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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

31 October 1980

3834

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :  
Rear Services Support of Troops in the Course  
of an Offensive Operation When Committing the  
Front's Second Echelon to Battle.

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson involving a front deputy commander for the rear and his rear chief of staff in planning and organizing the transportation of supplies, treatment and evacuation of wounded and sick, movement forward of supply bases, and the ammunition, fuel, and foodstuffs required to support the commitment to battle of a second-echelon tank army in the development of the front's offensive across the northern part of West Germany.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 26f: Rear Services Support  
of Troops in the Course of an Offensive Operation When Committing  
the Front's Second Echelon to Battle.

SOURCE Documentary

### Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as front deputy commanders for the rear and rear chiefs of staff in organizing the logistic support of a front and its second-echelon tank army when the latter is committed to battle in the development of an offensive across the North German plain. The lesson covers the front's logistic order of battle, the amounts of ammunition, fuel, and rations to be transported and the specific routes, bases, and motor, rail, sea, and air transport to accomplish this; the evacuation and treatment of wounded, and the forward displacement of logistic units and installations. The lesson assumes that the front rear services will accomplish their mission despite the fact that NATO will have delivered over 400 nuclear warheads and also employed neuromuscular toxic agents, as a result of which 30 percent of the logistic units and facilities will be in areas of serious contamination. Over the period in question the front is to suffer approximately 1,430,000 wounded; the number of killed in action is not discussed.

End of Summary

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Lesson No. 26f

I. Lesson subject: Rear services support of troops in the course of an offensive operation when committing the front's second echelon to battle.

II. Estimated time for completing Lesson No. 26f

Lesson Number and Title	Time allocation		Total
	for group exercise	for individual preparation	
Lesson No. 26f -- Rear services support of troops in the course of an offensive operation during commitment of the <u>front's</u> second echelon to battle	4 hours (180 minutes)	4 hours	8 hours
Including:			
-- a check of the students' lesson preparation	10 minutes	-	-
-- sizing-up of the task and conclusions from an estimate of the operational-rear services situation	80 minutes	-	-
-- proposals of the deputy <u>front</u> commander for the rear to the <u>front</u> commander regarding the organization of rear services support of <u>front</u> troops when the <u>front's</u> second echelon (10th Tank Army) is committed to battle	45 minutes	-	-

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Lesson Number and Title	Time allocation		Total
	for group exercise	for individual preparation	
-- performance of calculations for the 10th Tank Army's materiel support when it is committed to battle	40 minutes	-	-
-- summation of the lesson	5 minutes	-	-

III. Training objectives:

-- to give the students practice in estimating the operational-rear services situation and in preparing the deputy front commander's proposals to the front commander when committing the second echelon to battle;

-- to teach the students to make calculations of the materiel requirement for the replenishment of supplies in the course of an operation, particularly in a second-echelon army when it is being committed to battle.

To study in the course of the lesson the procedure for determining and substantiating the scope of front rear services tasks and their accomplishment for the support of the commitment of a second-echelon army to battle.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson -- group exercise

V. Methodological recommendations for the students' lesson preparation

At the beginning of the students' individual preparation the instructor, if desired by the training group, conducts a short briefing (no more than 20 minutes), for which the following procedure is recommended:

1. He will define precisely the initial data for working out the training topics of Lesson No. 26f and the documents in which these data are found; and direct attention to the fact that the students obtained and had these data in their hands during individual preparation and the group

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exercise in class.

2. He will recommend the best procedure of preparing for the lesson (to study the textual part of the assignment; to note the necessary data in a workbook; to work up a map of the rear services situation; to size up the task; to make an estimate of the operational-rear services situation; to prepare the proposals of the deputy front commander for the rear on the organization of rear services support of front troops when a second-echelon army is being committed to battle; to plot it on the map; and to make calculations of the materiel requirements for replenishing expended supplies).

3. If necessary, during the briefing the instructor will give the students assistance in working out the training materials for the lesson. For this it is advisable to hand the students a list of the main points from which the sizing-up of the task and an estimate of the operational-rear services situation is to be done, and also the sequence for preparing and the content of the proposals on organizing rear services support, and the sequence for performing the calculations for materiel support of a front's second-echelon army.

VI. The procedure for conducting the lesson:

At the beginning of the lesson the instructor verifies that the students have completed the individual work assignment (time -- 10 minutes).

The first training topic -- sizing-up of the task and conclusions from an estimate of the operational-rear services situation (time -- 80 minutes).

The instructor announces the operational time, and pinpoints the location of the front rear control post.

The instructor is in the role of the front commander and the students are in the role of deputy front commander for the rear.

Sizing up the task -- 30 minutes.

For working out this topic the instructor hears the brief reports of two students. It is desirable to have the students in this case report:

-- the situation of the front troops at the given time;

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- the tasks set by the front commander in his decision;
- where the main efforts of front troops must be concentrated;
- the line and time of the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon, and the projected regroupings of troops;

Here it is important that the students have made sound conclusions on each of these situations from the viewpoint of their effect on the organization of rear services support of front troops, and have determined the specific tasks facing the rear.

A possible variant of the report

See the material in Lesson No. 26a for the situation of the troops at 1930 hours 12 September and their tasks according to the decision of the front commander.

The following main tasks face the rear services of the front:

- to conduct measures for restoring the combat effectiveness of troops who were subjected to nuclear strikes and to eliminate the aftereffects of these strikes on rear services installations;
- to support the troops with available and incoming forces and means during development of the offensive, concentrating main efforts on the BRUSSELS axis;
- to support the movement forward to the line of commitment, the commitment to battle, and the combat actions of the 10th Tank Army (the front's second echelon).

In order for the rear services of the front to accomplish these tasks it is necessary:

- to restore in the front's rear zone the transportation lines leading out to the axis of the main attack;
- to organize rear services support of the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle, and for that purpose by the morning of 13 September to take wounded from the separate medical detachments and medical battalions into the front hospital bases; to rid the army of unserviceable equipment; to replenish materiel reserves up to established norms; to deliver to the army at the line of commitment by front motor transport the fuel and ammunition which it will expend in moving forward and being committed to battle;
- to expedite the movement of front bases and materiel reserves closer to the troops.

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Conclusions from an estimate of the operational-rear services situation -- time: 50 minutes

It is best to make the estimate of the operational-rear services situation systematically according to the following elements:

- the effects of enemy actions on the troops and rear services installations;
- the composition, disposition, and status of front and army (army corps) rear services large units, units, and facilities, and their capabilities for supporting the troops;
- the status of the transportation lines and the conditions for transporting materiel; the capabilities of all types of transport;
- the state of the front's materiel reserves, taking account of their availability and arrival, where these supplies are located, and the possibilities of moving them closer to the troops;
- the presence of wounded and sick among the troops and at the front's hospital bases, and the capabilities for their evacuation;
- the presence of damaged combat equipment and the capabilities for its repair (the students report as the appropriate chiefs of services);
- the status of the rear services control system.

A possible variant of the report of the conclusions from an estimate of the operational-rear services situation

1. West delivered a massive nuclear strike against the front's troops, airfields and rear services installations from 1630 to 1730 hours on 10 September, and until 2400 hours /West/ continued to deliver single and grouped strikes with missile troops and aircraft, employing nuclear, chemical, and conventional munitions.

By 2400 hours 10 September, the enemy had used 400 nuclear warheads, including nearly 40 with ground bursts, against the troops and rear services facilities of the Coastal Front. The enemy delivered air strikes using neuromuscular toxic agents against 35 to 40 front installations.

Up to 1930 hours 12 September, the enemy continued to deliver single and grouped strikes employing nuclear weapons. For the aftereffects of these strikes, see the assignment for Lesson No. 26f (paragraph 2).

Considerable damage has been dealt to the rear services of the front: the previously established support system has been broken up into into

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several isolated areas, and the through traffic of railroad trains and motor transport has been interrupted. Among the troops there are nearly 42,000 wounded and sick, more than 2,400 damaged tanks and more than 20,000 /damaged/ motor vehicles. Losses in materiel total more than 134,000 tons.

Up to 30 percent of the rear services units and facilities have found themselves in areas of intense, dangerous, and extraordinarily hazardous contamination.

On the whole, after carrying out the immediate measures for eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear strikes, the rear services of the front are able to support the offensive actions of the troops.

Steps must be taken to restore the combat effectiveness of the troops and rear services by carrying out treatment-evacuation measures; withdrawing the mobile rear services units and facilities from the contaminated areas; moving front bases and materiel reserves closer to the troops; replenishing the troop reserves to norms; evacuating the damaged equipment from the troops; and also reinforcing the armies with front rear services units and facilities.

2. Composition, disposition, and status of the main rear services units and facilities of the front:

At 1930 hours 12 September the front has the following (see the assignment for Lesson No. 26f, Appendix 2):

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Designation	Prescribed Complement	Deployed and Functioning	Deploying	Moving up to the deployment area. Moving by railroad.
<u>Front</u> forward base	2	1	-	1 (150 km)
<u>Front</u> rear base	2	1	1	-
Motor transport brigade	2	2	-	-
Road traffic control brigade	3	2	-	1 (80 km)
Bridge brigade	1	1	-	-
Railroad brigade	3	2	-	1 (150 km)
Pipeline brigade	2	2	-	-
Mobile hospital base	6	3	-	3 (80-300 km)
Rear hospital base	3	1	1	1 (600 km)
Separate medical detachment	5	2	-	3 (up to 40-50 km)

Note: The distance from the troops is shown in parentheses.

Thus, the front at 1930 hours 12 September has up to 90 percent of the prescribed complement of rear services units and facilities. Up to half of these are located west of the ELBE River; three mobile hospital bases, the 41st TGB /Rear Hospital Base/ and 50 percent of the 42nd Rear Hospital Base, and the main complement of the 4th Front Rear Base are located east of the ELBE River, and may be moved forward only after the reconstruction of the crossings over the ELBE River.

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As a result of losses, the capabilities of the deployed units and facilities have been reduced by 20 to 30 percent.

The armies and divisions have essentially all the prescribed rear services units, and they are manned at full troop strength level.

The distance of the army mobile bases from the troops is 100 to 120 km.

/As for/ the rear services units and facilities caught in contaminated areas:

a) the mobile ones will be withdrawn to safe areas in order to carry out measures for the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes (the students determine the areas themselves).

b) the fixed ones will wait for the radiation to drop to safe levels (10 to 15 hours).

The reconstitution of the 9th Army Mobile Base will be carried out by using front forces and means, and the reconstitution of the rest by army forces and means.

3. The status of the transportation routes and materiel shipping conditions. The capabilities of all types of transport.

As a result of the destruction in the front area of major road junctions and the bridge crossings over the ODER and ELBE rivers, through traffic on front roads will be interrupted for 2 to 4 days.

Traffic between the front and the rear services of the Center is to be handled via the temporary transshipment areas at SZCZECIN, KOSTRZYN, and also at the ports of WISMAR and GREIFSWALD.

The transfer of cargo across the ELBE River may be carried out in the area of STENDAL, where a front temporary transshipment area will be established. The railroad transport will approach the temporary transshipment area in the surviving sectors, bypassing the destroyed junctions and contaminated areas.

Such a route from the 1st Branch of the 4th Front Rear Base might be: WRIEZEN, BELZIG, GOMMERN, JERICHOW, KLITSCH (20 km east of STENDAL).

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The movement of transports from the 3rd Front Rear Base is to be done along the TORGELOW, STRALSUND, ROSTOK, WISMAR rail line;

With the reconstruction of bridges across the ELBE River at RATHENOW and STENDAL, /the route is/ PRENZLAU, TEMPLIN, NAUEN, RATHENOW, STENDAL, and LEHRTE.

As a result of the destruction of the railroad junction at PASEWALK, the supplying of cargo to the Combined Baltic Fleet by rail through the RP /regulating point or distributing point/ has been stopped.

Road troop forces are maintaining one FVAD /front military motor road/ in the area of each army. Many parts of the roads and the installations on them were destroyed or fell within contaminated areas. Motor transport movement may be accomplished by bypassing these areas.

Two field main pipelines were laid up to HANNOVER by the forces of the 3rd and 4th pipeline brigades; individual sections of the pipeline which were destroyed require reconstruction, for which up to 20 hours may be needed.

Thus, the most important task of the rear services is the reestablishment of through traffic on the front transportation routes, particularly across the ELBE River.

The existence at the front of three railroad brigades, three road traffic control brigades, one bridge brigade, one opmzhdb /?separate floating railroad bridge battalion?/ with the NZhM-56 /heavy floating railway bridge/, a omdzhp /sic, should be omzhdp for separate railroad bridge regiment/, and other units makes the following possible:

- carrying out the reconstruction of railroads on two previously selected axes;
- reestablishing with forces of special Ministry of Railways contingents the PASEWALK railway junction for the passage of no less than 12 paired /i.e., 12 in, 12 out/ trains per day;
- finishing the reconstruction of bridges across the ELBE River by 1500 hours 13 September;
- maintaining the military motor road network that has been developed and, in addition, preparing one front military motor road for the 10th Tank Army;
- reestablishing and extending the two field main pipelines at a rate of up to 60 km per day.

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Front transport capabilities for shipping materiel at 1930  
hours 12 September (in thousands of tons per day)

Type of Transport	Capabilities
Railroad transport (west of the ELBE River)	6.0
Motor transport (motor transport regiments and brigades)	14.6
Sea	10.0
Air	1.5
TOTAL	42.1

The cargo capacity of the armies' motor transport units has been reduced by 20 to 30 percent.

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4. State of supply of the main types of materiel in the front

	Ammunition (units of fire)					Fuel (fuelings)			Provisions (daily rations)	Total (thousands of tons)
	Small arms	Artillery, mortar, rocket	Tank	Anti- air- craft	Total (thou- sands of tons)	Gasoline	Diesel	Total (thou- sands of tons)		
1. Available in the front at 1930 hours 12 September	1.7	1.9	3.2	4.0	64.3	3.2	4.4	72.7	23.0	148.9
of these:										
-- among the troops	0.9	0.9	1.8	1.9	34.4	1.6	2.4	37.8	14.0	78.9
-- at the front forward base (west of the ELBE River)	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	4.27	0.2	0.2	4.0	2.0	9.2
-- at the 4th Front Rear Base and in materiel dispersal areas (west of the ELBE River)	0.3	0.39	0.4	0.5	10.6	0.38	0.46	8.2	3.0	20.2
-- at the front rear base, fixed depots, and in materiel dispersal areas (east of the ELBE River)	0.4	0.41	0.8	1.4	16.0	1.02	1.34	22.7	4.0	40.6
2. Supplied by the center on 13-14 September	0.5	0.7	0.5	2.0	18.9	0.5	1.0	13.7	3.0	34.0
Must issue to troops up to norms by morning of 13 September	0.25	0.4	0.75	0.6	13.5	0.56	0.7	12.2	1.0	26.2
Anticipated expenditure on 13-14 September	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.9	14.9	0.4	0.1	12.46	2.0	28.3
Front will have on morning of 15 September	1.9	2.0	3.0	5.1	69.2	3.3	4.4	73.9	24.0	154.6

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From an analysis of the table's data it follows that:

The front has sufficient materiel reserves for the continuation of the operation; however, a significant portion of them -- 40,600 tons or more than 27 percent -- are located east of the ELBE River at the front rear base and at fixed depots 200 to 300 km and more from the troops. Shipping across the ELBE River has been disrupted.

At 1930 hours 12 September, the armies' materiel reserves are below the norms. The available reserves may be sufficient for 3 to 4 days of combat actions. According to the front commander's decision, the armies' reserves must be brought up to norms by the morning of 13 September. For this it is necessary to issue 26,200 tons of materiel.

Front reserves west of the ELBE River consist of 29,400 tons. They can be supplied to the 2nd Army Corps, the 7th and 9th armies, and the 10th Tank Army by front motor transport (10 battalions) by calling upon the motor transport of these formations. First, by the morning of 13 September, the reserves must be brought up to norms for the 7th and 9th armies and the 10th Tank Army, which are operating in the first echelon on the main axis.

The replenishment of the 4th Army's reserves must be organized with the maximum involvement of sea transport.

It is advisable to use the 2nd Front Forward Base west of the ELBE River to support the armies which are operating on the main axis.

5. The presence of wounded and sick among the troops and at the front hospital bases, and the evacuation capabilities

At 1930 hours 12 September the front has a total of 91,900 wounded; of these, 41,900 men are in the line units; and out of these, 39,800 men are to be evacuated to hospitals. Up to 75 percent of the separate medical detachments and medical-sanitary battalions have been deployed to give medical aid to the wounded.

The expected number of wounded for 13-14 September is 52,000 men. Of these, up to 49,400 will require evacuation to front hospitals.

For 13-14 September the total men it will be necessary to evacuate to front hospitals is more than 89,200 (39,800 + 49,400).

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Front hospital bases and fixed hospitals have 78,000 hospital beds available, of which 50,000 are occupied by the wounded.

Thus, the entire available hospital bed system will be filled with wounded by the end of the fulfillment of the immediate task. During that time, a total of only 10,800 wounded can be evacuated to the interior (six military ambulance trains and two trips of 20 AN-12 aircraft per day).

Of the 34,700 available non-deployed hospital beds west of the ELBE River, 17,700 are located at a distance of up to 120 km from the troops.

For the evacuation of the wounded from the separate medical detachments and medical-sanitary battalions to the front hospitals there are:

-- four separate medical motor transport battalions, which on one trip can evacuate 12,000 wounded (another two separate medical motor transport battalions are to transport the 39th and 40th mobile hospital bases);

-- two otsap /separate medical transport air regiments/ to evacuate 300 to 360 men per trip.\*

In addition, up to 50 percent of the capabilities of the armies' medical motor transport companies may be used to evacuate the wounded (3,000 wounded per trip).

A total of 15,600 wounded may be evacuated per trip, and by the morning of 15 September up to 62,400 wounded (2 trips X 2 days X 15,600 men).

With respect to the time required for the mobile hospital bases to relocate on 13-14 September, medical motor transport can make a maximum of two trips per day. Therefore, for the evacuation of wounded it will be necessary to call upon general-purpose motor transport for 26,800 of the wounded (89,200 minus 62,400).

It is necessary:

-- to move all the non-deployed mobile hospital bases forward to the zone of actions of the 7th and 9th armies and the 10th Tank Army, and to deploy them by the morning of 12 September;

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\* Translator's note: This passage probably should read: "each regiment can evacuate 300 to 360 men," to substantiate the total shown two paragraphs below.

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- to increase the capacity of the TGB /rear hospital base/ hospitals by a factor of 1.5 to 2, so that the wounded and sick can be released from the mobile hospital bases;
- to ask the center for assistance in the immediate evacuation of the wounded to the interior, in view of the overloading of front hospitals;
- to call upon the armies' medical motor transport and general-purpose motor transport for the evacuation of the wounded from separate medical detachments and medical-sanitary battalions;
- to reinforce the 10th Tank Army with one separate medical detachment taken from the front reserve.

6. The presence of damaged combat equipment and the capabilities for its repair

At 1930 hours 12 September, the front has a large quantity of damaged equipment requiring running, medium, and major repairs (see the assignment for Lesson No. 26f, paragraph 4).

Up to 75 percent of the front complement of repair and recovery units have arrived in the front. Their capabilities for medium repairs consist of 120 tanks and 216 motor vehicles per day.

It is advisable that all unserviceable equipment requiring medium and major repair be sent to the front's damaged vehicle collection point for its repair.

7. The status of the rear control system

The rear control posts of the 7th and 9th armies are among the rear control posts that were destroyed. Also destroyed were the control posts of the 4th Front Rear Base, the 1st Front Forward Base, one FRS /front regulating station/, and one FRP /front regulating point/.

Communications have been disrupted on all of the main rail and motor transportation lines. The 7th and 9th armies have to be given assistance in manning their rear control posts, and communications have to be restored on the front transportation lines leading into the zone of actions of the 7th and 9th armies and 10th Tank Army.

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General conclusions

The status of the front rear services and the availability of materiel reserves permits the accomplishment of all the main tasks. However, the surviving system of rear services support of the front requires fundamental changes immediately in all lines of rear services work.

The main efforts of the rear services should be concentrated on restoring the combat effectiveness of the troops and the efficiency of the rear services, and on supporting the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle and the troops' offensive actions on the BRUSSELS axis.

For the medical support of subsequent front troop offensive actions, it is necessary to expand the rear hospital bases of the front 1.5 to 2 times and to ask the Center to expedite the evacuation of the wounded and sick to the interior.

The second training topic -- the proposals of the deputy front commander for the rear to the front commander concerning organizing rear services support of front troops when committing a second-echelon army to battle. Time -- 45 minutes.

The instructor hears the "proposals."

The students are to be in the role of deputy front commander for the rear. It is advisable at the beginning to hear the main points of the "proposals" of two to three students individually, and then to formulate the proposals to the full extent (the instructor renders assistance when necessary).

The sequence of the "proposals" presentation may be as follows:

- the principal idea of organizing rear services support of troops (which forces and means to use, where to concentrate the main efforts of the rear services, when and in which areas to deploy front bases to support which formations and large units);
- the size and time of replenishing (establishing) the materiel reserves (in the armies and the front forward bases);
- the procedure for reconstructing and maintaining front transportation routes;
- the organization of materiel shipments by all types of transport;
- the procedure for evacuating the wounded and sick from the troops to front hospital bases;

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- the measures for protecting the rear from weapons of mass destruction, its defense and security in the situation which has developed;
- the procedure for reestablishing front rear services control and communications.

When presenting all aspects of the proposals, particular attention will be paid to rear services measures for reestablishing troop combat effectiveness and the efficiency of the rear services.

The chiefs of the branch arms and services are to establish the procedure for restoring damaged equipment in accordance with the commander's decision.

A possible variant of the 'proposals' of the deputy front commander for the rear concerning the organization of rear services support of troops when the second echelon is committed to battle.

1. Rear services support of front troops will be accomplished through the use of the surviving materiel-technical resources of the tactical, army, and front rear services and through the intensive performance of measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear strikes against the troops and rear services installations.

First, medical aid will be given to the wounded and sick at the centers of mass destruction, and the transportation links leading to the BRUSSELS axis will be restored.

The main efforts of the front rear services will be concentrated on supporting the combat actions of the 7th and 9th armies and the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle for the development of the offensive.

The front forward bases will be moved closer to the troops and by the morning of 13 September will be deployed as follows:

- the 1st Front Forward Base in the WALSRODE area;
- the 2nd Front Forward Base in an area 10 km south of HANNOVER.

The 3rd Front Rear Base and a branch of it will remain in the former areas, will complete the performance of measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear strikes, and will renew their work as of 0600 hours 13 September.

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The 4th Front Rear Base will continue deploying west of the ELBE River.

Rear services support of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps is to be accomplished from the 2nd Branch of the 3rd Front Rear Base (WISMAR) and the nearest fixed depots; on the morning of 13 September the unloading port of NEUSTADT will be opened.

The disposition of the front rear services and the procedure for supporting the troops when they are carrying out subsequent front tasks will be according to plan.

2. By the morning of 13 September materiel reserves will be replenished to norms in the armies by drawing on the reserves available at the 2nd Front Forward Base, the 4th Front Rear Base, the 2nd Branch of the 3rd Front Rear Base (WISMAR), and on front motor transport.

Rear services support during the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle and its conduct of combat actions will be accomplished through the forces and means of the forward echelon of the front rear services, composed of the 1st Front Forward Base, the 38th Mobile Hospital Base, and the 17th Road Traffic Control Brigade which by the morning of 13 September will be in the WALSRODE, REKEM /sic -- RETHEM/, SCHWARMSTEDT area.

Support of the 10th Tank Army in the area of concentration will be accomplished using the supplies available at materiel dispersal sites and at the 4th Front Rear Base (west of the ELBE River).

Subsequently, the reserves at the front forward base will be replenished from the 4th Front Rear Base and a branch of it (2nd Branch) which will open 16 September in the BRAMSCHE (excluding) OSNABRUCK, BUNDE area.

3. On the reestablishment of transportation routes:

-- until through traffic is opened on the railroad lines, shipping and evacuation by rail transport will be carried out by bypassing the demolished junctions on the rail routes: NEUBRANDENBURG, GUSTROW, WISMAR, WRIEZEN, BEL'GITS /sic -- BELZIG/, LINDAU (30 km east of MAGDEBURG), KLITSCH (20 km east of STENDAL);

-- by 1100 hours 13 September a temporary transshipment area with a throughput capacity of eight supply trains per day will be deployed for the transshipment of cargo at STENDAL;

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-- the front road troops are to restore motor transport traffic on all front military motor roads by using bypasses of destroyed road junctions and zones of contamination.

In addition, one front military motor road will be prepared and extended for the 10th Tank Army.

By 15 September forces of the 20th Bridge Building Brigade will construct (lay) three motor road bridges across the ELBE River in the area of HAVELBERG, (excluding) MAGDEBURG;

-- by the morning of 13 September forces of a pipeline brigade will restore a pipeline and provide for its continuing deployment behind the advancing troops. As of 1000 hours 13 September the issuing of fuel will be resumed from the branch of the depot 10 km north of HANNOVER.

4. Until through traffic is restored the delivery of materiel will be accomplished via the network of front transportation lines: the 7th, 9th, and 6th armies and the 10th Tank Army from the 1st Front Forward Base, 2nd Front Forward Base, and 4th Front Rear Base via front motor transport which is west of the ELBE River (10 battalions) by calling upon army and troop motor transport.

At the 10th Tank Army's line of commitment to battle, front motor transport will supply 0.3 unit of fire of antiaircraft and artillery ammunition, and about 0.5 fueling of gasoline and diesel fuel;

-- the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps /will be supplied/ from the 2nd Branch of the 3rd Front Rear Base (WISMAR), and the closest fixed depots by motor transport of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps;

-- sea transport is to be employed to the maximum for supplying materiel to the 4th Army;

-- the front forward bases will be supplied by front motor transport from the 4th Front Rear Base and its branch.

Subsequent materiel shipments will be carried out according to the previously devised plan.

5. On medical support:

-- the evacuation of the wounded and sick from the centers of mass destruction to the separate medical detachments and medical-sanitary battalions will be conducted over the course of 12 to 13 September. For this, all medical transport of the armies and the front will be employed

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and, in addition, general-purpose transport will be enlisted.

The evacuation of the wounded is to be carried out:

- from the 7th, 9th, and 6th armies to the 4th Rear Hospital Base (WITTINGEN, GIFHORN, OEBISFELDE area);
- from the 10th Tank Army in the area of concentration to the 42nd Rear Hospital Base; when being committed to battle and conducting combat actions, to the 38th Mobile Hospital Base;
- forward hospital bases which are in the front reserve (besides the 38th Mobile Hospital Base) will move forward and on 13 September will deploy for support of the troops which are operating on the BRUSSELS axis; the 39th Mobile Hospital Base /will deploy/ in an area 10 km northwest of HANNOVER, the 37th Mobile Hospital Base in an area 20 km west of BRAUNSCHWEIG. The 40th Mobile Hospital Base will be in reserve ready to deploy on the main combat action axis;
- by 15 September the capacity of 42nd Rear Hospital Base hospitals will be increased 1.5 to 2 times in order to free the mobile hospital bases deploying nearby;
- the 43rd Rear Hospital Base arriving in the front will be used for the reception of the wounded from the troops while the subsequent front task is being carried out.

6. Measures for the protection, defense, and security of the rear:

- the elimination of the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear strikes on front installations will be conducted by the available forces and means and it will be completed by 1500 hours 13 September;
- to restore the 9th Army Mobile Base, the 3rd Battalion of the 10th Motor Transport Brigade will be placed under the command of the chief of the rear of the 9th Army effective 2400 hours 13 September;
- the technical coverage of railway and vehicle bridges across the ELBE River will be strengthened;
- the maneuver of the 2nd Regiment of the 49th Rear Security Division to the areas of the 7th and 9th armies and the 10th Tank Army will be planned to strengthen the defense of military installations and to organize an obstacle service.

7. The front rear control post is to be 10 km southwest of GARDELEGEN; its relocation is to be on the axis of relocation of the front command post.

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To reestablish the rear control posts of the 7th and 9th armies, part of the communications means will be allocated from the rear communications regiment, and also personnel from the 4th Front Rear Base, the 42nd Rear Hospital Base, and the 15th Road Traffic Control Brigade.

A request for increasing the evacuation of the wounded from the front to the interior will be submitted to the rear services of the Center.

The third training topic is the performance of calculations for the materiel support of the front's second echelon (10th Tank Army) during commitment to battle. Time -- 40 minutes.

The instructor at the board is to hear the students in the role of front rear chief of staff on the calculations they have done for the materiel support of the second-echelon army.

A determination will be made of the army's requirements in materiel:

- to replenish reserves up to established norms in the area of concentration;
- to replenish the reserves expended in the course of the movement forward to the line of commitment;
- to be expended up until the immediate task of the front is accomplished.

In the concluding remarks (time -- 5 minutes) the instructor notes the quality of the students' lesson preparation, the extent to which the training topics have been worked out, and the achievement of the training objectives; and he reminds the students that all the certificate-level tasks and subjects are to have been adequately reflected in the aspects of rear services support.

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Calculation for the materiel support of the front second echelon  
(10th Tank Army) when committing it to battle

Availability and shipping of materiel. Procedure of support	Ammunition (units of fire)					Fuel (fuelings)			Provisions (daily rations)	TOTAL thousands of tons
	Small arms	Artillery, mortar, rocket	Tank	Anti-air-craft	Total thousands of tons	Gasoline	Diesel	Total thousands of tons		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Weight of the supply accounting units of the 10th Tank Army (thousands of tons)	0.6	2.2	1.9	0.3	5.0	1.9	1.3	3.2	0.07	-
Authorized to be available in the army	1.15	1.3	2.65	2.5	-	2.16	3.1	-	15.0	-
Available to the 10th Tank Army at 1930 hours on 12 September	0.8	0.9	2.2	2.0	-	1.6	2.6	-	11.0	-
Required to supply: -- for replenishing supplies up to norms	0.35	0.4	0.45	0.5	2.1	0.56	0.5	1.7	4.0	4.1
-- for establishing increased reserves for the movement forward and commitment to battle	-	0.3	-	-	0.7	-	0.4	0.5	-	1.2
-- for replacing the expenditure in the movement forward to the line of commitment	-	-	-	0.3	0.09	0.5	0.5	1.6	-	1.7
Total required to supply the 10th Tank Army for its commitment to battle	0.35	0.7	0.45	0.5	2.8	1.06	1.4	3.8	4.0	7.0
Expenditure on 13-14 September	0.4	1.1	1.0	1.7	5.1	0.5	0.8	2.0	2.0	7.2
Total required to supply	0.75	1.8	1.45	2.2	7.9	1.56	2.2	5.8	6.0	14.2



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Availability and shipping of materiel. Procedure of support	Ammunition (units of fire)					Fuel (fuelings)			Provisions (daily rations)	TOTAL thousands of tons
	Small arms	Artillery, mortar, rocket	Tank	Anti- air- craft	Total thou- sands of tons	Gasoline	Diesel	Total thou- sands of tons		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
<u>Procedure of supply:</u> -- Moved up by army transport from the front rear bases and from the dis- persal sites before begin- ning the move- ment forward for replenish- ing supplies	0.35	0.4	0.45	0.5	2.1	0.56	0.9	2.2	4.0	4.6
-- Moved up by front trans- port	-	0.3	-	0.3	0.7	0.5	0.5	1.6	-	2.3
-- delivered by motor transport and moved for- ward to the 1st Front Forward Base (13-14 Sep- tember)	0.4	1.1	1.0	1.7	5.1	0.5	0.8	2.0	2.0	7.3

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