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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

6 March 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Developing an
Offensive Operation with the Commitment to Battle of
the Front's Second Echelon

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson outlining the points covered by a front chief of staff and front commander in estimating a situation, in submitting proposals for the commitment to battle of the second echelon to encircle and destroy a major grouping of NATO ground forces, and in allocating conventional fire and air support for these combat actions in northern Germany. Though nuclear weapons are not employed, they are to be in readiness for use.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 22a : Developing an Offensive Operation
With the Commitment to Battle of the Front's Second Echelon

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as a front chief of staff and front commander in estimating a situation, drawing up balances of forces, making proposals for repelling a NATO counterthrust and for committing to battle the second echelon in order to encircle and destroy a major grouping of NATO ground forces in the northern area of Germany, and in allocating conventional missile, artillery, aircraft, and helicopter support for the battle. Also discussed are the format of the front commander's concept of the decision and his assignment of tasks to subordinate major commanders. Though nuclear weapons are not employed, they are to be ready for use.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

- Brown - East Germany
- Blue - Great Britain
- Green - United States
- Lilac - Belgium
- Violet - The Netherlands

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LESSON No. 22a

I. Subject: Developing an offensive operation with the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon.

II. Estimated time:

Lesson Designation	Allotted time (in hours)		Total
	For the lesson in class	For individual preparation	
22a	4	6	10

III. Training objectives:

-- to teach students the development of an offensive operation with the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon, as well as to teach the encirclement and destruction of major enemy groupings;

-- to train students in estimating the situation that is developing during the operation, in making a decision, and in assigning tasks to troops.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson: group exercise with elements of a war game.

V. Methodological recommendations regarding the students' lesson preparation.

During individual preparation /the instructor/ will recommend that the students: assess the enemy and their own troops; calculate the balance of forces and means by axes; make a decision in the role of the front commander and plot it on a map; and write down the main conclusions and the decision in a workbook. At the end of individual preparation it is advisable to designate students for the positions of front chief of staff and commander, and also to check their preparation for the lesson.

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VI. Procedure for conducting the lesson (180 minutes)

1. Estimate of the situation in the front zone. (90 minutes)

Operational time: 2000 hours 9 September

The front commander has arrived at the alternate command post (the forest 10 km west of GARDELEGEN), which is headed by the front's deputy chief of staff, and has ordered the responsible officers to prepare a report of the conclusions from an estimate of the situation, and of the proposals for the further conduct of the operation.

As concerns the present training topic, it is advisable to hear the reports of four or five students, that of one of them in its full scope.

Students in the role of chief of staff will report:

-- the overall results of the actions of front troops during the first two days of the operation;

-- the strength, operational disposition, and status of the enemy groupings by axes, the nature of their actions, and their possible intentions;

-- the operational situation and status of front troop groupings by axes and their capabilities for developing the operation;

-- the proposals regarding the decision for further front troop actions.

REPORT
OF THE FRONT CHIEF OF STAFF

a) Front troops, as a result of the two-day engagements with the employment of conventional means of destruction, have inflicted considerable losses on the large units of four enemy army corps. The forces of the attack groupings have broken through the prepared defense of the troops of the Brown 6th Army Corps on the HAMBURG axis and of the Brown 1st Army Corps on the HANNOVER axis. They have stopped the offensive of the 6th Army Corps' 13th and 6th motorized infantry divisions in the HAGENOW area, of the Brown 4th Army Corps on the STENDAL axis, and of the Blue 1st Army Corps on the MAGDEBURG axis.

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Having penetrated enemy territory to a depth of 40 to 50 km on the HAMBURG axis, and 80 km on the HANNOVER axis, and having widened the breakthrough up to 40 and 75 km respectively, the front troops have established the conditions for further developing the offensive on the JUTLAND, KLOPPENBURG, and OSNABRUCK axes, as well as the threat of emerging in the rear and encircling the invading enemy groupings with our forces in cooperation with the troops of the Western Front.

b) The enemy, with attack groupings of the Brown 6th and 4th army corps (five divisions) and the Blue 1st Army Corps (three divisions) with air support, strove for two days to develop the offensive in the HAGENOW area and on the STENDAL and MAGDEBURG axes, to split the front's troops, and to emerge in the rear of their main grouping advancing on the HANNOVER axis. Building up his efforts by committing the reserves to battle, the enemy has succeeded in advancing 30 km in the HAGENOW area, 35 km on the STENDAL axis, and as much as 25 to 30 km on the MAGDEBURG axis, and in containing considerable forces of the front.

However, not achieving significant operational success by the invasion of his groupings, and lacking the forces to develop the offensive immediately, the enemy has been forced to take steps to protect his attacking troops from defeat. He will endeavor to prevent their encirclement, to move them out from under the flank attacks of our troops, or to tenaciously hold captured areas in order to use them as departure springboards for developing the offensive upon the approach of deep operational reserves or when going over to actions employing nuclear weapons.

On the HAMBURG and HANNOVER axes the enemy, with forces of the Brown 6th and 1st army corps, is attempting to delay the further advance of the front attack groupings through tenacious resistance at advantageous lines and counterattacks with air support in order to gain time for completing the activation and movement forward of the deep operational reserves. Resistance is being put up on the HAMBURG axis by two divisions of the 6th Army Corps (18th and 21st motorized rifle divisions), and in HAMBURG itself by up to a HEIMATSCHUTZ* infantry brigade and a garrison of up to 5,000 men; and on the HANNOVER axis by four divisions of the Brown 1st Army Corps (1st and 11th motorized infantry divisions, 3rd and 7th tank divisions) and the Blue 4th Armored Division, with the 11th Motorized Infantry Division having delivered a counterattack at 1600 hours in the direction of FALLINGBOSTEL, CELLE.

* comment: Heimatschutz are West German home defense troops.

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Enemy reserves in the areas: up to a Green mechanized division in the BREMERVORDE, SELSINGEN, WEDEL area; the Lilac 1st Army Corps in the ZEVEN, (excluding) VERDEN, BORGER area; the Lilac 2nd Army Corps in the (excluding) OSNABRUCK, OELDE, MUNSTER area.

The activation of up to two Brown infantry divisions continues in the areas of WESTERSTEDDE and southeast of BIELEFELD.

Means of nuclear attack have been set up in the following areas:

-- Pershing guided missiles, up to a squadron each in /these areas/: 10 km northwest of LEHNINGEN, southeast of NORDHORN, and northwest of BILLERBECK;

-- the 650th Lance Missile Battalion is 5 km north of ITZEHOE; the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion is 10 km east of LUNEBERG; the 150th Lance Missile Battalion is 15 km east of SULINGEN; the 24th Lance Missile Regiment is 5 km north of BOCKENEM; the 50th Lance Missile Regiment is 10 km southeast of SALZGITTER;

-- nine Honest John missile battalions and nine batteries of 203.2-mm howitzers in the first-echelon divisions.

Eight squadrons (wings) of fighters and fighter-bombers as well as six regiments of fire support helicopters have been detected.

There is confirmation of as many as five Nike-Hercules battalions and up to nine Hawk battalions. Installations on the axis of the front's main thrust are covered most densely.

As of the morning of 10 September one should expect a counterthrust by Lilac forces: the 1st Army Corps from the line MUNSTER (16 km east of SOLTAU), HODENHAGEN (10 km south of WALSRODE) in the direction of FALLINGBOSTEL, GIFHORN; and the 2nd Army Corps from the line WULFEL (7 km southeast of HANNOVER), LEBENSTEDT in the direction of HILDESHEIM, GIFHORN.

c) The operational situation and status of the front troop groupings by axes is described as follows:

In the KIEL and FEHMARN ISLAND area the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and two naval infantry regiments, which are advancing against six enemy HEIMATSCHUTZ infantry battalions and border troops, are capable of successfully accomplishing the assigned combat task.

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On the HAMBURG axis the 4th Army is advancing with two divisions against two divisions and two motorized infantry brigades of the Brown 6th Army Corps, and the HAMBURG garrison.

Balance of forces and means:

Forces and means	Our troops	The enemy	Ratio
	3rd & 7th MtzR divs, 6th Arty Div, 4th Army Arty Bde, 4th Rkt Lchr Arty Rgt, 4th Army Msl Bde	18th & 21st Mtz Inf divs, 37th & 38th Mtz Inf bdes, 13th Mtz Inf Div, 610th & 620th Arty rgts, 650th Lance Msl Bn***	
Operational-tactical missile launchers	11	10*	1:1
Tactical missile launchers	6	7	1:1
Atomic artillery pieces	--	29	absolute
Divisions	2	3**	1:1.5
Tanks	364	612	1:1.7
Guns and mortars	771	281	2.7:1

* Including five Pershing launchers

** Including the HAMBURG garrison

*** Losses: 18th Motorized Infantry Division -- up to 20 percent;
21st Motorized Infantry Division -- 10 percent;
13th Motorized Infantry Division -- up to 15 percent.

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Thus, the 4th Army outnumbers the enemy only in artillery. An intensification of efforts is required in order to develop the offensive and isolate the city of HAMBURG.

In the HAGENOW area the 4th Army with forces of a motorized rifle division, motorized rifle regiment, antitank reserves, and an army mobile obstacle detachment is repelling the thrust of two motorized infantry divisions of the Brown 6th Army Corps.

Balance of forces and means:

Forces and means	Our troops	The enemy	Ratio
	8th MtzR Div, 42nd MtzR Rgt, 14th MtzR Div, 4th Army AT Arty Rgt	39th Tk Bde, 13th Mtz Inf Div, 6th Mtz Inf Div, 40th & 41st Mtz Inf bdes, 14th Mtz Inf Div**	
Tactical missile launchers	4	8	1:2
Atomic artillery pieces	--	29	absolute
Divisions	1.5	2	1:1.3
Tanks	202	451	1:2
Guns and mortars	228*	416	1:1.8

* Not including the army antitank artillery regiment;

** Losses: 39th Tank Brigade and 6th Motorized Infantry Division -- 15 percent; 14th Motorized Infantry Division -- 10 percent;

Considering that the enemy will evidently use the 42nd Tank Brigade against the 14th Motorized Rifle Division at the springboard, our troops, conducting a defensive battle, have the capability of stopping the enemy offensive in the HAGENOW area without the allocation of additional forces and means.

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The 4th Army has the 2nd Tank Division in the second echelon.

On the STENDAL axis the 7th Army, reinforced with a motorized rifle division, is repelling the attack of two divisions (including one tank division) of the Brown 4th Army Corps. Here the following balance of forces has developed:

Forces and means	Our troops	The enemy	Ratio
	1st MtzR Div, 7th Army AT Arty Rgt, 4th AT Arty Bde, 2nd Corps Msl Bde*	16th Tk Div, 15th Mtz Inf Div, 450th Sergeant Msl Bn, 410th Arty Rgt**	
Operational-tactical missile launchers	6	3	2:1
Tactical missile launchers	3	7	1:2
Atomic artillery pieces	--	17	absolute
Divisions	1	2	1:2
Tanks	173	473	1:2.7
Guns and mortars	143	216	1:1.1

/sic/

* Not including the 7th Army Antitank Artillery Regiment and 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade

** Losses: 16th Tank Division -- 20 percent;
15th Motorized Infantry Division -- 15 to 20 percent.

The balance of forces in number of divisions and especially number of tanks favors the enemy. Considering the advantageous situation of our troops, it is necessary to take decisive measures for the encirclement and destruction of the enemy grouping operating here. It is advisable to deliver a thrust with the forces of the 14th Motorized Rifle Division from the DANNENBERG area in the direction of DANNENBERG, LUNEBURG and with the forces of the 9th Tank Division and 11th Motorized Rifle Division from the HERMANNBURG area (23 km north of CELLE) in the direction of SOLTAU,

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BUCHHOLZ with the task of routing the 14th and 1st motorized infantry divisions and establishing an outer front of encirclement. To establish an inner front, encounter thrusts will be delivered by the 13th Motorized Rifle Division and two regiments of the 4th Motorized Rifle Division.

The main front grouping, made up of five divisions of the 7th and 9th armies with two artillery divisions of the RVGK and the support of the main forces of the 1st Air Army, is advancing on the HANNOVER axis. The operational disposition of the 7th Army is in one echelon; the 9th Army has the 26th Tank Division in the second echelon. The enemy on this axis has three divisions of the Brown 1st Army Corps (one motorized infantry division and two tank divisions) and one armored brigade of the Blue 1st Army Corps. The balance of forces and means:

Forces and means	Our troops	The enemy	Ratio
	9th Tk Div, 11th MtzR Div, 5th & 10th Tk divs, 6th MtzR Div, 7th & 9th Army Arty bdes, 7th & 9th Army Rkt Lehr Arty rgts, 8th & 11th Arty divs, 7th Army Msl Bde, 2nd & 3rd <u>Front</u> Msl bdes	11th Mtr Inf Div, 3rd & 7th Tk divs, 6th Armd Bde, 4th Armd Div, 110th Arty Rgt, 150th Lance Msl Bn, 24th Lance Msl Rgt, 1st, 2nd & 4th Pershing Msl squadrons*	
Operational-tactical missile launchers	46	24	2:1
Tactical missile launchers	19	7	2:1
Atomic artillery pieces	--	39	absolute
Divisions	5	3.5	1.4:1
Tanks	1,263	839	1.5:1
Guns and mortars	1,521	604	2.5:1

* Losses: 11th Motorized Infantry Division and 4th Armored Division -- 10 percent, 3rd and 7th tank divisions -- up to 20 percent.

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The main attack grouping has superiority over the enemy. However, as of the morning of 10 September a counterthrust by the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps is possible. The 7th Army has no reserves; it is advisable to use the 9th Army's 26th Tank Division for the encirclement and destruction of the SALZGITTER grouping. Therefore, for routing the Lilac 1st Army Corps -- the most dangerous enemy grouping -- it is necessary to allocate no less than four fresh divisions of the 6th Army, and it will be necessary to repel the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust with forces and means available to the 9th Army.

On the MAGDEBURG axis three divisions of the 9th Army, Front Antitank Reserve /No. 2/ and Front Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 2, and two divisions of the Western Front's 3rd Army have stopped the offensive of six divisions (including three armored ones) of the Blue 1st Army Corps, Violet 1st Army Corps, and Brown 3rd Army Corps.

Balance of forces and means:

	Our troops	The enemy	Ratio
Forces and means	18th, 21st, & 23rd MtzR divs, 9th Army Msl Bde, 9th Army AT Arty Rgt, 5th AT Arty Bde; 31st & 32nd MtzR divs of the 3rd Army***	4th Armd Div (minus 6th Armd Bde), 1st & 2nd Armd divs, 50th Lance Msl Rgt, Blue 5th & 42nd Hvy SP Arty rgts, Violet 1st & 16th Mtz Inf divs, Brown 2nd Inf Div**	
1	2	3	4
Operational-tactical missile launchers	11	10	1:1
Tactical missile launchers	17	4	4:1
Atomic artillery pieces	--	48	absolute
Divisions	5	6	1:1.2

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1	2	3	4
Tanks	909	1,091	1:1.2
Guns and mortars	745*	647	1:1.1 /sic/

* Not including the 9th Army Antitank Artillery Regiment and 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade

** Losses: 1st and 2nd armored divisions, 1st & 16th motorized infantry divisions, and 2nd Infantry Division -- up to 20 percent

*** The 31st and 32nd motorized rifle divisions are each assumed to have 190 tanks and 150 guns and mortars.

Such a ratio and the encircling position of the groupings of the 9th and 3rd armies make it possible, in conjunction with the Western Front, to encircle and destroy the main forces of the enemy's SALZGITTER grouping by decisive actions along with air support. For establishing the outer front of encirclement it is necessary, after repelling the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust, to deliver thrusts with the 10th Tank Division and 6th Motorized Rifle Division in the direction of HANNOVER, RINTELN and with forces of the Western Front's 3rd Army in the direction of NORTHEIM, HOLZMINDEN. In order to establish the inner front /of encirclement/, encounter thrusts will be delivered by: the 26th Tank Division and 18th Motorized Rifle Division from the PEINE area in the direction of PEINE, BOCKENEM, with the landing of a tactical airborne landing force in the area of GROSS RHUDEN (7 km south of BOCKENEM); and by the Western Front's 36th Tank Division from the area southwest of OSTERODE in the direction of WULFTEN, BOCKENEM.

The front's second echelon:

-- the 2nd Army Corps, located on the JUTLAND axis 80 km from the front line, is combat-effective and can be committed to battle within 6 hours;

-- the 6th Army, consisting of three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division, is concentrated on the HANNOVER axis 90 to 100 km from the first-echelon troops of the 7th and 9th armies. For the army's movement forward and deployment 7 to 8 hours are required;

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-- the 10th Tank Army, having three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, is positioned 360 to 380 km from the forward large units of the front's main grouping. The considerable distance requires the movement forward of the army to a new area.

The front rocket troops are combat-effective, with 98 operational-tactical missile launchers and 103 tactical missile launchers available, as well as the number of nuclear warheads prescribed by you.

The 1st Air Army is at its aforementioned basing areas and has 720 combat aircraft.

For air support of the troops on 10 September, 11 regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation and 16 /regimental sorties/ of army aviation can be used.

Air defense troops, in cooperation with the 1st Air Army's fighter aviation and with troops of the Air Defense of the Country, will cover the front's main forces, control posts, and rear services installations.

Reserves:

-- the 13th Motorized Rifle Division is combat-effective, and is located 90 km from the DANNENBERG area. It will require 8 hours for its movement forward, crossing of the ELBE River, and deployment into battle formation;

-- the 20th Tank Division is combat-effective, and is positioned in the aforementioned area;

-- Front Antitank Reserve No. 1 and Front Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 1 are in the battle formations of the 7th Army's troops on the STENDAL axis.

Front Antitank Reserve No. 2 and Front Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 2 are in the battle formations of the 9th Army's 21st and 23rd motorized rifle divisions. By the morning of 10 September they can be withdrawn from the battle.

The large units and units of the special troops and rear services of the front will carry out previously assigned tasks. It will be necessary for the engineer troops to build bridges in the DOMITZ area for the 13th Motorized Rifle Division's crossing and to rebuild bridges in the

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TANGERMUNDE and FERCHLAND areas.

Front control posts will have to be moved to new areas.

d) I propose:

-- to continue at night the fulfillment of the previously assigned tasks;

-- at 0600 hours 10 September after 24 minutes of preparatory fire to commit the 6th Army to battle from lines: No. 1 -- BERGEN, MELLENDORF (20 km north of HANNOVER); No. 2 -- FALLINGBOSTEL, 4 km west of NEUSTADT in the direction of CELLE, NIENBURG, LINGEN, and to rout the Lilac 1st Army Corps in a meeting engagement in the WALSRÖDE area. To reinforce the army with the 8th Artillery Division (minus the 2nd Gun Artillery Brigade). To complete the defeat of the Northern Army Group's main forces and of the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force east of the RHINE River with the 7th, 6th, and 9th armies' forces on the axis of the main thrust, and by the close of 12-13 September to have them fulfill the front's immediate task;

-- to develop the offensive on the JUTLAND axis with the 4th Army's forces (3rd, 7th, 16th motorized rifle divisions, 2nd Tank Division) in the direction of BAD OLDESLOE and RENDSBURG; in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps, to complete the destruction of the Brown 6th Army Corps' main forces; and by the close of 10-11 May /sic -- September/ to seize the KIEL, RENDSBURG, ELSHORN line. At 0600 hours 10 September, to commit the 2nd Army Corps to battle from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, DWERKATHEN (12 km east of AHRENSBURG) in the direction of BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN with the task of routing the enemy's HAMBURG grouping. To transfer to the corps the 8th Motorized Rifle Division from its sector, and to allocate the 6th Artillery Division's 1st Gun Artillery Brigade and 4th Heavy Howitzer Brigade for reinforcement;

-- to carry out the encirclement and destruction of the Brown 4th Army Corps' main forces with the forces of the 7th Army's 14th, 13th, 1st, and 4th motorized rifle divisions, for which the 13th Motorized Rifle Division will be transferred to the army from the front reserve;

-- to repel the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust with: the strikes of two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation; strikes of the 9th Separate Fire Support Helicopter Regiment; artillery fire; and the forces of the 9th Army's 6th and 18th motorized rifle divisions;

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-- to encircle and destroy the enemy's SALZGITTER grouping in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army by allocating the 9th Army's 26th Tank Division, 18th, 21st, and 23rd motorized rifle divisions with the landing of a tactical airborne landing force in the GROSS RHUDEN area;

-- on 10 September to employ three army sorties of the 1st Air Army, 16 regimental sorties of army aviation, and the greater part of the front's artillery for the destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack means, control posts, and main groupings;

-- to have the rocket troops and aviation ready to deliver strikes against targets in accordance with the schedule of the front's initial nuclear strike;

-- by the morning of 10 September to regroup the 10th Tank Army in the area of (excluding) GRANZE, (excluding) BERLIN, (excluding) FURSTENWALDE, JOACHIMSTHAL;

-- by the morning of 10 September to relocate front control posts in succession to the following areas:

-- Alternate command post -- to the forest 9 km east of CELLE;

-- Command post -- to the forest 10 km south of VITTINGEN /sic -- WITTINGEN/;

-- Rear control post -- to the forest 10 km west of KLOTZE.

2. The /front/ commander's decision on the development of the offensive operation with the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon (75 minutes).

The operational time is 2100 hours 9 September. The chief of the General Staff has ordered that the concept of the decision for further actions and tasks of front troops be reported by high frequency /radio/.

It is advisable for the instructor to hear the following on this training topic: the reports of the concept by two or three students, the tasks for the troops by one or two students, and the report in full scope by one student.

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The front commander's report on the situation at 2000 hours 9 September
Concept of the decision:

During the night of 10 September the troops will continue to fulfill the assigned combat tasks.

At 0600 hours 10 September after 24 minutes of preparatory fire the 6th Army will be committed to battle from these lines: No. 1 -- BERGEN, MELLENDORF; No. 2 -- FALLINGBOSTEL, 4 km west of NEUSTADT in the direction of CELLE, NIENBURG, LINGEN; in cooperation with the 7th Army, it will rout the Lilac 1st Army Corps in a meeting engagement in the WALSRODE area.

On the axis of the main thrust the forces of the 7th, 6th, and 9th armies will complete the destruction of the Northern Army Group's main forces and of the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force east of the RHINE River, and by the close of 12-13 September will fulfill the front's immediate task and seize the line CUXHAVEN, AURICH, MEPPEN, REINE, MUNSTER, HAMM.

On the JUTLAND axis at 0600 hours 10 September the 2nd Tank Division will be committed to battle from the line WESTERRADE (9 km east of BAD SEGEBERG), SUHLEN in the direction of BAD SEGEBERG, NEUMUNSTER, and the 2nd Army Corps /will be committed/ from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, DWERKATHEN in the direction of BARGTHEIDE, UTERSEN; they will complete the defeat of the 6th Army Corps' main forces, and by the close of 10-11 September they will seize the line KIEL, RENDBURG, ELSHORN, WEDEL.

The 7th Army, with forces of the 14th, 13th, 1st, and 4th motorized rifle divisions, will encircle and destroy the 4th Army Corps' main forces in the ARENDSEE area.

The repulse of the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust will be accomplished by: the strikes of two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation, the strikes of the 9th Separate Fire Support Helicopter Regiment, artillery fire, and the forces of the 9th Army's 6th and 18th motorized rifle divisions.

For the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's SALZGITTER grouping in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army, at 0600 hours 10 September the 26th Tank Division will be committed from the line SOLSCHEN (8 km southwest of PEINE), (excluding) WEDTLENSTEDT in the direction of PEINE, BOCKENEM; a motorized rifle battalion of the 26th Tank Division will make an assault landing in the GROSS RHUDEN area, and the 9th Army's 18th,

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21st, and 23rd motorized rifle divisions will be allocated.

On 10 September the destruction by fire of the enemy's nuclear attack means, control posts, and main groupings will be carried out by three army sorties of the 1st Air Army and 16 regimental sorties of army aviation,* and by the greater part of front artillery.

The rocket troops and aviation will be in readiness to deliver the front's initial nuclear strike.

The operational disposition will be in two echelons: the first one being the 4th Army, 2nd Army Corps, and 7th, 6th, and 9th armies; the second being the 10th Tank Army. The reserve will be the 20th Tank Division.

Troop tasks

a) The 4th Army (3rd, 7th, and 16th motorized rifle divisions, and 2nd Tank Division), by committing the 2nd Tank Division to battle from the WESTERRADE, SUHLEN line, will develop the offensive in the direction of BAD SEGEBERG, RENDSBURG, complete the defeat of the 6th Army Corps' main forces north of HAMBURG in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps, make an assault crossing of the KIEL Canal from the march, and by the close of 10-11 September seize the KIEL, RENDSBURG, ELSHORN line.

Subsequently it will develop the offensive in the direction of RENDSBURG, FLENSBURG, VEJLE.

By 2300 hours 9 September the 6th Artillery Division's 1st Gun Artillery Brigade and 4th Heavy Howitzer Brigade will be transferred to the 2nd Army Corps in the WULMENAU area.

The boundary on the left: the line BAD OLDESLOE, ELSHORN.

* The allocation of aviation resources by tasks and armies is done in Lesson 22b. comment: Lesson 22b was disseminated as

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b) At 0600 hours 10 September the 2nd Army Corps (24th and 8th motorized rifle divisions), with the 6th Artillery Division's 1st Gun Brigade and 4th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, and with the commitment to battle of the 24th Motorized Rifle Division from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, DWERKATHEN in the direction of BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN, will defeat the enemy's HAMBURG grouping in cooperation with the 4th Army, and isolate HAMBURG by the close of 11 September.

By the morning of 10 September the command post will be in the forest 6 km west of RATZEBURG.

The boundary on the left: the line LUBTHEEN, BOIZENBURG.

c) The 7th Army (1st, 4th, 11th, 13th, and 14th motorized rifle divisions, and 9th Tank Division), with two divisions and in cooperation with the 6th Army, which will be committed to battle at 0600 hours 10 September from the BERGEN, MELLENDORF line, will defeat the Lilac 1st Army Corps in a meeting engagement in the WALSRODE area. The 14th Motorized Rifle Division will deliver a thrust in the direction of DANNENBERG, LUNEBURG, and by the close of 10 September will reach the line LUNEBURG, BUCHHOLZ, ROTENBURG, BLENDER (8 km west of VERDEN) with three divisions. It will complete the encirclement of the enemy in the ARENDSEE area with forces of the 1st, 13th, and 4th /sic/ motorized rifle divisions.

Subsequently the army's main forces will develop the offensive in the direction of ACHIM, ASCHENDORF.

By 2300 hours 9 September the 8th Artillery Division (minus the 2nd Gun Artillery Brigade) will be transferred to the 6th Army in the wooded area 20 km northeast of CELLE.

The boundary on the left: the line WIETZENDORF (12 km north of BERGEN), SYKE, HAREN (12 km north of MEPPEN).

d) The 6th Army (12th, 17th, 28th motorized rifle divisions, and 5th and 19th tank divisions), with the 8th Artillery Division (minus the 2nd Gun Artillery Brigade), 23rd Pontoon Bridge Regiment, and 12th Engineer Obstacle-Clearing Battalion, will go into battle at 0600 hours 10 September from the following lines: No. 1 -- BERGEN, MELLENDORF; No. 2 -- FALLINGBOSTEL, 4 km west of NEUSTADT in the direction of CELLE, NIENBURG, LINGEN; in cooperation with the 7th Army, it will defeat in a meeting engagement the Lilac 1st Army Corps in the WALSRODE area and the Brown 3rd Tank Division east of NIENBURG, make an assault crossing of the WESER River

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from the march, and by the close of 12-13 September seize the MEPPEN, BORGHORST line.

The commitment to battle will be supported by six regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation and two regimental sorties of bomber aviation.

Subsequently the offensive will be developed in the direction of LINGEN, ARNHEM.

Allocated for the army's operation are: 34 missiles -- 17 R-300 (3 of 20 kt, 5 of 40 kt, 9 of 100 kt) and 17 R-65 (3 of 3 kt, 5 of 10 kt, 9 of 20 kt); 12 regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation, 18 regimental sorties of army aviation, and 6 nuclear bombs (2 of 5 kt, 1 of 20 kt, and 3 of 10 kt).

The movement forward to the line of commitment will be accomplished along five routes (see the map). The departure line of HOHENTRAMM (9 km north of KLOTZE), DANNDORF (9 km east of WOLFSBURG) will be crossed at 2400 hours 9 September.

As of 0400 hours 10 September the command post will be in the forest 3 km east of the HUSTEDT station (9 km north of CELLE).

The boundary on the left: the line (excluding) MUDEN (13 km northwest of GIFHORN), NEUSTADT, BORGHORST.

e) The 9th Army, in its aforementioned composition and with the aforementioned reinforcement means, will repel the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust with a thrust by two divisions in the direction of HANNOVER, RINTELN, rout in cooperation with the 6th Army the enemy's HANNOVER groupings, and by the close of 10-11 September seize the PETERSHAGEN, LUGDE line.

Subsequently it will develop the offensive in the direction of MINDEN, GREVEN.

At 0600 hours 10 September the 26th Tank Division will be committed from the line SOLSCHEN, (excluding) WEDTLENSTEDT in the direction of PEINE, BOCKENEM, and the 26th Tank Division's motorized rifle battalions will make an assault landing in the GROSS RHUDEN area; and the forces of four divisions, in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army, will encircle and destroy the enemy's SALZGITTER grouping.

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f) By the morning of 10 September the 10th Tank Army will be concentrated in the area (excluding) GRANZE, (excluding) BERLIN, (excluding) FURSTENWALDE, JOACHIMSTHAL. It will be in readiness for commitment to battle in the direction of DIEPHOLZ, ENSCHEDE, EINDHOVEN.

g) The rocket troops and artillery:

--- will be in readiness for participation in the front's initial nuclear strike against the planned targets;

-- will deliver fire destruction on the 21st and 11th motorized infantry divisions and 3rd Tank Division forward of the lines of commitment and on the flanks of the 2nd Army Corps and 6th Army, and will support their actions during the development of the offensive.

The allocation for preparatory fire will be:

-- in the 2nd Army Corps zone -- corps artillery, the artillery of the 7th and 24th motorized rifle divisions, and the 6th Artillery Division's 1st Gun Artillery Brigade and 4th Heavy Howitzer Brigade;

-- in the 6th Army zone -- the army artillery of the 7th and 6th armies, the 8th Artillery Division, and the artillery of the 11th and 12th motorized rifle divisions and of the 5th and 19th tank divisions.

The 24-minute artillery preparation for the attack:

-- will inflict fire destruction by massed, concentrated, and barrage fire on the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps during their deployment for a counterthrust;

-- will prevent a further advance by the enemy groupings on the STENDAL and MAGDEBURG axes and will inflict fire destruction on them during their encirclement and destruction.

h) The 1st Air Army, before the close of 9 September, will continue the destruction of the detected launchers of the Lance and Sergeant 650th, 450th, and 150th missile battalions, and 24th and 50th missile regiments, and will continue supporting the 7th and 9th armies.

During 10 September three army sorties of front aviation and 16 regimental sorties of fire support helicopters will inflict destruction on the Lilac 1st Army Corps; safeguard the commitment to battle of the front's

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second echelon -- the 6th Army and 2nd Army Corps; support the troops of the 4th, 7th, and 6th armies during the development of the offensive; and support the 9th Army during the repulse of the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust.

When covering the troops, special attention will be given to eliminating enemy air strikes against the battle formations of the tank and motorized rifle units of the 6th Army and 2nd Army Corps.

It will continue searching for and destroying the nuclear means, particularly the Pershing, Lance, and Sergeant launchers, and their preparations to employ nuclear weapons. It will detect the forward movement of enemy reserves.

As of dawn on 10 September it will have nuclear weapons in readiness for use by one flight in each fighter-bomber regiment.

One regimental sortie of the 9th Separate Fire Support Helicopter Regiment will be allocated to participate in the preparatory fire for the 6th Army's commitment to battle.

i) The air defense troops, in cooperation with the 1st Air Army's fighter aviation, will cover the front's main grouping against enemy air strikes during the development of the offensive: the 2nd Army Corps and 6th Army during their commitment to battle, and troops of the 7th and 9th armies during the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's groupings on the STENDAL and MAGDEBURG axes.

I request:

1) Permission to relocate the front control posts by the morning of 10 September to the following areas:

- Alternate command post to the forest 9 km east of CELLE;
- Command post to the forest 10 km south of WITTINGEN;
- Rear control post to the forest 10 km west of KLOTZE.

2) Permission for and coordination of combined actions with the forces on the left in the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's SALZGITTER grouping.

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3) Critique of the lesson -- 10 to 15 minutes

The training group director states the subject and training objectives of the lesson. He sums up the results of the lesson and if necessary gives the students recommendations for additional study of relevant materials concerning the subject of the lesson.



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