

SNIE 13-3-61
30 November 1961

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**SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 13-3-61**

**CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES
AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST**

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 30 November 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE PROBLEM	1
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	2
I. OBJECTIVES	2
II. PEIPING'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION	3
III. CAPABILITIES FOR MILITARY ACTION AND SUBVERSION	3
IV. FOREIGN POLICY	4
V. LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION	5
VI. THE CONTINGENCY OF A SINO-SOVIET SPLIT	6
MILITARY ANNEX	8
I. THE ARMY	8
II. THE AIR FORCES	8
III. THE NAVY	9
IV. ADVANCED WEAPONS	9
TABLE 1	10
TABLE 2	11
TABLE 3	11

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CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist China's objectives in the Far East, its assessment of its own position, and its capabilities and likely courses of action over the next two years or so; and to consider how these might be affected by the contingency of an open break in relations between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Communist China almost certainly does not intend to attempt the open military conquest of any other Far Eastern country during the period of this estimate. Communist China's leaders believe that they can eventually achieve their objectives in the area at far less cost and risk through the techniques of Communist political warfare. When Peiping believes the circumstances are right, it will endeavor to supplement the more conventional forms of political warfare with guerrilla and terrorist action by indigenous forces, supported and guided by Peiping. (*Paras. 23, 25*)
2. In any case, the Communist Chinese will seize every opportunity to undermine US standing and to generate anti-American feeling in the Far East. They will strive to promote discontent and instability in the pro-Western countries of the area. (*Para. 24*)
3. Peiping has no compunctions about openly using its military forces to extend its control when it can do so with little or no risk. It will continue its refusal to renounce the use of force for the seizure of Taiwan and the offshore islands, but we believe that concern over retaliation by the US will deter it from attempting a military conquest of Taiwan or the offshore islands during at least the period of this estimate. However, the Chinese might undertake limited military action in the Strait area to test Nationalist Chinese defenses and to probe US determination or to call world attention to what it terms "the danger to peace caused by the US occupation of a part of China's territory." (*Paras. 26-27*)
4. Peiping's reluctance to launch a military invasion in the Far East will almost certainly not prevent it from reacting vigorously to any US or SEATO action which Peiping believed threatened its security. For example, if SEATO (or US armed forces alone) came to the defense of Laos or South Vietnam, Peiping's reaction would probably be to increase its

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aid to the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese while deploying substantial Chinese regular forces along its own southern border. In the more extreme situation where a SEATO or US action constituted a threat to North Vietnam which the North Vietnamese forces could not counter, the Chinese Communists would almost certainly intervene overtly with their own forces;¹ should such action appear to threaten the Communist position in northern Laos, the Chinese Communists would probably intervene overtly with their own forces. (Para. 28)

¹ Peiping's probable reactions to a number of intermediate courses of US action in South Vietnam are considered in SNIE 10-4-61, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions in South Vietnam," dated 7 November 1961. (TOP SECRET)

5. If Sino-Soviet relations were to deteriorate, for example to the present level of Albanian-Soviet relations, Communist China's military capabilities would be somewhat reduced and Peiping would have much less confidence that it could count on the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Perhaps most important, such an open Sino-Soviet break would also reduce Communist China's capabilities for political warfare, at least in the short run. The very foundations of communism would be shaken and Sino-Soviet rivalry for dominant influence in the other Communist parties of Asia would have a disruptive effect on these parties and would substantially weaken them as instruments of subversion for the time being. (Paras. 30-31)

DISCUSSION

I. OBJECTIVES

6. Communist China's long-range goal in the Far East is the complete communization of the area under the hegemony of Peiping. Short of this there are a number of interim objectives which represent stages of progression toward this goal. These include: the consolidation of Communist China's position as a great power; the reduction and eventual removal of the US military presence and the elimination of US influence from the Far East in general and Taiwan in particular; the disruption or subversion of governmental control in the non-Communist countries of Asia; and the development of communism in individual nations of the area as the opportunity arises. It is these interim objectives which will most directly shape Communist China's policy during the period of this estimate.

7. The Soviet Union is probably in general agreement with Communist China on these interim objectives, although there are and

will continue to be differences on tactics and timing. Chinese Communist interests are more directly involved in the Far East than are those of the USSR, and Peiping appears to be more impatient for concrete Communist advances, particularly in areas of substantial US interest. Chinese efforts to establish hegemony over Asia intensify the trend toward division of the Communist world into two major blocs with Moscow and Peiping as competitive centers. We believe that Moscow will strive to retain leadership of the Communist movement in the Far East as in the rest of the world.² In those areas where the strength of Peiping's influence makes this impossible (e.g., North Korea and North Vietnam), Moscow will endeavor to maintain at least a parity of influence.

² Sections I-V of this estimate assume that Sino-Soviet relations will not deteriorate to the breaking point during the next two years or so. The contingency of an open break in party relations is considered in Section VI, below.

II. PEIPING'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

8. Communist China's leaders believe that the world situation is ripe for the widespread pressing of anticolonial, Communist-guided revolutions. They are convinced that the military and political strength of the Bloc has grown to the point where the West can no longer be sure of victory in a military showdown. They probably estimate that, although the Western Powers will support local resistance to leftist revolutions in the underdeveloped, non-Communist countries, the fear of precipitating a major war will prevent the Western Powers from taking effective, direct action against such revolutions. They point to Cuba as proof that they are right. They may also believe that even in the unlikely event that a major war should develop, the hazards would be far greater for the principal Western Powers and even for the USSR than for Communist China. While they are almost certainly more sensitive to the consequences of general war than some of their more radical statements indicate, their concern over this possibility appears to be less acute than that of their Soviet partner.

9. The Chinese Communists believe that their own experience is more relevant than the Soviet experience for guiding other underdeveloped states in Africa, Latin America, and especially in Asia. In addition, the Chinese Communists inherit traditional Chinese feelings of superiority over other Asian peoples and believe that China is the natural political and economic center of the area.

10. The Chinese Communist leaders consider the US as the greatest barrier to the achievement of their ideological and national goals. Additionally, they see the US as the only force preventing them from bringing Taiwan "back to the motherland" and completing their revolution. Peiping almost certainly believes that once the US military presence is removed from Asia, the proximity of overwhelming Chinese power will lead naturally to the rise of Far Eastern governments which will be increasingly susceptible to Chinese Communist influence and the appeal of communism.

11. We believe that the extent of optimism and enthusiasm of the Chinese Communist leadership may determine its choice between vigorous and cautious policies. Domestic difficulties thus far do not seem to have had a direct effect on Peiping's foreign policy. Nevertheless, to the extent that prolonged, intensified economic setbacks may shake the confidence of Peiping's leaders in their capabilities and preoccupy their attention, we believe that the scope and range of Peiping's foreign policy initiatives may be reduced. Domestic difficulties, however, are not likely to restrain Peiping from pursuing objectives which appear attainable without high risk, or from taking direct action if it believes its national security is threatened.

III. CAPABILITIES FOR MILITARY ACTION AND SUBVERSION

12. The Chinese Communist armed services constitute the most powerful indigenous ground, air, and naval forces in Asia.³ However, only the army has a tested capability for prolonged, large-scale offensive action. The capabilities of the air forces are primarily oriented toward air defense and to tactical and logistical support of ground forces. The navy is primarily a defensive arm, designed for relatively short-range operations. Lacking nuclear arms, intermediate or intercontinental guided missiles, and most other advanced weapons, the armed services find their plans for military growth and modernization tied to the uncertain course of Sino-Soviet relations. We do not anticipate that Communist China will achieve a militarily significant domestic capability for the production of nuclear weapons and missiles during the period of this estimate.⁴

13. The Chinese Communists with their present forces are capable of executing large-scale ground campaigns on the mainland.

³ See the Military Annex for a more detailed discussion of Communist China's military strength and capabilities.

⁴ A comprehensive analysis of Communist China's advanced weapons capabilities and prospects is currently underway for SNIE 13-4-61, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Programs."

Unless opposed by very substantial Western—including US—forces, they could almost certainly seize most of Southeast Asia, the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan. During the period of this estimate, the Chinese Communists will possess only a minimum capability for long-range attacks beyond the periphery of China, and they will possess only a limited capability to defend themselves against air attack by a modern and well-trained force.

14. The preponderance of Chinese Communist power is already a matter of growing concern to other countries of the Far East. Fear of Communist China and a resulting reluctance to irritate or offend Peiping has increased the vulnerability of certain of these nations to Peiping's political and military pressures.

15. Communist China has considerable capabilities for propaganda and political warfare among the nations of the Far East. Peiping makes much of its "understanding and sympathy" for peoples who believe they are suffering from the effects of colonialism or economic and social backwardness from which, according to Peiping, the Chinese have so recently freed themselves. Economic aid programs have provided a means of penetration that is so valued by Peiping that it has made aid commitments of over \$141 million to non-Bloc Asian countries during the past year despite its own severe economic difficulties.⁶ It is possible, however, that the Chinese may have overestimated their ability to meet these commitments.

16. Peiping can employ several approaches in its efforts to develop subversive capabilities within non-Communist countries. It can offer its agrarian-based revolution as a model for peoples who wish to "liberate" and modernize their countries. The Chinese are able to provide guidance and aid to Communist parties, legal or illegal, in other Asian countries. In certain areas of Southeast Asia, the Chinese minority is a potent source of support for Peiping and a focus for local revolutionary

⁶ Total Chinese Communist aid commitments during the past year amount to \$502 million: \$282 million to other Bloc countries and \$220 million to non-Bloc countries.

activities. The Chinese can provide international political support for local revolutionary movements and propaganda against legitimate governments. They can provide training and supplies for antiregime guerrilla forces. Mao Tse-tung's doctrines provide a ready handbook for the conduct of "wars of national liberation."

17. Peiping's net capabilities for subversive action in the non-Communist Far East are increased by the vulnerability of the target countries. It is relatively easy in these areas to disguise externally supported guerrilla activities as indigenous uprisings against unpopular regimes (which to some degree they are). The local regimes are in most cases incapable of effectively containing these opposing forces without outside help.

IV. FOREIGN POLICY

18. Peiping's foreign policy is influenced both by Communist objectives and Chinese national interests. Generally, but not always, these move in the same direction, and it is possible that the Chinese Communist leaders are unconscious of any conflict between them. They probably hold that what is good for Communist China is good for the world Communist movement. Since the Bandung Conference of 1955, their general line of foreign policy has aimed at creating the image of a power of vigor and rapidly increasing strength as a result of having adopted communism; a power leading the way for those countries which are still retarded and weak.

19. At the same time, Chinese national interests have had considerable weight, even in some instances when they required at least temporary sacrifice of Communist goals. The policy toward Taiwan is at least in part nationalistic, because Peiping asserts that the acquisition of Taiwan is a domestic matter, i.e., the completion of the civil war *in China*. Peiping's relatively fierce reaction to Indonesia's persecution of Overseas Chinese merchants reflected a temporary victory of nationalism over the Communist line. The most striking example of the sacrifice of Communist to national interests is Peiping's aggressive pursuit of border claims against India

in the Himalaya region. Not only does this action conflict with the international Communist policy of wooing India's favor and support, but it constitutes a major source of weakness and division in the Communist Party of India.

20. A third factor, which is in the background of most Chinese Communist foreign policy decisions, is the attitude of the USSR. Although Peiping's policies for the Far East probably involve higher risks than those of Moscow, there is a sizable area of overlap between them. This gives Peiping considerable flexibility, although its dependence upon the protection of the Soviet nuclear deterrent gives Moscow some capability for restraining what it considers excessively risky Chinese policies. On the other hand, the Chinese probably still estimate that, in the last analysis, the Soviets could not afford to see communism defeated in China and would therefore intervene despite disapproval of Peiping's policies.

21. Peiping's foreign policy differentiates between pro-Western regimes and benevolent neutrals. Thus it carries on varying degrees of overt propaganda warfare and subversion against South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines while giving economic aid to such neutrals as Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia. Even in these neutral countries there are significant Communist or pro-Communist elements which Peiping would attempt to use against the governments should they drift too far toward the West.

22. In moving toward its objectives of eliminating US influence from the Far East and establishing itself as the dominant power in the area, Peiping's strategy probably has made the acquisition of Taiwan and the communizing of Japan and India its most important goals. On the basis of opportunity, however, South Vietnam and Laos are currently primary targets. To the extent its domestic strength allows, Communist China will pursue and expand its penetration efforts in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

V. LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION

23. During the period of this estimate, Communist China will almost certainly continue to pursue its interim objectives in the Far East primarily through the techniques of Communist political warfare. Peiping will attempt to capitalize on its power image, advertising that it is dangerous to be an enemy of Communist China and that communism is the inevitable wave of the future. At the same time, it will strive to convince neighboring peoples that Communist China is a benevolent giant which poses no threat to countries that are not in league with the West and that it is willing to provide generous aid to such countries.

24. In particular, Peiping will seize every opportunity to undermine US standing in the Far East and to diminish the US presence and influence in the area. The issue of US bases will be pressed, particularly in Okinawa and Japan, and economic difficulties anywhere in the Far East will be attributed to the policies of the US. Peiping will continue its efforts to capitalize upon anti-US feeling in the area among any group or class of people and will exploit the fear of nuclear war in its attempts to impel Western-oriented countries toward neutralism.

25. The Chinese Communists almost certainly believe that if US support were denied to non-Communist Southeast Asia, any country in this area could be subverted within a very few years by political-guerrilla means. On this basis, Peiping will continue to work to minimize the effectiveness of US support of these countries. When Communist China's leaders estimate that the situation in a pro-Western nation has become sufficiently soft, they will supplement political action with guerrilla-terrorist tactics against the incumbent regime. Such actions will be conducted by local forces (often Chinese trained) aided by Chinese technicians and advisers. The Chinese Communists almost certainly feel that over a period of time they can achieve their objectives by these means at little cost and with a fairly low degree of risk.

26. In general, the Chinese Communists feel little need to resort to overt military invasion

in order to enlarge their influence or communize other countries. On the other hand, they have no compunctions about openly using their military forces to extend their control when it can do so with little or no risk. Thus, they ruthlessly overran Tibet; they have fired upon Indian troops in the Himalayas; and they refuse to renounce the right to use force for the seizure of Taiwan and the offshore islands.

27. We do not believe that Peiping will launch a major military effort against India during the next two years or so. In the case of Taiwan and the offshore islands, concern over retaliation by the US will almost certainly deter them from undertaking a military conquest. Peiping will probably be fully aware of the dangers of attempting a limited action in the Taiwan Strait from which it cannot disengage without appearing to suffer a defeat. It remains possible, however, that Peiping might undertake limited action in the Strait area during the period of this estimate seeking thereby to test Nationalist defenses and to probe US determination or to call world attention to what it terms "the danger to peace caused by the US occupation of a part of China's territory."

28. Peiping's unwillingness to launch a military invasion in the Far East will almost certainly not prevent it from reacting vigorously to any US or SEATO action which Peiping believed threatened its security. For example, if SEATO (or US armed forces alone) came to the defense of Laos or South Vietnam, Peiping's reaction would probably be to increase its aid to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh while deploying substantial Chinese regular forces along its own southern border. In the more extreme situation where a SEATO or US action constituted a threat to North Vietnam which the North Vietnamese forces could not counter, the Chinese Communists would almost certainly intervene overtly with their own forces;⁶ should such action appear

⁶ Peiping's probable reactions to a number of intermediate courses of US action in South Vietnam are considered in SNIE 10-4-61, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions in South Vietnam," dated 7 November 1961. (TOP SECRET, [redacted])

to threaten the Communist position in northern Laos, the Chinese Communists would probably intervene overtly with their own forces.

VI. THE CONTINGENCY OF A SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

29. In the preceding sections of the estimate it has been assumed that the Sino-Soviet dispute is likely to proceed without degenerating into an open break in party relations. However, since such a break is at least conceivable, we believe it useful to consider some of its consequences.

30. If Sino-Soviet relations were to deteriorate, for example to the present level of Albanian-Soviet relations, Communist China would be deprived of even the low levels of military supplies, technical aid, and economic cooperation it now receives from the USSR. The replacement of Soviet sources with free world sources, particularly for POL, would entail difficult economic readjustments and would slow the rate of economic growth. Moreover, Communist China would have to rely on relatively vulnerable sea lines rather than secure overland supply routes. In addition, Peiping's progress in the development of nuclear weapons and missiles would be retarded. This reduction of capabilities would in itself limit somewhat the range of objectives Peiping could actively pursue in the Far East. However, a much greater inhibiting factor probably would be Peiping's greatly increased uncertainty that it could count on the Soviet nuclear support.

31. Perhaps most important, an open Sino-Soviet break would also weaken Communist China's capabilities for political warfare, at least in the short run. The very foundations of communism would be shaken and Sino-Soviet rivalry for dominant influence in the other Communist parties of Asia would have a disruptive effect on these parties and would substantially weaken them as instruments of subversion for the time being. In those parties where Peiping ultimately succeeds in establishing its predominance, policies would

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become increasingly militant and might pose a greater threat to the non-Communist governments of the area. In this case, internal unrest and instability would increase in the affected countries and guerrilla warfare might be conducted more widely than at present.

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MILITARY ANNEX

I. THE ARMY

1. Chinese Communist ground forces number about 2.6 million men—approximately the same as in the past several years. Their principal elements are 158 combat divisions including 102 infantry divisions that are organic to 34 armies. About two-thirds of these forces are currently deployed in critical frontier areas or strategic zones. Of these, 8 armies plus 6 independent divisions are in the Mukden Military Region which borders on Korea; 6 armies and 3 independent divisions are in the coastal provinces opposite Taiwan; and there are 4 armies and 1 independent division along the border with Southeast Asia from Burma to Hainan Island. (These totals do not include independent AA and cavalry units.)

2. The remaining ground combat units (approximately 45 divisions) provide a strategic reserve which would be available for redeployment to any other areas in the event of operations.⁷ The Chinese Communists probably have the capability to deploy a ground force of one or two divisions along the border with Laos-North Vietnam without immediate US detection. It is also probable that by D+15 days the Chinese Communists could deploy, from their strategic reserve, about 20 divisions into Korea, about 10 divisions into the area opposite Taiwan, and about 8 divisions into Southeast Asia. Given maximum capability, ideal conditions, and no interdiction, the entire strategic reserve of 45 divisions could be moved to the assembly area adjacent to North Korea within 30 days, to the area facing the Taiwan Strait within 55 days, and to the Southeast Asia border region within 80 days. In each case the buildup of forces would be far in excess of the number which could be effectively employed (especially in the event of joint action with North Korean or North Vietnamese troops). Furthermore, they would also probably exceed the total

⁷ See map at end of Annex for size and deployment of frontier and reserve forces.

which the Chinese Communists could transport and support forward of the assembly area.

3. Despite technological and logistical limitations, Chinese Communist infantry forces have demonstrated a high capability for prolonged, resourceful, and effective action. Under extremely adverse conditions of terrain, weather, and supply—such as would be encountered in Southeast Asia—the Red Chinese foot soldier has proved to be a tough and determined campaigner.

II. THE AIR FORCES

4. The Chinese Communist Air Force and Naval Air Force with a combined strength of approximately 3,000 aircraft of all types, have almost as many aircraft as all the non-Bloc countries of the Far East combined. In mid-1963, they are expected to have a somewhat smaller total number of aircraft. However, there will be an increased number of improved types, including nearly 200 FARMERS (MIG-19) and perhaps a few FISHBEDs (MIG-21). If the Soviet Union should decide to transfer BADGERS to China or assist the Chinese to produce BADGERS, a few jet medium bombers (probably fewer than 20) might be assigned to the air force.⁸

5. During the period of this estimate, mainland China's principal ground defense in depth against air attack will be her antiaircraft artillery, which probably now totals about 3,100 guns (1,700 light and 1,400 medium types). Three-fourths of these weapons are the older 37 mm and 85 mm types, the remainder including the more modern 57 mm and 100 mm guns, and possibly a few 130 mm guns. By mid-1963 we anticipate that nearly half the AA guns will be of the more advanced 57 mm and 100 mm types. This steady improvement is not expected to be

⁸ See Table 2 for estimated current strength of the air forces and probable strength by mid-1962 and mid-1963.

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accompanied by any increase in the total number of guns.

6. Red Chinese airmen have almost certainly taken measures to improve combat capabilities since their embarrassing encounter with the Chinese Nationalists in 1958, although the extent of qualitative improvement cannot be estimated precisely. On the other hand, POL shortages continue to limit training time and would make protracted operations impossible. Furthermore, the air forces can operate only a limited number of aircraft in inclement weather and lack a nuclear-weapons capability.

III. THE NAVY

7. The Chinese Communist Navy is primarily a defensive force, with very limited ability to engage in offensive operations.⁹ Its primary mission is coastal defense and control of territorial waters. We consider its overall strength and effectiveness adequate only for defense against invasion by a minor naval power. It has a proved capability for hit-and-run motor torpedo boat operations in its own coastal waters and a significant capability for offensive and defensive minelaying. In the event of major hostilities, it would also have a limited capability for submarine operations against lines of communication in the Western Pacific.

8. The navy could launch amphibious assaults with little warning against the offshore islands. The troop lift capacity of the conventional landing ships currently under direct naval control is estimated to be between 20,000 and 25,000 infantry troops supported by an armored division and an artillery division (the latter divisions being limited to between 25 and 50 percent of their organic motor transport). Employed for troop transport only, the lift capability would be increased

⁹ See Table 3 for Chinese Communist Navy estimated ship and personnel strength.

to approximately 60,000 lightly equipped infantry troops.

9. Several serious weaknesses limit the overall capabilities of the navy: a shortage of major surface and minesweeping craft; a lack of auxiliary forces capable of supporting extended operations; and the absence of an adequate construction program to replace aging amphibious craft. Construction of minor patrol types is likely to continue at a modest rate, aiming primarily at replacement of older units. Future naval development will probably continue to be extremely sensitive to the trends of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The completion of four "W" class submarines was seriously delayed because of the withdrawal of Soviet technical and material assistance. Although we believe that work on these units has been resumed, there is no evidence that the Soviets have provided assistance.

IV. ADVANCED WEAPONS¹⁰

10. At present Communist China has a very small capability in advanced weapons: it has no nuclear weapons and only the beginning of a missile capability. It has received help from the USSR in both the missile and nuclear fields, but the departure of most Soviet technicians in August 1960 raises questions as to the subsequent rate of progress in these fields. Certainly Peiping must regard as a matter of highest priority the development of its nuclear and missile capabilities as rapidly as possible, and it will continue to build on the foundations which the Soviets have helped establish. Furthermore the Chinese can exploit a great amount of open literature in these fields and can copy systems that have already been made available to them by the USSR.

¹⁰ A comprehensive analysis of Communist China's advanced weapons capabilities and prospects is currently underway for SNIE 13-4-61, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Programs."

TABLE 1
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND FORCES
(1 October 1961)

	UNITS	ESTIMATED STRENGTH
		2,633,000 Total *
Armies	34	7 @ 49,000 16 @ 48,000 6 @ 47,000 5 @ 46,000
Divisions:		
Infantry	* 108	69 @ 15,000 39 @ 14,000
3 Infantry Regiments		
1 Artillery Regiment		
24 light and medium field artillery pieces		
12 medium mortars		
1 AA Battalion		
12 light AA pieces		
12 AA machine guns		
1 AT Battalion		
12 x 57/76-mm AT guns		
1 Tank-assault Gun Regiment ^b		
32 medium tanks		
12 self-propelled assault guns		
Armored.....	* 4	6,600 each
80 medium tanks		
10 heavy tanks		
14 self-propelled guns		
Airborne.....	* 3	7,000 each
Cavalry.....	* 3	5,000 each
Artillery:		
Field Artillery.....	14	5,500 each
108 pieces up to 152-mm		
Rocket Launcher.....	2	3,300 each
72 x 132-mm multiple rocket launchers		
Antitank.....	3	3,400 each
96 AT guns		
Antiaircraft.....	6	1 @ 4,000 5 @ 2,700
1 @ 88 light and medium guns		
5 @ 48 light guns		
Public security.....	15	7,000 each
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMBAT DIVISIONS.....	158	

* Figure includes support and miscellaneous elements not shown in this table.

^b To date, 69 of the 108 infantry divisions are believed to have the tank-assault gun regiment. (In addition, the ground forces include approximately 68 independent combat regiments including artillery, cavalry, tank, and public security.)

^c Counted for purposes of comparison or measurement of line division strength, we consider, on this basis, that the Chinese Communists have an estimated total of 118 line divisions.

TABLE 2

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE AND NAVAL AIR FORCE
Estimated Current Strength and Future Buildup
Personnel: 90,000 (75,000 CCAF, 15,000 CCNAF)

AIRCRAFT	1 OCTOBER 1961			MID-1962			MID-1963		
	CCAF	CCNAF	Total	CCAF	CCNAF	Total	CCAF	CCNAF	Total
Fighter Jet.....	1,015	270	1,885	1,040	250	1,890	1,700	250	1,950
Attack Jet (Ftr).....	120		120	100		100	50		50
Prop.....	40		40						
Light Bomber Jet.....	240	180	420	210	150	360	180	120	300
Prop.....	120	20	140	90	10	100	30		30
Medium Bomber Jet.....							5		5
Prop.....	10		10	10		10	5		5
Transport Prop (Light).....	155	15	170	160	15	175	175	20	195
Turboprop (Med).....	2		2	5		5	10		10
Helicopter (Light).....	40		40	40	5	45	45	5	50
Reconnaissance Prop (ASW).....		10	10		10	10		10	10
Trainer Jet (Ftr).....	114	18	132	115	15	130	120	15	135
TOTAL (rounded to nearest 10).....	2,400	510	2,970	2,370	460	2,830	2,320	420	2,740

TABLE 3

CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY ESTIMATED SHIP AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH
(1 October 1961)


Personnel.....	65,000			
(Figure does not include Naval Air, Coast Defense, or Naval Reserve Personnel)				
		NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
		SEA	SEA	SEA
	TOTAL	FLEET	FLEET	FLEET
Principal Combatants:				
Destroyers (DD).....	4	4		
Destroyer Escorts (DE).....	4		4	
Submarines (SS).....	24	19	5	
Patrol:				
Patrol Escorts.....	14	1	12	1
Submarine Chasers.....	24	6	12	6
Fast Patrol Boats.....	8		8	
Motor Torpedo Boats (PT).....	150	35	55	60
Motor Gunboats.....	51	4	25	22
Minesweepers.....	36	15	13	8
Amphibious:				
Tank Landing Ship (LST).....	* 20(11)	8	9	3
Medium Landing Ship (LSM).....	^b 13(11)	1	8	4
Landing Ship Infantry (LSIL).....	^c 16	3	11	2
Utility Landing Craft.....	10		6	4
Other Landing Craft.....	200	50	100	50

* Numbers in parentheses are additional units in merchant service.

^b Eight fitted for minelaying.

^c Five to six fitted as minesweepers; five to six fitted with rocket launchers.

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