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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

24 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : John H. Stein  
Acting Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Development of  
the Offensive on the Opposite Bank of a Wide Water  
Obstacle with the Simultaneous Repulse of an  
Enemy Counterthrust

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson featuring a Soviet front's assessment of the NATO enemy, front objectives, balance of forces, air army missions, and tasking of the front's five ground armies, one army corps, and air army in the final phase of an offensive drive into The Netherlands and Belgium.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John H. Stein

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 28 : Development of the Offensive on the Opposite Bank of a Wide Water Obstacle with the Simultaneous Repulse of an Enemy Counterthrust

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as front commanders, chiefs of the intelligence and operations directorates, and air army commanders in the assessment of the NATO enemy, estimate of the situation, and tasking of the front's five ground armies, one army corps, air army, and supporting missile, air defense, and radioelectronic warfare units in the final phase of an offensive drive into The Netherlands and Belgium, with the main axis of attack in the direction of Brussels, and involving the capture of West Germany's North Sea coast and the northern portion of the Ruhr industrial area. In this lesson the front has at its disposal 79 nuclear munitions to repel NATO counterattacks and to destroy NATO missile launchers and major ground components, including a US Marine Corps amphibious landing force.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

Brown - West Germany  
Blue - Great Britain  
Green - United States  
Lilac - Belgium  
Violet -- The Netherlands  
Gray -- Denmark

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Lesson No. 28

I. Subject: Development of the offensive on the opposite bank of a wide water obstacle with the simultaneous repulse of an enemy counterthrust.

II. Time allocated for completion of the lesson /in hours/:

	Group training period in classroom	Individual study by students	Total
Lesson No. 28	4	4	8

III. Training objectives:

-- to teach the students how to estimate the situation and make the decision to develop the offensive on the opposite bank of a wide water obstacle with the simultaneous repulse of enemy counterthrusts;

-- to train the students in troop control during the development of the offensive and the repelling of an enemy counterthrust under conditions of the completion of the front's initial offensive operation.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson: group exercise with elements of a command-staff exercise.

V. Methodological recommendations during preparation for the lesson:

When the students begin their individual study for the lesson, the director of the training group conducts general and individual consultations. During these he recommends that they study the theoretical principles of the subject in the textbook Front Offensive Operations, pp. 197-201, 211-215, 220-221; and the assignment and map with the troop locations of both sides as of 1500 hours 17 September.

After they have studied the theoretical principles, he makes recommendations to the students on the degree of thoroughness with which the situation is to be established, the calculations to be made in order to

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substantiate the decision, the plotting of the latter on the map at the scale of the front, and also on the preparation and presentation of reports by them in the roles of the chiefs of the intelligence and operations directorates of the front staff, the commander of the 1st Air Army, and the front commander.

VI. Procedure for conduct of lesson:

In order to achieve the training objectives, it is recommended to conduct this lesson using the method of group exercise with elements of a command-staff exercise, and to work out the following training topics:

1. The theory of the topic -- 20 min.
2. Estimate of the situation -- 70 min.
  - assessment of the enemy -- 25 min.
  - assessment of our troops -- 45 min.
3. Report of the decision of the front commander -- 80 min.
4. Critique of the lesson -- 10 min.

First training topic. With respect to theory, it is advisable to examine only this topic -- "The situational conditions and troop tasks during development of the offensive and completion of the front offensive operation." In their responses on this topic the students should attain a clear understanding of the theoretical principles stated in the textbook Front Offensive Operations, pp. 197-201, 220, and 221.

Second training topic -- the estimate of the situation -- is to be worked out by sequentially listening to students' reports in the roles of the chiefs of the intelligence and the operations directorates of the front staff and of commander of the 1st Air Army.

In the case of the reports of the chief of the intelligence directorate, the conclusions from the evaluation of the enemy must focus on the complete and precise elaboration of the following matters:

- the strength of the enemy grouping in the offensive zone of the Coastal Front and the capabilities for its reinforcement;

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- the possible nature of enemy actions;
- the reconnaissance tasks of the front.

VARIANT OF THE REPORT  
of the chief of the intelligence directorate of the front staff

The enemy, having suffered defeat in the battles west of BREMEN, for the RHINE River, and for the RUHR industrial area, is continuing to offer stubborn resistance to the offensive of the Coastal Front troops with shattered units of the Brown 1st, 4th, and 5th army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, the Lilac 1st Army Corps, and the Violet 2nd Army Corps. At the same time, by committing fresh reserves and new contingents to battle he is striving to prevent front troops from breaking through to the western and southwestern Lilac and Violet borders. For this purpose he has delivered two grouped nuclear strikes against the troops of the 6th and 7th armies and the 10th Tank Army, has committed two fresh divisions of the Blue 2nd Army Corps to battle, and with them has delivered a counterthrust against the advancing troops of the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army. At dawn on 17 September he landed an amphibious landing force north of OLDENBURG made up of two Green marine /corps/ brigades, a Green mechanized division, and a Green airmobile brigade, with which he has gone over to the offensive and which, together with the airborne landing force that landed at 1500 hours in the area of WILDESHAUSEN, has developed a threat to the 7th Army's transportation lines and rear.

At 1500 hours 17 September, the enemy's first echelon is conducting combat actions with 13 shattered divisions (having sustained losses of up to 40 to 50 percent), two fresh divisions, two marine /corps/ brigades, and an airmobile brigade. These contain 25 to 30 operational-tactical missile launchers, more than 50 tactical missile launchers, 130 to 150 atomic artillery pieces, about 2,500 medium tanks, 1,200 to 1,250 guns and mortars, and over 800 antitank means.

The force resisting our troops' offensive can be built up by using the enemy reserves advancing from the areas of AMSTERDAM and LIEGE, whose arrival is possible by the close of 17 September and by the morning of 18 September. According to reconnaissance data, it has been established in this case that the strength of the advancing enemy reserves approximately numbers up to two infantry divisions, one motorized infantry division, and one parachute brigade, which may have in their complement 4 to 6 operational-tactical missile launchers and up to 12 tactical missile launchers, over 30 atomic artillery pieces, up to 700 medium tanks, 750 guns and mortars, and about 300 antitank means.

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Based on this, and considering the importance of the RHINE River as a strategic line, it must be expected that the enemy will strive to halt the offensive of the front's main troop grouping on THE HAGUE and BRUSSELS axes in the near future by means of a massed nuclear strike and counterthrusts from the areas east of APELDOORN and the RUHR industrial area in the general direction of MUNSTER; and by an offensive with the Brown 8th Army Corps from the VENLO area toward REES, with part of its forces going to RHEINBERG, he will try to throw back 10th Tank Army and 9th Army troops across the RHINE River; whereupon he will temporarily go over to the defense along its western bank and prevent the breakthrough of front troops to THE HAGUE and to Violet's southeast borders.

In the 7th Army's offensive zone, /the enemy/ will strive to prevent our troops from reaching the shore of the North Sea northeast and northwest of GRONINGEN by means of delaying actions on natural lines and by an amphibious landing force thrust from the area east of OLDENBURG towards WILDESHAUSEN.

The tasks of reconnaissance can be:

-- to continually reconnoiter the nuclear attack means and the /level of/ readiness to employ nuclear weapons;

-- to determine the possibility and time of the enemy's delivery of a massed nuclear strike;

-- to determine the enemy reserves' time of approach to the front line, the deployment areas, and the axes of their actions.

2./sic/ In the report of the chief of the operations directorate of the front staff the conclusions from the assessment of our troops should pay special attention to the precise elaboration of:

-- the operational situation of front troops;

--- the balance of forces and means;

-- the availability and capability of employing nuclear weapons;

-- the capability of building up efforts for the development of the offensive and the establishment of troop groupings for completion of the front offensive operation.

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VARIANT OF THE REPORT  
of the chief of the operations directorate of the front staff

During 15 to 17 September the troops of the Coastal Front, developing the offensive on the coastal and BRUSSELS axes, have defeated the large units of the Northern Army Group, have made an assault crossing from the march of the IJssel River south of ZWOLLE, and with the forces of the 9th Tank Division and the 28th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Army, together with the 29th Motorized Rifle Division of the 10th Tank Army, have engaged in fierce battle against the Blue counterthrust grouping west of ALMELO, HENGELO, ENSCHEDE.

On the approaches to the RHINE River they have routed the counterthrust grouping made up of the Violet 2nd Army Corps, and by 1500 hours 17 September have encircled its remnants north of MUNSTER. Forces of the 10th Tank Army and 9th Army have advanced to a depth of 60 to 80 km, and with three tank divisions in cooperation with an operational landing force -- the 30th Airborne Division -- have made an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march, seized three bridgeheads, and thus established conditions for developing the offensive on the BRUSSELS axis.

On the coastal axis, the large units of the 7th Army have pressed the remnants of the Brown 14th Motorized Infantry Division and the Lilac 1st Army Corps to the sea, while the 1st Motorized Rifle Division has reached the approaches to GRONINGEN. The forces of the 13th Motorized Rifle Division, and part of the forces of the 12th and 17th motorized rifle divisions, have been conducting tenacious combat from the morning of 17 September against the Green amphibious landing force which had debarked in the areas of BREMERHAVEN and WILHELMSHAVEN, where as a result of the fierce battle they /East/ have given up BRAKE, VAREL, OLDENBURG and as of 1500 hours 17 September are holding the bridgehead on the west bank of the WESER River south of BRAKE, as well as the line HUDE, HATTEN, OSTERNBURG, BLOHERFELDE, RASTEDE, LAND /unlocated/, HALSBEK, ZETEL.

By this time the Coastal Front conducting combat actions in single-echelon formation has deployed on these axes 17 divisions (eight motorized rifle divisions, eight tank divisions, one airborne division) in close contact with the enemy; /these divisions/ contained, together with the reinforcing and front-subordinate units and large units, 66 operational-tactical missile launchers, 41 tactical missile launchers, 2,760 medium tanks, 2,616 guns and mortars, and 1,200 antitank means.

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In the armies' second echelon and the front reserve there are 6 motorized rifle divisions available, of which the 4th, 11th, and 21st motorized rifle divisions and the 2nd Army Corps (the 3rd and 24th motorized rifle divisions) are at 65 to 70 percent strength, and the 8th Motorized Rifle Division is at 50 percent strength. The units and subunits of these divisions have in their complement 4 operational-tactical missile launchers, 14 tactical missile launchers, 830 medium tanks, 755 guns and mortars, and 725 antitank means.

The balance of forces, in this operational situation for front troops, is characterized by the following data:

	Considering only the first echelon			Considering the second echelon and reserves of each side		
	Our troops	Enemy	Balance	Our troops	Enemy	Balance
Launchers	107	up to 60	1.8:1	125	up to 72	1.7:1
Consisting of:						
for op-tac msls	66	up to 30	2:1	70	up to 30	2.3:1
for tac msls	41	up to 30	1.3:1	55	42	1.3:1
Divisions	17	16	1:1	23	19	1.2:1
Medium tanks	2,760	2,500	1.1:1	3,590	3,200	1.1:1
Guns and mortars	2,765	1,250	2.3:1	3,520	2,000	1.7:1
Including:						
Atomic	--	150	absolute	--	180	absolute
Antitank means	1,200	800	1.5:1	1,925	1,100	1.7:1

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It can be seen from this table that the operational situation of front troops permits the successful development of the offensive, while the availability of nuclear weapons makes it possible to destroy the opposing enemy, his means of nuclear attack, and his reserves.

Rocket troops and front aviation /sic/ have the following number of nuclear munitions in this case:

	Total	Consisting of:												
		Op-tac msls			Tac msls			Nuclear bombs						
		20 kt	40 kt	100 kt	3 kt	10 kt	20 kt	5 kt	10 kt	20 kt	100 kt	200 kt	300 kt	
2nd <u>Front</u> Missile Brigade	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3rd <u>Front</u> Missile Brigade	3	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Front</u> mobile missile technical bases (2)	26	5	7	-	4	4	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7th Army	5	1	1	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6th Army	7	2	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th Tank Army	4	-	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9th Army	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2nd Army Corps	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1st Air Army	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	3	2	4	9	4	
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	

Of these 79 nuclear munitions, the rocket troops and front aviation have 53 nuclear munitions in readiness for employment after 30 to 40 minutes, which, in our opinion, it would be advisable to employ in a front

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massed nuclear strike to destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons and defeat his counterthrust groupings and reserves advancing from the interior. The remaining 26 nuclear munitions are in the front mobile missile technical bases in Readiness No. 4.

On the JUTLAND axis, the troops of the 4th Army (the 7th and 16th motorized rifle divisions and the 2nd Tank Division) have fulfilled the assigned task and are located in the previous areas. Its 8th Motorized Rifle Division is to be pulled back to the front reserve after completing the destruction of the enemy in HAMBURG. There are two nuclear missiles in the army's mobile missile technical base (1 of 10 kt, 1 of 20 kt).

Thus, the operational situation of the front troops and the availability of nuclear weapons will enable us to concentrate our main efforts on the BRUSSELS axis and, following massed nuclear and air strikes, to commit first one motorized rifle division to battle, then on the morning of 18 September -- the 2nd Army Corps and the remaining divisions of the front reserve.

The defeat of the Green amphibious landing force is to be carried out by the forces of the 7th Army in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet.

The front offensive operation is to be continued in the previous operational disposition, and upon its completion the first operational echelon is to have:

-- on the JUTLAND axis -- retain the 4th Army made up of the 7th and 16th motorized rifle divisions, the 2nd Tank Division, and the 4th Army Missile Brigade;

-- on the coastal and HAGUE axes -- one combined-arms army and one army corps made up of the 7th Army (the 1st, 4th, 12th, and 17th motorized rifle divisions) and the 2nd Army Corps (the 11th and 24th motorized rifle divisions and the 15th Tank Division);

-- on the BRUSSELS axis -- one combined-arms army and one tank army made up of the 6th Army (the 3rd, 28th, and 29th motorized rifle divisions and the 9th Tank Division) and the 10th Tank Army (the 5th, 25th, and 26th tank divisions and the 21st Motorized Rifle Division).

In the front's second echelon -- the 9th Army (the 6th and 18th motorized rifle divisions and the 20th Tank Division); and in the reserve

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-- the 8th and 13th motorized rifle divisions, the 10th and 22nd tank divisions, and the 30th Airborne Division.

3. In the report of the commander of the 1st Air Army it is advisable to clarify the following topics:

-- the combat status of the air army and the capabilities to employ front and army aviation;

-- the available flight resources and proposals as to their allocation.

VARIANT OF THE REPORT  
of the commander of the 1st Air Army

The 1st Air Army has its combat aircraft inventory at 65 to 70 percent strength, and at 1500 hours 17 September has the following aircraft: 240 fighters, 210 fighter-bombers, 70 bombers, 74 reconnaissance aircraft, and 245 army aviation fire support helicopters.

With this combat strength it is able to perform combat tasks both during the day and at night: to destroy the enemy's nuclear attack means and aircraft at airfields, and to neutralize his reserves. In the process, the fighter-bomber and bomber aviation can neutralize up to 20 enemy battalion-size targets; the fighter aviation can cover the troops of the front's main attack grouping and destroy up to 40 to 50 enemy aircraft in the air; the reconnaissance aviation can carry out up to 50 to 60 aircraft sorties; and the army aviation with forces of four fire support regiments can destroy up to 180 to 200 tanks and other armored equipment.

The army's airfield basing permits it to concentrate its main efforts on the air support of the troop offensive on the BRUSSELS axis.

Until the end of the operation the air army has retained 27 nuclear bombs, 3 army sorties of front aviation, and 15 regimental sorties of army aviation. By the close of 17 September, the army's large units and units can make 23 regimental sorties of front aviation and up to 6 regimental sorties of army aviation. It is advisable to use the army's remaining flight resources in the following days of the operation so as to have no fewer than 20 regimental sorties in the front reserve at the end of the operation.

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The main tasks of the army should be considered to be:

-- the destruction of the launchers of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, of the 150th Lance Battalion, of the Lance missile regiments of the Brown 1st Army Corps and Blue 2nd Army Corps, and of the 550th /sic -- should be 510th/ Sergeant Missile Battalion of the Brown 5th Army Corps;

-- the defeat of the counterthrust groupings of the Blue 1st and 2nd army corps and the neutralization of the advancing large units of the Brown 8th Army Corps;

-- the destruction of the Green amphibious landing force south of BREMEN and WILHELMSHAVEN;

-- the conduct of air reconnaissance and simultaneous destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack means and his aircraft at airfields.

Third training topic -- The report of the decision of the front commander for development of the offensive on the opposite bank of a wide water obstacle with the simultaneous repulse of enemy counterthrusts is to be worked out using the method of group exercise, and two to three students are to be heard over the course of 80 minutes, paying special attention to the content of their concept of the decision and troop combat tasks.

VARIANT OF THE REPORT  
of the front commander

I have decided: to use massed nuclear and air strikes to destroy the enemy's detected means of nuclear attack and to defeat the units of the Green amphibious landing force south of BREMEN and WILHELMSHAVEN, the large units of the Blue 2nd Army Corps west of ENSCHEDE, the remnants of the Brown 5th Army Corps in the HELMOND, ROERMOND, KREFELD area, the Blue 1st Army Corps south of RECKLINGHAUSEN, and the advancing large units of the Brown 8th Army Corps upon their deployment south of VENLO. The defeat of West is to be completed through a decisive offensive by the troops of the 6th Army, the 10th Tank Army, and as of the morning of 18 September, of the 2nd Army Corps in the directions of APELDOORN, THE HAGUE; DEVENTER, ARNHEM, MECHELEN; REES, VENLO, WEERT, BRUSSELS, with part of their forces going towards MAASTRICHT; and by the close of 19 to 20 September they are to reach the line of the front operation's goal.

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The 7th Army, in its zone and in cooperation with the forces of the Combined Baltic Fleet, is to decisively develop the offensive in the previous directions, and by the close of 18 to 19 September it is to defeat the units of the Green amphibious landing force, destroy the remnants of the Lilac 1st Army Corps, and reach the coast of the North Sea, where it will organize the defense and prevent subsequent enemy amphibious landings.

In the massed nuclear and air strikes, 53 nuclear munitions, 23 regimental sorties of front aviation, and 6 regimental sorties of army aviation are to be employed.

Tasks of the troops:

-- The 4th Army (the 7th and 16th motorized rifle divisions and the 2nd Tank Division) is to intensify surveillance of the Gray national border and be in readiness to perform new tasks;

-- The 7th Army (the 1st, 4th, 12th, 13th, and 17th motorized rifle divisions) with the previous means of reinforcement, is to destroy the Honest John launchers north of WITTMUND, the control posts of the Lilac 1st Army Corps, Brown 1st Army Corps, and Green 10th Mechanized Division, and to defeat the units of the Green amphibious landing force south of BREMEN and WILHELMSHAVEN. With the commitment of the 4th Motorized Rifle Division to battle and the decisive offensive of the first-echelon troops, it is to defeat the opposing enemy and by the close of 18 to 19 September reach the coast of the North Sea, where it will organize its defense and subsequently prevent enemy amphibious landings, having no less than three motorized rifle divisions in its first echelon. Following the defeat of the Green amphibious landing force, the 13th Motorized Rifle Division is to be pulled back to the front reserve and concentrated in the area west of OLDENBURG.

The army's command post as of 18 September is at LEER.

The boundary line on the left is the former one.

-- The 6th Army (the 28th and 29th motorized rifle divisions and the 9th and 15th tank divisions) with the previous means of reinforcement, is to destroy the remnants of the Brown 17th Infantry Division southwest of ZWOLLE and the Blue counterthrust grouping south of ALMELO with a massed nuclear strike and army aviation actions. The main forces of the army, in a rapid offensive in the directions of HELLENDORRN, AMERSFOORT and DEVENTER, NIJMEGEN, are to complete the defeat of the opposing enemy and by the morning of 18 September seize the line NIJKERK, HOEVELAKEN, EDE,

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RENKUM, NIJMEGEN, where the 11th Motorized Rifle Division, the 15th Tank Division, and the sector of the front from NIJKERK to EDE will be transferred to the 2nd Army Corps.

Subsequently, with the forces of the 3rd, 28th, and 29th motorized rifle divisions and the 9th Tank Division it will develop the offensive in the direction of NIJMEGEN, TURNHOUT, MECHELEN; with part of its forces going toward BERGEN OP ZOOM it will destroy the enemy's new contingents, and by the close of 19 to 20 September will each Violet's southeast /sic -- southwest/ border on the line BRUGGE, RONE /sic -- ?RONSE/, EDINGEN /sic -- ?ENGHIEN/ having no less than three divisions in its first echelon.

The army's command post as of 18 September is DIEREN (10 km northeast of ARNHEM).

The boundary line on the left is FREMEN /sic -- ?FREREN/, (excluding) HENGELO, MILLINGEN AAN DE RIJN (8 km east of NIJMEGEN), (excluding) EINDHOVEN, VILVOORDE.

Four nuclear missiles are additionally allocated to the army (1 of 3 kt, 2 of 10 kt, 1 of 40 kt).

-- The 2nd Army Corps (the 11th and 24th motorized rifle divisions and the 15th Tank Division) is to receive from the 6th Army the sector of the front from NIJKERK to EDE; and by a rapid offensive in the direction of AMERSFOORT, THE HAGUE, with part of its forces going toward AMSTERDAM, is to defeat the Blue 3rd Motorized Infantry Division, seize THE HAGUE by the close of 19 to 20 September, and reach the coast of the North Sea, where it will organize the defense of the DEN HELDER, HELLEVOETSLUIS line, having no less than two divisions in its first echelon.

The army corps' command post as of the morning of 18 September is at BARNEVELD.

The boundary line on the left is APELDOORN, EDE, TIEL, and then along the WAAL River.

Four nuclear missiles are allocated to the corps (1 of 3 kt, 3 of 20 kt).

-- The 10th Tank Army (the 5th, 22nd, and 25th tank divisions and the 29th Motorized Rifle Division), with the previous reinforcement means, is to destroy by a massed nuclear strike and army aviation actions the enemy's

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detected means of nuclear attack and defeat the Brown 5th Army Corps in the HELMOND, ROERMOND, KREFELD area and the Brown 8th Army Corps large units which are advancing from the south, upon their deployment south of VENLO.

With a thrust by two tank divisions on HELMOND and BLERICK, it is to defeat their remnants and by the morning of 18 September seize the HELMOND, BLERICK line. With the forces of the 29th Motorized Rifle Division together with the troops of the 6th Army and of /one of/ the front's antitank reserves -- the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade -- it is to defeat the Blue counterthrust grouping and prevent its breakthrough to MUNSTER. After defeating the enemy west of ENSCHEDE and destroying the encircled remnants of the Violet 2nd Army Corps north of MUNSTER, it is to transfer the 29th Motorized Rifle Division to the complement of the 6th Army, withdraw the 22nd Tank Division to the front reserve, and concentrate it in the area north of RHEINE.

Subsequently, with the forces of the 5th, 25th, and 26th tank divisions and the 21st Motorized Rifle Division, it is to develop a rapid offensive in the direction of WEERT, BRUSSELS, and with part of its forces going toward LIEGE, complete the defeat of the opposing enemy, and by the close of 19 to 20 September arrive at Violet's southwest borders on the line (excluding) EDINGEN /sic -- ?ENGHEN/, CHARLEROI, DINANT, having no less than three divisions in its first echelon.

The boundary on the left is the former one; and as of the morning of 18 September, it is the front's left boundary.

Ten nuclear missiles are allocated to the army (2 of 3 kt, 2 of 10 kt, 4 of 20 kt, 2 of 40 kt).

-- The 9th Army (the 6th and 18th motorized rifle divisions and the 10th, 20th, and 26th tank divisions) with the previous reinforcement means, is to repel the counterthrust of the Blue 1st Army Corps and, together with the troops of the 3rd Army of the Western Front, is to continue the enemy's destruction in the RUHR industrial area. With the forces of the 26th Tank Division and with /one of/ the front's antitank reserves -- the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade -- it is to develop the offensive toward VENLO, with part of its forces going toward KREFELD, to repel the possible counterthrust of the Brown 8th Army Corps, and by the morning of 18 September seize the line VENLO, SUCHTELN, KREFELD, where it will transfer the 26th Tank Division to the complement of the 10th Tank Army.

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Subsequently, it is to complete the destruction of the enemy in the RUHR industrial area and by the close of 20 September, made up of the 6th and 18th motorized rifle divisions and the 20th Tank Division, it is to concentrate in the NIJMEGEN, HELMOND, WESEL area, where it will comprise the front's second echelon. After destroying the encircled enemy north of MUNSTER, the 10th Tank Division is to be pulled back to the front reserve and, by the close of 19 September, concentrated in the area northeast of MUNSTER.

-- The 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades are to destroy the Pershing missile launchers, nuclear weapons delivery aircraft, and the command posts of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force and the Northern Army Group.

Eight missiles are allocated to the brigades (4 of 20 kt, 4 of 40 kt).

-- The 1st Air Army is to destroy the enemy's detected means of nuclear attack and inflict destruction on the large units of the Blue 2nd Army Corps west of ENSCHEDE, the remnants of the 5th Army Corps northeast of HELMOND, the Brown 8th Army Corps large units advancing from the south, and the units of the Heimatschutz infantry division west of GRONINGEN, employing 24 nuclear bombs with an expenditure, before the morning of 18 September, of 23 regimental sorties of front aviation and 6 regimental sorties of army aviation, of which 18 regimental sorties of front aviation and 4 regimental sorties of army aviation are to be allocated to support the offensive of the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army. It is to support the combat actions of the 7th and 9th armies with the forces of five regimental sorties of front aviation and two regimental sorties of army aviation. The remaining two army sorties of front aviation and nine regimental sorties of army aviation are to be expended in the following days of the front troop offensive so as to have by the end of the operation no fewer than 15 to 20 regimental sorties and two or three nuclear bombs in the front reserve.

-- The front air defense troops are to concentrate their main efforts on covering the troops of the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army, and the missile brigades, and the front control posts.

-- The radioelectronic warfare units and means are to disrupt the radio communications of the large units of the Blue 2nd Army Corps and Brown 5th Army Corps, and of the reserves moving forward from the south, and to cover the bridges and crossings over the RHINE River in the MILLINGEN AAN DE RIJN, XANTEN sector against precision strikes by enemy aviation.

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-- Control of front troops is to be exercised from the command posts, alternate command posts, and forward control posts. In so doing, the command posts of the armies should be at a distance of no more than 18 to 20 km from the first echelon divisions.

Fourth training topic -- critique of the lesson. The director of the training group announces the subject and training objectives, rates the students' preparation and work, and explains individual principles of the theory and practice of troop combat actions with regard to the present subject. /hand-written insertion:/ He directs special attention to the widespread employment of airborne landing forces to support the most rapid fulfillment of the assigned task by the front troops in the operation.

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