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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

7 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Study and Critique  
of the Decision of the Commander of the Combined Baltic  
Fleet on the Combat Actions of the Fleet's Forces  
in the Front Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson dealing with an offensive operation by the Combined Baltic Fleet in the Baltic and North seas. The concept, strength, tasks, and fleet nuclear munitions employed for this operation are presented in a generalized manner.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

[Redacted Signature Box]  
John N. McMahon

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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DATE OF  
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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON NO. 5 : Study and Critique of the Decision of the Commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet on the Combat Actions of the Fleet's Forces in the Front Offensive Operation

SOURCE Documentary

### Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as commanders and senior staff officers of the Combined Baltic Fleet in planning an offensive in the Baltic and North seas in cooperation with a land front. The main points covered are: the overall mission, the strength in submarine, surface, and naval aviation forces in these areas; the specific tasks and NATO targets, the allocation and targeting of nuclear munitions, and the location of fleet control posts. The lesson deals with these topics in broad-brush manner.

End of Summary

### Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this lesson probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany  
Blue -- Great Britain  
Green -- United States

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I. Lesson subject: Study and critique of the decision of the commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet on the combat actions of the fleet's forces in the front offensive operation.

II. Estimated time for working out the lesson

Number and designation of lesson	Time allocated (in hours)		Total
	Group training period	Individual study	
<u>Lesson No. 5</u> : Study and critique of the decision of the commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet on the actions of the fleet's forces in the <u>front</u> offensive operation			

III. Training objectives

1. In individual study the students are to study the decision of the Combined Baltic Fleet commander on the combat actions of the fleet's forces in the front offensive operation and they are to be prepared to report on it, substantiating the main principles /of the decision/.

2. In the lesson:

-- the students' knowledge of the main points of the decision of the Combined Baltic Fleet commander on the actions of the fleet's forces in the offensive operation of the Coastal Front is to be verified;

-- the students are to be given practice in /making/ a concise and accurate report and in substantiating the main sections of the decision of the commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson -- group exercise.

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V. Methodological recommendations on preparing for the lesson

1. During preparation for the lesson, the students must study the operational mission and the appendices to the assignment for Lesson No. 5 and they must be prepared to make reports regarding clarification of the assigned tasks of the Combined Baltic Fleet and /to report/ the decision of the fleet commander.

2. During preparation for the lesson, leaders of study groups are to study:

-- the operational mission for Task No. 12 (77/78) and the assignment for Lesson No. 5, plus the appendices to them;

-- the parts of the decision of the commander of the Coastal Front dealing with the joint actions of front troops and fleet forces in the offensive operation;

-- theoretical matters concerning the subject;

-- the current training methods text.

Points that are not clear are to be cleared up by the lesson preparer at the training methods meeting.

In the student's individual study for the lesson:

-- the study topics for which the students must be prepared are to be announced, plus the procedure for conducting the forthcoming group training:

- A. Theoretical matters concerning the lesson subject (35 minutes);
- B. Clarification of tasks assigned to the fleet (30 minutes);
- C. Conclusions from the estimate of the situation (60 minutes);
- D. Concept of the actions of the Combined Baltic Fleet /CBF/ (70 minutes);
- E. Tasks for the formations, large units, and units of the CBF (35 minutes);

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F. Instructions for organizing the cooperation of forces (30 minutes);

G. Summary of the director of the study group (10 minutes);

-- the materials which the students must study during individual work should be defined precisely;

-- if necessary, a general briefing is to be held with the study group and other assistance is to be rendered to the students during their preparation for the group training.

VI. Procedure for conducting the lesson (6 hours -- 270 minutes)

At the beginning of the group training the director announces: "Operational time is 1600 hours 1 September. The representative of the Supreme High Command General Headquarters has arrived at the command post of the CBF to be briefed on the decision for the actions of the fleet's forces in the offensive operation of the Coastal Front."

During the lesson the director formulates the study topics precisely and announces the time allocated to the students for the reports. As called upon, the students make reports concerning the main topics assigned for the lesson; additional statements can be made voluntarily with the permission of the director. After each study topic is discussed the reports and additional statements are to be summed up.

When the reports and additional statements are being heard, particular attention should be given to the clarity, precision, and brevity of presentation and to the ability of the students to concentrate on the main content of the topic under discussion and correctly employ the terminology prescribed within the Navy.

A. Theoretical matters concerning the lesson subject (35 minutes)

Three or four students are to brief for 8 to 10 minutes each on:

-- the main principles defining the basis for the decision-making by the fleet commander on the actions of the fleet's forces in the front offensive operation on the coastal axis;

-- the procedure for making the decision and its content.

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A brief summing up is to be made (two to three minutes) and students' questions are to be answered.

Materials concerning the given topic are to be /found/ in the appropriate sections of Volume 2 of the textbook and in the lecture.

B. Clarification of tasks assigned to the fleet (30 minutes)

In clarifying the tasks assigned to the fleet, students in the role of CBF commander are to report in the following sequence:

- the tasks of the CBF;
- what is to be achieved by accomplishing the tasks assigned to the CBF;
- the conditions under which the tasks are to be accomplished by the fleet;
- the role and place of the CBF in the offensive operation of the Coastal Front;
- the time which the CBF has at its disposal to prepare and deploy its forces at the beginning of combat actions.

Report of the commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet

See the assignment for Lesson No. 5, Appendix 2.

2. Conclusions from the estimate of the situation (60 minutes)

Conclusions from the assessment of the enemy (30 minutes)

Students in the role of chief of intelligence of the fleet report the conclusions from the assessment of the enemy in the following sequence:

- the conclusions from the military-political situation in the theater of military operations;
- the overall concept of the actions of West's armed forces;
- the main groupings of West's naval forces and the possible concept of their actions;

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- the strengths and weaknesses of West's naval forces;
- the main enemy targets, by whose destruction the enemy's combat capabilities will be drastically reduced.

Report of the chief of intelligence of the Combined Baltic Fleet

See paragraph II (A) of the explanatory memorandum to the decision of the commander of the CBF, Appendix 3 (A) to the assignment for Lesson No. 5, and the map of the situation at sea.

Conclusions from the assessment of our own forces (30 minutes)

Students in the role of chief of the operations directorate of the staff of the CBF report the conclusions from the assessment of our own forces on the following main topics:

- status and combat strength of the CBF and its capabilities;
- targets for destruction by nuclear weapons and the capabilities of the CBF regarding their employment;
- allocation of CBF forces and means by tasks, and the proposals for increasing the readiness of the fleet to accomplish the assigned tasks;
- proposals for organizing and ensuring firm and continuous control of the fleet's forces.

Report of the chief of the operations directorate of the Staff of the Combined Baltic Fleet

See paragraph II (B) in the explanatory memorandum to the decision of the CBF commander, Appendix 3 (B) to the assignment for Lesson No. 5, and the map of the situation at sea.

1. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme High Command, the Combined Baltic Fleet has been at increased combat readiness since 31 August. On combat duty in the North Sea are 12 submarines, two rkm /small missile ships/, two large antisubmarine ships, two destroyers, and four krtr /radiotechnical reconnaissance ships/; in the Baltic Sea -- two submarines, two escort ships, 15 small antisubmarine ships, two radar picket ships, one radiotechnical reconnaissance ship, and four minesweepers. The remaining forces are located at bases and dispersal

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points.

To accomplish the assigned tasks during the offensive operation of the Coastal Front, the CBF can allocate 478 combat-ready submarines, surface ships, and boats, 239 aircraft and helicopters (101 of which are delivery aircraft), 16 shore-based operational-tactical missile launchers, 16 130-mm coastal artillery guns on mechanized transporters, two naval infantry regiments, and more than 170 ships of various kinds conscripted from civilian agencies.

For 12 days of the front offensive operation the aviation resources of the fleet are made up of: in regimental sorties -- 24 from naval reconnaissance aviation; 36 from ground-attack aviation, 18 from antisubmarine aviation (helicopters); eight from reconnaissance aviation, and in squadron sorties -- 10 from antisubmarine aviation; 10 from reconnaissance aviation.

The following forces may be employed in accomplishing the tasks of the fleet at the beginning of the war:

-- for destruction of aircraft carrier and other ship groupings, convoys, transports, amphibious landing forces, and minefields in the North Sea -- 12 submarines, three regiments of naval reconnaissance aviation, and six ships of Surface Strike Group No. 1;

-- for destruction of the enemy's submarines, surface ships and boats, convoys, transports, and amphibious landing forces, demolition and neutralization of his ground installations, the debarkation of our own amphibious landing forces, fire support for troops of the Coastal Front, combat against the mine threat, and for mine laying in the Baltic Sea -- nine submarines, two regiments of ground-attack aviation, a squadron and regiment of antisubmarine aviation, surface ships and boats from 22 brigades and one division /divizion/, four regiments of coastal missile and artillery troops, two regiments of naval infantry, and more than 170 conscripted ships. Subsequently, a significant portion of the forces may be withdrawn from the Baltic Sea to accomplish tasks in the North Sea.

To accomplish the assigned tasks the CBF is allocated 222 nuclear munitions with a total yield of 8,220 kilotons; of these, 167 munitions are in the fleet and 55 are to be supplied during the first four days of the front offensive operation.

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The targets for destruction by the nuclear weapons of the CBF are carrier strike groups /task forces/, Brown naval aviation at airfields, and mine depots; systems for control, surveillance, and radioelectronic warfare; surface ship groupings, and also convoys of the enemy. The main targets against which nuclear weapons are to be employed are carrier strike groups and naval aviation. Their destruction will give rise to conditions favoring the accomplishment of the other tasks assigned the fleet.

In numerical and qualitative composition the CBF in the Baltic Sea will have a twofold superiority over the enemy's naval forces.

2. When accomplishing the assigned tasks, the CBF will be able to:

-- repel a surprise attack of the enemy from the sea, defeat two carrier strike groups, and destroy up to 160 other ships and boats and approximately 110 transports and assault transports. That being the case, more than 80 percent of West's combat-ready ships and boats in the Baltic Sea can be destroyed;

-- demolish the command post of the allied naval forces, the radioelectronic warfare headquarters, and the three mine depots where almost the entire Brown reserve of mines is located, and destroy the aviation of the naval forces at seven airfields;

-- by the combined landing method debark amphibious landing forces made up of a reinforced rifle division and two regiments of naval infantry and render them fire support during actions on shore;

-- provide fire support for front troops advancing along the seacoast; prevent, in conjunction with front troops, the debarkation of amphibious landing forces on our own coast and on the coast which has been seized; and provide for the sealift of troops and materiel in support of the Coastal Front.

On the whole, the CBF can gain supremacy in the Baltic Sea, defeat the main groupings of the enemy's naval forces in the North Sea, and successfully assist the troops of the Coastal Front in the accomplishment of the tasks of the offensive operation.

3. Taking into account the above and the special features of the theater of military operations, it is proposed that:

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By employing 95 nuclear munitions in the initial nuclear strike at the beginning of combat actions, the fleet is to concentrate its main efforts on the destruction of Blue's Carrier Strike Group 401.2 and Brown naval aviation at airfields, on the demolition of important land targets, and the defeat of the enemy's main ship groupings in the Baltic Sea.

When front troops are accomplishing the immediate task (D to D6), 90 nuclear munitions are to be employed, the defeat of the enemy's ship and aviation groupings in the Baltic Sea is to be completed, amphibious landing forces are to be debarked on the Brown coast, Green's Carrier Strike Group 403.1 is to be destroyed, and the troops of the Coastal Front are to be assisted in the offensive.

When the front is fulfilling the subsequent task (D7 to D12), the fleet's efforts, in which 26 nuclear munitions are to be employed, are to be shifted to the North Sea and directed at aiding the troops of the Coastal Front in completing the enemy's defeat on the coastal axis, at organizing the defense of the coast which has been seized, and also at disrupting the enemy's sea transportation.

4. The following allocation of the fleet's forces and means according to tasks is proposed (it is reported using the map of the decision of the CBF commander). In order to increase the readiness of the forces and means of the CBF for repelling a surprise enemy attack and to strengthen and establish strike groupings of the fleet, in the areas of their actions it is necessary to build up the combat duty forces, to bring the fleet to full combat readiness promptly, and to deploy combat-ready forces to their assigned areas.

5. Continuous and firm control of the fleet's forces is to be provided by the system of command posts (main and alternate) prepared in advance at KALININGRAD, BALTIYSK, GDYNIA, and WARNEMUNDE.

About two days prior to the beginning of combat actions it is advisable to deploy a fleet auxiliary command post in the forest area five kilometers west of SWINOUJSCIE and one in the Gulf of Riga on the command ship Baltiysk. When front troops have seized the southeast coast of the North Sea, a fleet auxiliary control post is to be organized in CUXHAVEN.

The organization of communications is the existing one.

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D. Concept of the actions of the CBF (70 minutes)

Students in the role of chief of staff of the fleet are to make reports on proposals concerning the concept in the /following/ sequence:

-- overall formulation of the concept; axis of the main efforts of the CBF in the initial strike and when front troops are accomplishing the immediate and subsequent tasks (20 minutes);

-- allocation of the fleet's forces and means by tasks (20 minutes);

-- sequence and methods of actions of the fleet's forces (15 minutes);

-- proposals concerning the organization of the deployment of forces, their control, and the readiness times of the forces (15 minutes).

Report of the chief of staff of the CBF

See explanatory memorandum to the decision of the commander of the CBF, paragraphs IV, X, XI, and XII.

E. Tasks for the formations, large units, and units of the CBF (35 minutes)

Students in the role of commander of the CBF assign tasks in the following sequence:

-- tasks for submarines of the Baltic Fleet (5 minutes);

-- tasks for aviation of the Baltic Fleet (20 minutes);

-- tasks for the Navy of the Polish People's Republic (10 minutes).

Report of the commander of the CBF

See explanatory memorandum to the decisions of the commander of the CBF, paragraphs V (1, 2) and VI.

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F. Instructions for organizing the cooperation of forces  
(30 minutes)

Students in the role of chief of the operations directorate of the staff of the CBF report matters which are to be coordinated with the staff of the Coastal Front:

- when organizing the initial nuclear strike;
- when preparing and conducting the amphibious landing operation;
- when planning and carrying out the combat actions of the fleet's forces which are directed at aiding front troops in the offensive on the JUTLAND axis and along the southeast coast of the North Sea;
- when destroying the enemy's amphibious landing forces and organizing the defense of the coast that has been seized.

Report of the chief of the operations directorate of the  
Staff of the Combined Baltic Fleet

See explanatory memorandum to the decision of the commander of the CBF, paragraph IX (a, b, c, d).

G. Summary of the director of the study group (10 minutes)

The director of the study group reminds the students about the subject of the lesson and the training objectives and he comments on how these objectives were met.

He rates the students' reports and points out their negative and positive aspects. He indicates which study topics were insufficiently mastered and directs the students' attention to the need for eliminating the shortcomings which became manifest during the lesson.

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