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NIE 13-3-65
10 March 1965

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 13-3-65

Communist China's Military Establishment

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
10 MARCH 1965

SECRET

№ 377

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, AEC, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB

Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

THE PROBLEM

To assess the character and present effectiveness of Communist China's armed forces, and to estimate trends which would affect their future capabilities.

NOTE

This estimate is the first to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the broad range of questions pertaining to Communist China's military establishment. The Chinese Communist regime's intensive and highly effective security measures make China, in general, a difficult intelligence target. Estimating the nature and scope of the Chinese military production effort is made more difficult because much of the program is still in the developmental and factory construction stages. We are thus unable to make confident judgments on many important matters concerning the nature, scope, and prospects of Chinese Communist military developments and this paper should be read in the light of this general caution.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Communist Party influence permeates all levels of the Peoples Liberation Army (the entire Chinese Communist military establishment). The senior political and military leaders are united by ties of comradeship in a long revolutionary war. Political commissars are assigned to every command down to company level. Although the troops are conscripts, they are selected for political reliability and receive constant political indoctrination. (*Paras. 12-13, and para. 1 of Annex B*)

B. The Chinese Communists continue to proclaim the military doctrine of Mao Tse-tung which stresses self-reliance, the dominance of men and politics over weaponry, and the concept of a protracted "people's war." This doctrine, deemed applicable to "wars of national liberation," is also applied to a potential conflict with the US. Communist China is apprehensive regarding the possibility of a US nuclear attack followed by a large-scale invasion, but holds that in such a case China could accept nuclear devastation and still overwhelm the invaders in a protracted "people's war." The Chinese leaders hope that this prospect will deter the US. (*Paras. 6-10*)

C. The Chinese leaders, however, cannot derive much comfort from this rationalization of their present strategic situation. Since coming to power in 1949, they have steadily sought to modernize their military establishment. They have considered it a matter of first importance to develop an independent nuclear capability. (*Paras. 1, 11*)

D. Communist China's military power derives primarily from the numerical strength of the Chinese Communist Army (CCA), some 2.3 million men, and tremendous reserves of manpower. Although the CCA is essentially an infantry force, its capabilities for combat are formidable. In open warfare against modern opposition, it would be hampered by shortages of armored equipment, heavy ordnance, mechanical transport and POL. In mountainous or jungle terrain, these shortages would be of less importance. In 1961, many Chinese units had serious shortages of equipment and were understrength. The Chinese have sought to ameliorate this situation by bringing up to strength and fully equipping selected divisions. We estimate that as many as one-third of the combat divisions have been so improved, and are distributed throughout most of China's military regions. We lack the information to make any confident estimates of present production rates of specific items of army equipment, but Communist China has sizable facilities for the production of such materiel. We believe that the production at land armaments plants has increased over the low 1960-1963 level and that it will continue to increase. (*Paras. 15-17, 28, 38, and paras. 1-10 of Annex B*)

E. The mainstay of the Chinese Communist fighter force in the air force and navy is the some 1,600 MIG-15s and MIG-17s. There are also about 150 MIG-19s and 25 to 35 MIG-21s. Except for the

MIG-21s, these aircraft are obsolescent and probably less than 10 percent of these fighters have airborne intercept equipment. The backbone of China's air offense would be the 270 or so IL-28 jet light bombers. They also have 12 or so TU-4s and 2 TU-16 medium bombers capable of carrying a bulky nuclear weapon. Attrition has taken its toll of aircraft in service and the Chinese aircraft industry is only now approaching the capability to arrest this decline. The Chinese have beer adding to all of their aircraft development and production centers, and there are indications that they are getting ready to produce the MIG-19, or the MIG-21 and may, indeed, be in the early stages of production. We believe the chances are less than even that production of bombers will begin during the next two or three years. (*Paras. 22, 27, 41-43, and paras. 1-7 of Annex A*)

F. The primary mission of the Chinese Communist Navy (CCN) is coastal defense. Its major combatant units are 21 operational W-class submarines, 4 Gordy-class destroyers, 4 Riga-class destroyer escorts, and 14 patrol escorts. The CCN also has about 155 motor torpedo boats. The capabilities of the CCN against modern opposition would be limited by obsolescent equipment and probably by substandard combat proficiency of its crews. We believe the Chinese have placed a high priority on construction of submarines. We estimate that by mid-1966 the Chinese Communist naval order of battle will include 25 W-class submarines. (*Paras. 15, 25, 44, and paras. 8-11 of Annex A*)

G. The Chinese have given top priority to their nuclear weapons and missile programs. On the basis of our scanty evidence, we estimate that the Chinese, over the next two years, will be able to carry out a nuclear test program and stockpile about 10 bombs. In the ballistic missile field, we believe the Chinese are developing a medium-range missile (1,000 n.m.) modeled on the Soviet SS-4. It is possible that by 1967 or 1968 the Chinese could have a few such missiles with compatible fission warheads. The Chinese almost certainly are determined to develop a nuclear strike capability against US territory. This determination could be reflected in the initiation of programs in the near future looking toward longer run development of a limited number of ICBMs and the construction of a small fleet of missile carrying submarines. Even if the Chinese have already begun work on such programs, we believe that they could not pose a threat to the US until sometime after 1970. (*Paras. 51-52, 56*)

H. During the last year or two, Communist China's industry has begun to revive from the severe setbacks it suffered when the Great Leap Forward collapsed and the Soviets withdrew most of their assistance in 1960. We believe the Chinese leaders will sustain substantial military production even at the risk of serious economic difficulty. However, China's economy will not be able to support anything approaching a maximum production effort by all sectors of military industry and in coming years the Chinese will have to make a number of difficult decisions regarding priorities. We cannot predict in what quantities Peiping may decide to turn out the various items of equipment, and there is a good chance that the Chinese themselves do not yet see their way clearly. (*Paras. 31, 34, 56*)

I. Nevertheless, barring some major setback, Communist China's military power will gradually grow and this growing power will almost certainly increase Peiping's political leverage against its Asian neighbors—whether or not Chinese Communist leaders actually engage in direct hostilities or commit armed forces abroad. (*Paras. 53, 55*)

DISCUSSION

I. NATIONAL STRATEGIC FACTORS

A. The Development of Communist China's Strategic Situation

1. Since coming to power in 1949 the Chinese Communist leaders have steadfastly pursued the goal of creating a modern military establishment. To do this the Peiping regime clearly required substantial outside aid. It apparently worked out arrangements for receiving such assistance from the USSR in the course of concluding the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance; and during the Korean War it received large quantities of military supplies and equipment.

2. Following the Korean War, the Chinese undertook to convert their armed forces from a revolutionary volunteer force to a regular conscript military establishment. With indispensable Soviet advice, weapons, and industrial plant, supplied in quantities until mid-1960, the Chinese modeled their forces along Soviet World War II lines. Beginning in 1960, however, the Great Leap Forward debacle and the Soviets' withdrawal of most of their support[1] drastically retarded this modernization process. These setbacks, coupled with two successive years of near-famine, disrupted military construction and production plans. We have good evidence that the overall military budget was reduced, and that for a short time malnutrition was a problem even in the armed forces. Despite these serious troubles, the Chinese continued to push their missile and nuclear weapons programs.

3. Things have improved since 1962. Rations have been restored to acceptable levels. The Chinese have resumed production of submarines, made headway in the missile field, and appear to be about ready again to produce jet fighter aircraft. Above all, they have detonated a nuclear device. Although there is no prospect of China's approaching in the foreseeable future the strength of the US or USSR in advanced weapons, the gains to date have already increased Communist China's great weight in Asia and have raised the possibility of an eventual Chinese strategic threat to the US.

4. The rate and extent of China's military modernization program will in large measure depend on overall economic growth. With certain exceptions, Chinese economic performance has been fairly dismal in recent years, and enormous economic problems must somehow be overcome before the Chinese can achieve rapid, general economic growth. Chinese scientific and technical capabilities, though considerable, are inadequate to cope with all economic and military requirements.

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[1] Supply of Soviet military equipment, however, apparently did not cease altogether. See paragraph 37 below.

5. Communist China is concerned with a number of situations which impose specific military requirements. Chief among these are the confrontation with the US over Taiwan and the US presence in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, and the quarrel with India in the South. There is also evidence that both the Chinese and the Soviets are paying some increased attention to border security along their mutual frontier.

B. Chinese Communist Military Doctrine and Strategy

6. Peiping continues vigorously to proclaim the military thought of Mao Tse-tung. Mao's doctrine formed in pre-nuclear times and evolved from Mao's political concepts and his experience as a revolutionary leader, stresses self-reliance, the dominance of men and politics over weaponry, and the concept of protracted "people's war." Mao's doctrine takes into account the type of forces available to the Chinese and the type of war these forces could fight best. Whatever its efficacy as a defense strategy for China today, Peiping has used Mao's doctrine to good advantage in pushing its policy of revolution in the underdeveloped world, and in castigating Soviet policies and strategy for allegedly straying from the path of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism.

7. Despite their defiant oratory, since Korea the Chinese Communists have avoided direct military conflict with the US. In our view this reflects Peiping's awareness of its military and economic weaknesses and of the risks of provoking major US attack. Indeed, Communist China's military orientation is primarily defensive. Peiping has shown itself to be sensitive to the possibility of deliberate US attack. The Chinese are particularly apprehensive of a US nuclear attack, followed by a large-scale invasion.

8. Peiping's leaders have stated that Chinese troops will not cross borders in promotion of revolution and that Chinese forces will fight only if China is attacked. However, we believe that the Chinese would cross borders in reaction to what they considered a direct threat to Chinese territory. Furthermore, their national interests almost certainly encompass the maintenance of Communist regimes in North Korea and North Vietnam. The Chinese have maintained strong military forces in northeast China since the Korean War, and in 1961 they concluded a treaty with Pyongyang which provides for mutual defense, and, apparently, military coordination. Although there is no known treaty, similar security considerations almost certainly apply in the case of North Vietnam; since mid-1964, Peiping has accordingly provided armaments to Hanoi, chiefly jet fighters and air defense equipment, while improving its own logistic capabilities and building up air defense strength in South China.

9. Peiping's public utterances on the subject of nuclear weapons appear to contradict the high priority which is given to its own advanced weapons programs. Peiping's propaganda which plays down the effectiveness of such weapons against China has the domestic purpose of reassuring the Chinese people

and maintaining their morale and will to fight. This propaganda also claims such weapons cannot intimidate China nor effectively counter "wars of liberation," which it alleges are the types of conflict which will be prevalent in the forthcoming years.

10. In reality the Chinese leaders almost certainly recognize that a nuclear attack would be enormously destructive for China. Furthermore, Chinese reluctance to run high risk of US attack is affected by their uncertainty regarding the Soviet nuclear umbrella. The Chinese leaders probably consider the US is deterred from such an attack out of concern not only about Soviet responses but about the difficulties of becoming militarily engaged on the China mainland. They probably also see the US as inhibited in the use of nuclear weapons by its own statements and by political pressures. Whatever their real convictions on this score, their stated strategy in the event of nuclear attack is to attempt to absorb the destruction of China's cities and modern industry, then rely on space, time and massive manpower to wage a protracted "people's war" against the invading land forces.

11. The Chinese leaders however, cannot derive much comfort from this rationalization of their present strategic situation. They have evidently considered it a matter of first importance to develop a nuclear capability of their own as rapidly as possible, even when they were facing a general economic disaster. We do not know that they have yet worked out a coherent strategic concept integrating their conventional and prospective nuclear capabilities. Their success in detonating a nuclear device has obvious psychological and political effects, especially in Asia and Africa and in the context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry; it is a strong stimulus to Chinese national pride and support for Chinese pretensions to great power status. A primary motivation, however, must have been a strongly felt need to achieve an independent nuclear deterrent against the feared contingency of a US nuclear attack. Although Communist China cannot expect to develop, for several years, a nuclear delivery capability against the continental US, it could develop within a shorter period, a deterrent or retaliatory capability against US installations and allies in the Far East. Medium-range delivery capabilities could also be brought to bear, of course, on targets in the USSR and India.

II. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES

A. The Military and Its Relationship to Government and Party

12. Party influence and presence permeates all levels of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). The fountainhead of military policy and authority is the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Having shared long careers as guerrillas and revolutionaries, there are close bonds among the senior military figures and other top CCP leaders. Political commissars, coequals of the military commanders, are assigned

to each command down to the company level. The political officers communicate through a separate party chain of command to Peiping and are also responsible to local civilian Party authorities. This extensive apparatus is a powerful safeguard against the PLA's becoming an independent force in opposition to the regime; it also provides a continuing potential for friction and confusion over command authority.

13. As the PLA evolved from a guerrilla and revolutionary army into a peacetime conscript army in an era of increasingly sophisticated weaponry, divergence between political and military viewpoints and interests was inevitable. During the 1957-1959 period there were certain leaders in the PLA who openly opposed Mao's Great Leap Forward and who stressed the advisability of making concessions in order to ensure continued Soviet assistance. These issues figured prominently in the 1959 confrontation between Mao and Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, who was backed at that time by the PLA Chief of the General Staff, General Huang K'o-ch'eng, and a number of other ranking officers. P'eng and his backers were purged into obscurity. Since Marshal Lin Piao replaced P'eng, there has been almost no known expression of military disagreement. This has probably been the result not only of the object lesson of P'eng's fall, but of the fact that the pro-Soviet logic of P'eng's doctrinal arguments has become intolerably unpatriotic at a time of burgeoning Sino-Soviet estrangement.

14. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) manages China's armed forces. The chief staff components of the MND are three general departments: the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, and the General Rear Service Department. Combat arms and services, including the air and naval forces, are represented at the MND level by separate headquarters. In peacetime, the operational chain of command for the ground forces normally extends from the MND through the 13 military regions to the tactical units. The MND from time to time exercises direct operational control of armies and/or divisions, in which case the military regional headquarters retains only the administrative and logistical support functions. Such control is exercised by the MND in Peiping. In the war environment, MND control would be exercised through theater headquarters, field armies, and/or army group headquarters.

B. The Strength and Composition of the Armed Forces

15. We estimate that the PLA number some 2.5 million men, of whom 148,000 are in the air force and 76,000 are in the navy. China's military power derives primarily from the numerical strength of the Chinese Communist Army (CCA), some 2.3 million men, and the tremendous reserves of manpower available as replacements or for augmentation. The CCA is basically an infantry force, and its capabilities for combat are formidable. The modernization program accomplished since the Korean War has provided for the partial standardization of weapons and equipment, tactically balanced combat units, better training, and an improved command and staff organization. The capabilities of the Chinese Communist Air and Naval Air Forces (CCAF/CCNAF) (2,600 aircraft),

and the Chinese Communist Navy (CCN) (38 major combatant ships) against modern opposition are limited by obsolescent equipment and probably substandard combat proficiency among their pilots and naval crews. These limitations, however, would not inhibit the air and naval forces in operations against China's unassisted Asian neighbors.

16. The Chinese Communist Army is estimated to include 117 combat divisions (106 infantry, 3 airborne, 5 armored, 3 cavalry), 23 combat support divisions, 20 border/internal defense divisions, and some 70 independent combat and combat support regiments. These units generally resemble Soviet World War II organizations. This model is imposed upon the Chinese by their lack of heavy equipment, and also by China's lack of the infrastructure required to support a more modern army. Even so, documents captured in Tibet in 1961 indicate that many Chinese units then had serious equipment shortages, and that many were then understrength. It is unlikely that these general deficiencies have been entirely relieved since then.

17. Recognizing this problem, the Chinese have sought to meet it by designating selected divisions as "on duty" or "alert" units. These divisions were to be fully equipped, completely trained and brought up to full strength. We estimate that as many as one-third of the combat divisions have been so improved, and are distributed throughout most of China's military regions.

18. In January 1965, Peiping issued a decree which provided for extending the terms of service for enlisted members of the PLA. The new terms of service are: four years for the army; five years for the air force, special army units, public security troops, and land-based naval personnel; and six years for the navy. This decree probably represents, in part, formalization of the practice since 1960 of retaining selected personnel with the needed levels of technical skills to operate such increasingly complex equipment as the regime is able to provide. In this case, the overall increase in personnel would not be great.

19. If the new terms of service are applied to all enlisted personnel and if conscription levels remain unchanged, the strength of the armed forces could increase by as many as 600,000 by 1966. We believe that any increase in manpower would be used to bring existing units up to authorized strengths, rather than to increase the number of combat units. Peiping may also use the increased manpower to supply cadres for the revitalized militia program, to provide more border security personnel, and to perform internal security roles in Tibet and in ethnic minority areas bordering the USSR.

20. Peiping has recently begun to revitalize and enlarge the militia. The army is assigning more military personnel to militia work and during 1964 training was intensified. Peiping is taking pains to ensure that militia recruits are politically reliable and includes heavy doses of political indoctrination in their training schedule. We believe that the militia buildup is principally aimed at intensifying political controls over the population, but it will also be useful as an auxiliary defense force.

21. We believe the PLA is capable of maintaining internal order throughout mainland China. The Tibetan uprising of 1959 has constituted the only important challenge to this control. Through combined military-political tactics Peiping has successfully contained, even if it has not totally eliminated, minority unrest in Tibet and in Northwest China.

22. *Air Defense.* The mainstay of the fighter force (CCAF/CCNAF) is the some 1,600 MIG-15s and MIG-17s. There are also about 150 MIG-19s, and 25 to 35 MIG-21s. Except for the MIG-21s these aircraft are obsolescent. Probably less than 10 percent of these fighters have airborne intercept equipment, but those that do are distributed among units along the southern and eastern periphery. The Chinese may have a limited number of air-to-air guided missiles for their fighters. The Chinese early warning ground control intercept radar coverage at medium and high altitudes appears complete along the coast and inland some 500 miles. Coverage is also provided at some important areas farther in the hinterland. Shortage of fuel and maintenance problems have limited the amount of tactical flight training in the CCAF, but we believe that since 1963 flight activity has substantially increased. There is good evidence that attrition has taken its toll of aircraft in service. The Chinese aircraft industry is only now approaching the capability to arrest this decline. (See paras. 41-43, and Annex A)

23. There is some evidence to indicate that the Chinese have developed a few elite units to perform special missions such as reaction to reconnaissance overflights. These units are probably maintained at maximum proficiency with priority allocations of spare parts, maintenance, and POL, but it is likely that these elite units are smaller than regimental size.

24. The Soviets provided the Chinese Communists with a limited amount of surface-to-air missile (SAM) equipment before the mid-1960 crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. Although we are not certain that the Soviets have completely stopped furnishing such equipment, we believe that any further supply has been on a small scale. We have identified at least 20 SAM sites in China; some of these have been completely abandoned, and at any given time only a few are actually occupied with equipment. Our evidence suggests that the number of units is considerably smaller than the number of sites and that the Chinese move the units from one place to another in an effort to intercept Chinese Nationalist photo-reconnaissance flights. The Chinese have an urgent requirement for SAMs and we believe they are working hard on a production program. There are indications that the Chinese are now producing some kind of surface-to-air missile, either Soviet-type SAMs or prototypes of a Chinese version. The evidence is not sufficient to permit a firm judgment but we think it highly unlikely that either will be produced on a large scale for two or three years.

25. *Coastal Defense.* The primary mission of the CCN remains one of coastal defense. The major combatant ships are obsolescent and few in number. The navy does not have the capability to wage sustained offensive naval action.

We believe the Chinese have placed a high priority on the construction of submarines, as the principal element of their modern naval weapons program.[a] Units which currently could be utilized in a combatant role would for the most part be 21 operational W-class submarines, 4 Gordy-class destroyers, 4 Riga-class destroyer escorts, and 14 patrol escorts. The navy also has an estimated 155 motor torpedo boats. The Chinese have at least one and possibly two each of the Soviet OSA and KOMAR guided missile patrol boats. We believe the Soviets supplied the Chinese with a small number of Kennel-S-type coastal defense cruise missiles. Since 1963, there has been an increase in general naval activity. This increase has included all ship types and has involved daily coastal operations as well as occasional inter-fleet activity. Overall naval training has improved over the past few years and probably will continue to do so in the future.

26. *Air and Sea Lift.* The Chinese Communists' air lift and air drop capabilities are severely limited. Operational light and medium military transport aircraft could lift about 4,400 lightly-equipped troops or air drop 2,800 airborne infantry troops to a distance of about 500 n.m. Civil aircraft could augment this capability by about 50 percent. The troop lift capacity of amphibious landing ships and craft is about two infantry divisions (28,000 troops) or one infantry and one artillery division (20,200 troops). In port-to-port operations, ships of the merchant marine fleet could deliver less than four infantry divisions (up to 49,000 troops). In addition, in circumstances where small-craft operations were feasible, the Chinese could muster a large number of junks for transporting troops and light equipment.

27. *Offensive Capabilities.* The PLA's offensive capabilities beyond China's borders rest primarily on the large ground forces which can move and fight with simple transportation and logistic support. China's medium bomber force is limited to 12 or so propeller-driven TU-4s and 2 jet TU-16s. These are the only aircraft currently in the CCAF capable of carrying the bulky nuclear weapons which China may now be able to produce. The backbone of China's air offense would be the 270 or so IL-28 jet light bombers, which can carry up to 6,600 pounds and could be used effectively against lightly defended targets to a distance of 550 n.m. In addition fighters could be used in a ground support role, but these aircraft, designed as interceptors, would be severely limited in range and load-carrying capacity. The CCN's capability to operate its submarines in long-range operations is limited by the paucity of deep-water training and the lack of a mobile logistic support capability.

28. In open warfare against modern opposition, the PLA would be hampered by shortages of armored equipment, heavy ordnance, mechanical transport, and POL. In mountainous or jungle terrain these shortages would be of less importance. If not faced with major opposition from a modern outside power the PLA could overrun its neighbors in Southeast Asia and Korea. In any case,

[a] See paras. 8-11 of Annex A.

the Chinese are in a good position to infiltrate large numbers of troops across China's Southeast Asian borders. In a localized situation their presence could easily be decisive in support of a "war of liberation."

29. Chinese Communist capabilities for a brief and limited campaign along the Sino-Indian border were amply demonstrated in the fall of 1962. Indian defenses are improving, however, and this, together with the immense logistics and support problems that would face the Chinese once they crossed the Himalayas, make it unlikely that the Chinese could seize and hold any large portion of the Indian plain. They could, however, probably extend their control in Ladakh, the Himalayan Kingdoms and the Northeast Frontier Agency.

30. The Chinese Communists would be at a distinct military disadvantage in any conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border. In general the Soviets would have by far the better logistics, and their superior equipment and mechanized forces would be decisive.

III. THE ECONOMY'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT A MILITARY PROGRAM

31. Communist China's effort to build a strong independent economy along with a modern military establishment suffered a severe setback with the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians. China has since been attempting to adjust the serious dislocations in the economy on a basis of self-reliance. Its leaders remain unwilling to alter their rigid stance against the Soviet Union in order to receive renewed deliveries and technical assistance. Plagued as well with the overriding problem of population growth and inadequate food supply, the Chinese leaders were unable to reverse the industrial decline until 1963, and achieved only a modest industrial recovery in 1964. They have chosen to concentrate development on a limited number of priority sectors within the economy, primarily military production but also agriculture. Investment in these strategic sectors will not quickly raise production, and we believe that for at least several years China will not achieve a rate of industrial growth approaching pre-1960 levels.

32. Premier Chou En-lai recently admitted that China's nuclear weapons program has imposed a severe strain on China's budgetary resources. Although we lack the data to measure the cost of all of China's military and military-related programs with any precision, we believe that these expenditures in 1964 were on the order of 10 percent of gross national product (GNP). This burden is likely to increase in the next year or so, as many military production facilities begin large-scale manufacture of their products. It is in the longer term and in the future growth potential of the economy, however, that the impact of military spending will probably be most significant. We believe that at least half of China's total research and development resources, in terms of manpower and facilities, are now involved directly or indirectly with military activities. Such activities are probably absorbing an even greater proportion of China's best scientists and engineers. Many important civilian programs have probably been seriously retarded by this diversion of competent personnel.

33. Although Peiping is clearly giving top priority to the development of missiles and nuclear weapons, it is also giving attention to the modernization of its other weapons. The Chinese have been able to overcome some difficulties in conventional weapons programs by using Soviet prototypes and, where technical difficulties have retarded development, by ordering scarce materials and components from satellite and Free World states. The elevation of the bureaus which control defense industries to ministerial level in the past two years is added evidence that China is not neglecting conventional weapons development. These defense industries control the production of China's aircraft, electronic equipment, munitions, weapons, armored vehicles, and naval vessels. The Seventh Ministry of Machine Building was recently established, headed by a General of the Air Force; this ministry may be concerned with aircraft or missile development.

34. In view of the limited scientific, technical, and industrial base of the Chinese economy, China may prove unable simultaneously to pursue an ambitious weapons program, feed its giant population, and make substantial progress toward improving the civilian economy. As weapons development moves from the research and development phase to series production in large quantities, China will encounter increasing technical difficulties and costs. Nevertheless, we can expect to see substantial and even impressive progress in some military areas because of Communist China's capability thus far demonstrated and because of its determination to gain the dominant power position in Asia. On the other hand, China's ability to produce a broad range of advanced weapons in substantial quantities is questionable during this decade.

A. Foreign Assistance

35. China's growing access to Free World production equipment and technology, along with domestic progress in scientific and engineering education, may permit a limited improvement of military production on a broader base over the next few years. China will probably continue to step up its purchase of machinery and equipment and industrial plants from the Free World, particularly after the advent of its Third Five-Year Plan, scheduled to begin in 1966. Significant progress from the research and development phase to the production of both advanced and conventional weapons, however, will depend, among other things, on the expansion of China's metallurgical industry—particularly in precision rolling mills and electric furnace capacity—in order to produce the high quality steel plate, alloy steel, and non-ferrous alloys needed for the production phases of these programs. China has undertaken extensive negotiations abroad for equipment useful in military industries, but so far, few actual purchases and deliveries have been made. The Chinese have imported increasing quantities of precision machine tools since 1960 to compensate for their own weaknesses in these items, and they will probably seek to continue importing precision measuring and testing devices and specialized machine tools.

36. China's imports for military purposes, however, are limited not only by the small amount of foreign exchange and credit available, but also by export and licensing restrictions. Even if these conditions are eased, we do not believe that such assistance will have a decisive impact on Peiping's present military programs.

37. We believe that Soviet military support to China did not cease in 1960, but continued at a much reduced scale at least through 1962. During this time there was probably some Chinese access to Soviet experts and to Soviet military equipment. Soviet motives are difficult to establish; continuing contacts were probably partly a matter of delivery on previous contracts, but may also have represented a Soviet attempt to keep the door slightly ajar in the event a complete rupture could be avoided, and possibly, Soviet intelligence interest in keeping abreast of Chinese military developments.

B. Military Industries

38. *Land Armaments.* China has about 30 major plants for the production of land armaments and at least as many more plants for explosives and components. These include plants in operation prior to Communist accession to power in 1949, some of which have been expanded and re-equipped, and newer ones, including tank and artillery plants, which were built with Soviet aid. Three major plants appear to be involved in armored vehicle production, including a Soviet-aid plant at Pao-t'ou that started to turn out T-54 tanks in 1958 or 1959. Activity at all plants was low during 1960-1963, because of shortages of raw materials, general economic dislocations, and lack of skilled personnel to replace the withdrawn Soviet advisers and technicians. We lack the information to make any confident estimates of present production rates of specific items, but believe the present level of activity at these plants has increased over the 1960-1963 level. Communist China has considerable unused capacity and could further increase production of a full range of infantry weapons, as well as artillery, tanks, and ammunition.

39. *Chemical Munitions.* We believe Communist China is producing World War I-type chemical agents in small quantities, and probably has the capability to manufacture nerve agents. China may also have a munitions testing program for fragmentation shells containing toxic agents.

40. *Petroleum Industry.* Limitation on the supply of POL presents problems to the Chinese Communist military establishment. During peacetime it imposes restrictions on training, and in the event of war, it would become critical. China's supply of POL will probably increase over the next few years owing to a continuing increase of domestic crude and the import of refining equipment, although imports of specialized POL products may still be necessary. We believe China continues to import, principally from the USSR, all of its aviation gasoline, and probably all of its jet fuel and aviation lubricants. These three products comprised most of China's total POL imports of 700,000 metric

tons in 1964. China does not have the capability to produce high-grade aviation gasoline, but could produce jet fuel. Until additional refineries are available, however, production of jet fuel, would be at the expense of other products such as motor gasoline and lamp kerosene.

41. *Aircraft.* The only aircraft Communist China is known to be producing are a few small utility-type transports and possibly some helicopters. Production of the MIG-17 and preparation for production of a jet bomber and/or transport came to halt in 1960 with the withdrawal of Soviet technicians. A few MIG-19s may have been assembled, but this activity almost certainly ceased at the same time.

42. During the latter half of 1964, photography revealed 50 more MIG-19s than we had previously estimated to be in the Chinese Communist air order of battle. We do not know when or how these additional aircraft were acquired. We believe that the most likely explanation is that they have been in China since 1959 or 1960, perhaps in crates, and have gone undetected. However, we do not rule out the possibility that the Soviets delivered some after 1960. Photography of aircraft plants indicates that these aircraft were not produced in China or assembled from Soviet parts.

43. Since 1962, the Chinese have continued to add to all of their aircraft development and production centers and some of these facilities are now approaching an operational capability. The most urgent military aircraft needs appear to be replacements for fighters and, possibly, a vehicle for their future nuclear weapons. There are indications that the Chinese are getting ready to produce the MIG-19 or MIG-21 and may, indeed, be in the early stages of production now. The Chinese are probably aiming at the production of the MIG-21 because it would provide a significantly more modern defense system than would the MIG-19. We believe the chances are less than even that production of bombers will begin during the next two or three years.

44. *Naval Construction.* With the help of Soviet components, the Chinese up to 1960 were producing the W-class submarine, the Riga-class destroyer escort, the Kronshtadt-class submarine chaser, and the T-43 minesweeper. The withdrawal of Soviet support disrupted this program. Accumulated photographic coverage indicates the renewal in 1962 of China's submarine construction program with the subsequent building of up to six new W-class submarines. We believe this renewed program signifies an improving Chinese capability to produce submarines, but we do not know if they still must import certain materials and components. Chinese shipyards can probably build and deliver an operational W-class submarine within a period of 30 months. We estimate that by mid-1966 the Chinese Communist naval order of battle will include 25 W-class submarines.

45. Photography has also revealed a ballistic missile submarine of the Soviet G-class at Dairen. Although information concerning the origin of this unit is not conclusive, we believe that it was built in China with Soviet design assistance and possibly some Soviet-supplied components. We have recently seen at

least one each of the Komar-class and Osa-class guided missile motor boats. We believe that construction of both the boats and the missiles is within Chinese capabilities.

46. The anticipated completion by 1967 of a new model basin under construction at Wu-hsi, about 60 miles northwest of Shanghai, will enhance Chinese capabilities to design modern ships and submarines. If parallel research and development facilities are established for propulsion machinery, as would be expected, the Chinese will be able by the early 1970s to design and construct a variety of modern ships.

47. *Military Electronics.* Communist China's military electronics industry apparently had made much greater progress than most other complex defense industries prior to the withdrawal of Soviet support and therefore was not as badly disrupted as other sectors. The electronics industry has established an adequate technology for components and materials necessary for the maintenance of existing radar systems, and for the support of a sizable domestic production of VHF and microwave radars for ground, marine, and airborne application. The vitality of the industry has been most evident in radar development, where by the end of 1964 most of the estimated total of 1,100 radars deployed in China's air defense network were manufactured by the Chinese. Large numbers of obsolete Soviet and Japanese radars were replaced.

48. Communist China still lacks a broad base of modern facilities to fill strategic and tactical military communications requirements. It will be many years before China can install an adequate communications base and air defense facilities or supply all of the armed forces' needs for sophisticated electronics and communications equipment.

49. *Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Production.* We have no good basis for estimating a probable level of China's production of highly enriched uranium or of plutonium. The inadequate evidence available leads us to think that the most likely source of the U-235 in CHIC-1 was uranium partially enriched by gaseous diffusion in the Lanchou facility with further enrichment by the electromagnetic process either at Lanchou or some unidentified facility. We can establish a minimum production capacity of highly enriched U-235 by assuming a minimum size of electromagnetic plant that could have "topped off" just enough material in time for CHIC-1. These assumptions would give a daily output of U-235 of .05 kg, for a cumulative production by the end of 1964 of 40 kg, of which some 25 kg were used in the fabrication of CHIC-1. This production rate of about 18 kg a year is a minimum, and the production could have been considerably greater. If gaseous diffusion equipment occupies all the Lanchou plant and there is in China an electromagnetic facility able to "top-off" all Lanchou's output of partially enriched product, the maximum daily production of highly enriched U-235 could be as great as 1 kg. If such production started as early as mid-1963, the total cumulative production by the end of 1964 could be as great as 540 kg, with an annual production of 365 kg. We believe this rate is highly unlikely.

50. Our information on plutonium production is only slightly better. We believe that a small reactor at Pao-t'ou is now producing plutonium at a rate of about 10 kg a year. If it started up at the earliest date we believe possible, early 1963, the Chinese could have had as much as 6-8 kg of plutonium at the end of 1964. A large industrial complex was under construction in 1959 near Yumen in a remote area of Kansu Province, and was still under construction in 1964. We believe that among the projects under construction at this complex is a large nuclear reactor. In addition, there is some evidence that a small production reactor (100 MW) was under construction in 1962 in West China. A reactor of this capacity could produce about 15 to 30 kg of plutonium a year.

51. The translation of such uncertain estimates into possible devices or weapons is obviously highly speculative. The lowest estimate for U-235 production would provide material for only one device similar to CHIC-1 a year. We believe this to be too low. The highest estimate, which we believe equally unlikely, would permit some 20 devices or weapons similar to CHIC-1 a year. The lowest estimate of plutonium production would permit one or two all-plutonium devices a year, the highest estimate some six or seven. If both U-235 and plutonium were used in composite devices, the numbers would go up and, assuming the lowest estimates, the Chinese could produce up to five devices or weapons a year, depending on their technical abilities. Using the highest figures and advanced technology, the number of devices or weapons could be as high as 40 a year. None of these figures can be estimated with any assurance. We estimate that over the next two years, the Chinese will be able to carry out a test program and to stockpile about 10 bombs. Beyond the next two years or so, any estimates would be so imaginary as to have little validity.

52. The evidence leads us to estimate that the Chinese Communists are developing a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). We believe this system is essentially a Soviet design, probably the SS-4, perhaps with some Chinese modifications. It is possible that the Chinese could have a few MRBMs ready for deployment with compatible fission warheads in 1967 or 1968.

IV. PROSPECTS

53. Barring serious crop losses, some other domestic setback, or a sharp worsening of the international situation directly harming China, we believe that Peiping will be able to continue to improve the equipment of its armed forces. The economy will not be able to support anything approaching a maximum production effort by all sectors of military industry and in coming years the Chinese will have to make a number of decisions regarding priorities. We cannot predict in what quantities Peiping may decide to turn out various items of equipment, and there is a good chance that the Chinese themselves do not yet see their way clearly. We believe that despite increasing costs, the Chinese leaders will sustain substantial military production at the expense of the consumption levels of the public. Unless population growth is arrested or some

other major breakthrough is made in China's basic economic problems, the regime may be risking serious economic difficulties and, possibly, public disaffection.

54. The remarkable degree of military-political cohesion which has characterized Chinese Communist leadership for most of its history will almost certainly begin to dissipate with the passage of time, and especially when Mao leaves the scene. Present top leadership concerns about PLA political rectitude and about the new generation of leaders due to succeed the present "Long March" group before too long, probably reflect in part Peiping's awareness of such a prospect. If so, the regime's nervousness for the long run is justified, for the mounting problems of economic growth, resource allocation, and priorities mentioned above will confront a leadership team which was not fused by common experience decades ago, but which is rather a new crop of "post-heroic" officers, managers, and Party functionaries representing the conflicting needs of various sectors of China's society. Nevertheless, we believe these factors will not fundamentally reduce China's military strength nor affect the PLA's responsiveness to decisions by the Peiping leadership.

55. The gradual growth of Communist China's military power envisioned in this estimate will almost certainly increase Peiping's political leverage against its Asian neighbors—whether or not Chinese Communist leaders actually engage in direct hostilities or commit armed forces abroad. The degree to which Peiping is able to translate this leverage into tangible results in Asia will be largely determined by the course of the Sino-Soviet antagonism, the course of US-Communist confrontation, and the views Asian leaders come to have concerning US intentions and capabilities with respect to the situation their particular country faces.

56. We believe that the Peiping regime is realistic enough to realize that China cannot hope even to approach US or Soviet prowess in advanced weapons. The Chinese almost certainly do not presently entertain expectations for deploying in the foreseeable future hundreds of ICBMs, building a fleet of nuclear powered submarines, or developing an anti-ballistic missile system. Short of this, however, the Chinese leaders do have aspirations which, if brought to fruition, will have dangerous implications for the US. Although we have no positive evidence, it is almost certain that the Chinese Communists are determined to develop a nuclear strike capability against US territory. This determination could be reflected in the initiation of programs in the near future looking toward longer run development of a limited number of ICBMs and the construction of a small fleet of missile-carrying submarines. Such developments would also pose a threat to the USSR. Even if the Chinese have already begun to work on an ICBM we do not believe they could have an operational system until after 1970. Chiefly because of its range limitations, we do not believe that the G-class submarine the Chinese launched in the fall of 1964 signifies the beginning of a construction program that would pose a significant threat to the US, and we believe it will be well into the 1970s before the Chinese could develop such a submarine threat.

ANNEX A

MAJOR MILITARY PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

A. Aircraft Industry

1. *General.* We believe that the Chinese Communists have given the development of military aircraft a high priority. There is some photographic evidence to support this judgment, and we believe that China's inadequate air defense capability almost certainly has caused the Chinese leaders to give urgent attention to correcting the increasing obsolescence and deterioration of the CCAF/CCNAF.

2. There are five centers of the aircraft industry in Communist China: Shenyang, Sian, Ch'engtu, Nanch'ang, and Harbin. We believe each of these centers had received Soviet equipment and technical assistance up to mid-1960, and production and/or construction at each of them were badly disrupted when the Soviets withdrew their help. During the last two years or so, construction work and other activity at all of China's aircraft production facilities has gradually picked up and we believe the industry is recovering. All of the discussion which follows applies to Chinese production of Soviet-designed airframes and engines. We believe that a Chinese-designed combat aircraft could not be operational before the 1970s.

3. *Fighter Aircraft.* In 1956, the Chinese announced they had begun production of jet fighters. These aircraft, the MIG-17, were produced at Shenyang where the Soviets had helped the Chinese build an airframe plant and jet engine facilities. We believe that the Soviets had subsequently begun to help the Chinese to produce the MIG-19, and, by 1959 or 1960, the Chinese had probably begun to assemble a few MIG-19s. Production of both types of aircraft, however, apparently depended on the Soviets for the supply of important components, because shortly after the mid-1960 crisis in Sino-Soviet relations, production of aircraft at the Shenyang facilities almost certainly ceased. Although we do not believe the Shenyang complex has resumed production of jet fighters, there are indications that it may now be about to do so, possibly within the next few months.

4. The Chinese have also continued construction on aircraft production facilities in Ch'engtu. There are indications that since 1962 the Ch'engtu facilities have been preparing for production. We cannot rule out the possibility that production on a limited scale has already started, but we are inclined to the

view that it has not. We believe that the Ch'engtu facilities will produce a fighter aircraft. The final assembly building is of a size suitable for a fighter-size aircraft.

5. We are not certain what type of fighter will be produced but we believe it will be either the MIG-19 or the MIG-21. It is unlikely that the Chinese would go to the expense and trouble of producing the nearly obsolete MIG-17, and they are almost certainly not capable of producing an aircraft more advanced than the MIG-21.

6. *Bomber Aircraft.* Our evidence indicates that the Soviets were helping the Chinese build facilities near Sian for possible production of a jet bomber and/or transport. Although photography indicates that the Chinese have continued construction on the aircraft facilities at Sian, we believe the chances are less than even that production of bombers will begin during the next two or three years.

7. *Other Types of Aircraft.* A factory in Harbin had begun in 1959 to produce MI-4 helicopters. Here also, production has stopped and we have no evidence that it has resumed. The Chinese also have an AN-2 aircraft plant at Nanch'ang, and, although production of even this relatively simple utility-type aircraft was interrupted, and we believe that production has resumed at a low rate.

B. Naval Construction

8. *General.* Naval shipbuilding in Communist China has followed a pattern similar to that of other military industries. The Soviets assisted in establishing shipbuilding facilities, and while the Chinese wer. learning the technology, the Soviets supplied components which were assembled in China. Naval construction reached a peak during the 1958-1960 period, went into a drastic decline for two years, and began reviving in 1962.

9. *Submarine Construction.* In 1960, due to the Sino-Soviet rift, submarine construction ceased but the outfitting of four "Ws" previously launched continued at the Kiangnan shipyard in Shanghai. By 1962, at least 21 W-class submarines had been completed in Communist China, 15 at Shanghai and 6 at Wuchang. These submarines were constructed primarily from Soviet supplied components. Our evidence indicates that in 1962 construction of W-class submarines resumed at Shanghai where by mid-1964 one submarine had been launched, a second was in an advanced stage of construction, and a third in an early stage. Submarines have been photographed at Wuchang during the period 1962 to 1963. Although the nature and extent of submarine programs here are yet uncertain and the submarine activity may be major overhaul, we are inclined to the view that there is some new construction. It is not known how many new W-class submarines have joined the fleet since 1962, if any, or how many the Chinese intend to build.

10. Photography of Dairen harbor in November 1964 revealed that the Chinese have launched a submarine identical in outward appearance to the Soviet G-I class, which is designed to launch SS-N-4 350 n.m. ballistic missiles while surfaced. Photography indicates that the hull assembly began in about mid-1962. The Soviets almost certainly provided design assistance, and may have supplied components for the submarine. We have no evidence as to what missile the Chinese may be planning to use in this submarine or as to whether the Soviets have given them assistance in this respect. Presumably the Chinese are aiming at the SS-N-4. We have no evidence that the Chinese are now constructing any more of this class submarine, and it would be at least several years before any units could be operational with Chinese produced missiles.

11. *Other Naval Craft.* By 1960, the Chinese with Soviet help, had built four Riga-class destroyer escorts at the Hutung Shipyard in Shanghai, 18 Kronshtadt-class submarine chasers at the Kiousin Shipyard in Shanghai and at the Hunangpu Shipyard in Canton, and 12 minesweepers and about 75 motor torpedo boats in various yards in Shanghai, Canton, and Wuhan. We have no evidence that the Chinese have resumed production of destroyer escorts. Since 1962, a total of 30 to 45 motor torpedo and patrol boats has been produced. Commencing in 1965 production of these craft could be at the rate of about 10 to 15 a year each. New construction observed at Dairen and Port Arthur may be two new classes of patrol craft. At least one and possibly two each of the Soviet OSA-class and KOMAR-class motor boats have been sighted in China since 1963. In the Soviet Union, this type of craft carries SS-N-2 aerodynamic missiles with a high explosive warhead and with a range of 15-20 n.m. Although the Soviets may have supplied or helped build these craft, we believe that construction of both the boats and the missiles is within Chinese capabilities.

ANNEX B

CHINESE COMMUNIST ORDER OF BATTLE

A. Army

1. *Personnel.* The Chinese Communist Army (CCA) is a conscript army, but, inasmuch as only a small percentage of those eligible are taken into military service, the regime is able to be highly selective in its callup. The primary criterion is political reliability. Although soldiers are not required to be Communist Party or Young Communist League members, selection takes into account "good family background"—that is, poor peasant or worker origin—and "progressive" attitude. A second criterion is educability. On this account, since 1960, a larger proportion of conscripts have been students from urban areas. Thus CCA enlisted personnel are generally above average in these respects.

2. Even so, given the dearth of general and technical education in China and the general lack of practical experience with modern machinery, the CCA has difficulty in finding or developing technical personnel to man complex weapon systems. On the other hand, the hardihood and native ingenuity of the Chinese peasant enables the CCA to operate with a considerable degree of logistical improvisation.

3. *Morale.* At present, as far as can be judged, the morale and discipline within the PLA are good. Morale sagged in the lean years of 1959-1961 in reaction to ration cuts and adverse news from home; the regime moved adroitly and effectively to counter this reaction and has maintained an intense program of political indoctrination since that time. PLA successes against India in 1962 provided a psychological fillip. Little is known of officer attitudes, but the almost total absence of officer defectors is an indicator of satisfactory morale.

4. *Divisions.* The number of combat divisions in Chinese ground force order of battle has apparently remained quite stable over the past 9-10 years. We have good evidence to indicate the existence of 106 infantry, 5 armored, 1 airborne, and 3 cavalry divisions. With less confidence, we estimate that there are 2 additional airborne, 14 field artillery, 3 antitank, and 6 antiaircraft artillery divisions.

5. In the CCA, equipment and manning standards vary by region and mission, but in general, CCA units resemble Soviet World War II types. Documents captured in Tibet in 1961 indicated that many CCA units were then understrength and had shortages of equipment. We believe that since then the

Chinese have raised the strength and equipment levels of most CCA units, and, in particular, have brought as many as one-third of the combat divisions up to a relatively high degree of combat readiness.

6. We believe that at full strength the infantry division would number about 14,000 officers and men. Its principal combat elements would be 3 infantry regiments, 1 artillery regiment, and 1 tank/assault gun regiment. Its heavy equipment, all of Soviet type, would include T-54 and T-34 tanks, and SU-76 and SU-100 assault guns. The division would have a large number of mortars (82-, 120-, and 160-mm), as well as 57- and 76-mm guns and 122-mm howitzers.

7. Similarly, the Chinese armored division would number about 8,000 officers and men at full strength. Its principal combat elements would be 2 armored regiments, 1 artillery regiment, and 1 infantry regiment. Its heavy equipment would include T-54 and T-34 tanks, a few JS-1 or JS-2 heavy tanks, and some JSU 122 and 152 assault guns. In addition the division would have a small number of mortars, 76-mm guns, and 122-mm howitzers.

8. The CCA has two types of field artillery divisions. The gun division would have about 5,400 men at full strength; it usually has 3 regiments equipped with 122-mm guns and 152-mm gun-howitzers. The howitzer division would have about 6,300 troops at full strength; it is normally organized into 3 artillery regiments and 1 rocket launcher regiment, equipped with 122- and 152-mm howitzers and 132- or 140-mm multiple rocket launchers.

9. *Armies.* The typical CCA army includes 3 infantry divisions and 1 artillery regiment, and numbers about 47,000 at full strength. There is nothing in the CCA analogous to the Soviet combined arms or tank armies.

10. *Military Regions.* For administrative purposes, mainland China is divided into 13 military regions (see map), and these are divided into subordinate districts which in most cases conform to provincial boundaries. These are territorial rather than operational commands.

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARMY UNITS

	Number of Units
Army Headquarters	34
Combat Divisions	117
106 Infantry	
3 Airborne	
5 Armored	
3 Cavalry	
Border/Internal Defense Divisions	20
20 BD/MIS	
Combat Support Divisions	23
14 Field Artillery	
3 Antitank	
6 AAA	

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARMY UNITS (*Continued*)

	Number of Units
Service Support Divisions	11
11 Railway Engineer	
Combat Regiments (Independent)	18
9 Infantry	
5 Tank	
4 Cavalry	
Border/Internal Defense Regiments (Independent)	20
20 BD/MIS	
Combat Support Regiments (Independent)	47
12 Field Artillery	
6 Rocket Launcher	
24 Engineer	
5 Signal	
Service Support Regiment (Independent)	33
32 Motor Transport	
1 Railway Engineer	

B. Navy

11. *General.* Present ship strength of the Chinese Communist Navy (CCN) includes 28 submarines, 4 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, and about 250 smaller craft. Personnel strength is estimated at 76,500, including 14,500 in the naval air force. The CCN is principally a coastal defense force, however, with only limited capability for offensive operations. It has been strongly influenced by Soviet naval concepts.

12. *Organization.* Administrative and operational control over the naval forces is exercised through the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Orders from the Minister of National Defense are passed to the Commander-in-Chief of the CCN via the General Staff for information and coordination.

13. Chinese Communist Naval Headquarters are located in Peiping. The CCN is comprised of three major fleets: North Sea Fleet with headquarters in Tsingtao, East Sea Fleet with headquarters in Shanghai, and South Sea Fleet with headquarters in Chan Chiang (Fort Bayard). The North Sea Fleet is the major Chinese fleet and includes most of the major combatant ships in the CCN. Submarines currently operate only in the North and East Sea Fleets.

14. *Naval Air.* The Chinese Communist Naval Air Force (CCNAF) fighter regiments, charged with the protection of Chinese territorial waters, are administratively controlled by CCNAF headquarters at Peiping through the fleet headquarters. In their air defense role fighter units are operationally controlled by the Air Defense Command (ADC) of the CCAF. The bomber regiments are controlled by the fleet headquarters.

15. The CCNAF includes 9 fighter regiments (30 MIG-15/17 each) and 6 jet light bomber regiments (20 IL-28 each).

16. We believe the CCNAF is developing a torpedo attack capability with its IL-28 bombers. Recent intelligence indicates that some CCNAF fighter regiments are being equipped with MIG-19 aircraft.

C. Air Force

17. *Organization.* The largest active operational unit in the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) is the Air Division, with each division consisting of 2 to 3 regiments. The CCAF has a total of some 66 regiments including 51 fighter regiments (MIG-15/17/19/21), 3 attack regiments (MIG-15/IL-10), 9 jet light bomber regiments (IL-28), 2 prop light bomber regiments (TU-2), and 1 prop medium bomber regiment (TU-4). (See Table 2 for aircraft totals by type.)

18. *Strength.* The strength of both bomber and fighter units has been gradually reduced during the past few years. IL-28 regiments, originally consisting of about 30 aircraft each, now are believed to possess only about 18 aircraft per unit. Fighter regiments, with a previous strength of 32, have also been reduced due to attrition, and we believe now have no more than 25 aircraft.

19. *Air Defense.* The Air Defense Command (ADC) is the only major command in the Communist Chinese Air Force. For air defense purposes, both CCAF and CCNAF fighters are controlled by the ADC through its seven, possibly eight air defense districts. These districts are further subdivided into zones and sectors. Less than 10 percent of the fighter force is equipped for limited all-weather intercept. Acquisition of the few MIG-21s has no doubt improved the morale of the CCAF and enhanced its capabilities for reaction against reconnaissance overflights.

20. *Deployment.* The preponderance of jet fighter strength is deployed in the areas within about 300 n.m. of the coast and the boundaries with North Korea and Southeast Asia. The recent augmentation of South/Southwest China air defenses was the first major fighter redeployment in several years.

21. *Bomber Force.* Attrition is taking an increasing toll of the jet light bomber force and has already reduced the original force of some 450 to its present strength of about 270. Although IL-28 pilots are probably able to maintain only minimum proficiency, the fact that many pilots have been flying these same aircraft for up to 10 years would probably provide the bomber force with sufficient experience to conduct day medium altitude bombing missions. The night and radar capability of most crews are probably marginal. The 12 or so TU-4s and the 2 TU-16s are the only aircraft currently in the CCAF capable of carrying the bulky nuclear weapon which the Chinese may now be able to produce.

TABLE 1

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NAVAL UNITS [a]

Type	Total
PRINCIPAL COMBATANT:	
Old Destroyer (ODD)	4
Destroyer Escort (DE)	4
Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSB)	1
Submarine (SS)	28[a]
PATROL:	
Patrol Escort (PF)	9
Old Patrol Escort (OPF)	5
Old Radar Picket Patrol Escort (AGRL)	1
Submarine Chaser (PC)	24
Large Guided Missile Patrol Boat (PTFG)	1
Fast Patrol Boat (PTF)	12
Small Guided Missile Patrol Boat (PTG)	1
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT)	155
Motor Gunboat (PGM)	44
Old Motor Gunboat (OPGM)	3
MINE WARFARE:	
Minesweeper, Fleet (MSF)	14
Minesweeper, Coastal (MSC)	1
Minesweeper, Coastal (Old) (MSC (O))	4
Minesweeper, Auxiliary (MSA)	20
AMPHIBIOUS:	
Tank Landing Ship (LST)	20 (8)[b]
Medium Landing Ship (LSM)	13 (11)[b]
Landing Ship Infantry (LSIL)	16
Utility Landing Craft (LCU)	10
Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM)	200
AUXILIARIES:	
Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AG)	35
Light Cargo Ship (AKL)	8
Net Laying Ship (AN)	6
Oiler (AO)	4
Landing Craft Repair Ship (ARL)	1
Auxiliary Ocean Tug (ATA)	6
SERVICE CRAFT (various types)	380

[a] Includes 21 W-class, 3 M-V class, and 4 S-1 class.

[b] Numbers in parentheses are additional units in merchant service.

TABLE 2

ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT

Aircraft Type	CCAF	CCNAF	Total
Fighter	1,543	270	1,813
MIG-15/FAGOT	534	155	689[a]
MIG-17/FRESCO	747	75	822[a]
MIG-17D/FRESCO D	97	20	117
MIG-19/FARMER	130	20	150
MIG-21/FISHBED	35	0	35
Attack	98	0	98
IL-10/BEAST	60	0	60
MIG-15/FAGOT	38	0	38
Bomber	246	128	374
TU-2/BAT	80	10	90
IL-28/BEAGLE	151	118	269
TU-4/BULL	13	0	13
TU-16/BADGER	2	0	2
Transport	232	54	286
Medium	6	0	6
Light	148	15	163
Small	78	39	117
Reconnaissance	0	6	6
BE-6/MADGE	0	6	6
Helicopter	18	0	18
MI-4/HOUND	18	0	18
TOTAL (ALL TYPES)	2,137	458	2,595

[a] Does not include 35 MIG-15/MIG-17 aircraft at Phuc Yen in North Vietnam.


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HEILUNGKIANG
KIRIN
LIAONING
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TIENTSIN
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HUPEH
SZECHWAN
TIBET
TSINGHAI
YUNNAN
KWEICHOW
HUNAN
KIANGSI
FUKIEN
KWANGTUNG
KWANGSI CHUANG AUTONOMOUS REGION
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
NEPAL
KATMANDU
BHUTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
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

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

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

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