


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
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# STAFF NOTES:

## Western Europe Canada International Organizations




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WESTERN EUROPE – CANADA – INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by [redacted] Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Work to Begin on Reviewing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

The first preparatory committee meeting for the 1975 Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference will convene in Geneva on April 1. The NPT--which went into force on March 5, 1970--provides that five years after entrance into force a conference of all parties to the treaty shall be held in Geneva "...in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." With many ratifications of the NPT still outstanding, the review conference could well generate increased skepticism over disarmament measures as well as cause special embarrassment for the US, many of whose European allies remain among the non-ratifiers.

Three preparatory committee meetings to be held during 1974 and the early part of 1975 will attempt to formulate an agenda for the 1975 conference and to coordinate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the technical support that the IAEA will provide in its capacity as the agency responsible for verifying the NPT's important safeguards provisions and for supervising peaceful nuclear uses.

The first preparatory session, expected to last about one week to 10 days, will deal with procedural questions relating to next year's formal review conference, but the question of membership criteria for the preparatory committees and review conference will also have to be decided. The membership issue has already raised problems. The depository states of the NPT (the US, the UK and the USSR) earlier agreed that membership would be limited to those parties to the Treaty (those who have both signed and ratified the NPT) who are also members of either the IAEA Board of Governors or members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). This 26-member group could be expanded to include any states who ratified the treaty and safeguards agreements, and fulfilled the other membership criteria,

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at any time up until the convening of the review conference itself in 1975.

By insisting on these criteria for eligibility to the conference, the US and the Soviets hope to encourage further ratifications of the treaty, particularly by the EURATOM countries and Japan.

Limiting eligibility to the conference could also prevent critics of the NPT from using the review conference and its preparatory committees as an opportunity to attack the treaty's basic provisions and to urge its renegotiation. The larger the membership, the greater is the chance that the US and the USSR may become the target of attacks by other states for their failure to have concluded "general and complete disarmament"--an obligation specified in Article 6 of the NPT.

Although it had been thought that the membership of the preparatory committee was settled, there has been some agitation within recent weeks among non-preparatory-committee members to be admitted to the conference as "observers." This proposal has the limited support of some preparatory committee members who argue that this would provide an incentive for non-NPT parties to take a more positive stance on safeguards and the NPT in general. During debate of the December 1973 UNGA resolution relating to the NPT conference, it was agreed that non-preparatory-committee members would have the opportunity to present their views to the committee on any matter under discussion in which they might have a particular interest. To institutionalize observers at this point, the US argues, would negate the original decision of the NPT parties to form as small a representative preparatory committee as possible and would result in an unwieldy and possibly discordant group. [redacted]

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