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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington, D.C. 20505

20 March 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

John N. McMahon

Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS: Control of Rocket Troops and Artillery During Preparation and Delivery of the Initial Nuclear Strike in the

Course of an Offensive Operation

- 1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson detailing the organization and content of a front's initial nuclear strike with 167 missiles in the first launch against NATO forces in an offensive in northern West Germany.
- 2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

FIRDB-312/00726-81

John N. McMahon

HR70-14

ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 19-Nov-2009

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB - 312/00726-81

DATE OF INFO. 1977 DATE 20 March 1981

SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 24b: Control of Rocket Troops and Artillery During Preparation and Delivery of the Initial=Nuclear-Strike in the Course of an Offensive Operation

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as from chiefs of rocket troops and artillery in the makeup; scope, tasking; and timing of a front's initial nuclear strike during an offensive operation against NATO in northern West Germany. The lesson discusses the planned use of 167 missiles in the first launch and 13 missiles in the follow-up launch (out of 339 available); the times required by rocket troops to attain launch readiness from differing initial conditions; the nuclear yields, which range from 3 kilotoms to 100 kilotoms; the allocation and resources of the missile units in a front; and the main NATO targets: nuclear capable missiles, aircraft at airfields, nuclear weapons storage depots and field points, command posts, SAM's, and 16 ground divisions. Also given are the minimum safe distances that troops in various types of vehicles must be away from nuclear bursts of different yields.

End of Summary

Comment

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany
Blue -- Great Britain
Green -- United States
Lilac -- Belgium

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LESSON No. 24b

I. Lesson subject: Control of rocket troops and artillery during preparation and delivery of the initial nuclear strike in the course of an offensive operation.

II. Estimated time for completion of Lesson No. 24b:

-- group training period -- 3 hours;

-- individual study by students -- 3 hours;

Total -- 6 hours.

III. Training objectives of the lesson:

- 1. To study the special features of the combat employment of rocket troops during the preparation and delivery of the initial nuclear strike carried out in the course of a front offensive operation.
- 2. To give the students practice in refining the schedule of the initial nuclear strike, and in preparing and reporting proposals to the front commander on the situation; status, and capabilities of the front's rocket troops for nuclear destruction of the enemy.
- 3. To give the students practice in controlling rocket troops during the preparation and delivery of the initial nuclear strike.
- 4. To investigate questions of nuclear destruction upon delivering the initial nuclear strike.
- IV. Method of conducting the lesson: group exercise with maps in the classroom.
- V. Methodological recommendations regarding the students' preparation for the lesson.

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At the start of the students' individual preparation for the lesson, the directors of the training groups recommend:

- -- that they study the literature recommended in the assignment, paying attention to clarification of the special features of the rocket troops' preparation for an initial nuclear strike to be carried out in the course of an operation, and to sure knowledge of the organization and tactical-technical characteristics of the missile systems, and of the levels of readiness of the rocket troops -- 30 min.
- -- that they study the materials of the assignment and complete the questions given in the assignment -- 45 min.
- -- that they prepare the report of the chief of rocket troops and artillery -- 60 min.
 - VI. Procedure for conducting the lesson:

- 4. Control of rocket troops during the preparation and delivery of the front's initial nuclear strike........................40 min.
 - 5. Conclusion of the lesson director...... 5 min.
 - I. Theoretical questions (10 min.)

Examine with respect to theory the basic measures which ensure the maintenance of a high level of combat readiness on the part of rocket troops to deliver the initial nuclear strike in the course of an operation.

The basic measures which ensure the maintenance of a high level of combat readiness on the part of rocket troops to deliver the initial nuclear strike in the course of an operation must be:

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- -- continuous recommaissance of the enemy for the purpose of determining the coordinates of the targets to be destroyed by the rocket troops:
- --- systematic refinement of the planning for the initial nuclear strike and redistribution of targets among the means of their destruction;
- -- maintenance of all forces and means that control rocket troops in constant readiness to transmit tasks to the missile large units and units in the shortest possible time;
- -- centralized planning and control for the relocation of: front and army (corps) missile large units -- by the front staff; missile battalions of divisions -- by the army staff;
- -- timely-raising of the levels of readiness of the rocket troops depending on the situation that is developing; implementation of necessary measures to ensure the participation of the maximum possible number of launchers in the initial nuclear strike.

The students, in the role of chief of rocket troops and artillery of the Coastal Front, report to the front commander:

- -- the combat strength, situation, and status of front rocket troops;
- -- the tasks of the rocket troops in the initial nuclear strike and the organization of the recommaissance of enemy targets;
- --- the control of the rocket troops during the preparation and delivery of the initial nuclear strike.

Contents of the report

of the chief of rocket troops and artillery of the front

- I. /sic/ Combat strength, situation, and status of front rocket troops
- 1) During the conduct of the operation employing only Conventional means of destruction; the rocket troops sustained insignificant losses and are fully combat-effective.

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The combat strength of the front rocket troops is as follows:

- -- two front missile brigades -- 34 launchers;
- -- five army missile brigades -- 54 launchers;
- -- one corps missile brigade -- 6 launchers;
- -- 28 division missile battalions -- 99 launchers.

There are autotal of 193 launchers in the combat complement of the rocket troops (taking losses into account); 94 of them are /for/ operational-tactical missiles and 99 are /for/ tactical missiles.

Of this number, a total of 169=launchers can-be allocated to the initial nuclear strike (94 /for/ operational-tactical missiles, 75 /for/ tactical missiles).

-The losses consist of:

- -- 8 operational-tactical missile launchers;
- -- 13 tactical missile launchers;

21 -- total,

/And of:/

- -- 6=nuclear*armed operational-tactical missiles;
- -- 10 nuclear-armed tactical missiles;

≈16=-- total:

In the <u>front</u> troops there are available:

-- 339: nuclear-armed missiles (154 operational-tactical missiles, 185 tactical missiles).

Of this number, 276 missiles are in the missile large units and units (124 operational-tactical missiles, 152 tactical missiles) and 63 missiles are in the missile-technical units (30 operational-tactical missiles, 33 tactical missiles).

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All=the rocket troop subunits which can be allocated to the initial muclear strike have launchers loaded with nuclear-armed missiles.

Formations and Large Units	Numbe Launc		.		ration	for Fi al-Tac ssiles		mch Tac	tical	Missil	es
migo omios	OTM	TM	Total		40 /kt/	100 /kt/	Total	3 /kt/	10 /kt/	20 /kt/	Total
2nd Front Missile Brigade	17		17	2	3	12	17				
3rd Front Missile Brigade	17	do 99	17	2	3	12	17			•••	
4th Army	10	12	22		3	7	10	2	5	5	12
2nd Army Corps	6	8	14	1	3	2	6	1	3	4	8
16th Separate Missile Battalion		2	2		+-	 .			••	2	2
7th Army	11,	17	28	1	2	8	11	1	2	14	17
6th Army	11	11	22	2	2	7	11		5	6	11
9th Army	10	19	29		2	8	10	1	6	12	19
10th Army	12		12	3	9		12				
20th Separate Missile Battalion	••	4	4				••.	·	1	3	4
Total	94	73	167	11	27	56	94	5	22	46	73

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According to the condition at 1530 hours 10 September, the rocket troops are completing deployment in the siting areas.

On the march there are the following:

- -- 10 operational-tactical missile launchers (3rd Battalion of the 2rd Front Missile Brigade, 3rd Battalion of the 4th Army Missile Brigade, 3rd Battalion of the 7th Army Missile Brigade);
- -- 13 tactical missile launchers (7th Separate Missile Battalion, 4th Separate Missile Battalion, 11th Separate Missile Battalion, 20th Separate Missile Battalion).

In the concentration area there are 24 launchers of the missile battalions of the 17th, 28th, and 29th motorized rifle divisions, and of the 15th, 22nd, and 25th tank /divisions/.

3) /sic/ The situation of the rocket troops is characterized by the following levels of readiness:

*-	Number and No. time	R-300 tacti	/oper	ationa ssiles	11- 5/	R-65 /tactical missiles/				/
1/0.		No.1	No.2	No.3	On the	No.1	No.2	No.3	On the	In concentrat
					march			•	march	area
1	Number of launchers		45	39	10		35	27	13	24
2	Time required to bring to Readi- ness=No.1		9	17	32		7	14	27	
3	Time required to deliver	7	12	20	35	2	9	16	29	

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Thus, a strike can be delivered:

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after 9 min. -- by 35 launchers (0 -- OIM, 35 -- TM);
after 12 min. -- by 80 launchers (45 -- OIM, 35 -- TM);
after 16 min. -- by 107 launchers (45 -- OIM, 62 -- TM);
after 20 min. -- by 146 launchers (84 -- OIM, 62 -- TM);
after 30 min. -- by 159 launchers (84 -- OIM, 75 -- TM);
after 40 min. -- by 169-launchers (94 -- OIM, 75 -- TM).
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It is advisable to deploy the missile battalions which are on the march into battle formation in unprepared areas and to bring them to Readiness Nor I by 1615 hours 10 September.

At 1532 hours I gave the signal to deploy the subunits on the march into battle formation in the unprepared areas and to bring them to Readiness No. 1 by 1615 hours.

Taking into account the time needed to transmit commands and clarify. Lasks, all the allocated means of the rocket troops will be in Readiness No. 1 to deliver the initial nuclear strike by 1615 hours 10 September.

4) In the front's initial massed nuclear strike, using rocket troop means, 167 nuclear-armed missiles can be employed in a single launch (3 of 3 kt, 22 of 10 kt, 57 of 20 kt, 27 of 40 kt, 56 of 100 kt), which amount to-41 percent of the nuclear-armed missiles issued to the rocket troops for the front operation, and 49 percent of the missiles available in the front as of the situation at 1530 hours 10 September.

However, with due regard for possible changes in the scope of the tasks which must be accomplished in the initial nuclear strike, in all up to 50 percent of the nuclear-charged missiles allocated to the rocket troops for the entire front operation may be employed.

According to the situation at 1530 hours 10 September, front troops: have 152 tactical missiles available, the plan being to employ 73 to 75 of them in the initial launch. In the follow-up launch the plan is to employ an additional 13 tactical missiles.

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The missiles available in the missile units will make it possible, after conducting the initial nuclear strike, to have on alert 41 tactical missile launchers (within 40 to 45 minutes after the initial launch) and 30 operational-tactical missile launchers (individual launchers and batteries within 1 hour 24 minutes after the initial launch).

The missile-technical units are located in deployment areas. The missiles and warheads designated for the initial nuclear strike and for fulfillment of the front's immediate task have been given to the missile units and large units.

According to the status at 1530 hours 10 September, there are 48 missiles in the mobile missile technical bases (23 operational-tactical missiles and 25 tactical missiles) and 15 missiles in the 3rd Separate Missile Transport Battalion (7 operational-tactical missiles and 8 tactical missiles).

III. Tasks of the rocket troops in the initial nuclear strike and the organization of reconnaissance of enemy installations

1) Updated scope of rocket troop tasks

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In accordance with changes in the operational situation, in the course of the operation the tasks of the missile large units and units in the front's initial nuclear strike were continuously updated and necessary changes were introduced into the plan and schedule of the initial nuclear strike. As a result, according to the situation at 1530 hours 10 September, 'the plan is for the rocket troops to destroy the following installations (targets):

- -- the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Pershing-1A missile squadrons /with/-12 miclear warheads;
- -- the 650th and 150th Lance missile artillery battalions and the 24th and 50th Lance missile artillery regiments /with/-12 nuclear warheads;
- -- the 450th Sergeant Missile Artillery Battalion /with/ 4 nuclear warheads;
- -- the delivery aircraft at 15 airfields (/Nos./ 51 to 65) /with/-15. nuclear warheads;

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#Thus;/=a-total=of=53 nuclear warheads are planned /to be employed/
for-the destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack means.

/In addition, the plan is to destroy:/

- -- the command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps; the Blue 1st Army Corps, and the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps, /with/=8-nuclear-warheads;
- -- the centers of control, detection, and warning in the areas: 28 km east of AURICH, and VECHTA, WROHM, BAD MUNDER, /with/-4 nuclear warheads;
- -- the Hawk SAM batteries (the 3rd, 31st, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, and 39th battalions) /with/~23./nuclear_warheads/;
- -- the Thunderbird SAM batteries (the 36th Artillery Regiment) /with/=2"/nuclear warheads/.

In-all, 37 nuclear warheads against control posts and air defense means.

It is planned to employ the remaining 90 nuclear warheads of the rocket troops in cooperation with aviation against 16 of the enemy's first-echelon divisions and their tactical nuclear attack means:

Targets	Number of rocket troop nuclear strikes	Number of nuclear air strikes	Total number or nuclear strikes	
1	2	3	4	
Brown 18th Mtz Inf Div	9 (3 of 10 kt, 6 of 20 kt)	4 (4 of 5 kt)	13	
Brown 21st Mtz Inf Div	8 (2 of 10 kt, 6 of 20 kt)	3 (1 of 5 kt, 2 of 100 kt)	11	
Brown 13th Mtz Inf Div	5 (1 of 10 kt, 4 of 20 kt)	<u>.</u> . :	5	

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1	2	3	4
Brown 6th Mtz Inf Div	2 (2 of 20 kt)	13 (5 of 5 kt, 8 of 10 kt)	15
Brown 16th Tk Div	9 (5 of 20 kt, 4 of 100 kt)	6 (6 of 20 kt)	15
Brown 15th Mtz Inf Div	5 (1 of 10 kt, 4 of 20 kt)	5 (5 of 10 kt)	10
Brown 14th Mtz Inf Div	4 (4 of 20 kt)	2 (5/sic/ of 10 kt)	6
Green 4th Mec Div	3 (3 of 20 kt)	12 (3 of 50 kt, 9 of 10 kt)	15
Lilac 4th Mtz Inf Div	5 (4 of 20 kt, 1 of 40 kt)	3 (3 of 100 kt)	8
Lilac 1st Mtz Inf Div	4 (2 of 10 kt, 2 of 20 kt)	8 (2 of 5 kt, 3 of 20 kt, 3 of 100 kt)	12
Brown 11th Mtz Inf Div	3 (1 of 10 kt, 2 of 20 kt)	11 (5 of 20 kt, 6 of 10 kt)	14
Brown 3rd Tk Div	9 (3 of 20 kt, 4 of 40 kt, 2 of 100 kt)	6 (4 of 100 kt, 2 of 5 kt)	15
Brown 7th Tk Div	5 (2 of 10 kt, 1 of 20 kt, 2 of 40 kt)	10 (2 of 100 kt, 8 of 5 kt)	15
Lilac 101st Mtz Inf Div	4 (1 of 20 kt, 2 of 100 kt, 1 of 3 kt)	9 (4 of 10 kt, 5 of 5 kt)	13
Lilac 301st Mtz Inf Div		12 (1 of 100 kt, 5 of 20 kt, 6 of 5 kt)	12

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1	2	3	4
Brown 25th Inf Div		7 (5 of 5 kt, 2 of 20 kt)	7
Blue 1st Armd Div	8 (1 of 10 kt, 6 of 20 kt, 1 of 40 kt)	11 (6 of 100 kt, 5 of 50 kt)	19
Blue 4th Armd Div	7 (4 of 20 kt, 3 of 40 kt)	12 (12 of 100 kt)	19
Blue 2nd Armd Div		8 (4 of 100 kt, 4 of 5 kt)	·8
Brown 1st Mtz Inf Div	••	6 (6 of 200 kt)	6
Lilac 5th Mtz Inf Div	- -	10 (5 of 50 kt, 5 of 100 kt)	10
Brown 24th Mtz Inf Div		10 (5 of 100 kt, 5 of 200 kt)	10
Brown 17th Mtz Inf Div		~~	
Brown 19th Mtz Inf Div		10 (5 of 200 kt, 5 of 100 kt)	10
Brown 20th Mtz Inf Div		4 (4 of 200 kt)	4
Total	90	182	272

Thus, "it is planned for the rocket troops to employ a total of 180 missiles" (94 OTM, 86 TM), 50 percent of the number issued to the front for the operation; 167 of them are to be in the initial launch (94 OTM, 73 TM) and 13 in the second launch (13 TM). The following yields /in the amounts shown/ are planned to be employed: 3 of 3 kt, 23 of 10 kt, 69 of 20 kt, 27 of 40 kt, and 56 of 100 kt.

From the above it is clear that the main efforts of the rocket troops are directed at accomplishing the major task—— the destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack means and his main troop grouping with their tactical means of nuclear attack /at a level of / 88 percent.

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The rocket troops are to employ 76 percent of the nuclear warheads planned for the initial nuclear strike on the axis of the front's main thrust.

2) The rocket troop grouping for the nuclear destruction of the enemy in the front's initial nuclear strike

In conformity with the scope of the tasks and based on the operational disposition of front troops, it is planned to allocate the following to participate in the initial nuclear strike:

- -- two front missile brigades (the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades)
 -- 34-launchers:
- -- five army missile brigades (the 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th army missile brigades) -- 54-launchers;
- -- one corps missile brigade (the 2nd Corps Missile Brigade) -- '6=1
- -- 22 separate missile battalions of divisions -- 73=1aumchers (2 launchers are allocated from the 16th Motorized Rifle Division).

Total -- 167-launchers (94 OTM, 73 TM).

3) The allocation of targets for destruction among missile large units and units

The allocation of targets for destruction among missile large units and units is made according to the targets' nature, importance, and depth of location; the launch ranges, the yield of the nuclear warheads, the dispersion characteristics of the missiles, and the required effectiveness of destruction. When targets for destruction are located within the range of different types of missiles, the capabilities for delivering strikes at the most effective missile launch ranges, i.e., those providing the greatest reliability of target destruction, are taken into account. The allocation of targets for destruction among the units and large units with operational-tactical missiles and tactical missiles was made based on this consideration.

The students report the allocation of targets for destruction among the front missile brigades, army missile brigades, and separate missile battalions of motorized rifle divisions (tank divisions) following the

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schedule for the preparation and delivery of the initial nuclear strike.

The students then report the updated allocation of newly detected targets for destruction among the missile large units and units. This allocation was completed during their independent study for the lesson.

I propose to allocate the following against the newly detected targets for destruction and the targets whose locations were pinpointed at 1520 hours 10 September:

- 1. To assign the 26th Separate Missile Battalion for the destruction of the 50th Lance Missile Artillery Regiment (targets No. 026 -- 20 kt, No. 027 -- 20 kt, and No. 028 -- 20 kt).
- 2) To assign the 6th Army Missile Brigade for the destruction of the 1st-Pershing-1A-Squadron (targets No. 001 100 kt, No. 002 -- 100 kt, No. 003 -- 100 kt).
- 3) To relieve the 2nd Front Missile Brigade from destruction of the 1st Pershing Squadron, because the launch range does not permit it; and to assign the 2nd Front Missile Brigade for the destruction of the control and warning post in the area of VECHTA (No. 166), the control and warning center in the area of AURICH (No. 167), and the command post of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (No. 163); (targets No. 166 -- 100 kt, No. 167 -- 100 kt, No. 163 -- 100 kt).
- 4. To relieve the 3rd Front Missile Brigade from destruction of the and to /have it/ plan the destruction of the Northern Army Group's command post (target No. 164 -- 100 kt).

5) To relieve the 7th Army Missile Brigade from destruction of the

and to /have it/ plan the destruction of aircraft at the airfields in the area of BORGER (No. 64 -- 100 kt) and AHLHORN (No. 65 -- 100 kt).

The distribution of targets for destruction which has been carried out and the nuclear warhead yields which have been designated ensure the necessary level of destruction of the main targets, as follows: nuclear attack means -- P /percent destruction/ = 90 to 100 percent, air defense targets - P = 70 to 100 percent, aircraft at airfields - P = 100 percent, troops - So /meaning unknown/ equal to or greater than 40 percent.

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The radii of complete safety (without considering the maximum deviation of the bursts from the point of aim) for personnel and the safe distances will equal on the average (in kilometers):

| Designation                                                         | Tact | cical mis | siles | Operational-tactic missiles |       |        |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|--------|
|                                                                     | 3 kt | 10 kt .   | 20 kt | 20 kt                       | 40 kt | 100 kt |
| Radii of complete safety:                                           |      |           |       |                             |       |        |
| for personnel in motor vehicles and open armored personnel carriers | 2.2  | 3.2       | 4     | 4                           | 5     | 6.8    |
| for personnel in closed armored personnel carriers                  | 2.0  | 2.4       | 2.5   | 2.5                         | 2.7   | 3,1    |
| for personnel in tanks                                              | 1.8  | 2.1       | 2.2   | 2.2                         | 2.3   | 2.6    |
| Safe distance:                                                      |      |           |       |                             |       |        |
| for personnel in motor vehicles and open armored personnel carriers | 3.8  | 4.8       | 5.6   | 6.6                         | 7.6   | 9.4    |
| for personnel in closed armored personnel carriers                  | 3.6  | 4.0       | 4.1   | 3.1<br>/sic/                | 5.3   | 5.7    |
| for personnel in tanks                                              | 3.4  | 3.7       | 3.8   | 4.8                         | 4.9   | 5.2    |

The data are calculated for ranges of 35 km for the R-65 missile and 150 km for the R-300 missile.

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Before delivery of nuclear strikes I request your instructions to warnable troops: At the same time I request that during the period from 1530 hours to 1615 hours 10 September air army means conduct the final reconnaissance and pinpoint the coordinates of the targets against which the rocket troops will deliver their strikes (the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Pershing squadrons, the 650th and 150th Lance artillery battalions and 24th and 50th Lance artillery regiments, the 450th Sergeant Artillery Battalion; the command posts of the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps. Blue 1st Army Corps, and Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps;

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allocating 14 sorties of the operational air reconnaissance regiment and up
to 26 sorties of the tactical air reconnaissance regiments.

The procedure for delivery of the initial nuclear strike by rocket troops

The initial nuclear strike is planned to begin with a strike by the rocket troops against targets whose coordinates will be known at this time (from Launch to Launch plus 5 minutes). Reconnaissance of targets and pinpointing of coordinates in support of rocket troops, and strikes by the front air army, will be from Launch plus 10 to Launch plus 40 minutes. The launchers which did not participate in the initial launch will be at Readiness No. 2 during this period. The launchers which participated in the initial strike will prepare for follow-up launches. To prepare for follow-up launches; tactical missile batteries will need 45 minutes and operational-tactical missile batteries will need 1 hour 22 minutes.

Rocket troop strikes against reconnoitered targets and follow-up tactical missile launches are planned from Launch plus 45: to Launch plus 55 minutes.

Reconnaissance of targets for destruction in support of rocket troops will be carried out for the front and army missile brigades by the 20th Reconnaissance Air Regiment, and for the tactical missile battalions of the armies as follows: for the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps by the 21st Tactical Reconnaissance Air Regiment; for the 6th, 7th, and 9th armies by the 22nd Tactical Reconnaissance Air Regiment.

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- IV. Control of rocket troops during immediate preparation and delivery of the front's initial nuclear strike
- A. Control of rocket troops during preparation of the front's initial nuclear strike

#### Operational time 1532 hours 10 September

On the basis of the instructions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the front commander has ordered:

1) "Deliver the initial nuclear strike at 1630 hours 10 September." "Bring the rocket troops to Readiness No. 1 by 1615 hours 10 September."

The students make an estimate of the time needed to issue the commands to bring the rocket troops to Readiness No. 1. The order has been given to deliver the initial nuclear strike at 1630 hours 10 September. At the time that they receive this signal, the rocket troops are at Readiness No. 2, No. 3, and on the march. In order to bring the rocket troops to Readiness No. 1, taking into account the transmission of commands from the front down to the batteries inclusively (3 to 4 minutes), the following will be required:

for the R-300 /missiles/: -- from Readiness No. 2,
9 plus 4 = 13° minutes are needed;

- -- from Readiness No. 3, 17 plus 4 = 21 minutes are needed;
- -- for deployment from the march, 32 plus 4 = 36 minutes;

/for the/ R-65 /missiles/: -- from Readiness No. 2,
7 plus 4 = 11 minutes are needed;

- -- from Readiness No. 3, 14 plus 4 =-18-minutes are needed;
- -- for deployment from the march, 27 plus 4 =-31 minutes.

Thus, 36 minutes are required to bring the front rocket troops to -Readiness No. 1.

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The command to bring the rocket troops to Readiness No. 1 must be given:

-- for operational-tactical missiles, no later than 1539 hours 10 September;

-- for tactical missiles, no later than 1544 hours 10 September.

Contents of the command:

"DUKAT -- 9000 -- at 1615 /hours/"

#### 2) Operational time 1535 hours 10 September

The /front/ commander has approved the proposals of the chief of rocket troops and artillery on the allocation of newly detected targets and of the targets whose locations were pinpointed at 1520 hours 10 September, and has ordered that the tasks of the front missile large units and the 7th Army be updated.

The students give the commands to the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades and to the 7th Army's chief of rocket troops and artillery in updating the tasks for the initial nuclear strike:

To the 2nd Front Missile Brigade. Cancel the strikes against targets 001, 002, and 003. Prepare for strikes. Yield -- 100 kt. Readiness No. 2. 1550 hours. Air\* first.

Target 166 x = 5846700, y = 2451100, H /elevation/ = 40;

Target 167 x = 5925600, y = 2420300, H = 10;

Target 163 x = 5799950, y = 2414100, H = 60.

To the 3rd Front Missile Brigade. Cancel the strike against target 11. Prepare for strike. Yield—100 -kt—Readiness No. 2. 1550 hours. x = 5811100, y = 2429600, H = 70. Air first. Target 164.

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<sup>\*</sup> Translator's note: The adjective vozdushmyy /air/ may refer to "airburst."

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To the 7th Army's chief of rocket troops and artillery. Cancel the strikes against targets 6 and 7. Prepare strikes against airfields. Yield -> 100 kt. Readiness No. 2: 1550 hours. Air first.

Target 64 x = 5870900, y = 2404300, H = 30;

Target 65 x = 5863800, y = 2448050, H = 50.

## 3) Operational time 1540 hours

There have been received from the front intelligence directorate the pinpointed coordinates of

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The students make the decision to transmit the pinpointed coordinates to the chief of rocket troops and artillery of the 9th Army and the commander of the 2nd Front Missile Brigade.

## 4) Operational time 1615 hours 10 September

The chiefs of rocket troops and artillery of the armies and the army corps, and also the commanders of the <u>front</u> missile brigades, have reported that the missile large units and units have been brought to Readiness No. 1.

The students, in the role of chief of rocket troops and artillery of the front, report to the front commander that the rocket troops have been brought to Readiness No. 1.

B. Control of rocket troops during delivery of the front's initial nuclear strike

## 1) Operational time 1620 hours 10 September

The front commander has given the command to deliver the initial nuclear strike at 1630 hours 10 September. L'MOLOTe/Hammer/---7777 at 1630 hours."

The students, in the role of <u>front</u> chief of rocket troops and artillery, give the command to the <u>commanders</u> of the <u>front</u> missile brigades to deliver the initial nuclear strike at 1630 hours 10 September. 'MOLCE.

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#### 2) Operational time 1635 hours 10 September

The chiefs of rocket troops and artillery of the armies (army corps) and the commanders of the <u>front</u> missile brigades have reported that the launchings have been made. The <u>front</u> chief of rocket troops and artillery reports the launchings to the <u>front</u> commander.

#### 3) Operational time 1650 hours 10 September

As a result of the recomnaissance of the 20th Reconnaissance Air Regiment, the following data have been received: target=No.=018 Sergeant battery=at-position: x = 5899100, y = 2596050, H = 70.

The students, in the role of front chief of rocket troops and artillery, give the command to the 2nd Army Corps chief of rocket troops and artillery to destroy the Sergeant battery, allocating an on-alert launcher of the 2nd Corps Missile Brigade:

## To the 2nd Army Corps chief of rocket troops and artillery

The 2nd Corps Missile Brigade -- 40 kt. A strike at x = 5899100, y = 2596050, H = 70. Air first. Target 018.

## 4) Operational time 1655 hours 10 September

■Pinpointed coordinates have been received from the intelligence directorate:

Target=No.=152;=Lilac 1st Army Corps, x = 5877100, y = 2530800, H = 50 (10 km south of ROTHENBURG);

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The students, in the role of chief of rocket troops and artillery, transmit the coordinates of target No. 5 to the commander of the 2nd Front Missile Brigade, of targets Nos 12 and 13 to the commander of the 3rd Front Missile Brigade, of target No. 9 to the 9th Army chief of rocket troops and artillery, and of targets Nos. 152 and 153 to the 7th Army chief of rocket troops and artillery.

## 5) Operational time 1713 hours 10 September

The air army staff has reported that aviation has left the zone of rocket troop strikes. The <u>front</u> commander has ordered that the second launch by the rocket troops be carried out at 1715 hours against the planned targets and those that have undergone final recommaissance.

The students, in the role of front chief of rocket troops and artillery, give the command for the second launch (13 tactical missile strikes) and for the destruction of the six targets that have undergone final reconnaissance (Nos. 4, 5, 12, 13, 9, and 10). L'KOPYE / Spear / 4242 at 1615 / sic / hours"; "BURAN / Snowstorm / 1710 at 1615 / sic / hours."

## Concluding remarks of the lesson director

In the course of an offensive operation employing conventional means of destruction, the rocket troops are in constant readiness to deliver the initial nuclear strike. This is attained through: the presence of missiles ready for employment in the missile large units and units; continual reconnaissance of targets; the systematic updating of the tasks of the rocket troops for the initial nuclear strike and the timely relocation of missile brigades and battalions during the operation; the expeditious increase of the levels of readiness of the launch batteries allocated to the initial nuclear strike and the provision of continuous control of the rocket troops; and the taking of necessary measures to allocate the maximum possible number of launchers to the initial nuclear strike.

A front's initial nuclear strike carried out in the course of an offensive operation will differ from an initial nuclear strike at the beginning of an operation. By this time considerable changes may have occurred in the locations of most of the earlier planned targets of nuclear strikes, in the grouping of enemy ground forces, in the home airfield of

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the aviation, etc.; and new important targets may also have appeared. There will be definite changes in the composition of the forces and means allocated to deliver the initial nuclear strike, and in the number of nuclear warheads.

A characteristic feature of an initial nuclear strike delivered in the course of an operation will be the lesser centralization of its planning. Under conditions of a constantly changing situation, the timely updating of the plan of the initial nuclear strike in the front's nuclear planning group is actually possible in full scope only for front and army missile brigades. Under those conditions, the front most often will indicate (pinpoint) to the armies, for the separate missile battalions of their divisions, the targets of destruction, the number of nuclear strikes per target, and the time and level of readiness for delivery of the strikes. The choice of aiming points and yield and altitude of the burst is made in the armies, and sometimes even in the divisions with mandatory report /of them/ to the front staff:

It is very important at such a time to make preparations in secret and to carry out in full scope the measures to protect the rocket troops against weapons of mass destruction and means of radioelectronic warfare.

During the immediate preparation and execution of the initial nuclear strike, the <u>front</u> chief of rocket troops and artillery monitors the accomplishment by the rocket troops of the assigned tasks. Upon receiving from the <u>front</u> commander the task of destroying newly detected or undamaged targets, the preparation of strikes to destroy them is organized.

The transition to the employment of nuclear weapons will lead to a changes in the combat action methods of front troops, and will necessitate the clarification and making of new decisions, the assignment of tasks to the rocket troops and artillery, and the implementation of measures to eliminate the aftereffects of nuclear attack and to restore the combat effectiveness of the missile and artillery large units and units.

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A most important condition for the successful fulfillment of combat tasks by rocket troops in the <u>front</u>'s initial nuclear strike is the purposeful organization and conduct of party political work. Under these conditions, this work must be directed to the maintenance of a high level of readiness to deliver the initial nuclear strike to the explanation to personnel of the decisive importance of nuclear destruction in completely defeating the enemy's main grouping, and to the maintenance and development in the personnel of a feeling of responsibility for great precision and timeliness in the preparation and delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy.

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Note how well the training objectives have been achieved in the course of the lesson; rate the reports of the students; note the positive and negative aspects. Give instructions for eliminating the shortcomings revealed during the lessons.

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