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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

24 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :  
"The Making and Critique of the Decision  
of the Front Commander for an Offensive  
Operation"

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the first lesson of the series; and as such it outlines the overall situation, opposing orders of battle, and tasks to be dealt with by a Soviet front commander, his principal staff officers, and air army commander, in conducting an offensive operation, with both conventional and nuclear weapons, across the North German plain to The Netherlands and Belgium against NATO's Northern Army Group.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 1a: "The Making and Critique  
of the Decision of the Front Commander for an Offensive Operation"

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is used to instruct students acting as a front commander, its principal staff officers, and air army commander, in estimating the situation, assessing enemy and friendly forces, developing the concept of an offensive operation using both nuclear and conventional weapons, planning the offensive operation, and formulating the objectives and tasks of all the forces involved. The lesson focuses on the role of ground forces, missile support, air and air defense operations, and radioelectronic warfare activities. To support the concept and plan that is developed, the lesson presents a quantified balance of forces and also quite detailed orders of battle for instructional models of NATO's Northern Army Group and the opposing Soviet Coastal Front.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

Brown	-	West Germany
Blue	-	Great Britain
Green	-	United States
Lilac	-	Belgium
Violet	-	Netherlands
Gray	-	Denmark

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LESSON No. 1a

I. Subject: "The Making and Critique of the Decision of the Front Commander for an Offensive Operation"

II. Estimated time for completion of lesson No. 1a:

Lesson title	Time allocated (in hours)		Total
	group training period	individual study by students	
<u>Lesson No. 1a</u> -- clarification of the <u>front's</u> task, estimate of the situation, and reporting of the proposals of the chief of staff on the decision	8	17	25

III. Training objectives:

-- to teach the students the method of in-depth and comprehensive clarification of the front's objective and tasks in an operation, to conduct an operational briefing, to estimate the ground, air, naval, and electronic situation; to analyze the military, economic, and political factors in the zone of the offensive, and to draw well-grounded conclusions, obtaining from them a clear understanding of the objective of the operation and the principles of its preparation and conduct under present-day conditions;

-- to teach the students to prepare a qualitative and quantitative balance of forces and means and the other calculations necessary for making a well-grounded and most advisable decision on a front offensive operation;

-- to teach the students to formulate the concept of an operation, determine the tasks for the troops, and make proposals on the decision on a front offensive operation;

-- to train the students in reporting the task clarification results,

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estimate of the situation, and proposals regarding the decision on a front offensive operation.

In the process of mastering the lesson, they are to investigate the capabilities of the front to accomplish the breakthrough of the enemy's prepared defense during an offensive with conventional means of destruction, and are to determine the required number of forces and means for its conduct.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson -- group exercise with the elements of a war game.

V. Methodological recommendations regarding the students' preparation for the lessons.

During the preparation of the students for the lessons, the director of the training group is to be guided by: the textbook Front Offensive Operations, the operational assignment of task no. 12 and 12a (77778) with a map of the initial situation, the training methods text for lesson no. 1, the map of the decision, and the explanatory memorandum to it.\*

At the start of individual study by students, the director of the lessons is to conduct a briefing where he will recommend:

-- the study of: the Field Manual, paragraphs 51-57; Field Service Manual for Staffs, pages 51-59, 64-67; the training text Methods of Making a Decision; the textbook Front Offensive Operations, the section "Making a Decision;"

-- the procedure of the students' work with the training material, and the scope and content of the work that they must complete during the hours of individual study for lesson No. 1a.

During the students' independent work, the director of the lessons is to monitor their preparation for the lessons and give them necessary assistance.

After the clarification of the front's objective and tasks in the operation, the students are to proceed with a detailed study of the enemy (groupings of ground forces, nuclear means, air forces, naval forces, air defense, and electronic warfare means; locations of control posts and

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\* Translator's note: The listed reference material was not received.

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guidance centers, political and morale condition of the population, and the economy in the area of impending combat actions), his capabilities for the delivery of nuclear strikes and strikes with conventional means of destruction, and for making the transition to the offensive; they are to determine the possible nature and intent of his actions, as well as those targets whose destruction can result in a significant weakening of the enemy grouping.

Having studied the enemy, the students are to assess their own troops (number of forces and means allocated for the operation, their condition and operational situation, the basing of aviation, and materiel support), the prerequisites for cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet and the Western Front, the terrain and its effect upon the establishment of the attack groupings and on the conduct of offensive actions, and other matters. As a result of this, they will determine the quantitative and qualitative balance of forces and means in the zone of the front for the operation as a whole, at the start of war, and on the axes where the attacks are to be delivered.

Based on the clarification of the assigned task as well as a comprehensive study and estimate of the situation, the students are to determine the concept for the rout of the enemy groupings in the zone of the front offensive; they outline the targets for destruction in the initial nuclear strike, the axes of the main and other thrusts, the composition of the troop groupings by axes, and the combat tasks for the troops.

VI. Procedure for the conduct of lesson No. 1a -- eight hours (360 minutes).

1. Theoretical matters -- 10 to 15 minutes

2. CLARIFICATION OF THE OBJECTIVE AND TASKS OF THE FRONT IN AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION -- 50 minutes

The students in the capacity of front commander are to clarify the objective of the operation and the tasks of the front in it:

- the concept of the strategic operation in the theater of military operations;
- the objective and tasks in the front offensive operation, the time limits for fulfilment of the tasks;
- the place and role of the front in the strategic operation;

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-- the tasks of the adjacent front and the Combined Baltic Fleet, the tasks of the operational formations of the branches of the armed forces and the prerequisites for cooperation with them;

-- the employment of nuclear weapons of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Combined Baltic Fleet, and their effect on the fulfilment of the task by front troops.

The report of the commander regarding the clarification of the front's objective and tasks in the operation.

1. East is preparing and, in the event West unleashes war in Europe, will conduct a strategic offensive operation for the purpose of defeating the troop groupings of the Northern Army Group and the Central Army Group, the aviation of the 2nd and 4th allied tactical air forces, the naval forces of the West; and of forcing Brown, Lilac and Violet out of the war. Taking into consideration the high level of combat readiness of the Northern Army Group troops, military actions can be initiated within five to seven days by means of a surprise massed air strike and the transition of ground forces to the offensive on the HAMBURG-SZCZECIN and HANNOVER-BERLIN axes, both with the employment of nuclear weapons and with conventional means of destruction only.

2. The Coastal Front has the task of repulsing a possible attack by the enemy and preventing him from invading its territory. It has to prepare, and by special instruction of the Supreme High Command, conduct an offensive operation on the JUTLAND and HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axes, rout the troop groupings of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet and the Western Front, seize the northern section of the Brown territory and the territories of Lilac and Violet, reach the coast of the North Sea, and organize its defense.

The possibility of the delivery of a surprise strike by the enemy requires of front troops the meticulous organization of reconnaissance, the reinforcement of the cover of the state border, and the maintenance of the troops at a high level of combat readiness to repulse him. It is evident that two to three divisions at full strength will have to be brought out to the axes of probable enemy attacks to cover the state borders, and that each of the remaining axes will require one reinforced motorized rifle regiment from every first-echelon division.

3. The Coastal Front will fulfil one of the major tasks in defeating the main forces of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and in removing Brown, Lilac, and Violet from the war. The

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fulfilment of this task will disrupt the integrity of the aggressive NATO bloc, ensure that the enemy is cut off from his ports and supply bases on the North Sea coast, and produce favorable conditions for the final defeat of the Central Army Group.

The depth of the Coastal Front's operation is to be 600 km; its duration will be 10 to 12 days. Consequently, the average rate of advance of the offensive must be 50 to 60 km per day. This requires of front troops: the delivery of encounter attacks and rapidity of actions, the assault crossing from the march of wide water obstacles with the employment of airborne landing forces, the conduct of an amphibious landing operation to seize FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base, great exertion of physical efforts and high morale, and also the availability of operational reserves and a strong second echelon in order to build up the efforts of the first-echelon troops during the operation.

The width of the front offensive zone is to be 200 km at the start. If one bears in mind that our divisions are capable of advancing in a zone up to 15 km /wide/, then it will be necessary to have 13 to 15 divisions in the first echelon.

The front's immediate task will involve defeating the main troop grouping of the Northern Army Group and the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, the assault crossing from the march of the KIEL Canal and the WESER River, and seizing the FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER line and FEHMARN Island on the fifth to sixth day of the operation. The depth /of the immediate task/ is to be 250 km. Consequently, the average rate of advance must not be less than 40 to 50 km per day.

For the most rapid seizing of FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base, an amphibious landing operation must be conducted. Debarkation of the following is to be performed jointly with the Combined Baltic Fleet: on D /D-day/, one motorized rifle regiment and one naval infantry regiment on FEHMARN Island; on the morning of D2, a motorized rifle division (minus a motorized rifle regiment) and a naval infantry regiment on the KIEL Naval Base.

The successful fulfilment of the immediate task will require the concentration of the front's major efforts on the CELLE-OSNABRUCK axis, having not less than two armies in the first echelon of the front (11 to 12 divisions); and in the second echelon, two armies consisting of four divisions each, and two to three front reserve divisions.

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The considerable widening to 250 to 280 km of the offensive zone of the front as it advances deep into enemy territory, and rapid rates of advance will require the subsequent commitment to battle of an army of the front's second echelon on the third to fourth and fifth to sixth day of the operation.

For the defeat of the enemy's HAMBURG grouping, the forces of one army, made up of four to five divisions in the first echelon and of one army corps in the second echelon, will suffice.

The follow-up task of the front is to develop the offensive on the OSNABRUCK, BRUSSELS axis, to make an assault crossing from the march of the IJSEL and RHINE rivers, to rout the approaching reserves of the West, and by the tenth to twelfth day of the operation arrive at the North Sea coast and seize the BRUGGE, RANCE, CHARLEROI, DINANT line.

To assist front troops in the assault crossing from the march of the IJSEL and RHINE rivers, it will be necessary on D5 to D6 to conduct an airborne landing operation of the 30th Airborne Division; and on D6 to D7, no fewer than two tactical airborne landings with no less than a motorized rifle battalion each in strength will be needed.

With the front's arrival at the North Sea coast, the defense of the coast will be organized jointly with the Combined Baltic Fleet.

The depth of the follow-up task of the front is 350 km and the task is to be fulfilled in five to six days, which will require keeping up an offensive rate of 60 to 70 km per day.

It will become necessary to prepare the departure area for the offensive by front troops in such a way that it will support the repulse of a surprise enemy attack by our covering troops from their locations and by an encounter attack of the main forces of our first-echelon armies, and also support the organized transition of front troops to the offensive. This will require the delivery of maximum destruction upon the attacking enemy groupings while repulsing his attacks, and thereupon the transition to a decisive offensive to complete their defeat. In considering this engineer preparation of the front troops' departure areas for the offensive, it will be necessary to carry out this preparation taking into account the possible repulse of a surprise attack by the enemy, the occupation of these areas before his transition to the offensive, the rapid organization of a reliable air defense system for front troops, and its maintenance at a high level of combat readiness, with the presence of

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on-alert forces and means.

It will be necessary to start engineer preparation of the departure areas for the offensive no later than 3 September, with the allocation of all the engineer units of the front at full strength and part of the troops; the engineer work is to be completed by the troops upon the occupation of the areas.

4. To the right -- the Combined Baltic Fleet is destroying the enemy aircraft carrier grouping in the North Sea and the ship groupings in the North and Baltic seas; together with Coastal Front troops it is conducting an assault landing operation to seize FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base, and is assisting the front in seizing the southwestern coast of the Baltic Sea and the southeastern coast of the North Sea and in the organization of their defense; it is also disrupting enemy sea shipping in the North Sea and providing sea lift in support of the front.

To the left -- the Western Front is preparing an offensive operation on the KASSEL-KOBLENZ axis for the purpose of defeating the troops of the Northern Army Group and the main forces of the Central Army Group in cooperation with Coastal Front troops. Its right-flank 3rd Army is delivering an attack on the GOTTINGEN, MENDEN, BASTOGNE axis.

Thus, the actions of the Combined Baltic Fleet and the offensive of the 3rd Army will help the Coastal Front in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to it. In the process, it will be necessary to thoroughly organize and maintain the close cooperation of front troops with the forces of the Combined Baltic Fleet and the large units of the 3rd Army of the Western Front, especially in the period of defeating the HAMBURG, HANNOVER, and RUHR enemy groupings.

5. In case West unleashes war with the employment of nuclear weapons, in the initial nuclear strike in the front offensive zone, enemy troops and installations are to be destroyed as follows: by the Strategic Rocket Forces -- west of the NORDEN, DORTMUND line; by the Combined Baltic Fleet -- aviation on four airfields, three mine depots, and the command post of the combined naval forces, which will establish conditions favoring the successful development of the offensive by front troops into the enemy's operational depth, and at the same time will require making provision for the destruction of his main troop grouping and all the major targets located to the east of this line by our own forces and means in the initial and subsequent nuclear strikes. For the destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack means it will be necessary, as of 2 September, to have on-alert

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missile battalions in the missile brigades and delivery aircraft in the fighter-bomber regiments and bomber regiments.

6. During an offensive without the employment of nuclear weapons, the 1st Air Army of the front is to destroy the following in an air operation using three army sorties: the on-alert detachments of the 2nd Pershing Wing and batteries of the 650th and 150th Lance missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion, and aviation with destruction of the runways on airfields nos. 0.3, 0.7 /?sic/, 24, 27, 31, 37, and 43.

7. It has been stipulated that front troops are to be ready to fulfill the tasks in the offensive operation by 0500 hours 8 September. The front has seven days to prepare for the operation. In order to ensure order and great secrecy in the preparation of the operation and the occupation by front troops of the departure position for the offensive, it is necessary to accomplish the move of front troops out to the departure areas as follows:

- covering units -- the night of 2 September;
- first-echelon large units, rocket troops and artillery, and air defense troops -- the night of 6 September;
- second-echelon large units of the armies and the front reserve, units of the branch arms and special troops -- the night of 7 September.

Control of the front troops is to be organized from field control posts by the close of 5 September.

8. The front will be issued 680 nuclear munitions for the operation, including 320 air and 18 army sorties by the air army. These means will make possible the destruction of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the Lance and Sergeant missile battalions (regiments), aviation on 14 airfields, six to eight control posts, 15 to 16 nuclear weapons depots, and the destruction of more than 20 enemy divisions.

Conclusions: The Coastal Front will fulfill the primary task in the strategic offensive operation of repulsing the attacks and of defeating the main forces of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, of seizing the northern part of the Brown territory and the Lilac and Violet territories, and thereby of cutting off NATO troop groupings from the naval bases and supply ports on the North Sea coast.

The successful fulfilment of these tasks by front troops will further

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to a significant degree the defeat of the Central Army Group and the removal of Brown (the principal NATO bastion in Western Europe) and other members of this bloc from the war.

Based on the task allocated to the front, the most advisable concept of the operation might be the following: to deliver the main attack of the front with four armies on the CELLE, OSNABRUCK axis; and a second attack by an army and army corps on the BAD OLDESLOE, FLENSBURG axis. The forces of two armies are to defeat the enemy grouping on the CELLE axis, and in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, to encircle and destroy the main forces of the enemy's HANNOVER grouping. The flank units of the HAMBURG grouping are to be routed by a simultaneous attack on the BAD OLDESLOE, RENDSBURG /axis/, thereby establishing the conditions for its subsequent destruction.

In order to augment the efforts of the front's first-echelon troops and develop the operation at high rates of speed, it will be necessary to commit to battle the second echelons: on the JUTLAND axis on D2 to D3, and on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis on D3 to D4 and D5 to D6.

Through rapid attacks the defeat of the enemy's main forces and operational reserves east of the IJSEL and RHINE rivers will be completed, by assault crossings from the march in cooperation with airborne landing forces these rivers will be crossed, and the task assigned to the front in the operation will be fulfilled. The seizing of the RUHR industrial area and the defeat of the grouping defending it will be carried out by the forces of the front's left-flank army in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front.

The front will be operationally disposed in two echelons with two to three divisions present in the combined-arms reserve.

3. Operational briefing -- 25 minutes

Students in the role of front chief of staff are to conduct an operational briefing /that contains the following/:

- situation in the zone of the front;
- task allocated to the front;
- tentative concept of the operation;
- estimated time for preparation of the operation;
- issue of preliminary instructions to the troops;

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-- orders on preparing reports necessary to the front commander for making a decision.

The army commanders, army corps commander, chiefs of front staff directorates, and the chiefs of the branch arms and services are brought in to participate in the operational briefing.

Report of the front chief of staff in the operational briefing:

1. West has launched immediate preparations to unleash war in Europe. As of 2000 hours 30 August the state of "military vigilance" was put into effect for NATO troops.

The Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the combined naval forces in the Baltic and North Seas are preparing to deliver an attack in the zone of the Coastal Front. Military actions can be initiated by surprise with a massed attack by air and ground forces employing nuclear weapons as well as with conventional means of destruction. West's attack groupings can be set up within brief time periods. It is to be expected that the HANNOVER-BERLIN and HAMBURG-SZCZECIN axes are the most probable axes of attack.

2. The Coastal Front has been given the task of repulsing a possible enemy attack and interdicting his incursion into its own territory. It will prepare and, upon special order of the Supreme High Command, conduct an offensive operation on the JUTLAND and HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axes, in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet and the Western Front defeat the main forces of the Northern Army Group and the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, seize the northern part of the Brown territory and the Lilac and Violet territories, and reach the North Sea coast and organize its defense.

The immediate task of the front is to defeat the main forces of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force by attacks on the BAD OLDESLOE, RENDSBURG and CELLE, OSNABRUCK axes, to make assault crossings from the march of the KIEL Canal and WESER River, and to seize on the fifth to sixth day the line: FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER.

Together with the forces of the Combined Baltic Fleet it is to conduct an amphibious landing operation to seize FEHMARN Island on D-day and the KIEL Naval Base on D2.

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The follow-up task of the front is to develop an offensive on the ENSCHEDE, BRUSSELS axis, make an assault crossing from the march of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers, rout the approaching enemy reserves, and on the tenth to twelfth day of the operation seize the BRUGGE, RANCE, CHARLEROI, DINANT line and reach the North Sea coast and organize its defense.

Front troops are to be ready to fulfil the task at 0500 hours 8 September; the report of the decision is to be at 1600 hours 1 September.

3. The proposed concept of the operation is: to defeat the opposing enemy forces by an attack with the front main forces (7th, 9th, and 6th armies, 10th Tank Army) on the CELLE, OSNABRUCK axis, encircle and destroy the enemy's HANNOVER grouping in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, make an assault crossing from the march of the WESER River, and, while continuing to swiftly develop the offensive, fulfil the immediate task of the front on D5 to D6.

The second attack is to be delivered by the forces of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps on the BAD-OLDESLOE, FLENSBURG axis; they will rout the opposing enemy troop grouping, make an assault crossing from the march of the KIEL Canal, and by the close of D5 reach the Gray state border and the North Sea coast and organize a defense.

To augment efforts on the main axis of attack, the front's second echelon, the 6th Army, will be committed to battle the morning of D3 to D4, from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF or SYKE, UCHTE; on the axis of the second attack, the 2nd Army Corps /will be committed/ on D2 to D3 from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRONWOHLD. On D1 and D2, an amphibious landing operation will be conducted by the forces of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and the 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments in order to seize FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base. Subsequently /they will do the following:/ continue to develop the offensive swiftly on the BRUSSELS axis, complete the defeat of the main forces of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force east of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers, make an assault crossing from the march of these rivers in cooperation with airborne landing forces, and fulfill the front's task in the operation on D10 to D12. To augment efforts, the 10th Tank Army will be committed to battle on D5 to D6 from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK or from the OLDENZAAL, BORGHORST line on the GRONAU, EINDHOVEN axis. To assist the troops of the 10th Tank Army in the assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march, an airborne landing operation will be conducted on D5 to D6 by landing the 30th Airborne Division in the area of EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN.

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The front will be operationally disposed in two echelons. The 4th, 7th, and 9th armies will be in the first echelon; in the second echelon will be the 6th Army and 2nd Army Corps, and as of the morning of D2 the 10th Tank Army; in the combined-arms reserve will be the 13th Motorized Rifle Division and 20th Tank Division.

4. Estimated time for making the decision and preparing the front offensive operation.

The operational directive of the Supreme High Command was received by the Coastal Front staff at 0800 hours 1 September. The report of the decision is to be at 1600 hours 1 September. It has been prescribed that front troops are to be in readiness to fulfil the tasks in the operation at 0500 hours 8 September. Seven days have been allocated for preparation of the front offensive operation.

Time is to be allocated as follows:

- clarification of the operational objective and tasks assigned to the front -- 0800-0830 hrs 1 Sep
- bringing the troops to increased combat readiness -- by 1000 hrs 1 Sep
- bringing the troops to full combat readiness -- by 2000 hrs 1 Sep
- estimate of the situation and determination of the concept of the operation -- 0830-1030 hrs 1 Sep
- issuing of preliminary instructions to the troops, operational briefing, and orders to the chiefs of the branch arms and services on the preparation of proposals -- 1030-1100 hrs 1 Sep
- determination of tasks for the troops -- 1100-1200 hrs 1 Sep
- briefing on the proposals for the combat employment of the branch arms in the operation -- 1200-1400 hrs 1 Sep

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- decision announcement, assignment of tasks; orders on planning, cooperation, control, and support of the operation -- 1400-1430 hrs 1 Sep
- planning the front offensive operation -- 1430-2300 hrs 1 Sep
- reporting the decision to the Supreme High Command for approval -- 1600 hrs 1 Sep
- transmittal of tasks to the troops -- 1500-1700 hrs 1 Sep
- signing of the front operational directive on the operation -- 1800 hrs 1 Sep
- approval of the decisions of the army commanders -- 2100-2300 hrs 1 Sep
- approval of the front offensive operation plan -- 2400 hrs 1 Sep
- approval of the air army combat actions plan, plans for employment of the branch arms in the operation, and operational support plans -- 0100-0300 hrs 2 Sep
- commander's terrain reconnaissance -- 0600-0900 hrs 2 Sep
- organization of cooperation -- 1000-1400 hrs 2 Sep
- occupation of defense areas by covering units and of siting areas by on-alert forces and means -- night of 2 Sep
- engineer preparation of troop departure areas for the offensive -- 3-7 Sep
- occupation of departure areas for the offensive by first-echelon large units, rocket troops, air defense troops, artillery divisions, and the alternate command post of the front -- night of 6 Sep

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-- occupation of the departure areas  
by the second-echelon large units,  
the front combined-arms reserve,  
units of the branch arms and special  
troops, and the front command post  
and rear control post

-- night of 7 Sep

5. The chief of the operations directorate and the chiefs of the branch arms and services are to prepare preliminary instructions for the troops with guidance concerning the start of preparations for the front offensive operation, the allocation of on-alert missile battalions and delivery aircraft, the increasing of the combat readiness of the air defense troops and fighter aviation, the preparation and allocation of units for covering the state border, the allocation of engineer units and troops for engineer preparation of the departure areas for the offensive.

By 0500 hours 2 September the commander's reconnaissance plan is to be worked out.

6. The chiefs of the directorates, departments, branch arms, and services are to prepare reports on the capabilities and proposals regarding the combat employment of subordinate units and large units in the operation, and be ready to report them to the front commander for the purpose of making a well-grounded and most advantageous decision.

4. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION -- 180 minutes

a) Assessment of the enemy -- 90 minutes.

Students in the capacity of chief of the intelligence directorate of the front staff are to report the assessment of the enemy /through a discussion of the following/:

- military-political situation in the theater of military operations;
- overall strength and expected nature of enemy actions;
- grouping and capabilities of nuclear attack means;
- composition and grouping of the ground forces;
- composition, grouping and capabilities of the air forces;
- grouping and capabilities of the enemy naval forces;
- air defense forces and means;
- radioelectronic warfare forces and means;
- control system.

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Conclusions from the assessment of the enemy:

- most probable method and time of the unleashing of war, and enemy capabilities with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons in the initial and subsequent massed strikes;
- expected concept of West's actions and methods of conducting combat actions;
- strong and weak aspects in the enemy troop grouping and in the proposed nature of its actions;
- main installations of the enemy, the destruction of which will sharply reduce his combat capabilities.

Report of the chief of the intelligence directorate of the front staff

1. The military-political situation in Europe in the second half of August has become sharply aggravated. West has noticeably stepped up reconnaissance against the socialist countries and launched an extensive propaganda campaign to subvert their unity and intensify international tension. Simultaneously with this, NATO countries have initiated the mobilization deployment of their troops, a combat readiness check, and the full manning and equipping up to wartime T/O&E of the constant readiness units and large units. Industrial enterprises have significantly increased their military production output. As of 2000 hours 30 August the state of "military vigilance" was put into effect in Europe for NATO troops and troops of national subordination. All this indicates that West has begun immediate preparation to unleash war in Europe against East.

2. In the zone of the Coastal Front, the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force are preparing for combat actions. The Northern Army Group is capable of establishing attack groupings within limited time periods and of initiating air-supported combat actions by surprise with the employment of nuclear weapons as well as with conventional means of destruction. The strength of these troop groupings can be as follows: approximately 30 divisions; over 1,100 nuclear weapons delivery means (among them 36 Pershing missile launchers, 32 Lance launchers, 104 Honest John free-rocket launchers, 470 atomic artillery pieces, and 537 delivery aircraft); 7,021 tanks; approximately 5,000 guns and mortars; and 3,779 antitank means.

The above-mentioned troop grouping can have approximately 700 nuclear munitions.

The HAMBURG-SZCZECIN and HANNOVER-BERLIN axes are the probable axes of

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enemy attacks. The following attack groupings can be established on these axes:

a) on the HAMBURG-SZCZECIN axis -- consisting of three army corps (Brown 4th and 6th army corps in the first echelon and the Lilac 1st Army Corps in the second echelon). This amounts to the following: 10 to 12 divisions (including one tank division), six Lance missile launchers, four Sergeant missile launchers, 46 to 50 Honest John free-rocket launchers; 2,500 to 3,000 tanks; 1,600 to 2,000 guns and mortars (including more than 200 atomic artillery pieces); and over 1,500 antitank means.

This permits the enemy to have the following densities: one division per eight to ten kilometers; and 30 to 32 tanks, 20 to 25 guns and mortars, and approximately 20 antitank means per kilometer of front;

b) on the HANNOVER-BRUSSELS /?sic/ axis -- consisting of four to six army corps (Brown 1st Army Corps and Blue 1st Army Corps in the first echelon, Brown 5th Army Corps and Lilac 2nd Army Corps in the second echelon, and the Blue 2nd Army Corps and Violet 2nd Army Corps in the Northern Army Group reserve.) This amounts to the following: 18 to 19 divisions (including six tank or armored divisions), 36 Pershing missile launchers, 18 Lance missile launchers, 4 Sergeant missile launchers, 36 Honest John free-rocket launchers; 3,600 to 4,000 tanks; approximately 3,000 guns and mortars (including more than 250 atomic artillery pieces); and approximately 2,200 antitank means. The densities can respectively be: one division per seven to eight km of front; and 32 to 35 tanks, over 20 guns and mortars and 8 to 20 antitank means per kilometer of front.

Thus, in the first operational echelon the enemy can have: four to five army corps (14 to 16 divisions, including 6 tank or armored divisions), 36 Pershing missile launchers, 24 Lance missile launchers, 4 Sergeant missile launchers, 44 to 58 Honest John free-rocket launchers, 216 to 240 atomic artillery pieces; 3,820 to 4,570 tanks; 2,000 to 2,600 guns and mortars; 1,500 to 1,800 antitank means.

West troops are at full strength in personnel, combat equipment, and weapons. During the operation West can reinforce the grouping of Northern Army Group ground forces with three to four divisions by transferring the Blue 3rd Infantry Division and deploying additional Brown divisions.

The weak aspects of the grouping of Northern Army Group ground forces are considered to be:

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- the comparatively limited strength /sostav/ of fully combat-ready large units in peacetime which can be used in the Northern Army Group's first operational echelon;
- the small number of operational reserves in the theater of military operations and their deficient readiness (Lilac 2nd Army Corps, Violet 2nd Army Corps, Blue 2nd Army Corps);
- the comparatively weak combat effectiveness of the Lilac divisions, whose combat potential, in comparison with that of Brown motorized infantry divisions, corresponds to 0.6.

The ground forces large units and units are located at their permanent garrison posts at a distance of 100 to 350 km from the state border and in the exercise areas. For their movement forward and deployment in the departure position for the offensive they will require one to two days from the moment of receiving the combat order (signal).

c) The air forces grouping includes units and large units of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force that are based on 25 airfields at a distance of from 150 up to 700 km from the state border. The main air forces grouping is positioned in the area of OSNABRUCK, MONCHEN-GLADBACH, MALIN /?sic -- MALLER or MALLING/. Their total numerical strength is more than 800 combat aircraft; approximately 360 of them are delivery aircraft. During the operation the air forces grouping can be reinforced by Green and Blue aviation and the activation of up to seven Brown, Lilac, and Violet squadrons, in all up to 235 combat aircraft (including approximately 180 delivery aircraft). In the zone of the front, West can have up to 100 airfields, which permits the dispersal of aviation with up to one squadron per airfield.

The majority of the airfields have shelters for the aircraft.

The army and line unit aviation grouping includes the squadrons and regiments of divisions (motorized infantry divisions, tank divisions, armored divisions), and the command and wings of army corps /plural/. The total numerical strength of army aviation helicopters adds up to as many as 1,000 individual items, including up to 350 fire support helicopters.

d) The naval forces grouping can have in its complement over 460 different combat ships, submarines, and boats, including one to two attack aircraft carriers and approximately 340 combat aircraft and helicopters.

The first echelon of the striking fleet may be made up of a carrier strike large unit consisting of one Green strike aircraft carrier and one

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Blue strike aircraft carrier, on board of which there can be up to 150 combat aircraft, including approximately 60 delivery aircraft.

Up to 40 aircraft, including up to 20 delivery aircraft, can be allocated out of this number for strikes against front troops and installations. In addition, employment of the missiles from one nuclear ballistic missile submarine (16 missiles with 48 nuclear warheads) is possible. The enemy will be able to allocate up to 200 surface ships, up to 130 Brown naval aviation aircraft, and carrier-based ground-attack aircraft of the NATO striking fleet to counteract the debarkation of our amphibious landing forces and for the fire support of his own troops.

The availability in the naval forces complement of more than 30 landing ships and a large number of transport vessels will permit the enemy to carry out the debarkation of an amphibious landing force of up to one division in strength.

e) The air defense means include 16 Hawk and Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile battalions (regiments) and four air defense squadrons. In their complement are approximately 468 Hawk and Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile launchers and 72 fighters.

The air defense system is organized in two echelons: the first echelon has the Hawk surface-to-air missile means, depth of 50 to 70 km; the second echelon has the Nike-Hercules and Bloodhound surface-to-air missile means, depth of 70 to 150 kilometers.

The areas most heavily covered by surface-to-air missile means are: LUBECK, GEESTHACHT, HAMBURG; LUNEBURG, UELZEN, BREMEN; GIFHORN, SALZGITTER, HANNOVER, and the RUHR industrial area.

The radiotechnical system for detection of air targets and control of air defense means includes three control and warning centers, five control and warning posts, and up to 20 observation and warning posts that afford detection of air targets at low altitudes over a range of up to 60 to 90 km and at medium altitudes over a range of up to 200 km.

f) The enemy radio communications system includes more than 700 radio nets (links), including up to 200 command radio nets. The most important of them are:

-- radio communications for the control of missile/nuclear weapons units and of nuclear warhead storage subunits;

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-- radio communications for the command of army corps, the Northern Army Group, and the air forces and air defense of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force;

-- radio communications of radioelectronic warfare units, including radio nets of the Brown 51st Communications Battalion; Brown 120th, 420th, and 620th radiotechnical battalions; and Blue 13th rp/?Radio Regiment?/, 5th krs/?Communications Wing or Corps Communications Company?/, and 2nd and 226th re/?radio squadrons?/.

The enemy radioelectronic warfare units are capable of conducting periodic observation on 80 percent of the front's major radio nets and of monitoring every two hours the locations of the staffs of the large units and formations during conduct of the operation. By using radio jamming means, the enemy is capable of neutralizing more than 50 percent of the front's principal communications links at the tactical level.

g) Rear services installations and support. Up to five to seven days will be required for deploying and bringing the rear services organs up to full wartime T/O&E strength. Materiel reserves of all types have been established for not less than 30 days. The major rear installations are situated in the areas of SCHLESWIG, HASELUNNE, WESEL, and VENLO.

h) The nature of the terrain and its engineer preparation. The terrain in the zone of the front offensive is passable for all of the branch arms. The presence of large forest areas ensures good conditions for the camouflage of troops and combat equipment. In the zone of the front from the south to the north and northwest flow five large water obstacles (the rivers WESER, LEINE, IJSSEL, EMS, and RHINE, and the KIEL Canal), on which defense lines can be prepared. The enemy is preparing the departure area for the offensive on the line LUBECK, LUNGBURG, UELZEN, BRAUNSCHWEIG, SALZGITTER.

3. West maintains at a high level of combat readiness its strategic nuclear forces, the nuclear means of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the ground forces. This allows it to prepare and initiate within a relatively short time period (three to four days) surprise military actions with massed employment of nuclear weapons.

For the unleashing of war with conventional means of destruction only, it must be assumed that the enemy will need up to seven to eight days for the additional deployment of the ground forces reserves, and primarily for the conversion of the rear services to wartime status.

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In case West unleashes war with the employment of nuclear weapons, it can allocate, for participation in the initial massed nuclear strike, from the nuclear attack means available in the front zone, over 350 different means (36 Pershing missile launchers, 28 Lance and Sergeant missile launchers, 44 Honest John free-rocket launchers, 160 tactical aviation delivery aircraft, 16 army aviation delivery aircraft, and approximately 80 atomic artillery pieces) and employ approximately 370 nuclear munitions. Immediately following the nuclear strike, its ground forces groupings can go over to the offensive on the SZCZECIN and BERLIN axes with the task of splitting up the Coastal front troop grouping into pieces, defeating it, seizing the city of BERLIN, and reaching the ODER River on the fifth to sixth day of combat actions.

The main thrust of the Northern Army Group is most probable on the HANNOVER, BERLIN axis.

The offensive of the ground forces attack groupings that are using only conventional means of destruction can start after a massed air strike in which up to 600 combat aircraft can take part, and also after an artillery and army aviation fire strike.

In case the results and outcome of border engagement are unsuccessful for West and his main troop grouping has significant losses, he may go over to the defensive on the forward line LUBECK, LUNEBURG, UELZEN, BRAUNSCHWEIG; and if he loses /that line/, he will go over to delaying actions on intermediate defense lines along the LEINE, WESER, EMS, IJSSEL, and RHINE rivers and the KIEL Canal. In this case, the most probable line of the enemy's transition to the employment of nuclear weapons will be that of the KIEL Canal and the WESER River. During conduct of the defensive battle, the enemy's counterattacks are most probable as follows: on D2 by second-echelon large units of the first-echelon army corps;\* on D3 by the second-echelon corps,\* and on D4 to D5 by Northern Army Group operational reserves.

The major targets of West in the zone of the front offensive to the south of the FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND line and east of the NORDEN, DORIMUND line, the destruction of which can lead to a significant reduction of the combat capabilities of the enemy troops, are the following: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion; 15 to 16 airfields for the basing of tactical and naval aviation, 15 to 20 nuclear weapons depots; 7 to 8 Nike and Hawk

\* Translator's note: corps in plural sense.

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surface-to-air missile battalions, 15 to 18 divisions of the first and second operational echelons; the command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and army corps; control and warning centers and posts, and electronic warfare centers.

4. The main tasks of front reconnaissance must be considered to be:

-- the conduct of continuous surveillance of the missile units and delivery aircraft of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force at their permanent garrison posts (at their home airfields) and in the combat alert areas. The timely detection of the departure and deployment (dispersal) times and the locations of the siting areas (dispersal airfields) of the units, and also their readiness to deliver a nuclear strike;

-- the detection of enemy measures for the possible reinforcement of the Northern Army Group, the timely ascertaining of the departure of units and large units to their operational deployment areas, observation of the formation of attack groupings, and spotting of the enemy's intentions to use them;

-- the detection of the enemy's measures regarding the possible reinforcement of his air force and air defense groupings, the rebasing of air units to dispersal airfields, and the deployment of air defense means;

-- the continuous confirmation of the position and status of the enemy targets slated for destruction by nuclear weapons, primarily in the front's initial nuclear strike.

The combat strength and armament of West's ground forces in the zone of the Coastal Front is shown in Table No. 1 (appendix).

b) Assessment of our own troops -- 90 minutes

The students in the capacity of chief of the operations directorate of the front staff are to report the assessment of their own troops and the conclusions from it:

- strength of forces and means allocated to the front for conduct of the operation, their operational status and capabilities;
- availability and receipt times of the nuclear munitions;
- quantitative and qualitative balance of forces and means;
- prerequisites for preparation of the offensive operation;
- materiel support of the operation;
- assessment of the area of combat actions (terrain) and hydrometeorological conditions.



Conclusions from the assessment of our own troops:

- capabilities of troops, aviation, and air defense of the front with respect to the fulfilment of tasks in the operation;
- tasks and targets of nuclear weapons employment;
- most advantageous axes of the main and other attacks;
- operational disposition and schedule of troop deployment.

Report of the chief of the operations directorate of the front staff

1. The Coastal Front has in its complement on 1 September: four armies, one army corps, one air army, two front missile brigades, five army missile brigades, one corps missile brigade, three artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, four army artillery brigades, 17 motorized rifle divisions, seven tank divisions, one airborne division, one antiaircraft artillery division, five surface-to-air missile brigades, two S-75 surface-to-air missile regiments, two S-125 surface-to-air missile regiments, two antitank artillery brigades, one chemical defense brigade. Total: 90 operational-tactical missile launchers, 96 tactical missile launchers, 5,899 tanks, 5,998 guns and mortars, 920 combat aircraft (397 of them delivery aircraft), 5,074 antitank means.

During the operation, a tank army (one motorized rifle division, three tank divisions, 12 operational-tactical missile launchers, 16 tactical missile launchers, 1,183 tanks, 648 guns and mortars, 591 antitank means) and 235 aircraft (including 177 delivery aircraft) will arrive to join the front complement.

Taking it into account, the front will have in the operation: five armies (including the tank army), one army corps, one air army, 29 divisions (made up of: 18 motorized rifle divisions, 10 tank divisions, 1 airborne division), 102 operational-tactical missile launchers, 112 tactical missile launchers, 1,865 aircraft (including 587 delivery aircraft), 7,082 tanks; 6,246 guns and mortars; 5,665 antitank means.

The main body of front troops is in permanent garrison posts and is engaged in combat and political training. Division tactical exercises are being conducted: with the 8th Motorized Rifle Division at the LYUBTEN /?LUBTHEEN/ training ground and with the 9th Tank Division at the WITTSTOCK training ground. A command-staff exercise is being completed with the field headquarters of the 9th Army, and a division tactical exercise with the 10th Tank Division is being completed at the MAGDEBURG training ground.

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The disposition of the troops and their operational status permit the establishment of the necessary front attack groupings for the transition to the offensive within a brief time period (two to three days) and with observance of camouflage measures.

2. Allocated to the front for the operation are:

- 680 nuclear munitions, including 320 aerial /bombs/;
- 21 air army sorties, including three for participation in the air operation;
- ammunition in units of fire: 4.4 for small arms, 9.8 for artillery rounds, rockets, and mines /mortar rounds/; 11.6 for tanks, 13.2 for anti-aircraft artillery; 26.7 for aviation;
- fuel in refuelings: 7.3 of gasoline; 12.0 of diesel fuel; 25.9 of aviation fuel;
- rations -- 37 day's rations.

3. Balance of forces and means of the sides

a) Total

Designation	For the entire operation			At the start of the operation		
	East	West	Balance	East	West	Balance
Launchers	214	172	1.2:1	186	148	1.2:1
Including						
-- op-tac msIs	102	68	1.5:1	90	67	1.4:1
-- tac msIs	112	104	1:1	96	84	1.1:1
Aircft	1,275	1,123	1.1:1	920	888	1.1:1
Including						
-- delivery aircft	587	537	1:1	397	360	1.1:1
Divs	29	31	1:1	25	25	1:1

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Designation	For the entire operation			At the start of the operation		
	East	West	Balance	East	West	Balance
Including						
-- mtz R divs (mtz inf divs, inf divs)	18	25	1:1.4	17	19	1:1.1
-- tk divs (armd divs)	10	6	1.6:1	7	6	1:1
-- abn divs (abn bdes)	1	1 bde	1.5:1	1	1 bde	1.5:1
Medium tks	7,082	7,021	1:1	5,899	6,222	1:1
Guns and mrtrs	6,246	4,944	1.4:1	5,598	4,046	1.3:1
Including atomic	-	470	-	-	382	-
Antitk means	4,861	1,591	2.9:1	4,194	1,330	2.3:1
		<u>Qualitative balance</u>				
In divs	29	33	1:1.1	25	28	1:1.1
In strk pwr	29	25	1.1:1	25	20	1.2:1
In fire pwr	29	29	1:1	25	23	1:1

Accordingly, the overall densities can be: one division per seven to eight kilometers of front; up to 35 tanks, more than 30 guns and mortars, and approximately 30 antitank means per kilometer of front.

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b) By axes of attack

Designation	On the HANNOVER axis			On the HAMBURG axis		
	East	West	Balance	East	West	Balance
Launchers	164	112	1.4:1	50	60	1:1.1
Including						
-- op-tac msls	84	58	1.4:1	18	10	1.8:1
-- tac msls	80	54	1.4:1	32	50	1:1.5
Divs	21	19	1.1:1	8	12	1:1.5
Including						
-- mtz R divs (mtz inf divs, inf divs)	11	15	1:1.3	7	11	1:1.5
-- tk divs (armd divs)	9	4	2.2:1	1	1	1:1
-- abn divs (abn bdes)	1	1 bde	1.5:1	-	-	-
Medium tks	5,260	4,038	1.3:1	1,821	2,988	1:1.6
Guns and mrtrs	4,302	2,956	1.4:1	1,944	2,029	1:1
Including atomic	-	200	-	-	210	-
Antitk means	4,018	2,162	1.8:1	1,647	1,617	1:1
			<u>Qualitative balance</u>			
In divs	21	20	1:1	8	11	1:1.3
In strk pwr	21	14	1.5:1	8	11	1:1.3
In fire pwr	21	18	1.2:1	8	12	1:1.5

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4. In the initial nuclear strike, the Strategic Rocket Forces are to inflict destruction on the enemy troop grouping, aviation, and fleet to the west of the NORDEN, DORTMUND line, and the Combined Baltic Fleet is to destroy the following: aviation at airfields nos. 06, 08, 09, and 10 (EGGEBECK), (JAGEL), (RENDSBURG), (FRIEDRICHSORT); the mine depots at FLENSBURG, ECKERNFORDE, KIEL; and the command post of the combined naval forces at HOLTENAU.

Consequently, it is necessary to concentrate the main efforts of the front nuclear means:

-- on the destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack means (2nd Pershing Missile Wing, 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, 450th Sergeant missile battalion).

[redacted], delivery aircraft on 14 airfields (MARNE, WURSTERHEIDE, OLDENBURG, VEGESACK, KLOPPENBURG, BREMEN, DELMENHORST, OSNABRUCK, BUCKEBURG, DETMOLD, GUTERSLOH, BERGER, HUSUM, DIEPHOLZ); air defense forces and means (35th, 31st, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th Hawk battalions, 36th Thunderbird Regiment, 24th and 25th Nike battalions); control posts (command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, Blue 1st Army Corps, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps); five control and warning centers (posts) -- (WROHM, AHRENSBURG, EYTIN /?EIGEN/, FALLINGBOSTEL, BAD MUNDER); -- on inflicting 75 to 80 percent destruction upon 13 divisions (Brown 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th motorized infantry divisions, Brown 3rd, 7th, 16th tank divisions, and the Brown 27th Airborne Brigade; Green 4th Mechanized Division; Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions); and 30 to 50 percent destruction upon four divisions (Brown 1st and 21st motorized infantry divisions, Lilac 1st and 4th motorized infantry divisions).

In all, more than 350 nuclear warheads will be required in the front's initial nuclear strike for the destruction of approximately 80 targets.

The front can allocate the following for delivery of the initial nuclear strike: 90 operational-tactical missile launchers (4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th army missile brigades, 2nd Corps Missile Brigade, 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades); 56 tactical missile launchers (separate missile battalions of the first-echelon divisions of the armies) and up to 200 to 215 delivery aircraft, i.e. /a total of/ up to 346 to 361 carriers. To increase the yield of the front's initial nuclear strike, provisions will

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be made to have up to 10 separate missile battalions make up to two launches each.

It is advisable to allocate the nuclear weapons as follows:

- 376 for the initial nuclear strike;
- 166 for the fulfilment of the front's immediate task;
- 100 for the fulfilment of the front's follow-up task;
- 38 nuclear munitions in the front reserve.

Flight resources are to be allocated as follows:

- 3 army sorties for participation in the air operation;
- 24 regimental sorties for the initial nuclear strike;
- 354 regimental sorties for fulfilment of the front's immediate task;
- 199 regimental sorties for fulfilment of the front's follow-up task;
- 29 regimental sorties in the front reserve.

5. The status and readiness of front troops for delivery of the initial nuclear strike and transition to the offensive is to be characterized as follows:

-- rocket troops: from a status of constant combat readiness within 8 to 10 hours; from a status of increased combat readiness within 6 to 8 hours; from a status of full combat readiness within 30 minutes; on-alert launchers within 15 to 20 minutes.

-- aviation: from a status of constant combat readiness within 1 hour 30 minutes to 2 hours 30 minutes; from a status of increased combat readiness (with suspended nuclear bombs) within 20 to 25 minutes; on-alert delivery aircraft (from Readiness No. 1) within 3 to 5 minutes;

-- first-echelon troops: from departure areas for the offensive within 1.5 to 2 hours, from permanent garrison posts within 3 to 7 hours.

6. The width of the front's offensive zone at the start of the operation is 200 km, which makes it possible to have 10 to 12 divisions in the first echelon. The operational depth is up to 600 km, which requires a two-echelon operational disposition of troops with the presence of two to three divisions in the front reserve. The disposition of the front troops will permit the formation of the necessary attack groupings and the movement of large units out to the departure areas for the offensive



without having to carry out complex regroupings. On the HAMBURG axis, it is advisable to have the 4th Army in the first echelon, consisting of the 3rd, 7th, 8th, 14th motorized rifle divisions, the 2nd Tank Division, the 6th Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, and the 10th Antiaircraft Artillery Division (as of D3); in the second echelon /it is advisable to have/ the 2nd Army Corps (16th and 24th motorized rifle divisions) and a front reserve division; on the HANNOVER axis in the first echelon: the 7th Army (1st, 4th, 11th motorized rifle divisions, 5th and 9th tank divisions, and the 8th Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command) and the 9th Army (6th, 18th, 21st, 23rd motorized rifle divisions, 10th and 26th tank divisions, and the 11th Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command); in the second echelon: the 6th Army (12th, 17th, and 28th motorized rifle divisions, 19th Tank Division); the 10th Tank Army in its former complement (15th, 22nd, 25th tank divisions, 29th Motorized Rifle Division) and one to two reserve divisions.

In order to seize FEHMARN Island jointly with the Combined Baltic Fleet, the 48th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 62nd Naval Infantry Regiment are to be landed on D /Day 1/, and /to seize/ KIEL Naval Base an amphibious landing operation will be conducted on D2 /Day 2/ by the forces of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division (minus the 48th Motorized Rifle Regiment) and the 61st Naval Infantry Regiment.

To assist front troops in the assault crossing of water obstacles from the march it will be necessary to extensively employ tactical airborne landings; and /to cross/ the RHINE River, it will be necessary to conduct an airborne landing operation /in the form of/ an assault landing by the 30th Airborne Division on D5 to D6.

7. Such a front troop grouping will best ensure the defeat of the opposing enemy with conventional means of destruction and with the employment of nuclear weapons. It makes it possible to have a twofold to threefold superiority in forces and means and a density of 80 to 110 guns and mortars per kilometer of front in the sectors for the breakthrough of the enemy forward defense line. In this case it is advisable to designate the breakthrough sectors as follows: on the HANNOVER axis -- 17 km /wide/, WESENDORF, MEINE; on the HAMBURG axis -- 8 km (excluding) MOISLING, (excluding) GROSSBERKENTHIN.

8. In view of the threat of the possible delivery of a surprise strike by the enemy against front troops in the period of preparation for the operation, it is necessary to have on-alert missile launchers and

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delivery aircraft (with nuclear munitions on them) in such numbers as to ensure destruction of his operational-tactical means of nuclear attack and main control posts. The night of 2 September the 1st, 8th, and 21st motorized rifle divisions at full strength and one motorized rifle regiment from each of the remaining divisions of the front first echelon will be moved out to cover the border. Their efforts will concentrate on the HAGENOW, OSTERBURG, and MAGDEBURG axes.

9. In the preparation of the departure areas for the offensive not less than four to five days will be required, provided that one motorized rifle regiment per division and all front engineer units are allocated to the engineer jobs. Therefore, it will be necessary to start their preparation no later than the morning of 3 August.

10. It is advisable to implement the movement of front troops out to the departure areas for the offensive as follows:

- first-echelon large units, rocket troops and artillery, and air defense troops on the night of 6 September;
- second-echelon large units, and the front reserve, branch arm units, and special troops on 7 September.

11. It must be assumed that first of all the enemy will subject to a massed strike the front's rocket troops and first-echelon large units on the axis of his main attack, aviation at the airfields, and control posts. In view of this, it will be necessary to organize reliable air defense of the indicated targets by forces and means of the front air defense in cooperation with fighter aviation of the air army, air defense troops of the country, and adjacent forces, and to provide for the rapid replacement of the first-echelon large units that lose their combat effectiveness by large units of the armies' second echelons and of the front reserve.

12. The radioelectronic neutralization forces and means in the front complement are: five EPD-N /ground electronic countermeasures/ battalions and five EPD /electronic countermeasures/ helicopter squadrons for jamming of the key shortwave, ultra-shortwave, and radio-relay communications of the enemy; five EPD-S /aircraft electronic countermeasures/ battalions for jamming of the onboard radioelectronic means of aviation. In addition, the front air army has in its complement an EPD-S battalion, a separate EPD air regiment (20 YAK-28 PP /jammer/ aircraft and 10 MI-4 PP /jammer/ helicopters), and three EPD air squadrons (27 YAK-28 PP aircraft) in the 6th Bomber Division for neutralizing the radar means of the enemy's air defense.

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On the morning of D2, an OSNAZ-N /ground radio intercept/ battalion, a separate electronic countermeasures helicopter squadron, and an OSNAZ-S /aircraft radio intercept/ battalion, together with the 10th Tank Army, will arrive to join the front.

The availability of these forces and means makes it possible during the operation to simultaneously: neutralize the key radio and radio-relay communications of two army corps or two tactical air commands and eight to ten divisions of the enemy's first operational echelon; disrupt the operation of the TACAN radio navigation systems on 600 to 800 aircraft at the same time; and screen the command posts of the front and armies, missile brigades, main airfields for delivery aircraft, and major crossings over the ELBE, HAVEL, WESER, RHINE, and IJSSEL rivers against enemy radar reconnaissance and aimed air strikes.

13. The front troops are provided with all kinds of materiel. The materiel allocated to the front will allow fulfilment of the assigned tasks in the operation and establishment of the necessary reserves at its termination.

14. The conditions of cooperation with adjacent forces favor the front in the fulfilment of the assigned task. The Coastal Front will seize FEMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base together with the Combined Baltic Fleet. The fleet will accomplish the task of routing the enemy fleet and assist front troops in seizing the North Sea coast and in organizing its defense.

On the left the Western Front's 3rd Army will deliver its main attack on the GOTTINGEN, MENDEN, BASTOGNE axis. The army's successful rout of the Brown 3rd Army Corps will assist the front troops in the encirclement and destruction of the Blue 1st Army Corps and the Violet 1st Army Corps, and safeguard the front's main troop grouping against an enemy counterattack on the left during the operation.

#### Assessment of the terrain

The terrain in the front offensive zone, in both the departure area of the troops and in the enemy's disposition, is flat and up to 25 to 30 percent forest-covered. In the southern part of the zone the terrain is hilly, but in the depth of the enemy's disposition there is a series of low mountainous ridges of short length and width that are difficult to traverse off the roads. On the coastal axis the terrain is low-lying and open. The main obstacles to troop movement off the roads will be the numerous narrow

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rivers, canals, and drainage canals with marshy floodlands and banks. On the whole, the terrain is passable for all types of combat and transport equipment off roads with the exception of certain areas. Among these is the MECKLENBURG lake region (areas to the north of BERLIN) where there are a substantial number of forests and lakes which can be crossed only on roads. It is possible to covertly concentrate a major troop grouping (four to six divisions) in this area. The marshy terrain in the SULINGEN, VECHTE, DIEPHOLZ area is also difficult to traverse off the roads.

In addition, the presence in the offensive zone of such cities as HAMBURG, BREMEN, and HANNOVER, and the northern part of the RUHR industrial area will require the preparation and conduct in line units of special measures for their capture.

The major natural water obstacles are the rivers ODER and ELBE with the tributary HAVEL, the KIEL Canal, and the WESER, EMS, IJSSEL, RHINE, and MAAS rivers (the description of the water obstacles is given in the appendix to the operational assignment). The crossing of narrow rivers and canals will be provided for by forces and means of the large units and units (employing tank bridgelayers, assemblies of vehicle-mounted assault bridges, and pontoon bridge sets); the crossing of the WESER, EMS, and IJSSEL rivers and the KIEL Canal will require the employment of army forces and means; and the crossing of the ELBE, RHINE, and MAAS rivers will require the forces and means of the engineer troops of the armies and the front. The enemy can use the water obstacles as natural barriers in the preparation of defense lines.

The forests are chiefly mixed or coniferous. In almost all the large forests there are cuttings three to eight meters wide, accessible to the passage of motor vehicles and other equipment. It is possible to make use of the presence of a considerable number of large forests to conceal the troop disposition and to prepare the engineer structural elements for protective works and bridges. However, in large forests and major inhabited localities (cities), the delivery of nuclear strikes will give rise to obstructions and areas of destruction and fires that will impede the fulfilment of the tasks of supporting the forward movement of the troops, especially in the departure area for the offensive of the 7th and 9th armies.

The network of motor vehicle roads in the front departure area is sufficiently developed and averages 80 to 100 km per 100 square km of territory, which makes it possible to prepare, without considerable additional work, three to four routes /per large unit/ for the movement of

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the first-echelon large units out of the departure areas up to the state border. The roads have an asphalt (in places cobblestone) covering, with a roadway width of from five to eight meters; the width of the roadbed is eight to ten meters. The improved unsurfaced roads have a gravel-slag fill; the width of the roadway is three to seven meters. Bridges on the roads are stone, with a 30 to 60 ton load-carrying capacity. The number of roads will make it possible to select, for army and front routes, improved highways that allow intensive transport traffic.

There are five bridges over the ELBE River (two of them in the city of MAGDEBURG), and four bridges over the HAVEL River, in the departure area of the troops. To support the crossing of the rivers by the troops it will be necessary to lay or construct additional bridges (three to four bridges on the ELBE River, one to two bridges on the HAVEL River) and to prepare alternate crossings in case the enemy destroys the main ones.

The soils are primarily sand, sandy loam, and clay, allowing the use everywhere of earth-moving vehicles and machinery during engineer preparation of the departure areas and positions for the troops.

For the capture of nuclear land mines, hydrotechnical installations, and crossings at water obstacles it is necessary to provide for the allocation of special detachments from the first-echelon large units and for the wide employment of tactical airborne landing forces.

#### Assessment of meteorological conditions

The meteorological conditions are relatively favorable for the actions of front troops. However, the westerly direction of the wind at an average velocity of 30 to 40 kilometers per hour will assist the enemy in producing zones of radioactive contamination on the terrain, and will thereby impede front troop maneuvering during the development of the operation. At the same time, these conditions will limit our capabilities with respect to the employment of ground nuclear bursts. A wind of westerly and southwesterly directions in the surface stratum will favor the enemy, including the first-echelon regiments, in the employment of chemical weapons.

Conclusions: the combat strength, condition, disposition, and number of warheads and materiel to be issued will enable the Coastal Front to fulfil the assigned task in the operation within established time limits with or without the employment of nuclear weapons.

For the front to successfully fulfil its task, it will be necessary to

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provide for the following during preparation of the operation:

- concentration of the main efforts of front troops on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis, delivery of a second thrust on the BAD OLDESLOE-FLENSBURG axis;
- conduct of operational camouflage measures that safeguard the secrecy and timeliness of the preparation for the operation, preparation of departure areas for the offensive, and their occupation by the troops (formation of attack groupings);
- allocation of troops to cover the state border and the timely occupation and preparation by them of lines in the immediate vicinity of the border;
- preparation of the siting areas and routes of advance of the rocket troops;
- allocation of the on-alert means of nuclear weapons employment in a number which ensures the destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack means in case of the threat of their employment;
- security of the rocket troops upon their departure to the siting areas;
- provision for the surprise delivery of the front's initial nuclear strike against the nuclear attack means and main troop groupings of the enemy on the HANNOVER-BERLIN and HAMBURG-SZCZECIN axes;
- maintenance of front forces and means at a high level of readiness to neutralize the systems controlling the enemy's troops (forces) and combat means;
- preparation of the troops in the departure areas for the offensive to repulse a possible surprise invasion by West;
- systematic delivery to the troops and depots of the materiel issued for conduct of the operation, and its dispersal;
- maintenance of stable troop control by: setting up radio nets and links with the commanders and staffs of the armies and the corps on shortwave and ultra-shortwave bands, employing tropospheric radio stations and retransmitting radio transmissions, and also carrying out radio camouflage measures (radio simulation and deception) and observing strict radiocommunications operating routine;
- direction of the main efforts of party-political work towards maintenance of high combat readiness by the troops and the psychological preparation of personnel for the conduct of combat actions under conditions of the massive employment of nuclear weapons.

It is advisable to have front troops operationally disposed in two echelons with a combined-arms reserve available. Three armies are to be in the first echelon, two armies and an army corps in the second echelon, and

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one or two motorized rifle divisions and one tank division in the reserve.

The combat composition and numerical strength of the Coastal Front forces is in Table No. 2 (appendix).

4. REPORTS OF THE PROPOSALS -- 45 minutes

a) Students in the capacity of chief of the rocket troops and artillery are to report their proposals on the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery in the operation -- 15 minutes:

- strength, condition, and combat capabilities of the front rocket troops and artillery;
- tasks of the front rocket troops and artillery in the operation;
- allocation of nuclear warheads and conventional munitions;
- artillery allocation;
- composition and tasks of the antitank reserve.

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE FRONT ROCKET TROOPS AND ARTILLERY

1. The front rocket troops have in their complement eight missile brigades (2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th army missile brigades, and the 2nd Corps Missile Brigade) and 28 separate missile battalions to fulfil in the operation the tasks of defeating the opposing Northern Army Group troop grouping. There are 214 launchers in all, including 102 R-300 launchers and 112 R-65 launchers. At the start of the operation there will be 186 launchers; of these 90 are operational-tactical missiles and 96 are tactical missiles. For participation in the initial nuclear strike, it will be possible to allocate up to 146 launchers, including 90 R-300 launchers and 56 R-65 launchers. Based on the delivery of two launches by each of 10 separate missile battalions in the initial nuclear strike, it will be possible to destroy up to 176 enemy targets of the following types: battalions, /artillery or missile/ battalions; batteries of guided missiles, free rockets, and surface-to-air guided missiles; aircraft on airfields, command posts, and nuclear weapons depots.

Front rocket troops have been allocated 360 nuclear warheads (160 R-300 and 200 R-65) for the operation. Of this number of nuclear-armed missiles, 289 (129 R-300 and 160 R-65) will be on hand at the start of the operation; the remaining ones are to arrive on D2, D3, and D4.

It is advisable to charge the front rocket troops with fulfilment of

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the following tasks in the initial nuclear strike:

a) to destroy the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion, aircraft on 13 airfields, 13 nuclear weapons depots, six army corps command posts, five control and warning centers (posts), and 33 Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries;

b) to inflict damage on 15 to 18 enemy divisions in cooperation with the 1st Air Army.

2. Upon receiving permission for the issue of the nuclear warheads, the troops are to keep on combat alert one missile battalion from each missile brigade, and the 6th Army Missile Brigade and 2nd Corps Missile Brigade are to be at full strength.

3. Nuclear warheads are to be allocated as follows:

- 176 for the initial nuclear strike (90 operational-tactical missiles, 86 tactical missiles);
- 94 for fulfilment of the immediate task (34 operational-tactical missiles, 60 tactical missiles);
- 64 for fulfilment of the follow-up task (24 operational-tactical missiles, 40 tactical missiles);
- 26 missiles are to be in reserve (12 operational-tactical missiles, 14 tactical missiles).

To include the following troop allocation:

- 2nd Front Missile Brigade -- 26 missiles;
- 3rd Front Missile Brigade -- 27 missiles;
- 4th Army -- 49 (15 operational-tactical missiles, 34 tactical missiles);
- 6th Army -- 34 (17 operational-tactical missiles, 17 tactical missiles);
- 7th Army -- 56 (15 operational-tactical missiles, 41 tactical missiles);
- 9th Army -- 62 (16 operational-tactical missiles, 46 tactical missiles);
- 2nd Army Corps -- 14 (8 operational-tactical missiles, 6 tactical missiles).

4. Taking into account the reinforcement by artillery of the Reserve

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of the Supreme High Command (6th, 8th, and 11th artillery divisions), the front will have 6,246 guns and mortars for fire destruction of the enemy.

There are 5,665 antitank means, including 4,761 antitank guided missiles, for combat against enemy tanks and armored targets.

The available number of artillery will allow the armies to have breakthrough sectors of up to eight to ten kilometers in enemy's defensive lines, with a density of 100 to 110 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

Artillery tasks:

- to be in readiness to repulse an invasion by enemy ground groupings;
- to prepare massed and concentrated fire at the junction of the 4th and 7th armies with five battalions, at the junction of the 7th and 9th armies with five battalions, and at the junction with the 3rd Army of the Western Front with three battalions;
- to neutralize the enemy antitank means, artillery, mortar, radio means, and radar reconnaissance by a 15 to 20 minute fire strike before the forward detachments cross the state border;
- in the breakthrough of the defense line by the main forces of the first-echelon armies it is to inflict destruction by fire upon the enemy by conducting an artillery preparation for the attack of 35 to 40 minutes duration with a density of 100 to 110 guns and mortars per kilometer of breakthrough sector;
- to be in readiness during the operation to destroy newly detected nuclear attack means, artillery and mortar batteries, radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance and countermeasure stations, command posts and control posts, during the repulse of possible enemy counterattacks, during the commitment to battle of the 2nd Army Corps, 6th Army, and 10th Tank Army, and during the assault crossings of the LEINE, WESER, IJSSEL and RHINE rivers.

Artillery is to be allocated as follows:

- the 4th Army with the 6th Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command /RVGK/;
- the 7th Army with the 8th Artillery Division of the RVGK;
- the 9th Army with the 11th Artillery Division of the RVGK.

Upon commitment to battle of the 6th Army, the 8th Artillery Division

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of the RVGK (minus the 2nd Gun Artillery Brigade) is to be resubordinated to it; the 11th Artillery Division of the RVGK (minus the 15th Heavy Howitzer Brigade and the 12th Rocket Launcher Artillery Brigade) /is to be resubordinated/ to the 10th Tank Army; and the 1st Gun Brigade and 4th Howitzer Brigade of the 6th Artillery Division of the RVGK /are to be resubordinated/ to the 2nd Army Corps.

5. The front antitank reserve is to have in its complement:  
/antitank reserve/ No. 1 -- the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade, concentrating it in the forest area three kilometers north of PRITZWALK in readiness to move out to lines No. 1 -- PARUM, (excluding) LUBTHEEN, No. 2 -- PLATE, NEUSTADT-GLEWE, No. 3 -- (excluding) GRABOW, PERLEBERG; /antitank reserve/ No. 2 -- the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade, concentrating it in the forest area ten kilometers south of TANGERHUTTE in readiness to move out to lines No. 4 -- OSTERBERG, MESSDORF, No. 5 -- HALDENSLEBEN, NIEDERNDODELEBEN, and No. 6 -- LEITZKAU, NEDLITZ.

Upon the start of the offensive, the following are to relocate:  
Antitank Reserve No. 1 -- in the offensive zone of the 7th Army, No. 2 -- in the offensive zone of the 9th Army in readiness to destroy tanks during the repulse of possible enemy counterthrusts.

6. Ammunition is to be allocated as follows:

- 5.0 units of fire for the immediate task;
- 2.2 units of fire for the follow-up task;
- 0.3 units of fire are to be in your reserve.

b) Students in the role of commander of the 4th /sic/ Air Army report their proposals on the combat employment of front aviation in the operation -- 10 minutes:

- strength, condition, and combat capabilities of the air army;
- air army tasks in the operation;
- allocation of nuclear munitions and flight resources by tasks and for the support of the combat actions of front troops;
- concept of the employment of air army fighter aviation in the front air defense system;
- organization of the control of the air army on the ground and in the air during the operation.

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REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FRONT 1st AIR ARMY

1. The 1st Air Army has in its complement three fighter divisions, three fighter-bomber divisions, one bomber division, three reconnaissance air regiments, one electronic countermeasures air regiment, seven helicopter regiments (including five for fire support), and one air transport regiment.

The total in the army is 920 combat aircraft (including 397 delivery aircraft), 330 helicopters (including 200 fire support helicopters), and 46 transport and liaison aircraft.

The air army has been allotted 320 nuclear bombs (including 50 of 5 kt, 46 of 10 kt, 30 of 20 kt, 20 of 50 kt, 80 of 100 kt, 75 of 200 kt, 19 of 300 kt) and 21 army sorties for fulfilment of the combat tasks in the operation.

2. In the initial nuclear strike of the front, the air army is able to employ a maximum of up to 250 nuclear bombs with a 0.35 combat readiness coefficient. But if allowance is made for the necessity of allocating part of the fighter-bomber aviation forces to neutralize enemy air defense targets not destroyed by the front rocket troops, the air army can employ up to 200 to 215 nuclear bombs and inflict destruction on 15 to 16 divisions of the Northern Army Group's main troop grouping, and destroy three to five nuclear weapons depots, two to three primary control posts, and also the Pershing, Lance, and Sergeant missile launchers not destroyed by the front rocket troops in the initial launch.

At the mobile missile technical bases of the air army large units and units there are 255 nuclear bombs, which ensures accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the 1st Air Army in the initial nuclear strike.

In the initial massed strike of the air operation, with a combat readiness coefficient of 0.95, it will be possible for the air army forces and means to destroy aircraft on open parking areas and demolish runways on seven airfields, to destroy the on-alert batteries (detachments) of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, to destroy six Lance and Sergeant missile battalions and regiments, and to support the flights out and back to strike targets by long-range aviation, naval aviation, and its own strike forces in two zones with the neutralization and destruction in them of the enemy's air defense means.

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Up to 70 to 80 enemy aircraft can be destroyed in air battles (engagements) by fighter aviation forces in the initial nuclear strike or in the initial massed strike of the air operation.

3. The air army is capable of conducting combat actions on D1 to D2 at a rate of not less than three army sorties per day, and on D3 to D6 at a rate of not less than two army sorties per day. In all, during fulfillment of the immediate task, the air army can carry out up to 14 army sorties taking into account the combat actions in the air operation.

4. I propose that the combat actions of the air army, allocated flight resources, and nuclear munitions be planned as follows:

- for the initial nuclear strike -- 200 nuclear bombs, 15 nuclear bombs in reserve, and 24 regimental sorties;
- for fulfillment of the immediate task -- 72 nuclear bombs and 354 regimental sorties; in addition, there will be three army sorties according to the air operation plan;
- for fulfillment of the follow-up task -- 36 nuclear bombs and 199 regimental sorties;
- for the reserve of the front commander, 12 nuclear bombs and 29 regimental sorties;
- for air support of front troops, an allocation of 26 nuclear bombs, 55 regimental sorties by fighter-bomber aviation, 3 regimental sorties by bomber aviation, and 90 regimental sorties by Dr. A /sic -- probably Ar. A, army aviation (cf. p. 58)/.

All of the air army fighter aviation forces are to be allocated for the cover of front troops and installations. The repulse of massed enemy air strikes is to be carried out in a two to three-echelon operational formation, having up to 30 to 40 percent of the forces in the first echelon (in independent search areas in front of the zone of surface-to-air missile cover), 30 to 40 percent of the forces in the second echelon (in the zone of surface-to-air missile cover), and up to 20 to 30 percent of the forces in reserve at readiness on the ground (during actions with conventional means) or in the airborne alert zones (during actions with the employment of nuclear weapons);

-- as of 2 September to have on combat alert one flight from each fighter-bomber regiment and bomber regiment (41 delivery aircraft) in Readiness Nos. 1 and 2;

-- in case of a surprise air attack by the enemy, repulse of his raid is to be carried out by all of the air army fighter aviation forces with

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the subsequent commitment to battle (engagement) of the on-alert fighter aviation subunits and main forces as they are brought to readiness for takeoff. As of 1800 hours 2 September, there is to be one air squadron on combat alert in each fighter regiment by day, and one flight in Readiness Nos. 1 and 2 at night;

-- for control of air combat actions, there is to be an air army combat control center and two guidance and target designation posts in each army of the front's first operational echelon. An air army fighter aviation combat control center is to be deployed at the front's air defense command post. One air army combat control center is to be in reserve.

c) Students in the capacity of front chief of air defense troops are to report their proposals on the combat employment of air defense forces and means in the operation -- 10 minutes:

- the air enemy's strength and basing, the possible nature of his actions, and main axes of probable raids;
- the location, condition, and capabilities of the front's air defense troops and fighter aviation;
- the forces and means of air defense of the country, and adjacent air defense forces and means and the prerequisites of cooperation with them;
- the grouping of front air defense forces and means, organization of air defense during the moving out and deployment of the front's main forces and, first and foremost, of the rocket troops participating in the delivery of the initial nuclear strike, during repulse of a massed enemy air raid, and while front troops are accomplishing the main tasks during the operation.

#### REPORT OF THE FRONT CHIEF OF AIR DEFENSE TROOPS

1. Aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, air forces in the North European theater of military operations, and carrier aviation, at a strength that can be up to 900 aircraft, including more than 350 delivery aircraft in the zone of the front offensive, can operate against front troops and installations.

Enemy aviation is based at a distance of 150 to 400 km from the state border, requiring a 10 to 20 minute flight at an average speed of about 15 km per minute.

Under conditions of nuclear war, enemy aviation will operate in small groups throughout the entire zone of the offensive and to the entire depth

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of the operational disposition of the front troops. In the initial massed strike against front troops and installations, up to 600 aircraft can take part, including approximately 160 delivery aircraft. The western axis will be the primary axis of the raid, from which about 500 aircraft, including up to 140 delivery aircraft, should be expected. From the northwestern axis, approximately 100 aircraft can operate, including about 20 delivery aircraft.

Under conditions of war with the employment of conventional means of destruction, enemy aviation will operate in two or three narrow sectors of the front to the depth of the first operational echelon with groups of 12 to 16 aircraft or more. Up to 600 aircraft can operate in a massed strike against front troops and installations. The main axis of the raid will most probably be the western. However, it is not to be discounted that the northwestern axis may become the main one during the operation.

2. The front air defense troops at increased combat readiness are deployed in sites near their permanent garrisons and are performing combat alert according to schedule. The radar reconnaissance system is deployed but is kept in the stand-by mode /zakrytyy rezhim/. Warning the front troops and installations about the air enemy is carried out from the command post of the 6th Air Defense Corps.

The air defense large units and units are at full strength in personnel, weapons, and combat equipment, and fully supplied with materiel reserves. According to calculations, the combat effectiveness of the air defense system for one firing cycle and one fighter aviation guidance /cycle/ amounts to 20 to 25 percent.

The 6th Air Defense Corps forces and means (three surface-to-air missile brigades, three surface-to-air missile regiments, four fighter regiments) are operating in the zone of the front. Cooperation with them is being implemented by axes and by lines. In the process, the main efforts of the corps are concentrated on the northwestern axis.

The air defense troops of the 3rd Army and the 15th Fighter Division of the air army of the Western Front are operating on the left. Cooperation with them is being implemented by the mutual allocation from each /front/ of one fighter regiment at its full radius of action to the zone of the adjacent front.

4. I propose that the main efforts of the front air defense forces and means in the departure area be concentrated on covering the 4th, 7th,

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and 9th armies, the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the main airfields of the 1st Air Army, and control posts.

For fulfilment of these tasks the following air defense forces and means are to be used:

-- for reinforcement of the cover of the front first-echelon troops: the 13th KRUG-A /SA-4 modified/ Surface-to-Air Missile /SAM/ Brigade at the junction of the 4th and 7th armies; the 15th KRUG-A SAM Brigade on the right flank of the 9th Army;

-- for cover of the 3rd Front Missile Brigade, the 14th S-75 /SA-2/ SAM Missile Regiment; for cover of the 2nd Front Missile Brigade, a SAM battalion of the 13th SAM Brigade;

-- for cover of the airfields of the 1st Air Army, the 17th and 18th S-125 /SA-3/ SAM regiments;

-- for cover of the front command post, the 23rd S-60 /57-mm AA gun/ Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment;

-- for cover of the ODER River crossings, the 10th Antiaircraft Artillery Division of the RVGK.

To cover front troops as they move to and deploy in the departure position for the offensive, provisions are to have air defense troops move out and deploy jointly with the main forces of the first-echelon armies.

For repulse of the initial massed strike by enemy aviation, all the air defense forces and means of the front and the 6th Air Defense Corps are to be allocated. Control of the combat actions is to be exercised from the air defense command posts of the front and armies.

During the operation, the main efforts of air defense are to be successively concentrated on covering the troops during the breakthrough of the forward defense line, during commitment to battle of the 6th Army, 2nd Army Corps, and 10th Tank Army, and also during the assault crossing of the WESER, RHINE, and MAAS rivers.

d) Students in the capacity of chief of radioelectronic warfare of the front are to report their proposals on the employment of electronic countermeasures units in the operation -- 10 minutes:

-- conclusions from the assessment of the enemy radioelectronic systems;

-- condition and combat capabilities of the electronic countermeasures units of the front;

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-- electronic countermeasures tasks to be accomplished by the senior chief of radioelectronic warfare in the zone of the front;

-- proposals on the combat employment of electronic countermeasures units in the operation and on the destruction of enemy radioelectronic targets.

REPORT OF THE FRONT CHIEF OF RADIOELECTRONIC WARFARE

1. The enemy utilizes the following for control of nuclear forces, ground troops, tactical aviation, and air defense forces:

-- the SCARS automated nuclear weapons control system, which uses the communications channels of the ACEHIGH tropospheric and radio-relay communications links, underground cable communications lines, communication nets of the theater of military operations, and field communications systems of the Northern Army Group, army corps, and 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force;

-- the ground troops control system that consists of up to 17 to 20 communications centers for the staffs of formations and large units, and nuclear weapons units;

-- the tactical aviation control system, that includes 10 to 12 of the most important communications centers of air formations /and/ large units and up to 20 organs of control and cooperation (control and warning centers, control and warning posts, PPTS /?forward target designation posts/), and up to 8 to 10 TACAN radio navigation stations;

-- the air defense forces and means control system, based on the NADGE fixed automated control system, the LARS system, and the field control systems for the air defense of large units. There are up to 50 organs of control in the fixed and field air defense systems;

-- in the control system for radioelectronic warfare units up to 12 to 14 communications centers and up to 12 direction-finding radio nets can be deployed.

Conclusion: Before West troops start moving out and deploying, control of the formations and large units of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force will be exercised through the fixed centers of the communications systems of the theater of military operations, the ETA /unidentified/ tropospheric and radio-relay communications system of the US armed forces in Europe, the fixed centers of the NADGE and LARS air defense systems, and the centers of the inter-garrison communications system for control of troops and aviation. A total of up to 60 fixed control organs are deployed in the communications system, 18 of them being the most important ones.

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In addition, with the start of the forward movement of the troops, West can deploy in the zone of the front up to 50 major radioelectronic installations forming part of the field control systems for the armed forces, tactical aviation, air defense forces and means, and radioelectronic warfare units.

2. The radioelectronic neutralization units of the front are located in their permanent garrisons, at 100 percent strength in equipment and personnel. For neutralization of the enemy's ground radioelectronic means, the radioelectronic countermeasures units subordinate to the front have 18 ground and nine helicopter jammers, and for neutralization of aviation onboard radioelectronic means there are 36 ground jammers. For the movement of the radioelectronic countermeasures units to the siting areas and deployment into battle formation, five to seven hours are required.

The radioelectronic countermeasures units subordinate to the front are capable of doing the following:

a) during conduct of the operation without the employment of nuclear weapons -- simultaneously disrupting radio control in two army corps and radio communications for air warning and control;

b) during conduct of the operation with the employment of nuclear weapons -- disrupting radio control of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the first-echelon army corps with nuclear weapons units, and two to three army corps or the posts of one air defense sector;

c) reducing the effectiveness of airborne radar reconnaissance and of aimed air strikes while covering front troops and installations in three areas with dimensions of 30 by 50 km each and safeguarding the actions of two to three SAM /abbreviation incomplete/ in combatting low-altitude targets, of hampering the guiding into a target area of up to 300 enemy aircraft that are using three TACAN radio navigation stations in the zone and to a depth of 50 to 300 km, of disrupting the ultra-shortwave radio communications control for enemy aviation in a zone up to 50 km /wide/ and to a depth of up to 50 to 150 km.

3. The radioelectronic installations of the Northern Army Group to the west of the NORDEN, DORTMUND line are to be struck by the forces and means of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

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4. I propose, during conduct of the operation with conventional means of destruction, that the control of the Northern Army Group troops be disrupted by destroying the communications centers of the first-echelon army corps and large units, three tactical aviation forward control posts, two posts of the LARS air defense system, and two TACAN stations; and that the radio and radio-relay communications of the Brown 1st and 6th army corps and Blue 1st Army Corps, the Brown 3rd DAP /?long-range aviation regiment/, Brown Air Tactical Command, and Blue air forces, and the radio communications of decentralized warning of the 1st and 2nd air defense sectors be neutralized through jamming by the forces of the 12th OSNAZ-N /ground radio intercept/ Battalion and the 11th Separate Electronic Countermeasures Helicopter Squadron.

During conduct of the operation with nuclear weapons, in the initial nuclear strike of the front, that the control posts of the Lance missile battalions and regiments, and that of the army corps, and seven control and warning posts for air defense and tactical aviation be destroyed; that the radio and radio-relay communications for the control of the nuclear weapons units of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps, as well as those for control of the Brown 1st and 6th army corps, and 1st and 2nd OTSS PVO /?allied air defense communications centers/ be neutralized through jamming by the forces of the 12th OSNAZ-N /ground radio intercept/ Battalion and the 11th Separate Electronic Countermeasures Helicopter Squadron forces.

That the onboard tactical aviation radioelectronic means of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force that support the delivery of strikes against the front command post, the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, and troops at the crossings over the ELBE, HAVEL, WESER, IJSEL, and RHINE rivers be neutralized by jamming by the forces and means of the 62nd OSNAZ-S /aircraft radio intercept/ Battalion.

5. PROPOSALS OF THE FRONT CHIEF OF STAFF ON THE DECISION -- 40 minutes

Students in the capacity of front chief of staff are to report their proposals on the decision on the basis of the clarification of the objective and tasks of the front in the operation and the estimate of the situation:

I. Front objectives and tasks in the operation.

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II. Conclusions from assessment of the enemy (capabilities of the enemy with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, his troop groupings, possible intentions, start time and the expected nature of his actions, weaknesses and strengths);

III. Conclusions from assessment of our own troops (capabilities of the front troops to fulfill the assigned tasks, the effect of the nature of the terrain and weather upon troop actions during the preparation and conduct of the operation);

IV. Proposals on the decision:

- tasks for the front troops;
- allocation of troop efforts by axes;
- organization of control;
- transmittal of the tasks to the front troops.

REPORT BY THE FRONT CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE PROPOSALS ON THE DECISION

I. FRONT OBJECTIVE AND TASKS IN THE OPERATION

The Supreme High Command is preparing, and in case West unleashes war in Europe, will conduct a strategic offensive operation with the objective of defeating the troop groupings of the Northern Army Group and the Central Army Group, the aviation of the 2nd and 4th allied tactical air forces, the West naval forces, and of forcing Brown, Lilac, and Violet to withdraw from the war. In the initial nuclear strike in the offensive zone of the Coastal Front the following are to be destroyed:

- by the Strategic Rocket Forces: enemy troops and installations to the west of the NORDEN, DORTMUND line;
- by the Combined Baltic Fleet: aviation on airfields Nos. 06, 08, 09, 10; mine depots at FLENSBURG, ECKERNFORDE, KIEL; the command post of the combined naval forces at HOLTENAU. The 6th Corps of Air Defense of the Country is to cover the front against enemy air strikes.

In case war is unleashed without the employment of nuclear weapons, an air operation is to be conducted in the Western theater of military operations to destroy the enemy's missile/nuclear and air groupings, in which the 1st Air Army of the Coastal Front is to participate with an outlay of three army sorties.

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2. The Coastal Front has the task of repulsing a possible attack by the enemy and preventing him from invading its territory. /It is/ to prepare, and upon special order of the Supreme High Command, conduct an offensive operation on the JUTLAND and HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axes; and in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet and the 3rd Army of the Western Front, it is to defeat the Northern Army Group troop grouping and aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, seize the northern part of the Brown territory and the territories of Lilac and Violet, and reach the coast of the North Sea and organize its defense.

The depth of the task is 600 kilometers. Front troops must fulfill this task within 10 to 12 days. The average rate of the offensive is to be 50 to 60 km per day.

During fulfilment of the immediate task, front troops must defeat the main forces of the Northern Army Group within five to six days, advance 250 km, and seize the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER. The average rate of the offensive is to be 40 to 50 km per day.

During fulfilment of the follow-up task, front troops are to rout the operational reserves of the Northern Army Group, make an assault crossing from the march of the IJSEL and RHINE rivers, advance up to 350 km, and on the tenth to twelfth day of the operation seize the line BRUGGE, RANCE, CHARLEROI, DINANT; reach the coast of the North Sea, and organize its defense. The average rate of the offensive is to be 50 to 60 km per day.

3. On the right the Combined Baltic Fleet has the following tasks: to destroy the enemy's carrier grouping in the North Sea and ship groupings in the North and Baltic seas; conduct an amphibious landing operation to seize FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base together with troops of the Coastal Front; assist the front in seizing the southwestern coast of the Baltic Sea and the southeastern coast of the North Sea and in organizing their defense; disrupt enemy's sea shipping in the North Sea and provide sea lift in support of the front.

On the left the Western Front is to prepare an offensive operation on the KASSEL-KOBLENZ axis with the objective of defeating, in cooperation with the Coastal Front, the Northern Army Group troop grouping and the main forces of the Central Army Group. Its right-flank 3rd Army is to mount an attack on the axis GOTTINGEN, MENDEN, BASTOGNE.

The boundary with it is: EISENHUTTENSTADT, LUCKENWALDE, OSTERWIECK, LUNEN, (excluding) DUISBURG, DINANT.

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4. Thus, the Coastal Front, in a strategic operation in the Western theater of military operations, is to be in the first operational echelon; and to it belongs the decisive role in defeating the troops of the Northern Army Group and the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and in reaching the coast of the North Sea and the organization of its defense.

## II. CONCLUSIONS FROM ASSESSMENT OF THE ENEMY

1. At 2000 hours 30 August, West put into effect a state of "military vigilance" among NATO troops and proceeded to the immediate preparation and unleashing of war in Europe against East. In the zone of the Coastal Front, the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the naval forces of the Baltic and North Seas are preparing to deliver an attack.

For the conduct of combat actions they will be able to form ground forces attack groupings in three to five days: consisting of three army corps (Brown 4th and 6th army corps and the Lilac 1st Army Corps) on the HAMBURG-SZCZECIN axis; consisting of four to five army corps (Brown 1st and 5th army corps, Blue 1st Army Corps, Lilac 2nd Army Corps, and possibly the Violet 2nd Army Corps) on the HANNOVER-BERLIN axis; and to deliver a surprise attack against front troops and installations with the employment of more than 350 nuclear munitions.

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The complement of these groupings may contain the following:

Designation	HANNOVER grouping	HAMBURG grouping
Launchers	112	60
Including		
-- op tac msls	58	10
-- tac msls	54	50
Divs	19	12
Including		
-- mtz inf divs	15	11
-- tk divs (armed divs)	4	1
Medium tks	4,038	2,983
Guns and mrtrs	2,956	2,029
including atomic	260	210
Antitank means	2,162	1,617

The combat actions of these groupings are supported by the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, which numbers approximately 900 combat aircraft, including more than 350 delivery aircraft.

2. West can intensify the efforts of its attack groupings during combat actions by transferring to the zone of the front the Blue 2nd Army Corps and Blue 3rd Infantry Division and two or three additionally deployed Brown divisions.

3. The possible nature of the actions by West is: by means of attacks on the indicated axes, to split the troop grouping of the Coastal Front into fragments, inflict destruction upon it, seize the city of

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BERLIN, and on the fifth to sixth day of combat actions reach the ODER River. Four to five army corps (14 to 15 divisions) can operate in the first echelon, two to three army corps in the second, and one to two army corps and two to three divisions in the reserve of the Northern Army Group.

With the forces of the first-echelon army corps the enemy will attempt to destroy the first-echelon large units of the armies, make an assault crossing from the march of the ELBE River, and set up conditions for the further development of the offensive. On D3 to D4, with the commitment to battle of the army corps of the second echelon, he will build up efforts and seize BERLIN by means of attacks along converging axes that envelop it from the north and south, and with part of the forces attacking on the SZCZECIN axis, cut off the SCHWERIN grouping of front troops, press it against the sea and destroy it.

During fulfillment of the task, the attack groupings of the enemy can be reinforced: by one to two divisions on the SZCZECIN axis, three to four divisions on the BERLIN axis, and also by the air forces with 200 to 250 combat aircraft (including more than 150 delivery aircraft).

4. In case of an unsuccessful battle in the border zone and substantial losses on the part of the main troop grouping, the enemy can go over to the defense on the forward line LUBECK, LUNEBERG, UELZEN, BRAUNSCHWEIG, and in case of its loss, to delaying actions on intermediate lines along the KIEL Canal and the LEINE, WESER, EMS, IJSSEL, and RHINE rivers with the object of safeguarding the concentration and deployment of strategic reserves for the transition to the counteroffensive.

In the course of a defensive battle, enemy counterattacks are most probable when front troops reach these lines: AHRENSBOK, AHRENSBURG, UELZEN, CELLE, SALZGITTER by the second-echelon large units of the first-echelon corps; ZALTAU /sic -- SOLTAU/, HANNOVER by the second-echelon corps; and BREMEN, BIELEFELD by the operational reserves of the Northern Army Group.

5. The Northern Army Group has a widespread electronic system of control for troop combat actions and electronic warfare means, the neutralization of which can disorganize to a significant degree troop control and the guidance of aviation against our targets.

6. The major West targets in the zone of the front offensive east of the NORDEN, DORTMUND line, the destruction of which in the initial nuclear strike can bring about a considerable reduction in the combat capabilities

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of the enemy troops, are: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions and the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion; 15 to 16 home airfields of aviation; 15 to 20 nuclear weapons depots; 7 to 8 Nike and Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions; 15 to 16 divisions of the army corps of the first operational echelon (Brown 1st, 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th, and 21st motorized infantry divisions, 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions; Green 4th Tank Division, Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions, Lilac 1st and 4th motorized infantry divisions); the command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and six army corps; control and warning posts and centers and electronic warfare centers.

7. Based on the expected concept of the enemy's actions, the most advisable decision on the front offensive operation might be: the delivery of two thrusts -- the main one at the junction of the enemy attack groupings on the CELLE, OSNABRUCK axis, /leading to/ the rout of the Brown 1st Army Corps, and in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, the encirclement and destruction of the Blue 1st Army Corps and the Violet 1st Army Corps; the second thrust on the JUTLAND axis with an envelopment of HAMBURG from the north, which in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet /leads to/ the rout of the Brown 6th Army Corps and the establishment of conditions for the further development of the operation.

With the timely commitment to battle of the second echelon and the reserves, the efforts of the first-echelon troops will be built up, the operational reserves of the enemy will be routed, and by the swift development of the offensive the assigned tasks of the front in the operation will be fulfilled.

### III. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ASSESSMENT OF OUR OWN TROOPS

#### 1. The Coastal Front has in its complement:

-- four combined-arms armies (4th, 6th, 7th, 9th armies), the 2nd Army Corps, the 1st Air Army, 17 motorized rifle divisions, seven tank divisions, one airborne division, two front missile brigades, three artillery divisions of the RVGK, two antitank artillery brigades, two SAM brigades, one S-75 SAM regiment, two S-125 SAM regiments, one antiaircraft artillery division, one S-60 antiaircraft artillery regiment, one chemical defense brigade, and other front units of the branch arms and special troops;

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-- by the morning of D2, the 10th Tank Army will arrive to join the front complement with a strength of four divisions (three tank divisions, one motorized rifle division).

In all, the front will have for the operation: 29 divisions (18 motorized rifle divisions, 10 tank divisions, one airborne division); 214 launchers (102 for operational-tactical missiles, 112 for tactical missiles); 7,082 tanks; 6,246 guns and mortars; 5,665 antitank means (including 4,761 antitank guided missiles); 1,275 combat aircraft (including 587 delivery aircraft).

The front has been allocated 680 nuclear munitions for the operation, and 21 army sorties of the 1st Air Army have been planned (including three army sorties for participation in the air operation according to the plan of the Supreme High Command).

With the Coastal Front at this troop strength, the balance of forces and means in the zone of the offensive is described by the following:

Designation	For the entire operation			At the start of the operation		
	East	West	Balance	East	West	Balance
Launchers	214	172	1.2:1	186	148	1.2:1
Including						
-- op tac msl lnchrs	102	68	1.5:1	90	64	1.4:1
-- tac msl lnchrs	112	104	1:1	96	84	1.1:1
Aircft	1,275	1,123	1.1:1	920	888	1:1

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Designation	For the entire operation			At the start of the operation		
	East	West	Balance	East	West	Balance
Including -- delivery aircft	587	537	1:1	397	360	1.1:1
Divs	29	31	1:1	25	25	1:1
Including -- mtz R divs (mtz inf divs, inf divs)	18	25	1:1.4	17	19	1:1.1
-- tk divs (armd divs)	10	6	1.6:1	7	6	1.4:1 /sic/
-- abn divs (abn bdes)	1	1 bde	1.5:1	1	1 bde	1.5:1
Medium tks	7,082	7,021	1:1	5,899	6,222	1:1
Guns and mrtrs	6,246	4,944	1.2:1	5,598	4,046	1.3:1
Including atomic pieces	-	470	-	-	382	-
Antitk means	5,665	3,779	1.4:1	5,074	2,728	1.8:1

The Coastal Front has a negligible superiority over the enemy in launchers, artillery, and antitank means. In tanks and aviation the balance is approximately equal.

Therefore, in order to alter the balance of forces and means in its own favor and set up conditions favoring the fulfillment of the assigned task in the operation, it will be necessary for the Coastal Front to concentrate its

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main efforts on the attack axes in narrower zones, on the destruction of missile/nuclear means and delivery aircraft on the airfields, and on the defeat of the main ground forces grouping of the Northern Army Group.

2. The operational status and condition of front troops will allow, within brief time limits (in four to eight hours), the formation of attack groupings of troops, the repulse of enemy thrusts, and the transition to a decisive offensive.

In line with this, the forces and means available to the front will provide for the formation of two attack groupings and the delivery of these attacks:

-- the main one on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis by the forces of four armies;  
-- the second attack on the JUTLAND axis by the forces of one army and one army corps; and in addition, one or two divisions of the front reserve are to be on each of the attack axes.

The width of the offensive zone is to be 200 km, which will make it possible to have 10 to 12 divisions in the first echelon.

3. In the initial nuclear strike, the front can employ more than 370 nuclear munitions: to destroy the main missile/nuclear and air grouping of the enemy, nuclear warheads depots, air defense forces and means, the main control posts, and to inflict defeat on his main ground forces grouping.

4. When conducting combat actions with conventional means of destruction, the front can significantly weaken the enemy troop grouping by means of air strikes and artillery fire, ensure the breakthrough of the forward line on a 24- to 25-km wide front, given densities of 100 or more guns and mortars and 50 to 60 tanks per kilometer. In the process, it is advisable to have the adjacent flanks of two armies carry out the breakthrough on the axis of the front's main attack on a 17-kilometer front.

5. Thus, the combat strength of the front, operational status and condition of the troops, allocated number of nuclear and conventional munitions, and available materiel reserves will ensure that the front will fulfill the assigned task in the operation within the established time limits.

#### IV. PROPOSALS ON THE DECISION

1. Concept of the operation -- by splitting attacks: the 7th and 9th

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armies on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis and the 4th Army on the JUTLAND axis are to inflict defeat on the enemy's HANNOVER and HAMBURG groupings; and with the subsequent commitment to battle of the front's second echelon (the 6th Army and 2nd Army Corps) they are to develop a rapid offensive into the depth, and with part of the forces toward the flanks, disrupt the operational stability of the Northern Army Group, break up its attack groupings of troops, and in cooperation with the Western Front and the Combined Baltic Fleet, complete the defeat of these groupings.

By means of massed nuclear and air strikes and artillery fire, destruction is to be inflicted upon the enemy's missile/nuclear means and aviation, and upon his ground forces attack groupings in the areas of: AHRENSBURG, BREMEN, UELZEN; CELLE, NIENBURG, HAMELN, SALZGITTER.

With the employment of 376 nuclear munitions in the front's initial nuclear strike, the following are to be destroyed: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions and the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 450th Sergeant missile battalion; 17 nuclear weapons depots; delivery aircraft on 14 airfields; five control and warning centers (posts); the command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and six army corps; 30 to 40 Nike and Hawk SAM batteries; and the following is to be inflicted: 75 to 80 percent damage on 13 divisions (Brown 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th motorized infantry divisions, Brown 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions, Green 4th Mechanized Division, Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions) and 30 to 50 percent damage on four divisions (Brown 1st and 21st motorized infantry divisions, Lilac 1st and 4th motorized infantry divisions).

Upon the start of combat actions with the employment of conventional means of destruction only, the 1st Air Army, by means of three massed strikes in cooperation with long-range aviation and naval aviation, is to destroy the launchers of the on-alert detachments of the 2nd Pershing Wing and of the Lance and Sergeant missile batteries and battalions (regiments), and to rout the main forces of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force and gain supremacy in the air.

Maximum losses are to be inflicted upon the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps by the strikes of bomber aviation, fighter-bomber aviation, army aviation, and artillery fire.

The repulse of a possible enemy invasion is to be carried out by the covering forces and by encounter attacks with the main forces of the first-echelon armies of the front.

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The main attack of the front is to be delivered on the CELLE, OSNABRUCK axis with the forces of four armies (6th, 7th, and 9th armies, and the 10th Tank Army); the Brown 1st Army Corps is to be routed, and in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, the Blue 1st Army Corps and the Violet 1st Army Corps are to be encircled and destroyed in the area BRAUNSCHWEIG, BODENWERDER, NORDHEIM.

The second attack, on the BAD OLDESLOE, FLENSBURG axis with the forces of the 4th Army and the 2nd Army Corps, is to rout the main forces of the Brown 6th Army Corps in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet in the area ZEGEBERG /sic -- BAD SEGEBERG/, HAMBURG, GEESTHACHT.

The efforts of the troops of the front's first operational echelon are to be built up and the defeat of the enemy's HANNOVER and HAMBURG groupings is to be completed by committing the 6th Army to battle the morning of the third or fourth day of the operation from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF or SYKE, UCHTE on the NIENBURG, RHEINE axis, and the 2nd Army Corps on the second to third day of the operation from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRUNWALD on the BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN axis.

Upon commitment of the 6th Army to battle, the main efforts of the 7th Army are to be directed, in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps, at the rout of the large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps and part of the forces of the Brown 6th Army Corps; and the main forces of the front, developing a rapid offensive, are to rout the operational reserves of the Northern Army Group, and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation accomplish the immediate task of seizing the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER.

On the first and second day of the operation the forces of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and the 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments are to conduct an amphibious landing operation and seize FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base.

Subsequently, with the commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army on the fifth to sixth day of the operation from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK or OLDENZAAL, BORGHORST on the GRONAU, EINDHOVEN axis, the main forces of the front (7th and 6th armies and 10th Tank Army) are to develop a rapid offensive and complete the defeat of the main forces of the Northern Army Group to the east of the IJssel and RHINE rivers; and the 9th Army, in cooperation with the troops of the Western Front, is to encircle and destroy the enemy's RUHR grouping, make an assault crossing of those rivers from the march, and on the tenth to twelfth day of combat actions achieve the final

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objective of the front operation -- to seize the line BRUGGE, RANCE, CHARLEROI, DINANT, and reach the coast of the North Sea and organize its defense.

To capture the crossings and assist the 10th Tank Army troops in the assault crossing from the march of the RHINE River, on the fifth to sixth day of the operation an airborne landing operation is to be conducted by landing the 30th Airborne Division in the EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN area.

Front troops are to be operationally disposed in two echelons. In the first echelon are to be the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies; in the second will be the 6th Army, 10th Tank Army, and 2nd Army Corps; in the combined-arms reserve are to be the 13th Motorized Rifle Division and the 20th Tank Division.

2. The tasks of the front troops are specified to be as follows:

a) For the armies of the first operational echelon:

-- immediate task -- to inflict destruction on the Brown 6th and 4th army corps, to rout the Brown 1st Army Corps, to encircle and destroy the Blue 1st Army Corps and the Violet 1st Army Corps in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, to make an assault crossing from the march of the KIEL Canal and the WESER River, and on the third to fourth day of the operation seize the line: KIEL, RENDESBURG, ITZEHOE by the 4th Army; ROTENBURG, UCHTE by the 7th Army, and MINDEN, LUGDE by the 9th Army.

The depth of the task is 120 to 140 km; the average rate of the offensive is to be 35 to 40 km per day.

On the first day of the operation they are to reach the line AHRENSBOK, AHRENSBURG, UELZEN, ESCHEDA, PEINE, SALZGITTER. The depth of the task is 30 to 40 km.

To build up the efforts of the first-echelon troops, the second echelon of the front will be committed to battle: the 6th Army on the axis of the main attack (D3 to D4), the 2nd Army Corps on the JUTLAND axis (D2 to D3). The forces of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and the 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments are to conduct an amphibious landing operation on D1 to D2 to seize FEMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base.

-- follow-up task -- to rapidly develop the offensive, to rout by means of encounter attacks the operational reserves of the enemy -- the Lilac 1st

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and 2nd army corps; to complete the defeat of his HAMBURG and HANNOVER troop groupings and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation fulfill the immediate /sic/ task of the front -- to seize the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER.

Accordingly, the attack axes and width of zones at the start of the operation are specified to be as follows:

- for the 4th Army -- BAD OLDESLOE, RENDBURG, FLENSBURG (60 km);
- for the 7th Army -- CELLE, NIENBURG, PAPENBURG (75 km);
- for the 9th Army -- VOL'SBURG /sic -- WOLFSBURG/, MINDEN, MUNSTER, and part of the forces at BODENWERDER (60 km).

b) For the second echelon of the front:

- the 2nd Army Corps from the morning of D2 to D3 is to be committed to battle from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRUNWALD and develop the offensive on the BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN axis, and in cooperation with the 7th Army, on D3 to D4 encircle and on D5 to D6 destroy the enemy's HAMBURG grouping;

- the 6th Army from the morning of D3 to D4 is to be committed to battle from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF or SYKE, UCHTE and develop the offensive on the NIENBURG axis, and in cooperation with the 7th and 9th armies, rout the operational reserves of the enemy and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation seize the MEPPEN, BORGHORST line.

The follow-up task of the army is assigned as follows: to develop the offensive on the LINGEN, ARNHEIM axis, defeat the main forces of the Northern Army Group to the east of the IJssel River in cooperation with the 10th Tank Army, make an assault crossing of it from the march, and on the eighth to ninth day of the operation seize the AMERSFOORT, 'S-HERTOGENBOSCH line.

- the 10th Tank Army is to be committed to battle on D5 to D6 from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK or OLDENZAAL, BORGHORST and do the following: develop an offensive on the GRONAU, EINDHOVEN axis, complete the defeat of the main forces of the Northern Army Group to the east of the IJssel and RHINE rivers in cooperation with the 6th and 9th armies, make an assault crossing from the march of the RHINE River in cooperation with the 30th Airborne Division and on the eighth to ninth day of the operation seize the EINDHOVEN, ROERMOND line.

The follow-up task of the tank army is assigned as follows: in cooperation with the 6th Army to continue developing the offensive, to

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destroy the enemy reserves to the west of the RHINE River, and on the tenth to twelfth day of the operation to seize the SOIGNIES, DINANT line.

c) For the landing forces: from the morning of the fifth to the sixth day of the operation the 30th Airborne Division is to make an assault landing in the EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN area with the task of destroying the enemy in this area, seize the crossings over the RHINE River in the ARNHEM, WESEL sector, and assist the troops of the 10th Tank Army in making the assault crossing of it from the march.

-- the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and the 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments are to conduct on the first and second days of the operation an amphibious landing operation to seize FEHMARN Island (motorized rifle regiment and naval infantry regiment) and the KIEL Naval Base (by the rest of the assault landing forces).

d) For 2nd Front Missile Brigade: the siting area is to be LUBZ, (excluding) PUTLITZ, (excluding) PLAU; for the 3rd Front Missile Brigade, PESSIN, (excluding) PREMnitz, (excluding) BRANDENBURG; and /both/ are to be in readiness to participate in the initial nuclear strike of the front.

e) For the 1st Air Army: conduct reconnaissance, destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack, support and cover the combat actions of the ground forces, having concentrated principal efforts on the main axis of attack, and be in readiness to participate in the front's initial nuclear strike. The flight resources are to be allocated in regimental sorties: 354 for fulfillment of the immediate task, 190 for the follow-up task, 148 for air support of troop combat actions, and 29 for the reserve.

f) For air defense troops: concentrate the main efforts of air defense on the cover of the main grouping of front troops on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis, and in cooperation with the 6th Corps of Air Defense of the Country, repulse enemy air strikes.

g) For radioelectronic warfare forces and means: disorganize the control of the enemy's troops, combat equipment, and weapons on the axis of the main and second attacks by jamming his radio communications and by covering the command posts of the front and armies, missile brigades, and principal crossings against radar reconnaissance and aimed air strikes; and safeguard the stable control of troops and weapons under conditions of jamming and the delivery of strikes by enemy homing weapons.

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h) For the front reserves: the combined-arms /reserve/ is to relocate in the zones of the 7th and 9th armies in readiness to reinforce them; Antitank Reserve No. 1 is to be in the offensive zone of the 7th Army, and Antitank Reserve No. 2 /in the offensive zone of the/ 9th Army in readiness to repulse possible counterthrusts by enemy tanks; Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 1 and Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 2 are to relocate together with the respective antitank reserves.

i) In the initial nuclear strike of the front 376 nuclear munitions are to be employed, including: 4th Army -- 37, 7th Army -- 41, 9th Army -- 44, 6th Army -- 12, 2nd Army Corps -- 6, 2nd Front Missile Brigade -- 18, 3rd Front Missile Brigade -- 18, and the 1st Air Army -- 200.

The following are to be destroyed: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions and the 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion; delivery aircraft on airfields nos. 07 (HUSUM), 12 (MARNE), 16 (WUSTERHEIDE), 23 (BUCKEBURG), 27 (OLDENBURG), 28 (VEGESACK), 29 (BREMEN), 30 (DELMENHORST), 31 (BERGER), 33 (KLOPPENBERG), 34 (DIEPHOLZ), 41 (OSNABRUCK), 43 (GUTERSLOH), 46 (DEIMOLD);

control and warning centers at WROHM, ARHENSBURG, EYTIN /?EIGEN/, FALLINGBOSTEL, BAD MUNDER; the command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, Brown 1st, 4th and 6th army corps, Blue 1st Army Corps, Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps; the 3rd, 5th, 31st, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, and 39th Hawk SAM battalions, the 36th Thunderbird SAM Regiment, 24th and 25th Nike battalions; destruction is to be inflicted upon the Green 4th Mechanized Division -- 18 /nuclear munitions/; Blue 1st Armored Division -- 17; Brown 11th, 13th, and 14th motorized infantry divisions and Brown 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions, Blue 4th Armored Division -- 16 each; Brown 6th, 15th, and 18th motorized rifle /sic/ divisions, Blue 2nd Armored Division -- 15 each; Brown 1st Motorized Infantry Division -- 13; Lilac 1st Motorized Infantry Division -- 11; Lilac 4th Motorized Infantry Division, Brown 21st Motorized Infantry Division -- nine each; Lilac 5th and 101st motorized infantry divisions -- five each; Brown 27th Airborne Brigade -- three nuclear munitions.

The nuclear weapons are to be allocated as follows:

- 376 for the initial nuclear strike of the front;
- 166 for fulfillment of the front's immediate task;
- 100 for fulfillment of the front's follow-up task;
- 38 for the front reserve.

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3. Combat strength of the armies and army corps for the operation and their reinforcement:

a) First echelon

-- 4th Army (3rd, 7th, 8th, and 14th motorized rifle divisions, 2nd Tank Division) with the 6th Artillery Division of the RVGK, 10th Antiaircraft Artillery Division, (on D3), and the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 21st Engineer Position Preparation Regiment (on D4). The army is to be allocated 49 missiles (15 R-300, 34 R-65), 10 regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation, 20 /regimental sorties/ of army aviation, and five nuclear bombs.

-- 7th Army (1st, 4th, and 11th motorized rifle divisions, 5th and 9th tank divisions) with the 8th Artillery Division of the RVGK, 12th Engineer Obstacle Clearing Battalion (up to D3), 22nd Pontoon Bridge Regiment and 27th Assault Crossing Battalion (up to D4) and the 1st Battalion of the 21st Engineer Position Preparation Regiment (on D4). The army is to be allocated 56 missiles (15 R-300, 41 R-65), 17 regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation, 24 of army aviation, and eight nuclear bombs.

-- 9th Army (6th, 18th, 21st, 23rd motorized rifle divisions, 10th and 26th tank divisions) with the 11th Artillery Division of the RVGK, the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Engineer Position Preparation Regiment, 20th Pontoon Bridge Regiment (on D5), 11th Engineer Obstacle Clearing Battalion (up to D3). The army is to be allocated 62 missiles (16 R-300, 46 R-65), 16 regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation, 24 of army aviation, and seven nuclear bombs.

b) Second echelon

-- 2nd Army Corps (16th and 24th motorized rifle divisions). Upon commitment to battle, the corps is to be reinforced by the 1st Gun Artillery Brigade and 4th Heavy Howitzer Brigade of the 6th Artillery Division of the RVGK. The corps is to be allocated 14 missiles (8 R-300, 6 R-65), three regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation and four of army aviation.

-- 6th Army (12th, 17th, and 28th motorized rifle divisions and the 19th Tank Division). Upon commitment to battle, the 8th Artillery Division of the RVGK (minus the 2nd Gun Artillery Brigade), the 23rd Pontoon Bridge Regiment, and 12th Engineer Obstacle Clearing Battalion will reinforce the army. The army is to be allocated 34 missiles (17 R-300, 17 R-65), 12 regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation, 18 of army aviation, and six nuclear bombs.

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-- 10th Tank Army -- in its former composition. Upon commitment to battle, it is to be reinforced by the 11th Artillery Division of the RVGK (minus the 15th Heavy Howitzer Brigade and the 12th Rocket Launcher Artillery Brigade), the 27th Assault Crossing Battalion, and 22nd Pontoon Bridge Regiment. The army is to be allocated 16 missiles (6 R-300, 10 R-65) and six nuclear bombs.

c) Assault landing forces

-- 30th Airborne Division is the airborne landing force. To support the assault landing and the combat actions, it is to be allocated 10 nuclear munitions (two R-300 and eight bombs), nine regimental sorties by fighter aviation, three by fighter-bomber aviation, and two by bomber aviation;

-- 16th Motorized Rifle Division and 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments are the amphibious landing force. To conduct the amphibious landing operation it is to be allocated six nuclear munitions (two R-300s and four bombs), six regimental sorties by fighter aviation, three by fighter-bomber aviation, and one by bomber aviation.

d) Reserves

-- combined-arms -- 13th Motorized Rifle Division and 20th Tank Division;

-- antitank -- No. 1 -- 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade, No. 2 -- 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade;

-- mobile obstacle detachments -- No. 4 -- the 1st Battalion of the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment and No. 2 -- 12th Engineer Obstacle Clearing Battalion.

4. At the start of the operation the control posts are to be deployed as follows:

-- front command post -- as of 0400 hours 7 September in the forest 10 km northwest of NEURUPPIN;

-- alternate front command post -- as of 0400 hours 6 September in the forest 10 km northwest of GENTHIN;

-- rear control post of the front -- as of 0500 hours 7 September in the forest six km south of FURSTENBERG;

-- 4th Army command post -- in the forest three km south of WAREN;

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-- 2nd Army Corps command post -- in the forest five km west of GREIFSWALD. Upon commitment to battle -- 10 km southwest of BAD OLDESLOE;  
-- 7th Army command post -- in the forest five km east of STENDAL;  
-- 9th Army command post -- in the forest five km east of TANGERHUTTE;  
-- 6th Army command post -- in the forest 10 km southwest of EBERSWALDE.  
Upon commitment to battle -- in the forest three km north of WOLTHAUSEN or 15 km northwest of NIENBURG;  
-- 10th Tank Army command post -- in the forest five km west of TRZCIEL.  
Upon commitment to battle -- in the forest five km west of DAMME or five km west of RHEINE.

The readiness /time/ of the control and communications system has been set at 2000 hours 5 September. Operational groups are to move out to the field control posts the night of 3 September.

5. Combat tasks for the front troops are to be assigned by 1700 hours 1 September, the planning of the offensive operation will be completed by 2400 hours 1 September, the defense areas of cover units and large units are to be occupied by 0600 hours 2 September, the departure areas for the offensive are to be prepared by the close of 5 September and to be occupied by the troops in the course of two nights: the night of 6 September by the first-echelon large units, rocket troops and artillery, and air defense troops, and the night of 7 September by the second-echelon large units, the combined-arms reserve, and units of special troops.

6. ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THE LESSON -- five minutes

The director of the training group announces to the students the subject, training objectives of the lessons, and to what extent these objectives were achieved.


He analyzes the contents of the reports and notes the positive aspects and shortcomings of the students in the preparation for the lessons.

He briefly states the content of the principal topics of the lesson and reinforces it with examples from the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

He prescribes the time limits and procedure for eliminating the shortcomings detected in the preparation of the students. If necessary he gives separate assignments to individual students.

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APPENDIX A  
COMBAT STRENGTH AND ARMAMENT OF WEST IN THE ZONE OF THE COASTAL FRONT OFFENSIVE

Table No. 1

Army Corps	Large units and units	Launchers					Tanks				Artillery and mortars					Antitank means			Helos
		Perah	Lance	Sgt	Hoo John	Total	Med	Lt	Total	803 2- mm How	255- /sic/ mm How	Total atom arty	Arty	Morts	Total	AT defense	ATGM	Total	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
6th Army Corps (Brown)	6th Mts Inf Div			4	4	278		278	6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	13th Mts Inf Div			4	4	278		278	6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	18th Mts Inf Div			4	4	278		278	6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	21st Mts Inf Div			4	4	278		278	6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	65th Lance Arty /sic/ Bn		6			6													
	610th, 620th Arty Rgts								12		-	12			102				
	Air Force Cnd /sic/																		111 (48)
<b>Total</b>		6		16	22	1112		1112	36	24	60	394	164	638	320	118	436	159 (48)	
4th Army Corps (Brown)	14th Mts Inf Div			4	4	278		278	6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	15th Mts Inf Div			4	4	278		278	6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	16th Tk Div			4	4	298		298	6	6	12	76	38	126	58	34	92	12	
	450th Sgt Bn		4			4													
	410th Arty Rgt								12		-	12			48				111 (48)
	Air Army Cnd /sic/																		
<b>Total</b>			4	12	16	954		954	30	18	48	264	130	442	218	92	310	147 (48)	
1st Army Corps (Brown)	1st Mts Inf Div			4	4	278		278	6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	11th Mts Inf Div			4	4	278		278	6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	3rd Tk Div			4	4	298		298	6	6	12	76	38	126	58	34	92	12	
	7th Tk Div			4	4	298		298	6	6	12	76	38	126	58	34	92	12	
	27th Abu Bde												16	16	18	30	48		
	160th Lance Bn		6			6													
	110th Arty Rgt								12		-	12			48				111 (48)
Air Army Cnd /sic/																			
<b>Total</b>		6		16	22	1162		1162	36	24	60	340	164	584	294	156	450		
1st Army Corps (Blue)	2nd Armd Div					212		212	4	12	16	54	48	118	32	48	80	42 (illeg. no.)	
	1st Armd Div					265		265	4	12	16	54	42	112	28	48	76	42 (illeg. no.)	
	4th Armd Div					265		265	4	12	16	54	42	112	28	48	76	42 (illeg. no.)	
	24th, 50th Lance Mel Rgts		12			12								24		24		12	
	9th, 42nd Hvy SP Arty Rgts																24	24	12
	6th, 20th <del>abr</del> <del>rg</del> /7een armd recce rgtz/ 1st Army Avn Wing						90		90										(12)
<b>Total</b>		12			12	742		742	12	36	48	166	138	366	88	168	266	160 (illeg. no.)	
1st Mts Inf Div				2	2	216	68	216	4		4	72	102	178	66	48	114	12	
4th Mts Inf Div				2	2	216	68	216	4		4	72	102	178	66	48	114	12	

	107th AT Arty Bn												12	-	12					
	101st Flt Arty GP												72	-	72					
	<b>Total</b>			14	14	648		648	24		24		300	306	630	198	144	342	36	
2nd Army Corps (Lilac)	101st Mtn Inf Div			2	2	216	88	216	4		4		72	102	178	66	48	114	12	
	301st Mtn Inf Div			2	2	216	88	216	4		4		72	102	178	66	48	114	12	
	118th Arty Bn, 203.2								12		12				12					
	102nd Flt Arty GP												72		72					
	<b>Total</b>			4	4	432		432	20		20		216	204	440	132	96	228		
2nd Army Corps (Blue)	8th Mtn Inf Div					212		212	4	12	16		54	48	118	32	48	80	42 (illeg. no.)	
	7th Mtn Inf Div					212		212	4	12	16		54	48	118	32	48	80	42 (illeg. no.)	
	27th Arty Bde			12	12								24		24					
	2nd avy /army avn below/ Wing																		(12)	
	<b>Total</b>			12	12	424		424	8	24	32		132	96	260	64	96	160	96 (illeg. no.)	
2nd Army Corps (Violet)	2nd Mtn Inf Div			2	2	196	37	196	4		4		54	85	143	28	64	92	12	
	4th Mtn Inf Div			2	2	196	37	196	4		4		54	85	143	28	64	92	12	
	8th Mtn Inf Div			2	2	196	37	196	4		4		54	85	143	28	64	92	12	
	Flt Arty GP								12		12		72		84					
	<b>Total</b>			6	6	588		588	24		24		234	255	513	84	192	276	36	
Total at start of operation	Green 4th Mec Div					4	4	270	37	270	12	54	66	-	107	173		270	270	61
	2nd Parach Wing	36				36														
	<b>Total</b>	36		36	84	140	6322	6322	502	180	382		2066	1598	4046	1398	1330	2728		
5th Army Corps (Brown)	<b>TO ARRIVE:</b>																			
	17th Inf Div					4	4	99		6	6	12	76	62	150	130	47	177	12	
	19th Inf Div					4	4	99		6	6	12	76	62	150	130	47	177	12	
	20th Mtn Inf Div					4	4	244		6	6	12	76	46	134	80	29	109	12	
	810th Sgt Bn			4		4														
	810th Arty Regt								12		12		36		48					
	Air Army Cnd /sic/																		11 (48)	
	<b>Total</b>			4	12	10	442		30	18	48		284	170	482	340	123	463		
Total to arrive	3rd Inf Div (Blue)					159			4	12	16		54	54	124	54	18	72		
	24th Inf Div (Brown)					4	4	99	6	6	12		76	58	146	198	60	258		
	25th Inf Div (Brown)					4	4	99	6	6	12		76	58	146	198	60	258		
	<b>Total</b>			8	8	357			16	24	40		208	170	316 /sic/	450	136	588		
<b>Total to arrive</b>				4	20	24	799	799	46	42	88		472	340	812 /sic/	790	261	1051		
Total for operation	mtn inf divs-20 inf divs-3 armd divs (tk divs)-6	36		32	104	172	7021	7021	248	222	470		2636	1938	4944	2188	1591	3779		

\*Translator's note: Original document omitted the Lilac 5th Motorized Infantry Division by oversight but included its armament (equivalent to that of 1st and 4th Mtn Inf Divs) in the Total column.

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APPENDIX B  
COMBAT STRENGTH AND ARMAMENT OF THE COASTAL FRONT TROOPS  
(according to the decision)

Table No. 2

Formations	Divisions, Brigades, Separate Regiments	Launchers			Med tanks	Inf obs vehs	Artillery and mortars					Antitank means				Fire spt helos			
		R-300	R-68	Total			120-mm Mortars	122-mm Hows	130-mm Guns	152-mm Hows	Rkt Arty	Total	AT guns	ATOM	SPO-9		Total		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
4th Army	3rd Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90	-	18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	7th Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	8th Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	14th Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	2nd Tk Div			4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129		
	4th Army Maj Bde		12			12													
	4th Army Arty Bde, 4th Army Mnt Inchr Arty Rgt 4th Army Antitk Arty Rgt										36	54	54	144	36	27	-	63	
<b>Total</b>			12	20	32	1179	600	234	414	36	144	144	972	84	876	48	1008	40	
Reinforcement means	8th Arty Div of the RVOK									72	72	144	72	360					
<b>TOTAL</b>			12	20	32	1179	600	234	486	108	288	216	1332	84	876	48	1008	40	
7th Army	1st Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	4th Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	11th Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	8th Tk Div			4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129		
	9th Tk Div			4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129		
	7th Army Maj Bde		12			12													
	7th Army Arty Bde, 7th Army Mnt Inchr Arty Rgt 7th Army Antitk Arty Rgt										36	54	54	144	36	27		63	
<b>Total</b>			12	20	32	1288	600	198	378	36	144	144	900	72	828	36	923	40	
Reinforcement means	8th Arty Div of RVOK									72	72	144	72	360					
<b>TOTAL</b>			12	20	32	1288	600	198	450	108	288	216	1260	72	828	36	933	40	
9th Army	6th Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	18th Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	21st Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	33rd Mtn R Div			4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204		
	10th Tk Div			4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129		
	26th Tk Div			4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129	129	129		
	9th Army Maj Bde		12			12													
9th Army Arty Bde, 9th Army Mnt Inchr Arty Rgt 9th Army Antitk Arty Rgt										36	54	54	144	36	27		63		
<b>Total</b>			12	24	36	1502	720	252	486	36	162	162	990	84	1005	48	1137	40	
Reinforcement means	11th Arty Div of RVOK									72	72	144	72	360					

	TOTAL	12	24	36	1502	720	252	540	108	306	254	1140	84	1005	48	1137	40
TOTAL IN 1st Echelon		36	64	100	3969	1920	684	1476	324	882	666	2952	240	2706	152	2078	120
2nd Army Corps	16th Mtn R Div		4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204	
	24th Mtn R Div		4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204	
	2nd Cpa Mal Bde	6		6													
	2nd Cpa Art Rgt								18	36		54					
	2nd Cpa Sht Lncbr Arty Bde 2nd Cpa Antitk Arty Rgt										18	18		18	9		27
Total		6	8	14	428	240	108	180	18	72	54	432	42	369	24	435	
6th Army	18th Mtn R Div		4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204	
	17th Mtn R Div		4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204	
	28th Mtn R Div		4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204	
	18th Tk Div		4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129	
	8th Army Mal Bde	12		12													
	8th Army Arty Bde 8th Army Sht Lncbr Arty Rgt 8th Army Antitk Arty Rgt								36	54	54	144		36	27		63
Total		12	16	28	965	500 /etc/	180	324	36	126	126	720	72	696	36	804	40
Subordinate to front	13th Mtn R Div		4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204	
	20th Tk Div		4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129	
	30th Abn Div					112	18	30			6	54	31	42	135	208	
	2nd, 3rd Front Mal Bdes 4th, 5th Antitk Arty Bdes	36		36									144	72		216	
	Total		36	8	44	537	352	90	174		36	42	342	187	423	147	787
TOTAL IN 2nd Echelon		54	32	80	1930	1092	378	876	54	234	222	1965	301	1488	207	1998	80
TOTAL AT START OF OPERATION		90	98	186	5899	3012	1062	2154	378	1114	888	5498	541	4194	339	5074	200
10th Tank Army	To arrive by morning of D2																
	29th Mtn R Div		4	4	214	120	54	90		18	18	180	12	180	12	204	
	15th Tk Div		4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129	
	22nd Tk Div		4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129	
	24th Tk Div		4	4	323	120	18	54		18	18	108		129		129	
	10th Army Mal Bde	12		12													
	10th Army Arty Bde 10th Army Sht Lncbr Arty Rgt								36	54		90					
Total		12	16	28	1183	500 /etc/	108	252	36	126	126	648	12	567	12	591	
TOTAL IN FRONT	1st R divs -- 18 2d divs -- 10 3d divs -- 1 29	102	112	214	7082	3512 /etc/	1170	2406	414	1242	1014	6948	553	4761	351	6685	200