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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

18 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :
Preparation and Critique of the Plan for
Reconnaissance in the Front Offensive
Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson involving the planning for reconnaissance in support of the front offensive against NATO's Northern Army Group. The lesson indicates the number and type of reconnaissance resources available to the front, their capabilities, and the primary reconnaissance targets.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 9: Preparation and Critique
of the Plan for Reconnaissance in the Front Offensive Operation

SOURCE Documentary
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students planning for reconnaissance in support of a Coastal Front offensive in the area of NATO's Northern Army Group. The lesson lists priority target categories (over 500 of the 1,110+ targets are considered priority). These include missile and surface-to-air missile units, nuclear weapons storage areas, airfields for tactical and delivery aircraft, Northern Army Group and 6th Army Corps command posts, the allied naval headquarters, and the NATO defense lines. The front's reconnaissance resources include agent sources, special-purpose groups, COMINT and ELINT, and YAK-28R and MIG-21R aircraft. The lesson includes estimates of the probability of effective reconnaissance against each target category.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

Brown - West Germany
Green - United States
Lilac - Belgium

Blue - Great Britain
Violet - The Netherlands

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LESSON #9

I. Lesson subject: "Preparation and critique of the plan of reconnaissance in the front offensive operation"

II. Estimated time for completing the lesson:

Designation of the lesson	Time allocated		Total
	Group lesson	Individual study	
No.9	6 hours	8 hours	14 hours

III. Training objectives:

- to study, with a specific example, the planning of reconnaissance in the front offensive operation;
- to give the students practice in distributing reconnaissance forces and means according to tasks and targets, and in making calculations on the combat use of reconnaissance units in the front offensive operation;
- to make specific calculations on the capabilities of reconnaissance forces and means during a breakthrough of the enemy's defense;
- to explore forms and methods for the further improvement of reconnaissance planning in the front offensive operation.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson - group exercise on maps in the classroom.

V. Methodological recommendations regarding the students' preparation for the lesson. During the individual study hours the students must:

- study the lesson and the appendix thereto, and the recommended manuals and guides;
- study the reconnaissance forces and means of the front and their capabilities;
- complete the development of the "plan of reconnaissance

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of the Coastal Front for an offensive operation," according to the lesson;

-- prepare reports on the planning of reconnaissance, with the necessary calculations on the topics set forth in the lesson.

VI. Procedure for conducting the lesson:

A. Analysis of the theoretical aspects of the given subject
(The lesson director will define the theoretical aspects of the subject) -- 25 minutes,

B. Training topics to be completed and the estimated time.

1. Clarification of the purpose and tasks of reconnaissance and an assessment of the conditions for its organization and conduct -- 45 minutes.

It is advantageous to examine the given training topic in the following sequence: (a) Clarification of the purpose and tasks of reconnaissance; (b) the possible number and probable location of enemy targets and changes to be expected in the enemy's combat strength and grouping; (c) the condition of the front's reconnaissance forces and means, and their capabilities; (d) an estimate of the time for the organization of reconnaissance and for the preparation, deployment and dispatch of the reconnaissance organs to fulfill the reconnaissance tasks.

Operational time -- 1730 hours 1 September

(a) Clarification of the purpose and tasks of reconnaissance.

Variant of the report of the students.

The Coastal Front has the following tasks: to repel a possible enemy attack and not permit his incursion into East's territory; to prepare, and by special order of the Supreme High Command carry out, an offensive operation on the JUTLAND and HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axes; in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet and the Western Front to destroy the opposing grouping of Northern Army Group and 6th Army Corps troops and the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force; to seize the northern part of the Brown territory, the Lilac territory, and the Violet

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territory; and to arrive at the North Sea coast and organize its defense.

In conformity with the decision of the front commander and his orders, the purpose of reconnaissance is to detect the beginning of West's direct preparation for an attack and discover the concept of the command of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the 6th Army Corps on the conduct of combat actions; to determine the time and possible methods of attack, and to monitor the changes in the enemy's strength and grouping and in the nature of his actions during the operation.

In order to achieve the assigned purpose, the front's reconnaissance forces and means must fulfill the following very important tasks:

Before the beginning of the operation:

-- conduct continuous surveillance of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the 150th, 450th and 650th Lance missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 31st Fighter-Bomber Squadron, the 34th and 135th air wings, the 1st and 10th fighter-bomber wings, the 32nd Tactical Fighter Squadron, and the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, at their permanent locations and areas of combat alert; detect in timely fashion the time of deployment and the location of the siting areas (dispersal airfields) of the units, and also their readiness for employing nuclear weapons; determine the disposition sites of field points for the supply and storage of nuclear munitions, and the time of their issue to the units;

-- detect the enemy's measures for reinforcing the Northern Army Group and the 6th Army Corps; determine in timely fashion the movement of the staffs, units, and large units from their permanent garrisons to the concentration areas, and their moving out and deployment in their operational assignment areas; and monitor the establishment of attack groupings and the enemy's intentions for their use, especially on the LUBECK-SCHLESWIG and BRAUNSCHWEIG-OSNABRUCK axes;

-- detect the enemy's measures for reinforcing the air force and air defense groupings of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, for rebasing the air units to dispersal airfields and for deploying field air defense means; and also ascertain the enemy's intentions regarding their use;

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- determine the areas of deployment of the naval striking forces, and monitor changes in their composition and activity in the North Sea and the Baltic straits zone /BALTAP/;
- confirm continuously the position and status of targets for destruction by nuclear weapons.

During the operation /reconnaissance must/:

- establish the extent of destruction of the enemy, and his intentions regarding the further conduct of combat actions;
- pinpoint the disposition areas and the condition and nature of actions of the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps, paying special attention to detection of the disposition areas of the Northern Army Group's operational reserves;
- detect the undestroyed missile nuclear weapons units and delivery aircraft, and those newly arrived in the zone of the front;
- determine the nature of engineer preparation of the defense lines on the WESER, EMS, and RHINE rivers, and the KIEL CANAL.

Conclusion/s/:

- /1./ Complex and vital tasks of supporting the offensive operation have been assigned to the front reconnaissance.
2. Reconnaissance must obtain, in the shortest possible time, reliable data on the means of nuclear attack and on the main groupings of ground troops and aviation. While this is taking place, the targets for the initial nuclear strike of the front must be continuously confirmed.
3. The main efforts of the reconnaissance forces and means of the front are to be concentrated on the HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axis.
 - (b) The possible number and probable location of enemy targets, and changes to be expected in the enemy's combat strength and grouping.

Variant of the report of the students.

At the beginning of the war and during its course, troops of the Coastal Front may be opposed by the 6th Army Corps, the Northern Army Group (the Brown 1st, 4th, and 5th army corps, the Blue 1st and 2nd army corps, the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, and the Violet 2nd Army Corps), the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the allied naval forces.

Analysis shows that before the operation begins 965 targets associated with the enemy troops may be deployed in the front zone to the depth of the offensive operation, and that during the operation up to 1,181 targets /may be deployed/. The increase in the number of targets will occur because of the troops to be activated in the Brown territory and through the transfer of troops from the Blue territory.

Of the total number of 1,181 targets, 228 are means of nuclear attack, including 32 Pershing, Lance and Sergeant missile detachments and batteries; 23 squadrons of delivery aircraft (/and/ the airfields where they are based); 67 Honest John free-rocket and 203.2-mm (155-mm) howitzer batteries; 23 Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile batteries; and 83 supply and storage points for nuclear munitions. Five hundred and eighty (580) of the targets pertain to subunits, units and large units of the ground troops (motorized infantry, airborne, and tank battalions, artillery battalions, command posts, and others). One hundred and twelve (112) of the targets relate to air and air defense units (airfields for basing tactical aviation, surface-to-air missile batteries, antiaircraft artillery, control posts, warning posts, and others.) Fifty-one (51) targets relate to naval forces (naval bases, ports, operational large units, carrier strike groups, and air bases). Two hundred and ten (210) of the targets are installations of the operational rear and others (materiel depots, control posts, military industrial centers, bridges, crossings, defense lines, and others). Of the total number, 589 are most important, including 12 Pershing missile detachments, 20 Lance and Sergeant missile batteries, the 67 Honest John and 203.2-mm (155-mm) howitzer batteries, the 23 delivery aircraft squadrons/bases, the 23 Nike Hercules batteries, the 83 nuclear munitions supply and storage points, 190 motorized infantry (tank) battalions, 78 control posts for divisions, army corps, and the Northern Army Group, /plus/ 11

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divisions (reserves and the second echelon of the Northern Army Group), 35 airfields for basing tactical and army aviation, 42 Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries, and five defense lines.

From this calculation of the possible number of reconnaissance targets it is important to note that 19 percent of all the targets are means of nuclear attack, of which approximately 30 percent are tactical missile and atomic artillery subunits. Of the total number of targets in the enemy's first operational echelon, more than 700 may be deployed to a depth of up to 150 km from the state border; the other targets will be dispersed at a depth of from 150 km to 600 or 800 km. Approximately 75 to 80 percent of the targets are mobile.

Conclusions:

1. Of the total number of 1,181 targets, 734 targets, including approximately 340 most important ones, will be assigned to the reconnaissance forces and means of the front; the remaining targets will be assigned to the armies' reconnaissance forces and means.

2. The main efforts of the front's reconnaissance will be concentrated on the detection of the 340 most important targets.

3. To conduct reconnaissance effectively, it is advantageous to determine up to 17 areas for special attention.

(c) The condition of the reconnaissance forces and means of the front and their capabilities.

Variant of the report of the students.

The front has at its disposal the following types of reconnaissance: agent, special, radio and radiotechnical, and aerial.

Agent reconnaissance. The front has an active agent net (53 sources) for conducting agent reconnaissance, and has established an agent reconnaissance reserve (27 sources). An agent source can carry out reconnaissance of one or two targets. The probability of detecting a target by means of a single agent source is determined to be 0.6. Thus, the front's agent

reconnaissance can conduct reconnaissance of $(80 \times 2 \times 0.6) = 96$ targets.

Special reconnaissance. To carry out reconnaissance and special tasks in the enemy's rear, the front has in its complement a separate special-purpose regiment (72 special-purpose reconnaissance groups). A special-purpose reconnaissance group can conduct reconnaissance of an area of up to 250 sq km, or conduct reconnaissance of one or two targets. The probability of detecting a target by a special-purpose reconnaissance group is determined as 0.7. The special-purpose regiment can thus conduct reconnaissance of $(72 \times 2 \times 0.7) = 100$ targets.

Radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance. To conduct radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, the front has the following in its complement: a separate radio regiment (90 radio intercept posts and 28 radio direction-finding posts) and a separate radiotechnical regiment (40 radiotechnical posts, 40 radio intercept posts, and 12 radio direction-finding posts). In all, /the front has/ 130 radio intercept posts, 40 radio direction-finding posts, and 40 radiotechnical posts. With this number of posts, the regiments can provide surveillance of radio nets on 424 frequencies and of 96 radio-relay communications channels; can obtain 60 fixes per hour on the enemy's working radio stations; can detect and identify the type and affiliation of 180 to 200 ground radars; can detect 150 to 200 aircraft and track them on the basis of radar operation; and can detect, determine the type and affiliation, and monitor the location of 60 to 70 radio navigation system stations.

Aerial reconnaissance. The front has the following reconnaissance units in its air army to conduct aerial reconnaissance:

-- a separate operational reconnaissance air regiment. The regiment has 33 YAK-28R aircraft in service. Each aircraft can fly two or three sorties per day. Taking into account the percentage of materiel combat readiness and the probability that the aircraft will be able to overcome the enemy's anti-aircraft defense, the regiment can fly a total of 75 aircraft sorties on the first day of combat actions.

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The regiment is capable of the following during a day: reconnoitering and determining the coordinates of 50 to 70 targets; observing and establishing the enemy's movement over all types of roads, to an overall extent of 12,000 to 13,000 km; photographing up to 80 march routes covering up to 3,500 to 3,700 km; and detecting 60 to 70 percent of the enemy's working radars in the zone of the front.

-- a separate tactical reconnaissance air regiment (2). The regiment's inventory includes 40 MIG-21R aircraft. The sortie rate per aircraft may be three to four aircraft sorties per day. Considering the combat readiness coefficient (0,85 to 0,9) and the probability of overcoming the enemy's air defense (0,8), the regiment can complete up to 120 aircraft sorties on the first day of combat actions and has the following capabilities: reconnoitering 40 to 60 targets, determining their coordinates, and photographing them; observing and determining the enemy's movements on all types of roads over a total extent of 4,000 to 5,000 km, and in so doing photographing a march route up to 200 km in length; reconnoitering 40 to 50 troop concentration areas of 20 to 100 sq km each; and detecting 60 to 70 percent of the enemy's working radars in the zone of actions of a combined-arms (tank) army.

In all, the front's (active) reconnaissance forces and means are capable of the following in the course of a day:

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	Before the operation begins	During the operation
	Number	Number
Reconnoiter targets and determine their coordinates	155	340-400
Reconnoiter troop concentration areas	10-12 (in the border zone)	100
Determine troop movement on roads of a total length	100-150 km (in the border zone)	20,000-25,000 km
Provide surveillance of radio nets, /number of/ frequencies	424	424
Detect and determine type, affiliation and location of ground radars	180-200	180-200
Detect aircraft and track them on the basis of radar operation	150-200	150-200
Provide surveillance of radio-relay communications links, number of channels	96	96
Detect and determine the type and location of radio navigation system stations	60 to 70	60 to 70

Conclusions:

1. The main reconnaissance forces and means of the front are to be concentrated on discovery of the disposition areas of the means of nuclear attack, the main groupings of ground troops (divisions), command posts, airfields for basing delivery aircraft, Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile battalions, and

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defense lines,

2. For the most important targets (340), continuous, simultaneous surveillance by several sources should be organized; for the remaining targets, periodic surveillance should be conducted.

(d) Estimated time for the organization of reconnaissance and preparation, deployment and dispatch of reconnaissance organs to fulfill the reconnaissance tasks:

Variant of the report of the students.

The General Staff's combat instruction on reconnaissance was received at 0800 hours 1 September; the orders of the front commander and chief of staff on reconnaissance, at 1500 to 1700 hours 1 September.

It has been ordered that the reconnaissance instructions are to be submitted by 2100 hours 1 September; the reconnaissance plan, by 1100 hours 2 September. Reconnaissance forces and means are to be ready by 6 September. In all, 18 hours are /allocated for/ planning reconnaissance.

The time is to be allocated as follows:

- preliminary instructions are to be issued by 1800 hours 1 September;
- units and staffs are to be informed of the combat instructions on reconnaissance by 22 hours 1 September;
- planning of reconnaissance is to be completed by 1000 hours 2 September;
- radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance units of the armies and the front are to be fully deployed for reconnaissance by 0400 hours 2 September;
- the system of surveillance on the state border is to be organized by 0600 hours 2 September;
- matters of the cooperation of the front's reconnaissance forces and means and the sharing of information are to be coordinated with the staffs of the Combined Baltic Fleet and the Western Front by 3 September;
- collated data on enemy targets are to be in hand by 0500 hours 8 September.

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2. Calculation of reconnaissance forces and means according to targets -- 30 minutes.

It is advantageous to examine the given training topic in the following sequence: (a) The methods of determining the number of reconnaissance forces and means /needed/ for detecting the targets; (b) the calculation of the reconnaissance forces and means according to targets.

Operational time -- 1900 hours 1 September.

(a) The methods of determining the number of reconnaissance forces and means /needed/ for detecting the targets.

Variant of the report of the students.

In conformity with the estimate of the enemy's targets, their characteristics, and the condition and capabilities of the reconnaissance forces and means, a calculation has been made in regard to detecting the enemy's targets.

The calculation to determine the number of reconnaissance forces and means /needed/ to detect the enemy targets is based on the following requirements:

- the necessity of confirming an enemy target through several sources (in order to obtain reliable reconnaissance information), or through one reliable /source/;
- the specified degree /certainty/ of detection of the targets (means of nuclear attack, 0.9 to 1; control posts, 0.7 to 0.8; units and subunits of ground troops, 0.6 to 0.7; other targets, 0.4 to 0.5), and the mean errors in determining the coordinates of targets (installations) (for field artillery, up to 50 m; for tactical missiles, /up to/ 150 m; for operational-tactical missiles, 200 to 300 m);
- the probabilities of the reconnaissance forces and means' fulfilling the task (an agent source, 0.6; a special-purpose reconnaissance group, 0.7; operational and tactical reconnaissance aircraft, 0.6; radio direction-finding posts, 0.8 to 0.9).

For example, take as the reconnaissance target the 150th Lance Missile Battalion in the siting area before the beginning

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of combat actions. The battalion siting area consists of three primary and alternate areas for firing batteries, two technical positions, a fire control post (one shortwave radio net), and the disposition area of the servicing subunits.

The dimensions of the battalion siting area are 300 to 400 sq km; of the firing batteries' areas, 25 sq km.

The following are allocated to reconnoiter this target: one radio intercept post (for continuous surveillance) and one radio direction-finding group, which will be able to determine the disposition area of the control post when the battalion's radio and radiotechnical means are operating; one agent source, who can reconnoiter an area up to 250 sq km in size during daylight hours and determine the coordinates of one to two targets; and two aircraft sorties of the 22nd Tactical Reconnaissance Air Regiment. In one sortie, the reconnaissance aircraft can reconnoiter an area of 50 sq km and can determine the coordinates of two targets.

Thus, the forces and means allocated for reconnaissance of the target allow us to detect it with a probability of up to 0.9 - 1, and to obtain reliable data.

/Take as the/ target of reconnaissance the Lilac 4th Motorized Infantry Division in its concentration area during the operation. This reconnaissance target consists of 17 elements (the division command post, one rgdn /sic -- ?rocket launcher artillery battalion?/, four artillery battalions, four tank battalions, and seven motorized infantry battalions). The division occupies an area of up to 600 or 700 sq km in its concentration area.

The following are allocated for reconnaissance of this target: one radio intercept post for conducting surveillance of the work of the division shortwave radio net; when the radio means are operating the intercept post can determine the disposition area of the command post. One agent source and a special-purpose reconnaissance group, which can reconnoiter up to two to four targets. Three aircraft sorties of reconnaissance aircraft, which can reconnoiter an area of 180 sq km and determine the coordinates of up to five targets.

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Taking their capabilities into account, the allocated reconnaissance forces and means can conduct reconnaissance of the concentration area of the Lilac 4th Motorized Infantry Division with a probability of 0.6 to 0.7.

The requirements for reconnaissance forces and means to detect targets are defined in conformity with this method (see the calculation of reconnaissance forces and means according to targets).

In the enemy's complement of ground troops and means of nuclear attack there are up to 808 targets, 607 of which are /to be reconnoitered/ before the beginning of the operation. It is planned to allocate the following for the reconnaissance of these targets prior to the beginning the operation: 53 agent sources, 117 radio intercept posts, seven radiotechnical direction-finding groups, and 48 aircraft sorties; in the course of the operation, during fulfillment of the immediate task, 59 agent sources will be allocated, /as will/ 47 special-purpose reconnaissance groups, 117 radio intercept posts, seven radiotechnical direction-finding groups, and approximately 1,326 aircraft sorties by reconnaissance aviation.

In the air forces and air defense groupings there are 112 targets, of which approximately 108 /are to be reconnoitered/ prior to the beginning of the operation. The following are allocated for their reconnaissance prior to the beginning of the operation: two agent sources, 27 radio intercept posts, four radiotechnical direction-finding groups, and 21 aircraft sorties; in the course of the operation, during fulfillment of the immediate task, three agent sources, three special-purpose reconnaissance groups, 28 radio intercept posts, four radiotechnical direction-finding groups, and 174 aircraft sorties are to be allocated.

The reconnaissance forces and means for the detection of other targets are determined according to the same pattern.

Conclusions: The calculation made of the reconnaissance forces and means of the front makes it possible to:

-- carry out continuous surveillance of all targets which are nuclear attack means, and of the main groupings of ground

troops and tactical aviation;

-- allocate several sources for the reconnaissance of the most important targets (340), which will ensure that reliable data are obtained on them.

3. Planning for reconnaissance in the offensive operation of the Coastal Front (Report of the reconnaissance plan) -- 165 minutes.

The given training topic should be examined in the following sequence: (a) The tasks of reconnaissance and the forces and means to be allocated for their accomplishment before the beginning of the operation; (b) the tasks of reconnaissance and the forces and means to be allocated for their accomplishment in the course of the operation: (1) during fulfillment of the immediate task; (2) during fulfillment of the follow-up task.

Operational time -- 1100 hours 2 September.

Students in the role of the front chief of intelligence.

(a) The tasks of reconnaissance and the forces and means to be allocated for their accomplishment before the beginning of the operation.

Variant of the report of the students.

In preparing for the operation, the main efforts of all types of reconnaissance are to be concentrated on:

-- continuous surveillance of the missile/nuclear weapons units (the 2nd Pershing-1A Missile Wing, the 150th, 450th, and 650th Lance missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 31st Fighter-Bomber Squadron, the 34th and 135th air wings, the 1st and 10th fighter-bomber wings, the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, and the 32nd Tactical Fighter Squadron) at their permanent locations (air bases), in combat alert areas, with the timely detection of the time of deployment (dispersal) of the units, and also of their readiness to deliver a nuclear strike, plus determination of the disposition sites of the supply and storage points for nuclear munitions, and of the time of their issue to the units;

-- detection of the bringing of the 6th Army Corps and Northern Army Group units and large units to a heightened state of combat readiness, determination of their arrival at concentration areas, of their moving out, deployment, and grouping in operational assignment areas, and also /detection/ of their reinforcement by newly activated units and large units, plus discovery of the enemy's intentions concerning the use of the established troop groupings, especially on the LUBECK-SCHLESWIG and BRAUNSCHWEIG-OSNABRUCK axes;

-- detection of the enemy's measures for reinforcing the air force and air defense groupings of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, for rebasing air units at dispersal airfields and for deploying field air defense means, and also his intentions for their use;

-- determination of the composition and deployment areas of the allied naval forces' ship groupings in the Baltic and North seas;

-- determination of the troops' supply system and of the locations of the main rear services installations of the areas for activating field and territorial troops, and of measures for preparing the border zones for the beginning of combat actions.

To accomplish these tasks it has been planned to use 61 agent sources, 69 aircraft sorties (including six aircraft sorties violating West's airspace), 154 radio intercept posts, and 40 radiotechnical reconnaissance posts. Furthermore, as of 2 September forces and means of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies will begin to conduct reconnaissance.

The main efforts of agent reconnaissance of the missile/nuclear weapons units (the 2nd Pershing-1A Missile Wing, the 150th, 450th, and 650th Lance and Sergeant missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 31st Fighter-Bomber Squadron, the 34th and 135th air wings, the 1st Fighter Bomber Wing, the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, and the 32nd Tactical Fighter Squadron), and /on surveillance/ of the staffs of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, the Brown 1st, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th and 21st motorized infantry divisions and 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions, the Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions, the Lilac 1st, 4th, and 5th motorized infantry divisions, and the Green 4th Mechanized Division, in their

permanent locations and in their areas of operational deployment. Furthermore, surveillance will be conducted against tactical airbases nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 49, 35, 39, and 67, the nuclear munitions supply and storage points of artillery groups no. 5, 79, 294, 550, 552, 570, and 571, and also on the possible areas of deployment of divisions of the Northern Army Group and 6th Army Corps in the border zone.

The assigned tasks will be fulfilled by agent sources of the active net (53 sources), and by eight sources committed from the reserve on 2 to 3 September. On 3 September the active agent net will be shifted to wartime operating condition.

It is planned that beginning 1 September nine aircraft sorties (including three radiotechnical reconnaissance aircraft sorties) will be flown daily along the state border, with the tasks of timely detection of the arrival of enemy troops in the border zone, and of their areas of concentration and deployment for the offensive. Furthermore, six reconnaissance aircraft crews will be held in constant readiness to conduct reconnaissance violating West's airspace, with the task of pinpointing the areas of operational deployment of the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps.

The forces and means of the radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance regiments will be fully deployed for conducting reconnaissance as of 0400 hours 2 September.

The main efforts of the 8th Separate OSNAZ Radio Regiment will be aimed at detection of the disposition areas of the missile/nuclear weapons units (the 2nd Pershing-1A Missile Wing, the 150th, 450th, and 650th Lance and Sergeant missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments); at determination of the location of the staffs of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, the Blue 1st and 2nd army corps, the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, and the Violet 2nd Army Corps; at /determination of/ the concentration areas of the 8th, 11th, 15th, and 21st motorized infantry divisions, of the 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions, of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions, and of the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps; and also at establishment of the location of the main installations of the 600th and 800th supply commands, and of the nuclear munitions

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supply and storage points of the 5th, 79th, 294th, 550th, 552nd, 570th, and 571st artillery technical groups, and of the troop activation areas.

The main efforts of the 9th Separate OSNAZ Radiotechnical Regiment will be aimed at: detecting the staffs and control posts of the Brown Air Tactical Command, the Blue Air Force, and the Lilac Tactical Air Command; at pinpointing the bases of tactical and army aviation, at detecting the control organs of the command posts and firing sites of the Nike-Hercules and Hawk surface-to-air missile units and subunits, and the control organs of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force air defense system.

As of 0600 hours 2 September, forces of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies will organize a system of surveillance of the enemy in the border zone.

As of 3 September a systematic exchange of information will be organized with the staffs of the Combined Baltic Fleet, the Western Front, the border guard troops, and the Air Defense Forces of the Country.

All these measures during preparation for the operation will permit the fulfillment of the assigned reconnaissance tasks and the determination of the following:

- the time the missile/nuclear weapons units, the staffs, and the ground forces units and large units move from their garrisons into their operational assignment areas, and the plans for their use;
- the beginning of the dispersal of tactical aviation, and its readiness for delivering strikes;
- continuous confirmation of the position and status of the targets to be destroyed by nuclear weapons.

(b) The tasks of reconnaissance and the forces and means allocated to fulfill them during the operation:

During fulfillment of the immediate task

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When combat actions begin, the main efforts of front and army reconnaissance will be aimed at conducting reconnaissance of the installations (targets) which it is planned to destroy in the initial nuclear strike.

To accomplish this task we have developed, with the air army staff, a plan-schedule for a mass sortie of reconnaissance aircraft to reconnoiter the targets in order to determine (pinpoint) their coordinates.

It is planned that approximately 120 reconnaissance aircraft will take part in the mass sortie; /these will be drawn from/ the air reconnaissance regiments, the 6th Bomber Division, and the 2nd, 4th, and 8th fighter-bomber divisions. This /sortie/ will make it possible within 30 to 35 minutes to establish (confirm) the disposition areas of the Lance missile battalions and the Pershing-1A Missile Wing and determine the coordinates of their positions, and to confirm the concentration areas of the tank and motorized infantry battalions, of the means of nuclear attack, and of the command posts of 14 divisions of the Northern Army Group and 6th Army Corps.

It is planned that 61 agent sources will be used for this purpose. It is planned that the active agent forces will pinpoint the presence of 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force aircraft at the airfields, will determine the deployment areas of the command posts of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the Brown 1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th army corps, the Blue 1st and 2nd army corps, the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, and the Violet 2nd Army Corps, and the disposition areas of the missile/nuclear weapons units.

The radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance forces and means will be aimed at conducting surveillance of the radio nets controlling the means of nuclear attack, and the nets of the Northern Army Group command and the /following/ troops coming into /the Group/: the Brown 1st and 4th army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force and the Brown 6th Army Corps.

It is planned that troops of the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th armies will determine, through their surveillance system, the grouping and battle formations of the first-echelon divisions of

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the army corps, and the areas of artillery (chiefly atomic) firing sites to a depth of 10 to 15 km.

Thus reconnaissance will fulfill its assigned tasks of reconnoitering installations (targets) in support of the delivery of the initial nuclear strike. In this /reconnaissance/ the degree of detection of the installations (targets) will be 0.9 to 1 for the means of nuclear attack, and 0.6 to 0.7 for the main ground troop groupings.

In the course of the operation, during repulse of the enemy incursion and the development of the offensive, it is planned that the following main tasks will be fulfilled:

- continuous monitoring of the operational-tactical missile units: to detect their direct preparation for delivering nuclear strikes, and the time and axis of their relocation; to establish the losses, condition, and combat effectiveness of the missile units resulting from our troops' artillery and nuclear strikes;
- determination of the nature of the combat actions of the first operational echelon of the Northern Army Group and the 6th Army Corps: to detect the intentions and axis of concentration of their main efforts; to monitor the maneuvering of the forces and means, and /their/ preparation to go over to the defense; to determine the losses and combat effectiveness of the large units and units of the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps;
- to determine the condition of the reserves, to pinpoint their location, and to discover the intentions for their use;
- to pinpoint the location of the command posts of the Northern Army Group and the army corps and the control system of the aviation and air defense means, and to monitor their relocation;
- to monitor the airfields for basing tactical aviation (especially delivery aircraft), and the air defense forces and means. To determine their losses, their combat effectiveness, and their preparation for delivering strikes;
- to monitor the activity of the Brown, Blue and Green naval forces, to ascertain precisely the nature of their antilanding defense and the grouping of troops defending the Kiel Naval Base, and to detect preparations for an assault landing;
- to determine the results of the initial and follow-up nuclear strikes on rear services installations, and to monitor

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measures for their restoration. Special attention is to be paid to discovering the areas in which nuclear munitions supply posts are located;

-- to monitor progress in activating field and territorial troops;

-- to determine the nature of engineer preparations on the LEINE, WESER, EMS, and RHINE rivers. ✓

To accomplish these and other tasks, it is planned to employ 71 agent sources, 54 special-purpose reconnaissance groups, 1,800 aircraft sorties, 154 radio intercept posts, and 40 radiotechnical /DF/ posts; and also to fully use the forces and means of the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th armies.

The main efforts of agent and special reconnaissance will be aimed at pinpointing the coordinates of: the intact launchers of the 2nd Pershing-1A Missile Wing, the 150th, 450th, and 650th Lance missile battalions and the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments; the /intact/ airfields for basing delivery aircraft, the nuclear munitions supply points, the concentration areas of the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, the Blue 2nd Army Corps and the Violet 2nd Army Corps, and the troop activation areas.

Upon the beginning of the operation, from D to D5, 10 agent sources and 54 special-purpose reconnaissance groups will be continuously infiltrated into the enemy's rear.

It is planned that radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance forces will determine precisely the grouping and troop strength of the 6th Army Corps and the Northern Army Group, and also pinpoint the airfields for basing tactical and army aviation, especially delivery aircraft.

The main efforts of aerial reconnaissance during this period will be concentrated on the HAMBURG-FLENSBURG and HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axes, with the tasks of determining the results of the initial nuclear strike, discovering the intact missile/nuclear weapons units and delivery aircraft, and pinpointing the troop groupings of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force. It is planned that more than 300 sorties of reconnaissance aircraft will be flown each day. Aerial photographs will be taken in the areas of special interest nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14; of defense areas in the

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sectors LUBECK, MOLLN, BAD OLDESLOE and SPRAKENSEHL, BRAUNSCHWEIG, CELLE; and of the march routes for troop advance. Reconnaissance aircraft from the 20th Reconnaissance Air Regiment will fly missions to a depth of up to 800 km; aircraft of the 21st and 22nd tactical reconnaissance air regiments -- up to 400 km.

In planning reconnaissance during fulfillment of the immediate task, special attention is to be paid to the following:

-- detection of the enemy's attack groupings attacking on the SCHWARZENBEK-LUBTHEEN, LUCHOW-WITTENBERGE and BRAUNSCHWEIG-MAGDEBURG axes. To fulfill this task, it is planned that six agent sources, 48 aircraft sorties, and eight radio intercept posts will be allocated and that the reconnaissance forces and means of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies will be activated;

-- determination of the enemy's strength and grouping and the nature of /his/ actions in the cover zone in the TRAVEMUNDE, RATZEBURG, KRUMMESSE and BERGEN, BROME, GROSS ESINGEN /unidentifiable/ areas. It is planned that one agent source, eight aircraft sorties, two radio intercept posts, and the reconnaissance forces and means of the 4th and 7th armies will be allocated to fulfill this task;

-- determination of the strength and grouping of the enemy who has gone over to the defense on the forward defense line in the LUBECK, MOLLN, BAD OLDESLOE and SPRAKENSEHL, BRAUNSCHWEIG, NIENBURG areas. To fulfill this task, it is planned to allocate nine agent sources, 22 aircraft sorties, and two radio intercept posts and to activate the reconnaissance forces and means of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies;

-- precise definition of the concentration areas of the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps and the Green 4th Mechanized Division, of the axes to which they are assigned and their lines of deployment for delivering a counterattack. Special attention should be paid to the MUNSTER, HODENHAGEN, VERDEN, and RETHEN, HOLLE, BAD PYRMONT areas. It is planned that nine agent sources, six special-purpose reconnaissance groups, 50 aircraft sorties, and seven radio intercept posts will be allocated to fulfill this task, and that the reconnaissance forces and means of the 7th and 9th armies will also be assigned;

-- precise definition of the enemy's strength and grouping on the line of commitment to battle of the front's second echelon in the FALLINGBOSTEL, MELLENDORF, SULINGEN and SYKE, MINDEN.

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BRAMSCHE areas. It is planned that four agent sources, four special-purpose reconnaissance groups, 60 aircraft sorties, and four radio intercept posts will be allocated to fulfill this task, and that forces and means of the 6th, 7th, and 9th armies will also be assigned.

Relocation of the front reconnaissance units is planned to take place on the NEUSTADT-CELLE-DIEPHOLZ axis.

During the arrival of front troops at the line of the immediate task, the reconnaissance units will be deployed in the following areas:

-- the 8th Separate OSNAZ Radio Regiment: command post at UCHTE; the radio direction-finding companies at OLDENBURG, AHRENSBURG, MUNSTER, BURGDORF, NORDHEIM;

-- the 9th Separate OSNAZ Radiotechnical Regiment: command post at SIEDENBURG; the radiotechnical companies at NIEBULL, MARNE, VAREL, WERLTE, IBBENBUREN, LIPPSTADT;

-- the 10th Separate Special-Purpose Regiment: at CELLE.

It is planned to have nine agent sources, 18 special-purpose reconnaissance groups, and 30 aircraft sorties in reserve.

During fulfillment of the follow-up task

The main reconnaissance efforts will be aimed at accomplishing the following main tasks: detection of changes in the strength and grouping of the troops of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, especially of the means of nuclear attack, and discovery of the enemy's intentions regarding their reinforcement and use; detection of the enemy's measures for restoration of the rear services, especially of the deployment areas of nuclear munitions supply points; discovery of troop activation areas and determination of the arrival of Green and Blue troops; and detection of the enemy's measures for engineer preparation of the defense lines, especially on the RHINE River.

To fulfill these tasks, it is planned to employ 30 agent sources, 25 special-purpose reconnaissance groups, 100 radio

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intercept posts, and seven radiotechnical direction-finding groups; to fly up to 1,000 aircraft sorties of reconnaissance aviation; and also to make use of the main forces and means of the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th armies, and of the 10th Tank Army.

The main efforts of agent and special reconnaissance will be aimed at detecting the concentration areas of the reserves (especially the Green and Blue /reserves/), the troop activation areas, and the airfields for basing tactical aviation; and /at/ determining the nature of engineer preparation of the lines on the RHINE and MEUSE rivers.

During the operation, on D6, it is planned to infiltrate four agent sources and 12 special-purpose reconnaissance groups into the enemy rear.

The radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance forces and means will be aimed at the continuous surveillance of the radio nets of the command of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and of the arriving operational reserves, in order to detect in timely fashion the concentration areas of the operational reserves and the axes of their movement.

The efforts of air reconnaissance will be concentrated on the OSNABRUCK, BRUSSELS axis, in order to detect in timely fashion the concentration areas of the operational reserves, the axis of their movement, and the nature of the engineer preparation of the defense lines.

Starting on D6 it is planned that 150 to 200 aircraft sorties will be allocated per day to conduct aerial photography of the front lines at LINGEN, excluding MUNSTER; DIDAM, WALSUM; HEERDE, EERBEEK; and the areas ZUNDERT, PENDERMONDE, MOERBEKE, GAUD-GASTEDT /unidentifiable/.

It is planned that the front's reconnaissance units will relocate in the direction of OSNABRUCK-TILBURG, and that during fulfillment of the follow-up task by front troops the units will be deployed in the following areas:

-- the 8th Separate OSNAZ Radio Regiment: command post at EINDHOVEN; the radio direction-finding companies at ARNIS, WEDEL, HUDE, SCHUTTORG, WELLIKH /?WALLUCKE/;

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- the 9th Separate OSNAZ Radiotechnical Regiment: command post at BEST; the radiotechnical companies at GARDING, OSTGROFEN /?OSTGROSSEFEHN/, AKKRUM, RIDDERKERK, DEINZE, DINANT;
- the 10th Separate Special Purpose Regiment: at NIJMEGEN.

It is planned to have five agent sources, six special-purpose reconnaissance groups, and 25 aircraft sorties in reserve.

To control the reconnaissance forces and means during the operation, the following radio nets and radio links will be deployed from the command post and alternate command post:

- the radio net of the front chief of intelligence with the intelligence chiefs of the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th armies and of the 10th Tank Army;
- the radio link of the front chief of intelligence with the air army chief of intelligence;
- the combined radio net including the radio stations of the front chief of intelligence and of the reconnaissance air units;
- the radio links of the front intelligence chief with the commander of the 10th Separate Special-Purpose Reconnaissance Regiment, the commanders of the OSNAZ radio and radiotechnical regiments, and the OSNAZ communications center;
- the radio link of the control post of the /front/ intelligence chief with the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff.

For the reception of reconnaissance information from the reconnaissance aircraft, special radio receivers will be set up at the command posts of all divisions, of the army, of the chiefs of front and army rocket troops and artillery, and also at the command post of the front intelligence chief.

To obtain reconnaissance information from the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff, from adjacent forces, border guard troops, the Air Defense Forces of the Country, and from other sources, the channels of the front staff communications center will be used.

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Conclusions

1. The measures planned for the combat use of front reconnaissance forces and means in the operation will make possible the accomplishment of the assigned reconnaissance tasks, and will supply the command with the necessary data on the enemy. Furthermore, after the mass sortie of reconnaissance aviation, reconnaissance can update by Launch + 30 or Launch + 35 the position and coordinates of small, mobile targets to be destroyed by nuclear weapons.

2. To maintain cooperation with fleet reconnaissance, it is necessary to send an operations group to the fleet staff.

Concluding remarks -- 5 minutes

The training objective of the lesson and the degree to which it has been attained will be announced. An evaluation will be given of the students' preparation for the lesson, of their completion of homework assignments, and of the degree to which they have mastered the completed training topics.

The students should be advised as to which topics they should pay attention to during further training.

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