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# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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## GUYANA

### SUBVERSION and INSURGENCY

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
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
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## *Subversion and Insurgency*

### **A. General** [redacted]

Guyana, an independent nation since only 1966, has inherited from its colonial period a number of problems which lend themselves to exploitation by subversive and potentially insurgent elements as a means of weakening the country's political and social structure.

In the view of the government, the most important of these problems is the attempt by Venezuela to assert its long-standing claim to all territory west of the Essequibo River—some five-eighths of Guyana's land area—by trying to subvert the small groups of Amerindians in the area and by exploiting the separatist tendencies of the white ranchers living in the remote southwestern border region. Far removed from the center of government in Georgetown, and little touched by its decrees, the ranchers and the Amerindians lack a sense of loyalty toward or identification with the central government. In addition, the ranchers are distrustful of the government and its intentions, particularly because of its reluctance to give the ranchers clear title to the land they occupy. The primitive Amerindians, the indigenous inhabitants of Guyana, who cling to a traditional way of life, are an isolated, largely apolitical, remnant on the fringes of Guyanese society.

The other threat facing Guyana is internal and has its roots in the deep distrust and suspicion which have historically divided the country's two dominant racial groups—the Negroes and the East Indians. The dispute is essentially political and economic, and focuses on such basic issues as which group will wield political power and which will have preferred access to the limited number of employment opportunities. By the time Guyana achieved independence there had developed what is essentially a two-party system polarized along racial lines. The black community has come to be represented by the People's National Congress (PNC) led by Prime Minister Linden Forbes Burnham, and the great majority of East Indians have supported the People's Progressive Party (PPP), a Marxist-oriented party formed by Cheddi Jagan and his American-born wife. The PPP leadership, frustrated by its failure to gain control of the government despite the party's electoral strength, has been under pressure by extremists in its ranks to raise the banner of revolution, employ terrorism, resort to strikes, economic boycotts and similar tactics as a means of gaining such control. There is, how-

ever, widespread disagreement within the PPP over the wisdom of such tactics, perhaps reflecting the indecision of the Jagans themselves as to whether the party should seek to govern through the existing machinery or lead a revolution. Furthermore, all political factions recognize that serious disorders and other domestic turmoil might only encourage Venezuela to assert its territorial claims more vigorously.

In addition to these immediate threats, the Government of Guyana faces the pressing problem of trying to meet the expectations of its citizens for improved levels of living by trying to accelerate economic development of the country. This must be accomplished in the face of such handicaps as a narrow resource base, a shortage of investment capital, and a lack of skilled manpower. At the present time a majority of Guyanese appear to support the Burnham government's middle-of-the-road economic program, but popular attitudes could change markedly if there is not substantial progress made toward solving chronic problems such as unemployment and a shortage of housing.

Despite the potential for political, social and economic instability, extremist elements enjoy little influence at present, either within the 2 major political parties or in the country as a whole. There are, to be sure, small groups of extremists—ranging from factions receiving support from Communist China to Black Power advocates—but they are ineffectual and do not present a direct threat to the established democratic order. This is due in part to the conciliatory policies of the Burnham government, which have served to prevent a recurrence of the 1962-64 civil strife and to lower the level of racial and political tensions. Both the blacks and the East Indians now recognize that establishment of reasonably harmonious race relations is essential, [redacted]

[redacted] An equally compelling reason is that the PPP's capacity to mount guerrilla operations is virtually nonexistent, even when allowing for less than a high degree of operational efficiency on the part of Guyana's police and defense forces.

### **B. Basic vulnerabilities and strengths**

#### **1. Geographic** [redacted]

Guyana is a sparsely populated country, for the most part made up of hot, humid, coastal plains and forested plains and highlands which would present both advantages and handicaps to operations by guerrilla forces. Considered from the standpoint of

differences in terrain, Guyana is divided into three geographic regions—Wet Coastal Plains, Forest Plains and Highlands, and Southwestern Savanna.

The Wet Coastal Plains, with about 5% of the total land area, contain about 90% of the population (see Orientation Map, Figure 5). About half of this region, the area northwest of the Essequibo River, is fairly well suited for irregular force operations because there is sufficient vegetation for concealment. In addition, the paucity of surface transportation routes and the extreme difficulty or impossibility of vehicular cross-country movement would render the activities of irregular forces difficult to detect and combat by conventional forces. By contrast, the southeastern half contains the most extensive road network, as well as the densest population in the country. In most of the region, movement by small groups of irregular force personnel on foot would be feasible but would be arduous because of dense vegetation or periodically wet, miry ground. Movement of such groups in the populated southeast would be hampered by the extensive net of major and minor irrigation canals which crisscross that region.

Small bands of irregulars generally could obtain basic sustenance by exploiting local resources. Cultivated food crops, particularly rice, would be available in much of the southeast; natural sources and local areas of subsistence agriculture could be utilized elsewhere. Other supplies, such as clothing, arms, and ammunition, would be unavailable except for limited quantities from the larger settlements in the southeast. Irregular forces operating in this region would be subject to several adverse physiological and psychological conditions, the most severe of which are the almost continually high temperature and humidity and the numerous poisonous reptiles and disease-carrying insects. Border crossings would be easy, and could be accomplished with little chance of detection along the forested border with Venezuela, but would be difficult across the wide, unfordable Courantyne River forming the boundary with Surinam.

The Forested Plains and Highlands, comprising nearly 90% of the country, are covered almost completely by dense forest. In general, the region is sparsely populated and there are very few roads and only 2 short railroads. Large areas are accessible only by air or river travel. Most of this region is well suited to guerrilla operations. The predominantly dense vegetative cover would afford excellent concealment from both air and ground observation and provide limited cover from small arms fire as well. Although the dense vegetation and rough terrain would restrict irregular forces to movement on foot, these factors would hamper or even preclude operations by conventional ground, airmobile, and airborne forces. In general, fresh water, food from natural and cultivated sources, and timber for fuel and shelter construction are available; however, supplies

of clothing, arms, and ammunition would be difficult to obtain within the region. Supply by air from outside would be feasible by utilizing the scattered cleared areas. Conditions that could cause adverse physiological and psychological effects on irregular forces are similar to those prevalent in the Wet Coastal Plains. The international boundaries of this region are either forested or along forest-lined streams, are inadequately patrolled, and could be crossed by small groups with little chance of detection.

The Southwestern Savanna region is largely made up of flat to rolling plains except in the north, where plateau-like hills cut by deeply incised stream valleys are predominant. Scattered small groups of native engaged in subsistence agriculture and the inhabitants of a few cattle ranches comprise the region's sparse population. For the most part, the surface transportation network consists of a few dry-weather roads and tracks. Although the major streams are deeply incised and seldom overflow their banks, lakes and ponds develop in hollows and smaller tributary streams periodically flood extensive areas.

Conditions for irregular force operations are unfavorable in most of the Southwestern Savanna region. The main determinants are the general lack of sufficient vegetation for concealment from air observation and the overall suitability of the region for conventional military operations. Moreover, personnel would have to contend with wet, miry ground and extensive flooding at times during the wet season May through August, and a scarcity of fresh drinking water the rest of the year. Although irregular force activities would be possible in parts of the north, they would be restricted to the forested areas, most common on the steeper slopes and in incised stream valleys.

## 2. Social

Despite its physical compactness, Guyanese society has been having great difficulty in assimilating and integrating its various racial or ethnic groups, which have largely preserved distinctive social mores, religions, customs, and even habits of work. This population mélange is made up of half a dozen principal elements, plus several distinctive racial mixtures, that Guyana is often styled the "land of six peoples." Distinguishable elements include the East Indians, the Negroes and part Negroes; and British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Amerindian minorities.

The most distinctive feature of Guyanese society is the deep division between its 2 largest racial groups—the East Indians (more than 50% of the population) and the Negroes and mixed Negroes (about 44%). Latent antagonisms surfaced in the last 2 decades in increasing competition for scarce jobs and, in the early 1960's, in politically inspired racial riots. The racial conflict has caused many deaths, has left the people with a profound sense of insecurity, and has prevented the development of a unified nation.

As are most other aspects of Guyanese life, the stratification of the society and the current sociopolitical change are based primarily on ethnic origin. Absence of control by a European power for several centuries before independence created, at the top of the social structure, a small white group, which formed the upper levels of government and business. Only a small fraction of the population, this group consisted mostly of expatriates who would eventually return to the mother country. The children of the elite generally went to the mother country either for their education or upon reaching maturity, and usually often even when born in the colony) settled there afterwards. With the exception of a few U.S. citizens and Canadians who came to the country as senior officials of mining management after World War II, the dominant social group has been almost exclusively British for over a century and a half. This group is not homogeneous, for it includes a wide range of occupations (from managing director to sugar plantation overseer) and pronounced educational differences. Since independence, the predominance and exclusiveness of this elite has been reduced. People of other ethnic groups, who have achieved prominence in business, the professions, or high public office, now have access to the top social level.

The middle level of the social structure is extensive, extremely heterogeneous, and subdivided into several segments according to ethnic origins. Whatever the segment, access to this level is gained only by education, white-collar job, or wealth. The ability to speak good English (rather than the distorted versions used at the lower social level) is a prerequisite for membership. At the top of this middle group are the Portuguese, who, although white and European (or European-descended), had intermarried with the non-Europeans and who were never admitted to the upper level group. The Portuguese were indentured plantation laborers who originally came to the colony (mostly from the island of Madeira) during the latter part of the 19th century and early part of the 20th. They soon moved from the plantations to the towns, where many became merchants, and, in succeeding generations, politicians. The Portuguese have adopted British ways, speech, and culture and have become the top stratum of the middle-level group. This stratum also includes a number of prominent Africans and persons of other ethnic groups. In fact, since independence (1966) the number of lesser professionals, merchants, and public officials from all ethnic groups ascending to the top middle level has been on the increase.

In spite of the social stratification, all levels of society may mix at public functions and in private, and a thrust toward social integration of the middle and

upper levels is evident. Social mobility has increased in the last few years, and nationhood, with its attendant Guyanization of the governmental and managerial echelons which form the upper class, has brought a degree of fluidity to the society which is certain to alter its structure. The ethnic pattern of the social structure has remained sharp, however, and there are no strong occupational, associational, or class loyalties which effectively cut across racial lines and firmly unite the Negroes and the East Indians.

The nearly 100 years of compulsory primary schooling since 1876 have made the Guyanese keenly aware of the importance of education. As a result, the government spends more on education than on any other single item—12.7% of total public spending in 1966—and the officially reported literacy rate—one of the highest in South America—has risen from 76% of the population, aged 15 and over in 1946, to about 86% in 1967. (The actual literacy rate, however, may be somewhat lower, since many children in rural areas tend to lose their reading skills after leaving school.) Despite this progress, the government's efforts are still inadequate, especially in the face of a rapidly growing population. In 1960 only 10.9% of the population had received training beyond the primary level, only 3.4% had completed the secondary cycle, and only 0.4% (or 1,126 persons) held a university degree. Throughout the country, schools are overcrowded, ill equipped, and poorly staffed, and they are not providing the skills most needed for a developing economy. Although increased vocational and technical training is recognized by the government as essential to economic development, popular attitudes are changing only slowly, and most Guyanese still aspire to see their children receive an academic education if at all possible. In early 1968 the Minister of Education recommended to the National Assembly numerous changes in the educational system, but full implementation of the proposals—some of which are discussed below—may be delayed many years by the shortage of funds, the need to retrain teachers, and inertia in the government and among the teachers.

Another important problem in the educational system is the friction created by the imposition of British and Christian cultural standards upon East Indians. A large proportion of both secondary and primary schools are operated by Christian denominations. East Indian parents are concerned that their children will have to abandon their cultural identity in order to get along in school. They feel East Indian children are discriminated against in the system. Also, East Indian teachers are faced with the anomaly of having to teach a culture not their own, and in many instances have to become Christians in order to obtain a job or a promotion. Some Hindu and Muslim schools have been established, but they are still in-

adequate to meet the needs of the East Indian population. Sometimes referred to as "mushroom schools," these often can be attended only after normal school hours. The government has taken some steps to eliminate discrimination within the school system, to secularize denominational schools, to create more government schools, and to give more aid to Hindu and Muslim schools. It will be some time, however, before such educational reforms will be extensive enough to benefit all the East Indian school-age population.

The birth rate has remained at a high level for many years; as a result the population has a very large proportion of children. In 1960, for example, more than 46% of the population was less than 15 years of age. The death rate, meanwhile, has declined sharply, and it is this reduction in mortality that has initiated a rapidly rising rate of population growth. Emigration to the United Kingdom, which lowered Guyana's growth from a potential 3.3% per annum to 2.7% during the 1960's, has been severely curtailed because of the political and social problems it created in both the United Kingdom and Guyana. If the birth rate remains at its present high level while the death rate continues to decline, and there is no large increase in the volume of emigration, the population will more than double during the 20 years between 1969 and 1989. Such rapid growth can be expected to complicate the problem of improving the economic and social well-being of the Guyanese. The pressure of population on developed resources will be more intense, the number of dependent children in the population will increase, and the already much-needed investment capital will probably become even more difficult to obtain.

Despite charges by both Jagan and Burnham that racial prejudices have hampered government programs, the civil service, which is approximately 65% Negro and 35% East Indian, has generally maintained a professional nonpolitical status, approximating the British tradition. Relations between members of the 2 races have generally been good on purely civil service issues, and a fairly high esprit de corps has been maintained. The major problem of the bureaucracy has not been nepotism, partisanship, or disloyalty, but rather a low level of administrative and technical competence due to inadequate education, training, and experience.

### 3. Political

In spite of efforts made in the early 1950's to build a national multiracial party, not even the rallying cry of independence and anticolonialism proved strong enough to overcome the suspicion and distrust which have historically divided the Negro and East Indian communities. Since 1957 the country has developed

what is substantially a two-party system polarized along racial lines. The Negro community has come to be represented by the People's National Congress (PNC) led by Burnham, while the great majority of the East Indians have supported the People's Progressive Party (PPP) led by Jagan. Together these two parties have never polled less than 84% of the vote—in 1968 about 92%.

A third party, the United Force (UF), led by Marcellus Feilden Singh, has drawn its major support from the white community—particularly the Portuguese. This party has also attracted substantial Amerindian support and, in addition, has had appeal to those East Indians who did not approve of Jagan but who would not vote for Burnham.

To the problem of racial division is added the equally serious matter of ideological cleavage. Thus, while Burnham is a moderate socialist, Jagan is an avowed Marxist-Leninist who in June 1969 publicly proclaimed his adherence to the world Communist movement and his allegiance to Moscow. He has long advocated the radicalization of Guyana's political and economic system and an abrupt turn toward a pro-Soviet position in foreign policy. In his 2 previous attempts at governing, however, Jagan was largely frustrated by the reserve powers of the then British Governor. In Jagan's first attempt, after the PPP had won the 1953 election, his pro-Communist pronouncements so alarmed the British that they suspended the constitution and sent in troops. During his second effort (1961-64), the colony was rocked by bloody rioting and general strikes, occasioned mainly by his policies, especially that of state control of trade unions. Since then, there has been no recurrence of any comparable disorder.

### 4. Economic

Guyana has experienced considerable economic growth since 1946, but it continues to be a poor nation in which a large proportion of the people live at little more than subsistence levels. An accelerating population growth, which dates from the eradication of malaria in the early postwar period, has, in large measure, offset economic gains. Because of the rugged nature of its terrain (more than 80% of the country consists of dense, almost impenetrable tropical rain forest), only 13% of the total area is used for agricultural purposes, and the pressure of population on developed agricultural resources is very great, especially in the densely settled coastal area where 90% of the population lives.

Guyana's economy is dominated by 3 export commodities—sugar, rice, and bauxite—and manufacturing is limited largely to the processing of these products. As a share of GDP, mining increased from about 13% in 1961 to almost 19% in 1968, largely because of expansion programs in the foreign-owned bauxite in-

dustry. Moreover, the amount of bauxite converted into alumina and exported to aluminum producers more than doubled between 1961 and 1968. In the latter year bauxite and alumina exports contributed 43% of total commodity earnings.

Foreign trade is vital to the economy. During the 1960's, exports averaged the equivalent of almost 57% of GDP—one of the world's highest percentages—while imports averaged 54%. Because of increased production and a rising trend in export prices, the total value of exports grew fairly rapidly during the 1960's. Guyana, however, is highly dependent on imports for capital goods, industrial materials, and many consumer goods; and the increase in production, investment, and per capita income since 1964 has been accompanied by an even more rapid increase in imports.

During the 1960's, agriculture's share of GDP declined despite government efforts to diversify and expand production. Although progress has been made in increasing the output of less traditional food crops and livestock products, total agricultural production has shown little growth.

Continued economic progress appears to depend on further export expansion, based almost entirely on bauxite mining and agricultural production. Profitable exploitation of any additional mineral wealth, which a geological survey now in progress may report, will be inhibited by lack of adequate transportation. Guyana's large hydroelectric potential provides another development possibility but one that depends on the availability of external capital. Probably the most important factor in attracting investment, and thus in overall development, is the maintenance of political stability.

Government economic policy is designed primarily to speed economic development by encouraging private investment and by improving the country's infrastructure. It is also designed to solidify the political position of the PNC, the party which won the 1968 election and that is headed by Prime Minister Burnham. The government owns and operates 2 of the rice mills and other agricultural processing facilities, about one-half of the electric power generating capacity, various telecommunications facilities, and the national airline. It also exercises indirect control through price supports, marketing operations, and foreign trade regulations. To carry out its development policy, the government has, with external help, funded various agricultural and industrial incentive schemes to stimulate private investment. It has also financed a public investment program to expand the economy's inadequate network of transportation and communications.

The government's development policy is based on the Seven Year Development Plan, covering 1966-72,

which was drawn up at the end of 1965. Almost half the investment expenditure proposed under the original plan was earmarked for agriculture and transportation (mostly roads), about 30% for health and other social services, and the remainder for seawalls to protect cultivated land, for hydroelectric power development, and for direct investment in industrial projects, communications, and education. This plan was reviewed by an International Bank for Resources and Development (IBRD) study group in 1966 and revised by the government in 1969. Although the revised plan is more concrete than the original document, actual investments still are dictated mainly by the availability of foreign and domestic financing, and by local political considerations. The plan calls for annual public investment of about G\$43 million and anticipated private investments of some G\$60-\$80 million annually (US\$1.00=G\$2.00 since 1967; earlier the rate was US\$1.00=G\$1.70). Private investment rose to G\$65 million in 1966 and G\$83 million in 1967 but fell to G\$58 million in 1968 as a result of completion of some projects in the bauxite industry. Actual public investment expenditures have risen sharply since 1965, but averaged only about G\$28 million annually during 1966-68.

Guyana has managed to hold prices fairly stable. The cost of living increase has averaged slightly under 3% a year since 1964. Despite pressure from the highly unionized work force, money wages have increased at only a moderate rate in most sectors. These raises have averaged about 5% annually since 1964, thus resulting in a small increase in real wages. Since imports supply more than half of all goods sold in Guyana, much of the increase in the cost of living has been due to increases in the prices of imports.

Unemployment has remained high for the past 15 years, in spite of the steady growth of the economy. The unemployed represented between 15% and 20% of the labor force at the end of 1967, as against 18% in 1956. At the root of this persistent unemployment problem has been the steady progress of mechanization in agriculture. A contributory factor has been the growing dislike for agricultural pursuits on the part of new arrivals into the rural labor force, which causes them to remain idle in hopes of finding employment in other branches of the economy.

Analysis of the labor force by length of time worked during the year shows that underemployment is a serious problem. In addition to the many who held only part-time or occasional jobs, there were many whose occupations required only a minimum amount of time or whose full potential was not utilized. Only about one-half of the employed were fully employed (defined as those who worked at least 10 months a year). The government is endeavoring to increase employment. To cut the rate of unemployment



in half (to 10% of the workers) by 1972, however, employment would have to increase at a rate 4 times higher than at present.

##### 5. Security forces

The Guyana Police Force, established in 1839, is charged with responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, the prevention and detection of crime, the repression of internal disturbances, the protection of property, and the apprehension of offenders.

From 1891—when it was converted into a quasi-military force forming part of the overall defense forces of the then British colony—until independence in May 1966 it had a dual status. With independence, basic responsibility for military defense was entrusted to a newly created Guyana Defense Force (GDF). The Police Force still maintains a limited paramilitary capability and could be called upon in times of emergency to supplement the GDF.

The Police Force, headed by the Commissioner of Police, is organized on a geographical basis into 7 lettered divisions and a headquarters at Timehri Airport near Georgetown. The Commissioner is responsible to the Minister of Home Affairs for administrative matters. During a state of emergency, the force comes directly under the Prime Minister for operational control. Under both normal and emergency conditions, the force is expected to work closely with the GDF, and joint operations have been held to facilitate this cooperation, which, however, is somewhat inadequate.

The Police Force is assisted by 3 part-time auxiliary organizations: the Special Constabulary, a reserve organization which comes on active duty to assist with special situations such as elections; the Rural Constabulary, which serves as process servers in rural areas and as mine guards; and the Supernumerary Constables, who are employed as guards for the private firms and government departments which pay them. The constables wear police uniforms, are given several weeks of police training, and are subject to police discipline, but they are normally unarmed and are never called for regular police duty.

The Police Force consists of approximately 2,200 men. One-third are concentrated in the Georgetown-Timehri Airport area, the country's principal population center and strategic area, where civil disturbances are most likely to occur. The other personnel are located throughout the country in units varying from company size down to 2- and 3-man detachments in the interior villages.

The force's principal strengths include experience in riot control and adequate arms and communications equipment. Since independence, the British have continued to provide general police training for officers. In addition, U.S. assistance is provided through the

AID Public Safety Program. Lack of sufficient training, inadequate transport, and geographic dispersal of personnel would, however, limit the effectiveness of the force as a military auxiliary. The morale of the force has been high, particularly in the lower ranks. Some of the senior officers have, however, been unhappy over the intrusion of political factors into promotion policy resulting from Burnham's lack of confidence in the leadership of the force and his determination to ensure its political reliability. Although Burnham has publicly agreed to the principle of racial balance on the force, and some steps have been taken to promote it, the force is still mainly Negro. Nevertheless, it has generally acted impartially.

The Guyana Defense Force was organized and trained by the British, who, until late 1968, also provided several staff officers as well as the commander. Although the last British officer departed in March 1969, British military organization and tradition, including the practice of avoiding active involvement in politics, remain firmly established. The leaders of the GDF—Col. Clarence Price, GDF commander, and the 2 battalion commanders, Lt. Col. Martindale (also deputy to Price) and Lt. Col. Robert Stevenson—and the company commanders are considered to have no political ambitions.

The GDF, like the Police Force, is heavily Negro in its racial composition, with blacks accounting for some 70% of the 1,300 men and 500 reservists presently in its ranks. Prior to 1969, when Venezuela began to assert its claims to Guyanese territory more vigorously, the Burnham government had sought to follow through on its plans to achieve racial balance in the GDF by recruiting additional East Indians. This goal appears to have been abandoned—at least temporarily—in the belief that it did not further the government's goal of an "absolutely dependable military" for protection against Venezuela. The government instead adopted a modified policy of encouraging the recruitment of individuals best qualified for service in the force regardless of racial background but with tight security checks on all inductees, especially East Indians. This policy, along with the tendency of the blacks to be attracted to a military career and to adapt more readily to its demands, will tend to perpetuate the racial imbalance in the defense force.

The combined Defense Force-Police Force is capable of controlling internal incidents short of racial disorders approximating civil war. Widespread civil strife could be suppressed only with outside reinforcement of security forces. Flexibility is limited by a lack of cross-country mobility because of the shortage of trucks, aircraft, and amphibious vehicles.

#### 6. Foreign affairs

The government's concern about subversion relates primarily to the threat posed by Venezuela's attempts to advance its claim to all Guyanese territory west of the Essequibo River by subverting the Amerindian population there and inciting them to aid the separatist tendencies of a small number of white ranchers in the area.

The Venezuelan claim to the 55,000 square miles west of the Essequibo River (Figure 1) is based on the contention that an international arbitration tribunal award in 1899 was biased through bribery by

the British of the Russian chairman. The issue remained relatively quiet until the late 1960's. In February 1966, as final preparations were under way for Guyana's independence, the U.K., British Guiana, and Venezuelan Governments agreed to the establishment of the Venezuelan-Guyanese Mixed Commission to discuss disputes arising out of Venezuelan claims. The commission has had no success, and Venezuela has since provoked several incidents, including the 1966 seizure of Ankoko Island, a tiny border island, half of which is claimed by Guyana.

Since 1967 Venezuela has conducted a semiclandestine campaign to subvert the Amerindians, and it encouraged an abortive uprising in January 1969 of white ranchers in the Rupununi District. Although the Burnham government has spoken out sharply against the rebels and their foreign supporters, it has avoided making a *cause célèbre* of the issue. Instead it has sought, within its limited resources, to strengthen the armed forces and to improve the capability of forces in the border area. Guyana has not yet formally brought the dispute before the United Nations, but it might do so if Venezuelan pressure continues.

Guyana also has a border dispute with Surinam which has become an impediment to cooperation between the 2 countries. The difficulty stems from a difference of opinion over which tributary of the Courantyne River should be the boundary and involves some 6,000 square miles of territory. A treaty negotiated in 1939 between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which would have resolved the issue, was never signed because of World War II. This treaty, which found in favor of the United Kingdom, established the boundary substantially as it is today. A controversy also exists concerning offshore oil deposits which may exist at the mouth of the Courantyne. Neither issue had been settled at the time of Guyana's independence, and the situation remained relatively quiescent until December 1967, when elements of the Guyana Police Force ejected a Surinam hydrographic team from the contested area. A showdown appeared in view when Surinam established several police posts in the disputed area and Burnham ordered Guyanese military forces to move against the Surinamese police. The situation eased after the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands urged restraint. Another flareup occurred in August 1969 when the Guyanese seized a Surinamese police outpost in the disputed area. Prime Minister Burnham has indicated that he would be willing to submit the dispute to the World Court and that he is ready for talks to begin. The dispute has become entwined in the local politics of both countries, however, and a final settlement will be difficult to achieve.



## C. Primary active discontents

### 1. Amerindians and white ranchers

For much of the past decade Venezuelan governments have actively reasserted their territorial claim to the Essequibo area, and Venezuela has also undertaken a semiclandestine campaign to win the loyalty of the Guyanese Amerindians, especially those living near the disputed border. This led to the expulsion of a Venezuelan diplomat in early 1967, but efforts to persuade the Amerindians that they could expect better treatment from Venezuela have continued. Venezuela has helped to establish, finance, and direct a small but now discredited Amerindian political party—the Guyana National Party (GNP). It has also distributed free books, food, and other gifts; tried to teach the Amerindians Spanish; extended invitations for them to visit Venezuela; and given paramilitary training to several hundred. Although, as yet, little has been accomplished, these efforts have been aided by the fact that the Amerindians do not recognize national boundaries and customarily migrate between the 2 countries.

Tensions heightened in January 1969 when a small-scale insurrection broke out in the southwestern area known as the Rupununi District, inhabited by Amerindians and a small group of cattle ranchers of mixed Scottish and U.S. origin. These independent-minded ranchers, fearing a challenge from the government in Georgetown concerning land to which they have no title, have always tended to have separatist leanings. After receiving Venezuelan encouragement, training, and arms, the ranchers and some of their Amerindian employees, who were for the most part pawns, launched a surprise attack and momentarily seized the town of Lethem, the administrative center of the Rupununi District. Elements of the GDF, however, were quickly flown to the area, where they routed the rebels and razed their ranches. Most of the ranchers and some Amerindians fled to Brazil and Venezuela. Venezuela denied Guyanese charges of responsibility and did not respond to rebel calls for help. It did, however, give them hospitality and financial aid.

Guyanese policymakers are concerned about the Amerindians, among whom there are various tribal groupings with profound diversities in culture and social organization, but who nonetheless tend to act politically as one element. Although composing less than 5% of the population, they are a pawn in the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute. In addition, given the narrow balance of Guyanese politics, the Amerindian vote of about 10,000 assumes considerable significance. While in the past the United Force (UF) has had the greatest success in attracting their vote, both the PPP and the PNC have been increasingly seeking it. Pursuant to a decision made at the 1965 Constitutional Conference in London that Amerindians should be granted legal ownership or rights of occupancy in

areas where they are ordinarily resident, an Amerindian Lands Commission was set up to investigate and recommend the awarding of such lands to individuals, families, village councils, or tribal groups. The commission is to recommend limits on the amount of land to be assigned to an individual or tribe, whether such title will include subsoil rights, and how subsequent sales should be regulated, in order to protect the less sophisticated Amerindians from unprincipled land speculators. The study has been completed, but its nature and the likely degree of governmental acceptance of the commission's recommendations are not yet clear.

In general, the government's policy is to improve the Amerindians' material and social welfare and integrate them more fully into Guyanese society. In part, the implementation of this policy has suffered from administrative deficiencies and—in the 1964-68 period—from differences of opinion within the parties of the governing coalition. Thus, while the UF leadership has upheld the rights of the Amerindians as the original inhabitants, leaders of the PNC have tended to consider Negro rights foremost; Burnham also has considered settling the interior with Negroes from the eastern Caribbean islands. While the UF opposition supports the Amerindian claim to all the lands they have traditionally occupied, including mineral rights, Burnham and the PNC have tended to prefer a legalistic interpretation that the interior is all Crown land. Under such an interpretation the Amerindians would own only that to which they have been granted title by the Crown, and few such grants have been made.

The Burnham administration has yet to reconcile its advocacy of the integration of the Amerindian community into the larger Guyanese society with the Amerindians' determination to remain on large reservations specifically designed to sustain a purely Amerindian way of life (Figure 2). The Amerindian question is tied to the larger problem of settling and developing the interior which includes the questions of how many settlers to admit, and at what speed, and on what terms they should acquire land. Government



FIGURE 2. Amerindian village in the interior

policy on these issues has not yet been formulated, so that the development of a coherent Amerindian policy is impeded.

## 2. Jagan and his followers

As long as the PPP limits its opposition to non-violent means and its struggle for power to electoral channels no serious threat to stability is likely to arise. The PPP draws its principal support from the large East Indian community, most of whom are not Communist. The top leadership of the party, however, invariably follows a pro-Communist line and Jagan has publicly proclaimed his allegiance to Moscow. After 1953 the leadership was buoyed by the PPP's emergence as the country's largest party. It has been further encouraged by the numerical predominance of the faster growing East Indian community. The party leadership therefore has been disposed to follow the electoral path to power. It has, however, become increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of achieving power by peaceful means, and increasingly suspicious that Burnham would neither conduct honest elections nor surrender power to a duly elected PPP government. The party has charged that the British delayed granting the colony independence, and altered the electoral system, in order to ensure that the PPP would not be in power at the time of independence. They contend further that Burnham, following this same kind of policy, prevented a PPP victory in the 1968 election and, indeed, caused the party to fall below the PNC in electoral strength. They accuse him of manipulating the electoral regulations and rigging the election. The PPP's own dispirited campaign in 1968, however and Jagan's cynical attitude that it could not win were objective factors which contributed to the poor showing.

This growing frustration in the PPP may increase the temptation to initiate a program of armed struggle, which Jagan has stated is historically inevitable for Guyana. There are no indications, however, that the party has made any plans to take such a course of action. The party's capacity to mount guerrilla operations is extremely limited.

## D. Communist-inspired subversion

There is no Communist party per se in the country, but Cheddi Jagan's PPP is led by Communists and maintains ties with the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the United Kingdom and with other foreign groups and individuals. Jagan, in a speech at the Moscow meeting of world Communist parties in June 1969, openly enrolled the PPP in the



FIGURE 3. Cheddi and Janet Jagan

“ideological family” of Communist parties. He announced his determination to mold the PPP into a more disciplined Marxist-Leninist party and to revamp the party's organizational structure along the lines of the Soviet party.

Neither Latin American nor Soviet Communists, however, have shown an interest in encouraging, directing, or funding a revolutionary effort in Guyana. Although the PPP is Communist led and has proclaimed a Marxist ideology, it is not considered a Communist party by most of its membership. Of the PPP's estimated 26,000 members and supporters, only about 100 are believed to be hard-core Communists. The rank and file of the PPP, which consists mainly of East Indians, understands little concerning Marxist ideology and has supported Jagan in past elections mainly for racial reasons and because of Jagan's personal charisma.

The PPP, the oldest party, traces its lineage to the Political Affairs Committee, the first significant political organization founded in British Guiana. This Marxist-oriented political education group was formed in 1946 by Cheddi Jagan and his American wife, Janet (née Rosenberg) (Figure 3), whom he met in 1943 when he was a dental student in Chicago and she was a student nurse active in leftist circles and

In order to give his group a mass power base, Jagan became active in promoting the cause of the sugar workers, and, with their support, was elected to the Legislative Council in 1947. In January 1950, with the help of Forbes Burnham, president of the British Guiana Labor Union, Jagan founded the PPP. Its program of immediate reform, its ability to unite the rural East Indians and the urban working class Negroes, and the organizational talents of Janet Jagan soon made it the most powerful political force in the colony. Until 1968, the party consistently received a plurality of the electoral vote.

Shortly after the PPP's founding, a low-key power struggle broke out between Burnham and Jagan, at first because of Burnham's aspirations for leadership, and later because Burnham believed that Jagan's increasing involvement with international Communist circles might be seized upon by the British as a reason for proscribing the party. [redacted]

[redacted] the party grew in membership, winning the 1953 election with 51% of the vote.

Once in office, the PPP rejected the existing constitution as an improper instrument for achieving independent government, and attempted instead to implement its own policies of accelerated progress toward full self-government and the establishment of a Marxist state. Erratically, the party could not decide whether it wanted to govern with the existing machinery or lead a revolution, and its actions reflected this ambivalence. The economy declined because Western capital was leery of Jagan's Communist economic philosophy. When the government pushed through legislation aimed at getting full control of the labor movement, the long-established free trade unions resisted and strikes broke out. Violent disorders followed, and the British suspended the constitution.

With the PPP out of office and both Cheddi and Janet Jagan placed under restrictions by the British, intraparty dissension continued to grow, culminating in early 1955 when the Burnham faction called a party conference and installed Burnham as party leader. Because the majority of the Negroes supported Burnham and the majority of East Indians supported Jagan, the result was an open split in the party and the beginning of racial politics. Following the split, the PPP became mainly an East Indian party whose electoral support was primarily based on racial grounds and Jagan's personal appeal. Although there have been several defections and much factionalism, since 1957 Jagan's charisma among the East Indians, and also his intimidation practices, have been sufficient to compel dissident party members to submit to party discipline or be forced out. His appeal is apparently based on his decades of political work, his control of the PPP organizers, and the fear by many of his ability to retaliate against dissidence by violence or economic boycott. Thus, the PPP has remained firmly under the control of Cheddi Jagan, who holds the office of Party Leader, and his wife Janet, who occupies the position of General Secretary.

The Jagans have contended that because of government control of the electoral machinery the PPP could have no hope of coming to power legally. Yet they have vacillated between the militants who have called for violence and the moderates who have called for a more pragmatic, less ideological approach. The


more moderate faction, led by Fenton Ramsahove and Aston Chase, has argued that the party lacks a carefully planned strategy and that Cheddi Jagan's preoccupation with openly pursuing a Marxist policy will continue to stand in the way of the PPP's return to power. Their call for change floundered, however, when Jagan opposed them. The proceedings of both the 1967 and 1968 party congresses revealed Jagan's almost total control of the party machine. They also indicated his determination to continue to press for a disciplined Marxist-Leninist party structure, despite the peasant and small-capitalist instincts of most of the East Indians.

The PPP is by Guyanese standards, a fairly well organized party. Party membership is estimated at 6,000 dues-paying members and 20,000 supporters. The 3 major organs are the Party Congress, the General Council, and the Executive Committee. A Party Congress is held annually, ostensibly to elect the party leadership and to debate and approve major policies. However, the congress has not played a decisive role in party affairs; it has been, for the most part, a rubberstamp. Somewhat more significant is the 22-member General Council elected by the Party Congress and composed of the principal party officers (Chairman; Leader; Senior and Junior Vice Chairmen; the General, Assistant General, and Organizing Secretaries; and Treasurer) and generally 14 other voting members. Additional nonvoting members have been appointed when necessary to placate party factions. At the 1968 congress a resolution was passed naming 10 additional nonvoting General Council members to be drawn from the party's youth and women's groups, trade unions, and farmers and legislators, in an attempt to infuse new blood into the leadership and to widen its appeal. Most of the persons placed on the council, however, are on the payrolls of the party-controlled businesses, and the Jagans' domination is thus assured.

The Executive Committee, composed of the principal party leaders and 5 members elected by and from the General Council, handles moderately important party business and serves as a forum for discussion. A number of special and standing committees are designed to act in an advisory capacity to the Executive Committee. However, of the 9 standing committees, only the International Affairs Committee was functioning effectively in early 1969. The real power to make tactical political decisions is reserved to the Jagans, PPP Chairman Ranji Chandisingh, and Treasurer Boysie Ramkarran.

Although the PPP has maintained offices in New York and London, party activities abroad have not approached PNC levels, inasmuch as the overseas Guyanese population is overwhelmingly Negro. Domestically, the party has divided the country into 35 constituencies; each is a linkage between the local

organization, such as the village group, and the national party organization. The village groups send representatives to serve on the Constituency Committee, which in turn sends a Constituency Representative to serve on the PPP's National Constituency Committee. The strength of the party's local organization depends in large part on the effectiveness of overworked and underpaid organizers. In many areas the PPP's local activities have been hamstrung by the limited funds provided by the national organization and by the low morale of the organizers. The party's primary functional organizations are the Progressive Youth Organization and the Women's Progressive Organization, neither of which has been particularly effective. The party also controls the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union, which is the second largest sugar workers' union and is not affiliated with the Guyana Trades Union Council. Other PPP concerns are a publishing house, the New Guyana Publishing Company; a newspaper (the *Mirror*); and the Guyana Import-Export Co., Ltd. (GIMPEX), the party's trading arm. This company supplies most of the party's funds from its trading profits.



The radio and much of the press in Guyana continue to rely heavily on Western news sources, but there are a number of publications controlled by the PPP that are marked by a Communist bias. The most important of these publications, and indeed the primary channel for Communist propaganda to Guyana, is the *Mirror*. This daily newspaper, which appeals primarily to the East Indians, receives articles and photographs directly from TASS, but depends almost entirely upon shortwave broadcasts, especially from Havana and Moscow, for information and interpretation of current international news. Other propaganda material available at Freedom House, headquarters of the PPP, includes periodicals, pamphlets, and other publications from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Communist China, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Cuba. English-language shortwave broadcasts from Moscow and Havana can be received in Guyana, but these have very little political impact because the content is not aimed specifically at Guyanese listeners and there are very few shortwave receivers.

The limited effects of Communist propaganda are more than counterbalanced by Western influences. No films from Communist countries are shown com-

mercially, while Western films are popular among wide segments of the people. The PPP's library of Communist and pro-Communist literature is far overshadowed by the United States Information Service's lending library, reference and periodical collections, and motion picture film lending library.

### E. Non-Communist subversive groups

The small but growing black power movement presents a potential threat to Guyana's internal security. The larger and more active Black Power group, the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA), was formed in 1964 primarily to emphasize the African heritage of black Guyanese by developing educational programs related to African history, culture, and language. These have included providing free educational courses for some of its members and promoting instruction in Swahili. ASCRIA's present membership is about 200, and it has several thousand sympathizers. Since 1968, its founder and present leader, Sydney King, who has taken the African name of Eusi Kwayana, has begun to reorient the organization toward an aggressive racist stance, with the avowed goal of destroying white influence in the country. Kwayana's position as a government official—he is chairman of the Guyana Marketing Corporation—has given him influence within the PNC. Prime Minister Burnham believes it is good politics to have the popular Kwayana in the administration, but only as long as Burnham is able to maintain the upper hand over the leader of the militants. The Prime Minister does permit his own supporters in the PNC to participate publicly in Black Power activities, such as special social evenings and lectures.

Another small Black Power group is led by Brindley Horatio Benn, a Negro who served as chairman of the PPP for 10 years until he fell out with Jagan in 1965.

Benn and his few followers, however, are only a nuisance factor and have not developed significant support. In October 1965, Benn founded the Afro-Asian-American Association as a new Marxist-Leninist front to demonstrate to Jagan that he had an independent base of support and thus was a force to be reckoned with. Benn also registered the National Union of Workers composed of a few workers in diverse trades in Georgetown. (Any group of 7 can legally be registered as a union.) The 2 organizations are minuscule and serve primarily as political vehicles for Benn. In December 1968, Benn announced the formation of "Guyana's first Communist party," to be based upon the Black Power principles of Stokely Carmichael and to be called the Working People's Vanguard Party. This also is an insignificant organization and probably represents an effort by Benn to obtain more funds

## F. Stabilizing factors

Prime Minister Burnham (Figure 4) has been aware from the beginning that the maintenance of internal stability depends in large measure on the establishment of reasonably harmonious race relations. Burnham has sought to conciliate the East Indians, to present himself as a national rather than a racial leader, and to promote domestic peace and stability. He has also sought to demonstrate to the electorate that he is more effective than Jagan in attracting investment and foreign aid and promoting employment. Although the relative peace and stability of the last few years have not eliminated the racial character of Guyanese politics, much of the suspicion and fear which Jagan had aroused in the East Indian community concerning Burnham and his government appear to have been dispelled.

While Burnham's conciliatory policies have been designed to forestall a recurrence of the civil strife inspired by the PPP in the 1962-64 period, the government has also developed the legal and some of the military resources to handle violence. The Police Force and the Guyana Defense Force have been given antiriot training, while the National Security Law of December 1966 gives the government wide power to control explosives, firearms, and ammunition. It also provides for the preventive detention and restriction of movements of individuals thought to pose a danger to public order, but by January 1970 this provision had not yet been invoked.

A major goal of the Burnham administration's economic policies has been to develop the country and to raise the level of living. In the preindependence period, many Guyanese began to view colonialism as the root cause of all national problems, and independence as a panacea which would lead immedi-



FIGURE 4. Linden Forbes Burnham

ately to a new prosperity for all. In an atmosphere of racial and ideological tension, and with few loyal and talented men available for government service, it fell to Burnham to seek to satisfy these inflated expectations. From the beginning, the administration sought to discourage the unrealistic popular assumption that the government could immediately solve all problems or that foreign assistance would obviate the need for sacrifice at home. Instead, the government has stressed that independence brought with it greater responsibilities and that there is no substitute for self-help. The Burnham administration, though under no illusions concerning the length of time required to develop the country, quickly took charge and enjoyed some early success. Burnham's moderate tone and pro-Western orientation stimulated international confidence and helped to attract foreign aid and investment, and his success in ending the violence and lowering the level of tension helped to reverse the economic downturn of 1963 and 1964.

Although economic problems had previously received systematic study and analysis, the Burnham administration, with U.N. technical assistance, drew up a Seven Year Development Plan (1966-72) calling for better utilization of natural resources; increased agricultural and industrial productivity; development of new industries and additional agricultural exports; and construction projects such as sea defenses, dams, private and official housing, schools, hospitals, roads, and facilities for air transport and for storage. Other goals include development of additional coastal farm acreage, provision of hydroelectric power for an expanded aluminum industry, and improved access to the interior. The construction projects are expected to aid the campaign to reduce unemployment. Many of these projects, however, are not labor-intensive and can help only modestly.

Policymakers accorded the highest priority to agriculture in the development program, with emphasis on expanding sugar production and improving rice cultivation and marketing. Other plans include diversification to reduce dependence on imports of agricultural commodities and to increase exports to the Caribbean Free Trade Association. Development policy also relates to mining, especially bauxite and alumina. Some gold and diamond deposits are also being exploited, and a geological survey has indicated that deposits of other metals and minerals of commercial value may be present.

The government has devoted much attention to public welfare, and a large proportion of recurrent expenditure is budgeted for social services. The country has a number of community development projects which are run by the government's Department of Welfare and Social Security. The emphasis is upon the rural areas, where cottage industries are encour-





aged. Work has also been done in Georgetown in youth club development.

The government has given civic action responsibilities to the Guyana Defense Force. These include projects such as clearing areas in the interior for settlement, and building small bridges and access roads. In late 1967 the government set up a youth corps program designed to turn unemployed, unskilled youths into GDF reservists with skills useful to the economy. After 6 to 12 weeks of military basic training the youths spend 3 or 12 months on civic action projects and studying at a GDF-operated trade school. It is planned to train them also in farming techniques on the GDF experimental farm.

The government, through the Ministry of Information, also devotes considerable attention to explaining and popularizing its policies and programs. Major themes include the government's interests in rural areas, its desire for racial harmony, its ability to obtain foreign development capital, and its progress in solving urban unemployment. In addition, the government finds it necessary to expend a good deal of effort controlling the spread of both rumor and false information and the PPP's pro-Communist propaganda. This is necessary because the mass media, which at present include press and radio but not TV, are inadequate in terms of their ability to give accurate and comprehensive news coverage or to reach all sectors of the population. As a result, informal information systems (grapevines or rumor mills) operate extensively, particularly in the rural areas, where the mass media are less effective. Government success in promoting its policies and in countering rumor and distortion is uneven. Thus, while most Guyanese seem to be reasonably well informed on local developments, many retain an ingrained political-racial orientation which predisposes them to accord a high degree of credibility to reports which appeal to their bias and to reject others which do not.

The government places heaviest reliance on radio, which is used frequently by the Prime Minister and cabinet members to explain policy decisions. Under the terms of the government franchise, the country's 2 radio stations are required to grant 10% of their broadcast time to the Ministry of Information for its own announcements and programs. In late 1968, the ministry sharply increased its propaganda potential when the National Broadcasting Service, a government-owned radio station, was established. Liaison with the press is handled primarily through the Guyana Information Service, an agency within the Ministry of Information. Information distributed by the Information Service particularly news releases publicizing government achievements, are printed by the independent and progovernment newspapers.







~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AREA BRIEF

LAND

83,000 sq. mi.; 1% cropland; 3% pasture; 9% savanna; 77% forested; 10% water, urban, and waste (est. 1968)  
Limits of territorial waters: 3 n. mi.

PEOPLE

Population: 748,000; males 15-49, 155,000; 105,000 fit for military service  
Ethnic divisions: 50% East Indians, 44% Negro and Negro mixed, 4% Amerindian, 2% white and Chinese  
Religion: 57% Christian, 33% Hindu, 9% Muslim, 1% other  
Language: English  
Literacy: 86%  
Labor force: 175,000; about 75% agriculture; 10% mining, services, and manufacturing; 15% other; 21% unemployed; shortage of technical and managerial personnel  
Organized labor: 25% of labor force

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Guyana  
Capital: Georgetown  
Political subdivisions: 9 administrative districts  
Type: Parliamentary; constitutional monarchy and independent member within the British Commonwealth of Nations  
Legal system: Based on English common law with certain admixtures of Roman-Dutch law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction  
Branches: Council of Ministers presided over by Prime Minister; 53-member unicameral legislative National Assembly (elected); Supreme Court  
Government leader: Prime Minister L. F. S. Burnham  
Suffrage: Universal over age 21  
Elections: Last held in December 1968; next elections 1973  
Political parties and leaders: People's Progressive Party (PPP), Cheddi Jagan; People's National Congress (PNC), L. F. S. Burnham; United Force (UF), Feilden Singh  
Voting strength (1968 election): 36.5% PPP, 55.8% PNC, 7.4% UF, 0.3% other  
Communists: Unknown; top echelons of PPP and PYO (Progressive Youth Organization, militant wing of the PPP) include many Communists, but rank and file is non-Communist  
Other political or pressure groups: Justice Party, Guyana United Muslim Party, Guyana All-Indian League, African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa, Progressive Youth Organization (PPP affiliate), Young Socialist Movement (PNC affiliate), Guyana United Youth Society (UF affiliate), Afro-Asian-American Association, Committee for National Reconstruction, Guyana National Party (GNP)  
Member of: U.N. (FAO, IBRD, ICAO, IFC, ILO, IMF, ITU, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO), GATT

ECONOMY

GDP: \$210 million (1967), \$310 per capita; 1967 real growth rate (est.) 2%  
Agriculture: Main crops—sugarcane, rice, other food crops; food shortages—wheat flour, potatoes, processed meat, dairy products; caloric intake, 2,111 calories per day per capita (1965)  
Major industries: Bauxite mining, alumina production, sugar and rice milling  
Electric power: 102,000 kw. capacity (1968 est.); 402 million kw.-hr. produced (1967), 580 kw.-hr. per capita  
Exports: \$108 million (f.o.b., 1968); sugar, rice, bauxite, alumina, timber, diamonds, shrimp  
Imports: \$109 million (c.i.f., 1968); machinery, manufactures, food, petroleum  
Trade: Exports—100% to non-Communist countries; imports—99% from non-Communist countries (1966)  
Aid: Economic—extensions from U.S. (1953-68), \$24.8 million loans, \$18.0 million grants; from international organizations (FY66-67), \$7.5 million  
Monetary conversion rate: 2 Guyana dollars = US\$1  
Fiscal year: Calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads: 164 mi.; 146 mi. 4'8½" gage, 18 mi. 3'6" gage, all single track, none electrified  
Highways: 1,084 mi., 129 mi. paved, 195 mi. gravel, crushed stone, and bauxite ore, 760 mi. earth and sand  
Inland waterways: 3,700 mi.; Demerara River navigable to Mackenzie by ocean steamers, others by ferryboats, small craft only  
Freight carried: 75,593 tons 1961  
Ports: 1 principal (Georgetown) and 3 minor  
Civil air: 4 major transport aircraft  
Airfields: 86 total, 73 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; 13 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 2 seaplane stations  
Telecommunications: Highly developed telecom system with multistation radio relay network and over 12,100 telephones; plan tropospheric scatter link to Trinidad; 135,000 radio receivers, 2 AM stations

DEFENSE FORCES

Personnel: Army 1,300 (plus 500 in reserve), police 2,200  
Major ground units: 2 infantry battalions (1 with reserve component)  
Ships: 4 patrol craft  
Aircraft: 2 (prop)  
Supply: Mostly U.K., some U.S. equipment  
Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1969, \$2.35 million; about 3.6% of total budget





VENEZUELA

ATLANTIC  
OCEAN

BRAZIL

SURINAM

**GUYANA**

- International boundary
  - - - International boundary in dispute
  - - - Administrative district boundary
  - ⊕ National capital
  - ⊕ Administrative district capital
  - ⊕ Mabaruma
  - ⊕ Surfaced road
  - ⊕ Unsurfaced road or track
  - ⊕ Airfield
  - ⊕ Principal port
  - Populated places
  - Over 100,000
  - 10,000 to 25,000
  - Under 5,000
  - ⊕ Neighboring countries
- Scale 1:2,500,000

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY ADMISSIVE

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are: Main crops—sugarcane, rice, other food crops; shortages—wheat flour, potatoes, processed meat, products; caloric intake, 2,111 calories per day per (1965)

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**COMMUNICATIONS**

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
opment)

4 patrol craft

ift: 2 (prop)


ly: Mostly U.K., some U.S. equipment

ary budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1969, 35 million; about 3.6% of total budget




**ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**

- | INDUSTRY |                          | MINING      |              |
|----------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------|
|          | Brewing                  |             | Al Bauxite   |
|          | Meat packing             |             | Au Gold      |
|          | Sugar milling            |             | C Diamonds   |
|          | Food processing          |             |              |
|          | Margarine and soap       |             |              |
|          | Sawmill: wood products   |             |              |
|          | Machine and metalworking |             |              |
|          | Shipyards                |             |              |
|          | Stone quarry             |             |              |
|          | Lumbering                |             |              |
|          |                          | FISHING     |              |
|          |                          |             | Fishing area |
|          |                          | AGRICULTURE |              |
|          |                          |             | Sugar        |
|          |                          |             | Rice         |
|          |                          |             | Coconuts     |
|          |                          |             | Cattle       |




**VEGETATION**

- Dense tropical forest
- Seasonally flooded tropical forest with scattered marsh and swamp
- Grassland or savanna
- Cultivated land



**POPULATION**

Persons per square mile  
0 1 100 500  
0 0.4 30 103  
Persons per square kilometer  
Data based on 1960 census



**ETHNIC GROUPS**

- East Indian majority\*
- Negro and mixed Negro majority\*
- Amerindian majority\*
- East Indian majority\*\* with Negro and mixed Negro minority
- Amerindian majority with East Indian minority
- Probable Negro and mixed Negro majority; approximate limits
- Presumably unpopulated; environment inhospitable and/or data lacking

