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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

18 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Table of Contents
and Lesson No. 2: The Preparation and Critique
of the Plan of the Initial Nuclear Strike

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation from Russian of the Table of Contents of the lessons and of the lesson involving the planning by a front chief of staff for an initial nuclear strike in the northern area of West Germany.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

JN John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Table of Contents and Lesson No. 2:
The Preparation and Critique of the Plan of the Initial Nuclear Strike

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of the Table of Contents of a TOP SECRET series of lessons, entitled 'The Front Offensive Operation', prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Soviet Armed Forces, and of Lesson No. 2 of the series. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as front chiefs of staff in planning an initial nuclear strike with 376 nuclear warheads in the area of NATO's Northern Army Group. The main points set forth the specific targets (including NATO missile and SAM units, nuclear warhead depots, and airfields), warhead yields, time scheduling, allocation of tasks and targets among the Soviet nuclear delivery means; the reconnaissance tasks, targets, and capabilities; the targets for Baltic Fleet aviation, the targeting and countermeasures against NATO radioelectronic warfare means, and dimension data on typical NATO missile, artillery, airfield, command post, and ground force unit installations.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

Brown - West Germany
Blue - Great Britain
Green - United States
Lilac - Belgium
Violet - The Netherlands

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THE FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION

Training Methods Handbook No. 1
(Lessons No. 1 to 19)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Lesson
No.

Designation of lesson

- | | |
|--|--|
| <div data-bbox="121 877 243 951" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 75px; height: 35px; margin-bottom: 10px;"></div> | <div data-bbox="246 888 1276 1677"><p>1. The making and critique of the decision of the <u>front</u> commander for the offensive operation:</p><ul style="list-style-type: none">✓a) Ascertainment of the <u>front's</u> task, assessment of the situation, and reporting of the chief of staff's proposals on the decision;✓b) The organization of the work of the <u>front</u> field headquarters in the preparation of an offensive operation. Development and critique of the schedule for parallel work of the <u>front</u> field headquarters during decision-making, the assignment of tasks to the troops and the planning of the operation;c) Preparation and reporting of the proposals of the Chief of the Rocket Troops and Artillery on the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery in the <u>front</u> offensive operation;✓d) Operational calculations and the use of electronic computers to determine the capabilities of the air defense forces and means of the <u>front</u> to repel massed enemy air attacks;✓e) Decision of the <u>front</u> commander on the offensive operation. Instructions of the <u>front</u> commander on planning the operation, organizing cooperation and controlling the troops, maintaining constant readiness to deliver the initial nuclear strike and repel a possible enemy invasion, on supporting the troops' combat actions, and on political work in the operation;</div> |
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- f) Work of the nuclear planning groups, to include performing calculations on computers to support the adoption of the commander's decision to employ nuclear weapons in an operation.
- ✓2. Preparation and critique of the plan of the initial nuclear strike of the front
 - 3. Preparation and critique of the operational directive of the front on the offensive operation
 - ✓4. The making and critique of the decision of the commander of the air army on combat actions in the front offensive operation
 - ✓5. The study and critique of the fleet commander's decision on the combat actions of the fleet's forces in the front offensive operation.
 - ✓6. Study of the basic diagram of the mathematical model of the front offensive operation
 - 7. Preparation and critique of the plan of the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery in the front offensive operation:
 - ✓ a) Planning the combat employment of the rocket troops
 - b) Planning the combat employment of artillery
 - ✓8. Study and critique of the plan of the amphibious landing operation
 - ✓9. Preparation and critique of the plan of reconnaissance in the front offensive operation
 - ✓10. Preparation and critique of the plan of air defense in the front offensive operation
 - ✓11. Critique of the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive
 - ✓12. Study of the plan of radioelectronic warfare in the front offensive operation

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- ✓13. Preparation and critique of the plan of protection of the troops and rear services of the front against weapons of mass destruction in the offensive operation
- ✓14. The planning of engineer support of a front offensive operation
- ✓15. Organizing the control of the front's troops in an offensive operation. Preparing the plan for the organization of control
- 16. Preparing the plan and organizing cooperation of the front troops in an offensive operation
- ✓17. Organizing communications in a front offensive operation
- ✓18. Preparation and critique of the plan of the organization of rear services support of the front troops in an offensive operation
- ✓19. Preparation and critique of the plan for the front offensive operation

Short reports

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THE FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION

Training Methods Handbook No. 2
(Lessons No. 20 to 29)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- | Lesson
No. | Designation of lesson |
|---------------|---|
| 20. | Transition of <u>front</u> troops to the offensive with the use of conventional means of destruction: |
| | ✓a) The conduct of the air engagement and delivery of the initial massed strike in an air operation |
| | ✓b) The repulse of the enemy invasion and the transition of <u>front</u> troops to the offensive |
| 21. | The breakthrough by <u>front</u> troops of a prepared enemy defense: |
| | ✓a) Organizing the breakthrough of the enemy defense |
| | b) Organizing the combat actions of the rocket troops and artillery of the <u>front</u> in a breakthrough of the enemy defense |
| | ✓c) Combat actions of <u>front</u> and army aviation in the breakthrough of an enemy defense |
| 22. | Development of the <u>front</u> offensive operation: |
| ✓ | ✓a) Developing the offensive operation with the commitment of the <u>front's</u> second echelon to the engagement |
| | ✓b) Combat actions of <u>front</u> and army aviation in the development of the offensive operation with the commitment of the <u>front's</u> second echelon to the engagement |

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- ✓23. Relocation of control posts in the course of a front offensive operation. Work of the airborne command posts
- 24. The transition of front troops to the conduct of combat actions under conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons by the sides:
 - ✓a) Refining the plan and schedule of the initial nuclear strike and determining the measures to maintain the survivability of the troops. Delivery of the initial nuclear strike of the front
 - ✓b) Controlling the rocket troops and artillery during preparation and delivery of the initial nuclear strike
- 25. Restoring the combat effectiveness of the troops, eliminating the aftereffects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, and developing the operation:
 - ✓a) Estimating the forces and means of the sides following nuclear strikes. Instructions of the front commander on restoring the combat effectiveness of the troops and eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction;
 - b) Refining the decision on the development of the offensive operation
- 26. Committing the front's second echelon to the engagement:
 - ✓a) Organizing the commitment of the front's second echelon to the engagement;
 - ✓b) Organizing the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery when committing the front's second echelon to the engagement;
 - c) Organizing air defense when committing the front's second echelon to the engagement;
 - ✓d) Controlling the troops during commitment of the front's second echelon to the engagement;

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- e) Engineer support of the movement forward and commitment of the front's second echelon to the engagement involving the negotiation of nuclear minefields and zones of mass destruction;
 - ✓f) Rear services support of troops in the course of an offensive operation when the second echelon of the front is committed to the engagement
27. The assault crossing of wide water obstacles by front troops from the march:
- a) Making the decision for the assault crossing of a wide water obstacle from the march and the landing of an operational airborne landing force;
 - b) Engineer support of the front troops' assault crossing of water obstacles from the march
28. Development of the offensive on the opposite shore of a wide water obstacle with the simultaneous repelling of an enemy counterthrust
29. The preparation and critique of the operational summary (SITREP) of the front staff
- Short reports

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LESSON No. 2

I. Subject: 'THE PREPARATION AND CRITIQUE OF THE PLAN OF THE INITIAL NUCLEAR STRIKE'

II. Estimated time

	Group training period	Individual study by students	Total
Lesson No. 2	4	6	10

III. Training objectives:

-- to give the students practice in drawing up the plan and schedule, with explanatory memorandum, of the initial nuclear strike;

-- to teach the presentation of a brief and clear report on the contents of the documents worked out for the plan of the initial nuclear strike.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson: group exercise with elements of a war game.

V. Methodological recommendations on preparing for the lesson.

At the beginning of the lesson, after the director of the training group has studied the materials on Lesson No. 2 as well as the materials on Lesson No. 4 -- of the Air Forces Operational Art Department -- and No. 7a -- of the Rocket Troops and Artillery Department -- he will hold a briefing during which he will instruct the students as follows:

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1. To prepare (fill in the blank flow sheets) sections 1, 2, and 4 of the explanatory memorandum on the plan of the initial nuclear strike, and also sections 1 and 4 of the schedule of the initial nuclear strike (tasks of and targets to be struck by the 2nd Front Missile Brigade and the rocket troops of the 7th Army).

2. To study the content and form of the basic documents of the plan of the front initial nuclear strike.

3. To prepare (write up in work books) the theses for the report on the plan of the front initial nuclear strike and be prepared to present it during the lesson.

VI. Procedure for conduct of lesson:

1. Theory of the subject -- 10 to 15 minutes.

One or two students will brief on the following matters:

-- the purpose of the front initial nuclear strike and the basis on which its planning is carried out;

-- the personnel involved in drawing up the plan of the initial nuclear strike;

-- the procedure for refining the plan of the front initial nuclear strike during an operation which starts with the employment of conventional means of destruction.

2. Critique of the contents of the basic documents of the plan of the front initial nuclear strike -- 90 to 100 minutes.

Three or four students will brief on the following topics:

-- the documents which make up the plan of the front initial nuclear strike;

-- what is shown on the map, the schedule, and the explanatory memorandum for the plan of the initial nuclear strike of the Coastal Front.

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Possible content of the above-mentioned topics:

The plan of the front initial nuclear strike, which is worked out on a map, the explanatory memorandum for the plan, and the schedule, constitute the basic documents in planning the employment of nuclear weapons and reflect all the points having to do with the organization and delivery of the front initial nuclear strike: the allocation of targets between the rocket troops and aviation, their tasks, siting areas and basing areas, the procedure and times for delivery of the nuclear strikes as well as for providing cover against enemy air strikes to the grouping which has been established, and the organization of cooperation, control, and all kinds of support (especially reconnaissance, radioelectronic warfare, and topogeodetic support).

On the basis of these documents and in the process of developing them the following are elaborated: the plan (schedule) for preparing and delivering the initial nuclear strike of the front rocket troops; the plan of the initial mass sortie of the air army; the plan for reconnaissance and final reconnaissance of the targets during the initial nuclear strike; the plan for topogeodetic and hydrometeorological support of the delivery of the initial nuclear strike, and other items;

✓ The map of the plan of the front initial nuclear strike will show: the possible grouping of enemy troops in departure areas for attacks and enemy fixed targets in the interior (control posts, airfields, depots, Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile sites, communications centers, naval bases, and other important targets); rocket troop groupings, basing areas of front aviation; the tasks of rocket troops and aviation-- the number of targets (installations), the number and yield of the nuclear warheads to be employed against each of them; the control posts of the front, armies, front missile brigades, and army missile brigades; the location of electronic countermeasure means supporting the delivery of the initial nuclear strike and the weakening of enemy strikes; the line of demarcation between the strikes to be delivered by the Strategic Rocket Forces and the front missile troops and aviation; the installations to be hit by the aviation of the Combined Baltic Fleet and by the means of the adjacent Western Front.

The schedule of the initial nuclear strike will indicate the forces and means allocated for the initial nuclear strike (two front missile brigades, four army missile brigades, one corps missile brigade, 14 separate missile battalions, and the air army); the targets (installations) against which nuclear strikes are to be delivered and the level of their

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damage; and alternate installations (targets) for destruction.

The plan to be worked out will stipulate: the employment of 376 nuclear warheads -- 176 by the rocket troops and 200 by the 1st Air Army -- during the front initial nuclear strike. In the process, 10 separate missile battalions of the divisions will carry out two launches; the 1st Air Army will keep a reserve of aircraft in the air with 15 nuclear bombs (the 2nd Fighter-Bomber Division with five 20-kiloton bombs, the 4th Fighter-Bomber Division with five 20-kiloton bombs, and the Sixth Bomber Division with five 10-kiloton bombs).

The main efforts of the rocket troops and aviation are to be concentrated on the destruction of nuclear means (the 2nd Pershing Wing, two Lance missile battalions and two Lance missile regiments, delivery aircraft on 14 airfields, 17 nuclear warhead depots); eight control posts (the forward command post of the Central Army Group /?sic for Northern Army Group/, and the command posts of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the Brown 6th, 1st, and 4th army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, and the Lilac 1st and 2nd Army Corps); air defense installations (two Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile battalions, the 24th and 25th); eight Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions (the 38th, 38th /sic. presumably 39th, see below/, 31st, 36th, 5th, 35th, 37th, and 3rd); and on the destruction of 75 to 80 percent of all first-echelon large units of the enemy.

[Additionally, the students will be required to report specifically which enemy installations are to be destroyed by the rocket troops and aviation both jointly and independently. /Their reports are to include/ the degree of destruction of the installations.

The explanatory memorandum on the plan of the front initial nuclear strike will cover matters which cannot be expressed on the map.

The explanatory memorandum will be gone over systematically by sections, devoting particular attention to those sections which the student has prepared independently.

3. The presentation of the plan of the front initial nuclear strike will take 60 to 65 minutes.

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Students in the role of front chief of staff will report the plan of the initial nuclear strike covering the following topics:

- the purposes and tasks of the initial nuclear strike and the means allocated for its implementation;
- the allocation of targets between rocket troops and aviation;
- the organization of the initial nuclear strike;
- the organization of combat alert status;
- the organization of reconnaissance and final reconnaissance of enemy targets;
- ✓ -- the control of rocket troops and aviation during delivery of the initial nuclear strike;
- the organization of cooperation with adjacent units and between the rocket troops and front aviation;
- the organization of radioelectronic warfare.

Report by the Chief of Staff of the Coastal Front of the plan for the initial nuclear strike

Comrade formation commander!

In conformity with your decision regarding the operation and the instructions on its planning, the front staff, together with the chief of rocket troops and artillery and the commander of the 1st Air Army, have prepared a plan for the initial nuclear strike.

In preparing the plan, we have taken into account the instructions of the General Staff regarding the employment of nuclear weapons in an operation, its briefing on the tasks to be carried out by the Strategic Rocket Forces in the front offensive zone, and also the briefings of the commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet and the commander of the Western Front concerning the tasks to be fulfilled by the fleet and the front during the initial nuclear strike in the Coastal Front zone and on its flanks.

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1. The purpose in delivering the initial nuclear strike: to disrupt the mass employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy, disorganize troop control at the army corps to division level, destroy the main surface-to-air air defense means along the axes of action of our aviation, inflict decisive damage on the groupings of troops of the first-echelon army corps, and establish the most favorable conditions for the completion of their destruction and the most rapid accomplishment of the tasks of the Coastal Front troops.

2. Tasks to be accomplished in the initial nuclear strike:

-- destruction of the 2nd Pershing-1A Missile Wing, two battalions (150th and 160th) and two regiments (24th and 50th) of Lance missiles, a Sergeant missile battalion (450th); delivery aircraft on 14 airfields -- Nos. 07 (HUSUM), 12 (MARNE), 16 (WURSTERHEIDE), 23 (BUCKEBURG), 27 (OLDENBURG), 28 (VEGESACK), 29 (BREMEN), 30 (DELMENHORST), 31 (BERGER), 33 (KLOPPENBURG), 34 (DIEPHOLZ), 41 (OSNABRUCK), 43 (GUTERSLOH), 46 (DETMOLD);

eight control posts (Forward Command Post of the Northern Army Group, and the command posts of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the Brown 6th, 1st, and 4th army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, and the Lilac 1st and 2nd Army Corps) and the electronic warfare units and subunits positioned with them; two battalions of Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles (24th and 25th), eight battalions of Hawk surface-to-air missiles (39th, 38th, 31st, 36th, 5th, 35th, 37th, and 3rd); the 36th Thunderbird Air Regiment; five air control and warning posts and centers in the areas of AHRENSBURG, WROHM, EIGEN, BAD-MUNDEN /?sic for BAD-MUNDER/, and FALLINGBOSTEL; and destruction of 75 to 80 percent of 13 divisions and one brigade (the Brown 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 18th motorized infantry divisions, 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions, and the 27th Airborne Brigade, the Green 4th Mechanized Division, and the Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th Armored Divisions) along the axis of the main and other attacks; and of 30 to 50 percent of four divisions (the Brown 1st and 21st motorized infantry divisions and the Lilac 1st and 4th motorized infantry divisions).

For the fulfilment of these tasks there have been allocated: seven missile brigades (two front missile brigades, four army missile brigades, and one corps missile brigade) and 14 separate missile battalions of the divisions.

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The total is 346 delivery vehicles employing 376 nuclear warheads, including 30 tactical missiles for follow-up launchings to be carried out by ten separate missile battalions (3rd, 7th, 8th, 4th, 5th, 10th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, and 6th).

3. In the delivery of a strike against nuclear means and aviation, taking into account the technical capabilities of the delivery vehicles, and also with a view to creating more favorable conditions for cooperation between the rocket troops and aviation, the plan provides for the following allocation of strike targets between them:

The rocket troops (content of the report according to the schedule) are to destroy independently: the 2nd Pershing 1A Missile Wing, the 150th and 160th battalions and 24th and 25th regiments of Lance missiles, the 450th Sergeant Battalion, aircraft on airfields Nos. 07 (HUSUM), 12 (MARNE), 16 (WURSTERHEIDE), 23 (BUCKEBURG), 27 (OLDENBURG), 28 (VEGESACK), 29 (BREMEN), 30 (DELMENHORST), 33 (KLOPPENBURG), 34 (DIEPHOLZ), 41 (OSNABRUCK), 43 (GUTERSLOH), and 46 (DETMOLD);

command posts of the Brown 6th, 1st, and 4th army corps, Blue 1st Army Corps, and the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps; the 39th, 38th, 31st, 36th, 5th, 35th, 37th, and 3rd Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions, the 36th Thunderbird Air Regiment; control and warning posts and centers in the areas of AHRENSBURG, WROHM, EIGEN, BAD-MUNDEN, and FALLINGBOSTEL; and are to strike the Brown 1st Motorized Infantry Division and 27th Airborne Brigade and the Lilac 101st Motorized Infantry Division.

Aviation: jointly with the rocket troops, is to strike the Brown 6th, 14th, 15th, 18th, and 21st motorized infantry divisions and 7th and 16th tank divisions; the Blue 1st and 2nd armored divisions, and the Lilac 4th Motorized Infantry Division.

4. Organization of the initial nuclear strike

The initial nuclear strike is to be accomplished by a single launching of operational-tactical missiles, two launchings of tactical missiles, and one sortie of aviation during a 50-minute period.

Between LAUNCH and LAUNCH plus 5 minutes, front, army, and corps missile brigades and separate missile battalions of the divisions will deliver a strike against fixed enemy installations that have been previously reconnoitered and whose coordinates are known.

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The takeoff of 1st Air Army large units and units will take place simultaneously with the initial launching of the missiles -- at LAUNCH, and the strikes against the enemy when he moves forward or occupies the departure areas for the attack will be carried out from LAUNCH plus 12 to LAUNCH plus 24 minutes (by the 8th Fighter-Bomber Division), from LAUNCH plus 17 to LAUNCH plus 35 minutes (by the 2nd and 4th fighter-bomber divisions), and from LAUNCH plus 35 to LAUNCH plus 45 minutes (by the 6th Bomber Division).

Strikes by the rocket troops against enemy targets whose coordinates have not been determined before the start of the initial nuclear strike will be delivered from LAUNCH plus 45 to LAUNCH plus 50 minutes after final reconnaissance has been conducted.

5. Organization of combat alert

With the object of weakening an enemy surprise strike, destroying his means of nuclear attack and control posts, and defeating his groupings of ground forces, the following allocations, upon receipt of authorization to issue warheads, are to be made in order to perform the combat alert:

a) In the rocket troops: The 1st Missile Battalion of the 2nd Front Missile Brigade (six launchers with six 100-kiloton missiles) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 001-006 -- the 1st and 2nd Pershing 1A missile wings; the 1st Missile Battalion of the 3rd Front Missile Brigade (six launchers with six 100-kiloton missiles) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 007-009 -- the 3rd Pershing 1A Missile Wing and Nos. 11 to 13 --

the 1st Missile Battalion of the 4th Army Missile Brigade (four launchers with four missiles -- three of 40 kilotons, and one of 100 kilotons) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 13 /sic/ to 15 -- the 650th Lance Missile Battalion, and No. 1 -- the 1st Missile Battalion of the 7th Army Missile Brigade (four launchers with four 100-kiloton missiles) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 54 to 55 -- the aircraft on the airfields at OLDENBURG and VEGESACK, and Nos. 6 and 7

the 1st Missile Battalion of the 9th Army Missile Brigade (four launchers with four 100-kiloton missiles) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 010 to 012 -- the 4th Pershing 1A Missile Wing and No. 8 -- the 6th Army Missile Brigade (12 launchers with 12 missiles -- eight of 100 kilotons, two of 40 kilotons, and two of 20 kilotons) to be ready for

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delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 020 to 022 -- the 150th Lance Missile Battalion, Nos. 024 to 027 -- the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, No. 59 -- aircraft at the DELMENHORST Airfield, and Nos. 160 to 161 -- the control and warning posts and centers in the areas of FALLINGBOSTEL and BAD-MUNDEN; the 2nd Corps Missile Brigade (six launchers with six missiles -- two of 100 kilotons, three of 40 kilotons, and one of 20 kilotons) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 016 to 019 -- the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion, and Nos. 2 and 3 -- the

b) In the air army: The 8th Fighter-Bomber Division (eight aircraft with eight bombs -- four of 200 kilotons and four of 100 kilotons) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 379 to 382 -- the Brown 6th Motorized Infantry Division, and Nos. 476 to 479 -- the Brown 13th Tank Division; the 2nd Fighter-Bomber Division (12 aircraft with 12 bombs -- ten of 260 kilotons, two of 10 kilotons) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 478 to 482 -- the Brown 16th Tank Division, Nos. 013 to 015 -- the Brown 550th Lance /Missile/ Battalion, and Nos. 016 to 019 -- the Brown 450th Sergeant /Missile/ Battalion; the 4th Fighter-Bomber Division (12 aircraft with 12 bombs -- six of 200 kilotons, three of 20 kilotons, and three of 10 kilotons) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 520 to 521 -- the Brown 7th Tank Division, Nos. 04 to 06 -- the 2nd Pershing 1A Missile Wing, Nos. 020 to 022 -- the 150th Lance Missile Battalion, and Nos. 024 to 027 -- the 24th and 50th Lance Missile Regiments; the 6th Bomber Division (nine aircraft with nine bombs -- three of 300 kilotons, one of 200 kilotons, and five of 100 kilotons) to be ready for delivery of strikes against targets Nos. 537 to 540 -- the Blue 1st Armored Division, and Nos. 529 to 533 -- the Blue 4th Armored Division.

6. Reconnaissance and final reconnaissance of enemy targets

Reconnaissance and final reconnaissance of enemy targets to be hit by the front initial nuclear strike are to be conducted as follows:

1 a) by agent sources of the active net: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th squadrons of the 2nd Pershing 1A Missile Wing; the 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments and the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion; control posts -- the forward command post of the Northern Army Group and the command posts of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the Brown 6th, 1st, and 4th army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, and the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps; the headquarters of the Brown 1st, 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 18th motorized infantry divisions, 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions, and 27th Airborne Brigade, and of the Blue

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1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions;

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b) by radio-intercept and direction-finding posts of the separate OSNAZ radio reconnaissance regiment of the front and the separate OSNAZ radio battalions of 4th, 7th, and 9th armies: control posts of army corps and divisions, of the 2nd Pershing 1A Missile Wing, the 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion, the 24th and 25th Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile battalions, the 39th, 38th, 31st, 36th, 5th, 35th, 37th, and 3rd Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions; and the radio nets and control posts of missile-technical support units;

c) by radiotechnical reconnaissance posts of the OSNAZ radiotechnical regiment of the front and OSNAZ radiotechnical battalions of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies: radar stations of the 24th and 25th Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile battalions and of the 39th, 38th, 31st, 36th, 5th, 35th, 37th and 3rd Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions; control and warning centers and posts in the areas of AHRENSBURG, WROHM, EIGEN, BAD-MUNDEN, and FALLINGBOSTEL;

d) by the air defense radar stations of the front and armies: aircraft taking off from the airfields of HUSUM, MARNE, WURSTERHEIDE, BUCKEBURG, OLDENBURG, VEGESACK, BREMEN, DELMENHORST, BERGER, KLOPPENBURG, DIEPHOLZ, OSNABRUCK, GUTERSLOH, and DETMOLD;

e) by front reconnaissance aviation during the period from LAUNCH plus 12 to LAUNCH plus 17 minutes to support the rocket troops: by the 21st Tactical Reconnaissance Air Regiment -- the 13th, 6th, and 14th motorized infantry divisions, the 16th Tank Division, the 650th and the 450th Lance missile battalions; and by the 22nd Tactical Reconnaissance Air Regiment -- the Brown 3rd and 7th tank divisions and 150th Lance Missile Battalion, the Blue 1st and 2nd armored divisions, and 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments.

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7. Control of rocket troops and aviation when delivering the initial nuclear strike

The control of rocket troops and aviation when delivering the initial nuclear strike is to be effected by the front commander personally from the command post and through the chief of the front rocket troops and artillery, the commander of the 1st Air Army, and the commanders of the armies.

The commanders of the armies are to control their rocket troops personally from their command posts.

Until the start of the initial missile launch (aircraft takeoff), the main means of communications are to be the fixed and field cable communications links used with secure communications equipment, the signal procedure tables, and the table of control signals with the schedule for the organization of the initial nuclear strike.

From the start of the initial launch (aircraft takeoff) use of radio communications is unlimited.

The coordinates of detected targets are transmitted from on board the aircraft following a coded map. The target coordinates transmitted by aircraft will be received at the staffs of the front and army missile brigades and at the command posts of the armies and of the front.

Reports on the accomplishment of launches (delivery of air strikes) against planned targets are to be made immediately following the accomplishment of the launch (strike) over all operating communications channels of the VOZDUKH /air/ series.

8. Cooperation

a) In the initial nuclear strike, the Strategic Rocket Forces are to hit enemy targets in the front offensive zone west of the NORDEN-DORTMUND line.

b) The Coastal Front, by destroying the batteries of the 38th and 39th Hawk missile battalions, is to support the transit on this axis of long-range and front aviation.

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c) During the initial nuclear strike, aviation of the Combined Baltic Fleet is to hit: delivery aircraft at airfields Nos. 9 (RENDSBURG), 06 (EGGEBEK), 08 (JAGEL), and 10 (FRIEDRICHSORT); three mine depots in the areas of FLENSBURG, ECKERNFORDE, and KIEL; and the command post of the combined naval forces in the area of HOLTENAU.

d) At the boundary with the Coastal Front, the Western Front is to destroy by means of a nuclear strike the large units of the Violet 1st Army Corps and of the Brown 3rd Army Corps.

Cooperation communications with the 3rd Army will be effected by radio link through the 9th Army operations group that is with the 3rd Army staff.

9. Organization of radioelectronic warfare

a) With the object of disrupting the enemy's control of his nuclear attack means and his troops and reducing the capability of his electronic warfare units, the following are to be destroyed during the initial nuclear strike:

-- with nuclear weapons: the forward command post of the Northern Army Group and the command post of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force in the areas of BRAMSCH and IBBENBUREN; the command posts of eight /sic/ army corps (the Brown 6th, 1st, and 4th army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, and the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps); warning centers and posts in the areas of AHRENSBURG, WROHM, EIGEN, BAD-MUNDEN, and FALLINGBOSTEL;

-- with conventional means (artillery and aviation): the reconnaissance and jamming means of the 18th, 13th, 6th, 14th, and 1st motorized infantry divisions, the Brown 16th, 3rd, and 7th tank divisions, and the Blue 1st and 2nd armored divisions, the radioelectronic means of detection, target designation, and guidance of the 39th, 38th, 31st, 36th, 5th, 35th, 37th, and 3rd Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions.

The following are to be neutralized by jamming:

-- by the electronic neutralization units of the front and armies: up to 60 of the key shortwave and 50 radio-relay communications /links/ of the control posts of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (including two nets supporting the delivery of nuclear strikes and control of nuclear weapons units); the communications of the 1st and 2nd air defense sectors of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the Brown 6th, 1st, and 4th army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, and the Lilac 1st and 2nd

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army corps; and up to 60 ultra-shortwave /VHF/ and 50 radio-relay communications /links/ of the ten divisions of the enemy's first echelon;

-- by electronic neutralization units of the front and the 1st Air Army: up to 100 ultra-shortwave communications /links/ for guiding enemy aircraft to ground targets and up to 400 aircraft receivers of the Tacan radio-navigation system in the zones of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies;

-- by helicopter means of electronic neutralization of the 23rd Separate Electronic Countermeasures Air Regiment of the 1st Air Army: the radar means of air defense control and warning centers and posts, and of the detection, target designation, and guidance stations of the 39th, 38th, 31st, 36th, 5th, 35th, 37th, and 3rd Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions;

-- by aircraft means of electronic neutralization of the 23rd Separate Electronic Countermeasures Air Regiment and one electronic neutralization aviation squadron of the 6th Bomber Division, in conformity with the plan of the commander of the 1st Air Army: enemy ground air defense radar means.

Electronic neutralization units of the front and the 1st Air Army are to provide cover against precision bombing for the siting areas of the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 6th army missile brigades, the 2nd Corps Missile Brigade, and the command posts of the front and the 1st Air Army. #

b) In the interests of assuring the stability of troop control under conditions of active enemy jamming:

* -- from LAUNCH plus 12 minutes, retransmission posts on board MI-4 helicopters are to be used as a supplement;

-- radio communications with front and army missile brigades are to be ensured on shortwave and ultra-shortwave bands by using tropospheric sets. In addition, main and bypass radio-relay communications links from the front and the armies are to be established in each brigade and battalion.

c) With the aim of assuring electromagnetic compatibility of the operating electronic means controlling the nuclear strike, and also of precluding jamming of our radioelectronic means while the enemy is being jammed, the electronic neutralization plan, the communications plan, and the plans of the branch arm chiefs will provide for: the frequency

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separation of operating communications means; the prohibition of jamming on the frequencies employed in nets used for control of nuclear strikes, for reconnaissance, transmission of data from on board aircraft, and for air defense control and radiotechnical reconnaissance; and the signalling of immediate cessation of jamming on certain frequency bands.

Reference data on the dimensions of targets to be hit, their combat composition, and some norms of combat readiness of enemy troops

The Pershing missile squadron -- has nine launchers, with three launchers per platoon. The squadron's siting area measures 10 x 15 kilometers.

The Lance missile battalion -- has six launchers, three batteries with two launchers each. The battalion siting area measures 15 to 20 x 15 to 20 kilometers. The battery launching site measures 300 x 300 meters. Distance between batteries is 3 to 5 kilometers. The time from the march to launch readiness is 15 minutes.

The Sergeant missile battalion -- has four launchers, with one launcher per battery. The battalion siting area measures 15 to 20 x 15 kilometers. A battery launching site measures 300 x 400 meters. Distance between batteries is 5 to 10 kilometers.

The time from the march to launch readiness is 45 minutes.

Tactical nuclear means

In the Brown SMAP /?composite artillery regiment/ an Honest John free-rocket battery has four launchers. In the Lilac and Violet army corps, the Honest John free-rocket battalion has four launchers. The battalion siting area measures 1 x 2.5 kilometers.

One primary site and two to three alternate sites, measuring 300 x 300 meters, are prepared for a battery.

The siting area for a 203.2-mm howitzer atomic artillery battery measures 1,000 x 800 meters.

The siting area for a 203.2-mm howitzer battalion -- three batteries -- measures 4 x 5 kilometers.

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Air defense means

A Brown Hawk surface-to-air missile battalion has four batteries of six launchers each, totaling 24 launchers, and is sited on an area measuring 15 to 20 x 30 kilometers. A battery occupies an area of 300 x 400 meters.

A Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile battalion has four batteries of nine launchers each, totaling 36 launchers. It is sited on an area measuring 30 to 40 x 60 kilometers. A battery occupies an area of 400 x 600 meters.

Airfields -- In all, in the offensive zone of the Coastal Front there are up to 100 runways over 1,800 meters in length.

All airfields are equipped with arch-roofed aircraft shelters up to 60 centimeters thick with concrete doors. In peacetime, two to three air squadrons of 18 to 24 aircraft each -- 36 to 72 in all -- are based at each airfield.

Command posts and communications centers

The command post of an army corps is disposed on an area measuring 2.5 x 1.5 kilometers.

The command post of a division is disposed on an area measuring 1 x 1.5 kilometers.

Communications centers (control and warning centers and control and warning posts) are located near inhabited localities in underground shelters and dugouts located in areas measuring 500 x 800 meters. Barracks and surface installations are situated on them. The components to be hit are the communications means and antenna-feeder devices.

Concentration areas (departure areas) of motorized infantry divisions and tank divisions

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Concentration areas of Brown, Lilac, and Violet motorized infantry and tank divisions, and Blue tank divisions /sic/ measure 20 x 30 and 20 x 25 kilometers /respectively/.

Reconnaissance capabilities with respect to time and accuracy in determining target coordinates

Type of Reconnaissance	Data Acquisition Time	Mean Errors in Determining Coordinates
Special-purpose reconnaissance groups	30 to 90 minutes	up to 300 meters
Radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance of an army or <u>front</u>	up to 40 minutes or more	--
Air reconnaissance:		
-- photographic prints	up to 6 to 8 hours	--
-- photographic -- on wet negatives	25 to 45 minutes	--
-- visual spotting with transmission of coordinates from on board aircraft	3 to 5 minutes after spotting	400 meters
Agent reconnaissance	45 minutes to 1.5 hours	200 to 500 meters

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The reconnaissance aircraft details required for final reconnaissance are as follows:

- a) For reconnaissance of a platoon (battery) of Pershing, Lance, and Sergeant missiles -- one or two aircraft are required;
- b) For final reconnaissance of an army corps command post or one Hawk missile battalion -- two tactical reconnaissance aircraft are required;
- c) For final reconnaissance of troops on the march when a division is advancing along three routes -- two aircraft for each route.

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