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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

26 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :  
Organizing Air Defense When Committing the  
Front's Second Echelon to Battle

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson outlining the matters covered by the chief of the front air defense troops in planning and organizing the employment of air defense troops when the front's second echelon (a tank army in this case) is committed to battle in an offensive operation against NATO's Northern Army Group.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 26c: Organizing Air Defense  
When Committing the Front's Second Echelon to Battle

SOURCE Documentary

### Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is used to instruct students acting as front chiefs of air defense troops in the steps involved in organizing the use of air defense troops, including fighter aviation, to cover the commitment to battle of a front's second-echelon tank army, which is developing an offensive operation across northern West Germany toward Belgium and the North Sea coast. The main points covered deal with the strength, assignment, tasks, and actions of front SAM and anti-aircraft artillery troops and fighter aviation; NATO's opposing air order of battle, actions, and capabilities; and measures for radar reconnaissance and air defense control and cooperation.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

Brown	-	West Germany
Blue	-	Great Britain
Green	-	United States
Gray	-	Denmark
Lilac	-	Belgium
Violet	-	Netherlands

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Lesson No. 26c

Lesson subject: ORGANIZING AIR DEFENSE WHEN COMMITTING THE FRONT'S SECOND ECHELON TO BATTLE

I. Estimated time for completing Lesson No. 26c:

Number and lesson title	Time allocated		
	Group training period	Individual study by students	Total
Lesson No. 26c -- Organizing air defense when committing the front's second echelon to the battle	3	2	5

II. Training objectives of the lesson:

1. To teach the students to evaluate the ground and air situation quickly and comprehensively, to adopt a sound decision, and to organize the air defense during a front offensive operation when committing the second echelon to battle.

2. To improve the students' knowledge on aspects of the organization and combat employment of front air defense forces and means in an offensive operation.

III. Method of conducting the lesson: group exercise in class on maps (for lesson No. 26a) with a critique of the proposals developed by the students during individual study concerning the organization of air defense when committing the front's second echelon to battle.

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IV. Methodological recommendations on the preparation of the students for the lesson

When conducting the briefing it is advisable, at the study group's request, to inform the students of the training objectives, training topics, and procedure for conducting the lesson, and then to recommend to them the following work procedure in preparation for the lesson:

1. To study the necessary data on air defense matters from the assignment for lesson No. 26a, to understand the concept of the front commander's decision on committing the second echelon to battle from the standpoint of the correct organization of air defense.
2. To study the assignment for lesson No. 26a, estimate the situation, and make sound conclusions about the possible scale and nature of the air enemy's actions when committing the front's second echelon to battle, and about the status and positioning of front air defense forces and means, mainly from the standpoint of establishing a grouping to most reliably cover the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle.
3. In the role of chief of the front air defense troops, to prepare proposals on the organization of the air defense when committing the 10th Tank Army to battle, to write them down in their workbooks, and to plot on the map for lesson No. 26a the grouping of air defense forces and means (the SAM and radiotechnical large units and units subordinate to the front and armies) and the airborne alert zones for fighter aircraft and the lines from which they are to intercept the air enemy at altitudes of 5,000 meters.

It is recommended that in preparing proposals they use the sample form of the content of the report of the chief of the front air defense troops -- appendix No. 2 of Lesson No. 26b.

V. The procedure for conducting the lesson

A. The main training topics and the approximate distribution of training time:

An examination of the students' lesson preparation and a critique of the theoretical aspects of the lesson subject ..... 10 minutes



1. Conclusions from a clarification of the concept of the front commander's decision on the commitment to battle of the second echelon -- the 10th Tank Army -- and the tasks of air defense ..... 15 minutes
2. Conclusions from the estimate of the possible scale and nature of the air enemy's actions when the front's second echelon is being committed to battle ..... 20 minutes
3. Conclusions from the assessment of the status and positioning of the front air defense forces and means ..... 15 minutes
4. Proposals concerning the organization of the air defense of the troops and installations when committing the front's second echelon to battle ..... total 70 minutes
  - a) The tasks and concept of the air defense ..... 5 minutes
  - b) The organization of the reconnaissance of the air enemy ..... 10 minutes
  - c) The organization of the antiaircraft cover of troops and installations ..... 30 minutes
  - d) The organization of fighter aviation cover ... 15 minutes
  - e) The organization of control over air defense forces and means and of the cooperation between them ..... 10 minutes
- Conclusion ..... 5 minutes

At the beginning of the lesson the plotting of the grouping of air defense forces and means on the map must be checked by general inspection, in accordance with the assignment of Lesson No. 26b; and the workbooks are to be checked for the proposals on organizing the air defense.

To test the students' understanding of theoretical matters, it is advisable to ask them one or two theoretical questions (at the discretion of the lesson director) on the lesson subject.

After the critique of the theoretical matters, the director will announce the operational time of 2100 hours 9 September, appoint the students to the role of chief of the front air defense troops, and begin the critique

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of his /the chief's/ report of the proposals on the organization of the air defense, listening to the reports of one or two students on each training topic; and if necessary he may listen to supplements to each individual topic of the report.

It is advisable to listen to the reports for each student's work map that is hung on the blackboard. In so doing, the lesson director is to require that the report be brief and precise, be within the time set by him, and be adequately substantiated.

After hearing the reports and supplements of the students on each training topic, for the purpose of clarification (checking the students' knowledge) it is necessary to ask about the organizational structure and tactical-technical characteristics of the armament of the front air defense forces and means and of the air enemy. At the conclusion of the examination of each training topic it is advisable to conduct a short, partial critique, in which it is possible to make the necessary criticisms about individual topics and to clarify them or give a sample report on the training topic under consideration, using material from the current training manual.

B. Some substantiations on the content of the training topics to be worked out.

1. The first training topic -- conclusions from the clarification of the concept of the front commander's decision on committing the second echelon to battle -- is brought out for examination in order to correctly define the tasks, role, and place of the air defense in an offensive operation, in particular when committing the front's second echelon to battle.

In actual activity, before hearing the proposals on the organization of air defense, the front commander, for purposes of clarifying and checking, can ask how the chief of air defense forces refined and arrived at conclusions from the clarification of the concept of his decision on the commitment of the second echelon to battle and how the chief of air defense troops refined the air defense tasks under these conditions.

The concept of the front commander's decision on committing the second echelon to battle is worked out in Lesson No. 26a by the students and is given in the training manual for that lesson.

Sample conclusions from the clarification of the concept of the Coastal Front commander's decision:

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With the aim of exploiting the offensive operation on the main axis of the front, the concept of the front commander's decision calls for the following:

Before the close of 12 September, by delivery of nuclear strikes (grouped and individual) and by the actions of the combat-effective troop groupings, the destruction of the encircled enemy groupings in the zones of the 7th and 9th armies is to be completed by the morning of 13 September, thereby improving the operational disposition of the troops on the axis of the front's main attack, bringing about favorable conditions for committing the front's second echelon to battle, and also freeing forces to exploit success on the axis of the front's main attack.

The front's second echelon -- the 10th Tank Army -- is to be committed to battle on the morning of the next day (13 September), following a massed nuclear strike delivered by the front rocket troops and aviation from the SYKE, UCHTE line along a frontage of 45 km in the zone of the 6th Army, leapfrogging through the battle formations of the 5th Tank Division and 17th Motorized Rifle Division, which were weakened by enemy nuclear strikes, on the SULINGEN, ENSCHEDE axis for the purpose of completing the rout of the units of the Brown 1st and 5th army corps and of fulfilling the front's immediate task. Subsequently the Army, exploiting success on the KLEVE, EINDHOVEN, BRUSSELS axis, is to make an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march on the morning of 14 September on the main axis of the front in cooperation with the 30th Airborne Division, and thereafter reach the line that achieves the objective of the front operation.

The 6th Army, with the combat-effective units of the 5th Tank Division and 17th Motorized Rifle Division, is to seize the SYKHE, UCHTE line and support the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle, after which, having transferred the 17th Motorized Rifle Division to the composition of the 7th Army, it is to become the front's second echelon.

The 7th Army, having completed the rout of the encircled units of the Brown 4th Army Corps before the close of 12 September, is to develop the offensive on the morning of 13 September with the main forces on the DALMENKHORST /sic -- DELMENHORST/, EMMEN, MENNIKH /unidentified/ axis, and with part of the forces on the ROTENBURZH /sic -- ROTENBURG/, BREMENSKHAVEN /sic -- BREMERHAVEN/ axis, in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps is to complete the rout of the remaining units of the Brown 4th Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps and by the close of 16-17 September (the fourth or fifth day) reach the North Sea coast throughout all of its offensive zone and fulfill its task in the front operation.

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The 9th Army, having completed the rout of the Blue 1st Army Corps by the close of 12 September, on the morning of 13 September immediately following a massed nuclear strike develops the offensive on the general BIELEFELD, MUNSTER, VENLO axis, completes the rout of the Lilac 2nd Army Corps, Brown 5th Army Corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps in cooperation with the 10th Tank Army of the front and the 3rd Army of the Western Front, and by the close of 14 September fulfills its follow-up task. Subsequently developing the offensive on the MUNSTER, VENLO axis, by the close of 16 September it seizes the northern part of the RUHR area, and with forces of no less than one division makes an assault crossing of the RHINE River in the area south of /partially illegible -- probably WESEL/ and seizes the VENLO area.

In this way the front's main grouping, against which one must expect the enemy's aviation will concentrate its main efforts -- massed and concentrated strikes -- will be as follows on the morning of 13 September when the front's second echelon is committed to the engagement: the 10th Tank Army, advancing and deploying to the line of commitment to battle; the main forces of the 7th and 9th armies, which directly adjoin the 10th Tank Army's line of commitment; the grouping of missile/nuclear means -- the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the 3rd and 5th front mobile missile technical bases, and also the missile brigades of the 6th, 7th, and 9th armies, and the main home airfields for delivery aircraft of the 1st Air Army.

The success of the development of the offensive on the main axis at a given moment and the subsequent achievement of the front offensive operation's objective will depend to a decisive degree on the reliable cover and preservation of the front forces and means against enemy air strikes.

Consequently, based on this the air defense tasks will be to continue covering the main groupings of front troops and missile/nuclear means on the axis of the main attack when completing the rout of the encircled enemy groupings in the zones of the 7th and 9th armies; on the morning of 13 September the main efforts of front air defense troops and fighter aviation will concentrate first of all on covering the 10th Tank Army against massed and concentrated enemy air strikes, particularly when it is advancing on the line of its deployment and commitment to battle; and on covering the main forces of the 7th and 9th armies directly adjacent to the line of commitment of the 10th Tank Army, the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the 3rd and 5th front mobile missile technical bases, and also the main home airfields for delivery aircraft of the 1st Air Army.

Thereafter, the main efforts of the air defense troops and fighter aviation will be concentrated on covering the front's main grouping on the

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SULINGEN, EISKHEDE /sic -- ENSCHEDE/, KLEVE, EINDHOVEN axis when making the assault crossing of the RHINE and MAAS rivers, and on subsequently developing the offensive on the BRUSSELS axis.

2. Conclusions from the estimate of the possible scale and nature of the air enemy's actions when the front's second echelon is being committed to battle.

/See chart on following page/

The West air grouping directly in the Coastal Front area -- the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (without fighter aviation) and the Allied Air Forces Baltic Approaches (minus Gray's tactical air command) -- has up to 300-330 combat-ready aircraft, including up to 155-170 nuclear weapons delivery aircraft, taking into account the 60 percent losses incurred in preceding combat actions and the replacements that had arrived to join it (up to 126 aircraft, including up to 96 delivery aircraft).

In addition, it should be expected that up to 25 /sic -- 20/ to 25 delivery aircraft of Green and Blue carrier-based aircraft and up to 50 to 60 aircraft, including up to 25 to 35 delivery aircraft, from the Blue home air force command will take action against troops and installations in the front area.

With this strength the enemy has the capability to deliver massed and concentrated strikes with up to 300 to 350 planes in a raid, including up to 170 to 190 delivery aircraft.

A massed enemy air strike is most probable on the morning of 13 September against troops of the 10th Tank Army as it is advancing and particularly on its line of deployment and commitment to battle, and against the troop groupings of the 7th and 9th armies which are adjacent to the 10th Tank Army's line of commitment. One should expect concentrated strikes against the discovered siting areas of the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, 3rd and 5th front mobile missile technical bases, army missile brigades, and also against the main home airfields of the 1st Air Army's delivery aircraft.

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Combat Strength and Capabilities of Enemy Aviation

	Number of aircraft			Anticipated in massed and concentrated air raids
	At start of operation	Based on 60 percent losses	Including those combat-ready	
From Allied Air Forces Baltic Approaches /NATO/ (without Gray tactical air command)	$\frac{144}{-}$	$\frac{55-60}{-}$	$\frac{45-50}{-}$	
2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (without fighter aviation) including Green 49th Tactical Fighter Wing	$\frac{528}{264}$	$\frac{210-215}{100-110}$	$\frac{160-175}{80-90}$	
2nd Allied Tactical Air Force replacements:				
2 Blue air squadrons		$\frac{24}{24}$		
2 Brown air squadrons		$\frac{30}{-}$		
1 Green tactical fighter wing		$\frac{72}{72}$		
Total arriving in 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force as replacements		$\frac{126}{96}$	$\frac{100-105}{75-80}$	
Total in 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force and Allied Air Forces Baltic Approaches		$\frac{390-400}{196-206}$	$\frac{300-330}{155-170}$	$\frac{240-270}{125-135}$
Green and Blue carrier-based aviation	$\frac{62}{62}$	$\frac{20-25}{20-25}$	$\frac{20-25}{20-25}$	$\frac{20-25}{20-25}$
Blue home air force command (1st Bomber Group and 38th Tactical Air Group)	$\frac{162}{96}$	$\frac{60-70}{35-40}$	$\frac{50-55}{25-35}$	$\frac{50-55}{25-35}$
Total anticipated against troops and installations in the front area		$\frac{470-500}{250-270}$	$\frac{370-410}{200-230}$	$\frac{310-350}{170-195}$

- Remarks:
1. The combat strength of enemy aviation at the start of the operation is taken from assignment No. 10 (Explanatory Memorandum).
  2. Total aircraft are in the numerator, the delivery aircraft among them are in the denominator.
  3. The combat readiness factor (good working order) is taken to be 0.8.

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One should expect that when enemy air raids are negotiating the front air defense system, it will be negotiated at the same time by a large number of small groups on a wide front, mostly at low and extremely low altitudes under cover of intense electronic jamming.

3. Conclusions from the assessment of the status and positioning of front air defense forces and means

Front air defense troops and fighter aviation, in fulfilling the tasks of air defense in cooperation with the 6th Air Defense Corps and the air defense forces and means of the Western Front and Combined Baltic Fleet, are to concentrate their main efforts on covering the troops of the front's main grouping (6th, 7th, and 9th armies), the grouping of missile/nuclear means (2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, and 3rd and 5th front mobile missile technical bases), and the principal home airfields of the 1st Air Army's delivery aircraft (4th Fighter-Bomber Division and 6th Bomber Division).

Simultaneously with the fulfillment of their combat task, the air defense forces and fighter aviation are to carry out measures and work to restore the combat effectiveness of the large units and units and to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear strikes delivered in the period 11-12 September.

The large units and units of front air defense troops have suffered an average of up to 20 to 25 percent losses in personnel, weapons, and combat equipment, but individual regiments, for the most part antiaircraft artillery regiments, /have suffered/ up to 40 percent /losses/ or more.

According to the condition at 1930 hours 12 September, the combat strength of front air defense troops is described as follows:

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Air defense large units and units	Number of large units, units, and firing entities					
	Total in the <u>front</u>		Including			
			Subordinate to <u>front</u>		In armies and army corps	
	Units	Firing entities	Units	Firing entities	Units	Firing entities
KRUG-A /SA-4 modified/ SAM brigades	6	44	2	15	4	29
S-75 /SA-2/ SAM regiments	3	7	1	2	2	5
S-125 /SA-3/ SAM regiments	2	12	2	12	-	-
KUB /SA-6/ SAM regiments	18	62	3	8	15	54
S-60 /57-mm AA gun/ AAA regiments	17	52	3	15	14	37
KS-19 /100-mm AA gun/ AAA regiments	2	11	2	11	-	-

In addition, front air defense troops include two air defense radiotechnical regiments (the 17th and 18th) and five air defense separate radiotechnical battalions in which there are 30 radar companies.

The level of equipping in regimental air defense means corresponds to the percentage strength level of the divisions.

The front large units and units of air defense troops as of 1930 hours 12 September have taken up position and are fulfilling their tasks as follows:

-- the 13th KRUG-A /SA-4 modified/ Front SAM Brigade, with eight combat-effective SAM batteries available, is covering the 2nd Front Missile Brigade, the 5th Front Mobile Missile Technical Base, and missile units of the 2nd Army Corps and 4th Army; the brigade's siting area is 160 to 180 km away from the line of commitment of the front's second echelon;

-- the 15th KRUG-A /SA-4 modified/ Front SAM Brigade, with seven combat-effective SAM batteries available, is covering the troop grouping in the area of BERGEN (20 km southeast of SOLTAU), (excluding) HANNOVER, (excluding) BRAUNSCHWEIG, and BODENTEICH (15 km south of UELZEN); the brigade's siting area is 50 to 100 km away from the 10th Tank Army's line of commitment;

-- the 14th S-75 /SA-2/ Front SAM Regiment, with two combat-effective SAM battalions available, is covering the 3rd Front Missile Brigade and 3rd Front Mobile Technical Maintenance Base; the battle formation of the regiment is 80 to 100 km away from the 10th Tank Army's line of commitment;

-- the 17th and 18th S-125 /SA-3/ Front SAM regiments are covering the home airfields of the 1st Air Army's delivery aircraft (the 4th Fighter-Bomber Division and the 6th Bomber Division respectively);

-- the 23rd S-60 /57-mm AA gun/ Front AAA Regiment, with five combat-effective batteries available, is covering the front command post;

-- the 10th AAA Regiment of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) is in the complement of the 4th Army's air defense troops and is reinforcing the cover of the army's troops, with the task of subsequently covering the crossings and hydrotechnical installations of the KIEL canal;

-- the 17th Air Defense Radiotechnical Regiment, which has seven combat-effective companies available and which is to establish a second line of radar posts, is conducting reconnaissance of the air enemy in the offensive zone of the 6th and 9th armies and partly of the 7th Army;

-- the 20th Air Defense Radiotechnical Regiment, which has eight combat-effective companies available and which is to establish a second line of radar posts, is conducting reconnaissance of the air enemy in the zones of the 7th Army and 2nd Army Corps. Subsequently the regiment has the task of deploying posts along the North Sea coastline.

On the basis of the composition and disposition of the air defense troop large units and units, the following can be brought in to cover the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon, in addition to the 10th Tank Army's air defense troops: the 15th Front SAM Brigade and the 6th Army's air defense forces and means (the 6th S-75 /SA-2/ Army SAM Regiment, the air defense means of the 5th Tank Division and 17th Motorized Rifle Division), which are deployed in the forward movement zone and in front of the line of commitment, and also the main air defense forces and means of the 7th and 9th armies (the 7th and 9th armies' KRUG-A /SA-4 modified/ SAM brigades) deployed on the flanks.

In establishing an air defense troop grouping to cover the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle, a negligible regrouping of the forces and means is required, specifically the movement forward and deployment of the

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10th Army's SAM brigades on the night of 13 September in front of the army's line of commitment and the regrouping of the 6th Army's 6th S-75 /SA-2/ SAM regiment.

For fighter aviation cover of the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon and cover of the front's main grouping, and stemming from basing conditions, the 3rd and 5th Fighter divisions may be used with the expenditure of 12 regimental sorties to cover the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle.

4. Proposals on organizing the air defense of troops and installations when committing the front's second echelon to battle

a) During commitment of the second echelon, the air defense of front troops and installations will be accomplished in cooperation with the 6th Air Defense Corps and with the Western Front's air defense forces and means. While continuing to cover the front's main troop groupings and missile/nuclear means on the axis of the main attack during completion of the defeat of the encircled enemy groupings in the areas of the 7th and 9th armies, on the morning of 13 September the main efforts of front air defense troops and fighter aviation will be concentrated on cover against massed and concentrated enemy air strikes, primarily /those strikes on/ the 10th Tank Army when it is advancing to its line of deployment and commitment to battle, the main forces of the 7th and 9th armies which adjoin the 10th Tank Army's line of commitment, the siting areas of the 2nd and 3rd Front missile brigades, the 3rd and 5th front mobile missile technical bases; and also the army missile brigades of the 6th, 7th and 9th armies, and the main home airfields of the 1st Air Army's delivery aircraft.

Subsequently, with the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle, the main efforts of air defense troops and fighter aviation will be concentrated on covering the front's main grouping of troops and missile/nuclear means on the SULINGEN, ENSCHEDE, KLEVE, EINDHOVEN axis, when making the assault crossing of the RHINE and MAAS rivers, and in the subsequent development of the offensive on the BRUSSELS axis.

b) Radar reconnaissance of the air enemy will be accomplished by a network of radar posts which are to be deployed in two lines: the first -- /by the/ air defense separate radiotechnical battalions of the 4th, 7th, 6th, and 9th armies; the second line -- /by the/ 17th Air Defense Radiotechnical Regiment in the 6th and 9th armies' area, and the 20th Air Defense Radiotechnical Regiment in the 7th Army's area along the North Sea

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coast. The second line of posts in the 4th Army's area and the third /line of posts/ in the zone of the front's main thrust are to be supported by the means of the 6th Air Defense Corps. Two radar posts from the air defense separate radiotechnical battalion of the 10th Tank Army will be deployed additionally to thicken the radar coverage on the second echelon's line of commitment to battle. In addition, the reconnaissance of the air enemy will be augmented by the radars of the command posts of anti-aircraft large units and units, by division control posts, and also by the system of visual observation posts.

(See the map for the grouping of radar posts.)\*

c) Anti-aircraft cover of front troops and installations when committing the second echelon to battle will be accomplished by the integrated grouping of the SAM large units and units of the 6th, 7th, and 9th armies, of the 10th Tank Army, and those of front subordination, in cooperation with fighter aviation; the main efforts are to be concentrated on the front's main axis of attack, primarily on covering the 10th Tank Army and the missile/nuclear means.

The SAM large units and units of front subordination will be utilized in this case as follows:

-- the 15th KRUG-A /SA-4 modified/ Front SAM Brigade, together with the anti-aircraft means of the 6th, 7th and 9th armies, is to reinforce the cover for the movement forward, deployment, and commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army. In so doing, its organic 10th KRUG-A Army SAM Brigade will be deployed together with the 6th Army's 6th S-75 /SA-2/ Army SAM Regiment directly in front of the line of commitment to battle;

-- the 13th KRUG-A /SA-4 modified/ Front SAM Brigade is to cover the grouping of missile/nuclear means of the 2nd Front Missile Brigade, the 5th Front Mobile Missile Technical Base, and missile units of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps;

-- the 14th S-75 /SA-2/ Front SAM Regiment is to cover the 3rd Front Missile Brigade and 3rd Front Mobile Missile Technical Base;

-- the 17th and 18th S-125 /SA-3/ front SAM regiments, as before, are to cover the main home airfields of the delivery aircraft of the 1st Air Army's 4th Fighter-Bomber Division and 6th Bomber Division;

-- the 23rd S-60 /57-mm AA gun/ AAA Regiment is to cover the front command post;

-- the 10th AAA Regiment of the RVGK is to continue to fulfill the previously assigned task.

\*  Comment: Map was not received.

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(See the map for the grouping of front and army SAM large units and units.)

d) Fighter aviation cover of the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon and of the front's main grouping when developing the offensive and making an assault crossing of the RHINE and MAAS rivers will be carried out by the main forces of the 1st Air Army's fighter aviation -- the 3rd and 5th fighter divisions -- in cooperation with the 15th Fighter Division of the Western Front and the 35th and 36th fighter regiments of the 6th Air Defense Corps. The troops of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps on the JUTLAND axis will be covered by the 2nd Fighter Division in cooperation with the 33rd and 34th fighter regiments of the 6th Air Defense Corps.

For direct cover of the 10th Tank Army's advance and commitment to battle, 12 regimental sorties of the 3rd and 5th fighter divisions will be allocated; and, for cooperation, two regimental sorties of the 6th Air Defense Corps' fighter aviation will be allocated.

(See the map for fighter aviation basing, airborne alert zones, and the air enemy intercept lines.)

e) Control of air defense forces and means when repulsing massed and concentrated enemy air raids in the period of the 10th Tank Army's movement forward and commitment to battle will be exercised from the front air defense command post, where the 1st Air Army's fighter aviation combat control center is set up and an operations group of the 6th Air Defense Corps is located, and also from the air defense command posts of the armies, the air defense control posts of the divisions, and the command posts of the SAM large units and units, depending on the nature of the air enemy's actions and the intensity of the electronic jamming.

The cooperation of air defense troops and fighter aviation will be carried out thoroughly following the previously prescribed air defense plan: with respect to zones of combat actions and in one zone (the zone of SAM means) by allocating the efforts of the cooperating means according to altitudes, directions, lines, times of actions, and targets.

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Concluding remarks

At the conclusion of the lesson, remarks will be made as to the quality of the completed training topics and degree of achievement of the training objectives of the lesson, which topics were inadequately developed, and where the students should direct their attention in order to prepare for the following lessons.



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