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# Prospects for Finland and Their Implications for the Other Scandinavian Countries

*Submitted by the*  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

*Concurred in by the*  
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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## PROSPECTS FOR FINLAND AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OTHER SCANDI- NAVIAN COUNTRIES

### THE PROBLEM

To assess Finland's current relations with the USSR and with the West, its ability to withstand Soviet pressures, and the implications of Finnish-Soviet developments for other Scandinavian countries, over the next two or three years.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. Since World War II, the basic dilemma of Finnish policy has been to preserve the country's independence and its Western orientation, while recognizing that Soviet apprehensions and Soviet power require Finland to make some accommodations to Soviet interests. (*Paras. 7-11*)

2. Over the last few years, these accommodations have appeared to increase under President Kekkonen's direction of Finnish policy.

However, his skill in handling Finnish-Soviet relations in recent years has won him widespread respect. We believe that he will not wittingly prejudice Finland's basic independence and essentially Western character. (*Paras. 12-20*)

3. The USSR will probably continue to view Finland more as a lever for promoting its policies against the West generally, and particularly in Scandinavia, than as a target *per se*. Moscow has cogent reasons for not pressing Finland to

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the wall, including its recognition of the political costs of any attempt to acquire direct control. For the present, the Soviet aim is gradually to acquire a stronger voice in Finnish political decisions, especially in those related to foreign policy. (Paras. 21-25)

4. The basic Finnish dilemma will continue to manifest itself, and perhaps even sharpen, as new situations arise. The development of the Common Market (EEC) is already presenting such a case. To preserve its vital trade ties with the West, Finland will have to have some sort of understanding with the EEC, but Moscow is suspicious of the EEC's political implications and will strongly oppose too close a Finnish tie. (Paras. 29-33)

5. Finland's military weakness invites Soviet demands to participate in the defense of Finland under the terms of the 1948 Mutual Assistance Pact between them. To reduce the likelihood of such demands, Finland is seeking to improve its military capabilities, in part through the acquisition of air defense missiles. The USSR is favorably disposed toward such a development in hopes of gaining an influence over the Finnish military establishment and some extension of the Soviet air defense system. (Paras. 34-38)

6. The Scandinavian countries recognize the imperatives of Finnish policy and see in it some protection for their own independence. Their policies are not likely to shift sharply so long as they believe that Finland's basic independence is not seriously threatened. However, Soviet action to reduce Finland to satellite status would probably lead Norway and Denmark to tighten their ties with NATO and cause Swedish pressures for a link-up with the West to rise sharply. (Paras. 39-41)

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## DISCUSSION

### I. INTRODUCTION

7. Since the end of World War II, Finland's principal preoccupation has been to preserve its national integrity and essentially Western character in the presence of overwhelming Soviet power. In the early postwar period President Paasikivi directed the nation's effort toward rebuilding the country, discharging heavy reparation payments to the USSR, and assuring the Soviets that under no circumstances would Finland ever again become a threat to the USSR. Finnish confidence in the efficacy of the "Paasikivi line," as this policy came to be known, waxed strong when the Communists were ousted from government in 1948 without provoking Soviet intervention. Then, during the first half of the 1950's, the Soviet attitude toward Finland appeared to grow more relaxed.

8. Encouraged by these signs, and believing that a genuine neutrality was possible, many Finns departed from their self-imposed censorship and, particularly after the denigration of Stalin in 1956, ventured public criticism of the USSR and its policies. In 1957, Vaino Tanner, one of the most outspoken critics of Moscow and of the new President Urho Kekkonen, who had succeeded Paasikivi the previous year, assumed open leadership of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and in 1958 a broad coalition government led by the Social Democrats came to power.<sup>1</sup> This coalition, which included persons objectionable to Moscow and for the first time in the postwar period brought the Conservative Party into government, was strongly Western oriented. At the same time, Finland expanded its trade with the West, and a serious imbalance in Soviet-Finnish trade developed. These de-

<sup>1</sup> See Table I for a breakdown of Finnish party strengths in the postwar period.

velopments marked a sharp departure from the Finnish-Soviet relationship which had obtained under Paasikivi, and encouraged a trend toward greater Finnish independence from Moscow.

9. The Soviets moved quickly to underscore their special interest in Finnish affairs by exerting heavy economic pressure. As a result of this pressure, Kekkonen and his Agrarian Party withdrew their support from the government, thereby causing its fall. An Agrarian minority government dominated by Kekkonen was then formed, and amicable Finnish-Soviet relations were restored on the implicit understanding that persons unacceptable to Moscow would not be included in the cabinet. This concession closed government participation to the Social Democrats under Tanner's leadership and deepened the split which had developed within the SDP between the Tannerist majority and a minority leftist splinter group (Skogists) which supported Kekkonen. In addition, it brought the Social Democratic and Conservative Parties together in opposition to Kekkonen and his Agrarian Party, and criticism of Kekkonen's accommodations to Moscow spread among the Finns.

10. In the fall of 1961, the Soviets took advantage of the Berlin crisis to demand military consultations under the 1948 Mutual Assistance Pact.<sup>2</sup> This step was taken primarily as a reminder of Soviet concern for Scandinavian relations with NATO, but also

<sup>2</sup> Under the 1948 *Mutual Assistance Pact*, Finland and the USSR agreed to provide mutual support in case of attack on the USSR by West Germany or any of its Allies, through Finland. It also provided that the two countries should consult in case of a threat of such attack. This Pact, originally valid for 10 years, was extended in 1955 for an additional 20 years.

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probably to influence the Finnish presidential elections scheduled for early 1962. Kekkonen's personal intervention with Khrushchev, who then withdrew Soviet demands, reinforced his claim to be the indispensable man for conducting Finnish relations with the USSR. In the circumstances, Kekkonen's principal opponent, who had been severely criticized by Moscow, withdrew, assuring Kekkonen's re-election.

11. In sharp contrast to their angry reaction after the 1958 crisis, even the most bitter opponents of Kekkonen appeared to view this most recent crisis as a situation to be accepted with realism and managed with finesse. While still strongly anti-Russian in feeling, most Finns recognize their country's vulnerability to Soviet pressures and accept the futility of aggressive assertions of Finnish independence. The feeling has become widespread in Finland that, in present and foreseeable circumstances, key Finnish national leaders must enjoy the approval of the Soviets, although many still deplore what they regard as Kekkonen's haste to placate Khrushchev.

## II. KEKKONEN'S ROLE

12. President Kekkonen, a vigorous 61, now dominates Finnish political life by exercise of the broad powers of his office and by his control of the Agrarian Party, which emerged from the last elections as Finland's largest. Since his re-election in February 1962 he has brought about the formation of a majority coalition government which excludes both the Tannerite majority wing of the SDP and the Communists, and which is almost wholly responsive to his will on foreign policy. In this field he enjoys the general support of all other important political groups, although within the Tannerite wing of the SDP considerable distrust of Kekkonen remains. Even the strongly anti-Soviet military establishment finds Kekkonen's leadership acceptable.

13. Kekkonen's basic policies stem from what he considers to be the central fact of Finnish life: the unlikelihood that the West would be willing and able to support Finland against major Soviet pressures and the consequent necessity for accommodation with Moscow. Impressed with Soviet military and economic progress, he appears to feel that no basic shift in the East-West balance of power which would reduce Finland's vulnerability is likely to occur in the foreseeable future. He also believes that the USSR will continue to exert pressures on and through Finland, and that these will rise and fall with the barometer of cold war tensions, especially as they relate to Germany.

14. Thus Kekkonen believes that, if Finland is to retain its essentially Western character and the maximum possible degree of independence, it must pursue foreign and even certain domestic policies designed to retain Soviet confidence in its desire for friendly relations with the USSR. Because Kekkonen is aware of the strong anti-Russian bias of most Finns, he believes that the government must act in such a way as to check political and popular manifestations which could antagonize Moscow. Moreover, he has convinced himself that he alone among Finnish political leaders is capable of conducting Finnish-Soviet relations in such a way as to reassure the Soviets without sacrificing the essential conditions of Finnish independence.

15. In line with these convictions, Kekkonen has used his official powers extensively to restrain the Finns from the public expression of anti-Soviet sentiments. In addition, in order to give evidence of Finland's acceptance of the realities of its position vis-a-vis Moscow, he has acted to increase political, economic, and cultural contacts with the USSR. He has also sought to break down the resistance of the Finnish military to high level exchanges with their Soviet counterparts.

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16. The extent to which Kekkonen has sacrificed some aspects of Finnish domestic independence for what he considers to be foreign policy imperatives has lowered Finnish popular morale. Political tensions have also arisen from his use of the Soviet threat

and from the fact that he has had to rely at times on the Communist-dominated Finnish Peoples' Democratic League (SKDL) for political support.

17. On the other hand, even his more bitter opponents concede that Kekkonen is a patriotic anti-Communist seriously concerned with maintaining Finland's independence and Western character. His trips to the West in 1961 were almost certainly designed to secure a more explicit Western acceptance of Finnish neutrality and thus to strengthen his political hand against both Moscow and his internal critics. His performance in 1960-1961 in obtaining Soviet consent to Finland's association with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) indicates that he is aware of the vital importance of Finnish trade links to the West. Moreover, he has vigorously fought the Communists in domestic political campaigns, and we believe he is aware of the threat to his own political position which would develop if Communists were allowed to occupy key government posts.

18. There is no way of firmly predicting how far Kekkonen would go to accommodate the USSR. He has demonstrated a willingness to make piecemeal concessions, albeit largely in ways which have helped him establish his personal monopoly of political authority. On the other hand, he clearly recognizes that there are limits to accommodation if he is to maintain his political ascendancy and if Finland is to retain a position generally acceptable to the West as well as the East.

19. In present circumstances, therefore, we believe that Kekkonen does not contemplate permitting Communists to have a voice in government, and does not intend to alter Finland's relations with key countries. He will try to avoid actions strongly opposed by either the East or West and will refrain from associating Finland with any political or military organization exclusively identified with either side. At the same time, while Kekkonen will welcome discreet expressions of Western understanding for Finland's position, he will continue to discourage and, if necessary, oppose moves by the Western Powers which suggest Finnish collusion with the West against Moscow.

20. Kekkonen will probably seek to continue Finland's present policy of maintaining official trade relations with both Germanies, while not extending diplomatic recognition to either. If Moscow were to press Finland hard for recognition of East Germany, Kekkonen might give in, but he would simultaneously recognize West Germany. The chances of Kekkonen's conceding on this issue would go up quite sharply if he was able to gain concessions from Moscow in return, such as a Finnish link to the EEC. Finland will also support broad proposals for disarmament and denuclearized zones affecting Northern and Central Europe, in the hope that progress along these lines would help reduce tensions in the Scandinavian area.

### III. THE SOVIET ROLE

21. The most critical factor affecting Finland's future will obviously be Moscow's policies and actions. Given the power situation and geographic factors, Moscow will continue to be able at times of its own choosing to bring great pressure on the Finns through economic, diplomatic, and military means.

22. The record of Soviet policies in the last decade suggests that Finland has not been staked out for a direct satellite status, at least

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for the foreseeable future. Instead the Soviets have sought to acquire gradually an even stronger voice in Finnish internal politics, and to impose strict limits on Finnish external policies. Under such a policy, Moscow has demonstrated a readiness to provoke periodic crises designed to check Finnish tendencies toward Western orientation and to insure that Finland's "positive neutrality" toward the East is maintained and even strengthened. It is not too much to say that the USSR now possesses what amounts virtually to a power of veto over major Finnish policies and those Finns aspiring to key national posts.

23. Under present circumstances Moscow will continue to have important reasons for not pressing Finland beyond this point. In general, the Soviets probably regard Finland less as an object *per se* than as a lever. In view of Finnish popular acceptance of Kekkonen's policies of accommodation, the Soviets have no immediate concern over internal developments, and are probably convinced that in the long run the strategic position of Finland can be exploited to draw Finland into still closer association with the USSR. The Soviets almost certainly believe that the abrupt extinction of Finnish independence would require military occupation and that the political cost would be greater than the increase to Soviet security would warrant.

24. Moreover, in its present status Finland continues in the Soviet view to be a useful hostage in dealing with the other Scandinavian countries and, to a degree, with the West in general. Danish and Norwegian reluctance to accept nuclear weapons, and Swedish hesitancy to tie up closely with the EEC, are to a considerable degree influenced by Scandinavian fears that such steps might draw a Soviet response adverse to Finnish—and broader Scandinavian—interests. Finally, Soviet tolerance of Finnish independence serves as a demonstration of the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" line.

25. It seems likely, therefore, that as a general policy the USSR will be satisfied to keep Finland moving toward alignment with Bloc policies, prodded only occasionally by threats and pressures. However, since Soviet policy toward Finland has often developed less from concern with Finland itself than as a reflection of broader cold war developments and Soviet desire to use Finland as a means to other ends, the present state of a precariously balanced Soviet-Finnish relationship might be altered at any time in the context of broader world developments. For example, a significant change in the West German or Scandinavian military positions, particularly in the matter of nuclear armament, might become the occasion used by the Soviets as justification to extract major military concessions from the Finns.

#### IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS

26. The basic problems discussed above are inherent in Finland's political character and geographic position. In addition there are a number of issues currently emerging which will put new strains on the delicate balance of Finnish political life. Over the next few years, any one of them might open the way to a new round of Soviet intrusion in Finnish affairs.

##### The Domestic Communist Problem

27. The large Communist-dominated SKDL represents a constant threat to Finnish political stability and offers the Soviets a potential means of undermining Finnish independence. Although the SKDL lost several seats in the last election, it could benefit significantly from a continuing split in the SDP—a split which has already contributed to a considerable strengthening of Communist influence in the trade unions. If the SDP split is not healed, and if SKDL parliamentary power grows substantially, it will probably become increasingly difficult for Kekkonen

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to resist a demand for at least some individual Communists in the government.

28. In these circumstances, if Moscow was to press for Communist inclusion (something it has not done in the past) Kekkonen might recommend the inclusion of the SKDL in the government. However, he would have difficulty in persuading even his own Agrarian Party to adopt such a course, and it is unlikely that the other parties, with the possible exception of the minority Social Democrats (Skogists), would enter a cabinet including Communists. Should Communists nevertheless be included, Kekkonen would almost certainly use his powers to prevent SKDL deputies from securing key positions affecting foreign policy, defense, or internal security. At the same time, we believe he will continue to strive to check SKDL growth. To this end, Kekkonen may alter his present hard line against the Social Democrats when the octogenarian Tanner steps down as Social Democratic leader.

#### Trade Policies

29. The development of the EEC could present Finland with a critical dilemma concerning its political and trade relationships with the West and with Moscow. The EEC presents a serious threat to Finnish trade, but any attempt to establish direct ties with the EEC risks encountering strong opposition from Moscow.

30. Foreign trade is the key factor in the country's economy, and the government is concerned to maintain the present high export level, particularly in trade with the West. Roughly four-fifths of Finland's trade is with the West; the remainder is with the Bloc.<sup>3</sup> The Finns regard a continuance of this trade

<sup>3</sup> The percentage of Finland's trade with the Bloc has shown a steady decline in recent years, and if it were not for periodic Soviet pressures the present percentage would probably sink even lower. See Table II.

pattern as essential to their economic well being and ultimately to their political independence. They are already apprehensive that the expansion of EEC membership will create serious difficulties in maintaining their competitive position in Western markets, at least over the longer term.

31. Despite some diversification since World War II, about three-quarters of Finland's exports still consist of wood products. Finland's prospects for trade expansion and overall prosperity depend upon increasing sales of these products to the West. Currently, more than 70 percent of these shipments go to Western Europe, with the UK alone taking 30 percent. If the UK, Finland's chief customer, and Sweden, Finland's main competitor, affiliate with the EEC, Finland may be hard put to retain its Western markets. If the common external tariff of the EEC on items affecting Finnish exports were held down, or if new markets outside Europe were opened, Finland's problem would be considerably mitigated. However, even this would probably not prevent some reduction of Finland's access to Western markets, thus probably increasing its dependence upon the USSR for export markets in less rewarding economic fields.

32. Kekkonen probably hopes to persuade the USSR to accept a Finnish link with the EEC after the fashion of Finland's loose relationship to EFTA in 1961. However, Kekkonen would expect the USSR to insist upon assurances that Finnish-Soviet trade would be maintained at least at the present level, and that Finland's relations with the EEC would involve no political commitments affecting Finnish neutrality. Kekkonen also hopes that such an arrangement would be acceptable to the West, and expects the Swedes and the UK to champion the Finnish cause. If this did not prove to be the case, Finnish disillusionment with the West and pessimism regarding Finland's ability to stay

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independent of Moscow would greatly increase.

33. If the EEC were willing to admit Finland on the terms noted above as probable Soviet requirements, the Finns would press the Soviets hard for their approval, and we believe that there is an even chance that the Soviets would accede. Kekkonen would probably be willing to make some additional concessions (e.g., recognition of East Germany, and possibly even the inclusion of the SKDL in minor government posts) if he felt Soviet acceptance could be obtained thereby.

#### Defense Policies

34. To date Finland has not even built up its forces to the low limits set by the 1947 Peace Treaty.<sup>4</sup> In the last two years, however, Finland has taken steps to strengthen its military capabilities. The apparent motivation for these steps is the conviction of Kekkonen and the Finnish military leaders that they are necessary in order to forestall possible Soviet demands—already foreshadowed in Soviet allusions to Finnish military weakness—for Soviet participation in the defense of Finland under the terms of the 1948 Mutual Assistance Pact. Currently, Finland is pressing both the UK and Moscow, the main signatories of the 1947 Peace Treaty, for relaxation of the treaty restrictions in order to permit it to maintain larger forces and to possess guided missiles, the latter mainly for air defense.

35. While the initiative for this military build-up is Finnish, Moscow is almost certainly favorably disposed toward it, hoping

<sup>4</sup> Under the 1947 Peace Treaty which was signed by 10 nations including the USSR and the UK, Finland is not permitted military forces in excess of 41,900, or certain modern weapons including guided missiles. Finnish military expenditures during the last decade have been extremely modest, ranging between one to two percent annually of Finland's GNP.

thereby to increase Soviet influence over the Finnish military and possibly to extend somewhat the Soviet air defense system. The Finns have apparently indicated their intent to acquire a Soviet ground-to-air missile system, and have allocated nearly 50 percent of an earlier Soviet credit of roughly \$125 million for military purchases. There is also some evidence that Finnish resistance to admitting Soviet instructors to train military personnel in the use and maintenance of new equipment is weakening, and that a limited number of Soviet technicians would now probably be accepted.

36. On the other hand, Kekkonen and the Finnish military leadership are anxious to balance off this military reliance on Moscow with considerable purchases from the West, and also to seek further Finnish-Western contacts on a high military level. The Finns have recently purchased a naval training vessel and early warning radars from the UK, as well as AA guns from Switzerland and Sweden. They are also interested in obtaining antitank missiles from the UK, and other modern equipment from the West.

37. If the West refuses to modify the 1947 treaty so as to allow the Finns to obtain guided missiles this would probably halt current Finnish efforts to obtain them. However, such a refusal would tend to undermine Finnish rapport with the West and in the long run would provide no assurance against a Finnish decision to override Western objections and to acquire such weapons at a later date, with even greater dependence on Soviet sources.

38. The contemplated build-up of Finland's military forces would give Finland a limited air defense capability, but would not significantly increase Finland's capabilities for defense against a major attack. While it would provide an opening for an increase of Soviet influence in Finnish military affairs, it would be unlikely to alter the basically

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anti-Russian bias of the Finnish military. It might strengthen Finland's case in resisting Soviet pressures for military cooperation in future times of crisis, particularly the stationing of Soviet forces on Finnish soil.

#### V. SCANDINAVIAN REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE FINNISH DEVELOPMENTS

39. The Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, wish to see Finland remain independent and as a buffer between themselves and the USSR. The Scandinavians, many of whom also feel a special sense of obligation to Finland, believe that in present circumstances Finland is pursuing a realistic course, and that the Finns themselves best understand the policies which their situation demands. They are, therefore, generally opposed to any Western demonstrations of support for Finland which could provoke a strong adverse Soviet reaction. Similar considerations of possible Soviet reactions will also continue to influence Norwegian and Danish policy against permitting nuclear weapons on their soil, and make Sweden

even more cautious about association with the EEC.

40. If it appeared that the Finnish position was deteriorating markedly, Norway and Denmark would probably lean even closer to their NATO allies. At the same time, in some quarters in Scandinavia there would be interest in the creation of a neutral Scandinavian grouping. The governments of those countries would only favor pressing for such a grouping, however, if they saw a reasonable chance of NATO acquiescence.

41. Sweden, most sensitive to Finnish developments, would regard any major change in Soviet-Finnish relations as having an important implication for its own policy of neutrality. In a situation where Finland's position was deteriorating markedly, Sweden would probably emphasize its neutral position, while at the same time taking steps to increase its military strength. If Finland were to become a Soviet Satellite, pressures for a Swedish link-up with the West would probably rise sharply.

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TABLE I  
PARTY STANDINGS IN THE FINNISH PARLIAMENT

	1939	1945		1948		1951		1954		1958		1962	
	Seats	Percent of Votes	Seats	Percent of Votes	Seats	Percent of Votes	Seats	Percent of Votes	Seats	Percent of Votes	Seats	Percent of Votes	Seats
SKDL (Communist Dominated)	..	23.5	49	20.0	38	21.6	43	21.6	43	23.2	50	22.0	47
Social Democratic	85	21.3	49	24.2	56	23.2	51	24.1	53	23.2	48(37) <sup>a</sup>	19.5	38
Skogists (Left Socialists)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.7	3(14) <sup>a</sup>	4.4	2
Agrarian	56	21.3	49	24.2	56	23.2	51	24.1	53	23.1	48(47) <sup>b</sup>	23.0	53
Swedish	18	7.9	14	7.7	14	7.6	15	7.9	13	6.7	14	6.4	14
Liberal	6	5.2	9	3.9	5	5.7	10	7.0	13	5.9	8	6.3	13
Conservative	25	15.0	28	17.1	33	14.6	28	12.8	24	15.3	29	15.6	33
Other	10	2.0	1	0.8	0	0.8	0	0.4	0	0.9	0(1) <sup>b</sup>	2.8	0
TOTAL	200	100.0	200	100.0	200	100.0	200	100.0	200	100.0	200	100.0	200

<sup>a</sup> Ten Social Democratic deputies defected to the Skogists immediately after the election in July and an eleventh in September 1959.

<sup>b</sup> One Agrarian deputy defected in September 1958 and formed the Small Peasant Party in February 1959.

TABLE II  
FINNISH FOREIGN TRADE DURING 1957-1961

	1957		1958		1959		1960		1961	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
	Values in millions of US dollars									
	712.2	663.8	729.1	774.7	835.3	835.3	1,063.4	989.1	1,150.9	1,054.4
	Distribution in percent									
EFTA	29.2	28.4	31.3	30.3	31.7	31.3	33.5	34.9	34.7	34.7
United Kingdom	17.6	21.7	17.2	22.1	15.7	23.3	15.8	24.5	15.3	22.2
Sweden	5.9	3.1	8.3	3.6	9.1	3.2	10.4	4.9	11.5	5.7
Other EFTA countries	5.7	3.6	5.8	4.6	6.9	4.8	7.3	5.5	7.9	6.8
EEC	25.1	23.8	29.8	26.9	32.0	26.5	34.5	28.1	34.8	31.0
West Germany	11.4	8.9	16.5	10.8	18.0	10.9	19.4	11.6	21.3	12.9
France	5.1	5.6	4.7	6.2	5.1	4.8	5.8	4.7	5.0	5.2
Other EEC countries	8.6	9.3	8.6	9.9	8.9	10.8	9.3	11.8	8.5	12.9
Sino-Soviet Bloc	30.6	29.4	25.6	24.8	24.8	23.5	20.6	19.5	19.2	18.0
USSR	17.7	20.0	18.0	17.3	17.8	16.8	14.7	14.2	13.3	12.1
Poland	5.2	3.4	3.1	2.6	2.8	2.1	2.5	1.8	2.4	2.2
Other Bloc countries	7.7	6.0	4.5	4.9	4.2	4.6	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.7
United States	5.6	5.1	5.3	4.6	5.1	5.8	5.7	5.0	5.7	4.4
All other countries	9.5	13.3	8.0	13.4	6.4	12.9	5.7	12.5	5.6	11.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

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