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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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25 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Increasing Soviet Capability to Operate Against Missile Submarines

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article generally characterizes Soviet forces capable of assisting in operations against enemy missile submarines and makes recommendations for improving these capabilities. The author rules out the Long Range Air Force as a significant element in antisubmarine warfare, but builds a case for upgrading other antisubmarine warfare aircraft forces and equipment. He observes that Soviet forces must carry out preemptive destruction of missile submarines or destroy them after only a few of their missiles have been launched. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

[redacted]

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

[redacted]

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Late 1966

DATE 25 February 1974

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Problems of Combat Against the Submarine Missile/Nuclear Danger

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor of Aviation P. Nevzorov. This article generally characterizes Soviet forces capable of assisting in operations against enemy missile submarines and makes recommendations for improving these capabilities. The author rules out the Long Range Air Force as a significant element in antisubmarine warfare, but builds a case for upgrading other antisubmarine warfare aircraft forces and equipment. He observes that Soviet forces must carry out preemptive destruction of missile submarines or destroy them after only a few of their missiles have been launched.

End of Summary

Comment:

Gen.-Mayor of (Naval) Aviation Peter Pavlovich Nevzorov died in February 1967. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.

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The Problems of Combat Against the Submarine Missile/Nuclear Danger

by

General-Mayor of Aviation P. Nevzorov

Interesting articles have been published recently concerning the thwarting of an enemy missile/nuclear attack during various stages of a war and the activities of various branches and arms of branches of the armed forces during these stages. These articles have analyzed the most important aspects of combat against the submarine enemy and, for the most part, correctly bring to light the roles of the various branches of armed forces and arms of the branches.

At the same time, there is a lack of adequate clarity concerning a number of questions, both on the theoretical level and on the practical level. Thus, in our opinion, Colonel G. Lebedev's article* does not assess quite correctly the possible degree to which the various forces, and first of all, long-range aviation, can participate in combatting missile-carrying submarines. Furthermore, the author identifies thwarting the submarine missile/nuclear threat with the general mission of our Armed Forces to destroy the enemy navy, and, in doing so, he again attributes to long-range aviation those capabilities for combatting missile submarines which, unfortunately, it does not possess.

Since many theoretical propositions, and practical recommendations as well, have, in essence, only begun to be formulated and consequently require further deepening and refinement, I would like to express my views also concerning the significance and characteristics of combat against modern submarines, to throw light on the principles of the organization and conduct of combat actions against them and, in so doing, devote attention to the fundamentals of the use of aviation and its combat capabilities.

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* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (74), 1965.

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We fully share the opinion of those admirals, generals, and officers who consider that in its importance and scale, combatting missile submarines today has nothing in common with the antisubmarine defense of the World War II period.

The unceasing increase in the missile/nuclear might of the probable enemies' atomic submarines, which moreover are at a constant high state of combat readiness, will constitute from the very first minutes of a war a very serious threat to our state and to other countries of the socialist commonwealth.*

Hence, combatting the submarine missile/nuclear danger is developing into a problem of nationwide importance and has become one of the most important tasks of our Armed Forces.

The protection of the country from the missile/nuclear strikes of enemy submarines cannot limit itself to passive defensive measures alone. It is impossible to create any sort of stationary all-round impregnable defense along the sea frontiers of the Soviet Union and member countries of the Warsaw Pact. In the same vein, it is impossible, before the initiation of military operations, to bar enemy submarines from penetrating into the areas of their launching positions (for all practical purposes they already occupy these areas at present). The initial nuclear strikes of our strategic rocket forces, augmented by the strikes of missile submarines, long-range aviation, and naval missile-

* At present the USA has built 37 missile submarines, of which 29 are in service in the Navy and are constantly on duty in the northwest portion of the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific Ocean. Attempts are also being made to expand the patrol zones of the submarines by establishing bases for them in the Indian Ocean. After completion of the shipbuilding program, i.e., by the end of 1966, Polaris missiles will, in relative proportion, equal 62 percent of all of the shore-based intercontinental ballistic missiles that the USA plans to produce. We must also keep in mind that currently the work of further increasing the launching range, yield of warheads, and target-hitting accuracy of the missiles is being continued vigorously.

carrying aviation, against important installations (including submarine bases and the plants where submarines are built) cannot also bring success in combatting enemy submarines at sea, although undoubtedly these strikes will drastically weaken the enemy's potential capabilities.

The question is quite reasonable: in general, is it possible in the initial period of a war to conduct successful combat against the submarine missile/nuclear danger? We must keep the following in mind in order to answer this question more or less convincingly.

According to the views of the probable enemy, his atomic missile submarines are part of the first strategic echelon. They can carry out underwater missile launchings from the very first minutes of a war, from directions unexpected by us and so chosen as to make it difficult for us to combat both the submarines themselves and the missiles launched from them.

Furthermore, by possessing almost unlimited cruising range, atomic missile submarines are capable of relatively rapidly changing their launching positions and of going to areas difficult of access for antisubmarine forces. The execution of extensive maneuvering by the submarines has almost no impact on their effectiveness in delivering strikes against selected installations because, by using existing radionavigation systems and artificial earth satellites, they can determine their coordinates with sufficient accuracy.

Now we can formulate an answer to the question posed above: the successful thwarting or weakening of the nuclear strikes of enemy missile submarines in the initial period of a war is not achieved by strikes against enemy bases and other shore installations. This task can only be fulfilled as a result of successfully combatting the missile-carrying submarines directly at sea or on the ocean, and successfully combatting the missiles launched by them in the air.

This combat must be conducted by the antisubmarine forces of our Navy and by the antimissile defense troops, both specially designated and trained for this.

Without touching on questions related to antimissile defense, we will dwell briefly on the specific features and requirements of organizing combat against missile submarines at sea by the antisubmarine forces of the Navy.

First of all, it is appropriate here to emphasize that combat against modern atomic, and particularly missile, submarines is a very difficult task. In doing it, the most difficult of all to accomplish is the search for submarines on the vast expanses of the seas and oceans, at distances of up to 4000 kilometers from our bases and, in the future, considerably farther.

Because of the imperfection of modern detection means, it is impossible to distinguish atomic submarines from missile submarines or conventional torpedo submarines. Therefore the actions of our forces have developed into combat against all submarines,* which has naturally given rise to grave additional difficulties.

Changing conditions in the employment of modern submarines have placed completely new requirements on the organization of combat against them. In our opinion, these requirements boil down to the following.

First of all, both on a strategic scale and on an operational scale, and all the more on a tactical scale, combat against missile-carrying submarines must be active and aggressive in nature to the utmost degree.

Secondly, timely discovery and detection of the submarine enemy has to be accomplished before the initiation of combat actions, i.e., still under peacetime conditions. Therefore the reconnaissance currently being conducted for the purpose of discovering the intentions and actions of the naval enemy must be supplemented by a systematic search for submarines in the entire theater and by the continuous tracking of detected submarines.

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* At present there are in the navies of the USA and NATO countries 367 various submarines, of which 172 belong to the US Navy. The USA has 21 multipurpose atomic submarines; according to future plans, by 1970 the number of these submarines is to be increased to 70 units.

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Filling in the missing data during the period of threat will scarcely succeed, because for this there may not be either forces or time and, consequently, actions to thwart the enemy's nuclear attack will be doomed to failure.

And finally, it is only possible to thwart or not allow the strikes of enemy missile-carrying submarines by immediately destroying the submarines, because otherwise a submarine is now capable of launching all 16 Polaris missiles in 15 minutes, and in an even shorter period of time in the near future.

Concerning the requirements which should serve as the basis for the organization of combat against submarines, it is also appropriate to talk about possible variants in the actions of our antisubmarine forces. In our opinion there will be two such variants. The first is to destroy the detected missile-carrying submarines before the enemy launches his missiles, by the procedure of preemptive actions taken on orders of the Supreme High Command. In this case, the thwarting of the missile/nuclear strike is ensured to the greatest degree. The second is for our antisubmarine forces to take retaliatory actions after it has been established that the enemy has initiated the unleashing of war or after the launching of missiles by the submarines has become a proven fact. Of course, in this case too, it will be necessary to get the permission of the Supreme High Command. However, in doing this, we can obviously count, not on thwarting, but on weakening the submarine enemy's initial nuclear strike, since a certain portion of the missiles may be launched before our forces initiate offensive actions.

The experience of past wars and postwar operational and combat training of the fleets indicates that success in searching for and destroying submarines at sea depends directly on the combat capabilities of antisubmarine submarines, antisubmarine aviation, and antisubmarine surface ships, using various means of detection and destruction and exerting their combined efforts under various conditions, for as yet there exist no other forces to which one might give preference.

Antisubmarine submarines, especially those with atomic propulsion, will become one of the most effective

antisubmarine forces, as they are equipped with the latest means of submarine detection and long-range means of destruction. Possessing a vast radius of action and great autonomy, they are capable of conducting a prolonged search in all areas of the seas and oceans and under any hydrometeorological conditions.

Antisubmarine surface ships also have means of detecting and destroying submarines. The allegations of some comrades (primarily submariners) about the ineffectiveness of employing surface ships against submarine missile-carriers in the areas of their launching positions, supposedly because of their inadequate combat reliability, are too categorical, in our opinion. Any antisubmarine forces have characteristic deficiencies. However, in a great many cases, surface ships can make a significant contribution to the detection and tracking of submarines, sometimes even in remote areas (particularly in peacetime conditions and during a period of threat). Thanks to their great autonomy and the presence of communications means, surface ships can be used in close cooperation with aviation participating in search and strike groups. The combat capabilities of antisubmarine ships increase with the presence of helicopter carriers.

Aviation has considerable combat capabilities for combatting submarines. However, this statement cannot be applied to all arms of the air forces and all types of aviation. Colonel G. Lebedev is mistaken when he asserts in the aforementioned article that long-range aviation is capable of independently searching for and destroying mobile and small-size targets, among which, without any basis whatsoever, he also includes submarines, ranking them with surface ships and immobile shore installations. We must not forget that submarines are concealed from visual and radar observation by a layer of water and that, as yet, long-range aviation aircraft do not have any technical means of underwater detection.

However, in general, it would be erroneous to ignore this arm of the air forces in the context of solving the problem being discussed.

As has already been mentioned, long-range aviation, jointly with naval missile-carrying aviation, can, with a

portion of its forces, be enlisted in the delivery of initial nuclear strikes against installations which support the actions of enemy missile submarines, but, in our opinion, it is in no position to provide support in thwarting the submarine enemy's nuclear attack during the initial period of a war.

When the topic is combat by aviation forces against submarines at sea or on the ocean, what is meant is specially trained antisubmarine aviation, armed with special-purpose aircraft equipped with various means of detecting and destroying submarines.*

In the past we had such aviation within the composition of the Navy, and we still have it. Despite this, however, we are faced, in essence, with the necessity of setting it up with completely new quality and in the required numbers, since the obsolescent types of antisubmarine aircraft on hand with imperfect search equipment cannot reliably fulfil the requirements of combat against the submarine missile/nuclear danger. In so doing, we are far from the thought of setting aviation off against the other arms of the antisubmarine forces, though there is every ground for considering that antisubmarine aviation is reliable

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* Radar (and also visual) observation, still the primary means of detecting targets in the air and on the surface of the water, is unacceptable when searching for submarines underwater. Therefore, antisubmarine aircraft are equipped with search devices based on various principles of physics (radiohydroacoustic, magnetometric, thermal direction-finding, optical, and for detection of the initial missile launchings, etc.). Special antisubmarine homing torpedoes, bombs, and rockets are used as means to destroy submarines. For this reason, existing missile-carrying and bomber aircraft are not suitable for combat against submerged submarines.

and the most mobile and economically advantageous force for combatting submarines.*

Estimates show that even a partial thwarting of the launching of nuclear missiles from enemy submarines fully justifies the material expenditures on the production and maintenance of antisubmarine aircraft, not to even mention that tens and hundreds of cities and important installations on our territory will be saved from nuclear attack.

Besides searching for and detecting submarines, aircraft are also capable, independently or jointly with other antisubmarine forces of a fleet, of tracking and destroying the detected enemy submarines. Further improvements of technical means for the search and detection of submarines will considerably increase the operational and combat capabilities of aircraft (For example, just by using a thermal direction-finding device under certain conditions, antisubmarine aircraft will increase their combat capabilities eight to ten or more times in comparison with the use of radiohydroacoustic means.).

Comparing all of the positive and negative features of all mobile antisubmarine forces (submarines, ships, aviation), we can conclude that the best results in combatting the submarine missile/nuclear danger can be achieved with the joint employment of all three forces, in which the shortcomings of one of the forces are compensated for by the positive qualities of the others. Thus, we consider that, in general, combat against submarines should be carried out during their transit from their bases, and also in the areas of the seas and oceans where there is the greatest probability of their showing up and operating.

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* It will suffice to point out that a single antisubmarine submarine, using a hydroacoustic set, can examine in a day a sea or ocean area of up to 40 thousand square kilometers, but, along with this, depending on the remoteness of the search areas, transit to these areas may take several days. Antisubmarine aviation, armed with long-range aircraft, is able to conduct a search at distances of over 4,000 kilometers; a total of two aircraft can accomplish the same task in a single sortie with the help of radiohydroacoustic means.

Calculations show that the overall scope of those areas from which Polaris missiles will most likely be launched against our territory and where our antisubmarine forces should carry out uninterrupted observation, amounts to approximately 46 million square kilometers.

Of course, it is exceedingly difficult to control such a maritime expanse. At the same time, allowing for the conditions required to ensure successful missile launchings by the enemy's submarine missile-carriers on patrol, we can consider that not all of the indicated area has to be covered by observation in the first instance, but only a portion of it, covering approximately 20 million square kilometers. And this is a fully realistic task for our antisubmarine forces.

We share the opinions of those comrades who assert that it is difficult for us to establish antisubmarine lines in open sea theaters such as the Atlantic and the Pacific. At the same time, the military-geographic conditions of several sea theaters (primarily in island areas, narrows, straits, etc.) permit us to achieve a monitoring capability against the actions of enemy submarines by the use of cable-hydrophone lines and to destroy these submarines by the use of minefields. However, this, of course, requires great efforts and material expenditures, but nevertheless, we obviously should not refrain from setting up antisubmarine lines.

Thus, the principal elements of a system designated to combat submarines at sea should be mobile all-arms forces (antisubmarine submarines, aircraft, and surface ships), and to a certain degree also, stationary means of detection, with reliable control of them, of course. This entire system, established in peacetime, should be closely coordinated with the antiaircraft and antimissile defenses and the system of early warning against enemy missile/nuclear attack on the appropriate operational axes of the theaters of military operations. Otherwise, the antimissile defense troops will be powerless in combatting missiles launched from submarines.

In our opinion, the principles for the organization of combat against missile submarines at sea should greatly

resemble the principles for the organization of antiaircraft defense.

The information obtained by various means on enemy submarines has to be supplemented by search for and observation of the submarines. Upon receiving information of the initial detection of submarines, mobile antisubmarine forces of the fleets carry out continuous tracking and mutual guidance and, when military actions are initiated, they proceed to resolutely destroy them. In doing so, the preparation and implementation of an initial strike which is as crushing as possible against the enemy by all of the antisubmarine forces which are maintaining contact with the submarines will be of particularly critical importance.

These conditions can be achieved by skilfully using the threat period to prepare and deploy antisubmarine forces, including aircraft too. To allocate a large reserve of antisubmarine forces for subsequent operations is impermissible during this period, since this may lead to a weakening of the initial strikes.

The actions of antisubmarine forces and means must be delimited by zones or areas and distributed over the entire possible expanse of open sea theaters.

The subdividing or delimiting of specific zones or areas is determined by the need to increase responsibility for the fulfilment of assigned tasks, by the need to improve the conditions which ensure the mutual security of antisubmarine forces from damage by our own atomic means, and also by the desire to control these forces as reliably as possible on the broad expanse of open ocean and sea theaters.

It is not without interest to note that such a division of sea and ocean expanses for the actions of the various

antisubmarine forces is also practiced at present by our probable enemies.*

Of course, we are far from thinking of copying the American organization. At the same time, we must not fail to take into consideration those specific conditions of combat against submarines which manifest themselves to the same extent both for us and for our probable enemies.

Obviously, in conformity with our organization, we also should not refrain from allocation of sea and ocean areas for the operations of antisubmarine forces. For these purposes, it is most advantageous to allot the remote ocean areas to antisubmarine submarines and long-range aircraft.

It is advisable to assign surface ships, helicopters, and short-range antisubmarine aircraft to the areas within the boundaries of the seas adjoining our territory and also to the closed sea theaters (the Baltic and Black Seas, where for the most part there may be enemy multi-purpose submarines). In addition, these forces will also accomplish the tasks of supporting the deployment of our strike submarines and their return to their bases.

In our opinion, in accordance with the indicated principles, preparation of the theaters in respect to antisubmarine warfare with means of detection, obstruction, communications, and control should be carried out.

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* Thus, to combat our submarines, the northern portion of the Atlantic Ocean, from the coast of North America to the Norwegian Sea and the western portion of the Barents Sea inclusive, has been divided up by the American military command into zones for the operations of specific large units of antisubmarine forces, including land-based antisubmarine aviation, surface ships, and submarines. Aircraft of land-based antisubmarine aviation carry out systematic patrols in these zones, observing large areas. According to available data, just to search for our submarines in the Atlantic, antisubmarine aircraft of the NATO member-countries conduct up to 200 aircraft sorties daily. In wartime they plan to increase the number of aircraft sorties flown to 500 sorties per day.

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Discussing problem questions of combat against the submarine missile/nuclear danger, I also wish to express my opinion concerning the possible (advisable) forms of conducting combat actions with various antisubmarine forces, since these questions have not yet received sufficiently concrete definition.

In our opinion, it is advisable to look upon combat against missile submarines as a very important component part of naval combat actions in ocean theaters. It is, in essence, an independent special naval operation carried out most often at the same time as the delivery of initial nuclear strikes by strategic means, since, in this case, the most advantageous conditions are created for the further conduct and development of a strategic operation by a fleet. Having expressed this point of view, we do not forget that, according to existing official views, the destruction of submarines is considered to be within the overall task of combat against enemy naval forces. However, the inherent characteristics of combat against submarines, and the considerable volume of tasks accomplished and supporting measures carried out, in doing this, are evidence of the impossibility of uniting them within the framework of a single operation which pursues the purpose of destroying carrier strike forces, or groupings, of other surface ships and amphibious landing detachments, and of destroying enemy naval forces in their bases.

In combat against submarines, there are appearing a new spatial factor--the underwater environment--and qualitatively new forces and means of combat. Therefore, the concept, organization, and plan for the use of antisubmarine forces, including aviation, in combat against submarines will be isolated from the plan for the use of forces to destroy enemy surface forces. Proceeding from these considerations, the time has come to consider combat against missile-carrying submarines as a form of special naval operation.

In our opinion, the purposes of such an operation might be, first of all, to thwart a surprise missile/nuclear attack by the enemy from the direction of the sea (by destroying the submarine missile-carriers in the theater or its separate operational axes), and also to safeguard our strike submarines and surface ships from strikes by enemy

multi-purpose submarines. In this matter, the indicated purposes can only be achieved as a consequence of resolute actions by antisubmarine forces from the beginning of the war, with the indispensable condition of having established contact beforehand with the submarine enemy.

The component elements of an independent operation combatting submarines, united by a common concept and plan, might be: the joint and independent actions of antisubmarine forces of the Navy to destroy all enemy submarines discovered and being pursued; the delivery of nuclear strikes by missile submarines, naval missile-carrying aviation, and long-range aviation (exploiting the results of the actions of strategic rocket forces) against installations for the basing, construction, support, and control of the enemy submarine forces in the theater; the actions of antimissile defense forces to destroy submarine-launched missiles; and the combat actions of forces of the Navy, and, in part, of forces of Air Defense and of the maritime front, in support of the operation.

The scope of the operation will be determined by its scale and purposes. Depending on the scope, the operation may be conducted by missile and antisubmarine atomic submarines throughout the entire expanse of the theater, and by large units and units of antisubmarine, naval missile-carrying, and long-range aviation at the maximum radius of operation of the aircraft.

An operation to combat submarines will obviously be the fastest moving of all operations naval forces of a fleet have to carry out.

Thwarting the initial nuclear strike of enemy submarines, when they are being tracked, is possible during the first tens of minutes of the war. The subsequent destruction of all submarine groupings discovered will most likely require not more than two or three days (since, as is known, the enemy plans to carry out his strikes by strategic means within a period of three days).

At the same time, it would be incorrect to fit the entire combat against submarines into the form of an operation alone. Even after its successful accomplishment, there can be no guarantee that individual surviving enemy

submarine missile-carriers will not deliver strikes against our installations.

Therefore, the second form of use of the antisubmarine forces of the Navy might be in systematic (day-to-day) combat actions, in accordance with a previously outlined plan, providing also for the achievement of resolute purposes. We should assume that, in contrast with an operation, such actions by antisubmarine forces will most often be independent in nature in the zones or areas allotted to them.

Upon examining the actions of aviation in combat against missile submarines, it is necessary to emphasize aviation's special, if one may speak in that way, role in this combat.

First of all, these actions are characterized by great spatial scope, since the search for submarines will take place at great distances from base airfields, on several axes and in many areas at the same time. And this will require from aviation a state of high combat readiness and the carrying out of the maneuvering of its forces between theaters, will call for a great number of daily combat sorties, will make it necessary for bases to be organized near the areas of forthcoming actions, and will require that new airfields be equipped and that the appropriate aviation-engineer support and material-technical support be organized at them.

Apart from this, in providing for immediate and resolute actions of antisubmarine aviation at the beginning of the war, it will be necessary while still in peacetime to enlist a considerable portion of the forces of this aviation in combat duty, jointly with antisubmarine submarines and surface ships. Only in this case will continuous and direct contact with every enemy missile submarine be possible.

The inherent characteristics of searching and tracking submarines at sea require the use of aircraft operating at medium and low altitudes. In connection with this, the ground control of aircraft becomes considerably complicated, especially at great distances. The accuracy of air navigation is decreased and piloting technique becomes more complicated. That being the case, the greatest difficulties

arise when supporting the actions of antisubmarine aviation in Arctic areas.*

The features enumerated give rise to specific demands for the creation of antisubmarine aircraft equipment, for weapons, and for flight personnel training, etc. The present condition of antisubmarine aviation permits it to merely participate in an operation to destroy missile-carrying submarines which is carried out by the joint efforts of all antisubmarine forces.

In our opinion, we can consider as an independent form of use of antisubmarine aviation both its conduct of systematic combat actions and, in peacetime, its participation in the carrying out of combat duty. In so doing, aviation can act jointly with other antisubmarine forces. In the latter case, its cooperation with the antisubmarine submarines will most frequently be of an operational nature (because of the lack of reliable means of mutual identification and of communications with each other). As regards the cooperation of aviation with antisubmarine surface ships, it will, in most instances, be of a tactical nature, consisting of mutual guidance and the maintenance of contact with the underwater target until it is destroyed.

Regarding the conduct by antisubmarine aviation of an independent operation for combatting enemy submarines, such an operation will obviously be possible in the event that antisubmarine aviation receives long-range aircraft.

From what has been set forth above, it is evident that upon antisubmarine aviation will fall the responsibility for accomplishing most of the tasks pertaining to combat against missile submarines at sea. This creates the need for a quantitative increase of this aviation, for its qualitative improvement, and for research and development in suitable methods of using it.

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* For example, complex hydrometeorological and ice conditions frequently hamper, and sometimes even prevent, the use of some technical means for air navigation and searching for submarines.

The basic principle, laid down as the basis for not only the operational but also for the tactical use of antisubmarine aviation, is to achieve a monitoring capability in all the areas where enemy submarines are searched for, detected, tracked, and destroyed. For this purpose it is most advisable that in the areas adjoining our coasts (including also the internal seas of closed theaters) short-range antisubmarine aviation operate, and that in remote zones of open ocean and sea theaters such a task will be within the capability of long-range antisubmarine aviation.

The operational structure of aviation forces should allow for their most effective use, taking into consideration the concept and plan of the operation.

Here, several variants are possible, depending on the composition of our own forces and the scale of the operation. Thus, the composition of forces which is to accomplish the primary tasks and the operation may include these groupings: for the searching, tracking, and destroying of enemy missile submarines in remote areas; for the accomplishment of the same tasks, but primarily against multi-purpose submarines near our coasts; for actions against missile submarines located in areas of oceans beyond the limits of countries bordering our own, by high-speed and low-altitude, long-range antisubmarine aircraft, capable of crossing continental air defenses with the least losses; and finally, for support of the actions of our submarines, for destroying enemy submarines in their bases and also the shore means supporting them, and for laying minefields.

While still in peacetime, all of the required groupings of aviation forces should be established, should work out their intrinsic tasks, and should be in constant readiness.

In the course of systematic combat actions, antisubmarine aviation may fulfil all of the tasks enumerated above or only a part of them, depending on the situation. When searching for submarines, this aviation operates in combat formations which include groups or single aircraft (helicopters) for support, search groups, search and strike groups, or strike groups. Search and strike groups are the most effective since they are capable of

destroying submarines immediately upon detecting them or upon receiving the order to do so.

The intense dynamism of the operations and combat actions of aviation against submarines, their great spatial scope, and the need for concentrating efforts on the main axes and for organizing cooperation with the other arms of the forces assisting in the accomplishment of the main task, require centralized control. Such control also ensures maintenance of the aviation in a high state of combat readiness, more correct planning of its use, and continuity of the control of large units and units of aviation.

We believe that on the scale of a single fleet, the commander of aviation of the fleet should exercise direct control over antisubmarine aviation in an operation and during systematic combat actions, on the basis of tasks received from the fleet commander.

When the forces of the aviation of two or more fleets are engaged in simultaneous actions, and also when the composition of the aviation includes aircraft capable of conducting sorties over all of the principal remote ocean areas, it is advisable that direct control be assigned to the Commander of Aviation of the Navy, on the basis of the tasks and plan of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

A certain amount of decentralized control over the forces of aviation, for example, when they are operating on isolated operational axes of very extensive sea theaters, is not excluded.

In conclusion, we will note that the contents of this article far from exhaust all of the questions pertaining to the problem of combat against the submarine missile/nuclear danger. This subject requires further theoretical research and the verification of a number of propositions in the course of operational and combat training. Therefore, discussion of it in our military press will facilitate the development of correct views on the use of the various

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branches and arms of branches of the armed forces in accomplishing this important task.

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