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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

3 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :
Preparation and Critique of the Plan
for the Front Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson about the overall planning by a front chief of staff for an offensive in the area of NATO's Northern Army Group. Charts showing specific nuclear targets and specific forces and axes of the offensive are included.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 19 : Preparation and Critique of the Plan for the Front Offensive Operation

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as front chiefs of staff in making the overall plan for the Coastal Front's offensive in the area of NATO's Northern Army Group. The time schedule for the offensive in the model plan calls for the front to cover the 600 kilometers to the North Sea coast in 10 to 12 days. Two charts are included. One shows the number and yield of nuclear warheads allocated to strike specific NATO targets: missile and SAM units, airfields, nuclear weapons depots, and control and warning centers. The other chart shows the distribution of front forces for attack on the two main axes (CELLE, BRUSSELS and BAD OLDESLOE, FLENSBURG) and for amphibious assaults on Kiel Naval Base and Fehmarn Island.

End of Summary

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LESSON 19

I. Subject: "Preparation and critique of the plan for the front offensive operation."

II. Estimated time for completing the lesson.

| Time allocated | | Total |
|-----------------------|------------------|-------|
| Group training period | Individual study | |
| 6 | 12 | 18 |

III. Training objectives:

- to study with the students the content of the plan for the front offensive operation;
- to give the students practice in the independent development of a plan for the front offensive operation;
- to teach the students the skill of reporting the plan for the front offensive operation clearly, briefly, and in proper sequence.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson: group exercise with war game elements.

V. Methodological recommendations on preparing the students for the lessons

* In giving the briefing before the beginning of the students' independent study, the lesson directors will recommend that they study paragraphs 88, 98, and 99 in the Field Service Manual for Staffs, the section "Planning an Operation" in the textbook Front Offensive Operations, and the plan for the front offensive operation in the Collection of the forms of combat documents.

* Comment : This may be a reference to Chapter II, Section 3, of the 1974 textbook. See FIRDB-312/01997-79.



They /the lesson directors/ will give instructions on the procedure in developing the plan for an offensive operation and the explanatory memorandum thereto, and will also establish the time when these must be submitted to the director for checking.

In the process of developing the plan for a front offensive operation, the lesson directors will monitor and direct the students' work so that it is high in quality and fully developed, and they will also prepare comments for the critique during the lesson.

The lesson directors will carefully check the plans and explanatory memoranda prepared by the students, and will give the students instructions on their revision.

In preparing for the lesson and during the course of it, the lesson directors will be guided by the decision of the front commander on the offensive operation, by the front operational directive, by the instructions on planning the operation, by the assignment for the lesson, and by the plan for the front offensive operation and the explanatory memorandum thereto.

VI. Procedure for conducting the lesson

1. Theoretical matters -- 10 to 15 minutes.
2. Structure of the plan for the front offensive operation -- 45 minutes.

The students will report the arrangement of the plan for the front offensive operation as follows:

- the initial data for development of the plan for the front offensive operation;
- the documents of the plan for the front offensive operation;
- the content of the graphic part of the plan for the front offensive operation;
- the content of the written plan for the front offensive operation;
- the content of the explanatory memorandum to the plan for the front offensive operation.

Report on the structure of the plan for the front offensive operation

1. The initial data for the development of the plan for the front offensive operation are:

- the operational directive of the Supreme High Command; ✓
- the instructions of the General Staff; ✓
- the decision of the front commander on the operation;
- the results of the estimate of the operational situation.

2. The plan for the front offensive operation is a decision developed in detail. In planning the front offensive operation, the following are set out in detail: the sequence and methods of fulfilling each of the tasks of the operation; the distribution of efforts and materiel by tasks and on the axes of the attacks; the establishment of the procedure for cooperation; and the development of the matters of party-political work, of all types of combat action support, and of troop control.

The following relate to the documents of the front offensive operation:

- the plan for the front offensive operation;
- the plan for the initial nuclear strike of the front;
- the plan for the airborne landing operation;
- the plan for the amphibious landing operation;
- the plan for the operational cover and deployment of front troops;
- the plan for party-political work;
- the plan for the combat employment of rocket troops and artillery in the front offensive operation;
- the plan for combat actions of the air army in the offensive operation;
- the reconnaissance plan;
- the plan for protection against weapons of mass destruction;
- the operational camouflage plan;
- the engineer support plan;
- the chemical support plan;
- the electronic neutralization plan; ✓
- the topogeodetic support plan;
- the hydrometeorological support plan;

- the rear services support plan;
- the plan for organization of troop control in the offensive operation;
- the plan for communications, as an integral part of the control plan.

3. The plan for the front offensive operation may be worked out graphically on a map or in written form.

On the map of the plan for the front offensive operation the decision will be plotted in its full scope and will additionally /include/:

- the zones of responsibility for destruction of /enemy/ landing forces and sabotage groups;
- the march routes for advance to the lines of commitment of the second-echelon large units of the armies and the front;
- the forces and means allocated for cover;
- the axes of attack and lines of commitment of the second-echelon large units of the armies for the breakthrough of the /enemy's/ forward defense line;
- the procedure for troop cooperation in joint fulfillment of the tasks;
- the sectors for the breakthrough of the enemy's forward defense line by the first-echelon armies;
- the sectors for the troops' assault crossings of water obstacles;
- the lines of consolidation during the development of the operation;
- the groupings of the main forces and means for fulfillment of the immediate and follow-up tasks of the front (formations, front missile brigades, surface-to-air missile brigades, rear bases and control posts), and other data not depicted on the map of the decision.

4. In developing a written plan for the front offensive operation, the following are set forth in it:

- the conclusions from clarification of the task and the estimate of the situation;
- the concept of the front offensive operation;



- the planning for the combat actions of front troops by tasks;
- the procedure for covering the troops' advance and deployment;
- the tasks and procedure for conduct of party-political work;
- the support for troop combat actions in the operation;
- the organization of control of front troops in the operation.

A map of the decision is to be attached to the written plan for the front offensive operation.

5. The explanatory memorandum attached to the graphic plan for the front offensive operation sets forth the following:

- ✓ brief conclusions based on an estimate of the situation;
- ✓ the purpose and concept of the operation;
- ✓ the combat composition of the front troops, and the distribution of reinforcement means and flight resources by tasks and armies;
- ✓ the quantitative and qualitative balance of forces and means of the sides and their readiness;
- ✓ the procedure for fulfilling the main tasks of the front, depending on the conditions and the possible initiation of the war;
- ✓ the purpose and tasks of the initial nuclear strike of the front, the forces and means allocated to deliver it, and the availability and times of intake and distribution of the nuclear warheads;
 - the support of front troops during delivery of the nuclear strikes;
 - the organization of preparatory fire, and the procedure for fire support and close fire support of the troops;
 - the tasks of employing front and army aviation in the operation;
 - the procedure for cooperation of front troops, forces, and means in the operation;
 - the main tasks and undertakings for support of the operation;
 - ✓ the times of deployment and readiness of the front troops for the offensive;
 - ✓ the availability, receipt, and distribution of materiel;

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-- the organization of control, and the signals for troop cooperation and control.

3. /sic -- should be 6./ Content of the main matters of the plan for the front offensive operation -- 150 minutes.

Operational time -- 2400 hours 1 September

The students will report the content of the main matters of the plan for the front offensive operation as follows:

- the schedule of arrival and occupation by the front troops of the departure areas for the offensive;
- the grouping of the enemy's troops and the possible nature of their actions;
- the effect of the means of the Supreme High Command, of the Air Defense Forces of the Country, and of the combat actions of adjacent forces on the fulfillment of the tasks by front troops;
- the allocation of the efforts of the troops on the axes of attacks and the procedure for fulfillment of the tasks;
- the organization of the repulse of an enemy invasion;
- the content of the initial nuclear strike;
- the cooperation of front troops with the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Defense Forces of the Country, and with adjacent forces in fulfilling the most important tasks in the operation;
- the organization of the control of front troops in the occupation of departure areas and during the operation.

Report of the content of the main matters of the plan for the offensive operation of the Coastal Front

Front troops will be brought to an increased level of combat readiness by 1000 hours 1 September and to full combat readiness by 2000 hours 1 September.

1. Occupation of the departure areas for the offensive by large units and units of the Coastal Front is planned to take place during two nights (on 6 and 7 September). Combat support (covering) units will move forward on the night of 2 September to reinforce the cover of the state border; units allocated for engineer preparation of the departure areas for the offensive and engineer troops will move out on the night of 3 September. The

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schedule for the occupation by front troops of the departure area for the offensive is prescribed as follows:

-- on the night of 6 September the first-echelon large units, rocket troops, air defense troops, and control posts will move into the departure areas;

-- on the night of 7 September the second-echelon large units of the armies, and large units of the front reserve, branch arms, and special troops /will move into the departure areas/.

Occupation of the departure areas for the offensive by front troops will be completed by 0530 hours 7 September.

Front control posts will move forward as follows:

-- the alternate command post by 0400 hours 6 September; the command post by 0400 hours 7 September; and the rear control post by 0500 hours 7 September.

2. In the Coastal Front zone, West deploys the Northern Army Group, composed of the following: nine to ten army corps (the Brown 1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th army corps, the Blue 1st and 2nd army corps, the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, the Violet 2nd Army Corps, and three to four separate divisions); the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force; and significant naval forces in the Baltic and North seas. In all, /West deploys/ 30 to 31 divisions, more than 1,000 aircraft, and approximately 600 combat ships and boats. In the course of five to seven days they can complete the deployment of their main forces and the establishment of attack groupings of troops on the axes of the probable attacks, HAMBURG-SZCZECIN and HANNOVER-BERLIN, having at least four to five army corps in the first echelon.

The strength of these groupings can amount to the following:

-- the HAMBURG /grouping/: 10 to 12 divisions (the Brown 4th and 6th army corps, the Lilac 1st Army Corps, and one or two separate divisions); approximately 60 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers; approximately 3,000 tanks, more than 2,000 guns and mortars (including over 200 nuclear weapons); and 1,600 to 1,650 antitank means.

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-- the HANNOVER /grouping/: 15 to 16 divisions (the Brown 1st and 5th army corps, the Blue 1st and 2nd army corps, the Lilac 2nd Army Corps, and one to two separate divisions); over 100 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers; more than 4,000 tanks; approximately 3,000 guns and mortars (including 250 to 260 nuclear weapons); and over 2,000 antitank means.

During the offensive the enemy troop grouping may be reinforced by the Violet 2nd Army Corps and by additional deployment of Brown large units.

In an initial massive nuclear strike at the beginning of the operation against troops and installations of the front rear, West may employ approximately 370 nuclear warheads of varying yield (including 36 Pershing missile launchers, 28 Lance and Sergeant missiles, 44 Honest John free-rocket launchers, up to 160 delivery aircraft, and more than 80 atomic guns).

One might expect the enemy's actions to be of the following nature: to split the Coastal Front troop grouping by surprise attacks on two axes; to destroy the grouping in detail, and to arrive at the ODER River on the fifth to sixth day of combat actions. In case of an unsuccessful outcome of the border engagement and if many losses are sustained, it is believed that the Northern Army Group will go over to the defense on the line ELBE-LUBECK Canal, LUNEBERG, UELZEN, BRAUNSCHWEIG, and will conduct delaying actions, exploiting the naturally advantageous lines of the terrain.

During the defensive actions, West may deliver counter-thrusts: in the battle for the forward defensive line, with the second-echelon forces of the first-echelon army corps; in the battle for the LEINE and WESER rivers, with the Northern Army Group's operational reserve forces.

In conducting combat actions at the beginning of the war with conventional means of destruction, the enemy may go over at any time to the employment of nuclear weapons. In so doing, the most probable moments for the enemy's transition to actions using nuclear weapons may be the following: an unsuccessful outcome for the enemy of the border engagement of /his/ first-echelon troops, the enemy's loss of the forward defensive line or of the WESER River line, and the threat that our troops might reach the

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RHINE River.

The most important enemy targets in the zone of the front offensive east of the NORDEN, DORTMUND line, those whose destruction in an initial nuclear strike could lead to a significant weakening of his combat capabilities, are: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing; three battalions and two regiments of Lance and Sergeant missiles; 12 to 14 divisions of the first operational echelon; 15 to 18 airfields where tactical aviation and army aviation are based; 16 to 18 nuclear weapons depots; up to ten battalions of Nike and Hawk surface-to-air missiles; the command posts of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the allied naval forces, and of five to six army corps; and four to five control and warning centers (posts) and electronic warfare centers.

3. If West unleashes a war employing nuclear weapons, enemy troops and installations will be destroyed in an initial nuclear strike as follows: by the Strategic Rocket Forces -- /those/ west of the NORDEN, DORTMUND line; by the Combined Baltic Fleet -- enemy aviation at four airfields; three mine depots; and the allied naval forces command post. This will create conditions favoring the successful development of an offensive at high rates of speed and the attainment of the final purpose of the operation within the prescribed time.

If combat actions begin without the employment of nuclear weapons, according to the plan of the Supreme High Command an air operation will be conducted to destroy the enemy's missile/nuclear and air groupings in the theater of military operations. This will also contribute to the successful development of an offensive by front troops.

In the departure areas for the offensive, front troops will be covered by the forces of the 6th Corps of the 8th Army of the Air Defense of the Country, made up of the 56th, 57th, and 58th surface-to-air missile brigades; the 50th, 51st, 52nd, and 54th S-75 surface-to-air missile regiments, the 33rd, 34th, 35th, and 36th fighter aviation regiments; the 15th Radiotechnical Brigade, and the 101st OSNAZ-S /aircraft radio intercept/ Battalion. The forces and means of the 6th Air Defense Corps will substantially reinforce the air defense system of the front troops.

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On the right, the Combined Baltic Fleet will destroy the enemy's aircraft carrier grouping in the North Sea and other ship groupings in the North and Baltic seas; it will conduct, together with troops of the Coastal Front, an amphibious landing operation to capture FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base; it will assist in capturing the southwestern coast of the Baltic Sea and the southeastern coast of the North Sea and in organizing their defense; it will disrupt enemy shipping in the North Sea, and will safeguard shipments by sea in support of the front.

On the left, the Western Front will prepare an offensive operation on the KASSEL, KOBLENZ axis, with the aim of destroying, in cooperation with the Coastal Front, the troop groupings of the Northern Army Group and the main forces of the Central Army Group. The Western Front's 3rd Army on the right flank will mount an attack along the GOTTINGEN, MENDEN, BASTOGNE axis. In this way the decisive actions of the Combined Baltic Fleet and the 3rd Army of the Western Front will help the Coastal Front to fulfill the tasks assigned to it.

4. The main attack of the front will be delivered by the forces of the 7th, 9th, and 6th armies and the 10th Tank Army on the CELLE, BRUSSELS axis; the secondary attack will be delivered by the 4th Army and the 2nd Army Corps on the BAD OLDESLOE-FLENSBURG axis, with the conduct of an amphibious landing operation to capture FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base.

In fulfilling the immediate task of the front, forces of the 7th and 9th armies will inflict defeat on the Brown 1st Army Corps, and in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front will encircle and destroy the main forces of the Blue 1st Army Corps and the Violet 1st Army Corps; 4th Army forces, in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet, will inflict defeat on the enemy's HAMBURG grouping.

In order to build up the efforts of the front first-echelon troops, the 2nd Army Corps will be committed to battle on D3 to D4, from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRUNWALD on the BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN axis; the 6th Army /will be committed to battle/ on D3 to D4 from the FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF line or the SYKE, UCHTE line on the NIENBURG, RHEINE axis.

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From the commitment to battle of the 6th Army, the main efforts of the 7th Army and 2nd Army Corps will be concentrated on the destruction of the enemy's HAMBURG grouping. The 4th, 6th, and 9th armies, continuing their swift offensive, will fulfill the immediate task of the front on the fifth to sixth day of the operation and seize the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER.

On the first day of the operation it is planned that defeat will be inflicted on the large units of the enemy's first echelon and that /our troops will/ arrive at the AHRENSBOK, AHRENSBURG, LAUBENBURG, UELZEN, ESCHUDE, BROCKEL, PEINE, SALZGITTER line.

In case the enemy goes over to the defense on the forward line, the sectors of breakthrough are as follows: in the 4th Army zone, MOISLING GROSSBERKENTHIN (8 km), the breakthrough will be carried out by the forces of two divisions, with a density of 100 to 105 guns and mortars. In the 7th Army zone, WESENDORF, (excluding) GAMSEN (8 km), the breakthrough will be carried out by the forces of two divisions with a density of 100 to 110 guns and mortars. In the 9th Army zone, GAMSEN, (excluding) MEINE (9 km), the breakthrough will be carried out by the forces of three divisions with a density of 105 to 110 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

To seize FEHMARN Island, the 48th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 62nd Naval Infantry Regiment will be landed; /to seize/ the KIEL Naval Base on D2, the 16th Motorized Rifle Division (minus the 48th Motorized Rifle Regiment) and the 61st Naval Infantry Regiment /will be landed/.

In fulfilling the follow-up task, the front troops will develop the offensive on the BRUSSELS axis with their main forces; they will destroy the main forces of the Northern Army Group east of the IJSEL and RHINE rivers; they will destroy the enemy's RUHR grouping in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front; they will make an assault crossing of the IJSEL and RHINE rivers from the march, employing airborne landing forces; and on the tenth to twelfth day of the operation they will capture the BRUGGE, RANCE, CHARLEROI, DINANT line and arrive at the North Sea coast and organize its defense.

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To build up the efforts of the front troops in fulfilling the follow-up task of rapidly developing the offensive and making an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march, the 10th Tank Army will be committed to battle on D5 to D6 from the FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK line or the OLDENBURG, BORGHORST line on the GRONAU, EINDHOVEN axis, and an operational airborne force, the 30th Airborne Division, will be landed in the EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN area.

In conducting combat actions with nuclear weapons, it is planned that 376 nuclear warheads will be used in the initial nuclear strike to destroy the following: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, three battalions and two regiments of Lance and Sergeant missiles, 17 nuclear weapons depots, the delivery aircraft on 14 airfields, five control and warning centers (posts); the command posts of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and six army corps; and 30 to 40 Nike and Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries. Seventy-five to 80 percent destruction will be inflicted on 13 divisions, and 30 to 50 percent destruction on four divisions.

The operational disposition of front troops will be in two echelons. In the first echelon will be the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies; in the second echelon, the 6th Army, the 10th Tank Army, and the 2nd Army Corps; in the combined arms reserve, the 13th Motorized Rifle Division and the 20th Tank Division.

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DISTRIBUTION OF FRONT FORCES AND MEANS AND REINFORCEMENT MEANS

| Designation of attacks and elements of the front operational disposition | Formations, large units, and units | Rocket troops and artillery | Air defense troops | Engineer troops | Chemical troops | Electronic counter-measures units | Flight resources in regimental sorties | Nuclear munitions |
|--|---|---|--------------------|--|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Axis of the front main attack -- CELLE, BRUSSELS | 7th Army (1st, 4th, 11th mtzR divs, 5th, 9th tk divs, 7th Army Msl Bde, 7th Army Arty Bde, 7th SAM Bde) | 8th Arty Div of Res of Supr Hi Cmd /RVGK/ | | 12th Eng Obstcl Ctr Bn, (to D3), 22nd Pon Brdg Rgt & 27th Aslt Crss Bn (to D4), 1st Bn of 21st Eng Position Prep Rgt (from D4) | | | Ftr-Bmr Avn -- 17, Army Avn -- 24 | 15 R-300 msls (2x20, 4x40, & 9x100 kt); 41 R-65 msls (3x3, 10x10, & 28x20 kt); 8 bombs (5x20, 3x100 kt) |
| | 9th Army (6th, 18th, 21st, 23rd mtzR divs, 10th, 26th tk divs, 9th Army Msl Bde, 3rd SAM Bde) | 11th Arty Div of RVGK | | 11th Eng Obstcl Ctr Bn, (to D3), 3rd Bn of 2nd Eng Position Prep Rgt, 20th Pon Brdg Rgt (from D5) | | | Ftr-Bmr Avn -- 16, Army Avn -- 24 | 16 R-300 msls (3x20, 4x40, & 9x100 kt); 46 R-65 msls (4x3, 10x10, & 32x20 kt); 7 bombs (1x20 & 6x50 kt) |
| | 6th Army (12th, 17th, 28th mtzR divs, 19th Tk Div, 6th Army Msl Bde, 6th Army Arty Bde) | 8th Arty Div of RVGK (minus 2nd Gun Arty Bde) on commitment to battle | | 23rd Pon Brdg Rgt, 12th Eng Obstcl Ctr Bn, on commitment to battle | | | Ftr-Bmr Avn -- 12, Army Avn -- 18 | 17 R-300 msls (3x20, 5x40, & 9x100 kt); 17 R-65 msls (3x3, 5x10 & 9x20 kt); 6 bombs (2x5, 1x20, & 3x10 kt) |

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| | 10th Tk Army (15th, 22nd, 25th tk divs, 29th MtzR Div, 10th Army Msl Bde, 10th Army Arty Bde, 10th SAM Bde) | 11th Arty Div of RVGK (minus 15th Hvy How Bde & 12th Rkt-Lch Arty Bde) on commitment to battle | | 22nd Pon Brdg Rgt, 27th Aslt Crss Bn on commitment to battle | | | | 6 R-300 msIs (2x20 & 4x40 kt); 10 R-65 msIs (6x10 & 4x20 kt); 6 bombs (1x10, 2x20, & 3x100 kt) |
| Axis of the second attack -- BAD OLDES-LOE, FLENS-BURG | 4th Army (3rd, 7th, 8th, 14th mtzR divs, 2nd Tk Div, 4th Army Msl Bde, 4th Army Arty Bde, 4th SAM Bde) | 6th Arty Div of RVGK | 10th AA Arty Div (from D3) | 2nd & 3rd bns of 21st Eng Position Prep Rgt (from D4) | | | Ftr-Bmr Avn -- 10, Army Avn -- 20 | 15 R-300 msIs (2x20, 4x40 & 9x100 kt); 34 R-65 msIs (3x3, 7x10 & 24x20 kt); 5 bombs (3x5 & 2x10 kt) |
| | 2nd Army Corps (16th, 24th mtzR divs, 2nd Corps Msl Bde) | 1st Gun Arty Bde & 4th Hvy How Bde of 6th Arty Div of RVGK on commitment to battle | | | | | Ftr-Bmr Avn -- 3, Army Avn -- 4 | 8 R-300 msIs (1x20, 4x40, & 3x100 kt); 6/ R-65 msIs (1x3, 2x10, & 3x20 kt) |
| Amphibious landing forces: | | | | | | | | |
| -- to FEH-MARN Island | 62nd Nvl Inf Rgt, 48th MtzR Rgt | 46th S-60 AA Arty Rgt /of the/ 10th AA Arty Div of RVGK | | | | | Ftr Avn -- 6, Ftr-Bmr Avn -- 3, Bmr Avn -- 1, REW -- 1 | 2 R-300 msIs (40 & 100 kt) 4 bombs (2x5 & 2x10 kt) |
| -- to KIEL Naval Base | 16th MtzR Div (minus 48th mtzR Rgt), 61st Nvl Inf Rgt | | | | | | | |
| Airborne landing force | 30th Abn Div | | | | | | Ftr Avn -- 9, Ftr-Bmr Avn -- 3, Bmr Avn -- 2, REW -- 2 | 2 R-300 msIs (40 & 100 kt) 8 bombs (4x50 & 4x100 kt) |

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| Aviation | 1st Air Army (1st, 3rd, 5th ftr divs; 2nd, 5th, 8th ftr-bmr divs, 6th Bmr Div) | | 17th & 18th S-125 SAM rgts | | | | | |
| Combined-arms reserve of the front | 13th MtzR Div, 20th Tk Div | | | | | | | |
| Antitank reserve of the front | | No. 1 -- 4th AT Arty Bde; No. 2 -- 5th AT Arty Bde | | | | | | |
| Front mobile obstacle detachments | | | | No. 1 -- 1st Bn of 20th Cbt Engr Rgt; No. 2 -- 12th Engr Obstcl Bn | | | | |
| Engineer troops reserve | | | | 20th Cbt Engr Rgt (minus 1st & 4th bns); 20th, 23rd pon brdg rgts (to D4) | | | | |
| Chemical troops reserve | | | | | 3rd Chem Def Bde, 1st Rad Recco Helo Sqn, 13th Sep Rad & Chem Recco Co | | | |

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|--|---|---|--|---|---|--|---|---|
| For cover: | | | | | | | | |
| -- 3rd Front Missile Brigade | | | 14th S-75 SAM Rgt | | | 62nd Sep OSNAZ-S Bn | | |
| -- 7th & 9th armies | | | 15th Krug /SA-4/ SAM Bde | | | | | |
| -- 2nd Front Missile Brigade & 4th Army Command Post | | | 13th Krug /SA-4/ SAM Bde, 23rd S-60 AA Arty Rgt | | | | | |
| -- ODER River bridges | | | 10th AA Arty Bn Bn of RVGK (to D) | | | | | |
| For front undertakings | | | 17th Air Def Radiotech Rgt, 20th Radiotech Rgt (from D2) | 6th Eng Rd-Brdg Bde, 13th Eng Cmlg Bn 14th Eng Control Post Bn, 16th Sep Fld Wat Sup Bn | 16th, 18th obsk /7Sep Spec Monit Bn, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th rad & chem recce cos, 2nd, 3rd comput & analysis stas | 12th Sep OSNAZ-N Bn, 1st Sep ECM Helo Sqn; 12th Sep SPETSNAZ*, Rgt | | |

* Comment: SPETSNAZ in an ECM context refers to jamming units. OSNAZ-S and OSNAZ-N are aircraft and ground radio intercept, respectively.

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5. To repulse an enemy invasion it is planned that Coastal Front troops in the departure area will do the following:

- deliver air strikes against the enemy troops that have gone over to the offensive, and destroy them with artillery fire;
- units and large units allocated to reinforce the cover of the state border will conduct combat actions in the areas being occupied and will hold them firmly;

- antitank means will maneuver on the axes of the enemy penetration;

- the main forces of the first-echelon armies will deliver meeting attacks.


Rocket troops and aviation will remain in constant readiness for delivering the initial nuclear strike of the front. Air defense troops will repulse the enemy's air strikes. The 1st Air Army will support the combat actions of the front troops, and in cooperation with the air defense troops will repulse enemy air strikes.

6. The purpose of the initial nuclear strike of the front is as follows: to disrupt the massive use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, to disorganize his troop control, to weaken his air defense system, to attain a decisive superiority over the enemy's main ground forces grouping and his aviation in the zone of the offensive, and thereby to create conditions favoring the fulfillment by front troops of the tasks assigned to them in the operation. In the front's initial nuclear strike, the plan is to employ 376 nuclear munitions (90 operational-tactical missiles, 86 tactical missiles, and 200 by aviation). Their total yield is 30,542 kilotons (4x3 kt, 30x5 kt, 36x10 kt, 86x20 kt, 20x40 kt, 10x50 kt, 120x100 kt, 60x200 kt, and 10x300 kt). The following are allocated for delivering the initial nuclear strike: The 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades; the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 6th army missile brigades; the 2nd Corps Missile Brigade; the 1st Air Army and the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, 18th, 21st, and 23rd separate missile battalions. Of these, the following will make two launchings: 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 18th, 21st; and 23rd separate missile battalions.

The following are to be destroyed by nuclear weapons:

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| No. | Designation of Targets to Be Struck | Number and Yield of Nuclear Munitions | | | Who Strikes | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------|-------------------|--|------------------|
| | | Missiles | Bombs | Total | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
| 1 | a) To Destroy | | | | | |
| | Missile units: | | | | | |
| | 2nd Pershing Wing | 12x100 | -- | 12 | 2nd Front Msl Bde (6) 3rd Front Msl Bde (3) 9th Army Msl Bde (3) | |
| | 650th Lance Bn | 3x40 | -- | 3 | 4th Army Msl Bde | |
| | 150th Lance Bn | 2x40, 1x20 | -- | 3 | 6th Army Msl Bde | |
| | 450th Sergeant Bn | 1x20, 3x40 | -- | 4 | 2nd Corps Msl Bde | |
| | 50th Lance Msl Rgt | 3x100 | -- | 3 | 6th Army Msl Bde | |
| | 24th Lance Msl Rgt | 1x20, 2x100 | -- | 3 | 6th Army Msl Bde | |
| | 2 | Delivery Aircraft at Airfields | | | | |
| | | No. 12 (MARNE) | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 4th Army Msl Bde |
| | | No. 27 (OLDENBURG) | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 7th Army Msl Bde |
| | | No. 28 (VEGESACK) | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 7th Army Msl Bde |
| | | No. 30 (DELMENHORST) | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 6th Army Msl Bde |
| No. 29 (BREMEN) | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 7th Army Msl Bde | |
| No. 16 (WURSTERHEIDE) | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 2nd Front Msl Bde | |
| No. 33 (KLOPPENBURG) | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 7th Army Msl Bde | |
| No. 41 (OSNABRUCK) | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 3rd Front Msl Bde | |
| No. 23 (BUCKEBURG) | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 3rd Front Msl Bde | |
| No. 46 (DETMOLD) | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 9th Front Msl Bde | |
| No. 43 (GUTERSLOH) | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 9th Army Msl Bde | |
| No. 31 (BERGER) | -- | 1x200 | 1 | 2nd Ptr-Bmr Div | | |
| No. 07 (HUSUM) | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 4th Army Msl Bde | | |
| No. 34 (DIEPHOLZ) | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 3rd Front Msl Bde | | |
| 3 | Nuclear Weapons Depots | | | | | |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 4th Army Msl Bde | |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 2nd Corps Msl Bde | |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 2nd Corps Msl Bde | |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 3rd Army Msl Bde | |
| | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 9th Army Msl Bde | | |




| 1 | 2 | misfiled | Bombs | TOTAL | 6 |
|---|---|--------------|-------|-------|--|
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 9th Army Msl Bde |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 3rd <u>Front</u> Msl Bde |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 2nd <u>Front</u> Msl Bde |
| | | -- | 1x200 | 1 | 2nd Ftr-Bmr Div |
| | | 1x100 | -- | | 7th Army Msl Bde |
| | | 1x100 | -- | | 7th Army Msl Bde |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 3rd <u>Front</u> Msl Bde |
| | | -- | 1x300 | 1 | 6th Bmr Div |
| | | -- | 1x300 | 1 | 6th Bmr Div |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 9th Army Msl Bde |
| | | -- | 1x300 | 1 | 6th Bmr Div |
| | | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 2nd <u>Front</u> Msl Bde |
| 4 | Control and warning centers | | | | |
| | AHRENSBURG | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 4th Army Msl Bde |
| | WROHM | 1x100 | -- | | 4th Army Msl Bde |
| | <u>EYTIN</u> /sic -- ?EIGEN/ | 1x20 | -- | 1 | 3rd Sep Msl Bn |
| | <u>BAD MUNDEN</u> /sic -- ?BAD MUNDER/ | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 6th Army Msl Bde |
| | FALLINGBOSTEL | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 6th Army Msl Bde |
| 5 | Control posts | | | | |
| | Northern Army Group CP | -- | 2x200 | 2 | 6th Bmr Div |
| | 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force CP | -- | 2x200 | 2 | 6th Bmr Div |
| | Brown 6th Army Corps CP | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 4th Army Msl Bde |
| | Brown 1st Army Corps CP | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 7th Army Msl Bde |
| | Brown 4th Army Corps CP | 1x40 | -- | 1 | 7th Army Msl Bde |
| | Blue 1st Army Corps CP | 1x40 | -- | 1 | 9th Army Msl Bde |
| | Lilac 1st Army Corps CP | 1x100 | -- | 1 | 7th Army Msl Bde |
| | Lilac 2nd Army Corps CP | 1x40 | -- | 1 | 9th Army Msl Bde |
| 6 | Air defense troops | | | | |
| | 24th Nike Bn | -- | 3x10 | 3 | 6th Bmr Div |
| | 25th Nike Bn | -- | 4x10 | 4 | 6th Bmr Div |
| | 39th Hawk Bn | 3x10, 1x3 | -- | 4 | 3rd Sep Msl Bn (2) 7th Sep Msl Bn (2) |



| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|--------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------|----|--|
| | 38th Hawk Bn | 1x10, 3x20 | -- | 4 | 8th Sep Msl Bn |
| | 31st Hawk Bn | 3x20 | -- | 3 | 14th Sep Msl Bn |
| | 36th Hawk Bn | 3x10, 1x3 | -- | 4 | 4th Sep Msl Bn (3) 5th Sep Msl Bn (1) |
| | 5th Hawk Bn | 2x20, 2x40 | -- | 4 | 3rd <u>Front</u> Msl Bde |
| | 35th Hawk Bn | 3x10, 1x3 | -- | 4 | 10th Sep Msl Bn |
| | 37th Hawk Bn | 4x40 | -- | 4 | 2nd <u>Front</u> Msl Bde |
| | 3rd Hawk Bn | 3x10, 1x3 | -- | 4 | 21st Sep Msl Bn |
| | 36th Thunderbird Rgt | 2x20 | -- | 2 | 9th Army Msl Bde |
| | b) <u>To Inflict Damage On</u> | | | | |
| 7 | Ground Forces Troops | | | | |
| | <u>Brown 6th Army Corps:</u> | | | | |
| | 6th Mtz Inf Div | 3x20 | 3x200, 4x100, 5x5 | 15 | 3rd Sep Msl Bn (3) 8th Ftr-Bmr Div (12) |
| | 18th Mtz Inf Div | 4x20, 5x20 | 2x100, 4x5 | 15 | 3rd Sep Msl Bn (1+3)* 7th Sep Msl Bn (2+3) 8th Ftr-Bmr Div (6) |
| | 13th Mtz Inf Div | -- | 2x200, 8x100, 6x5 | 16 | 8th Ftr-Bmr Div |
| | 21st Mtz Inf Div | 1x20, 2x100 | 2x100, 4x5 | 9 | 4th Army Msl Bde (3) 8th Ftr-Bmr Div (6) |
| | <u>Brown 4th Army Corps:</u> | | | | |
| | 14th Mtz Inf Div | 5x20 | 3x100, 5x50, 3x10 | 16 | 14th Sep Msl Bn (1) 11th Sep Msl Bn (4) 2nd Ftr-Bmr Div (11) |
| | 15th Mtz Inf Div | 5x20 2x10 | 4x200, 4x100 | 15 | 2nd Ftr-Bmr Div (8) 1st Sep Msl Bn (4+3) |
| | 16th Tk Div | 3x20 1x10 | 8x200, 4x20 | 16 | 9th Sep Msl Bn (4) 2nd Ftr-Bmr Div (12) |
| | <u>Lilac 1st Army Corps:</u> | | | | |
| | 1st Mtz Inf Div | -- | 5x100, 2x40, 4x5 | 11 | 4th Ftr-Bmr Div |

* Plus (+) denotes follow-up launch

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|-----|---|
| | 4th Mtz Inf Div | 3x100, 2x20 | 2x100, | 9 | 2nd Front Msl Bde (5) 2nd Ftr-Bmr Div (4) |
| | 5th Mtz Inf Div | -- | 2x100, 3x10 | 5 | 2nd Ftr-Bmr Div |
| | <u>Green 4th Motorized Inf Div</u> | -- | 14x200, 4x20 | 18 | 2nd Ftr-Bmr Div |
| | <u>Brown 1st Army Corps:</u> | | | | |
| | 1st Mtz Inf Div | 13x20 | -- | 13 | 4th Sep Msl Bn (1+3) 5th Sep Msl Bn (3+3) 10th Sep Msl Bn (+3) |
| | 11th Mtz Inf Div | -- | 10x100, 4x10, 2x5 | 16 | 4th Ftr-Bmr Div |
| | 7th Tk Div | 7x20 | 4x200, 2x50, 3x5 | 16 | 4th Ftr-Bmr Div (9) 18th Sep Msl Bn (4+3) |
| | 3rd Tk Div | -- | 10x200, 4x100, 2x5 | 16 | 4th Ftr-Bmr Div |
| | 27th Abn Bde | 2x40 1x20 | -- | 3 | 7th Army Msl Bde |
| | <u>Blue 1st Army Corps:</u> | | | | |
| | 2nd Armd Div | 7x20 | 5x100, 3x50 | 15 | 23rd Sep Msl Bn (4+3) 4th Ftr-Bmr Div (8) |
| | 1st Armd Div | 7x20 | 4x300, 3x200, 3x100 | 17 | 21st Sep Msl Bn (+3) 6th Sep Msl Bn (4) 6th Bmr Div (10) |
| | 4th Armd Div | -- | 3x300, 6x200, 6x100, 1x10 | 16 | 6th Bmr Div |
| | <u>Lilac 2nd Army Corps</u> | | | | |
| | 101st Mtz Inf Div | 4x100, 1x40 | -- | 5 | 3rd Front Msl Bde |
| | Total | 176 | 200 | 376 | |

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7. Cooperation of front troops is planned as follows:

a) The initial nuclear strike of the front from LAUNCH to LAUNCH + 5 minutes will be carried out by rocket troops against enemy targets whose coordinates are known. Simultaneously with the missile launch, the 1st Air Army will take off. From LAUNCH + 18 to LAUNCH + 45, the aviation will deliver nuclear strikes on the planned targets and will carry out final reconnaissance of the targets which are to be destroyed in the initial nuclear strike. From LAUNCH + 45 to LAUNCH + 50 the rocket troops will destroy the targets that have been given final reconnaissance and the newly discovered targets. At this time the second launches will take place.

At the moment the initial nuclear strike is being delivered, the personnel of units and large units will be under cover. The line of safe distance for our troops during delivery of the initial nuclear strike has been established as 4 to 5 kilometers from the nearest targets to be struck.

It is planned that the first-echelon large units of the armies which may lose combat effectiveness due to enemy nuclear strikes will be replaced by second-echelon large units of the armies and the front reserve; in case a first-echelon army is put out of action, a second-echelon army or army corps will be committed in its place.

b) The transition of front troops to the offensive without the employment of nuclear weapons is planned to take place after 15 to 20 minutes of preparatory fire against enemy troops who have begun an attack. Preparatory fire will begin simultaneously with the flight over the state border of the aviation taking part in the air operation.

The repulse of attacks by enemy ground forces will be carried out by covering troops from the areas to be occupied and by meeting attacks of the main forces of the front's first-echelon armies.

c) It is planned that the breakthrough of the enemy's forward defense line without the employment of nuclear weapons is to be done by 4th Army forces on an 8 km sector -- (excluding) MOISLING, (excluding) GROSSBERKENTHIN; and by 7th and 8th army

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forces on an 8 km sector -- WESENDORF, MEINE.

It is stipulated that a density of 100 to 110 guns and mortars per kilometer of front will be set up in the breakthrough sectors. Preparatory fire is planned to last from 34 to 37 minutes, based upon the possible density of the defense line occupied by the enemy.

For breakthrough of the enemy's defense and development of the offensive, it is planned that two divisions from the second echelons of the first-echelon armies will be committed to battle.

d) During fulfillment of the immediate task of the front, the following has been planned: the 4th Army forces, in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet, will inflict defeat on the Brown 6th Army Corps. In its subsequent commitment to battle (D2 to D3) from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRUNWALD, on the BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN axis, the 2nd Army Corps, in cooperation with the 7th Army, will destroy the enemy's entire HAMBURG grouping; the 7th and 9th army forces will destroy the Brown 1st Army Corps and in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front will encircle and destroy the Blue 1st Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps in the BRAUNSCHWEIG, BODENWERDER, NORDHEIM area.

To intensify the efforts of the first-echelon armies and to develop an offensive on the axis of the main attack of the front, the plan is to commit to battle the second echelon of the 6th Army on D3 to D4 from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF, or SYKE, UCHTE, on the NIENBURG, RHEINE axis. Upon commitment to battle of the 6th Army, the main efforts of the 7th Army will be concentrated on the destruction of the Brown 4th Army Corps.

The destruction of the enemy's operational reserves -- the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps -- is planned to be carried out by 6th, 7th, and 9th army forces in a meeting engagement.

e) To build up efforts and develop an offensive at a high tempo, the 10th Tank Army will be committed to battle on D5 to D6 from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK, or OLDENZAAL, BORGHORST, on the GRONAU, EINDHOVEN axis. During fulfillment of the follow-up task, it is planned that the 9th Army forces will encircle and destroy the RUHR grouping of the enemy's troops in

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cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front and that the forces of the 10th Tank Army and of the 6th and 7th armies will complete the destruction of the enemy troop groupings east of the IJssel and Rhine rivers and will make an assault crossing of them from the march in cooperation with the 30th Airborne Division. Provision has been made for the conduct of an airborne landing operation on D5 to D6 in the EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN area.

f) The NORDEN, DORTMUND line has been established as the line of cooperation with the Strategic Rocket Forces: west of this line the most important groupings of enemy troops, aviation, and installations will be struck by the forces and means of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

An amphibious landing operation is stipulated to be conducted on D and D2 together with the Combined Baltic Fleet for the purpose of capturing FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base. The Combined Baltic Fleet in the zone of the front will destroy: enemy aviation on four airfields, three mine depots, and the command post of the allied naval forces.

8. Control of front troops will be organized as follows:

a) During the advance to and occupation of the departure position for the offensive /control will be exercised/ by radio-relay and wire channels of the fixed communications net, using secure communications devices and mobile means, and through the communications nets of the provost and traffic control service and the movement control service. The time of readiness for the control and communications systems is 2000 hours 5 September.

b) During the operation, control of the front troops will be exercised from field control posts via all active communications nets employing secure communications devices and observing the measures that ensure secure troop control.

IV. Approval of the plan for the offensive operation -- 45 minutes.

Students in the role of the front chief of staff will report the plan for the offensive operation of the Coastal Front to the

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formation commander for approval:

- the purpose of the operation and the tasks to be fulfilled in it by front troops;
- the strength and possible grouping of the enemy, and the possible nature of his actions;
- the combat composition of the front troops and the distribution of efforts by tasks and axes;
- the concept of the operation;
- the planning of the initial nuclear strike of the front;
- the schedule for the preparation and occupation by the troops of the departure areas for the offensive;
- the combat employment of the aviation, branch arms, and special troops, and the support of the operation;
- the repulse of a possible enemy attack, and the transition to the offensive;
- the organization of troop control.

Report of the plan for an offensive operation
by the Coastal Front

1. In conformity with the directive of the Supreme High Command and with your decision and orders on the planning, the front staff has developed a plan for an offensive operation by the Coastal Front, /shown/ on a map and with an explanatory memorandum. The staff of the air army and the chiefs of the branch arms, special troops, and services have developed plans for the combat employment of aviation, rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops, electronic countermeasures units, and special troops in the operation and also plans for the combat support of troops actions in the operation. The chief of the political directorate of the front has developed a plan for political work during the preparation and conduct of the offensive operation; the chief of the front rear /has developed/ a plan for the rear services support of the operation.

The plan for the operation has been worked out with a view to fulfilling the assigned tasks with the use of nuclear weapons, or with the use of conventional means of destruction only, and also with a view to having front troops, while they are in the departure position for the offensive, repulse a possible surprise enemy attack.

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The front offensive operation is planned on the basis of tasks.

The depth of the immediate task is 200 to 250 km, the duration of its fulfillment is five to six days, and the average rate of advance is 40 to 50 km per day. The depth of the follow-up task is 350 km, the duration of its fulfillment is five to six days, and the average rate of advance is 60 to 70 km per day.

The total depth of the operation is 600 km, its duration is 10 to 12 days, and the average rate of advance is 50 to 60 km per day.

2. In planning the offensive operation we took as a point of departure the fact that West could complete full troop mobilization in a limited time in the Coastal Front zone, and could deploy attack groupings on the HAMBURG-SZCZECIN and HANNOVER-BERLIN axes with a strength, respectively, of 10 to 12 and 16 to 18 divisions. Their composition could consist of more than 170 launchers, 7,000 tanks, approximately 5,000 guns and mortars (including 450 to 470 atomic pieces), and more than 2,100 individual antitank means.

In the first echelon, the Northern Army Group could have four to five army corps (14 to 16 divisions, approximately 130 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers, approximately 5,000 tanks, more than 3,250 guns and mortars, including 216 atomic artillery pieces, and more than 2,100 antitank means.) This troop grouping could be supported by 850 aircraft from the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (including more than 350 delivery aircraft).

West's combat actions could begin with the use of nuclear weapons or with conventional means of destruction only. The concept of their actions may be as follows: To break up the Coastal Front troop grouping by delivering two splitting attacks on the HAMBURG-SZCZECIN and HANNOVER-BERLIN axes, to destroy the grouping in detail, and to arrive at the ODER River line on D5 to D6.

During the conduct of combat actions the enemy troop grouping may be reinforced through the additional mobilization of

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two or three Brown divisions.

In a massed nuclear strike at the beginning of the operation against front troops and installations, West may employ up to 370 nuclear warheads (to include 36 Pershing missile launchers, 28 Lance and Sergeant missile launchers, approximately 44 Honest John free-rocket launchers, more than 80 atomic pieces, and up to 160 delivery aircraft).

In case of an unsuccessful border engagement, West may go over to the defense on the forward line: LUBECK, LUNEBERG, UELZEN, BRAUNSCHWEIG, and when that is lost, to holding actions on the favorable natural terrain lines of the KIEL Canal, the rivers LEINE, WESER, EMS, IJSSEL, RHINE, MAAS, and others.

3. To fulfill the tasks assigned to it in the operation the Coastal Front has: five armies (including one tank army), one army corps, one air army, two front missile brigades, and three artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. In total: 29 divisions (18 motorized rifle divisions, 10 tank divisions, one airborne division), 102 operational-tactical missile launchers, 112 tactical missile launchers, 7,082 tanks, 6,246 guns and mortars, 5,665 antitank means, and 1,275 aircraft (including 587 delivery aircraft). For the operation the front has been issued 680 nuclear munitions, to include 160 R-300 missiles, 200 R-65 missiles, and 320 aerial bombs, plus 21 army sorties by the air army, of which three army sorties are to participate in the air operation in accordance with the plan of the Supreme High Command.

The plan is to establish two attack groupings. The one on the BAD OLDESLOE-FLENSBURG axis will be made up of one army and one army corps: the 4th Army (four motorized rifle divisions and one tank division), reinforced by the 6th Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command and by the 10th Antiaircraft Artillery Division from D /sic -- ?D3/ in the first echelon, and the 2nd Army Corps (two motorized rifle divisions) in the second echelon. On the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis /the grouping/ will be made up of four armies: the 7th and 9th armies (seven motorized rifle divisions and four tank divisions) in the first echelon, and the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army (four motorized rifle divisions and four tank divisions) in the second echelon, reinforced respectively by the 8th and 11th artillery divisions

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of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. In addition, on this axis is planned the action of the antitank reserves, No. 1 -- the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade, and No. 2 -- the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade, together with mobile obstacle detachment No. 1 -- the 1st Battalion of the 20th Engineer Regiment and No. 2 -- the 12th Engineer Obstacle Battalion. Two divisions will be held in the front reserve -- the 13th Motorized Rifle Division and the 20th Tank Division.

With an overall relative strength in launchers of 1.2 to 1, in tanks of 1 to 1, in guns and mortars of 1.2 to 1 and in antitank means of 1.4 to 1 in favor of the front, the establishment of these attack groupings makes it possible to achieve a significant superiority over the enemy on the axis of the main attack: in tanks of 1.3 to 1, in artillery and mortars of 1.4 to 1, and in antitank means of 1.8 to 1. At the same time, on the axis of the other front attack, we yield superiority to the enemy only in tanks, /in a ratio of/ approximately 1 to 1.6.

Nuclear weapons are to be distributed as follows:

-- for fulfilling the immediate task -- 166 nuclear munitions, including 34 R-300 missiles (9x20 kt, 15x40 kt, and 10x100 kt), 60 R-65 missiles (12x3 kt, 18x10 kt, and 30x20 kt), and 72 aerial bombs (10x5 kt, 16x10 kt, 15x20 kt, 10x50 kt, 12x100 kt, 5x200 kt, and 4x300 kt);

-- for fulfilling the follow-up task -- 100 nuclear munitions, including 24 R-300 missiles (6x20 kt and 18x40 kt), 40 R-65 missiles (22x10 kt and 18x20 kt), and 36 aerial bombs (10x5 kt, 10x10 kt, 5x20 kt, 8x100 kt, 2x200 kt, and 1x300 kt);

-- the front reserve -- 36 nuclear munitions, including 12 R-300 missiles (5x20 kt and 7x40 kt), 14 R-65 missiles (4x3 kt, 4x10 kt, and 6x20 kt), and 10 aerial bombs (8x200 kt and 4x300 kt).

Flight resources are to be distributed as follows:

-- for fulfilling the immediate task -- 354 regimental sorties (including 90 by army aviation, 99 by fighter aviation, 68 by fighter-bomber aviation, 33 by bomber aviation, 33 by reconnaissance aviation, and 11 for radioelectronic warfare);

-- for fulfilling the follow-up task -- 199 regimental

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sorties (including 55 by army aviation, 54 by fighter aviation, 48 by fighter-bomber aviation, 18 by bomber aviation, 18 by reconnaissance, and 6 for radioelectronic warfare);

-- the front reserve -- 29 regimental sorties (including 5 by army aviation, 9 by fighter aviation, 8 by fighter-bomber aviation, 3 by bomber aviation, 3 by reconnaissance aviation, and 1 for radioelectronic warfare).

The air support planned for the troop offensive is to be three to four regimental sorties of army aviation and two to three regimental sorties of fighter aviation per day of battle for all the armies.

4. The following concept of troop actions is used as the basis of the planning for the Coastal Front operation:

a) Fulfillment of the immediate task of the front. To deliver two splitting thrusts; the main one, by the adjacent flanks of the 7th and 9th armies on the CELLE, OSNABRUCK axis, to defeat the large units of the Brown 1st Army Corps and, in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, encircle and destroy the Blue 1st Army Corps and the Violet 1st Army Corps in the BRAUNSCHWEIG, BODENVERDER, NORDHEIM area; the second thrust by the 4th Army forces on the BAD OLDESLOE, RENDSBURG axis, and in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet, is to inflict destruction on the Brown 6th Army Corps.

Commitment to battle of the second echelon of the front as follows: the 2nd Army Corps on D2 to D3 from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRUNWALD, on the BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN axis and the 6th Army on D5 to D6 from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF, or SYKE, UCHTE, on the NIENBURG, RHEINE axis will augment the efforts of the first-echelon troops, develop the offensive, and complete the final defeat of the HAMBURG and HANNOVER groupings.

Upon the commitment to battle of the 6th Army, the main efforts of the 7th Army will be directed toward the defeat, in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps, of the large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps and part of the Brown 6th Army Corps forces; the main forces of the front, developing a rapid offensive, will defeat the operational reserves of the Northern Army Group and on the fifth to sixth day of the offensive will fulfill the

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immediate task -- capture of the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER.

On the first day of the operation the depth of the task is planned to be 30 to 40 km. It is planned that destruction will be inflicted on the enemy troops by meeting attacks of the main forces of the first-echelon armies in the border engagement, and that by the end of the day the line AHRENSBOK, AHRENSBURG, LAUENBURG, UELZEN, ESCHEDA, PEINE, SALZGITTER, will be captured.

In case West goes over to the defense on the first line, LUBECK, LUNEBURG, UELZEN, BRAUNSCHWEIG, the plan is to break through this line: in the 4th Army zone, in the sector (excluding) MOISLING, (excluding) GROSSBERKENTHIN (8 km); and on the axis of the front main attack in the sector WESENDORF, (excluding) MEINE (17 km), with a density of 100 to 110 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

The plan is to seize FEHMARN Island on the first day of the operation by an amphibious landing of the 48th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 62nd Naval Infantry Regiment; and to seize the KIEL Naval Base with the 16th Motorized Rifle Division (minus the 48th Motorized Rifle Regiment) and the 61st Naval Infantry Regiment.

b) Fulfillment of the follow-up task of the front. The main efforts of the front troops will be concentrated on the OSNABRUCK-BRUSSELS axis. It is planned that on D5 to D6, with the commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK, or OLDENZAAL, BORGHORST, on the GRONAU, EINDHOVEN axis, the offensive will develop rapidly and defeat of the main forces of the Northern Army Group east of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers will be completed. The 9th Army, in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, will encircle and destroy the enemy's RUHR grouping, and make an assault crossing from the march of the RHINE River in cooperation with the 30th Airborne Division. In 10 to 12 days of combat actions the final objective of the operation will be attained -- seizure of the line BRUGGE, RANCE, CHARLEROI, DINANT, arrival at the North Sea coast, and the organization of its defense in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet.

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To assist the front troops in the assault crossing from the march of the RHINE River, an airborne landing operation is planned, with the 30th Airborne Division to be landed in the EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN area in order to seize the RHINE River crossings in the ARNHEM, WESEL sector.

5. The initial nuclear strike of the front is planned with a view to the destruction of the Northern Army Group's missile/nuclear grouping, aviation, and main ground forces east of the nuclear NORDEN, DORTMUND line. In this strike 376 nuclear munitions will be employed (including 86 R-300 missiles, 90 R-65 missiles, and 200 nuclear bombs); more than 300 of these /will be employed/ on the axis of the main attack of the front. The following will be destroyed in the initial nuclear strike: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, and the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion;

and
delivery aircraft at 14 airfields (No. 07 -- HUSUM, No. 12 -- MARNE, No. 16 -- WURSTERHEIDE, No. 27 -- OLDENBURG, No. 28 /sic -- probably No. 23/ -- BUCKEBURG, No. 31 -- BERGER, No. 33 -- KLOPPENBURG, No. 34 -- DIEPHOLZ, No. 28 -- VEGESACK, No. 30 -- DELMENHORST, No. 29 -- BREMEN, No. 41 -- OSNABRUCK, No. 43 -- GUTERSLOH, No. 46 -- DETMOLD).

The following will also be destroyed: five control and warning centers (AHRENSBURG, WROHM, EYTIN /?EIGEN/, FALLING-BOSTEL, BAD MUNDEN /sic -- probably BAD MUNDER/; the command posts of the Northern Army Group, of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, of the Brown 6th, 1st, and 4th army corps, of the Blue 1st Army Corps, and of the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps; and 37 Nike and Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries. Destruction of 75 to 80 percent will be inflicted on 13 divisions (the Brown 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 18th motorized infantry divisions, the Brown 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions and the Brown 27th Airborne Brigade; the Green 4th Mechanized Division, and Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions); and destruction of 30 to 50 percent will be inflicted on four divisions (the Brown 1st and 21st motorized infantry divisions and the Lilac 1st and 4th motorized infantry divisions).

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The following are allocated for delivery of the initial nuclear strike: the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th army missile brigades, the 2nd Corps Missile Brigade, the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the 2nd, 4th, and 8th fighter-bomber divisions, the 6th Bomber Division, all the separate missile battalions of the first-echelon large units, and the greater part of the separate missile battalions of the second-echelon large units. In all, 14 battalions, of which 10 battalions will carry out two launches each. The second launch will be three missiles /per battalion/.

The use of this number of nuclear munitions will ensure the swift defeat of the main forces of the enemy's opposing grouping and the successful development of the front offensive operation.

In case the operation is conducted with conventional means of destruction only, it is planned that the 1st Air Army will participate with three army sorties in the air operation, conducted according to the plan of the Supreme High Command. In this operation the air army will destroy the on-alert detachments of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the /on-alert/ batteries of the 650th and 150th Lance missile battalions, of the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, and of the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion, and the delivery aircraft at the following airfields: No. 03 (LECK), No. 07 (HUSUM), No. 24 (WITTMUND), No. 27 (OLDENBURG), No. 31 (BERGER), No. 37 (HOPSTEN), and No. 43 (GUTERSLOH).

6. Engineer preparation of the front troops' departure areas for the offensive is planned as follows:

- by covering units (9 regiments from the first-echelon divisions) and by the entire 1st, 8th, and 21st motorized rifle divisions from the morning of 2 September;
- by allocated troops (one motorized rifle regiment each from the 4th, 14th, 18th, and 23rd motorized rifle divisions), with the involvement of all engineer units from the morning of 3 September.

Engineer work will be completed with the arrival of front troops in the departure areas for the offensive in the period 6 to 7 September.

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Positions are to be prepared at the following distances from the state border: for the covering units -- 2 to 5 km away; the departure areas for the first-echelon large units -- 20 to 40 km away, and for the second-echelon large units -- 60 to 70 km away; and the concentration areas for the front reserves -- 100 to 120 km away.

It is planned that front troops will occupy the departure area on two nights: the night of 6 September the first-echelon large units, the rocket troops and artillery, and the air defense troops /will occupy the area/; the night of 7 September the second-echelon large units of the armies, the large units of the front reserve, and units of the branch arms, special troops, and the rear /will occupy it/.

Front troops will be ready for the offensive at 0500 hours 8 September.

7. The combat employment of aviation, branch arms, and special troops has been planned, /as well as/ matters of all types of support for troop combat actions in the operation. The plans made by the appropriate chiefs will be submitted to you today for approval.

The available forces and means allocated to the front for the operation, and their correct and efficient employment, will ensure fulfillment of the assigned tasks in the operation and the establishment of the prescribed reserves at its conclusion.

8. In case the enemy is the first to go over to the offensive, it is planned that his attacks will be repulsed by covering troops from the areas to be occupied, and that the main forces of the first-echelon armies will deliver meeting attacks.

The transition of front troops to the offensive is planned to immediately follow 15 to 20 minutes of preparatory fire on the enemy's means of nuclear attack, artillery, and main troop groupings.

9. Per plan, the front troops are to be controlled from the command post and the alternate command post, and in case these posts go out of action, from the airborne command post and the rear control post. Control systems and communications are to be

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ready at 2000 hours 5 September.

While the front troops are being brought to increased and full combat readiness, control is to be exercised from the permanent garrison posts and from protected and field /control/ posts. To this end, when increased combat readiness is put into effect, operations groups are to be sent to the protected and field control posts of the army corps and armies.

While troops are moving forward and occupying the departure position, control is to be exercised from field control posts by mobile means and over the communications nets of the provost and traffic control service and the movement control service.

Upon the beginning of combat actions, /control/ is to be by radio, with observation of secure troop control measures.

Up to the beginning of combat actions, the plan is to exercise troop control through the radio-relay and wire communications channels of the supporting communications net with the employment of secure communications devices, by mobile means, by staff officers, and by personal contact of the command.

4. /sic -- should be VII./ Assessment of the results of the lesson -- 15 minutes

The lesson director will assess the results of the lesson:

- /he will/ announce the subject of the lesson, the training objectives, and the results attained;
- comment on the quality of the students' preparation for the lessons;
- analyze with the students the quality of the plans they have developed for the front offensive operation and the explanatory memoranda attached thereto;
- draw attention to staff competence and to matters that were poorly mastered by the students, giving individual assignments as needed;
- touch on the unity, parallelism, and role of high-quality planning under modern conditions and following the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

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VII. /sic/ Reference material

✓ In the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the plan for a front offensive operation was most often /developed/ in written form, and a map of the decision was attached to it.

✓ As a rule, the written plan for the operation with the attached map of the decision was reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff.

As concerns the planning of operations in the Great Patriotic War, a lecture has been prepared under the title "The planning of front offensive operations according to the experience of the Great Patriotic War." This lecture is available in the general library.

Procedure for developing the plan for a front offensive operation

In order to maintain the secrecy of the plan for the operation, the number of persons allocated to its development is strictly limited. In peacetime the composition of the planning group is defined by an instruction of the General Staff, but in wartime the list of planners is approved by the front commander.

The plan for the operation is developed under the direction of the front chief of staff, together with the chiefs of branch arms and services and the air army commander.

The chiefs of the branch arms (services) and the air army commander who participate in planning the operation are called upon to work out matters of the use of branch arms and aviation only in the parts that concern them. In case of drastic changes in the situation at the beginning of combat actions, and also when preparing the subsequent offensive operation in the course of the war, a wider circle of persons drawn from command personnel of the front field headquarters may be brought into planning the operation, by order of the commander.

In the experience of the Great Patriotic War, plan development was done by a strictly limited circle of persons, with the observation of the strictest secrecy. At the beginning only the troop commander, a member of the Military Council, the front chief of staff, and the chief of the operations directorate

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would take part in developing the plan for the front offensive operation -- and sometimes, only the front commander and chief of staff. Later on, the circle of persons was widened.

Thus, in planning the Kiev offensive operation, the operations part of the plan was worked out by front commander N.F. VATUTIN and chief of staff S.P. IVANOV. When the basic part of the plan was ready, the commander of the 2nd Air Army, General S.A. KRASSOVSKIY, the commanders of the branch arms, and the chiefs of the services were brought into the planning.

Written operations plans were prepared by hand, usually in two copies: one would be sent to the General Staff or to General Headquarters for approval, and the second would be kept in the personal safe of the commander or chief of staff of the front.

Many plans were drawn up personally by front chiefs of staff. For example, the written plan for the offensive operation of the Western Front in August 1941 was handwritten by front chief of staff V.D. SOKOLOVSKIY, the graphic plan for the Kiev operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front was personally drawn on a 1:200,000 scale map by front chief of staff S.P. IVANOV, and so forth.

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