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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Operational-
Strategic Employment of Naval Forces

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article defines NATO concepts of the tactics of a nuclear war at sea, which involves the employment of nuclear missile submarines, strike aircraft carriers and antisubmarine warfare means. The major portion of the article is devoted to NATO plans for antisubmarine defense of the coastal areas of Europe, the US and Canada against the growing Soviet submarine threat. The Atlantic antisubmarine zones are described, and the numbers of submarines, surface ships and aircraft committed to each are noted. The article also touches upon the antisubmarine defense of carrier strike forces. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966. The Russian-language version was disseminated as FIRDB-312/03131-74.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the Codeword

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Operational-Strategic Employment of
Naval Forces

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Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Admiral S. Kucherov. This article defines NATO concepts of the tactics of a nuclear war at sea, which involves the employment of nuclear missile submarines, strike aircraft carriers and antisubmarine warfare means. The major portion of the article is devoted to NATO plans for antisubmarine defense of the coastal areas of Europe, the US and Canada against the growing Soviet submarine threat. The Atlantic antisubmarine zones are described, and the numbers of submarines, surface ships and aircraft committed to each are noted. The article also touches upon the antisubmarine defense of carrier strike forces.

End of Summary

Comment:

Admiral Stepan Grigoryevich Kucherov was identified from 1957 to 1962 as Chief of the Directorate of Naval Training Institutions. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. The Russian-language version of this article was disseminated as FIRDB-312/03131-74.

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The Operational-Strategic Employment of Naval Forces
(According to the Views of the NATO Armed Forces Command)

by
Admiral S. Kucherov

The NATO command, especially the American command, has concluded that war in general, and particularly war at sea, will consist of two periods: a relatively brief initial period which will come to be decisive, and in the course of which both sides will strive to make maximum use of the nuclear might of all their armed forces; and a subsequent period of indefinite duration and less intensive combat actions. The main distinguishing characteristic of the subsequent period of war will be that nuclear weapons will be employed on an insignificant scale, the major part of them having been expended in the initial period.

It is assumed that the initial period of war in general, and particularly war at sea, will last about 30 days and will predetermine the outcome of the war. This period will be adopted as the basis for all operational, strategic, and mobilization planning. Capitulation by the enemy is assumed to be possible in this initial period. This initial period will consist primarily of a so-called general nuclear offensive mounted by all the branches of the armed forces simultaneously in all theaters of military operations and continuing for about three days.

It is assumed that strikes mounted simultaneously by strategic and operational-tactical attack means against targets previously selected in peacetime can produce a fundamental turning point in favor of the NATO countries. The actions of the armed forces, particularly the ground forces, are directly dependent on the results of the general nuclear offensive, the goal of which is in the shortest possible time after the initiation of military actions to destroy or curtail the nuclear potential of the enemy to the maximum extent by destroying his nuclear means, submarine bases, and airfields. An important goal of the nuclear offensive is also the destruction of the radar means of controlling submarine forces and aviation.

It is assumed that a future war can be won only through the combined efforts of all the branches of the armed forces directed toward destroying the enemy's military targets and crushing his will to resist. Each branch

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of the armed forces will accomplish its own specific tasks, and none of these branches can be replaced by another. However, as already indicated, the dominant role in the war, particularly in the initial period, is given to nuclear weapons, missiles, and to modern aircraft in service with the air forces and navy as the most reliable and effective means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target.

Therefore, at this stage in the development of the armed forces, a large role is given to the air forces and navy and to the extensive use of nuclear and missile weapons by them.

It should be noted that the supply of a fleet with nuclear and missile weapons and modern types of combat equipment, and the qualitative change in the combat capabilities of the navy's new ships and aircraft have significantly increased a fleet's operational capabilities. This has led to a change in views concerning the nature of naval operations in a future war and the role of individual classes of ships and methods for employing them.

During the Second World War, the main task of the fleet was to destroy enemy ships at sea, protect its own lines of communication, and disrupt the enemy's sea lines of communication. Now the main task of the naval forces has become actions against administrative-political and industrial centers and military targets of strategic importance.

While earlier the primary danger for warships and transports at sea was thought to be submarines, in accordance with which the entire system of antisubmarine defense was built for the naval theater, at present the American command regards as the primary threat the actions of missile-carrying submarines against shore targets of strategic importance. Therefore, it gives special attention to warfare against submarines and to protection of the coastline against missile-carrying submarines.

Substantial changes have also occurred in views regarding the conduct of amphibious landing operations, the protection of sea lines of communication (especially in the initial period of war), the principle of forming the battle formations of the forces, and the tactics for employing both ships and aircraft. Specifically, the US and NATO consider missile-carrying nuclear submarines and strike aircraft carriers as the main forces intended for delivering a missile/nuclear attack from ocean and sea axes.



The employment of missile-carrying submarines. These submarines are intended mainly to destroy administrative-political, industrial, and military targets of strategic importance.

At present, missile-carrying nuclear submarines of the 14th Squadron are patrolling in the Norwegian Sea area. On combat alert in the Mediterranean Sea is the 16th Squadron of missile-carrying submarines.

In the future, as the construction program for missile-carrying submarines armed with A-3 Polaris missiles is fulfilled, their number and operational-strategic capabilities will grow accordingly.

A basic principle in the employment of missile-carrying submarines is continuous patrolling in designated areas from which it is intended to employ Polaris missiles. These areas are selected with the object of achieving maximum destruction of strategic targets throughout the Soviet Union.

The norms for the intensity of operational use of missile-carrying submarines adopted by the American command ensure that up to two-thirds of their combat strength is in the combat patrol areas. In a period of threat and in wartime, this can be increased. For example, during the crisis in the Caribbean Sea, two submarines went out to sea from the base at Holy Loch on the basis of a combat alert signal.

* This high intensity of combat use is ensured, specifically, by the availability of two crews for each submarine.

The employment of strike aircraft carriers. The rapid development in the postwar years of new means of mass destruction has significantly changed the role of strike aircraft carriers. While during the Second World War they were basically given the tasks of destroying enemy ships at sea and protecting sea lines of communication, they now have another task: in the initial period of the war to participate in the general nuclear offensive.

- The subsequent tasks of carrier strike forces are:
- the aerial nuclear support of ground forces on coastal flanks;
 - the support of landing forces;
 - the destruction of enemy ships at sea.

Consequently, the main emphasis in the operational training of NATO naval forces is given to working out actions by carrier strike large units



conducted for the purpose of delivering nuclear strikes against the enemy's shore targets in the initial period of war.

The most ready carrier strike large units are constantly located in forward sea and ocean zones, which are at the same time the most likely initial areas for combat actions.

According to knowledge gained from combat training, it can be assumed that the NATO countries in the North Atlantic Naval Theater can, during a period of threat, deploy as many as three carrier strike large units: in the Atlantic, one US and one British carrier strike large unit; and in the Mediterranean Sea, one carrier strike large unit from the US Sixth Fleet.

To support actions by the strike aircraft carriers, a large number of warships and auxiliary ships are included in the carrier strike large unit, and land-based aviation is also allocated. For antisubmarine defense, the carrier strike large unit has an antisubmarine hunter-killer carrier group of standard composition (one antisubmarine helicopter carrier and eight destroyers).

Seven to eight days will be needed to deploy an American carrier strike large unit to the Norwegian Sea from bases in the US; from bases in Great Britain, from 1.5 to two days will be required.

A characteristic feature of actions by a carrier strike large unit against shore targets is its surprise appearance in the designated area, the launching of all aircraft participating in the operation, and the delivery of strikes by small groups and individual aircraft against a large number of targets located at a considerable distance from one another.

In carrying out strikes the carrier strike large unit maneuvers, as a rule, in a set area, the size of which can vary depending on the composition of the carrier strike large unit and the geographical features of the theater. According to knowledge gained from maneuvers and exercises of the NATO strike fleet, a carrier strike large unit in the Atlantic is assigned a maneuvering area of approximately 200 by 200 miles, and a carrier strike large unit in the Mediterranean Sea, 100 by 100 miles. In their maneuvering during the period of delivering strikes, the carrier strike large units proceed in battle formations which ensure the organization of antisubmarine defense and air defense along with a wide dispersal of groups of ships and individual ships.



The general principle for forming battle formations of carrier strike large units is as follows.

The carrier strike large units are widely dispersed, and each of the aircraft carriers maneuvers independently. The distance between aircraft carriers is from 20 to 100 miles (the average is 70 miles). A system of antisubmarine defense and air defense for all aircraft carriers is established with consideration of the location of the escorting ships and aircraft in relation to the carriers; that is, the entire carrier strike large unit operates in a single battle formation:

- the antisubmarine hunter-killer carrier group moves out 50 to 60 miles from the strike carriers in the direction of the threat and conducts searches for enemy submarines using ships, aircraft, and helicopters in a zone 40 to 60 miles wide;
- antisubmarine defense ships (in addition to the hunter-killer carrier group) form into hunter-killer groups and conduct a search for submarines at a distance of 20 to 25 miles from the aircraft carriers;
- air defense missile ships are stationed up to 40 miles from the aircraft carriers, in order to use their weapons most effectively;
- radar picket ships are stationed in a circle 50 to 150 miles from the center of the battle formation. This allows them to detect aerial targets at a distance of up to 250 miles and to intercept them with carrier-based fighters 100 to 120 miles from the aircraft carriers.

According to knowledge gained from operational training, the American command concludes that carrier strike groupings on the main axes are capable of using the following number of nuclear warheads in the course of the first three days of the initial period of war:

- two carrier strike large units in the Atlantic (each one comprising two aircraft carriers) -- 393;
- one carrier strike large unit in the Mediterranean (two aircraft carriers) -- 252.

As indicated earlier, the duration of the general nuclear offensive is assumed to be three days. However, recently in the course of operational training, a tendency to reduce this time has been noted. The average time for carrying out strike plans in all the exercises conducted in 1960-1963 was 44 hours.

As a rule, all carrier-based strike aviation takes part in delivering the first strikes.



The employment of antisubmarine forces and means. It is planned to develop aggressive combat actions against submarines at the same time as naval forces are accomplishing the main task, the delivery of missile/nuclear strikes against strategic military and industrial targets.

Warfare against submarines is the second main task of the US and NATO navies. In 1957, the NATO command established special Atlantic Fleet antisubmarine forces. At first they were called antisubmarine defense forces, but starting 1 July 1957, they began to be called the Atlantic Fleet antisubmarine forces. The commands of the US and NATO naval forces believe that the new name, in which the word "defense" has been eliminated, more accurately reflects the purpose of the antisubmarine forces.

Under modern conditions, warfare against submarines will have to be carried out with those forces which the NATO naval forces will have at their disposal at the outset of the war. Therefore, NATO is already establishing in peacetime special antisubmarine forces which include warships of various classes -- aircraft carriers, surface ships, submarines -- as well as aircraft, helicopters, and coastal hydroacoustic detection means. The US and NATO commands plan to conduct warfare against enemy submarines by doing the following:

- destroying the basing points and control posts for submarines in the course of the general nuclear offensive, throughout the entire depth of the theater;
- destroying shipbuilding yards, submarine bases, and submarines as they depart from and return to their bases;
- detecting and destroying submarines during sea transit to a designated area of operations and in areas of combat operations.

It is assumed that these tasks will be accomplished both in the course of conducting special operations and in the course of everyday combat activity.

The NATO command includes among special tasks operations designed to destroy shipbuilding yards and submarine bases. Also included are mine-laying operations conducted to hinder the departure of submarines from their bases and their breakout into combat operations areas.

It is assumed that antisubmarine defense of convoys during sea transit, as well as of ports and bases, will be conducted in the course of everyday combat activity.



However, in case large enemy submarine forces break out or threaten to break out into combat operations areas, special operations for their destruction can be carried out. These operations can also take place during a period of particularly important shipments when the enemy is engaged in aggressive counteraction.

The overall goal of antisubmarine warfare is to ensure NATO supremacy on the oceans and to deprive the enemy of this possibility.

According to the views of the NATO command, successful warfare against submarines depends to a great extent on the organization of the command, the preciseness of cooperation, and the reliability of control. The basis of the organization of the command and control of antisubmarine forces is, in addition to the centralization principle, the zone principle, which provides that in each zone (area) a designated grouping of antisubmarine forces will operate.

From an analysis of operational training conducted in recent years by the NATO naval forces in the North Atlantic Theater of Naval Operations, it is apparent that there is a tendency to establish specific operational large units of antisubmarine forces for each area (zone). These large units have been given their designations.

According to knowledge gained from exercises in this theater of naval operations, the command of the NATO naval forces has designated the following zones (areas).

The Forward Antisubmarine Zone. The command of NATO naval forces includes in the forward antisubmarine zone the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea areas. The following tasks may be assigned to the NATO antisubmarine forces in this zone:

- to prevent the breakout of Soviet submarines of the Northern Fleet into the Atlantic (this is the primary task);
- to protect sea lines of communication in this zone;
- to support operations of carrier strike large units in this zone.

To carry out these tasks, the command of the NATO naval forces, according to knowledge gained from exercises, plans to allocate the following forces: nuclear antisubmarine submarines -- 9; diesel antisubmarine submarines -- 62; aircraft of land-based aviation -- 110. Also, the possible employment of surface ships in this area cannot be ruled out.

American submarines, aircraft, and other ships and means will comprise the main part of these forces. For actions in this area, the British intend to allocate up to 30 antisubmarine submarines and as many as 24 antisubmarine aircraft of land-based aviation.

It is planned to concentrate the above forces mainly in the area of Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the Shetland Islands. Overall command of the antisubmarine forces in the forward zone has been given to the commander of the antisubmarine forces of the US Atlantic Fleet.

In the Barents Sea area, for actions on the approaches to our bases, the command of the NATO naval forces is planning to allocate up to four nuclear antisubmarine submarines and four or five diesel antisubmarine submarines. On the Kanin Point -- Rybachiy Peninsula line, the laying of antisubmarine mines and having antisubmarine submarines on alert on station is possible. There is being set up the observation by antisubmarine aircraft of the departure of our submarines in the area between Spitsbergen Island and Franz Josef Land.

American submarines are conducting reconnaissance principally in the area of the main base of the Northern Fleet (on the approaches to Kola Inlet), off the Murman coast, and in the area of Novaya Zemlya. British submarines operate, as a rule, north of the 70th parallel.

At the same time as the submarines, NATO surface ships also conduct reconnaissance in the Barents Sea area. Reconnaissance in the area of the Kola Peninsula coast is conducted by British fishing trawlers. Usually these ships maneuver in groups of two or three or alone in the immediate vicinity of Soviet territorial waters, as well as in the combat training firing ranges used by ships of the Northern Fleet. In each group of trawlers there is one with additional radar equipment. During Northern Fleet exercises, the number of British trawlers in the fleet's area of operations grows considerably. It is characteristic that the fishing trawlers continue to navigate in these areas even when fishing ceases. In addition to the fishing trawlers, there also appear periodically in the theater British, French, and Norwegian destroyers, escort vessels, minesweepers, and minelayers, all obviously for reconnaissance purposes. These ships usually operate in the area of Varanger Fjord and the Rybachiy Peninsula, but sometimes they also cruise along the Kola Peninsula coast.

In order to prevent our submarines from entering the Norwegian Sea from the Barents Sea, an antisubmarine line is being set up in the area of Spitsbergen and Bear Island, and the northern coast of Norway.

The command of the NATO naval forces began setting up this line in 1961. Starting in late 1961, Norwegian aircraft of the Albatross type have been making periodic flights along a course from the northern Norwegian coast to Bear Island to the Spitsbergen archipelago. Since early 1962, in accordance with NATO command plans, Norwegian submarines have been making secret voyages in this area. Simultaneously, north of the Lofoten Islands, in the sector from Harstad to Hammerfest, British antisubmarine defense escort vessels patrol continuously. While on patrol, these escort vessels and Norwegian submarines periodically work out antisubmarine tasks.

In the future, it can be expected that on this line there will be as many as six diesel submarines at one time, as well as antisubmarine aircraft (a patrol squadron of 12 aircraft) and hydroacoustic detection means; antisubmarine minefields will be laid. The possible employment of surface ships in this area should not be ruled out.

An analysis of the overall nature and content of the exercises conducted by NATO naval forces makes it possible to assume that an antisubmarine line is also being established in the area of Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, the Shetland Islands, and the southwest coast of Norway. On this antisubmarine line, the NATO command is planning to employ four or five nuclear antisubmarine submarines, as many as 42 diesel antisubmarine submarines, as many as 80 land-based patrol aircraft, two or three radar picket escort vessels, and two or three long-range radar detection aircraft. Of these, one nuclear submarine and as many as seven diesel submarines will be operating in the Danish Straits. In the passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, there will be in operation as many as two nuclear submarines, as many as eight diesel submarines, and as many as four antisubmarine aircraft; between the Faroe and Shetland Islands, one nuclear submarine, as many as six diesel submarines, and two or three antisubmarine aircraft will be in operation. In this area, according to NATO command plans, continuous reconnaissance is being conducted by antisubmarine forces, mainly US and British. Used for this are submarines, surface ships, aircraft, helicopters, and coastal means for observing submarines.

Starting in 1958, the commands of the US and Canadian naval forces have been engaged, in the course of a number of exercises, in working out an antisubmarine defense of the coastline.

On the basis of an analysis of these exercises and other materials, the antisubmarine defense of the US and Canadian coastline takes the following form. The basis of the organization of the antisubmarine defense

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is the division of the US and Canadian coastline into zones (areas).

In the defense of the US and Canadian coastline, the following evidently may be employed in warfare against missile-carrying submarines: up to three antisubmarine aircraft carriers; about 70 frigates and destroyers; about 30 escort vessels; and as many as 200 land-based patrol aircraft.

The antisubmarine defense of the coastline rests on a system of coastal hydrophone stations and a system of ship and air patrol.

The overall command of the antisubmarine defense of the US and Canadian Atlantic coastline is assigned to the commander of the antisubmarine forces of the US Atlantic Fleet. Because of its specific features, the entire US and Canadian Atlantic coastline can be divided into two zones: the northern antisubmarine defense zone and the southern antisubmarine defense zone.

The northern antisubmarine defense zone extends from the northern tip of the Newfoundland Peninsula to Norfolk. The depth of the antisubmarine defense area off the Canadian coastline is about 500 miles, and off the US coastline about 600 miles. In this area, warfare against missile-carrying submarines was carried out in exercises through the combined efforts of the American and Canadian antisubmarine forces under the overall command of the American naval command.

For this purpose, the following forces were allocated:

-- American forces -- one antisubmarine aircraft carrier, as many as 22 destroyers and escort vessels, as many as four squadrons of land-based antisubmarine aircraft;

-- Canadian forces -- one antisubmarine aircraft carrier, about 20 destroyers and escort vessels, as many as two squadrons of land-based antisubmarine aircraft.

The southern antisubmarine defense zone extends along the US coastline from Norfolk, including the Bahama Islands, and out to sea for a distance of up to 500 miles.

Judging from the exercises, it can be expected that to combat missile-carrying submarines in this area, there will be allocated simultaneously: one antisubmarine aircraft carrier, as many as 30 destroyers and escort vessels, and no fewer than six patrol squadrons of land-based antisubmarine aircraft.

In addition to the establishment of an antisubmarine zone along the US and Canadian Atlantic coastline, the commands of the US and NATO naval forces are planning to set up the observation of enemy submarines in the Davis Strait and in the area of Newfoundland, the Azore Islands, and Gibraltar.

According to knowledge gained from exercises, for actions in the Davis Strait, there may be allocated as many as three antisubmarine submarines and as many as ten land-based antisubmarine aircraft. Of these, there will be on permanent patrol in the Davis Strait as many as two submarines and one or two aircraft. We must also take into account that in accordance with the agreement concluded among the USA, Canada, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland and Venezuela, there is in constant operation in the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean a system of seagoing meteorological stations. The meteorological station ships conduct continuous mobile patrol. Altogether, there are on permanent duty in various places in the North Atlantic as many as nine meteorological station ships. All these meteorological stations have been converted from escort vessels. In addition to carrying out their basic tasks, they conduct observation of submarines.

For observing submarines in the area of Newfoundland, the Azore Islands, and Gibraltar, there may be allocated about 40 antisubmarine aircraft: two squadrons from the Argentinia area; one squadron from the Rota area; and one detachment from Lagens. In the event the situation becomes difficult in this area, the arrival of other antisubmarine forces is possible, including even antisubmarine submarines and antisubmarine aircraft carriers.

The Eastern and Central Antisubmarine Defense Zone of the Atlantic (the width of the zone is 450 to 500 miles). The command of the NATO naval forces believes that the main task in the eastern and central antisubmarine defense zones of the Atlantic is the defense of ocean lines of communication. The composition of operational large units during exercises of antisubmarine forces varied; therefore, it can be assumed that the NATO command has still not established an organization for antisubmarine forces in this area.

According to knowledge gained from exercises, it can be expected that to combat submarines in this zone there will be allocated: three antisubmarine aircraft carriers, as many as 70 destroyers, as many as 20 antisubmarine submarines, as many as 30 escort vessels, and as many as 200 antisubmarine aircraft.

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As one of the methods used in the protection of lines of communication in the Atlantic during the first days of war, the command of the NATO naval forces plans the withdrawal of merchant ships out from under attack by moving them to the west. Subject to evacuation are all ships, with the exception of those always carrying important cargos and those having a speed of less than nine knots. Ships with a speed of 17 and more knots must proceed independently; the rest must go in convoys of up to 50 to 60 ships each.

According to knowledge gained from exercises, the command of the NATO naval forces plans to put into action in this zone the following forces:

-- in the northern and central areas of the Atlantic (including the North Sea): one or two antisubmarine aircraft carriers, as many as seven destroyers, as many as 11 escort vessels, and as many as 36 antisubmarine aircraft;

-- in the English Channel area: as many as five destroyers, as many as 18 escort vessels, and as many as 20 antisubmarine aircraft and helicopters;

-- in the Biscayne area of the Atlantic: one antisubmarine aircraft carrier, as many as five destroyers, as many as five antisubmarine submarines, as many as four escort vessels, and as many as 20 antisubmarine aircraft;

-- in the Iberian area of the Atlantic: one antisubmarine aircraft carrier, six destroyers, as many as five antisubmarine submarines, as many as 12 escort vessels, and as many as 28 antisubmarine aircraft.

In this connection, the command of the NATO naval forces believes that although the forces being allocated to the central area and the eastern part of the Atlantic (including also the North Sea) will not provide complete protection for shipping, they will still make it possible to prevent serious losses of merchant ships.

The organization of the antisubmarine defense of carrier strike large units. According to knowledge gained from exercises, antisubmarine defense tasks are performed in all phases of the activity of carrier strike large units: when departing bases, during sea transit, during the delivery of strikes against shore targets, when replenishing supplies at sea, and when entering bases.

The antisubmarine defense of carrier strike large units when departing bases. Usually carrier strike large units depart from various bases in individual groups, separated from one another by at least 100 miles. For example, one American carrier strike large unit leaves from the following

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bases: Norfolk, Mayport, Boston, and Newport. Before the departure of the ships of the carrier strike large unit from the bases on their planned transit route, a search is made for enemy submarines. The search is conducted either by a hunter-killer carrier group which has been assigned to support the carrier strike large unit in all stages of its activity, or by specially assigned ships and aircraft. The search for submarines usually begins 12 hours before the departure of the carrier strike large unit from the base.

Antisubmarine defense of the carrier strike large unit during sea transit. This is carried out by antisubmarine hunter-killer carrier groups and by the patrol aircraft of land-based aviation. The antisubmarine hunter-killer carrier group proceeds in search formation along the course of the carrier strike large unit, ahead of the carrier strike large unit and about 50 to 80 miles away from it in the direction of the threat.

The antisubmarine defense of the carrier strike large unit during the delivery of strikes. Because of the threat of the employment of megaton nuclear bombs by the enemy, the Americans decided to resort to widely dispersed battle formations for carrier strike large units during the phase of delivery of strikes against shore targets. The general principle for forming a battle formation is as follows. The carrier strike groups in their own formations are positioned on the corners of a square, the center of which is the center of the battle formation (when there are three antisubmarine hunter-killer carrier groups, the aircraft carriers are positioned on the corners of an isosceles triangle). The distance between the aircraft carriers is, on the average, 70 miles. The headquarters ship is positioned near the center of the battle formation. Furthermore, antisubmarine defense for the strike aircraft carrier is provided by an antisubmarine hunter-killer carrier group which moves forward at a distance of 50 to 60 miles away from the strike aircraft carrier in the direction of the threat. At the same time, land-based antisubmarine aircraft conduct a search for submarines in the entire area of operation of the carrier strike large unit.

In conclusion, it must be said that for warfare against Soviet missile-carrying submarines in the North Atlantic Naval Theater, it is planned to employ all the antisubmarine forces of the NATO countries: antisubmarine aircraft carriers, antisubmarine submarines and antisubmarine surface ships, antisubmarine aircraft, coastal hydroacoustic stations for long-range detection of enemy submarines, seagoing meteorological stations, and a system of ship and air patrol.



However, the command of the NATO naval forces believes that this composition of antisubmarine forces allocated to combat missile-carrying submarines in this naval theater is inadequate, and it is taking measures to increase the antisubmarine forces. It also should be noted that the observation of Soviet submarines is already being organized in peacetime so that with the beginning of military actions (or in a period of worsening of the international situation) there is no need to make fundamental changes in this organization, but only to reinforce aviation and ship large units and subunits operating in already familiar antisubmarine zones.

By way of a conclusion, it should be noted that at present, based on the actual status and real capabilities for the building up of naval strike forces, the leadership of the US and NATO naval forces believes that nuclear missile-carrying submarines and strike carriers are the main forces for warfare at sea. In the future, with the progressive increase in the number of strategic missiles on shore-based launchers and the number of nuclear submarines with A-3 Polaris missiles, the role of the main forces in a missile/nuclear offensive will shift to submarine-based and shore-based strategic weapons systems. It can be expected that beginning with 1966 carrier strike forces will gradually be freed from carrying out strategic tasks and will be switched over to carrying out operational-tactical tasks.

In view of the presence in our navy of nuclear missile-carrying submarines, the US and NATO commands are interested in simultaneously ensuring the security of their sea lines of communication and in employing carrier and strike groups, as well as in warding off the threat of strikes by our submarines against US shore targets. Therefore, a very great deal of attention is given to establishing special antisubmarine forces armed with effective means for detecting and destroying high-speed submarines. In addition, NATO's leadership is also establishing an extensive system of missile, naval, and air bases in the theater. All this urgently requires the greatest possible increase in the vigilance and combat readiness of our armed forces.

