

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~

4441

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

19 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Controlling  
Front Troops During the Commitment to Battle of the  
Front's Second Echelon

SECURITY SOFTWARE AMERICA, JANUARY

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson describing the condition and disposition of front forces in an offensive operation in the northern part of West Germany at the time of the commitment of the front's second echelon to the battle, focusing on the composition and use of forward and airborne control posts to control this commitment.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

FIRDB-312/02481-80

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
19-Nov-2009

~~TOP SECRET~~



FIRDB-312/02481-80

Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy  
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
U. S. Air Force  
Director, National Security Agency  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center  
Director of Strategic Research  
Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~



## Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 17 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB - 312/02481-80

DATE OF  
INFO. 1977

DATE  
19 September 1980

SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 26d : Controlling Front Troops During the  
Commitment to Battle of the Front's Second Echelon

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation of the lesson describing the general condition and disposition of the forces of the Coastal Front, which is engaged in an offensive operation in the northern part of Western Germany, at the time of the commitment of the front's second echelon to the battle. The lesson sets forth the location, composition, axes of attack, and operational formation of the front's armies, air army, rocket troops and artillery, air defense, and reserves, as well as their concentration, airborne landing, assault crossing, and siting areas. Detailed information is presented on the numbers, types, and sizes of the nuclear munitions and missile launchers that these forces possess. Also described are the locations, staffing, and use of the front control post system, especially the forward and airborne control posts. End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

Brown - West Germany  
Blue - Great Britain  
Lilac - Belgium

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~



LESSON No. 26d

I. Lesson subject: Controlling front troops during the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon

II. Training objectives of the lesson:

-- to teach the students troop control during the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon;

-- to study the procedure for using the forward and airborne control posts of the front during the commitment to battle of the second echelon;

-- to provide the students with practical experience in writing combat reports to the General Staff during the operation;

-- to examine the contents of a front combat report submitted to the General Staff during the operation.

III. Training topics and their completion time

---

Training topics	Completion time In the group training period
1. Critique of the combat report submitted to the General Staff	45 minutes
2. Assessment of the condition of the system of front control posts, and the use of the PPU /henceforth expanded as forward control post/ to control the commitment to battle of the <u>front's</u> second echelon	20 minutes

---

TS #808234  
Copy # 5



Training topics	Completion time In the group training period
3. The procedure for using the <u>front airborne control post during the commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army</u>	15 minutes
Lesson summary	10 minutes
Total:	90 minutes

IV. Method for conducting the lesson -- group exercise.

V. Methodological recommendations on the students' preparation for the lesson


As the students begin their individual preparation for the lesson, the study group leaders are to recommend that they:

-- study the assignment for lessons Nos. 25a, 25b, and 26a /of this handbook/, and the textbook Front Offensive Operations,\* Chapter 3, pages 207-211. Field Service Manual for Staffs,\* paragraphs 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 79, 80, and 81.

The training text Front Control Posts in Modern Operations,\* accession number 102194.

The training text Combat Document Forms of the Staffs of Ground Forces Formations (Front -- Army),\* Book I, accession number 77668, pages 113-116.

-- It is to be explained to the students that in the self-study hours they must work out the combat report from the Coastal Front Staff to the General Staff and write it in their workbooks.

\*  Comment: Front Offensive Operations was received and disseminated as FIRDB-312/01997-79; the other reference materials were not received.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 6 of 17 Pages

In order to write the report the students must make use of the assignment for lessons Nos. 25a, 25b, and 26a, the situation map of the Coastal Front area for 1930 hours 12 September, and the decision that the students /in the role of/ the Coastal Front commander made in lesson No. 26a on the commitment to battle of the second echelon.

Moreover, the students must define the measures for organizing control of the front troops during the commitment to battle of the second echelon and the work procedure of the forward and airborne control posts.

In the process of writing up the combat report the students must be guided by paragraphs 79, 80, and 81 of the Field Service Manual for Staffs and by Combat Document Forms of the Staffs of Ground Forces Formations (Front -- Army), pages 113-116, accession number 77668.

Following the conclusion of the /students'/ individual study the instructors are to collect the written combat reports from the students and correct them.

#### VI. Procedure for conducting the lesson

First training topic. Critique of the combat report submitted to the General Staff.

Operational time -- 2230 hours 12 September

The students in the role of the chief of the operations directorate are to report to the front chief of staff the combat report to the General Staff that has been worked out in the individual study hours.

#### PLAN OF THE REPORT

- the general situation and condition of the Coastal Front;
- the situation and condition of the troops of the 4th, 7th, 6th, and 9th armies, and the 2nd Army Corps; the rocket troops and artillery, the air defense troops, the 1st Air Army, and the front reserves;
- what the adjacent forces are doing;
- the disposition and condition of the enemy;
- the decision of the Coastal Front commander.

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 7 of 17 Pages

CONTENTS OF THE REPORT

1. The Coastal Front troops, in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet and the Western Front's large units of anti-aircraft artillery, are continuing to conduct combat actions on their previous axes. Through the use of nuclear weapons and decisive troop actions they have destroyed the first operational echelon of the Northern Army Group and OAK /allied air command/.

From the data of all types of reconnaissance it has been established that the large units of the Brown 1st and 4th army corps and Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps have lost up to 75 percent of their complement; the rest of the large units /have lost/ up to 50 to 70 percent; and the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing has been destroyed. Enemy reserves approaching from the operational depth have incurred considerable losses and have halted their movement.

The aggressiveness of the enemy air grouping has fallen sharply.

The front has 158 nuclear munitions, of which 41 are R-300 missiles (12 of 20 kt /kilotons/, 20 of 40 kt, and 9 of 100 kt), 69 are R-65 missiles (12 of 3 kt, 28 of 10 kt, and 29 of 20 kt), and 48 are nuclear bombs (8 of 5 kt, 5 of 10 kt, 5 of 20 kt, 5 of 50 kt, 10 of 100 kt, 5 of 200 kt, and 10 of 300 kt), along with 60 operational-tactical missile launchers and 57 tactical missile launchers.

2. At 1930 hours 12 September the front troops are assuming the following posture:

a) The 4th Army (the 3rd, 7th, 24th, and 8th motorized rifle divisions, and the 2nd Tank Division), exploiting the results of the front's massed nuclear strike and the successful actions of adjacent forces, has advanced with three divisions up to the KIEL Canal in the KIEL, RENDBURG sector.

The army has 12 missiles with nuclear warheads, of which 4 are R-300 missiles (1 of 100 kt, 1 of 40 kt, and 2 of 20 kt) and 8 are R-65 missiles (3 of 3 kt, 2 of 10 kt, and 3 of 20 kt), along with 8 operational-tactical missile launchers and 10 tactical missile launchers.

The army's command post in the forest 8 km southwest of DIZNAK /sic/ is being restored.

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 8 of 17 Pages

The alternate command post is in the forest 2 km east of BUCHHOLZ.

b) The 2nd Army Corps (the 8th and 24th motorized rifle divisions) is engaged in a battle to seize the city of HAMBURG. The 24th Motorized Rifle Division has advanced to the WEDEL, SCHNELSEN, RAHLSTEDT line.

The 8th Motorized Rifle Division has advanced as far as the ELBE-LJBECK Canal.

The corps has 8 missiles with nuclear warheads, of which 2 are R-300 missiles (1 of 100 kt and 1 of 40 kt) and 6 are R-65 missiles (1 of 3 kt, 2 of 10 kt, and 3 of 20 kt), along with 3 operational-tactical missile launchers and 6 tactical missile launchers.

The command post of the corps is in the forest 3 km northeast of STEINHORST.

c) The 7th Army (the 1st, 4th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th motorized rifle divisions), in cooperation with the forces of the 4th Army, has defeated the enemy's penetration grouping, the Brown 4th Army Corps. The remnants of the 16th Tank Division and up to two brigades of the 15th Motorized Infantry Division have been encircled and are being destroyed by the forces of the 1st and 13th motorized rifle divisions. On the axis of the main thrust the 12th Motorized Rifle Division, which has been transferred from the complement of the 6th Army, is developing an offensive northeast of BREMEN. The units and subunits of the 1st, 11th, and 14th motorized rifle divisions that have maintained combat effectiveness are conducting combat actions. The rest of the forces are located in concentration areas and are carrying out measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear attack.

The army has 18 missiles with nuclear warheads, of which 4 are R-300 missiles (1 of 20 kt, 2 of 40 kt, and 1 of 100 kt) and 14 are R-65 missiles (4 of 3 kt, 8 of 10 kt, and 2 of 20 sht /sic -- kt/), along with 7 operational-tactical missile launchers and 7 tactical missile launchers. The army's command post and rear control post are finishing up work to restore combat effectiveness.

The alternate command post is in the forest 10 km southwest of UELZEN.

d) The 6th Army (the 5th, 9th, and 19th tank divisions, and the 17th Motorized Rifle Division) has made an assault crossing of the WESER River and is mounting an offensive with just the forces of the 17th Motorized

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 9 of 17 Pages

Rifle Division and the combat-effective subunits of the 5th Tank Division. The remaining units are carrying out measures to restore combat effectiveness. The 19th Tank Division has been withdrawn from battle and is being transferred to the front reserve.

The 8th Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command has suffered great losses, and the combat effectiveness of two brigades -- the 25th Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade and the 28th Rocket Launcher Artillery Brigade -- has been restored; the 6th Army Rocket Artillery Group -- the 6th Rocket Artillery Regiment -- is in action in the area of the 17th Motorized Rifle Division; and a subgroup of the 6th Army Artillery Group -- the 6th Army Artillery Brigade -- is in action in the area of the 5th Tank Division.

The army has 7 missiles with nuclear warheads, of which 2 are R-300 missiles (1 of /partially unclear -- could be 40 or 10/ kt and 1 of 20 kt) and 5 are R-65 missiles (1 of 3 kt, 2 of 10 kt, and 2 of 20 kt), along with 4 operational-tactical missile launchers and 7 tactical missile launchers.

The alternate command post is in the forest 6 km southwest of BERGEN.

e) The 9th Army (the 6th, 18th, 21st, and 23rd motorized rifle divisions and the 10th, 20th, and 26th tank divisions) is exploiting the results of the initial nuclear strike. The forces of its 10th and 20th tank divisions and 6th Motorized Rifle Division have made an assault crossing of the WESER River and are developing an offensive; mounting its main attack on the BIELEFELD, MUNSTER axis, in cooperation with Western Front antiaircraft artillery, the army has defeated the forces of the Blue 1st Army Corps, having encircled the remnants of the Blue 1st and 4th armored divisions west of MAGDEBURG with the forces of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division and the units of the 21st and 23rd motorized rifle divisions that have maintained combat effectiveness. The remaining units of the 21st and 23rd motorized rifle divisions are carrying out measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear strike.

The 9th Army Artillery Group (the 36th Gun Artillery Brigade and the 9th Army Artillery Brigade) is in action in the area of the 10th Tank Division and the 6th Motorized Rifle Division.

The 24th Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade of the 11th Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command is on the march, with the head of the column southwest of HANNOVER.

TS #80823A  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 10 of 17 Pages

The army has 21 missiles with nuclear warheads, of which 4 are R-300 missiles (1 of 100 kt, 1 of 40 kt, and 2 of 20 kt) and 17 are R-65 missiles (9 of 20 kt, 5 of 10 kt, and 3 of 3 kt), along with 6 operational-tactical missile launchers, and 11 tactical missile launchers.

The command post is in the forest 6 km southwest of BURG.

f) The 10th Tank Army (the 15th and 22nd tank divisions, and the 29th Motorized Rifle Division) -- the front's second echelon -- has concentrated in the area of SANDVERG /sic -- SANDFORTH/, LEHRTE, TANGERHUTTE, KALBE.

At 1600 hours 12 September seven nuclear munitions struck the army troops. As a result of the strike the control of the 29th Motorized Rifle Division has been disrupted and its 87th and 88th motorized rifle regiments have lost up to 60 to 70 percent of their personnel.

As of 1800 hours 12 September reconnaissance detachments from the 15th Tank Division and 29th Motorized Rifle Division have been moved into the battle formations of the 5th Tank Division and 17th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Army and are conducting reconnaissance without crossing the line of contact with the enemy.

The army has 23 missiles with nuclear warheads, of which 10 are R-300 missiles (2 of 20 kt, 5 of 40 kt, and 3 of 100 kt) and 13 are R-65 missiles (7 of 10 kt and 6 of 20 kt), along with 9 operational-tactical missile launchers, 12 tactical missile launchers, approximately 840 tanks, 700 guns and mortars, and 220 antitank means.

The army's command post is in the forest 5 km northwest of FAHRENHORST.

g) The front rocket troops and artillery delivered grouped and individual strikes against enemy troops during 12 September.

The 2nd Front Missile Brigade is in the siting area of LUBTHEEN, GRABOW, (excluding) LENZEN.

The 3rd Front Missile Brigade is in the siting area of UELZEN, (excluding) STIEYKE /probably STEIMKE/, ESCHUDE.

The 2nd Front Missile Brigade has 5 missiles with nuclear warheads (1 of 20 kt, 2 of 40 kt, and 2 of 100 kt) and 9 operational-tactical missile launchers; the 3rd Front Missile Brigade has 7 missiles with nuclear

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 11 of 17 Pages

warheads (2 of 20 kt and 5 of 40 kt) and 14 operational-tactical missile launchers.

The artillery is in the battle formations of the line units.

h) The air defense troops of the front, in cooperation with fighter aviation of the 1st Air Army, units of the 6th Corps of the Air Defense of the Country, the air defense forces and means of the Combined Baltic Fleet, and the air defense troops of the Western Front, are repulsing enemy air strikes against the troops and rear services installations of the front.

During 12 September the air defense troops of the front shot down 55 aircraft and helicopters of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force as well as 26 army aviation helicopters.

The 13th Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade is covering the 2nd Front Missile Brigade and the troops of the 2nd Army Corps; the 15th Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade is covering the installations of the front rear services and the crossings over the ELBE River.

i) In its previous composition the 1st Air Army essentially completed rebasing to new airfields, and the main forces of its fighter-bomber and bomber aviation are conducting combat actions to support and cover the advancing troops of the 4th, 7th, 6th, and 9th armies and 2nd Army Corps.

Bomber aviation forces are delivering strikes against the enemy's missile/nuclear means and reserves. Reconnaissance aviation is conducting reconnaissance of the enemy's nuclear attack means and reserves.

The army has 48 nuclear bombs (8 of 5 kt, 5 of 10 kt, 5 of 20 kt, 5 of 50 kt, 10 of 100 kt, 5 of 200 kt, and 10 of 300 kt).

The army's forward command post is in the forest 2 km east of CROYA.

j) The front reserves:

The 28th Motorized Rifle Division has been concentrated in the area (excluding) SCHÖNHAUSEN, REDEKIN, PRITZERBE, where it is conducting measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear attack.

The antitank reserve and mobile obstacle detachment: the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade and Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 1, the 1st Battalion of the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment, are in movement, with the head of the

TS #80823A  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 12 of 17 Pages

column in the vicinity of OSTENHOLZ; the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade and Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 2, the 12th Engineer Obstacle Battalion, are in movement, with the head of the column 5 km east of LEHRTE.

3. On the right the Combined Baltic Fleet is completing the defeat of the enemy's naval forces in the Baltic Sea and is continuing to build up its efforts to combat his naval forces in the North Sea.

On the right /sic -- left/ the forces of the Western Front's 3rd Army are developing an offensive on the GOTTINGEN, DORTMUND axis.

4. In the front zone the opposing enemy grouping and its nuclear means have been destroyed by nuclear strikes. The greatest losses (up to 75 percent) were incurred by the large units of the Brown 1st and 4th army corps, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps.

The 14th and 15th motorized infantry divisions of the Brown 4th Army Corps, the 17th, 19th, and 20th motorized infantry divisions of the Brown 5th Army Corps, whose losses total up to 50 percent, are the most combat-effective. The enemy's missile/nuclear grouping has suffered heavy losses. However, the enemy is still capable of delivering massed nuclear strikes as well as strikes by tactical and army aviation.

In the front zone up to 120 targets for destruction with nuclear weapons have been identified.

On 13 September the probable concept of the enemy may involve an attempt to go over to the defense with combat-effective large units of the first echelon and approaching reserves and to hold the prepared BREMEN, BIELEFELD line. At the same time, through nuclear strikes against them the combat-effective groupings of front troops are to be defeated and their further advance prevented. In addition, the possibility is not to be ruled out that the enemy will make a counterthrust with combat-effective groupings of troops (of the Brown 5th Army Corps) from the OSNABRUCK, BIELEFELD line or the DEMFORDE /sic -- probably LEMFORDE/, MINDEN line, and with the Brown 24th Infantry Division and Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division from the BREMEN, DIEPHOLZ line.

5. The front commander decided that by 2000 hours 12 September the following nuclear means that have been detected are to be destroyed through the delivery of grouped and individual strikes employing 15 nuclear munitions: the 4th Pershing Squadron, a Lance battalion, the 24th Lance Artillery Regiment, and delivery aircraft on two airfields, as well as the

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 13 of 17 Pages

encircled enemy groupings and the command post of the Brown 1st Army Corps.

At the same time the operational posture of the front troops is to be upgraded with combat-effective large units; the defeat of the encircled enemy groupings in the areas of the 7th and 9th armies is to be completed; and conditions are to be established for committing to battle the front's second echelon, the 10th Tank Army.

On the morning of 13 September the 10th Tank Army is to be committed to battle in the area of the 6th Army from the SYKE, UCHTE line to develop an offensive on the SULINGEN, ENSCHEDE axis; and by the close of 14 September it is to fulfill the front's immediate task. Subsequently exploiting success on the KLEVE, EINDHOVEN, BRUSSELS axis, it is to make an assault crossing of the RHEIN River from the march and is to achieve the objectives of the operation in the time limits prescribed by the General Staff.

On the morning of 14 September the 30th Airborne Division is to make an airborne landing to support the 10th Tank Army's assault crossing of the RHEIN River.

On the morning of 13 September, 78 nuclear munitions are to be employed in a massed nuclear strike, including 40 /delivered/ by the rocket troops and 38 by the 1st Air Army of the front, and the following are to be destroyed: the remnants of the 1st and 3rd Pershing squadrons, delivery aircraft on four airfields, the remnants of the Lance 150th Battalion and 25th Regiment, four control and guidance centers for tactical aviation, the command post of the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps and Brown 5th Army Corps, and combat-effective headquarters units.

The massed nuclear strike is to start at 0800 hours 13 September for the rocket troops and artillery of the front, and 0815 hours 13 September for the 1st Air Army. The fire strike is to last 15 minutes. The artillery of the 6th Army is to be called upon for an artillery strike.

The operational disposition of the front troops is to be in two echelons: the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies, the 10th Tank Army, and the 2nd Army Corps are to be in the first echelon; and the 6th Army is to be in the second echelon.

During the commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army, control of the troops will be exercised from the forward control post at Hill 70, 2 km southwest of WITZIN, with employment of the forces and means of the front

TS #808234

Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 14 of 17 Pages

airborne control post.

Second training topic. Evaluation of the condition of the system of front control posts, and the use of the forward control post to control the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon.

Plan of the report:

- condition of the system of front control posts;
- the forces and means allocated to restore the front forward control post;
- the area into which the forward control post is to be relocated in order to control the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon;
- the composition of the group departing with the commander on the mobile /sic/ control post.

#### CONTENTS OF THE REPORT

As of 1930 hours 12 September the following are in operation in the front:

- the front command post is in the forest 10 km south of WITTINGEN;
- the alternate command post of the front is in the forest 14 km southeast of CELLE;
- the rear control post of the front is in the forest 11 km southwest of GARDELEGEN, where it is finishing up work to eliminate the aftereffects from the enemy's use of toxic agents;
- the forward control post has still not been restored;
- the airborne control post is on the airfield at WITTINGEN.

Thus, all three of the front control posts are functioning. However, due to the fact that the forward control post has been put out of operation, the front command post is operating at reduced strength and work at the rear control post has been hampered. A series of measures must be urgently carried out connected with restoring the forward command post and finishing up the elimination of the aftereffects from the enemy's use of

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 15 of 17 Pages

toxic agents against the rear control post of the front.

Personnel from the front officer reserve regiment, the communications means that have survived and the reserve of communications means of the OPS /separate communications regiment/ are to be allocated to restore the front forward control post.

One rifle battalion of the 28th Motorized Rifle Division and a combat engineer company of the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment /are to be assigned/ for security and services.

The restoration of the front forward control post is to be completed by 2400 hours 12 September. The chief of the department of control posts is to be charged with the responsibility for restoring the command post.

By 2400 hours 12 September the front's communications system is to be restored and communications channels are to exist with the General Staff; the front's forward control post, airborne command post and rear control post; the Western Front, the Combined Baltic Fleet, all of the armies, and the 2nd Army Corps.

The front forward control post is to be deployed by 0200 hours 13 September in the area of Hill 70 (2 km southwest of WITZIN).

The /front/ forward control post is to have stable communications with the command post and forward control post of the 10th Tank Army, the command posts and forward control posts of the 4th, 6th, and 7th armies, the command post of the 1st Air Army, and the alternate command post of the front. The following are to be in the forward control post with the front commander: the chiefs of the operations and intelligence directorates, the chief of the communications troops, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery, the chief of the air defense troops, the commander of the 1st Air Army, the chief of the engineer troops, the chief of the chemical troops, and the chief of the radioelectronic warfare department.


The front commander is to exercise control of the troops from the forward control post as of 0200 hours 13 September.

Third training topic. The procedure for using the front airborne control post during the commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army.

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 16 of 17 Pages

Plan of the report:

- the location of the airborne control post;
- the composition of the airborne control post;
- the tasks confronting the airborne control post.

CONTENTS OF THE REPORT

The airborne control post is to be located on the airfield at WITTINGEN, 7 km from the front command post.

The composition of the front airborne command post /sic/ is as follows: 1 AN-10 /transport aircraft/, 1 R-140, 1 R-130, 3 R-111, 1 R-802, 1 R-832M, and an R-409 (1/2). Two high frequency radiotelephones.

Communications range (in km)

on ultra-shortwave /band/ -- 200-300 km

on shortwave /band/ -- 2-3000 km

Personnel: Operations Group -- 11 men

Communications Center -- 12 men

Crew -- 5 men

Length of the flight (in minutes) -- 35-40

Members of the operations group on permanent duty:

- 1 of the operations officers
- 1 of the intelligence officers
- 1 of the artillerymen
- 1 of the air defense officers
- 1 of the chemical officers

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/02481-80

Page 17 of 17 Pages

The rest of the complement is to arrive together with the front commander.

The commander may be in the air on the airborne control post in person with a group of responsible officers in order to monitor the advance of the 10th Tank Army.

In the event that the forward control post is destroyed, the airborne control post may be used as a temporary control post during the commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army.

The airborne control post may be /used as/ a relay station and ensure that the front commander at the forward control post has stable communications with the front command post, the command posts and forward control posts of the 10th Tank Army and the 4th, 6th, and 7th armies.

#### CRITIQUE OF THE LESSON

The instructor is to point out that only certain aspects of the control of front troops during the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon have been examined in this lesson. Troop control is a much broader topic. It also includes assigning tasks to the troops for the commitment of the second echelon, providing for the organization of cooperation during the commitment, /providing/ combat and operational support for the commitment, organizing provost and traffic control service, and many other matters.

The instructor is to restate the lesson subject and training topics, and is to rate to what extent they have been achieved during the lesson. He is to evaluate the students' written combat reports and /oral/ reports, their positive and negative aspects, and he is to point out what /topics/ and which students specifically require improvement.

TS #808234  
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~