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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

14 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Preparation and Critique of the Plan of the Combat Employment of the Rocket Troops and Artillery in the Front Offensive Operation: Planning the Combat Employment of Artillery

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson on the matters to be considered by a front chief of rocket troops and artillery in planning and preparing the employment of conventional artillery in an offensive operation in the northern area of West Germany.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRYUSSR

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DATE OF
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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 7b: Preparation and Critique of the Plan of the Combat Employment of the Rocket Troops and Artillery in the Front Offensive Operation: Planning the Combat Employment of Artillery

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as front chiefs of rocket troops and artillery in planning the combat employment of front conventional artillery in the area of NATO's Northern Army Group. It sets forth the tasks to be accomplished by the artillery during repulse of a NATO invasion, in the breakthrough of defensive lines, and during a deep offensive, detailing the NATO areas and combat units to be hit. Also discussed are the recommended gun densities and ammunition allocations; the antitank organization, areas, and tasks; the organization of artillery groups, artillery reinforcements, movement time and distance factors, and radioelectronic defense. End of Summary

Comment:

This report is a continuation of FIRDB-312/01110-80, which covered planning of the employment of the rocket troops.

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this lesson probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany
Blue -- Great Britain
Green - United States
Lilac -- Belgium

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VII. Procedure for the Conduct of Group Training Exercise No. 7b.
Time allocated for the lesson is 4 hours (180 minutes).

Planning the Combat Employment of Artillery

1. Check of student readiness for the lesson -- 15 minutes.

In conducting this check, two questions will be examined:

First question: What is the essence of destruction by fire?

Answer: Destruction by fire consists in the simultaneous or successive delivery of fire strikes against enemy targets and installations using conventional artillery ammunition, aviation ordnance, and other /conventional/ means of destruction. Destruction by fire is carried out with the object of decisively destroying the enemy's nuclear attack means, the main groupings of his motorized infantry and tank troops, artillery, control posts and other important installations; of gaining and retaining fire superiority over the enemy, and thereby creating conditions favoring the defeat of the enemy and successful fulfillment of the tasks of the operation.

Second question : What is the essence of gaining and retaining fire superiority?

Answer: The essence of gaining and retaining fire superiority over the enemy in an operation consists in continuous destruction and neutralization of enemy nuclear attack and fire means and the infliction of such destruction on them that they are deprived of the initiative and the capability of inflicting substantial damage on the attacking troops as they move forward, attack, and exploit their success in the depth on the axis of the main attack of the front and army. This is accomplished through conducting active, purposeful, and effective reconnaissance, maintaining numerical superiority in the fire means of the attacking artillery, and maintaining continuous control over its fire and maneuvering.

2. Report by the student in the role of the chief of front rocket troops and artillery to the front commander on the "Plan for the Combat Employment of Rocket Troops and Artillery..." covering the following points:

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- 1) The artillery's tasks in destroying the enemy by fire: during repulse of an invasion, when going over to the offensive, when breaking through the enemy defense, and during the conduct of the operation -- 30 minutes.
- 2) Artillery allocation and establishment of artillery groupings, planning the moving out and deployment of artillery -- 45 minutes.
- 3) Allocation of artillery ammunition by tasks and by formations of the Coastal Front -- 45 minutes;
- 4) Organization of the electronic defense of front rocket troops and artillery -- 35 minutes.

The report of the chief of rocket troops and artillery on planning the combat employment of artillery in the front offensive operation (variant).

A. The artillery's tasks of destroying the enemy by fire

The Coastal Front artillery is charged with the following tasks:

During the repulse of an invasion by an enemy grouping:

- a) By means of massed concentrated fire in the areas of RATZEBURG, MOLLN, SEEDORF; GUDOW, TALKAU, BUCHEN; VELPKE, NEUNDORF, BARMKE; HELMSTEDT, SCHOPPENSTEDT, JERXHEIM; and also, by means of close defensive fire along the state border, to inflict destruction on the enemy as he invades GDR /German Democratic Republic/ territory on the HAMBURG, HAGENOW; LUCHOW, SEEHAUSEN; UELZEN, STENDAL; and BRAUNSCHWEIG, MAGDEBURG axes. Massed fire at the junctions of the armies is to be planned as follows: between the 4th and 7th armies -- by five battalions of the 4th Army, between the 7th and 9th armies -- by five battalions of the 7th Army, between the 9th Army and the 3rd Army of the Western Front -- by three battalions of the 9th Army.
- b) Front Antitank Reserve No. 1 -- the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade is to occupy the areas of LASKE, KUHBIER, and PRITZWALK in readiness to deploy along the following firing lines: No. 1 -- PARUM, (excluding) LUBTHEEN; No. 2 -- PLATE, NEUSTADT, GLEWE; No. 3 -- (excluding) GRABOW, PERLEBERG;

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Front Antitank Reserve No. 2 -- the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade is to occupy the areas of KOBBE /sic -- ?KOBBELN/, KAHNERT, (excluding) PAREY, in readiness to deploy along firing lines No. 4 -- OSTERBURG, MESSDORF; No. 5 -- HALDENSLEBEN, NIEDERNDODELEBEN; No. 6 -- LEITZKAU, NEDLITZ, and to destroy the enemy tanks which break through.

c) With the start of the air operation, from H-hour to H plus 0.04, to destroy by fire the enemy's air defense means in the flight zones of our aviation: 4th Army artillery /is to carry out this task in/ TRAVEMUNDE, BAD-OLDENSLOYE /sic -- BAD-OLDESLOE/, GODENDORF, and RATZEBURG; 7th Army artillery /in/ BERGE, WIEREN, VARENHOLZ, and BRÖME; 9th Army artillery /in/ GRAFHORST, FALLEROLEBEN /sic -- ?FALLERSLEBEN/, KONIGSLUTTER, and SCHONINGEN.

d) Upon joining a meeting engagement at the border, to destroy by fire these large units: 18th, 13th, and 6th motorized infantry divisions, 1st Motorized Infantry Division, 3rd and 7th tank divisions, and 1st and 2nd armored divisions together with their tactical means of nuclear attack; to neutralize the enemy artillery-and-mortar grouping and antitank means; and to destroy enemy tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry combat vehicles which break through into the depth.

e) Before the front forward detachments cross the state border, to destroy by fire the enemy artillery, personnel, and fire means at the centers of resistance, antitank means, radio and radar sets, and electronic warfare means.

When breaking through the enemy defensive lines

Destruction by fire is to be planned only in the case of a breakthrough of the enemy forward defensive line by the adjoining flanks of two armies. The duration and the organization of the artillery preparation for the attack are to be determined in keeping with: the concept of the actions of our troops, the nature of the enemy defense, the necessary degree of destruction to be inflicted on the defense, the scope of the tasks to be accomplished by front and army aviation in the tactical depth of the enemy defense, the available artillery and ammunition; and additionally, when there is a breakthrough of the defense accompanied by forward movement from the depth, by the time required by first-echelon units to move forward and deploy for the attack, i.e., to negotiate the distance from the lines of deployment in battalion columns to the line of transition to the attack.

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The duration of the artillery preparation for the attack, taking into account the absence of specific data on the enemy at the defensive line, will be determined by the second condition. Its duration will equal 32 minutes (/the time required to go/ 8 kilometers at 15 kilometers per hour).

Under the given conditions, it is possible to make an approximate determination of what forces the enemy may employ to occupy the defense in the sectors selected for the breakthrough. Utilizing the data on methodology in Table S2, we determine the artillery density and amount of ammunition required for conducting the artillery preparation. After determining the ammunition expenditure per gun according to Table S7, the approximate duration and the organization of the artillery preparation for the attack are determined.

If, on the axis of the front main attack, the forward defensive line is not broken through from the march, it is to be broken through by the main forces of the first-echelon (7th and 9th) armies by committing additional troops to battle as follows: 3rd and 7th motorized rifle divisions -- in the 4th Army sector (8 kilometers); 5th Tank Division, 11th Motorized Rifle Division, and 10th Tank Division, and 6th and 18th motorized rifle divisions -- in the sector of the 7th and 9th armies (17 kilometers) (see "Plan of Combat Employment...").

The Brown 3rd or 7th tank divisions may occupy a previously-prepared defense in the breakthrough sector on a front of up to 30 kilometers and more.

At that point, depending on the nature of the defense, the national affiliation of the divisions, the width of the breakthrough sectors -- 8 kilometers for the 7th Army and 9 kilometers for the 9th Army -- we shall determine what magnitudes are required. An artillery density of 108 guns is required in the 4th Army breakthrough sector, and of 115 and 110 guns respectively in the breakthrough sectors of the 7th and 9th armies. Ammunition requirements -- per army and per gun -- for the artillery preparation will amount to: 56,000 rounds, with 61 rounds per gun for the 7th Army; 61,000 rounds, with 64 rounds per gun for the 9th Army; and 60,000 rounds with 67 rounds per gun for the 4th Army.

The respective durations of the artillery preparation for the attack will be 31 minutes in the 7th Army zone and 34 minutes in the 9th Army zone. /But the durations/ have been prescribed as: the same for the 7th and 9th armies -- 34 minutes; and in the 4th Army zone -- 37 minutes. The procedure for the calculations is set forth in Table 3.

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Table 3

	Breakthrough sector		Required gun density per km of front	Total guns required	Ammunition required, in thousands of rounds*	Expenditure** per allocated gun, in rounds
1	2		3	4	5	6
4th Army	8 km	Against targets (without artillery reinforcement)	96	857	56	
		For artillery reinforcement	12	92	4	
		Totals:	108	949	60	67
7th Army	8 km	Against targets (without artillery reinforcement)	103	824	52	
		For artillery reinforcement	12	92	4	
		Totals:	115	916	56	61
9th Army	9 km	Against targets (without artillery reinforcement)	99	887	57	
		For artillery reinforcement	11	96	4	
		Totals:	110	983	61	64

* For destruction of all targets in the artillery preparation in the breakthrough sector.

** Determined according to the data in Appendix 3 to the assignment for Lesson 1c (4th Army -- 900 guns, 7th Army -- 918 guns, 9th Army -- 954 guns).

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The organization of the artillery preparation (the timetable) is to be worked out by the armies with subsequent approval by the front.

Artillery support for the attack will be carried out by means of a barrage in depth coupled with successive concentration of fire to the depth of the defense of the first-echelon battalions. Artillery close support of advancing troops will be accomplished by means of massed fire and concentration of fire on individual targets and on the lines of the targets, and also by means of adjusted fire from platoons and batteries. At least 50 percent of all types of artillery must participate continuously in the artillery close support.

During the offensive operation

In the course of the offensive in the operational depth, to be in readiness to destroy newly-detected tactical means of nuclear attack, antitank means, artillery and mortar batteries, and also control posts and other important targets:

-- when there is a breakthrough of possible defensive lines which the enemy could prepare and occupy along the LEINE, WESER, and EMS rivers;

-- during assault crossing of the water obstacles of the IJSEL and RHINE rivers;

-- during the repulse of counterthrusts by the enemy reserves from the ROTENBURG, CELLE, WOLFSBURG; HAMELN, HILDESHEIM, WOLFSBURG axes;

-- when the 6th Army is committed to battle, provision having been made to bring in at least 12 /artillery/ battalions of the 7th Army;

-- when the front second echelon (the 10th Tank Army) is committed to battle, provision having been made to bring in for this purpose up to 12 /artillery/ battalions of the 6th Army, as well as the major portion of the organic and attached artillery of the 10th Army.

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Tasks of the antitank reserves and the procedure for their maneuvering

The front antitank reserves: with the commencement of the offensive, the 4th and 5th antitank artillery brigades of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command /RVGK/ are to relocate as follows:

Antitank Reserve No. 1 (4th Antitank Artillery Brigade) -- in the 7th Army offensive zone on the PRITZWALK, UELZEN, SOLTAU, VERDEN, KLOPPENBURG, MEPPEN axis will be in readiness to participate in the repulse of enemy counterthrusts from the SOLTAU, GIFHORN axis by deploying on firing lines No. 7 -- MUDEN, (excluding) MEISSENDORF, No. 8 -- HEBER, DORFMARK; and No. 9 -- (excluding) VERDEN, BRUCHHAUSEN; Antitank Reserve No. 2 (5th Antitank Artillery Brigade) -- in the 9th Army offensive zone on the KHENERT /sic -- KAHNERT/, HELMSTEDT, LEHRTE, BUCKEBURG, MUNSTER axis will be in readiness to participate in repelling tank counterthrusts from the HILDESHEIM, GIFHORN axis by deploying on firing lines No. 10 -- NEYELSBURG /sic -- ?NEULSENBURG/, LICHTENBERG, No. 11 -- LOKKUM /last letter illegible, possibly LOCHUM/, RODENBERG, and No. 12 -- GREVEN, MUNSTER.

B. Establishment of the artillery grouping. Planning the moving out and deployment of artillery

a) Establishing the artillery grouping

The armies' requirements for reinforcement artillery will be determined by the volume of tasks to be accomplished simultaneously. The artillery is to carry out the greatest volume of the tasks of destroying the enemy by fire while conducting operations without employing nuclear weapons during the artillery preparation for an attack in the breakthrough of the defensive lines.

The requirement of the first-echelon armies for reinforcement from RVGK artillery is defined as the difference between the total amount of artillery needed for the destruction of the enemy by fire in the artillery preparation for the attack, and the amount of organic artillery which can be allocated for this purpose. The overall artillery requirements of the armies are to be determined in keeping with the decision on the operation, the operational disposition of the troops, the number and width of the breakthrough sectors, the nature of the enemy defense, and the required artillery density, and on this basis an artillery grouping is to be established which will result in the gaining and retention of fire superiority over the enemy artillery; and also provide for powerful artillery groups on the axis of the main thrusts in the following

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strengths: regimental artillery groups from first-echelon regiments /consisting of/ 3 to 4 artillery battalions; division artillery groups /consisting of/ 3 to 5 artillery battalions; army rocket-launcher artillery groups /consisting of/ 3 to 7 rocket-launcher artillery battalions; and army artillery groups /consisting of/ up to 9 artillery battalions.

The calculation of the requirements of the second-echelon army /sic/ of the front (6th Army and 10th Tank Army) for reinforcement in RVGK artillery, taking into account the absence of necessary data on the probable grouping of the enemy in front of the line of commitment to battle, is to be made on the premise that artillery groups must be established such that their presence will ensure independent action on the part of the regiments, divisions, and armies which are separated from the main forces of the front (see data in Table 4).

In order to establish artillery groups of the required strength, the following may be allocated from the organic artillery of the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army:

-- from the artillery battalions of the first-echelon divisions --
3 x 6 = 18 artillery divisions /sic -- battalions/;

-- from the army artillery -- 8 artillery battalions. In all, 26 artillery battalions.

Reinforcement is required as follows: for the 6th Army -- 16 artillery battalions (42-26 = 16), and for the 10th Tank Army -- 12 artillery battalions (38-26 = 12), which correspond respectively to an RVGK artillery division minus one brigade and an RVGK artillery division minus two brigades.

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Table 4

Operational disposition		Designations of artillery groups	Number of artillery groups	Strength of artillery groups: battalions	Artillery battalions required
In the first echelon					
Divisions	Regiments				
		6th Army			
3	6	Regimental artillery groups	6	3	18
		Division artillery groups	3	4	12
		Army rocket-launcher artillery groups	1	7	7
		Army artillery groups	1	5	5
Totals			11	--	42
		10th Tank Army			
3	6	Regimental artillery groups	6	2 with 3 bns ea, 4 with 2 bns ea	14
		Division artillery groups	3	4	12
		Army rocket-launcher artillery groups	1	7	7
		Army artillery groups	1	5	5
Totals			11	--	38

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CONCLUSION: In committing the 6th Army (of the front second echelon) to battle, it is advisable to reinforce it with the 8th Artillery Division of the RVGK (minus the 2nd Gun Artillery Brigade), having regrouped it from the 7th Army zone into the 6th Army movement zone during the night between D2 and D3; and to reinforce the 10th Tank Army with the 11th Artillery Division of the RVGK (minus the 15th Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade and 12th Rocket-Launcher Artillery Brigade), with /the latter division/ to be concentrated:

a) when committed to battle from the FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK line, in the area of LEMFORDE, (excluding) LEVERN, WEHDEM;

b) when committed to battle from the OLDENZAAL, BORGHORST line, in the area of BEVERGEN /?BEVERGERN/, (excluding) IBBENBURN, KHYERETEL /sic -- ??HORSTEL/ area, by the close of D5 to D6 for resubordination to the 10th Tank Army.

In conformity with the estimate of the situation during the conduct of the offensive operation, a front antitank reserve is to be established consisting of two RVGK antitank artillery brigades. According to the estimate of the situation, as of the morning of D3 a simultaneous counterthrust by two army corps of the Northern Army Group may be expected:

-- from the MUNSTER, KHEDENKHAGEN /sic -- ?HEDDERHAGEN/ line on the CELLE axis, by the Lilac 1st Army Corps (1st, 4th and 5th motorized infantry divisions) and the Brown 1st Motorized Infantry Division;

-- from the RETHEN, SALZGITTER line on the BRAUNSCHWEIG axis, by the Lilac 2nd Army Corps (101st and 301st motorized infantry divisions) and the Blue 4th Armored Division.

Substantiation for the required composition of front antitank reserves Nos. 1 and 2 is given in Table 5.

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Table 5

Front Formations	Composition of enemy grouping during counterthrust	Anticipated number of tanks and armd pers carriers (inf combt veh) /APC, ICV/				Tanks to be destroyed to repulse counterthrust (50 percent)	Antitank means required when balance of forces is 1:1 in tanks and 1:1.5 in armd pers carriers and inf combt veh	Antitank means available		Shortage of antitank means	Required reinforcement
		Totals	Losses		With losses taken into account			Total	Based on losses of 20 percent		
			\$	Number							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
7th Army	Lilac 1st Army Corps (1st, 4th & 5th mtz inf divs): medium tanks --	648	10	65	583	292	292	2 mtz rifle divs -- 168; army AT arty regt -- 63; ICV -- 186; tanks -- 428	845-169=676	784-676=108	/From/ RVGK AT Arty Bde
	APC & ICV --	950	10	95	855	428	285				
	Brown 1st Mtz Inf Div: medium tanks --	278	20	56	222	111	111				
	APC & ICV --	350	20	70	280	140	94				
Totals:							784	845	676	108	108
9th Army	Lilac 2nd Army Corps (101st & 301st mtz inf divs): medium tanks --	432	10	43	389	195	195	Up to 1.5 mtz rifle divs -- 126; army AT arty regt -- 63; ICV -- 93; tanks -- 321	503-101=402	523-402=121	/From/ RVGK AT Arty Bde
	APC & ICV --	630	10	63	567	284	189				
	Blue 4th Arm'd Div: medium tanks --	212	20	42	170	85	85				
	APC & ICV --	200	20	40	160	80	54				
Totals:							523	503	402	121	108
Totals:	medium tanks --	1,570			1,364	683	1,307	1,348	1,078	229	216
	Assault APC & ICV --	2,130			1,862	932					

NOTES: 1. The calculation was carried out without taking into account the RPG-7 antitank rocket launchers which will make up the shortage in the number of special (artillery) antitank means and increase the effectiveness of combat against tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and armored personnel carriers during the defeat of the enemy's counterthrust grouping.

2. In these calculations, account was taken of: the 216 tanks and 315 armored personnel carriers in a Lilac motorized infantry division, the 212 tanks and 200 armored personnel carriers in a Blue armored division, the 270 tanks and 300 armored personnel carriers in a Green infantry division; and the 278 tanks and 350 armored personnel carriers in a Brown motorized infantry division.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. For successful combat against tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry combat vehicles, during the repulse of a simultaneous counterattack by an enemy grouping from two axes, it is advisable that front antitank reserves Nos. 1 and 2 be composed of the 4th and 5th antitank artillery brigades of the RVGK respectively.

2. Taking into account the axes of possible enemy counterthrusts, the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade (Front Antitank Reserve No. 1) is to be relocated in the 7th Army offensive zone, and the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade (Front Antitank Reserve No. 2) relocated within the 9th Army zone.

b) Planning the moving out and deployment of artillery

a) After receiving the signal for bringing the front troops to full combat readiness, the artillery large units and units are to move out to the concentration areas following the combat alert, or directly into the assigned firing position areas. First to move out and deploy, together with the covering units, will be the organic and attached artillery of the covering troops. The division artillery groups, army artillery groups, and army rocket-launcher artillery groups will move out from the departure areas to the firing positions at a special signal. As required, part of the division artillery groups, army artillery groups, and army rocket-launcher artillery groups may move out onto firing positions along the border together with covering troops.

b) RVGK artillery (RVGK artillery divisions) will move out from their permanent locations into the operational assignment areas, after which, according to the plans of the armies, it will move out into the firing position areas of the corresponding artillery groups: the regimental artillery groups, the division artillery groups, the army rocket-launcher artillery groups, and the army artillery groups (see data in Table 2 of Appendix 4 to the assignment). The 8th Artillery Division of the RVGK must complete a march of 100 kilometers in three hours and 20 minutes. A total of five hours is required for the division to move out and concentrate, taking into account the time required to form into a column (one hour) and leave the military posts. Moving out into the firing positions along the border requires an additional three hours (two hours for the 60-kilometer march and one hour for deployment). The total time comes to eight hours.

3) The antitank reserves of the armies and front are to occupy the assigned disposition areas (see data of Table 2 of Appendix 4) on the axes

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of the possible invasion by the enemy main forces, in readiness to move out and deploy on the prepared firing lines.

4) The artillery of second echelons and reserves is to move out and deploy in the departure areas of its large units.

5) The regimental army ^{t?} groups of the first-echelon divisions are to be in readiness to move out and deploy on the firing positions at a distance of two to four kilometers from the border, in the zones of action of their regiments, in readiness to destroy the enemy by fire in his cover zone while the regiments are going over to the offensive.

6) After moving out to the border, the artillery will prepare a fire system to cover the movement forward and deployment of the front troops, to repulse a possible enemy invasion, and to destroy the enemy by fire in a meeting engagement at the border.

7) Up to eight hours will be required to bring the RVGK artillery to full combat readiness and deploy it, including the front antitank reserves (see Table 3 of Appendix 4 to the assignment).

C. Allocation of artillery ammunition by operational task and among front units

To accomplish the tasks in the offensive operation employing only conventional means of destruction, the Coastal Front is allocated 7.5 units of fire for its ground artillery and 3.5 units of fire for its antitank means.

The calculations presented in Table 4 of Appendix 4 to the assignment show that on the basis of an allocation of 0.3 unit of fire for the reserve, the front's requirements amount to 7.5 units of fire. From this amount it is necessary to allocate 5.0 units of fire for the accomplishment of the immediate task, and 2.2 units of fire for the follow-up task. In addition, provision is to be made for establishing an ammunition reserve of 2.3 units of fire at the end of the front operation.

The allocation of artillery ammunition by formations is shown in the data presented in Table 5 of Appendix 4 to the assignment. In particular, the 7th Army requires 645,000 rounds of ammunition for the operation, which include approximately 80,000 rounds to be expended by the attached RVGK artillery. The army organic artillery, whose /prescribed/ unit of fire is 74,880 rounds, is to have 565,000 rounds, which amounts to 7.55 units of

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fire (7.5 units of fire). The amount of ammunition indicated for the 7th Army is that quantity required to destroy the Brown 4th Army Corps (two motorized infantry divisions and one tank division), the Green mechanized division, and the Brown 1st Army Corps (one motorized infantry division and one tank division). ✓

Based on the scope and nature of the tasks to be accomplished, the following ammunition expenditure by ground artillery has been estimated for the front formations: 4th Army -- 3.6 units of fire, 7th Army -- 7.5, 9th Army -- 8.7, 6th Army -- 7.5, 2nd Army Corps (for commitment to battle and accomplishment of the assigned task) -- 2.5, air and amphibious landing forces -- 5.0, RVGK artillery battalions -- 5.0, and 10th Tank Army -- 5.0 (for the follow-up task).

For carrying out unforeseen tasks of fire destruction, replenishing possible ammunition losses, and also for the shifting of ammunition, the front reserve is allocated 0.3 unit of fire for its ground artillery and 0.2 unit of fire for its antitank means.

CONCLUSION

1. The calculations which have been made will serve as a basis for the ground artillery ammunition expenditure plans made by the rocket troop and artillery staffs of the armies and for the plans made by the missile and artillery armament service and rear staff of the front on the ammunition supply to the troops.

2. When the need for ammunition does not tally with the amount issued (allocated for the operation), the ratio of the amount needed to the amount allocated is to be taken into account in distributing the ammunition. For example, let us say that 7.5 units of fire are needed but 6.5 units of fire are issued, which is 87 percent of the ammunition needed. Consequently, instead of 5.0 units of fire, 4.35 units of fire may then be assigned for the immediate task.

D. Organization of radioelectronic defense of rocket troops and artillery in the front offensive operation

Students in the role of chief of the staff of rocket troops and artillery of the front are to report the content of "The plan for radioelectronic defense of the rocket troops and artillery ..." (see paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 to the assignment), covering the following matters:

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1) Protection against enemy radioelectronic reconnaissance and radioelectronic neutralization during: the preparation of the operation, the preparation and delivery of the initial nuclear strike, the fulfillment of the immediate task, the movement forward and commitment to battle of the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army. In examining this section of the plan, emphasis should be placed on the special importance of timely and reliable destruction of the enemy radioelectronic means by the rocket troops and artillery.

2) Protection against enemy homing and other kinds of weapons which have electronic-neutralization /capacity/. The students' particular attention is to be directed toward /maintaining/ the continuity and effectiveness of the cooperation of front and army missile brigades with the OSNAZ-S /~~aircraft radio intercept~~/ battalions of the armies and the front, which are charged with the task of covering them.

3) Protection against the effects of ionizing and electromagnetic radiations from enemy high-altitude nuclear bursts.

4) Ensuring the electromagnetic compatibility of the radioelectronic means of the rocket troops and artillery and other branch arms and special troops.

CONCLUDING REMARKS -- 5 minutes

In summing up the results of the lesson, note is to be made of the following:

1. In their work of preparing the offensive operation, the front commander and staff must give considerable prominence to the matters of planning and organizing the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery, and especially to the matters of destruction by fire and by nuclear means.

2. The bulk of the work in planning the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery is to be entrusted to the chief and the staff of the front rocket troops and artillery.

3. In conformity with the decision of the front commander for the operation and the proposals and instructions of the chief of rocket troops and artillery, the staff will carry out the entire complex of measures for planning the combat employment of rocket troops and artillery in the operation, namely: it will determine the scope of the tasks of the nuclear

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and fire destruction of the enemy in the operation, and the procedure, methods, sequence, and times required for their fulfillment, and will also determine the measures in preparing and comprehensively supporting the combat actions of the rocket troops and artillery, and in organizing the control of rocket troops and artillery in the operation.

4. The staff of the rocket troops and artillery, moreover, is to participate directly in preparing the operational documents of the front staff and in organizing cooperation with other branch arms. The participation of the rocket troop and artillery staff in the nuclear planning group is a particularly important aspect of its activity.

5. In planning and organizing the combat actions of the rocket troops and artillery, the chief and staff of the rocket troops and artillery will cooperate closely with the directorates and services of the front field headquarters.

At the end of the concluding remarks, the degree to which the students have mastered the content of the lesson subject and the extent to which they have attained the assigned training objectives are to be pointed out; the students' work and the training level they achieved will be rated; their shortcomings and the procedure for eliminating them will be indicated.

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