sites were offered. [ ]

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Of three sites reconnoitered, one located [ ] was selected. This particular site was on a [ ] farm and was well hidden from the road - approximately 1200 yards. Physically, the building was in deplorable condition yet it would provide the necessary shelter for our equipment. Surrounding terrain was ideal for erection of a fairly well disguised antenna which would give our broadcast signal an excellent chance of penetrating the target area.

With the usual delays caused by slow-moving Latin customs we were not able to move our equipment into the building until 25 April. Five days later all equipment was installed and ready to go at a low-power level. At that time we were awaiting the arrival of a power generator which would enable us to go on high power. By 1 May we were ready. Tapes arrived during the afternoon and SHERWOOD was on the air (momentarily). Almost every piece of equipment failed during the course of the first day's broadcasting. We did manage, however, to complete three complete two-hour inauguration programs.

From the opening day until the final broadcast at 1300 July 2 not a single program failed to be transmitted on schedule. This successful operation must be at least partially attributable to "Lady Luck."

Another commo phase of this operation dealt with radio circuits which were of a routine nature and were employed as a channel for handling necessary staff communications.

A still further function of SHERWOOD was that of base station for 12 agent radio circuits in the target area. Of the 12 agents mounted, the base station came into contact with 11. Because of the specific area in which we were operating, there were many periods of poor communication encountered. On the whole, service to the agent operators could be considered successful and more than satisfactory.

Other duties in the field included necessary liaison to establish the initial steps in setting up the SOMERSET operation.

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ANNEX E

K PROGRAM

BY

Mr. [ ]

On 16 April 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency dispatched me to Guatemala, where I was to operate as an undercover agent, posing as a wealthy American tourist and operating independently of the permanent CIA installation in that country. The background of my assignment was as follows:

1. By and large, executive power in Guatemala is centered in Guatemala City, the country's capital. Thus success or failure of the operation in the last analysis hinged upon our ability to wrest control of the city from the ARBENZ Government. Conversely, as long as the ARBENZ regime could exercise sway over the city, local successes in the provinces would not necessarily have assured us victory.

2. ARBENZ and his advisers also recognized this strategic premise and were laying their plans accordingly. With the threat of an uprising growing daily, especially since the arrival of the arms shipment in Puerto Barrios, unprecedented measures were taken to ready the armed forces concentrated in Guatemala City and the law enforcement agencies for the anticipated showdown. Repressive measures were stepped up and during the week beginning 30 May, the Guatemalan police struck a devastating blow against the underground organization of CASTILLO Armas. For a variety of reasons we had not been able to stave off this event, whose success was mainly attributable to the insecure and thoroughly unprofessional practices in which the Guatemalan underground excelled.

3. While our undertaking was still in the planning phase, we had viewed this very development as a likely contingency. We had been reckoning with the possibility of a stalemate at some stages of the revolt, irrespective of insurgent successes in the provinces and irrespective of the scope of the internal resistance which we might be able to muster and actualize. Once that stalemate had been reached, we knew that the factor of Guatemala City as a focal point of governmental strength would loom large. Something had to be done about this.

4. We knew that Guatemala City was the Achilles heel of our undertaking. We had been unsuccessful in making serious inroads into the monolithic structure of government control over the armed forces concentrated there. The civilian resistance organization in Guatemala City was deplorably weak and exposed to the unceasing vigilance of the Government, the mounting fury of police terror, and communist deprivations. There existed, to the best of our knowledge, no serious fissures in the Army High Command's loyalty to President ARBENZ personally, although it is only fair to say that the officers' corps in its overwhelming majority had all along been strongly anti-Communist. The police, we found, was to all intents and purposes Communist controlled.

5. In the light of such unfavorable auspices for a speedy investment of the center of governmental strength and in realization of the

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overriding importance of the time element in all this, we determined that an attempt would have to be made to activate a resistance cell within the structure of the ARBENZ regime.

6. As an optimum we would have liked to obtain concrete assurance of major defections among the troop units garrisoned in Guatemala City, once the internal uprising in the provinces hit its stride and military units in the provincial garrisons defied government control.

7. As a minimum, we were anxious to assure a transfer of power from ARBENZ to elements sympathetic to our cause, ahead of a military showdown which - we knew - would be a prolonged and bloody affair and which might well have resulted in a Government victory.

8. The thesis was generally accepted that a palace revolution "old style" would militate against the effectiveness of a thorough purge of all Communists and fellow travelling elements in Guatemala. Although we favored a popular uprising on a vast scale as a pre-requisite for such a thorough house-cleaning, we were naturally prepared to accept a palace coup in preference to failure and defeat, provided we could be satisfied that the transfer of power thus engineered was not merely a Communist ruse designed to mask the preservation of Communist influence and power behind a governmental front. As subsequent developments proved, such a dodge was in fact attempted and had it not been for the vigilance of our representatives in Guatemala City, might have succeeded.

9. The linchpin of President ARBENZ' control was the Army High Command. As long as its fealty to the President remained unimpaired, the chances of a successful overthrow of his regime were scant. Even peripheral defections in the provincial garrison towns could not make up for the continued allegiance of elite troops concentrated in the capital, and their defection could not be hoped for unless and until a significant element of the Army High Command decided to abandon the sinking ship.

10. To hasten this development by establishing lodgements of control within the Army High Command of Guatemala was the special assignment on which my Agency ordered me to proceed to Guatemala.

11. It stands to reason that the tasks with which I have been entrusted could not in propriety be discharged by [ ] personnel assigned to our Embassy whose compromise would have disclosed beyond peradventure that the conspiracy enjoyed official American backing. For that very reason, it was clearly understood by all concerned, including our Ambassador, that should I be apprehended in the performance of my mission, the United States would merely accord me the customary protection to which all citizens abroad are entitled, but would disavow all knowledge of my mission.

12. The only facilities to which I did have access, were the [ ] cable link and the diplomatic pouch through which I could communicate with the regional headquarters [ ] and with the Director in Washington.

13. On 29 April I introduced myself to Colonel X, [ ] the representative of an organization composed of Guatemalan exiles and a few prominent and independently wealthy United States citizens dedicated to the cause of overthrowing the ARBENZ regime.

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14. I explained to Colonel X that the Americans participating in this endeavor were not in any manner answerable to the United States Government. However, I left no doubt in his mind that we were acting within the framework of United States foreign policy which had resolved that Communist ascendancy in Guatemala constituted a direct and major threat to the security of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and which for that reason was looking with favor upon any attempt undertaken by patriotic Guatemalan elements to break the Communist stranglehold.

15. It should be noted as a fact of a significance transcending this particular operation that Colonel X, after a period of considerable doubt, decided to cooperate with us mainly on the strength of his conviction that this undertaking was backed by the United States. He may or may not have swallowed my story that the United States Government was not involved. He may have believed my protestations that this was essentially a Guatemalan undertaking. This matter was never raised between us again.

16. Colonel X's persistent demands for tangible manifestations of United States backing, culminating in an almost vehement insistence that military objectives in the capital of his own country be subjected to air bombardment suggested to my mind that he viewed this whole affair in the context of the worldwide struggle between the United States and Soviet imperialism. His decision to stake his life and career on what he must have realized was an exceedingly hazardous venture stemmed essentially from his conviction that in so doing he was aligning himself with the United States.

17. Over a period of almost two months, Colonel X furnished high-level intelligence, which - I have been told - contributed to the success of the operation. It should be stressed that he did so at a time when our fortunes were at their lowest ebb and that his trust in our good faith and in our professional competence was never seriously shaken - not even when the whole structure of the internal resistance organization caved in.

18. I cannot help but feel that Colonel X must have known that he was working for the US intelligence service. However, it should be stressed that at no time while this operation lasted was he provided with conclusive evidence of a direct involvement of the United States Government and the prime requirement of non-attributability remained inviolate all through this operation.

19. My attempts to recruit members of the Army High Command, principally the Minister of Defense, Colonel SANCHEZ, and his chief assistant, the Chief of Staff of the Guatemalan Army, Colonel PARINELLO, met with the difficulties of unexpected severity and finally had to be abandoned so as not to jeopardize the security of Colonel X.

20. Just prior to D-Day I made one last attempt through the [ ] who at my request invited SANCHEZ and PARINELLO to meet with me [ ]. At that stage it was my intention to serve them with a flat ultimatum rather than wasting on them any further missionary efforts.

21. I found myself hamstrung, however, by [ ] stipulation that I was not to engage in any recruitment attempts under the

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protection of his roof, a restriction obviously imposed at the insistence

[ ]  
22. I was furthermore laboring under the handicap of not being able to deal with the aforementioned officers from a position of strength. Rather than courting rebuff and possible compromise of Colonel X, I cancelled the engagement, being certain that the impact of government reverses would eventually convince them that they were backing the wrong horse. As it turned out, neither played a pivotal role in the regime's final undoing, and both, in the reflection of their enforced exile, are likely to rue the day when they chose to ignore my overtures.

[ ]  
24. Like Hitler, President ARBIENZ, until the moment of his enforced abdication, remained in effective control of the governmental apparatus and any premature sally might have met with swift retribution. My instructions to Colonel X had been all along to tread warily and not to stake the few important assets which we had been able to develop, in a precipitate move.

25. The internal uprising I had promised Colonel X never materialized. Furthermore, the manifestations of United States backing to which all along he had pointed as an indispensable prerequisite for the success of a palace coup supported by the Army High Command, were somewhat slow in coming. In the end, all came out well.

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ANNEX F

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL

by

[ ]

The undersigned joined PBSUCCESS in October 1953 as a KUFIRE officer. After reading over the files available at Headquarters at that time and having been briefed on the present status of the operation, the writer was assigned the specific task of proceeding to Honduras in order to study at first hand and report on those assets, particularly KUFIRE, which were reported to be controlled by the CALLIGERIS organization. During this preliminary two-week assessment, the writer met CALLIGERIS and several of his senior staff members. Most of the time was spent debriefing CALLIGERIS on the extent of his KUFIRE assets both within the target country and within those peripheral countries which had access to the target. Almost immediately two facts became obvious, and both were reported upon the writer's return to Headquarters. Namely, that CALLIGERIS himself had very little specific information regarding the names, identities, locations and little access to information of any of the members of his intelligence nets, particularly those within the target country. Secondly, it appeared that although intelligence was being produced by nets within the target country, until that time most of this information had not in fact come from well-placed or specifically trained intelligence agents but from a series of informants or friends of CALLIGERIS or CALLIGERIS's staff who upon occasions reported bits of information and incidental intelligence which they felt would be of value to him. With the exception of what later became the SHINGLE-SLEEKER net there was very little indication that CALLIGERIS had anything which approximated a clearly defined intelligence reporting structure.

It became the writer's job then to endeavor to establish within the CALLIGERIS organization, using those assets which were already available and contacted, a series of intelligence nets in the target country, as well as a CE structure which would serve not only to police the CALLIGERIS organization but also to establish effective penetrations in the enemy services both within the target country and her neighbors. In view of paucity of information available outside the target country concerning those assets which CALLIGERIS claimed to control inside, it was necessary to make a trip into the target country in order to identify those assets and endeavor to establish the net structures discussed above.

According to information which had been supplied by CALLIGERIS, the entire intelligence organization within the target area was being run by SEQUIN, with the aid of SEMANTIC and SECANT. A closer study of the situation revealed, however, a picture that was somewhat different. SEQUIN's position at that time could be better defined as that of an administrative coordinator, not entirely responsible for intelligence, but also responsible for coordinating efforts along the PP and PM lines in the target area. SEQUIN's main contribution in the intelligence field was his handling of SLEEKER through SETTLER. The SLEEKER/SETTLER complex had been producing fairly well at that time, but it was felt that much of their production could have been obtained through overt sources. The writer then met with SETTLER in order to debrief him thoroughly on the SLEEKER operation and instruct him on methods that were designed to make the best possible use of what

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appeared to be an extremely useful Communist Party penetration. A difficulty which arose in this situation and which is in some respects characteristic of all of the intelligence operations handled by the CALLIGERIS organization was that SETTLER himself had very little information concerning SLEEKER's identity, background, method of operation, motivation or reliability. The attitude adopted by SETTLER when queried for more specific details concerning SLEEKER and his operations was that there was really very little necessity for going deeper into the SLEEKER operation since the fact that he was producing information of considerable value to us was sufficient proof of his bona fides. As maudlin as that concept may seem to anyone with a reasonable degree of sophistication in intelligence, it is important to bear in mind that throughout the entire project that point of view was espoused time and time again by CALLIGERIS and several of his senior officers. Although CALLIGERIS was more than willing to pay lip service to "getting to the bottom of things", he never to the writer's knowledge took any positive action in this regard. The importance of this concept should not be forgotten since it is believed that in many ways it serves to explain why much later in the project many of the intimate details promised by CALLIGERIS were never made available to KUBARK personnel.

Another problem which arose at the time of the writer's first trip into Guatemala and which became increasingly more serious as the project moved on was the lack of any functional division of responsibility throughout the CALLIGERIS organization. The three key CALLIGERIS men in the target, SEMANTIC, SECANT and SEQUIN, all performed a multiplicity of functions. This not only had an adverse effect on security as far as compartmentation was concerned, but also created serious problems during the last few months of the operations, when the size and diversity of the jobs to be performed made it a humanly impossible task for these three men--and finally only SEMANTIC and SECANT--to be responsible for accomplishing the major part of the task which lay ahead. This again is a reflection of the "CALLIGERIS method" which involved the use of one or two trusted and capable followers to handle all of his work in a given area. Although it was originally contemplated that SEMANTIC was to be the Principal Agent for political and economic intelligence within the target and that SECANT was to be the Principal Agent for the military intelligence, in the final analysis these intelligence functions accounted for only a small part of the work that they were to do. It is indeed unfortunate that SEMANTIC had so little time to devote to intelligence, since he showed a distinct aptitude for this work and it is believed that he could have accomplished considerably more than he did had his efforts not been constantly distracted by the myriad of other requirements placed upon him by CALLIGERIS.

After the existing nets and agents within the target country were identified and brought under some degree of control, SEMANTIC assumed the functions of a coordinator of intelligence and reports officer for all the reports coming out of the target. He understood the basic requirements of a good intelligence report and after several months was able to turn out good political intelligence, properly sourced and with at least a preliminary evaluation on his part. In the field of military intelligence SECANT through his contacts in each of the military garrisons and his contacts with the officers on active duty within the military in Guatemala City was able to turn out the first coherent order-of-battle report that had been received by us since the inception of the project. To the best of the writer's knowledge this report served as the basis for future order of battle planning. The greatest single failing of the military intelligence reporting was its inability to produce specific answers to the EEIs forwarded to the field by LINCOLN. All of these EEIs were distributed to SEMANTIC

to SECANT and to SEMANTIC within the target with specific instructions that they carried the highest priority for intelligence gathering. In spite of the constant insistence on the part of the case officer both to CALLIGERIS and to SECANT on the importance of obtaining the specific information requested in the EELs, it became obvious that CALLIGERIS felt that the degree of detail which we were seeking was far more than that which he required to wage a successful military campaign. This opinion was voiced by CALLIGERIS to the writer on several occasions and it is believed that this accounts in part for his failure to produce through his nets the information which we required. It is worth while to note here that although CALLIGERIS recognized the need for accurate and up-to-date intelligence, he consistently felt that our criteria and methods were far too advanced considering the capabilities and degree of sophistication on the enemy which we were confronting. This was true to a large degree in the military intelligence reporting, but became much more apparent when our insistence for details delved into matters pertaining to counter-intelligence and security.

It is recognized that the intelligence production of the CALLIGERIS assets throughout PBSUCCESS was extremely small and scanty when taking into consideration the magnitude of the task which was set out to be accomplished. Although some of the factors bearing on this are being brought out in this report, it might be helpful to point out what the writer believes are the two most important contributing factors. First of all, CALLIGERIS never did recognize the need for efficient and independent intelligence structure within his organization. No effort had apparently been made to change CALLIGERIS's viewpoint prior to the writer's arrival and many hours were thus necessarily spent tediously pointing out and explaining to CALLIGERIS the reasons which dictated a much tighter security and intelligence structure. It was not until the White Paper incident in late January 1954 that CALLIGERIS finally began to turn a little and recognized the need for tightening up within his own organization and expanding his CE functions. Even after the Delgado Affair, CALLIGERIS's personal viewpoint did not change appreciably. Although he recognized in part the seriousness of the affair, when an effort was made to delve deeper into it, he brushed the matter off stating that he had already conducted his own investigation and was satisfied that he now knew the facts surrounding the Delgado case. (It is interesting to note here that several months after the Delgado affair in a routine meeting between the writer and CALLIGERIS, the latter made a point of mentioning that we, "the Group", had actually failed in our responsibilities and missed a wonderful opportunity when we did not investigate fully the circumstances surrounding the entire Delgado affair). Since all of the writer's dealings with the CALLIGERIS organization were done through CALLIGERIS, the latter's personal opinions had a significant effect on the actions taken by CALLIGERIS's subordinates on any given problem. This, of course, is true of any organization of the type with which we are dealing, but it seemed particularly true in this case since CALLIGERIS delegated practically no authority and thus would follow through on suggestions only when he personally felt that they were worth while.

The second factor which is believed to be responsible for the scant intelligence production within the CALLIGERIS group is the fact that almost without exception all of those people charged with specific intelligence functions, from principal agents down to informants, were all assigned, or were actually participating in, at least one or two other functions either within the PP or PM field. With the sole exception of SLEEKER and one or two other low-level informants, all of the personnel

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within the intelligence structure were performing covert or semi-overt anti-Communist functions within the target. Their intelligence gathering amounted to a side line, and as pointed out above, most of their reporting consisted of items which came to their attention and which were forwarded to CALLIGERIS through either SECANT or SEMANTIC for his use. In spite of all the writer's efforts to convince CALLIGERIS that an intelligence structure should be entirely independent of the military or PP aspects of the project, CALLIGERIS himself, as well as others on his staff, always seemed to feel that in the final analysis intelligence was subordinate to military planning. Consequently, many well placed persons, who had they remained inconspicuous and covert would have been able to produce considerable reliable intelligence, found themselves blown or forced into exile due to their semi-overt activities in a field other than intelligence. This practice was in effect long before the advent of PBSUCCESS and turned out to be almost impossible to change.

PERSONNEL

One problem which the writer believes should be made a matter of record in the event that a situation such as that which we have recently experienced in PBSUCCESS ever develops again is that of the qualifications of the KUBARK personnel sent to the field to make contact with senior officials of foreign governments. Since an operation of this type by its nature precludes the use of official government channels for its communications and dealings with foreign officials, it is extremely important that the KUBARK personnel assigned the task of making overt representation to foreign governments, as spokesmen of a "group" (leaving it tacitly understood although not confirmed, that this "group" in fact is the United States government), have the stature, maturity and age qualifications as well as the professional ability required to perform their job. Since the opinions formed by foreign government officials of the United States Government and of KUBARK are based largely on impressions that they receive from those individuals with whom they come in contact, it becomes extremely important to our efforts to maintain prestige abroad, for us to leave with these officials a feeling of high regard for our professional competence and seriousness of purpose.

SECURITY AND COVER

The variety of problems encountered in endeavoring to maintain security and adequate cover for the personnel associated with this project has been covered elsewhere in this report, but certain specific comments as regards security and cover in the field will be touched on briefly with the thought that they might provide some useful suggestions for future operations.

Probably the greatest single lesson in cover to be garnered from PBSUCCESS field operations is the pressing need for more extensive commercial cover facilities particularly in the area covered by this operation. Short range commercial cover can be provided fairly easily through the use of legitimate or notional concerns who would have reason to send representatives to a given country for a short period of time on legitimate business. This system worked well in PBSUCCESS for individuals who were required to make one or possibly two short trips into a given country and who were not to remain for periods in excess of one or possibly two weeks. Short range cover was also provided through the use of tourist cover, but the shortcomings of this can easily be seen in that this type of cover usually precludes returning

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to a country for a second trip and in many areas of South and Central America would not permit the traveler to remain in an area for more than a few days.

In some of the larger capitals in South America a flimsy commercial cover is sometimes all that is needed to cover the cursory examination a person might receive in a hotel, bar, plane, etc., but in most of the smaller capitals and cities throughout Central America, the provincialism and busy-body attitude of most of the resident American population dictates the use of a much firmer and better back-stopped cover. In a sense the degree of depth and plausibility of cover required for a given individual bears an inverse relationship to the size of the city that he is about to visit. The development of an extensive resident contract agent program, even though no immediate use is seen for these agents, is something that the writer feels would yield substantial dividends were we ever called upon to mount, in a short period of time, another operation calling for a group of Americans to establish ostensibly a semi-permanent residence.

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ANNEX G

FIELD COORDINATION

by

Mr. [


]

I. Contacts With Foreign Governments:

[Redacted content]

[Redacted]

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... Field Operations

The details on the PM, FI and PP aspects of the operation have been covered in separate reports, therefore, this will include a short constructive criticism and comments on the coordination of the three fields of operation.

The problem of selection of competent, trained indigenous personnel to fulfill certain specific jobs was great, and to keep the selected personnel on a given job was still more difficult. At first it was difficult to get Colonel Castillo to delegate authority to his staff. He would use a few competent men, some of whom had been given FI or PP jobs, to do a multitude of miscellaneous tasks, therefore, never leaving them enough time to do the job they were responsible for. This situation never completely cleared up, especially in FI since the man responsible for Intelligence was also the man with all the contacts in Honduras and the Colonel's right-hand man.

Since the whole project was geared to support a PM operation and there did exist a shortage of personnel, all effort was made to give PM tasks a priority. These included preparing, briefing and dispatching, organizers, sab leaders and the infiltration of arms. In the middle of this was the docking of the Alfhem at Puerto Barrios with arms which

meant the preparation and dispatch of special sab teams.

These special operations compromised many of the routes across the frontier and the action alerted the enemy to set up patrols along the border. One other operation that hampered the infiltration of personnel and just about stopped the infiltration of arms was the first propaganda leaflet drop over Guatemala City. This drop had a tremendously good PP effect, but the timing of it was premature compared with the state of the PM operations. The field knew nothing about the drop until after it was made. The field would have probably concurred with the drop since it was only afterwards that the effects on the PM operations were really felt. Shortly after the drop the ARBENZ Government cancelled all civil liberties and constitutional rights, grounded all private planes, started an active border patrol and started rounding up and torturing all anti-Communists. This crackdown rolled up a large portion of the leaders in the Castillo Armas internal organization. The two top internal leaders, [ ] and [ ] had to exile themselves in the Ecuatoran and Salvadoran Embassies respectively. Many of the other top echelon also went into exile or going to hiding. The only two people left in operation were [ ]

[ ] but even these two people had to leave Guatemala City and move to the Sanales area.

During this period radio operators were being infiltrated, sab men and independent organizers were being infiltrated, arms were being flown into [ ] since [ ] miles north of San Jose, by [ ] in the two Cessna 180's. Each plane would carry in 1000 pounds of gear.

Also through this same route, radio operators, sab men and organizers were infiltrated. In Honduras arms were being moved out of [ ] air field by trucks and [ ] to the forward staging areas. This large movement of arms within Honduras was delayed until the last possible day because of the alert it would cause in that country and because of the strike situation on the North Coast of Honduras. The strike hurt our freedom of movement tremendously since the Honduran army and police were all alerted to watch for arms being sent from Guatemala to the strikers. This caused many of our people to be picked up and although we were able to get them released, caused much delay.

Because time was in favor of the ARBENZ Government, it was necessary to move fast for an earliest possible D-Day. The internal organization was being closer controlled, the leaders had been exiled or eliminated, the Honduran Government was under great pressure to expell Castillo Armas and his Guatemalan exiles, the OAS and UN were preparing inspection teams and bless the newspapermen who did their fair share in publicizing the affair.

By 17 June preparations were not ideal, but the arms and shock troops were at the border and ready to move. The weather was bad and movement across the border on 18 June was slow since no roads exist and all movement had to be over mountain and jungle trails. By 20 June Colonel Miguel Mendoza had captured Esquipulas and Colonel Ernesto Neiderheitmann had taken Camotan. These two columns had launched from Nueva Ocotepeque and Copan Ruinas. Colonel Chajon moved out of Florida on the 17th and on the 21st was on the outskirts of Gualan. Major Torres and Perez moved out of Macuelizo on the 18th. Major Torres reached Entre Rios by the 21st and Perez had captured Morales.

On the 23rd Colonel Chajon retreated from Gulán threatened by a superior force reinforced from Zacapa. Major Torres retreated from the Puerto Barrios area and Perez was forced by a Guatemalan Air Force AT-6 attack to abandon Morales. Perez pulled a hundred men back to the Honduran border and returned to Tegucigalpa for new instructions, money for food and more equipment. Major Torres was isolated between the Montagua and the Honduran border to the north. Perez was given food and arms and instructed to move back into Morales. Major Torres and his men were pulled out of their position and given instructions to follow Perez into Morales, since this was the only place the Montagua could be crossed, and proceed to Puerto Barrios. Since communications were bad with this group it was not until the 3rd of July that a message was received from this group over Tropical Radio that they were in control of Puerto Barrios and to send them shoes and food.

In the South Colonel Mendoza and Colonel Neiderheitmann joined forces at Vado Hondo. Colonel Castillo joined them there. The darkest days of the fight were during the Chiquimula campaign on the 24th and 25th of June. Chajon was routed in Gulán, Perez retreated from Morales and Major Torres retreated from Entre Rios. Bad weather grounded air support on the eve of the attack on Chiquimula and approximately 75% of the [redacted] deserted that night believing they had been defeated. [redacted] extraordinary air to ground support in the 180 and a follow-up as soon as the weather cleared with a good attack by the F-47s was what tipped the balance.

Once Chiquimula was in complete control a new government, which [redacted] had been working on in Tegucigalpa, was announced.

Preparations began immediately for the attack on Zacapa. The attack started on 29 June, the same day a cease fire was requested. The night of 29 June Colonel Castillo and Major Oliva met with the Zacapa Garrison commander and arranged the surrender terms. Messages were received from Coban and Jutiapa that those two garrisons were also ready to join Castillo Armas.

On 30 June Castillo Armas flew to San Salvador for the meetings with Colonel Elfego Monzon. On the same day I flew from Managua to Tegucigalpa, picked up Ambassador Ruben Melhao and Carlos Salazar, present Guatemalan Foreign Minister, and took them to San Salvador where they were to make final arrangements for the arrival of Colonel Castillo and the meeting. From San Salvador we picked up the downed F-47 pilot at Nueva Ocotepeque, flew to Chiquimula and Esquipulas to make sure Colonel Castillo had departed, from there flew to Managua and delivered the pilot. The morning of 1 July I departed Managua for Tegucigalpa. Upon reaching Tegucigalpa, Ambassador Willauer gave me instructions to depart immediately for San Salvador informing me that the meeting was not going well and that Castillo Armas was getting ready to depart for Chiquimula.

Ambassador Peurifoy arrived in San Salvador from Guatemala City the morning of 1 July, I arrived late in the afternoon and immediately contacted Castillo Armas and [redacted] No agreement had been reached and the meetings were on the verge of breaking down. Castillo Armas, [redacted] and their whole group were very unhappy with the terms and were ready to return to Chiquimula.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

I met Ambassador Peurifoy the night of 1 July. I reviewed the situation with him and pointed out the discontent in the Castillo forces. The Ambassador informed me that he had just received a telephone call from the Secretary of State and had received instructions to press for an agreement immediately. He also pointed out that the Junta would consist of five men with Colonel Monzon provisional President for fifteen days at which time a permanent president would be elected. I was not satisfied with the terms but my latest instructions had been to help Ambassador Peurifoy in any way I possibly could and not allow the meetings to break down. I proceeded to the Presidential Palace and contacted Castillo Armas and [redacted] Ambassador Peurifoy had already informed them the "Group" was cancelling their support, including air, if they did not agree to the above terms. I first talked to Castillo about one o'clock in the morning of the second. He was unhappy with the terms, but willing to accept them if that was the desire of the "Group". I then talked with [redacted] who was much more difficult to convince. He claimed he would have no part in the signing of such an agreement. We finally got around this point by having only the two Colonels sign the agreement and not having the two legal advisors sign. [redacted] as did the rest of Castillo's group, felt they had won the battle and lost the peace. Finally around three a.m., convinced more by fatigue than anything else, [redacted] and Carlos Salazar agreed to rewrite the terms since they had been very poorly written by Monzon's lawyers. At 4:45 am the agreement was signed. At 8 o'clock the same morning Castillo left for Chiquimula to check his command post and explain the terms of the agreement to his field commanders, including Major Oliva who had returned to Chiquimula the day before just in case Castillo would not be allowed to leave Salvador. Oliva had instructions to continue the march at 11 o'clock 2 July.

Castillo returned to San Salvador on 3 July after spending the night of 2 July in Tegucigalpa. From San Salvador Castillo flew to Guatemala City with Colonel Monzon and Ambassador Purifoy.

I flew to Guatemala City on 6 July after gathering the gear and closing shop in Tegucigalpa. The situation in Guatemala City was chaotic and the feeling of unrest ran high. Nothing had been done about controlling the Communists; Communist homes had not been searched and the organization of the new government was proceeding very slowly. I held a meeting with Castillo Armas, Major Oliva and [redacted] early in the morning 7 July. Castillo claimed he had no control of the army in Guatemala City and, therefore, could take no strong action against removing Monzon as President of the Junta and getting control of the situation. [redacted] and I had already discussed the situation in detail. That morning I told Castillo he had until Friday 9 July, to take over Presidency of the Junta and cut the Junta down to three men, himself as President, Major Oliva and Colonel Monzon. I pointed out this had to be done by this date to relieve the unrest and to cut the Junta down to working size so they could start taking the necessary action against the Communists. All parties agreed that this step had to be taken. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~  
RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

[ ]  
The unrest was somewhat relieved on 8 July when Castillo took over the Presidency of the Junta. Valenzuela in Honduras was much happier and President Somoza was tickled pink.

The appointment of the Ministers was completed during the weekend and the following important appointments took place: Lt. Colonel Oscar Mendoza, Army Chief of Staff; Colonel Fito Mendoza, Chief of the Air Force; Colonel Ernesto Neiderheitmann, Chief of the Base Militar; Jose B. Linares, Chief of the Guardia Judicial, and Colonel Miguel Mendoza had been offered the post as Chief of the Guardia Civil. The Governors in the Provinces were being changed as well as the Chiefs of the Military Garrisons.

My last meeting with Castillo Armas took place the morning of 12 July. He informed me he felt much more secure about his position and would start to take the necessary action. I talked with [ ] that same morning. [ ] felt a little better, but still felt we could not lose control of Castillo. Until Castillo cleaned up the situation he did not feel the United States should recognize the new government or give them aid or the aircraft.

I turned over the contacts to [ ] and visited Ambassador Peurifoy that afternoon before departing. Peurifoy was also disturbed that no concrete action had been taken against the Communists; I briefed him on what had taken place during the morning meetings and how [ ] felt about the situation. He told me that the United States was getting ready to recognize the new government and he did not believe he could stop it at that time. I explained to him that Castillo Armas was probably the best man we had at the time, especially because of the build-up we had given him, but that he was not a strong man and needed plenty of good, strong direction. Every effort was made to give the Ambassador a true picture of the existing situation.

ANNEX H

SHERWOOD - CLANDESTINE RADIO - by Mr. David PHILLIPS

INDEX

PART ONE	History of the Operation
PART TWO	Analysis of the Operation
ANNEX A	Panic Program
ANNEX B	Press Clippings

PREFACE

In this report the name SHERWOOD will denote the clandestine radio operation which was part of a general project designed to "remove the Communist government of Guatemala and replace it with one friendly to the United States, without bloodshed if possible..."

Mr. David PHILLIPS was named as Case Officer for the implementation and operation of SHERWOOD. PHILLIPS arrived at the base of operations, within the continental limits of the United States, on 4 March 1954 and began preparations for the daily clandestine broadcasts which commenced on 1 May 1954 and continued until 2 July 1954 when an armistice was signed and there no longer existed the need for "clandestine" operation.

SHERWOOD plans also called for an Orson Welles type "panic broadcast", scheduled to coincide with D-day, H-hour. Due to the impossibility of fixing a definite H-hour, this project was suspended. The potential effect of such a program, however, is so great that a discussion of its preparation is included in this report of Special Annex A.

The report is divided into two parts. Part I describes the actual history of the operation, without comment. Part II is an analysis of the operation embodying a study of its achievements and errors, with an eye to assisting future clandestine radio movements, especially in the Western Hemisphere.

PART ONE - HISTORY OF THE OPERATION

Preparation

The initial step for the Case Officer was a detailed study of the physical and psychological terrain of the target country. Physically, the target consisted of (1) the capital city and (2) the provinces of Guatemala. Psychologically, the target was the combined population formed by the inhabitants of the capital and the provinces. This group might have been broken down, roughly, in the following percentages:

1. Hard core of Communist leaders 2%
2. Public officials and Communist sympathizers (some motivated as much by distrust of the United States as by Red leanings) 13%
3. Large group of uninformed, apathetic, "neutral" listeners, a sort of soap opera audience 60%
4. Large group of moderately informed listeners who deplored Communist influence but had been <sup>able to do anything</sup> ~~unable to do anything~~ <sub>nothing about it</sub> 23%
5. Small band of militant anti-Communists, actively engaged in combatting ARBENZ regime (some in exile) 2%

The purpose of the clandestine broadcasts, of course, was to intimidate members of groups 1 and 2 and swing members of group 3 into the ranks of group 4, and in some cases, group 5.

The second preparatory step for the Case Officer was a thorough, general study of the target country - history, legend, social structure, religion, and personal characteristics.

The third move taken by the Case Officer was a detailed study of the operational plans and aims of other phases of the project in order to coordinate SHERWOOD plans and objectives as closely as possible with KUHOOK, KUGOWN operations.

The fourth step was the personal observation of the target country and its inhabitants by the Case Officer. To this end PHILLIPS made a tour of Guatemala. A careful investigation was made of the capital city and its surrounding towns. Street names, transportation systems, public utility layouts, military positions, legislative locations, etc were observed. General terrain was covered during several days by foot, automobile and small plane. In the limited time permitted, the provinces and provincial way of life were also studied.

Personal conversations were undertaken with an authentic cross-section of the population. Opinions ranging from strict Communist-line to bitter anti-Communist thinking were found. The people talked freely and without suspicion and the germane parts of their conversations formed the basis on which all psychological efforts on the following broadcasts were based.

Visits to neighboring countries were made to evaluate general area feeling. A long conference with Colonel Carlos CASTILLO Armas and members of his command was an invaluable barometer for judging program content.



And it was during these visits among Guatemalan exiles that the case officer was able to audition and recruit members of the SHERWOOD production team.

### The Team

The final team selected for SHERWOOD was:

[ ] A professional radio announcer and producer, [ ] in Guatemala City. [ ] was initially recruited by the GROUP's representatives in the capital and left the country to join the operation directly. A short time before his radio program, strongly anti-Communist. [ ]

[ ] Later events made it quite obvious that the intruders were government agents assigned to damage [ ]

[ ] A former anti-Communist student leader who had been imprisoned for his activities against the ARBENZ regime, and who had been allowed later to go into exile. He had been out of Guatemala for 2 1/2 years, working with Colonel Carlos CASTILLO Armas in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. This man was a militant anti-Communist.

[ ] had also been exiled for about two years. He served as general propaganda man for CASTILLO Armas. He was one of the editors of [ ] anti-government publication published in [ ] and aided in the establishment of [ ] anti-Communist newspaper edited by exiles in [ ]

[ ] Anti-Communist Costa Rican recruited by the GROUP's representatives in San Jose. [ ] received no payment for their work, but [ ] received a fixed payment of \$200 per month for a six months' period. (His wife and children lived in San Jose during the period he worked on the programs.) He was not used on the air because of his accent, but he contributed as a script writer.

[ ] A Guatemalan with experience in theatre who had worked in the United States for a long period of time. She served as English-Spanish translator and was featured on a regular program directed to the Women of Guatemala. She was recruited by representatives in the capital of the target country.

[ ] these young girls were recruited by PHILIPS in [ ] where their father [ ] served as [ ] for CASTILLO Armas. They undertook various secretarial chores.

[ ] An older Guatemalan newspaperman. Used as a script writer for a short period of time, but later disposed of because of the pathological fear which made him a security risk as well as an ineffective collaborator. (It was later discovered that only the casual inclusion of his name on a list of possible anti-Communists was responsible for his being in exile.)

The above personnel composed the indigenous team, and they composed and narrated the programs.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
RNDAT/PBSUCCESS

The production work was directed by PHILLIPS. Physical requirements were under the responsibility of Miss [redacted] who expertly managed the two safe houses needed for living and working quarters. A technician was assigned by Commo.

The work of the above was carried out in direct liaison with the central office of the project. PHILLIPS worked under the direction of the senior KUGOWN officer; [redacted] collaborated closely with the finance and security officers, and the technician with the senior communications officer.

#### The Physical Layout

The indigenous team and its supervisors lived together in two safe houses, one in and another near a small city close to the central office of the project.

Final sites were safe houses "D" and "E". The studio and the living quarters of the female contingent were in house "D" and the working office and living quarters of the males were in house "E". In both houses servants cleaned and prepared meals under the supervision of [redacted]

House "D" was in the country, isolated, surrounded by a large lawn and fairly close to a public park. The main house contained three bedrooms. It was in this house that most of the activity was carried on. In a small annex to the main house was the studio. Here was installed the equipment needed for the recording of the programs.

House "E" was a large residence in a nearby city, isolated from neighbors by an expansive yard.

During the final weeks of the SHERWOOD programs PHILLIPS, [redacted] left the United States and proceeded to an improvised studio only a short distance from the SHERWOOD transmitters, located in a stable on a farm near the capital of a Central American republic sympathetic to the anti-Communist cause [redacted]

This temporary studio was installed in an isolated home in the jungle. Although living conditions were of the worst - no water, no furniture - the proximity to the broadcasting studios made it invaluable. Except on one occasion, tapes were made here and rushed to the broadcasting transmitter.

The broadcasting transmitter was a powerful short wave unit which easily reached its audience within Guatemala, as well as neighboring republics. (And could be picked up in the United States.) This also served as a communications center for field activities of the project.

#### Programs

Programming began on 1 May 1954. This was a fortunate date as, after an official transmission of the Labor Day festivities in the capital, all Guatemalan radio stations went off the air. Anyone in the country wanting to hear a radio broadcast was, of necessity, forced to turn to their short wave band. Thus, the chances of listeners accidentally stumbling across our programs was greatly increased. Moreover, this chance was heightened by the simple expedient of placing ads in the local papers.

The day before the first program representatives in Mexico City were instructed to send a telegram to all newspaper editors in Guatemala City. The telegram asked that a half-page advertisement be placed in the paper announcing a new Mexican short wave station destined to begin operation the next day with a special program featuring "Agustin LARA, CANTINFLAS, and many more" (See Section Two and Press Clippings.) The telegram, signed with a fictitious name over a fictitious firm title.

Instructed editors that they should collect from the representative of the company who would be arriving the next day, would stay at the Gran Hotel San Carlos, and who would talk to them about future advertisements. A telegraphic room reservation was made for the notional representative, so that editors who checked would find that he was scheduled to visit the city. The telegrams arrived too late to catch the evening papers, but two out of three of the morning papers carried the half-page ad. It is presumed that many listeners, with no other programs to hear, tuned in on the frequencies mentioned in large letters in the ad to hear CANTINFLAS. Payment for the two ads was later sent to the appropriate editors through the mail.

The first day's program included an introduction to the series, plus a special program which purported to describe the May Day parade taking place in the capital. This was briefly mentioned as a "reproduction" so that intelligent listeners would not be insulted, but also styled to allow complete credence on the part of the less observing listener. The voice of MARTINEZ, Communist leader, was imitated making a speech, and later monitoring of the true government broadcast revealed that SHERWOOD's facsimile was reasonable and authentic.

On 2 May the programs entered the "pre-D-day" phase. This was the beginning of the uphill campaign to create distrust in the government and to inspire confidence in the phlegmatic anti-Communist elements. Typical programs during this period were:

- (1) "Nuestra Campana Radial" (Our Radio Campaign). Explanation of the reasons behind our clandestine broadcasts, and why we were on the air.
- (2) "Sangre de Martires" (Blood of Martyrs). A full radio theatre's dramatic program, with sound effects, background music, etc. which dramatised examples of Red tyranny, the torture and imprisonment of anti-Communist patriots, etc.
- (3) "Que Somos" and "Donde Vamos" (What We are, Where We Are Going). The ideologies and aims of the Liberation Movement - what we intended to do when in power, and how our program would affect each type of individual who was listening.
- (4) "Rompiendo Las Cadenas" (Breaking the Chains). An aggressive program, outlining the activities which would ultimately break the Red yoke. Individual and group instructions. Beginning with passive resistance, this program slowly built up to the D-day announcements of active resistance and combat. This was the program that sparked the famous "32" campaign, gave individuals tools with which to fight.
- (5) "Pegando Centro" (Bull's Eye). Short spot program, ending with ominous sound effects, which spotlighted individual Communists and their crimes. As often as possible, based on actual intelligence.

(6) "La Mujer y La Patria"(Woman and Country). A woman's program, spoken and written by a woman, giving females their angle in the struggle and how they could help.

(7) "Miscellanea Musical del Aire" - disc jockey type of comedy show. Quiz programs, jokes, poems, etc. - all jabbing a sharp needle of satire and ridicule against Red leaders and sympathizers.

(8) "Alma Chapina." A nationalistic program, featuring indigenous marimba music, poem recitals, recounting of history and legend.

(9) "Las Noticias atras Radio Liberacion." News summaries and reports that press-censored Guatemalans might not otherwise know, with comments showing the way the international press was thinking, and how the country of Guatemala was losing its prestige in the eyes of the world as a result of its Red affiliation.

The regularly scheduled programs changed completely on the advent of the move of the skeleton crew to the field and the occurrence of D-day.

The KUGOWN type of programming gave way to an almost KUHOOK type, reporting on battle action, defection, army losses, etc. Radio Liberacion also served as an information source for the world's newspaper and radio reporters and United Nations bodies. (See Part II for examples and results of the new type programming during the action period.)

#### Security

Members of the radio team were brought into this country on round-trip plane tickets. They knew only that they were working for "The Group." They were unaware of the physical location of the transmitter which broadcast the tapes which they prepared(except for the skeleton crew which later moved to the site.)

Owners of the two houses used were told that radio programs were being prepared for the Latin commercial market, mostly translations of successful U.S. shows. Employees who were near operations were also given this cover story, which was never questioned.

Mail for the team was censored by supervising officers. All mail was dispatched and received at safe boxes in New York and Mexico.

Members of the team were never allowed to leave safe houses except in company of one of the supervisory group. Trips to restaurants and movies were strictly limited and each team member was well briefed with his cover story in the event he or she was questioned. No members of the team were allowed to leave the United States unescorted until the project was terminated.

All vehicles, machinery and equipment used in the safe houses were procured in a sterile manner. All documents were sterilized before arriving at safe houses. Indigenous members of the crew were unquitting as to the true names of PHILLIPS, [ ] and other supervisors.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NO DISSEMINATION~~

PART TWO

ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION

Preparation

The Case Officer's personal knowledge of the target country and the characteristics of its inhabitants was undoubtedly a major consideration in the final effectiveness of the SHERWOOD clandestine programs. The decision of the leaders of the general project to completely brief the SHERWOOD Case Officer was also a deciding factor in the fluid coordination called for in such an operation. That the Case Officer must be fluent in the language of whatever country is the target of such a project is self-evident.

The trip taken by the Case Officer through Guatemala shortly before the first broadcasts was certainly the most valuable preparatory step taken. It was felt that even the most obscure errors in program content might damage the plausibility of the theme of a clandestine station "operating in some secret location in the Republic." Such a minor error as calling a fire hydrant red when, in reality, they were green would have lessened the impact of the broadcasts. (The trip revealed, incidentally, that there are no fire hydrants at all in Guatemala.) Exact knowledge of prominent landmarks, highways, public buildings, military installations, etc., was a vital factor in post D-day broadcasts and attempting to aid military movements made in great haste. It was interesting to note that the indigenous team, presuming the acceptance of the listening audience, seldom made an effort, without prompting, to insert deceptive details into the scripts in order to establish and maintain the myth of being within the target country.

Programs were broadcast during the periods in which the largest listening audience was presumed to be at home. Individual programs in the broadcast schedule were presented in the order which seemed most logical according to the social habits of the country - women's programs well before or after meal times, for instance.

A thorough knowledge of Guatemala's radio stations and newspapers and their editorial slant was considered an important part of the overall planning. TAKE FROM HERE

A final and extremely pertinent factor in the Case Officer's preparation is a deep personal knowledge of the political opinions of each member of his team. If an announcer disagrees with the ideas expressed in a particular speech, his very lack of enthusiasm or shaded inflection of words can negate the psychological goal desired. This can sometimes be overcome by an explication to the individual team member of the reasons behind the airing of viewpoints not readily acceptable to him. During the SHERWOOD broadcasts one announcer was very unhappy at the thought of reading a squib which took a crack at the United Fruit Co. He had worked for the Company and considered it fair and just. Only when convinced that the disassociation of "Radio Liberacion" with the Company would aid the cause did he tear into Mr. GUMP with gusto.

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NO DISSEMINATION~~

The Team

SHERWOOD was fortunate in counting on an excellent team of indigenous personnel. The three key members were hard workers, quick-witted, and absolutely dedicated to the task of rooting Communism out of their homeland. [redacted] was a professional radio man, and it is to be hoped that any operation similar to SHERWOOD can count on at least one professional of his calibre to spark the other members of the team. Oddly enough, the major failing of the team was the lack of a sense of the dramatic, and a Case Officer should constantly be on his toes to give the suggestions which make clandestine broadcasts more thrilling than every day commercial broadcasts.

If a recruiting officer must choose between a good radio man and a militant anti-Communist, however, the political fanatic will provide better work in the end. The combination is the acme.

A woman's program and women's voices are an important component of any sustained broadcast movement. SHERWOOD was fortunate that no insurmountable female problems arose during the few months that women lived and worked in "D" house. Nevertheless, the obvious delicate possibilities would make the use of women inadvisable in any operation that might run more than three or four months. Pre-cut spot announcements on records or tapes made and later inserted in programs would solve this problem easily.

As a result of his work on SHERWOOD the Case Officer strongly advises that future operations avoid recruiting any indigenous personnel over the age of 35. This suggestion applies even to agents with vast experience and ability. Younger people take suggestions rapidly and without debate. Older members of the team are wont to destroy a working schedule with obtuse investigation of motive and final result, and do not easily take up the mean little tasks which must be accomplished in order to meet rigid broadcasting schedules.

The supervision team should be carefully chosen. Naturally a knowledge of the language spoken by the indigenous team is helpful. But the primary requisite - above ability and experience - is the possession of a good nature. Living and working with an indigenous team on a 24-hour basis can become an irritating chore, and the output of the team depends directly on the manner in which they are treated. Specifically, a Latin team is quick to spot the feeling on the part of a supervisor that he is present only because it is his job. Pessimism on the part of the supervisor rapidly inculcates pessimism into the team. Optimism keeps them happy and proud of their work. A Case Officer will find it difficult to praise the team overmuch if their work has been good and his criticism should be confined to suggestions of how it might be done "the next time."

The Case Officer should be the only officer to contact the team except for very unusual occasions.

The Case Officer and his aides should set a "good example" until it hurts. If any member of the supervisory team fails to do so, he should be relieved immediately.

### The Physical Layout

The working and living quarters for a team such as is necessarily employed for the production of clandestine radio broadcasts need not be luxurious. They should be comfortable, functional and isolated. The equipment should be the finest obtainable and in perfect condition.

A. Safe houses "A", "B" and "C" had been vacated when the SHERWOOD Case Officer arrived at the site of operation. Although they had been selected for other reasons than broadcast preparation, it had been hoped that they would serve for studios and living quarters as well. They turned out to be inadequate. One was too near an airfield; even sound-proofing efforts failed to obviate the constant roar of aircraft engines. Another house was in a dense residential section - curious neighbors were chased frequently from the back door.

The following characteristics are desirable in a safe house for this type of operation:

1. Large enough that people can get out from under each other from time to time.
2. Spread out enough that some members of the team can sleep while others are working.
3. Isolated enough that neighbors do not drop in to borrow a cup of sugar.
4. A telephone - indispensable.
5. Has a large enough lawn that team members, who can not be running to the race track, can indulge in some sort of sport.
6. The most desirable feature by far is a landlord <sup>WHO</sup> ~~that~~ lives in Afghanistan.

B. The equipment needed in order to make tapes is listed below:

1. Double Mangacorder recording machine.
2. Mixer box.
3. Control box.
4. One portable recording machine.
5. Good receiver with adequate antennae.
6. One disc recording machine.
7. Two desk mikes and one standing mike (bi-directional).
8. Two turn-tables (three-speed).
9. Complete collection of sound effects records.
10. Collection of general music records, with special emphasis on the marches and music native to target country. (Do not make the mistake of not purchasing American records. Any broadcast this side of Iron Curtain which did not contain American song hits would be suspicious.)
11. General office supplies: typewriters, standard size; only heavy bond paper (thin paper rattles in the mike).
12. Several good dictionaries; a thesaurus; a one volume encyclopedia and volumes of legend, history and poetry of target country.

### The Programs

SHERWOOD was an extremely interesting clandestine operation because it was possible to judge its effectiveness soon after the first transmission. At that time the press of Guatemala was still comparatively free of censorship and published items revealed, or at least influenced to a great extent, public opinion. There was no frustration - the kind that broadcasting to an Iron Curtain void invokes. It was possible to put the flame to an ARBENZ hot-foot and watch him jump; to foment a rumor and watch it grow, sometimes into actuality; to cry havoc and sometimes see it wrought. The true estimate of the SHERWOOD operation cannot be known at this time, a few days after the end of the conflict. A true estimate would require a miniature GALLUP poll, with especial care taken to question at length the opposition leaders - ARBENZ, FORTUNY, TORIELLO, et al - and find out how much they suffered from the barbs received daily on the programs.

But it is obvious that SHERWOOD was an asset to the overall program. When the broadcasts began on 1 May 1954, Guatemala was an almost tranquil country. Communist officials were firmly and snugly settled in what seemed to be permanent positions. Anti-Communist elements were inactive to a large degree and anti-Communist sympathizers did not see even a slight chance of successful revolt against the powers that guided the affairs of the Republic.

One month later, on 1 June, newspapers carried banner headlines over their editorials: "Terror in the Republic", "Unrest in Our Streets," and "Where Are We Heading?"

The psychological planning of the broadcasts and other KUGOWN projects aimed at a steady increase in tempo until that point was reached. Perhaps the point was reached too soon. Government officials were so jittery that they took extremely cruel repressive measures against anti-Communists. Many were forced to take exile and flee the country. Intelligence rings were destroyed. Thus, on D-day the hoped-for mass revolt of the people did not occur. It hardly could, as most of the leaders had been imprisoned and the mass of anti-Communists had been intimidated to the point of fear for their lives and families.

This point of strategy will have to be cleared up by historians. But perhaps a country scheduled for abrupt revolt cannot be too agitated, perhaps the frenzied state of affairs made the final showdown even more inevitable. Certainly the arrival of the arms ship ALFHEM was a consideration. It took the place of several weeks of argument on SHERWOOD transmissions and clearly defined the issue: Guatemala had received arms from Russia, thus Guatemala and Russia were playing footsie. From that point there was no question of the nature of the target, only the question of how soon and in what manner it would be destroyed.

SHERWOOD had several primary objectives:

1. To offer hope and confidence to anti-Communist;
2. To intimidate Communist leaders;
3. To defect;
4. To deceive; and
5. To entertain;

and, after D-day:

6. KUHOOK support; and
7. To provide world-wide information.



1. To offer hope and confidence: Anti-Communist elements in Guatemala had sponsored a series of futile, abortive revolts over a long period of years. They had fizzled so dismally that the morale of the population had fallen dangerously. Even militant anti-Communists saw little hope of effective action. Exiled anti-Communist leaders were divided, the once active groups within the country were losing their zip, and hard-hitting Soviet-style government propaganda had cemented the impression that the Red leaders were firmly entrenched.

SHERWOOD's very existence was a strong counter-punch. Here was something concrete. Here was a daily recounting of the injustices of Communism; here was a voice rebelling against authority and authority powerless to stop it.

Although SHERWOOD destroyed as much as possible, it attempted to offer at least a suggestion of creation at the same time. Every time SHERWOOD said that such-and-such a condition must go, it tried to offer a replacement that was fair and just. When a radio announcer visualized the horror of living under a future police state, he also indicated the joys of living under a democratic government. Individuals - students, workers, farmers, soldiers - were told of the particular benefits that they would reap under the regime that would replace Communism.

Incessantly SHERWOOD emphasized that victory over Communism was inevitable. The time was coming, the day, finally a matter of hours. Even the words of the song composed by the SHERWOOD team and adopted as a battle tune contained the words "Have hope, boys, the day will soon arrive."

2. To intimidate: The broadcasts of SHERWOOD contained programs designed to make Communist leaders and groups shake in their boots. "We Accuse of High Treason" was a highly dramatic feature which singled out a prominent Red and roasted him over a slow fire. His history, his failings, his suspicious habits and his motives were treated at length. Although an effort was made to refrain from the "we will string you up" sort of threat, it was made obvious that HE was in for an unhappy time. Black new items, based on at least a shred of truth, revealed the vile day-to-day life the Red was living. If a Commie leader left the country to attend a convention we pointed out that he was really meeting Soviet officers for military talks; if TORIELLO offered a non-aggression pact to a neighboring republic, we identified it as a Kremlin-style attack warning; and if ARBENZ was fuming to know who was piloting the leaflet-dropping planes, we congratulated the Chief of his Air Force for not giving away the facts.

Obviously the most effective efforts were the ones based on intelligence reports - lists of names of officials who had received oversized loans, known Communists, and authorities who were building up their accounts in foreign banks, etc.

"Bull's Eye," another program of the same type, announced the names of Communists who had arms stored in their houses. It was quite gratifying to read - in United Press reports - that one of our individual targets had been visited by the military police and rudely relieved of a cellarful of machine-guns.

Intimidation broadcasts after D-day changed considerably to the "you will have the blood of the nation on your hands" attack.

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3. To defects: The defection pitches of SHERWOOD broadcasts were slanted not only to the military, but to the members of the police force, Red sympathizers and even "neutrals", all of whom were urged to swing over to the winning side.

The direct military defection program began in a subtle way, recounting the feats of heroic Soviet pilots who had found fame and fortune by coming over. It built gradually to the full post-D-day effort when Colonel Rudolfo MENDOZA gave his former Air Force buddies detailed instructions and soldiers and officers of the army were asked to make the switch in groups.

Those members of the armed forces and police who were tied down by fear of their families were instructed to defect mentally, giving anti-Communists warnings before arrest.

Broadcasts were coordinated with leaflet drops during the final days of action in the Zacapa area. The leaflets were prepared by the SHERWOOD team and dropped on troops without communication with the capital, who were ignorant of the rapidly changing situation.

Primarily, from beginning to end, the idea was that everyone would have to make a decision sooner or later. The Liberation Forces were going to win, so why choose the losing side?

Evidence indicates that the defection program was especially effective with pilots. At one stage in the final days it was necessary for SHERWOOD to make a quick step back with all except pilots who could bring a plane with them - too many refugees were going across the border and our broadcasts had to tell them to stay at home!

4. To deceive: This was the product that was really pushed by SHERWOOD. From the first day of broadcasting the claim was incessantly reiterated that the station was within Guatemala. It was the Big Lie. Technicians cannot explain why the ARBENZ government never found the location of SHERWOOD transmitters, but apparently they never knew. In the last days, TGW made shrill accusations against Honduras. The only logical reasoning is that the Guatemalan technicians just never thought of the possibility of SHERWOOD being strong enough to emanate from a republic not bordering Guatemala.

The failure of the government to locate SHERWOOD, and the constantly repeated newspaper stories that it had been destroyed, helped create the final impression that it was in the country. Perhaps really intelligent listeners felt that it was not, but the mass of uninformed people seemed to have accepted our claims. LIFE magazine, in the issue published a week after the armistice spoke of the broadcasts "from the jungle."

A glance at the newspaper clippings in Annex 2 (Master Copy only) show the confusion that resulted from the broadcasts. Several times it was announced that the station was destroyed. The Government said it would find us within three days and that there were, in reality, two stations, one in Mexico and one in Honduras. Lights were turned out throughout the Republic to find the location. The Military Attache of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City was approached by a Government official who wanted instructions on operating aircraft homing equipment in order to search us out. Newspaper articles accused ARBENZ of operating the station from the National Palace as an excuse to curb civil liberties.

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This confusion was ably abetted by agents within the country who spread rumors, made false denunciations to the government, and wrote letters to the newspapers saying that they had seen suspicious movements of men and machinery.

At one time 1,000 farmers walked through the San Marcos mountains to locate the station.

On another occasion a regular SHERWOOD program ended with a dramatic "raid." The whining of bullets and a woman's scream preceded the sudden cutting of the program --- a carefully rehearsed destruction. The next morning, incredibly, the government newspaper announced in banner headlines that SHERWOOD had been destroyed. It was great fun reappearing on the air after this edition hit the streets.

Whenever possible, deception effects were based on reality. When TGW announced that a Communist demonstration had been cancelled because of rain, our "rain" sound-effect record formed a steady background to our next program. After D-Day the Case Officer debriefed pilots who had flown over Guatemala, and innocent remarks on the next program indicated rain, sunshine or heavy clouds.

All communique issued by SHERWOOD "had just been brought by messenger" from the offices of the High Command. Assertions of strength and statements from Liberation officers "who just terminated a council in this building" must have startled the true Liberation officers in the field. Taped interviews with Col. Carlos CASTILLO Armas were studied into the programs.

So many fantastic rumors and statements were made about the possible location of SHERWOOD that in the end the truth would have been considered just another wild guess.

#### POST D-DAY PROGRAMING

SHERWOOD announced D-Day, H-Hour on a program several hours long and culminating with an exhortation from the Supreme Chief of the Liberation Army. The style of the broadcasts changed considerably after the H-Hour announcement. Formalized programs gave way to bulletins, comedy was cut, popular music was replaced with marches, and, generally, the programs took on an aggressive air combined with a strong pitch for army defection. The voices of women were no longer used, as the station had changed to its new field headquarters."

SHERWOOD participated and cooperated directly with PM operations. At the request of the senior PM officer in the field, it took on specific tasks too numerous to include in this report. An example, however, was the request of the PM officer to do something about the rapid movement of government troops from the capital to the city of Zacapa. SHERWOOD immediately advised that all movement in mechanized vehicles was prohibited and all such vehicles would be considered military objectives; all inhabitants of the capital were warned that they should leave at once, taking belongings with them, but only by foot or with animal drawn carts; that all people leaving the cities must avoid highways A, B, and C, because Government troops disguised as civilians had been moving on those routes (i.e., the only two roads left to travel were the already cluttered ones to Zacapa); that military drivers should travel at the slowest possible speeds because the

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road-mines (non-existent) were intended only to destroy vehicles, not take innocent lives; that our sabotage teams should have care when utilizing vehicles stolen from the Government because (it was explained in obvious code-sentences) many of them had been booby-trapped; and that everyone friendly to the CASTILLO Armas cause should sabotage highways and bridges.

CANDLES IN JANS

SHERWOOD also created heroes, skirmishes, mass defections, and in the final days it activated, armed, and put in motion two great columns of Liberation forces which were scheduled to arrive at the capital "in a few hours." The latter deception took place on the Sunday morning before the Sunday night resignation of President Jacobo ARBENZ.

Col. Rudolfo MENDOZA, "Chief of the Liberation Air Force," refused to appear in a SHERWOOD interview, fearing reprisal. After half a bottle of scotch and an adroitly hidden tape-recorder microphone, however, a vigorous statement asking defection of Guatemalan pilots went on the air without his knowledge. Such drastic action was necessary after the first few days of battle proved that ground forces were not numerous and that an "air force hero" was needed to justify the Liberation Air Force's frequent sorties.

It was SHERWOOD which laid down the terms which could bring peace. Among the terms were the ousting of communists and the formation of a military junta to replace ARBENZ. The first junta headed by Col. DIAZ replaced ARBENZ and outlawed Communism.

It was at this point that SHERWOOD played what was probably its most important role in the conflict. The Government had ostensibly removed everything that CASTILLO Armas was fighting for, putting the Liberation Army in an extremely delicate position. Only a controlled media like radio was capable of instantly refusing to recognize DIAZ and promising that the fight would continue, even increase in fury, until he was removed as well.

The final SHERWOOD program was carefully planned and painstakingly rehearsed. After appropriate dramatic programming and a speech by CASTILLO Armas, the announcer promised that the SHERWOOD transmitter would now be hidden away in a secret place. There it would remain, a symbol of the forces which were ready to go into action whenever freedom was in peril.

World Wide Information: Very little "combat" news filtered from the field to the outside world. As a result phony government propaganda hand-outs were the only news releases passing through the strict censorship from the capital, and government reports of fictitious bombing and strafing of civilians were hitting the headlines of the world. The Guatemalan representative before the U.N. told a stream of lies with impunity.

SHERWOOD at this period began a series of programs aimed at foreign correspondents and newsmen in the capitals of neighboring countries. Radio stations in several countries picked up these programs and rebroadcast them, long and short wave, to the entire world.

Finally, a United Press dispatch identified a SHERWOOD report as coming from an "authoritative source." From that point, we had it made.

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ATTACHMENT I

TO

ANNEX H

During initial stages of PBSUCCESS planning a special "Orson Wells" type of panic program had been scheduled to coincide with D-Day, H-Hour. This project was abandoned when it became obvious that H-Hour would not be precisely determined until the last minute, and when the destruction of a principal agent ring made it doubtful that necessary sabotage and agent interruption could be counted on. But the possibilities of such a program, especially for future actions, are so great that a short note is made here.

In Guatemala it has for many years been the custom for all radio stations --- long and short wave --- to tune in to the frequency of TGW, the government station, once a week to rebroadcast a government sponsored program known as the "National Hour." This situation, duplicated in most Latin republics, was to have been taken advantage of by an interruption which would spur the country into violent motion. SHERWOOD had prepared a special program, imitating announcers and performers of the "National Hour." It was too much to hope that Government officials and members of the Armed Forces could long be fooled by such an intrusion. Consequently, filtered interruption was to have been interrupted --- an announcer claiming to be speaking for the government would breathlessly explain that although the rebels had succeeded for a few moments in taking over the network, everything was now under control. The program would have continued in this vein, negatively reporting a growing chaos among Red leaders and increasing gains of the revolutionaries.

An agent cutting in on the remote control lines running from the studios to the TGW towers would have put such a program on every single radio in the country, long and short wave. Orson Wells had Charlie McCarthy as competition; SHERWOOD would have had none. The psychological potential of such a situation is obvious.

By laborious editing of clear tapes of ARBENZ and TORIELLO speeches, SHERWOOD was prepared to have true voices making transcendental announcements favoring the CASTILLO Armas forces.

Although the technical details of such an undertaking at first glance seem insurmountable, in reality the action would not be difficult, considering that (1) one agent would cut the remote control line, and (2) an agent or team would sabotage the transmitting towers at a given moment --- allowing SHERWOOD's own transmitters to usurp the TGW frequency.

The panic and consternation caused by a simple SHERWOOD intrusion program a few days after D-Day proves that a true deceptive panic program, taking over the frequency of TGW, would have been of tremendous impact. It is strongly advised that the possibility of such a program be considered in any future projects along the general line of PBSUCCESS.

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SCRANTON FINAL REPORT

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ANNEX I

SCRANTON FINAL REPORT

by

SCRANTON Case Officer - Mr. [ ]

I. Synopsis

SCRANTON was the official cryptonym used to designate the indigenous agent radio operator training program under sub-project MT/3 of Project PBSUCCESS. A total of 13 RO's, including 7 residents (RRO) and 6 tactical (TRO), and one cryptographer were trained and graduated from training sites in Nicaragua from 6 March through 9 June 1954. 12 of these were launched from Honduras against the target by 15 June, the remaining operator being sent to SAHARA for use in sub-project PT/16. Present records indicate that 11 of the 12 RO's came up on the air, although only 5, mostly TRO's, managed to remain active throughout the entire period. Of the 11, one was interned by Salvador and 2 lost their equipment through enemy action. The latter 3 managed to rejoin friendly forces, 2 being back on the air, and the third about to be relaunched when the Project terminated. Incomplete records indicate the RO's handled a minimum of approximately 200 messages from and 100 to the field.

II. Basic Mission and Requirements

A. The original basic SCRANTON mission is detailed in SCRANTON file SCR/1. In brief it consisted in producing by D-15 a total of 20 Guatemalan operator agents, including 10 RRO's and 10 TRO's. These were to be deployed according to the tactics and strategy of unconventional warfare against 10 major Guatemalan targets. In general, the RRO's were to be in contact with "inner forces" at each target, while the TRO's were to accompany "shock forces" directed against each target. Both RRO's and TRO's were to furnish secure commo between their respective forces and their supreme headquarters. RRO's originally were to live "black" and furnish commo up to D-Day at which time they were to go off the air and remain silent until D plus 30. This was to provide a means of reconstitution of inner forces and organizations in the event of failure. The TRO's were to be ready to follow the shock troops into guerrilla type warfare if need be. With the controls thus envisaged, the supreme commander would possess highly flexible assets against most contingencies.

B. The original basic requirements of 10 RRO's and 10 TRO's were shaded to 7 RRO's and 6 TRO's when it became evident that CALLIGERIS, the principal indigenous agent, was unable to furnish trainee candidates in the time desired. The new requirements were obtained by elimination of targets considered to be of lesser importance. Fulfillment of these requirements is discussed in Section IV of this report.

C. Supplementing the new basic RO requirements, new requirements in the form of 10 (later 6) cryptographers were added in an effort to increase the flexibility of the training program by relieving last minute RO trainees of the necessity of learning crypto work and thus shortening the period of training necessary. However, CALLIGERIS proved to be just as unsuccessful in obtaining crypto candidates and only 1 crypto operator was graduated as such.

III. Sites

A. [ ] - The original training site at [ ] approxi-

mately [ ] kilometers West of the Nicaraguan capital, was obtained by Jacob R. SEEKFORD (ps) from [ ] on 10 January. Gear was flown to Nicaragua on 14 January, and the [ ] site was activated by Andrew F. MERTON (ps) and John F. MIDDLECOTT (ps) on 29 January. However, on the next day, 30 January, before any trainees had arrived, the site was blown when the Guatemalan government published an expose mentioning inter alia, the names, location and purpose of this site. The site was deactivated the same day and the non-sensitive gear stored with [ ] pending policy decision by Headquarters. On 2 February, following indications by [ ] that a new site would be forthcoming after the storm blew over, Merton was ordered to return to LINCOLN, while Middlecott was to sit tight and reactivate when able. A complete report on the above events is contained in the SCRANTON SCR/2 Part II file. Aerial photos of the [ ] site taken by Jacob R. Seekford are included in the same file.

b2 c [ ] On 19 February a tentative site was selected at [ ] approximately [ ] kilometers Northwest (best recollection) of Managua. This site was rejected by [ ] as not secure enough. No photos are available of [ ]

C. [ ] - In view of time limitations it was decided to utilize a site located on [ ] about [ ] kilometers Northeast of the Nicaraguan capital, about 1 mile from the Saranac training camp. No facilities were available and it was necessary to construct living and training quarters in the open jungle, the first week in March. Trainees began arriving about 21 February and were used in camp construction. Trainees were strictly compartmented from the Saranac camp. Actual training began on 6 March and continued at this site until 18 April, at which time activities were transferred to the Saranac site. It should be emphasized that living conditions were of the crudest at [ ] as were road communications. Photos are contained in SCRANTON file SCR/2 Part I.

D. [ ] - On 18 April, Saranac (PM) training activities closed and SCRANTON moved to the Saranac quarters in the hacienda ranch house of the [ ] finca. Training continued at this site until SCRANTON closed on 9 June. Fairly comfortable facilities including a well, a latrine, and two cooks [ ] eased the situation although the road communications system was still primitive. With the advent of the real rainy season in early June, [ ] was practically cut off from civilization and it was actually necessary in two instances to use horses for transportation. As a result of the road conditions, one more site change was contemplated to a point about 15 km from Managua, but because of the lack of control over the landlord of the proposed site, it was decided to purchase enough stores to tide [ ] over until the end of the training period. Photos of the [ ] site are included in the SCRANTON File SCR/2 Part I. A comparison of the scale of living related to civilized standards may be comprehended when it is recorded that rats often ran over the sleeping bodies of the trainees and instructors and that a 5 foot boa constrictor was kept by one trainee in the attic of the main building as a counter measure. However, other than infrequent malaria attacks, the health of the trainees was consistently good.



IV. Indigenous Personnel

A. Training Program

1. It requires a minimum of 16 weeks of instruction starting from scratch to turn out a satisfactory communicator, according to past experience. Also, D-Day was limited only by the rainy season, which in the target country normally begins in May and June. Thus, without interruptions and with a full complement of basic trainees on hand by 31 January, sufficient time just existed to fulfill requirements.

2. A training program was therefore set up in bare outline based on 16 weeks, which divided the available time on a daily basis between technical instruction and agent instruction. The technical section was modeled after examples contained in commo files, while the agent section was written up in the Spanish language by Andrew F. Merton (ps) who extracted and paraphrased pertinent sections from the Basic Tradecraft manual. Additional material was kindly made available by the Director of Training. This training outline and lessons are contained in Letter of Instructions, SCRANTON File SCR/1.

B. Procurement and Training

1. A total of 20 trainees (See SCR/4 files) were eventually procured by CALLIGERIS, the first 6 arriving about 21 February and the last one arriving 10 May. Obviously, the procurement of trainee candidates was not a smooth operation, nor did it make the fulfillment of the training mission any easier.

2. Apparently due to a basic misunderstanding by CALLIERIS, the latter at first sought to exfiltrate only experienced men from the target country. As the delay in procurement began to become a source of apprehension, investigation by CADICK (ps) and LUGTON (ps) corrected the situation, and by 22 March, 11 trainees were on hand in SCRANTON of whom 4 were experienced. By this date, the above apprehensions had led LINCOLN to re-examine the situation, as a result of which instructions were sent to the field to attempt to obtain mercenaries in Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Salvador, Columbia, and elsewhere, if necessary. At the same time, basic requirements were re-examined and pared to 7 RRO's and 6 TRO's. In another effort to remedy the situation, it was decided to ask for 10 (later 6) crypto trainees to relieve last minute RO trainees of learning crypto work. However, neither the mercenary nor the crypto recruitment idea prospered. Towards the end, it was necessary to rely upon CALLIGERIS' ability to exfiltrate trained personnel. He succeeded, and by D-Day the required 13 RO's were trained and ready, nine of whom had had previous experience. Fortunately the 4 tyros were among the first to arrive. The remaining 7 trainees were scratched for various reasons including security, illiteracy, inability "to grasp anything except generator crank handles", and lack of time. One man was graduated as a crypto clerk only.

3. With regard to training problems apart from trainee recruitment difficulties, delays caused by moving the training sites contributed to the overall difficulties. Also a factor following Merton's return to LINCOLN was Middlecott's inability to speak

Spanish. The basic levels of the trainees varied from intelligent to slow. All could read and write the Spanish language and most displayed commendable perseverance. A partial confirmation of the need for a 16 weeks training period is seen in the fact that the tyros, who received 14 weeks of training and were the last to graduate, were considered to be barely adequate communicators.

4. Training aids included blackboard lectures, code training tables, recorded tapes, field trips, training lectures from Director of Training, and, most important, an actual training circuit set up between SCRANTON and SHERWOOD. The latter circuit proved invaluable since it provided actual communication conditions over a distance of about 40 kilometers. Because of the necessity for compartmentation, it was necessary to let the trainees believe that the base station was in Honduras. It is safe to say that the training circuit was the single most important factor in producing 13 SCRANTON graduates, and for this reason it is desirable to point out the contribution made by the SHERWOOD operators who maintained the base end of the circuit 7 days a week.

5. Factors affecting the morale of the trainees were, on the positive side, the professional ability and competence of the Office of Communications instructors, their willingness to undergo the same hardships as the trainees, their ability to speak Spanish, the obvious backing given by [redacted] and SKIMMER, (i.e., sites and equipment), the messages from CALLIGERIS, the presence of and occasional use of firearms, and the graduation ceremony itself, the ceremonial opening of a bottle of champagne and toasting the departing graduates. On the negative side were the presence of agitation, the dislike of mercenaries, the enforced isolation, the lack of women and hard liquor, and the lack of communication with home. That morale was very high is probably best demonstrated in the field performance of the operators where it will be recalled that 11 out of 12 operators launched were eventually heard from.

6. Graduation of operators was not announced until immediately before their departure. Minimum time was given for packing, saying farewells, show down inspections, etc., so as to accustom the individual to frequent changes and uncertainties. It also precluded most of the last minute message-bearing to friends so contra productive of security. The champagne graduation referred to before added the proper note of solemnity to the occasion.

#### C. Signal Plans

These were prepared by SHERWOOD. In general they consisted of 2 guard channels with a selection of approximately 8 side frequencies. [redacted] performed the necessary photographic work. Assignments may be found in the SCRANTON file SCR/11, with a consolidated list in SCR/11. Due to the relatively poor quality of the graduates, much of the actual operation took place on the guard channels, since the risk of losing the poorer operators during a frequency change was too great.

#### D. Operational Briefing (ONTRICH)

The briefing of the radio operators took place in Tegucigalpa. Each operator was briefed separately and checked out

on his equipment before being dispatched. Each operator was given the opportunity to make several radio contacts with the base from Tegucigalpa. The operators were briefed thoroughly on operational procedures, security and "black" existence within Guatemala. The operators were introduced to their guides and a complete primary, alternate and emergency infiltration plan was worked out. A guide thoroughly familiar with the routes and area of operation was provided for each radio operator who was not familiar with the area from where he was to operate. Most of the operators were infiltrated overland from Honduras and El Salvador, one flew in with C in the 180 and was dropped off 30 miles from Quezaltenango. In addition to their radio equipment each operator was provided with money, a pistol, ammunition, a medical kit and emergency rations. There were no casualties among the radio operators.

E. Launching

The 12 RO's were launched as follows by ONTRICH:

<u>Sig Plan</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Destination</u>	<u>Date</u>
ACEITE	TRO-38	Bond Shock	14 June
DIESEL	TRO-34	Hank Shock	14 June
(Equipment shot up in action; rejoined and awaiting relaunching)			
GASOLINA	TRO-40	Danny Shock	15 June
JOBCS	RRO-27	Frank	12 June
(Unable to get to Frank; interned by Salvador; released and rejoined troops; converted to TRO with Danny Shock)			
JOCOTA	RRO-28	Adam	12 June
MANGO	RRO-32	Adam	15 June
MANZANA	RRO-26	Cesar	15 June
PAPAYA	RRO-31	Cesar	10 June
PERA	RRO-22	ACP(Advance CP)	15 June
SANDIA	RRO-25	Bond	11 June
(Arrived Bond, equipment captured; rejoined at TORONJA)			
TORONJA	RRO-24	Hank	12 June

F. Performance

Following incomplete figures will indicate general performance:

ACEITE - 26 msgs from; 16 msgs to.  
DIESEL - 17 msgs from (last one 21 June); 9 msgs to.  
GASOLINA - 42 msgs from; 29 msgs to.  
JOBCS - 13 msgs from; 10 msgs to.  
JOCOTA - ? msgs from; 9 msgs to.  
KEROSENA - 11 msgs from (last one 22 June); 6 msgs to.  
MANZANA - 4 msgs from; 2 msgs to.  
MANGO - no show.  
PAPAYA - Heard once on 18 June. No contact.  
PERA - 71 msgs from; 42 msgs to.  
SANDIA - 1 msg from.  
TORONJA - 10 msgs from; 9 msgs to.

Approximately 200 messages were handled from the field and 100 to the field.

G. Miscellaneous

Indigenous personnel at SCRANTON other than the trainees

were limited to two Nicaraguan nationals who served as cooks and orderlies. These were [ ]

V. Security

A. Physical security was maintained by physical compartmentation of the SCRANTON operation from SARANAC and SHERWOOD, the latter being 100%. Physical isolation was the secret of the compartmentation.

B. [ ] all graduate trainees but one [ ] the remark being made that this group was the best of all groups tested. The one operator, GASOLINA, who arrived at SCRANTON too late [ ] was treated as suspect, both on this account and because possibly pertinent derogatory information had been uncovered on a person bearing his name. The eventual decision to use GASOLINA was vindicated when he turned out to be one of the more active operators. It is realized, of course, that this alone would not guarantee GASOLINA's bona fides.

C. Clearances - The Office of Security, Headquarters, was responsible for uncovering trainee [ ] as a one time member of a communist cell in the Costa Rican Communist Party, Vanguardia Popular. [ ] The case of GASOLINA was referred to in sub-paragraph B above. In general, clearances were obtained in time to be of value to the operation and due credit must be given to Security for an all out successful effort. It should be added that in case there was the least suspicion of an operator, he was assigned as a TRO, under the constant supervision of trusted CALLIGERIS men.

D. The effects of the Guatemalan "White Paper" of 30 January have been referred to previously in this report.

E. One incident which might have caused a security hazard was the arrival of trainee-candidate [ ] in Nicaragua in a state of such intoxication that he could not remember his alias. [ ] was returned to Honduras and no damage resulted.

F. Another possible security hazard was the emergency operation of Middlecott for appendicitis. Handling and reporting of the incident by John S. Shepstone (ps) indicate that no security hazard resulted.

G. One incident of interest security-wise was the approach by an [ ] employee, [ ] for employment by SCRANTON. A full security investigation at the time failed to disclose definitely derogatory information, but subject's connection with [ ]

H. CASIMIRO - About 1 June, Casimiro, the Nicaraguan cook, was taken to the Capital for his regular 1-day a month at home. He failed to meet the return truck and after two days his absence was reported to Salamander. He was presumably drunk and listed AWOL.

I. Cover - The light tourist/lumber employee cover given to the staff instructors apparently served the purpose. Major use of the cover was for overt commercial travel between FJHOPEFUL and LINCOLN.

Movement in Nicaragua was facilitated by special travel permits issued by Salamander. The only time these failed to serve the purpose was during the assassination attempt against [ ] at which time all movement was restricted. The isolation of the SCRANTON sites served to ease the strain on cover. Details of individual cover are on file in Security and Commo.

J. Miscellaneous - Merton recalls he was told by one of the Commo staff that [ ] once asked "who is PIVALL". It is believed that [ ] may be the answer.

#### VI. Staff Personnel

A. Staff instructors included John F. Middlecott, John S. Shepstone, and Andrew F. Merton. The bulk of the instruction was carried by the former two and too much credit cannot be given them. Middlecott spoke no Spanish although training was not delayed on this account. Shepstone's Spanish was more than adequate for the job, while Merton's Spanish may be classified as adequate. Difficulty was experienced in getting Shepstone into Nicaragua, which may have contributed to overall problems in meeting deadlines.

B. Merton and Middlecott activated the first SCRANTON site at [ ] on 29 January 1954. Following the expose of this site, Merton returned to LINCOLN since his service in Guatemala would have exposed United States interests should he have been blown. Middlecott carried on with the aid of Vincent Pivall(ps), Spanish speaking Saranac instructor, and began training on 6 March. Shepstone arrived on 3 April to share the instruction load. Middlecott was recalled to LINCOLN over 23 April - 3 May for consultation and briefing. After Middlecott's return to SCRANTON, he was stricken by appendicitis on 21 May and, following a successful operation, remained thereafter at SHERWOOD where he assisted the training net to SCRANTON. It should be remarked that Middlecott's service following his operation was on a volunteer basis, a tribute to his professionalism. He was unable to serve further at SCRANTON since road communications were too rough for his safe convalescence. Following 21 May, Shepstone was aided by Merton who returned from LINCOLN to SCRANTON for the short time remaining. Shepstone departed for Headquarters on 5 June, leaving Merton to finish training alone and to close SCRANTON on 9 June.

C. Other staff personnel, not assigned to SCRANTON but who worked closely therewith, were Vincent Pivall, and SHERWOOD personnel, particularly DUNNAVANT (ps), who was top commo man in the area and who was responsible for preparation of signal plans and equipment. It is regrettable that time and space does not permit adequate description and recognition of the part played by each of these.

#### VII. Gear

While reporting of gear performance is a technical matter, the following remarks may be made. Signal strengths were adequate and in some cases, depending upon favorable propagation conditions, excellent. 10-watt and  $\frac{1}{2}$  watt equipment was used over ranges

extending up to 380 miles at the most. The  $\frac{1}{2}$  watt equipment was handicapped by the lack of a break-in feature. Noise levels were high. The best operating hours appeared to be in the early evening, and the indigenous operators tended to come up more at this time. Early morning hours were also used extensively.

#### VIII. Estimated Costs

Costs of gear will have to be obtained from commo. A total of about \$15,000 was expended for quarters, subsistence, supplies, etc. of the training camp and personnel. Of this sum, approximately \$3,000 was lost in the events following the Guatemalan White Paper expose. A complete report has been submitted to Finance with a copy in SCRANTON File SCR/3.

#### IX. Conclusions

The following conclusions are set forth in statement form, with explanation where necessary:

A. Trainee procurement problems should be resolved at the earliest possible moment, once the relative role of agent radio operations has been determined. It is better to plan for 4 months of training beginning with raw recruits who are in the hand, rather than count upon the doubtful results of a search for experienced trainees.

B. Equally important with A above is the placing of a training/operational case officer in direct contact with the principal indigenous agent, or if this is not possible security-wise, at least as an assistant to the case officer in contact with the P/A. In PBSUCCESS, ONTRICH (ps) was obviously so overloaded with problems on so many different levels, he could not possibly give proper attention to 13 individual agent operator briefing and launching problems. This is to be construed only as praise for ONTRICH in that he was able to accomplish the job under the conditions imposed by the circumstances. However, records indicate that as early as 28 February, direct radio commo with CALLIGERIS was requested and same was not obtained until the first week in June. A sub-conclusion would be to get radio commo with the P/A first.

C. A third and self-evident conclusion is that resident agent operators should be launched and planted well in advance of any FP efforts which may bring crackdowns in their wake. It is regretted that the trainee procurement and other difficulties did not make this possible in PBSUCCESS.

D. The use of Spanish speaking instructors contributed immeasurably to the keeping up of morale of the trainees as well as easing the logistical situations.

E. It is to be noted that the TRO's, scholastically the poorest of the trainees, turned out the bulk of the traffic. This might indicate the relative willingness of the operator to perform under conditions of proper protection, and by extrapolation, points to a possible solution to the problem of getting resident agents to come up on the air, i.e., by increasing the agents subjective sense of security whenever possible, through the use of technical devices such as remote control, "invisible" antenna wires, extremely compact equipment, etc.

F. A technical conclusion, which perhaps does not belong in this report, is that plans should not include operating a propaganda broadcast and an agent base station together. The mutual interference of the functions contributed to the difficulties encountered in PBSUCCESS.

G. Due to the problems caused by slow procurement and "flaps", agent training was minimized, an undesirable circumstance which may have contributed to the RRO's difficulties once launched. Thorough training in living "black" during a "roll up" or tactical situation would have been especially desirable in the case of Project PBSUCCESS.

H. Underlying the SCRANTON training program as it did the entire PBSUCCESS program, was the necessity of the cooperation of such people as [redacted]. It seems, however, that many problems would have been simplified if the SCRANTON program at least had been situated in an isolated location in Honduras, a remark that may well be applicable to Saranac and other activities. The travel and documentation problems would have been simplified, as would have coordination and liaison with the P/A.

I. RRO activities from D-Day to D plus 30.

While briefing included instructions for RRO's to lie low from D-Day to D plus 30, under the demands of the tactical situation as it developed, RRO's were in practice utilized more or less as tactical operators.

ANNEX J

SUPPORT

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH BY MISS [ ]

1. Purpose:

The primary objective was to provide on a current and continuing basis an analysis of the operational, geographic, economic, political, and sociological conditions in all areas of the target country for use of KUHOOK and KUGOWN planning officers of the project. A secondary objective was to obtain for operational use, publications, maps, photographs, charts, and other support materials as required.

2. Files:

Prior to the activation of LINCOLN, only a modicum of background data on the target country had been assembled. There was no organized filing system. Raw intelligence reports, research studies, statistical data, publications, photographs, and maps had been hurriedly assembled by duplicating those in WH Division, and through collection facilities of RMO/OIS. A "Grid Coordinate" filing system was established at LINCOLN. Information was filed by area categories corresponding to the Grid squares of the tactical map used in the project. Target files were set up on the 10 military garrisons in the area of operations. Bulky studies, bound publications, maps, photographs and records comprised a reference library after pertinent data therein had been cross-referenced to the appropriate Grid category.

3. EEIs:

To supplement the background data available at the outset of the project, EEI requests on the target areas were sent to KUFIRE field agents and CALLIGERIS' tactical nets. EEI was also extracted by screening the information reports and dispatches received at LINCOLN from Headquarters and field stations.

The first EEI requests were voluminous questionnaires in English hurriedly prepared and sent to LUGTON for field use of CALLIGERIS' nets. These questionnaires were too bulky for rapid translation and alien agent comprehension. Consequently, they were not answered promptly or in sufficient detail to meet KUHOOK needs. The second group of EEIs produced better results since the questionnaires were more brief, specific and in Spanish.

Lack of staff personnel at the [ ] and GUAT stations also delayed answers to EEI requests. An individual from LINCOLN was assigned to the GUAT station for a month to collect EEI and photograph potential targets.

72 EEI requests were issued between 18 February and 14 May. (26 were to RMO/OIS for terrain studies from aerial photographs for sabotage planning;



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12 were to RQM/OIS for terrain studies and aerial photographs of potential drop zones for supply of field teams; 10 were to KUFIRE and CALLIGERIS nets for Order of Battle data on military garrisons; 3 were to KUFIRE and CALLIGERIS for details of airfield facilities; 18 were to the GUAT station for blueprints, photographs, and details of strategic installations for sabotage planning; 3 were to RQM/OIS for KUGOWN support materials.)

#### 4. RQM/OIS:

Two aerial photographic interpreters were made available at Headquarters to prepare terrain studies and overlays from aerial photographs made by ODUNIT during World War II. These studies were forwarded promptly. They were sterilized for field use. This was the only available terrain information for air operations and proved of considerable value during the final stages of the project.

A large collection of still photographs supplied by RQM/OIS provided the location of oil storage facilities and strategic installations which became bombing targets.

The clipping service contributed useful leads for KUGOWN officers: however it could have been more effective if the clippings had been current instead of approximately two weeks old.

Part of the collection of records used by KUGOWN radio activities was supplied by RQM/OIS. (FYI: RQM/OIS collection facilities - to me - seemed unnecessarily sluggish in the beginning, but about the first of May, they jarred loose and submitted some worthwhile background information. Most of the information they supplied was at least a year or two old, and I found it hard to understand why this information couldn't have been made available to us in December instead of May.)

#### 4. Personnel:

The lacking essential was experienced personnel. It was not until April that a full time staff was assigned to this section. This staff of 3 secretaries had to be trained on the job. Maintenance of the files and preparation of EEI requests had been done in connection with other jobs. KUHOOK requirements had outdistanced its operational research facilities. As a result, full time of the staff was spent in the final stages of the project in supplying KUHOOK and Air Operations requests for target data, assembling OB info, and in preparation of situation reports.

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ANNEX K

SAHARA, INTRUSION PROGRAM

PT-16

By Mr. [ ] Senior Staff Officer, PBSUCCESS

I. INTRODUCTION

SAHARA PT-16 was an operational task conceived in principle in December 1953, by the Chief of Project for the purpose of harassing and intruding upon the communications system of the Guatemalan Government in the hope of causing confusion, delay and general breakdown of the government communications circuits.

Initial studies were assigned to KUCLUB in January 1954, but nothing concrete was developed. At a meeting at LINCOLN on 15 May 1954, interested Headquarters staff felt that little could be done in the few days remaining before 10 June. The one asset believed of value was the information assembled by a staff of four men who had been working for several months at the American Embassy in Managua, recording messages from Guatemalan military radio circuits.

On [ ] insistence that some action be taken, this meeting resulted in the following:

A. A special group agreed to lend every possible assistance.

B. [ ] Senior LINCOLN Staff Officer, was assigned as Case Officer. He was given a broad objective to accomplish, and was not handicapped by restrictive or limited instructions.

C. An initial list of radio transmitting and receiving gear was ordered to be prepared for [ ] to SOMERSET.

D. Representatives of a special group at [ ] were requested to prepare tape recordings of the general characteristics of the Guatemalan military radio transmitters and to make available the radio frequencies currently utilized.

E. A Guatemalan radio operator, reportedly familiar with Guat military circuits, was assigned to the project to operate the transmitter and to provide background knowledge and radio lingo sufficient to perform "intrusion" work. Unfortunately, the man assigned proved to be a telegraph operator with no radio military experience, and no knowledge of radio circuits and equipment. For incompetence and for security reasons he was removed from the site before the critical period.

II. PREPARATIONS

The last week in May, the Case Officer proceeded to Headquarters. Five thousand pounds of sterile equipment needed to install power and operate receivers and a radio transmitter were crated for [ ] The Case Officer then proceeded to Managua, arriving [ ] on 30 May under the alias of Clifford MARSHALL.

A suitable location for SAHARA was found in the garage and servants' quarters of an unoccupied residence on property belonging to C

It was imperative that SAHARA be C ] SHERWOOD for security reasons. Therefore, the selection of the site, transportation and installation of equipment, and the actual operation of SAHARA were accomplished without the assistance of SHERWOOD. The site selected proved to be exceptionally well suited to this operation because it was located several thousand feet above the SHERWOOD C ] which provided optimum conditions for transmitting and receiving radio messages.

The selection of this site was a fortunate one in other respects as well. Because it was located on property C ] it was possible to have C ] guarding the site at all times without arousing suspicion or curiosity. Further, the proximity to the home of C ] provided excellent opportunity for frequent contact with C ]. The privacy of the grounds permitted the erection of 13 specially cut antenna not visible to the public. Also, the site provided excellent opportunity for bringing various groups of people into the area without knowledge of other groups already located at the site. This was extremely important because of the fact that it was necessary for Guatemalans, C ] and also an American Embassy employee to work at the site on certain occasions.

### III. OPERATIONS

#### A. Intelligence Activity

SAHARA was originally conceived as a harassment to the Guatemalan Army. In order to harass, it was first necessary to listen to Guat circuits. The clear traffic passing over these circuits was so startling both in amount and in importance of information that what began exclusively as a harassment program expanded overnight to include a large-scale interception program of Guatemalan intelligence. Nineteen radio operators were utilized to police various frequencies in order to intercept these enemy messages, which were distributed locally and then transmitted to Headquarters.

This intelligence was utilized for operational purposes; the dropping of supplies to friendly groups near Gualan is an example. SHERWOOD clandestine radio script received most of its ring of authenticity during the critical days from last-minute factual news lifted from SAHARA intelligence.

#### B. Harassment

Harassment activities consisted of disrupting receipt of coded messages at Guat commo headquarters by taking on additional code groups whenever the legitimate operator paused, thereby creating confusion and delay up to one-half hour until the circuit was able to reestablish identification signs, or until the frequency was changed.

As SAHARA harassment activities became effective, the Guatemalan circuits were forced to utilize commercial channels of communication, and SAHARA was then able to arrange for and effect interception of the commercial circuits as well. SAHARA also procured important intelligence by the utilization of voice scramblers belonging to friends of C ]

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By harassing the Guatemalan communications circuits during the four critical operational days, SAHARA was able to cause delay and confusion and even forced the enemy to utilize unaccustomed frequencies and codes, thus further slowing down their communications system.

#### C. Intrusion

Because the enemy was surprised and completely unprepared to cope with intrusion, SAHARA was able to accept and receive military operational messages under the guise of addressee when the addressee did not immediately reply. Even when the addressee did reply, SAHARA also replied and thus confused both sender and addressee. The enemy communications facilities accepted three SAHARA intrusion messages with no apparent recognition of invalidity.

Whenever climatic conditions permitted and Guatemalan circuits were heavily loaded, SAHARA intruded with repeated CQs and requests for repeated code groups and entire messages. The best efforts of this nature caused a tie-up of Guat commo facilities at a critical period for one and three-quarters hours for the transmittal of a one-paragraph coded message.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

SAHARA's strong attack on the Guatemalan communications system played an important part in causing the ARBENZ government to fall. The activities of SAHARA produced the following results:

1. The Guat Army High Command was unable to direct military operations with certainty.
2. The resulting confusion sowed seeds of distrust in ARBENZ' ability to control the situation.
3. The intrusion accomplished created the impression that the entire Guat commo system was interspersed with "Rebel" operators.
4. In some instances, official information intercepted was given out over SHERWOOD clandestine radio before it was delivered through official Guat Army channels.

#### V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Since all SAHARA activities are well-documented in the copies of the messages intercepted, it would be extremely valuable to have an analysis made to determine the relative value of each type of harassment and intrusion, and their effect on the target.

The guidance and encouragement of Staff D in this activity were of great value. It is the recommendation of the Case Officer that henceforth activities of this nature be handled by a competent Staff D man who would be made a Senior Staff member of the project at its inception. In this manner he would be able to familiarize himself thoroughly with all aspects of the project as the project developed.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

by

C

] Chief, Support

I. INTRODUCTION

The administrative support of LINCOLN was put on a senior staff level at the very outset of the Project by the Chief of Project when by his foresight he foresaw the need to have the Chief of Support on a command level with the operating section Chiefs. This one action enabled the Chief of Support to keep current with all the requirements of the project as it progressed. It made it possible for him to anticipate in many instances the requirements of the operating officers, thereby eliminating needless delays and time consuming explanations or misunderstandings.

For purposes of discussion, administrative support can be broken down into the following general categories:

- a) Budget and Fiscal
- b) Logistical Supply
- c) Personnel
- d) Communications (pouch and courier)
- e) Field Location and liaison.

In addition to the above general fields, by its nature it intermixes with Security, "Commo" (radio and cable traffic) and operations.

No attempt will be made in this report to cover all the situations met and dealt with on this project. The purpose is instead to present a summary of the problems encountered and the solutions found to be most satisfactory. The routine operations of administrative support are presumed to be well known and have no place in a special report on PBSUCCESS.

II. DISCUSSION:

Budget and Fiscal

(a) Foreign Currency Procurement

One of the first requirements was to secure sufficient foreign currency to minimize the use of U.S. currency in the target area and to prevent an influx of a substantial amount of new U.S. currency which might arouse undue suspicion of U.S. interest in the area.

Early in December 1953 the Comptroller was requested to take the necessary action to secure approximately C in indigenous currencies. The Finance Division attempted to locate such monies, but was unsuccessful as only insignificant amounts, if any, were available on the open market. It was determined that any effort to create activity would be noticable, hazardous and would yield only nominal amounts. Although attempts

were made by [redacted], Finance Division, to initiate a purchasing program through the foreign offices of the [redacted] no appreciable quantity could be obtained in a secure manner.

This necessitated the use of U.S. dollars throughout the entire project. Due to the fact that throughout the target area dollars are readily accepted and are freely passed, no serious difficulty was encountered, except in Guatemala proper where the pay of indigenous agents was rendered more difficult than it would have been otherwise.

It will be readily recognized, however, that in any area in which dollars do not normally circulate, or are not readily passed, a lack of adequate indigenous currency could present serious problems.

(b) Operating Budget:

Initially it was planned to operate the project on a task basis, in separate stages, as the project progressed. This envisaged an overall estimated budget [redacted] which would include all the separate tasks plus headquarters overhead support.

LINCOLN, during the first three stages prepared monthly operating budgets, by task, based upon anticipated expenditures. Eventually this proved impracticable as the responsible operating officers were unable to anticipate with any degree of accuracy their requirements in advance. In addition, to be of value the information would have to be accurate and complete. With the limited number of personnel available with finance training, it was not possible to keep such detailed records. Therefore, upon the completion of stage 3, this system was abandoned. Funds were then provided directly to the responsible officer, on the approval of the Chief of Project, as the course of events necessitated.

During the first three stages a Station Reserve was established to provide each station with an emergency fund. This provided LINCOLN and the field with sufficient funds to meet emergencies as they arose. Therefore, upon abandonment of the Task System of budgeting, the Station Reserve was constantly replenished as the operational needs dictated. This was a simpler and more expeditious method, although from an accounting standpoint, a looser method.

The cooperation received from headquarters left nothing to be desired. Every effort was made in each instant by all concerned to provide all funds requested within the required time limit. There was no incident or time when the project was delayed or hampered in any way by lack of funds. In one or two instances when it appeared that sufficient funds were not available in the field, subsequent investigation disclosed that either the individual did not know whom to ask for funds or had not accurately determined his requirements in advance.

(c) Monthly Summary Accounting:

In order to keep PBSUCCESS field accountability in one central record, it was decided that the area command stations, in their relation to LINCOLN, from an accounting standpoint, would be treated as sub-stations reporting to a station. This meant that all funds sent to the stations would be picked up on LINCOLN's books as an advance from LINCOLN

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to the Station; the station would account to LINCOLN, which in turn would render a consolidated accounting to Headquarters. As the project developed, this meant that LINCOLN was receiving monthly accountings from GUATEMALA, C. In addition, from the first of April, FJHOPEFUL started reporting directly to LINCOLN. The volume of work grew to the point that it became a full time job for two finance officers, in addition to the Chief of Support. It is a moot question as to whether or not it would have been better to have each station report directly to headquarters or whether they should report directly to LINCOLN. The serious disadvantage lay in the fact that an additional volume of work was put on LINCOLN at a time that it could least afford it.

In respect to the Summary Accountings, as stated above regarding the providing of funds, the assistance, advice and guidance provided by headquarters was invaluable.

#### LOGISTICAL SUPPLY

This function was primarily assumed by headquarters which had better facilities available to them. The success of their effort is evidenced by the fact that at no time was it necessary to assign a specific supply officer to the project. The cooperation given the Chief of Support enabled him to perform this function.

Local supply and procurement was usually on a cash basis from commercial houses in the LINCOLN area. C. J was fully cooperative within their capabilities. Excellent rapport was established in the beginning and maintained to the end of the project.

#### PERSONNEL

(a) The caliber of the personnel assigned to the project was excellent on the whole. It is not within the purview of this paper to discuss the qualities or deficiencies of the Staff Officers. This subject will be fully covered by the Chief of Project in another section of this report. The following comments are pertinent only to the clerical staff.

(b) It can be said that without exception the clerical staff turned out a superior performance under working conditions which, of necessity, involved long hours, a unique cover story, and restricted living and social conditions.

(c) The one weakness which presented the greatest problem was the relative inexperience either on any job, or with the Agency. This meant that at least half of those assigned had to be trained on the job in all phases of office procedures and the specialized phases of intelligence ~~wherein they were working~~. Although for a time, through the end of March, C. J as Administrative Officer, was able to assist in this training and supervise their performance, she was required as an operations officer and was no longer able to assist. This led to the abandonment of a central filing system and the creation of individual files in each operating office, kept on an individual basis. Due to the short term of the project, this did not present any major difficulties. The establishment of the "Who's Who" file under the Chief/FI did much to offset the lack of a central file.

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(d) The maintenance of personnel records was held to a minimum as it would have been a duplication of headquarters' records. However, the maintenance of even minimum records on the various individuals, constantly coming and going, required constant attention.

COMMUNICATIONS (Pouch and Courier)

(a) To provide LINCOLN with adequate communication between the field and LINCOLN and headquarters and LINCOLN, a special courier system was laid on that utilized the established State Department diplomatic couriers and also [ ] couriers.

(b) Outgoing pouches from LINCOLN to the field were picked up at LINCOLN by a [ ] [ ] carried by him to a contact point located at the International Airport Post Office, and there turned over to the State Department Diplomatic courier. He in turn received from the State Department courier any incoming pouches from the stations to LINCOLN.

(c) Pouches to and from headquarters were dispatched via registered air mail. For this purpose post office boxes were established in Washington and [ ] [ ]

(d) In the initial stages, there was one incoming and one outgoing courier per week to the field. As the project progressed, this proved inadequate, and although efforts were made in the beginning to obtain two incoming and outgoing couriers, it was not until the end of Stage Three that the second courier was obtained.

(e) In order to provide SHERWOOD with broadcast tapes, it was necessary to provide daily tape courier service. This was done by employing as special couriers four former contract employees of DTROBALO. These men operated on a three to four days per week schedule until Stage Five, at which time they went on to a daily schedule.

(f) Approximately 760 pouches were processed by LINCOLN during its seven months of operation. When this is compared with the normal station volume, and consideration is given to the fact that much of the work was handled by inexperienced personnel with no major flaps occurring, the magnitude of the job can be more readily appreciated.

FIELD LOCATION AND LIAISON

(a) Once the site of LINCOLN had been determined, it was necessary to provide sufficient safe houses for non-station activities and also to establish liaison with the [ ] [ ] which would not only preserve the cover story, but insure good working relations with our host.

(b) The original safe houses were procured by the Headquarters Security Division representative early in December 1953. The liaison with [ ] [ ] was established at the same time by the Chief of Project and the writer by [ ] [ ] visit of 7 December and [ ] [ ] visit of 15 December. [ ] [ ] are to be commended for the excellent cooperation given the entire project during the period it was stationed at LINCOLN. One of the principal reasons for this cooperation is the fact that during the entire project official contact with the [ ] [ ] was restricted to the Chief of Project and the Chief of [ ] [ ]

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Support, excepting for Security matters which were handled by the Chief of Security and Air Support requirements which were handled by the Chief of Air Support.

(c) To maintain the field location in a proper manner the Chief of Support acted in the capacity of an Adjutant and a Headquarters Commandant. It was necessary to publish a set of basic regulations for the conduct and guidance of personnel; arrange for billeting of visitors; procure supplies and equipment locally by purchase or requisition or provide office space as required, etc. No major difficulties were encountered in any of the above.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS:

#### Budget and Fiscal:

It is recommended that:

(a) Prior to the establishment of another such project, a thorough study be made well in advance of the requirement date to determine if any indigenous currency is available and in what quantity. Also whether or not the lack of it will have a material effect on the project.

(b) If a detailed operating budget is to be maintained, a qualified bookkeeper be made available to keep such records and the operating officers be thoroughly indoctrinated in the necessity of maintaining their requirements within budgetary classifications.

(c) Serious consideration be given to whether or not the additional work load justifies the maintenance of a single accountability at field level.

#### Logistical Supply

Although the lack of a Logistics trained officer on the Chief of Support's staff was not critical, it is believed his staff and the project as a whole would have been strengthened if one had been available.

#### Personnel

It is recommended that:

(a) No person be assigned to a field project of this type who is not experienced and thoroughly familiar with Agency procedures. Much valuable time and effort was lost through "on the job training."

(b) All personnel going to the field be indoctrinated in such terminology as "PM", "FI", "PP", etc., and their functions. They should also be required to learn standard trade terminology.

#### Communications (Pouch and Courier)

It is recommended that:

In the earliest planning stages, the pouch and courier network be organized, detailed and confirmed with all other interested government agencies. It was noted that a substantial time lag existed between

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the time that a requirement was laid on by Headquarters with the State Department and the date the State Department actually implemented the requirement.

Field Location and Liaison:

(a) The extremely good working relations between C and the Project would indicate that the methods used to select and maintain LINCOLN Station were satisfactory. The principal reason for this satisfactory relationship is believed to be that all official contacts with the host organization were limited to a few responsible individuals. Thus, conflicting requirements, unnecessary demands, or unauthorized requests were avoided.

(b) It is, therefore, recommended that in similar situations in the future, liaison with other cooperating government bodies be limited to a few responsible individuals through whom all requirements or requests are channelled.

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