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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

24 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Restoring the
Combat Effectiveness of the Troops, Eliminating the
Aftereffects of the Employment of Weapons of Mass
Destruction by the Enemy, and Developing the Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson detailing the losses sustained by a front and by one of its armies after a NATO nuclear and toxic chemical agent strike, and the losses of NATO's Northern Army Group after the front's initial and follow-up nuclear strikes. It also outlines the proposals for the front's reorganization and regrouping to renew the offensive following another nuclear strike.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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DATE OF
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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 25a : Restoring the Combat Effectiveness of the Troops, Eliminating the Aftereffects of the Employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction by the Enemy, and Developing the Operation

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as army commanders, chiefs of front operations and intelligence directorates, and front chiefs of staff in describing the losses sustained by the front and one of its armies after a NATO nuclear strike with 400 nuclear munitions and strikes with toxic neuroparalytic chemical agents. Despite these strikes, the front retained its combat effectiveness (only 8 of its 21 first-echelon divisions lost effectiveness); and it still had available 117 nuclear missile launchers, 4,000 tanks, and 620 aircraft. Even though it lost 11 of its 25 divisions, NATO's Northern Army Group also retained its combat effectiveness after the front's nuclear strikes, still having available 56 nuclear missile launchers, 200 atomic artillery pieces, 3,000 tanks, and 600 aircraft. The front would require two days to eliminate the aftereffects of the nuclear and chemical strikes, reorganize and regroup, and then renew the offensive following a nuclear strike with 50 warheads.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this lesson probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany
Blue -- Great Britain
Green -- United States
Lilac -- Belgium
Violet -- The Netherlands

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Lesson No. 25a, 25b*

I. Lesson subject: Restoring the combat effectiveness of the troops, eliminating the aftereffects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, and developing the operation.

II. Estimated time for conducting Lessons Nos. 25a and b:

Number and designation of lessons	Time allocated, in hours		
	Group training exercise	Individual study	Total
<u>Lesson No. 25a.</u> Estimating the forces and means of each side after nuclear strikes. Orders of the front commander on restoring the combat effectiveness of the troops and eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction.	4	7	11
<u>Lesson No. 25b.</u> Refining the decision to develop the offensive operation.	4	6	10

* Translator's note: Lesson No. 25b will be disseminated as a separate report.

III. Training objectives:

-- to give the students practice in evaluating the condition of each side's troops after nuclear strikes;

-- to teach the students how to make an evaluation of the forces and means of each side after nuclear strikes, and how to make the decision to restore the combat effectiveness of the troops and eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction;

-- to give practice in making decisions and assigning tasks to the troops on the development of the offensive operation.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson -- group exercise with elements of a command-staff exercise.


V. Methodological recommendations regarding the students' preparation for the lesson.

In accordance with the schedule of the lessons, the instructor sets the time that the students receive the operational assignment and maps with the situation at 2400 hours 10 September.

At the beginning of independent study, the lesson director recommends to the students:

1. That they study the Field Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, pp. 147-156, 176-179, 216-220, 240, 251-252; the Field Service Manual for Staffs, pp. 24-27, 33, 67-71, 74, 93, 95-97, 102, 143, Appendices 1 and 3; and the textbook Front Offensive Operations.

2. He explains the scope and content of the work which the students must complete during preparation for the lesson: to study the situation and evaluate the condition of both sides' troops after the nuclear strikes; to prepare the reports of the 6th Army commander, the chief of the operations directorate, the chief of the intelligence directorate, and the front chief of staff; to make the decision for the front commander on the development of the offensive operation; and to prepare the orders of the front commander on restoring the combat effectiveness of the troops and eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction.



He recommends that the students write down in their workbooks the content of the reports, the decision of the front commander and his orders. The day before conducting the lesson it is advisable to assign students to the posts of front commander, chief of staff, chief of the intelligence directorate, chief of the operations directorate, chief of rocket troops and artillery, chief of air defense troops, front chief of the rear, the chiefs of branch arms and services, and the army commanders.

VI. Procedure for conduct of the lesson

Lesson No. 25a.

Evaluation of the condition of each side's troops after the nuclear strikes, according to the situation at 2400 hours 10 September.

The students, playing the role of 6th Army commander, report on the following matters:

- the installations which were subjected to enemy nuclear strikes, and the number and yield of the nuclear warheads employed against them;
- the damage inflicted on troops and army installations by enemy nuclear and chemical weapons, and the condition and combat effectiveness of the army's large units, units, and rear services installations;
- data on the radiation, chemical, and engineer situation in the army zone;
- the capabilities of the army's troops to perform assigned tasks;
- the decision of the army commander according to the situation at 2400 hours 10 September.

Report of the 6th Army commander
(30 minutes)

From 1630 hours to 1730 hours 10 September the enemy delivered a massed nuclear strike against the troops and rear services installations of the army, and continued to deliver single and grouped strikes until 2400 hours, employing nuclear, chemical, and conventional munitions. The enemy employed a total of about 60 nuclear warheads and toxic agents of the VX type.

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According to generalized data, the greatest destruction was inflicted on the 5th and 19th tank divisions, against each of which the enemy employed 15 to 16 nuclear warheads. As a result, the tank divisions sustained losses of up to 65 to 70 percent and for all practical purposes have lost their combat effectiveness. Strikes with nuclear warheads and VX-type toxic agents have been delivered as follows: eight against the 12th Motorized Rifle Division, seven against the 17th Motorized Rifle Division, five against the 6th Army Missile Brigade, four against the 6th Surface-to-Air Missile /SAM/ Brigade, and two against the 6th SAM Regiment. The command post and forward control post have been put out of action. According to tentative data, the army's losses in personnel, weapons, and equipment comprise: 35 to 40 percent for the 17th Motorized Rifle Division, up to 30 percent for the 12th Motorized Rifle Division, and 15 to 20 percent for the air defense troops; the condition of the 5th and 19th tank divisions is being updated.

The army has lost eight R-300 /operational-tactical missile/ launchers, nine R-65 /tactical missile/ launchers, six launchers of the 6th SAM Brigade, and four launchers of the 6th SAM Regiment.

Massive centers of destruction and fires have been created in the troops' disposition areas and movement routes. As a result of the 5th and 19th tank divisions' loss of combat effectiveness, a gap with a frontage of up to 35 to 40 km has been formed in the army's operational disposition on the axis of the army's main thrust. Out of the three first-echelon divisions, only the 12th Motorized Rifle Division has retained its combat effectiveness, which requires the reestablishment of the army's attack grouping. The subunits and units of the first-echelon divisions which have retained their combat effectiveness have gone over to the attack and have advanced 10 to 15 km on separate axes.

The remaining army troops are restoring control and taking measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear strikes.

I have decided: while continuing the delivery of nuclear strikes against newly detected means of nuclear attack and against the enemy's surviving groupings, to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of nuclear weapons under cover of the units and subunits which have retained their combat effectiveness and of the army's antitank reserve and mobile obstacle detachment, and to restore by 1600 hours 11 September the combat effectiveness of the army's large units and units (except for the 5th and 19th tank divisions).

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Effective the morning of 11 September, by committing the 17th Motorized Rifle Division to battle immediately following the nuclear strikes, to renew the offensive with the forces of two divisions (12th and 17th motorized rifle divisions) in the direction of SULINGEN, DIEPHOLZ, complete the defeat of the opposing units of the Brown 11th Motorized Infantry Division and 3rd Tank Division, and by the close of 11 September seize the line VECHTA, DIEPHOLZ, ESPELKAMP. To subsequently develop the offensive in the direction of DIEPHOLZ, LINGEN.

I request: the delivery of nuclear and air strikes against the advancing enemy reserves; the reinforcement of the army with two divisions; the withdrawal of the 5th and 19th tank divisions which have lost their combat effectiveness to the front reserve.

The students in the role of the chief of the operations directorate report to the Coastal Front commander the status and balance of the front troops according to the situation at 2400 hours 10 September.

Outline of the report:

- the number and yield of nuclear warheads which have been delivered against the troops and installations in the front offensive zone;
- the losses from enemy nuclear and chemical strikes and conventional means of destruction, and the condition of the front troops;
- the radiation and chemical situation in the front zone;
- the condition of the front's troop control.

Report of the chief of the operations directorate of the front staff
(45 minutes)

From 1630 to 1730 hours 10 September the enemy delivered a massed nuclear strike against the troops, airfields, and rear services installations of the front, and until 2400 hours continued to deliver single and grouped strikes by rocket troops and aviation, employing nuclear, chemical, and conventional munitions.

By 2400 hours 10 September the enemy had employed 400 nuclear munitions against the troops and rear services installations of the Coastal Front, including about 40 with ground bursts. The enemy delivered air strikes against 35 to 40 front installations employing toxic agents with

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neuroparalytic effects.

As a result of the enemy's nuclear and chemical strikes, massive centers of destruction and fires and sizable areas of radioactive and chemical contamination were created in the disposition areas of the troops and on their forward movement routes. The fixed vehicular and railroad bridges across the rivers ODER and ELBE have been destroyed.

The troops, control posts, and rear services installations of the front have sustained considerable losses. The following have been destroyed and put out of action by enemy strikes:

-- in the rocket troops -- 97 launchers, consisting of 42 for operational-tactical missiles (2nd Front Missile Brigade -- 9, 3rd Front Missile Brigade -- 4, 4th Army Missile Brigade --- 4, 2nd Corps Missile Brigade -- 3, 7th Army Missile Brigade -- 5, 6th Army Missile Brigade -- 8, 9th Army Missile Brigade -- 6, 10th Army Missile Brigade - 3) and of 55 launchers in the separate missile battalions of the divisions. At present the front has 117 launchers (60 for operational-tactical missiles, 57 for tactical missiles) and 105 nuclear-armed missiles (39 operational-tactical missiles, 66 tactical missiles).

The front rocket troops have retained their combat effectiveness and are in a condition to continue fulfilling their combat tasks.

-- in the 1st Air Army, total losses comprise about 200 aircraft, including 78 fighters, 77 fighter-bombers, 20 bombers, 21 reconnaissance aircraft, and 5 electronic countermeasures /aircraft/. The air army has 620 aircraft and 120 nuclear bombs at its disposal, and thus has retained its combat effectiveness and is in a condition to continue fulfilling the assigned tasks;

-- in the air defense troops of the front and at the airfields of the 1st Air Army, enemy nuclear strikes destroyed up to 9 KRUG batteries, 2 S-75 SAM battalions, and 7 air defense radar posts; a number of batteries and radar posts are now in zones with high levels of radiation, chemical contamination, and fires. All this considerably complicates the conditions for conducting air defense and requires the maneuvering of forces and means to restore solid radar coverage at low and medium altitudes, especially of the first-line posts, the maneuvering of SAM subunits and units to cover the most important installations and troop groupings, and the taking of air defense means out of the centers of destruction and zones of contamination. Although the fire capabilities of the air defense troops have decreased by

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15 to 20 percent as a whole, the air defense system of the front has not been disrupted. The air defense troops are combat-effective and are continuing to fulfill their assigned tasks in the existing grouping, taking measures to eliminate aftereffects, and to restore disrupted control and the combat effectiveness of the units and subunits which were subjected to enemy nuclear strikes.

In the line units of the front, 27 out of 28 divisions have been subjected in varying degree to enemy nuclear and chemical strikes. Nine of them, including four tank divisions, have lost their combat effectiveness (the 14th Motorized Rifle Division of the 4th Army, the 1st and 11th motorized rifle divisions and 9th Tank Division of the 7th Army, the 5th and 19th tank divisions of the 6th Army, the 21st and 23rd motorized rifle divisions of the 9th Army, and the 25th Tank Division of the 10th Army). The remaining 19 divisions have retained their combat effectiveness. In this process, 8 of the 21 first-echelon divisions have lost combat effectiveness.

All of the nine divisions which have lost combat effectiveness are to be withdrawn to the armies' and front's reserves, and require the decontamination treatment of personnel and combat equipment and the restoration of combat effectiveness.

The 7th and 6th armies have sustained the greatest losses. In the 7th Army, three out of five divisions have lost combat effectiveness; in the 6th Army two out of four divisions have lost combat effectiveness. As a result of this, gaps reaching frontages of 40 km or more have been formed in the operational disposition of the 7th and 6th armies.

The first-echelon divisions which have retained combat effectiveness have renewed the offensive with their forward units and subunits on separate axes and, overcoming demolitions and centers of fires, have advanced 8 to 15 km.

The first-echelon armies and the 2nd Army Corps, with the exception of the 6th Army, do not have second echelons.

The following can be used to restore the attack groupings of the armies and front: the 17th Motorized Rifle Division -- the second echelon of the 6th Army; the 20th Tank Division and 28th Motorized Rifle Division -- the reserve, and the 10th Tank Army -- the second echelon of the front, with corresponding readiness by 11 and 12 September.

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The divisions of the front reserve are located at a distance of 130 to 150 km and the 10th Tank Army at 300 to 350 km from the line of possible commitment to battle. From one to two days will be required to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear strikes, to assign tasks, to move forward under conditions of the presence of destruction and centers of fires, and also to cross the ELBE River and to commit them to battle.

The radiation situation which has developed in the disposition area of the 10th Tank Army does not permit it to begin forward movement for another 10 to 12 hours, i.e. following a drop in the radiation level. Consequently, the 10th Tank Army can begin the forward movement for commitment to battle only in the second half of 11 September.

Front engineer troops will require about one day to clear passages in the zones of destruction, to contain the centers of fires, and to prepare routes and the crossings of the ELBE River for the forward movement of the 10th Tank Army to the line of commitment to battle.

Troop control has been disrupted to a considerable degree by the enemy's nuclear and chemical strikes. The front's forward control post, the auxiliary communications center of the General Staff, the command post of the 4th Army, the command post and rear control post of the 7th Army, the command post and forward control post of the 6th Army, and the rear control post of the 1st Air Army have been destroyed; the rear control post of the front has been contaminated with VX toxic agents and requires decontamination treatment. To restore the control posts of the front and armies which have been put out of action will require using a sizable portion of the reserve of communications means and of officer personnel. One to two days will be required to carry out these measures.

In order to ascertain the actual radiation and chemical situation in the front zone it will be necessary to reconnoiter up to 1,000 km of routes and up to 2,000 to 2,500 square kilometers of contaminated areas, which will require 10 to 12 hours. All this enables us to conclude that the first-echelon armies can renew the offensive starting at 1200 to 1400 hours 12 September, but that the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon -- the 10th Tank Army -- is possible no earlier than the morning of 13 September.

In the rear services units and installations of the front the enemy's nuclear strikes have destroyed 58,000 tons of munitions, 64,000 tons of fuel, about 12,000 tons of other materiel, one regulating station, a spare regulating station, the regulating port at SWINOUJSCIE, and other rear

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services installations.

Up to 50 percent of the fixed depots, rear services large units, units, and installations are in centers of fires; considerable sections of highways and railways are destroyed and obstructed. The demolished railroad bridges on the ODER and ELBE rivers will halt the arrival of materiel from the rear services of the Center and its delivery to the troops by rail unless temporary transshipment areas are organized.

According to preliminary calculations, the losses of materiel reserves at front depots will not significantly affect the fulfillment of the front's immediate tasks.

Throughout 11 September it is necessary to replenish up to norms the troops' and armies' materiel reserves and to take steps to restore the front's reserves.

The large number of wounded and injured in the line units as well as the incapacitation of two fixed and eight field hospitals require that urgent measures /be taken/ to provide medical assistance to the wounded and injured and to evacuate them to fixed hospital bases.

According to preliminary data, the Coastal Front has a strength of: 117 launchers (60 for operational-tactical missiles, 57 for tactical missiles), 105 nuclear-armed missiles, more than 600 aircraft and 120 nuclear bombs, and 19 divisions that are combat-effective to some degree, including 5 tank divisions, about 4,000 tanks, and more than 3,000 guns and mortars.

Thus, the front troops have retained their combat effectiveness and, after eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction, restoring combat effectiveness, and establishing attack groupings in the armies, can renew the offensive on 12 September immediately following the nuclear strikes, and build it up as of the morning of 13 September through the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon, the 10th Tank Army.

On the right, the Combined Baltic Fleet is completing the defeat of the enemy's naval forces in the Baltic Sea, and is continuing to intensify its efforts in the battle against the enemy's naval forces in the North Sea.

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On the left, the 3rd Army of the Western Front is conducting combat actions with its main forces to defeat the large units of the Violet 1st Army Corps and Blue 1st Army Corps in cooperation with the 9th Army of the Coastal Front.

The students in the role of chief of the intelligence directorate of the front staff report to the front commander data on the results of the nuclear strikes delivered against the enemy groupings.

Outline of the report:

-- the results of the Coastal Front's initial and follow-up nuclear strikes and the anticipated damage inflicted on the enemy's nuclear means, aviation, air defense means, and troop groupings;

-- the condition of the enemy's troop groupings by axes, and the possible nature of his actions;

-- the assessment of the radioactive contamination of the terrain, the areas of destruction, and the centers of fires;

-- the enemy targets to be destroyed by front nuclear weapons (nuclear means, air defense means, aircraft, and troop groupings);

-- the main reconnaissance tasks.

Report of the chief of the intelligence directorate of the front staff
(45 minutes)

As a result of the Coastal Front's initial and follow-up nuclear strikes, according to data from all types of reconnaissance, the approximate losses of enemy forces amount to 26 launchers of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, 22 Lance and Sergeant launchers, about 60 Honest John launchers, and up to 50 percent of the atomic artillery pieces.

Out of 25 divisions, 11 have lost their combat effectiveness (the Brown 1st, 6th, and 11th motorized infantry divisions, and 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions; the Green 4th Mechanized Division, the Lilac 1st and 101st motorized infantry divisions, and the Blue 1st and 4th armored divisions); 10 of them are first-echelon divisions. The remaining divisions have losses of 15 to 50 percent; at the control posts of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the army corps

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/plural/, the losses amount to up to 50 to 60 percent of the personnel and approximately 70 to 80 percent of the communications means; four control and warning posts and centers and 10 nuclear munitions supply and storage points have been destroyed; 15 airfields have been put out of action, on them up to 100 aircraft have been destroyed, and, taking into account the aircraft shot down from the air, the enemy's total aviation losses amount to approximately 250 aircraft; and 22 Hawk SAM batteries and 4 Nike-Hercules batteries have also been destroyed.

Thus, as a result of the front's massed nuclear strike the Northern Army Group has sustained considerable losses; however, it has retained its combat effectiveness. At 2400 hours 10 September, in its complement it tentatively has up to 56 launchers (16 operational-tactical, 40 tactical), about 200 atomic artillery pieces, over 3,000 tanks, more than 2,000 guns and mortars, up to 600 aircraft, and 14 divisions with varying degrees of combat effectiveness.

Gaps have been formed as follows in the enemy's operational disposition in the sectors of: UELZEN, SOLTAU -- up to 40 km /wide/, REIHEM, HANNOVER -- about 60 km /wide/, and SALZGITTER, HELMSTEDT -- up to 50 km /wide/.

On the HAMBURG axis the enemy, its 13th, 18th, and 21st motorized infantry divisions having suffered losses of up to 50 percent, is continuing to resist the troops of the 4th Army and is stubbornly holding on to the city of HAMBURG. The enemy reserve on this axis -- up to one Heimatschutz infantry brigade /West German home defense troops/ -- is moving from the RENDBURG area in a southerly direction.

On the UELZEN-BREMEN axis, five divisions of the Brown 4th Army Corps and Lilac 1st Army Corps have retained combat effectiveness (the Brown 14th and 15th motorized infantry divisions and 24th Infantry Division, and the Lilac 4th and 5th motorized infantry divisions); three of them are in the first echelon and two are in the reserve.

On the HANNOVER axis in the REIHEM, HILDESHEIM sector, large units of the Brown 1st Army Corps (the 11th Motorized Infantry Division and 3rd and 7th tank divisions) and of the Lilac 2nd Army Corps (the 101st Motorized Infantry Division) have lost their combat effectiveness as a result of nuclear strikes (losses of 65 to 70 percent).

The nearest reserves on this axis are the Brown 5th Army Corps (the 17th, 19th, and 20th motorized infantry divisions) and 25th Infantry

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Division, which have sustained losses of up to 35 to 40 percent, and the 25th Infantry Division /sic/, which has lost up to 50 percent of its personnel, weapons, and combat equipment.

In the HILDESHEIM, HELMSTEDT, GOGLAR /sic -- GOSLAR/ area, out of four divisions of the Lilac 2nd Army Corps and Blue 1st Army Corps, two divisions have retained combat effectiveness (the Lilac 301st Motorized Infantry Division and the Blue 2nd Armored Division). The enemy's reserves in this sector have not been ascertained.

The deep operational reserves -- up to six divisions -- the 5th and 7th motorized infantry divisions of the Blue 2nd Army Corps, the Blue 3rd Infantry Division, and the 2nd, 4th, and 6th motorized infantry divisions of the Violet 2nd Army Corps, were subjected to nuclear strikes by the Strategic Rocket Forces and sustained losses within a range of 45 and 50 percent.

The air forces of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force are continuing to deliver single and grouped nuclear strikes against front troops, and are supporting their troops, concentrating their main efforts on the HANNOVER axis.

The enemy air defense large units and units have sustained losses of up to 30 to 50 percent. The enemy's air defense system has been disrupted.

Extensive zones of destruction and centers of fires have formed in the enemy's disposition as a result of the front's nuclear strikes, which decreases his capability to maneuver forces and means from the interior and especially along the front. The most sizable zones of destruction and fires have formed in the areas of FLENSBURG, RENDBURG, ECKERNFORDE; BREMEN, OSNABRUCK, NIENBURG; and MINDEN, BIELEFELD, ALFELD.

In view of the large troop losses in the first operational echelon, and the presence of sizable zones of destruction and centers of fires, in the next one to two days the enemy can hardly undertake any vigorous offensive actions with major forces. By moving forward the nearest operational reserves -- up to six divisions -- the enemy will strive to close the gaps which have formed in the troops' operational disposition for the purpose of preventing further development of the front troop offensive into their depth. He will attempt to alter the balance of forces in his favor by delivering nuclear and conventional strikes against those front rocket troops, aviation, air defense means, and troop groupings which have retained their combat effectiveness. Subsequently, upon the approach of

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the deep operational reserves immediately following the nuclear strikes, he will no doubt go over to the offensive.

The enemy targets to be destroyed by front nuclear weapons are: the surviving launchers of the 2nd Pershing Wing, the Lance missile batteries of the 650th, 450th /sic -- should be 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion/, and 150th missile battalions and of the 24th Missile Regiment; delivery aircraft at airfields; Hawk SAM batteries, the enemy's operational reserves, and the large units and units of the first operational echelon which have retained and restored their combat effectiveness.

The main tasks of reconnaissance are: to determine precisely the losses and combat effectiveness of the units and subunits of the rocket troops and atomic artillery, the aviation, and the first-echelon large units of the enemy; and to determine the strength, concentration areas, and axes of forward movement of the operational reserves of the enemy and his intentions as to their use.

The students in the role of the front chief of staff report to the front commander the conclusions made from their estimate of the situation, and their proposals on restoring the troops' combat effectiveness and developing the operation.

Outline of the report:

-- conclusions from an estimate of the situation and condition of our troops;

-- conclusions from an evaluation of the enemy;

-- proposals for eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction, for restoring the troops' combat effectiveness, and for developing the operation.

Report of the front chief of staff
(40 minutes)

1. The troops of the Coastal Front have sustained significant losses as a result of the enemy's massed nuclear strike. Nine out of 28 divisions have lost combat effectiveness, including eight first-echelon divisions. The remaining 19 divisions have sustained losses of from 10 to 50 percent. The 7th and 6th armies have sustained the heaviest losses; in their

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operational disposition gaps with a width of 40 to 50 km have formed on the axis of the front's main thrust. The armies have lost their attack groupings. The armies and the 2nd Army Corps, with the exception of the 6th Army, do not have second echelons.

The subunits and units of the first-echelon divisions which have not been subjected to enemy nuclear strikes have renewed the offensive on separate axes immediately following the nuclear strikes, and have advanced 10 to 15 km.

The 1st Air Army, with a strength of about 600 aircraft and 120 nuclear bombs, has retained combat effectiveness and is capable of fulfilling its combat tasks.

The front's second echelon, the 10th Tank Army (excluding the 25th Tank Division), and the front's reserve divisions are combat-effective.

The front rocket troops, with a strength of about 117 launchers and 105 nuclear warheads, have retained combat effectiveness.

The air defense troops of the front are combat-effective and are continuing to fulfill their tasks of repelling enemy air strikes.

On the whole, the front troops have retained combat effectiveness and, after eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction, restoring combat effectiveness, and establishing attack groupings, are capable of renewing the offensive effective the morning of 12 September following massed nuclear strikes. The losses of materiel reserves at front and army depots will not substantially affect the fulfillment of the front's immediate task.

2. The enemy, having suffered defeat in the border engagement, has employed nuclear weapons for the purpose of preventing the total defeat by East of the troops of the first operational echelon and the capture of vitally important lines and areas in the depth.

In response to the enemy's massed nuclear strike, the Coastal Front delivered an initial nuclear strike against the nuclear, air, air defense, and ground groupings of the Northern Army Group.

As a result of the front's initial and follow-up nuclear strikes, the following approximate losses have been inflicted on the enemy: 26 Pershing launchers and 22 Lance launchers, approximately 60 Honest John launchers

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and up to 50 percent of the atomic artillery pieces. Ten out of 25 divisions, including the 5th Tank Division, have lost their combat effectiveness. At the control posts of the Northern Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the six army corps, up to 50 to 60 percent of personnel and approximately 60 to 70 percent of the communications means have been put out of action; approximately 250 enemy aircraft have been destroyed.

Gaps and breaches reaching 40 to 45 km have been formed in the enemy's operational disposition on the HANNOVER axis. The large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps and Blue 1st Army Corps are conducting combat actions in semi-encirclement.

Although the enemy's troop grouping in the Coastal Front zone has sustained significant losses, it has retained its combat effectiveness. According to preliminary data it has in its complement 56 launchers, about 200 atomic artillery pieces, over 3,000 tanks, more than 2,000 guns and mortars, up to 600 aircraft, and 15 divisions with varying degrees of combat effectiveness.

No less than two days will be necessary for the enemy to eliminate the aftereffects of the employment of nuclear weapons, to restore the troops' combat effectiveness, and to take organizational measures in the large units and units. As of the morning of 11 September the enemy will be capable of inflicting destruction with grouped nuclear weapons strikes and air strikes against the front's rocket troops, second echelon, and reserves, and the large units and units of the first-echelon armies and the 1st Air Army which have retained combat effectiveness. He can at the same time thicken the defense of the first-echelon troops with the forces of the nearest operational reserves composed of up to six divisions, close the gaps formed in his operational disposition in order to prevent front troops from further developing the offensive into the depth, and gain time to bring up the deep operational reserves.

The operational situation and the actions of our adjacent forces are conducive to the development of the front operation. It is necessary to coordinate the cooperation of the troops of the 9th Army and the Western Front's 3rd Army to complete the defeat of the enemy's SALZGITTER grouping.

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I propose:

1. To complete the elimination of the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction, the restoration of troop combat effectiveness (except for the large units which have lost combat effectiveness), and the establishment of attack groupings: in the armies by 1800 hours 11 September, in the front by 1900 hours 12 September; to replenish the troop and army materiel reserves up to norms by 0600 hours 12 September, and the front materiel reserves by the close of 14 September.

The restoration of combat effectiveness is to begin first with the restoration of the disrupted communications channels with the General Staff and among front control posts, and also of /the channels for/ controlling rocket troops, aviation, the first-echelon armies, and the 2nd Army Corps.

To develop by 0600 hours 11 September a plan to restore combat effectiveness and eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction, and to clarify the tasks of the front troops and the procedure for their replenishment with personnel, combat equipment, and materiel. Based on reconnaissance data, to organize the withdrawal of troops from zones of destruction, fires, and radioactive and chemical contamination to safe areas for the elimination of aftereffects and the restoration of combat effectiveness.

The 11th and 21st motorized rifle divisions and the 25th Tank Division, which have lost combat effectiveness, are to be pulled back to the front reserve and concentrated as follows: the 11th Motorized Rifle Division to the northeast of BERGEN; the 21st Motorized Rifle Division to the northwest of HALDENSLEBEN, the 25th Tank Division to the southeast of KOPENICK. In the divisions which have lost combat effectiveness, restore control and carry out decontamination treatment of their personnel, weapons, and combat equipment; and carry out the necessary organizational measures.

Restore the front attack groupings by drawing on the front's second echelon and its reserve divisions, by regrouping the forces and means in the first-echelon armies, and by using the surviving units and subunits from the complement of the large units which have lost combat effectiveness; and thus have the following /attack groupings/: one made up of the 10th Tank Army, 9th Army, and 6th Army on the HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axis; the 4th Army on the FLENSBURG axis; the 7th Army and 2nd Army Corps on the coastal axis. The front's second echelon, the 10th Tank Army, is to be concentrated in the area of UELZEN, CELLE, KLOTZE by the close of 12

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September. The Front Antitank Reserve No. 2 and Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 1 are to be deployed by 0600 hours 11 September on the RETHEM, SCHWARMSTEDT line in readiness to repel enemy tank attacks.

On the morning of 12 September, deliver a strike with 50 nuclear warheads, and air and artillery strikes employing conventional means of destruction against the enemy's detected means of nuclear attack, aviation, and surviving troop groupings; and renew the offensive with all combat-ready divisions of the first-echelon armies. In order to augment the power of the attack on the axis of the front's main thrust, do the following: on the morning of 13 September commit to battle the front's second echelon -- the 10th Tank Army -- tentatively from the SYKE, UCHTE line in the direction of SULINGEN, DIEPHOLZ, GRONAU; and immediately following the nuclear strikes make a thrust with three armies on the BRUSSELS axis, with the 7th Army and 2nd Army Corps on the coastal axis, and with the 4th Army on the FLENSBURG axis; complete the defeat of the Northern Army Group's main forces and approaching reserves east of the RHINE River, and by the close of 15-16 September fulfill the immediate task of the front.

At the same time, part of the forces of the 7th Army jointly with the 2nd Army Corps are to complete the defeat of the large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps and the 6th and 13th motorized infantry divisions of the Brown 6th Army Corps; and the forces of the 9th Army, in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army are to destroy the encircled SALZGITTER grouping of the Blue 1st Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps.

Subsequently, by developing a rapid offensive, make an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march, defeat the deep operational reserves, and fulfill the front's follow-up task.

The operational disposition of the front troops is to be in one echelon, with the 28th Motorized Rifle Division in reserve.

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