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TEXT

SUBJECT: MONTHLY REPORT, OCTOBER 1991


1. THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES KEY ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE MONTHLY WARNING MEETINGS HELD BY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS DURING OCTOBER 1991.

KEY POINTS

NORTH KOREA: P'YONGYANG PROBABLY WILL SUBSCRIBE EVENTUALLY TO
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS, BUT IT WILL
ATTEMPT TO STRETCH OUT THE PROCESS, BARGAIN FOR FURTHER CONCESSIONS,
AND DELAY IMPLEMENTATION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THE NORTH KOREANS
ALSO WILL TRY TO CONCEAL THE SCOPE OF THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND
SHIFT TOWARD DUAL-USE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: MAY 2004









NORTH KOREA

THE NORTH KOREANS' INITIAL RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSALS TO REMOVE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT WAS FAVORABLE BUT NON-COMMITTAL. IN THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, MOST ANALYSTS EXPECT NORTH KOREA TO SIGN AN IAEA AGREEMENT, BUT COOPERATE ONLY MINIMALLY WITH INSPECTORS. WINNING P'YONGYANG'S ASSENT TO HALT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON WILL BE EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT, BUT ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION PROVIDE SOME PRESSURE POINTS.

DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY HAS BEEN A HIGH-PRIORITY AND COSTLY EFFORT FOR THE NORTH, AND ANALYSTS ARE VERY SKEPTICAL THAT P'YONGYANG WILL ACCEPT A BAN ON REPROCESSING OR ABANDON ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

THE NORTH KOREANS ARE WELL-SCHOOLED IN DENIAL AND DECEPTION AND IN PUTTING SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS UNDERGROUND; ANALYSTS BELIEVE THE NORTH KOREANS MAY HAVE UNDISCOVERED SITES FOR HIGH EXPLOSIVES TESTING, WEAPONS DESIGN, AND RELATED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE TASKS.

P'YONGYANG COULD ULTIMATELY ACCEDE TO SAFEGUARDS CONFIDENT THAT, AS IN IRAQ, SUBMISSION TO IAEA INSPECTIONS WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY IMPEDE ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM AND MAY EVEN BRING GREATER ACCESS TO FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY.

JAPAN'S TENTATIVE OFFER OF SEVERAL BILLION DOLLARS IN ASSISTANCE CONTINGENT UPON NORTH KOREAN ASSENT TO THE IAEA REGIMEN REMAINS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE.

NORTH KOREA'S RECENT DECISION TO JOIN THE UNITED NATIONS OPENS THE DOOR TO BROADER INFLUENCES. NEVERTHELESS, P'YONGYANG MAY SIMPLY IGNORE FOREIGN PRESSURE, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, AND CONTINUE WORK ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM UNTIL COMPLETION.



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