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
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
GROUND FORCES

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CHAPTER VIII

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81. Ground Forces

A. General

The Iraqi Army, well trained by only Arab States standards, at present totals 41,000 personnel (excluding paramilitary forces), organized into a headquarters establishment, two infantry divisions, a training (cadre) division, and an independent brigade.

The Army's top leadership is satisfactory by Arab standards, and its personnel are well fitted physically and temperamentally for service in this geographically difficult area. The following factors, however, limit the Army's effectiveness: 1) a low level of general and technical education, limiting the ability of the Army to assimilate modern weapons, equipment, and techniques; 2) a lack of combat experience by all ranks; 3) limitations in weapons and equipment to amounts sufficient properly to equip only one infantry division; and 4) lack of professional confidence in all ranks.

Nevertheless, the Iraqi Army at present is capable of maintaining internal order and probably could resist successfully an attempted invasion by its Arab or Iranian neighbors. Iraq could offer only minor harassing opposition to invasion by a major power such as the Soviet Union. Iraq has not formulated war plans in coordination with adjacent countries. Offensively, she could not effect the conquest of any adjoining state except, perhaps, Syria, nor could she now, either alone or in concert with other Arab States, conquer Israel.

The organization of the Army is designed to fulfill its primary mission the defense of Iraq. One infantry division, the so-called Mountain Division, is stationed in northeastern Iraq to cover the invasion routes through the Kurdistan mountain passes. The Plains Division is stationed in the southeastern section covering the Persian Gulf. The Cadre (Training) Division, with its mechanized units, receives and trains recruits, and guards the Khanaqin border area, northeast of Baghdad. The Independent Bodyguard Brigade, under the Ministry of Defense, serves as a tactical reserve, but its defensive capabilities are limited.

None of the divisions is at full personnel strength, and all are deficient in tables-of-equipment materiel, although recent acquisition from Great Britain of transportation and materiel has increased mobility and capability. Most items of

equipment are purchased from Great Britain, which also furnishes training missions on a contractual basis, as needed, at the request of Iraq.

Iraq, by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance with the United Kingdom (1930), has granted to the United Kingdom certain base and military rights, most notable being the right to maintain the Royal Air Force bases, Habbaniya, near Baghdad, and Shaibah, near Basra. The United Kingdom has a further interest in Iraq by her practical control of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). Agitation against manifestations of dominant British interest in Iraq, coupled with fear and hatred of Israel, which the Arabs feel is the creature of, and maintained by, Britain and the United States, have contributed to the growth of fierce "nationalism,"* which tends to obscure the menace of Soviet invasion. Communist elements, growing in strength, do not hesitate to use this "nationalistic" spirit or its manifestations to their own ends.

Politically, Iraq adheres in general to the principles and policies of the Arab League, modified by self-interest.

B. Administrative organization

1. Army high command

a. STRUCTURE — In accordance with the Constitution of 1925, the King is the head of the Army. Government control of the Army, however, is exercised by the Prime Minister through the Minister of Defense, with the Chief of the General Staff as the Defense Minister's military advisor. The General Staff, a modification of the British divisional General Staff, aids the Chief of General Staff in the exercise of command over the Army (FIGURE 81-1).

b. FUNCTIONS — Although the organization of the high command generally follows the British system, it does not work smoothly because of the importance of personality differences. Most questions, however trivial, are referred to the heads of branches, to the Chief of the General Staff, or even to the Minister of Defense for decision. Further-

* It must be noted that "nationalism" as here used does not conform to the usual definition of "homogeneous chauvinism." Rather, it connotes general adherence to a combination of "principles" involving pan-Arabism, Islamism, anti-Zionism, parochialism, and foreign antipathy.



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


FIGURE 81-1. IRAQI HIGH COMMAND

more, the chain of command is flexible, and it is not uncommon for an element of the chain to be bypassed as a subordinate goes over his head for decisions.

(1) *The Defense Council*—The Defense Council, established by law to insure proper coordination between the departments of the high command, has not been convened in recent years, although it continues to exist on paper. Its designated members include the chiefs of the principal high command departments and the divisional commanders, with the Chief of the General Staff as president. As a functioning body, the Defense Council would be responsible directly to the Minister of Defense.

(2) *The Ministry of Defense*—The organization of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense is based on a modification of a British divisional staff. The Chief of the General Staff, the Director of Administration, and the Military Accountant General are on the same level, each reporting directly to the Minister of Defense (FIGURE 81-2). Under the Chief of the General Staff, at the General Staff level, are the General Staff Branch, or G Branch, supervised by the Director of Military Operations; the Director of Translation; the Chief of the Royal

Iraqi Air Force; the Chief of Engineers; the Chief of Artillery; the Chief of Mechanical Transport; the Chief of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers; and the Chief of Signals. Under the Director of Administration are combined the functions of the British Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General. The Military Accountant General combines the functions of the United States Army Finance Officer, Fiscal Officer, Budget Officer and Comptroller (with respect to funds and finance only).

(3) *The General Staff*—The Iraqi General Staff, under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, includes the General Staff Branch (commonly known as the G Branch), under the supervision of the Director of Military Operations; the Director of Translation; and the Chiefs of the Royal Iraqi Air Force, Engineers, Artillery, Mechanical Transport, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, and Signals. Two special planning sections who report directly to the Chief of the General Staff are the War Plans Section and the Training Plans Section, both of which were organized in 1951 to correct planning deficiencies in the Iraqi Army. The G Branch assists the Chief of the General Staff in the phases of operations, training, intelligence, and establishment (T/O&E). It can, therefore, be considered comparable to a combined G2, G3 of the United States General Staff. The Staff is divided into five sections. The Operations (I) Section controls Armament Establishment. The Military Training (II) Section supervises all training activities of the Iraqi Army and also has the responsibility for the Army press, including the publication of a quarterly military magazine. The Intelligence (III) Section is normally a branch of the G Staff but in the past has been made directly responsible either to the Minister of Defense or to the Chief of the General Staff, depending on the personal desires of the persons occupying those positions. The Plans, Establishments, and Staff Duties (IV) Section is responsible for the preparation of establishments (T/O&E) except for the armament. The Topography Section is charged with the preparation and procurement of maps for the Army. The chiefs of arms and technical services under the Chief of the General Staff act as commanders of troops of their arm or service who are directly under the command of the Ministry of Defense, and as technical staff officers. The Translation Section recently was removed from the control of the Director of Military Operations and placed on the same level as the G Branch.

(4) *The Director of Administration*—The Director of Administration combines the functions of the British A and Q Branches. He is responsible to the Minister of Defense for the coordination and supervision of the activities of the follow-



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


FIGURE 81-2. IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

ing directorates: the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, the Director of Recruiting, the Director of Contracts, the Director of Ordnance, the Director of Medical Services, and the Director of Veterinary Services.

(5) *The Military Accountant General* — The Military Accountant General is responsible for planning, administration, and control of Army Finance. This arrangement is a modification of the British system, since in the Iraqi Army the Military Accountant General is not only on the same level as the Chief of the General Staff and the Director of Administration, but also responsible directly to the Minister of Defense.

2. Territorial organization

a. **WARTIME** — There was no known territorial organization in the Iraqi Army prior to 1948. Upon the declaration of martial law on 14 May 1948, when Iraq commenced hostilities with Israel, the country was divided into four military zones: Zone 1, the Central Zone, with headquarters in Baghdad, included the provinces (*liwas*), Baghdad, Al Kūt (formerly Kūt al Imāra), Diyālā (formerly Diyālā), and Ad Dulaym (formerly Dulaim); Zone 2, North, headquartered at Kirkūk, included the provinces, Al Mawşil (formerly Mosul), Irbīl (for-

merly Erbil), Kirkūk, and As Sulaymāniyah (formerly Sulamiāniya); Zone 3, the South Zone, with headquarters at Basra, included the provinces, Al Başrah (formerly Basra), Al 'Amārah (formerly 'Amāra), and Al Muntafiq (formerly Muntafiq); and Zone 4, the Euphrates Zone, headquartered at Ad Diwāniyah (formerly Ad Diwāniya), comprised the provinces, Karbalā' (formerly Karbalā), Al Ḥillah, (formerly Hilla), and Ad Diwāniyah (formerly Diwāniya). Each commander was supreme in his zone. This organization was only temporary, necessitated by the situation in Palestine, and was made for domestic security. Upon the cessation of hostilities, a peacetime territorial organization was established.

b. **PEACETIME** — Iraq is now divided into three divisional administrative districts: 1st (Plains) Divisional District (Hq, Ad Diwāniyah), 2d (Mountain) Divisional District (Hq, Kirkūk), 3d (Cadre) Divisional District (Hq, Baghdad). The areas of these districts are comprised of the following provinces: 1st Division Area - Ad Dulaym, Al Kūt, Al 'Amārah, Karbalā', Ad Diwāniyah, Al Başrah, Al Ḥillah and Al Muntafiq; 2d Division Area - Al Mawşil, As Sulaymāniyah, Irbīl and Kirkūk; 3d Division Area - Diyālā and Baghdad. (See FIGURE 81-11.)

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3. Arms and services

a. ARMS — The combat branches of the Iraqi Army, known as Arms, consist of the following: Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers, Armored Force, and Corps of Signals.

b. SERVICES — The service branches of the Iraqi Army, known as Services, consist of the following: Transportation, Medical, Military Police, Veterinary, Ordnance, and Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. These components of the Iraqi Army correspond to similar elements in the British Army.

C. Tactical organization

1. General

The Iraqi Army has no tactical organization higher than the division. There is no corps or army organization, but British plans for rehabilitation and expansion of the Iraqi Army include the formation of a corps headquarters by 1956. During the Israeli conflict the Iraqi Expeditionary Forces were formed and dispatched piecemeal as brigades, which came under a force headquarters consisting basically of Headquarters, 1st Division. Under this system the Field Commander was given great latitude by the Chief of General Staff (CGS). This arrangement resulted in the CGS being left largely ignorant of the field situation. In future operations it is likely, since each of the divisions probably would be employed separately, that a headquarters for such a force would consist of the

headquarters of the augmented division nominated for the purpose.

There are no higher headquarters staffs.

2. Staff organization

Division staff—The staff organization of an Iraqi division follows closely that of a British division. There are the usual General (G), Administrative (A), and Quartermaster (Q) branches; and the normal division special staffs: Chief, Royal Artillery (CRA); Chief, Royal Engineers (CRE); Chief Signals Officer (CSO); Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (AA/QMG); Supplies Officer (Sups Offr); Paymaster; Courts Martial Officer (CMO); Assistant Director Medical Services (ADMS); Assistant Director Veterinary Services (ADVS); Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal (DAPM); and the Deputy Assistant Director Ordnance Service (DADOS) (FIGURE 81-3).

3. Combat units

a. INFANTRY DIVISIONS — Each of the three infantry divisions has a different TO&E, based upon its mission. Thus, the 1st (Plains) Division is organized for operations in the plains area of the south and west, both against external aggression and for the maintenance of internal security. While the 1st Division is being motorized, a few pack animals still remain. Units of this division are expected to be fully motorized (first-line transport) by the end of 1953. The 2d (Mountain) Division (so-called because its deployment is in the




FIGURE 81-3. IRAQI DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

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mountainous areas of the northeast rather than because it is a true mountain division) has artillery regiments of the pack type and animal transport. The 3d (Training) Division has the dual mission of training recruits and, with its mechanized units, of guarding against any force entering Iraq along the Khanaqin route. The Mechanized Force is assigned to the 3d Division. (See FIGURES 81-4, 81-5, and 81-6, for organization of the three divisions.)

b. INFANTRY BRIGADES — The Iraqi infantry brigades (FIGURE 81-7) have an organization similar to that of the British brigades (the practical equivalents of United States regiments). When operationally employed, they usually are formed into brigade groups by addition of an artillery regimental signal section, a field company of engineers, and a company each of field ambulance and transport.




FIGURE 81-4. IRAQI 1ST DIVISION




FIGURE 81-5. IRAQI 2D DIVISION

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


FIGURE 81-6. IRAQI 3D (CADRE) DIVISION




FIGURE 81-7. IRAQI INFANTRY BRIGADE

c. **INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS** — The organization of Iraqi Army infantry battalions and lower elements follows very closely that of similar units of the British Army and is somewhat comparable to that of United States small units. The "support" company of the Iraqi battalion is the practical equivalent of the United States heavy weapons company, and the Iraqi "rifle section" is the equivalent of the United States squad. The Iraqi infantry battalion is the Army's smallest self-sustaining fighting unit (FIGURE 81-8).

d. **MECHANIZED FORCE** — The Mechanized Force, attached to the 2d Division, is the only combat-ready section of that division and the only fully mechanized element of the Army. Its mission is primarily to guard the Khanaqin border area and

to assist the civil police in maintaining order (FIGURE 81-6).

e. **TANK SQUADRON** — An independent tank squadron consisting of 24 Churchill tanks and 8 armored cars is stationed in Baghdad, under control of the Ministry of War. Its present mission is primarily to assist in the maintenance of internal security.

f. **ARMORED CAR REGIMENTS (INDEPENDENT)** — The three armored car regiments, called the Khalid, Mansur, and Faisal, have the same general TO&E, although the cars differ in make and armament. The Khalid regiment uses the Humber Mark IV car equipped with one 15-mm. and one 7.9-mm. Besa machine gun, the Mansur regiment is equipped with the Chevrolet mounting one Vickers machine gun, and the Faisal regiment uses the Daimler equipped with one 2-pounder and one 7.9-mm. Besa machine gun. The Khalid Regiment is attached to the Mechanized Force; the Mansur to the 3d Division; and the Faisal to the 2d Division. Car equipment of the Mansur Regiment is in poor condition; that of the others is fair. (See FIGURE 81-9.)

g. **ROYAL BODYGUARD BRIGADE** — The Royal Bodyguard Brigade is strictly a ceremonial organization, having no combat capability. It consists of the following elements: the Royal Bodyguard Armored Troop, with personnel strength of two officers and 20 enlisted men, equipped with four Humber Mark IV cars mounting 2-pounder guns; the Hashimi Regiment of Cavalry, believed to consist of four squadrons, a "show organization" totally



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


FIGURE 81-8. IRAQI INFANTRY BATTALION (NOT MOTORIZED)




FIGURE 81-9. IRAQI ARMORED CAR REGIMENT

It is equipped with four 6-inch howitzers, an obsolete weapon, which are to be replaced by eight 5.5-inch howitzers. (Three of the new weapons were to be available on 1 April 1953.) When fully equipped with modern weapons, this battery will form the nucleus for the 1st Medium Artillery Regiment when this larger unit is formed at some future indefinite date.

(2) *Medium (4.5-inch) Artillery Battery* — Designated as the 2d Medium Artillery Battery, this unit has eight 4.5-inch guns and is also under the control of the Ministry of Defense. This battery is only a cadre organization, however, since it is used as a depot battery for the Artillery School.

(3) *25-pounder gun-howitzer regiments* — Table-of-equipment requirements for this type of organization are 24 pieces, although most units have only 12.

(4) *3.7-inch mechanized (United States "motorized") howitzer regiment* — The organization of the 3.7-inch howitzer regiment is patterned after that of the 25-pounder gun-howitzer regiment except for transport. All regiments, however, are equipped with only 12 pieces. As fast as additional 25-pounders are received from the British, they are to be substituted for the 3.7-inch towed howitzers, and the gun strength is to be brought up to 24 per regiment.

(5) *3.7-inch pack howitzer regiment* — This unit is organized on the same lines as the 25-pounder gun-howitzer regiment except for transport. All regiments have only 12 pieces instead of 24.

unit for combat; and the Royal Bodyguard Infantry Battalion, also a ceremonial organization without combat capability.

h. ARTILLERY REGIMENTS AND BATTERIES — Iraqi Artillery forces are being modified and reequipped, but contain 11 basic types of units as follows:

(1) *Medium (6-inch) Artillery Battery* — This battery, designated the 1st Medium Artillery Battery, is controlled by the Ministry of Defense.

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(6) *Heavy (4.2-inch) Mortar Battery* — The 1st Mortar Battery has 16 British 4.2-inch mortars and is under the command of the Ministry of Defense. The battery headquarters and two troops of four mortars each, equipped for animal transport, are located in Mosul to work with the 2d Division. The remaining troops are motorized and are located in Baghdad.

(7) *Survey Battery* — The 1st Survey Battery is a corps-type artillery survey unit. It includes two survey troops, but Iraqi Army plans call for the addition of a sound-ranging troop if equipment can be secured.

(8) *Heavy (3.7-inch AA guns) Antiaircraft Battery* — The Heavy Antiaircraft Battery is composed of two troops, both located in the outskirts of Baghdad. These troops have only elementary instruments, however, which restricts their effectiveness.

(9) *Light Antiaircraft (40-mm. Bofors) Regiment* — The Light Antiaircraft Regiment includes two batteries of 18 Bofors towed 40-mm. AA guns each and a regimental headquarters. This organization is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

(10) *Light antiaircraft (20-mm.) battery* — Two light antiaircraft (20-mm.) batteries are in existence and are assigned to the 1st and 2d Divisions, respectively. The first is equipped with eight 20-mm. Breda guns (Italian) and the second with twelve 20-mm. Flak guns (German).

(11) *Antitank Regiment* — The 1st Antitank Regiment consists of two batteries, each equipped with twelve 17-pdr. towed antitank guns. It is located in Baghdad under the control of the Ministry of Defense.

4. Service units

a. ENGINEER

(1) *Engineer battalions* — Information concerning the 1st and 2d Engineer Battalions is scanty. They are assigned to the 1st and 2d Divisions, respectively. Available information indicates that each battalion consists of a headquarters and three companies. Equipment is that of a British engineer battalion, but most of the transport is animal; only a few vehicles are used.

(2) *Engineer Field Park Company* — This organization, located in Baghdad under command of the Ministry of Defense, is organized to operate an Engineer Base Supply Depot. It is very short of dozers and rollers.

b. SIGNAL — Tables of organization and equipment for Iraqi signal units are basically British with local modifications. The 1st and 2d Signal Battalions are organized to provide communications for the 1st (Field) Division and the 2d (Mountain) Division, respectively. The 3d Signal Battalion of

the 3d (Training) Division provides communications for the 3d Division, but its main mission is to provide field training for nontechnical signal personnel.

The Army Signal Company operates the Ministry of Defense communications network. Detachments from this company operate the Ministry of Defense telephone exchange, the Washash Camp exchange, and the Ordnance Depot exchange, all located in Baghdad. The Radio Line of Communications Platoon operates the fixed radio network between the Ministry of Defense and all major garrison towns. The other radio platoon is a reserve unit to provide communications for advanced field headquarters.

The River Flotilla Signal Section is an independent unit providing communications between Flotilla Headquarters at Al 'Amārah and each of four gunboats (the *Dhat Alsawari*, the *Abdul Rahman*, the *Junada*, and the *Jassy*). There is also a link from the Flotilla headquarters to 1st Division headquarters.

c. TRANSPORTATION UNITS — Transportation-type units are divided into four categories: Motor Transportation Companies; Motor Transport Park Company; Transport Workshops; and Animal Transport Companies. The assignment of transportation-type units is as follows: 1) to the Ministry of Defense — Motor Transport Park Company, 3d Motor Transport Company,* 4th Motor Transport Company*; 2) to the 1st Division — 1st Motor Transport Workshop; 3) to the 2d Division — 2d Motor Transport Company, 2d Motor Transport Workshop, 1st Animal Transport Company, 2d Animal Transport Company; 4) to the 3d Division — 1st Motor Transport Company, 3d Motor Transport Workshop.

There are 480 mules per Animal Transport Company, and Motor Transport Park Company vehicles comprise 70 assorted staff cars.

The 2d, 3d and 4th Motor Transport Companies have an identical organization with a Company Headquarters and three Platoons. The Company Headquarters is equipped with three trucks, 1½ ton, 4 x 2, Dodge commercial and two trucks, ¼ ton, 4 x 4, (Jeep). Each platoon has 24 trucks, 1½ ton, 4 x 2, Dodge commercial. The 1st Motor Transport Company has a similar organization but is equipped with 70 Bedford trucks.

d. MEDICAL SERVICE UNITS — Medical Service Units in the Iraqi Army consist of 1) four Base Hospitals: one in Baghdad with 600 beds, a 150-bed unit in Kirkūk, and 100-bed units in Mosul and Ad Dīwāniyah; 2) ten Garrison Hospitals, located at 'Aqrah (formerly 'Aqra), Irbīl, Ruwāndūz, Al

* Available to 1st Division on call.



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Manşuriyah (formerly Al Mansūriya), Jalūlā', Basra, Al 'Amārah, Al Musayyib (formerly Al Musaiyib), As Sulaymāniyah, and An Nāsiriyah (formerly An Nāsiriya); 3) six Field Ambulance Units, organized into a headquarters and five ambulance sections, with prescribed personnel strength of 6 officers and 141 enlisted men (actual strength is often below these figures); and 4) one Base Medical Stores Depot.

There are no medical officers attached or assigned to units in the Iraqi Army; medical services are provided in peacetime by the officers of the Field Ambulance Units and Garrison Hospitals. In wartime, it is possible that a medical officer and two orderlies would be attached to units in the field.

Iraq has 24 four-litter British ambulances and 60 new jeep four-litter ambulances. Animal transport also is employed by field ambulance units in the 2d (Mountain) Division.

5. River Flotilla

The River Flotilla, consisting of four gunboats, is an integral part of the 1st (Plains) Division. Crews are Army artillerymen. The flotilla has proved effective in police actions and in tribal control.

D. Order of battle

1. Strength

a. PERSONNEL — The personnel strength of the Iraqi Army was estimated at 41,000 officers and men as of 5 March 1953. Career personnel number about 22,400; the others are conscripts. Most of the officers are members of the Regular Army who received commissions upon graduation from the Military College. Personnel represent all sections of the country.

b. UNITS — The Iraqi Ground Forces currently consist of three infantry divisions supported by a number of service units and small independent tactical organizations under the direct control of the Ministry of Defense. All Army Service Schools are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. Headquarters service installations and units provide logistic and administrative support to the infantry divisions, whereas the majority of the small independent tactical units are concentrated in Baghdad as ceremonial and guard troops and as security forces used as an adjunct to the civil police. In addition, certain elements of these supporting troops are designed for the defense of the capital against enemy attack.

The 1st and 2d Divisions are the two major tactical units and form the major portion of the combat strength of the Army. The only opera-

tional components of the 3d or Training Division are the Mechanized Force and the one battalion of the 19th Infantry Brigade (Motorized).

The River Flotilla is an organic part of the 1st Division; Iraq has no navy. This small force of about 180 men is based at Al 'Amārah and is equipped with four gunboats. Its mission is maintenance of internal security along the rivers, and support of 1st Division operations.

The Iraqi Army is primarily an infantry force. A gradual reorganization has been undertaken since the Palestine War, however, in order to overcome weaknesses evidenced during that conflict. Under supervision of the British, modernization of weapons and transport, and expansion of existing units, have been the goals.

c. ARMAMENT — The authorized and actual quantities of armor, artillery, and mortars in the Iraqi Army are shown in FIGURE 81-10. The authorized strength column represents a compilation of table-of-equipment requirements of the individual infantry divisions and the separate tactical units. In most instances, actual strength is below the authorized strength. By modern standards, armament on hand is grossly inadequate and in many cases obsolescent. The Army is attempting to remedy this situation, however, and considerable improvement has been noted since 1950.

FIGURE 81-10. ARMAMENT OF IRAQI GROUND FORCES

ARMAMENT	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	ACTUAL STRENGTH
ARMOR:		
Tank, Medium.....	29	29 (Churchill, Mk VII, U.K.)
Armored Car.....	164	160 (52 Daimler, U.K.) (56 Humber, U.K.) (52 Chevrolet, U.S.)
ARTILLERY:		
6-pounder Gun, AT....	76	48 (U.K.)
17-pounder Gun, AT....	36	36 (U.K.)
25-pounder Gun, Field Arty.	108	84 (U.K.)
6-inch How, Field Arty..	4	4 (U.K.)
5.5-inch Gun-How, Field Arty.	16	8 (4 serviceable)
3.7-inch Pack Howitzer, Field Arty.	12	60 (U.K.)
3.7-inch Gun, AA.....	8	8 (U.K.)
20-mm. Gun, Flak, AA..	0	12 (German)
20-mm. Gun, AA.....	0	8 (Breda, Italian)
40-mm. AA.....	54	38 (Bofors, U.K.)
MORTARS:		
4.2-inch.....	28	16 (U.K.)
3-inch.....	114	94 (U.K.)
2-inch.....	268	198 (U.K.)

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2. Dispositions

a. GENERAL — The disposition of the ground forces of the Iraqi Army is dictated by two factors: guarding likely routes of approach of an invading army and maintaining internal security. Current dispositions of forces in the urban and tribal areas east of the Euphrates River fulfill this dual role. This deployment is designed also to defend the eastern frontier against possible attack by the U.S.S.R. Present distribution of units also provides for defense in depth from north to south. Ability of the Army to redeploy rapidly is limited by inadequacy of transportation and communication facilities, a

situation which, however, is being improved by gradual purchase of more automotive equipment. Owing to these limitations, it would be difficult for the Army to conduct a planned withdrawal or to reinforce present dispositions. No Iraqi forces are employed abroad. Ground-force dispositions are shown in FIGURE 81-11.

b. DETAILED — For detailed identification and location of Iraqi Ground Force Units see the July 1952 issue of the *Order of Battle Summary—Foreign Ground Forces*, published quarterly by the Production Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.



FIGURE 81-11. IRAQI GROUND FORCE DISPOSITIONS, 1 MAY 1953

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E. Strategy and defense

1. Strategic problems and doctrines

a. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE COUNTRY —

Iraq is traversed by one of the major routes of approach from the Soviet Union through Iran to the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. In addition, Iraq contains extensive petroleum resources and facilities. In the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers she possesses large supplies of fresh water in an otherwise arid area. The northern sections of Iraq and Syria cover the southern land approach to Turkey, an approach which outflanks Turkey's eastern defenses and provides the easiest route into the Anatolian plateau.

During World War II, Iraq was of great importance to the Allied Powers because of the tremendous flow of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union via Persian Gulf ports. Iraqi connections to Iranian highways, developed by the United Kingdom and the United States to aid the flow of supplies, could be used by the Soviets in an invasion of the Middle East. In any conflict with the Soviet Union, a stable Iraq, friendly toward the Western Powers, would be vital to them, owing to Iraq's petroleum production and her ability to provide air bases and staging areas relatively close to the Soviet Union's petroleum-producing and industrial areas. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, in the event of general hostilities, could gain great initial advantage by denying to the Western nations the petroleum supplies of the Middle East, thus forcing these Powers to obtain POL from distant sources to supply Europe and the military forces in the Middle East area. Soviet occupation of the excellent sites in Iraq for air bases and staging areas would necessarily deprive the Western Powers of these facilities. The conquest of one Arab nation probably would reduce the desire of the others to resist further Soviet aggressive efforts.

Iraq is susceptible to invasion by the Soviet Union through the northern and northwestern passes of the Zagros Mountains of Iran, which lead into the Mosul and Kirkūk oil-producing areas, thence to the Levant coast and Suez Canal; and via Dezfūl (formerly Dizfūl), and the Khuzistan plain, Iran.

b. STRATEGIC PROBLEMS — From the strategic point of view, Iraq may be divided into three areas: the mountainous north and northeast; the desert and steppe areas of the west and northwest; and the riverine area of the center and southeast.

The mountainous area (and the Zagros Mountains of Iran to the eastward) interposes a barrier to invasion by way of Iran. The obstructive effect, however, is rather lessened by passes, notably those near Rawāndūz and Panjwīm (villages shown on the map, FIGURE 81-11), which, because the ap-

proaches are situated in Iran, permit only partial control by Iraq.

The desert areas seriously hinder the access of an invading force from a westerly direction, owing mainly to a lack of water-supply sources that are essential to the vehicles and personnel of a mobile force.

In the riverine area the Tigris and Euphrates, having few bridges, are formidable parallel obstacles, particularly in flood season. The main strategic obstacles in this area are irrigation canals and the large marsh and water-basin areas in the south, particularly those along the Shatt al Arab, the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.


The population of Iraq includes several important divergent elements: about equal division in the Islamic faith between the rival Shiah and Sunni sects; fragmentary and dissident Christian sects, including a sizable, intelligent Assyrian group; a large Kurdish minority; and many nomadic tribes who are more strongly influenced by their sheikhs than they are by governmental authority. There is uniformity in poverty, disease, lack of education, and parochial attitude.

Politically the Iraqi are intensely "nationalistic" and anti-Israel, with concomitant distrustfulness of the West, particularly of the United Kingdom and the United States, which they consider exploitationist, dominationist, and pro-Zionist. This distrust and dislike generally exclude a realization of the Soviet menace, and only in the ruling class is there a conception of the Soviet threat. A small hard core of underground Communists and sympathizers takes advantage of every situation to increase its ranks and to further internal chaos and anti-Western "nationalism." In war, this growing group probably would necessitate the retention of sizable elements of the Army to maintain internal security.

Iraq is one of the few countries of the Middle East which is agriculturally self-sufficient under her present marginal standard of living, but war would cause serious disruption of food production. The very low state of industrial development requires the importation of all machinery and most manufactured goods, which naturally would be curtailed, if not completely stopped, if Iraq were engaged in conflict. Furthermore, all replacement military supplies and materiel would have to be imported over long ocean routes and then distributed over Iraq's limited inland transportation facilities.

Iraq, under foreseeable political conditions, has two potential enemies: Israel and the Soviet Union. Because of geographical and political considerations, an invasion of Iraq by Israel through Jordan or Syria is unlikely, involving, as it would, the defeat of the Arab Legion of Jordan and the forces of

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Syria, with Egypt at her rear. In all probability, the logistical problems facing Israel would be too great and the political results too unfavorable for her to make such an attempt.

c. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES — Iraq has no heritage of military tradition and no authorship, present or past, of significant military documents or lore. Present Iraqi military publications are Arabic translations of British and United States manuals and books.

The only two modern experiences of Iraq in warfare were the abortive coup of Rashid Ali in 1941, during which the Iraqi forces were defeated by markedly inferior British and Arab Legion elements; and the war with Israel in 1948 in which the Iraqi forces, despite a show of morale and some demonstration of tactical sufficiency, generally failed because of poor leadership, inferior quality in weapons, and complete logistical breakdown.

Experience indicates that, when major elements of the Iraqi Army are removed for combat duties from their prime mission of assisting in maintenance of internal order, the imposition of military law to control internal dissidents is essential.

The ruling and military factions are aware of the strategic vulnerability of Iraq, but preoccupation with the problem of Israel, intense "nationalistic" feeling, and, to some extent, lack of confidence in Iraq's ability to resist Soviet aggression have led to inertia in strategic planning against Soviet invasion.

2. Permanent fortifications

a. GENERAL SYSTEM — On the recommendation of the British Military Mission, Iraqi troop dispositions are based on defense of likely avenues of invasion. Demolition sites have been prepared at mouths of mountain passes and on strategic roadways, particularly in the Rawāndūz and Panjwīm areas. The main parts of these access routes are within the territory of Iran, with which no coordinated defense plans exist. This situation forces Iraq to provide defenses only against an enemy debouchment from the passes. Stockpiling of plastic explosives obtained from the United Kingdom has been provided near the demolition sites, which were prepared by the British Army during World War II. In 1951, the Iraqis began renovating these wartime sites with a view of incorporating them into the overall defense plan of the country. The stage of completion of this work is not known.

b. LAND FORTIFICATIONS — Iraq has no system of permanent fortifications. During World War II, a number of blockhouses covering passes and fords were constructed in scattered areas. These offer

protection only against rifle fire, however, and have been turned over to the police force for use as stations.

Iraq has no coastal defenses.

F. Tactics

1. Basic tactical doctrines

The Iraqi Army has no original tactical doctrines but employs those of the British Army, due to the tutelage of the British Military Mission.

To a very limited extent, each of the three Iraqi divisions is tactically suited to its purported mission: The 2d Division is basically animal-transported and its artillery is pack type; the 1st Division is basically motor-transported; and the combat elements of the 3d Division are mechanized and motorized to enable them to fulfill their dual mission of assisting civil authority and of covering the Khanaqin border area.

In the event of invasion by a major power, such as the Soviet Union, such tactical doctrines as may be extant probably would be disregarded, since only token resistance by Iraqi forces may be anticipated.

The history of Iraqi forces in the Israeli conflict was one of frequent disregard for even elementary tactical rules. No information is available to indicate any improvement.

General observations on Iraqi application of British tactical doctrines follow.

a. TACTICAL FORMATIONS — Although the Army is divided into three divisions, experience indicates that the brigade group is the basic tactical formation. If and when more than one brigade is used, a force headquarters is improvised.

b. ARMORED CAR REGIMENTS — Although the assignment of these regiments is such as to suggest that they would perform reconnaissance duties for the divisions, the fact that the regimental organization permits breaking down to squadrons suggests piecemeal employment such as obtained in the Israeli conflict.

c. MECHANIZED FORCE — Here again a potential reconnaissance force can be broken down to three squadron groups of all arms.

d. PLANNING STAFF — There has recently been established, under the direct control of the Chief of General Staff, a Planning Staff consisting of two sections, War Plans and Training. To this body, long recommended by the British, is delegated the planning for strategy and defense and the preparation of maneuver plans.

e. COMMAND AND CONTROL — Theoretically, command and control are employed as in the British Army, but in practice the Arab proclivity to



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retain control in the ultimate commander and the parallel reluctance of subordinates to make and carry out decisions cause failure in the command structure.

f. ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS — The Arab propensity to use "writings" causes difficulty, inasmuch as even minor details are in writing. Confusion exists in the combining of operational and administrative orders. Theoretically, British forms are employed.

2. Special operations

a. WATERBORNE — Considerable amphibious training has been given in cooperation with the River Fleet. Local river craft, relatively unsuited to military use, however, are the only craft available in Iraq. Cover for crossings or for movement along a river is provided by protective troops along the bank, stationed, or moving, according to the type of operation, in box formation. As many as two battalions may be used to cover the movement of a brigade. The River Flotilla has developed a substantial degree of skill in fire support for such operations. Air support, in the form of pinning the enemy to the ground, has been practical in river exercises.

b. PROTECTION BY NIGHT OF RIVER OPERATIONS — Standing operating procedures for protection at night are in force. In general, these procedures call for the establishment of a box perimeter 200 yards square about the waterborne forces, with two sides of the perimeter located on the river banks. Machine guns are sited to cover approaches, including those by water. Vessels are concentrated within the perimeter.

c. ARMY-AIR COOPERATION — The Air Force is under direct control of the Chief of General Staff (CGS). During operations the air force commander occupies quarters with the ground force commander. Air force liaison officers are always attached to the headquarters of brigade groups.

The air force commander provides air support at the request of the ground force commander at Force Headquarters, by signal to the airfield at which air support is located. Air support communication, consisting of voice and code radio, and dropped messages are provided by the Air Force.

d. MARCHES, MOTOR TRANSPORT MOVEMENT — British discipline is used.

G. Personnel

Personnel administration in the Iraqi Army is controlled by the Adjutant General (AG) under the Director General of Administration (DGA/GS), and by the A Branches at lower unit levels.

1. Ranks

The rank structure of the Iraqi Army corresponds to that of the British Army, with the difference that colonels, who are in principle staff officers, in practice serve as commanders of some brigades.

Distinction is made on the enlisted level between conscripts and volunteer personnel, in terms of pay, required term of service, and T/O positions.

No posts in the Iraqi Government, outside the Ministry of Defense, ordinarily are held by Army officers. Two special categories of personnel exist in the Iraqi Army: Deputy Officers and Chaplains.

The rank of *Naib Dabit* (Deputy Officer) is the equivalent or comparable rank to the British and American Warrant Officer. Formerly this rank was awarded to graduates of the Royal Military College and held for a one year probationary period before the graduate received a commission. This practice is no longer in effect. Cadets now attend the Military College for three years and, upon graduation, are commissioned as second lieutenants. *Naib Dabits* are now procured from selected NCO's and civilians who will have a technical or administrative specialty required by the Army.

Imams, or chaplains (a term which includes all personnel employed by the Army to perform religious ordinances and duties) are treated as a separate class of noncombatant officer personnel, subject to special rules of procurement and administration. The duties of an *Imam* are to give religious instruction and guidance to individuals; he does not lead organized prayer. In addition to his religious duties, the Imam is designated assistant quartermaster, entrusted with the issue of rations and the keeping of ration accounts. Commanding officers, however, usually reserve this duty for themselves.

Technician grades of non-commissioned officers are distinguished by special titles, insignia, and pay.

FIGURE 81-12 lists the various ranks in the Iraqi Army, their literal translations, United States Army equivalents, and basic annual rates of pay.

2. Pay

a. BASIC PAY — Pay administration in the Iraqi Army follows the ordinary British pay system and functions with somewhat more efficiency than in other Middle Eastern countries. Pay rates, however, are a major morale issue. The basic pay scales of the Iraqi Army were set up by the National Defense Acts and Service Acts of 1937 and 1938 and have not been materially altered since that time. To correct these rates to meet the great rise in living costs, following World War II a system of cost-of-living allowances was set up for all ranks,

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FIGURE 81-12. PAY AND ALLOWANCES, IRAQI ARMY

RANK	LITERAL TRANSLATION	U.S. ARMY EQUIVALENT	BASIC ANNUAL RATE OF PAY
Mushir..... (Monarch only)	Field Marshal...	General of the Army.	US\$ 4,032
Amid.....	Dean.....	General.....	3,360
Fariq.....	Commander.....	Lt General.....	3,024
Amir al Liwa.....	Prince of Brigade.	Maj General....	2,520
Zaim.....	Leader.....	Brig General....	2,016
Aqid.....	Contractor.....	Colonel.....	1,680
Muqaddam.....	Giver.....	Lt Colonel.....	1,344
Rais Awwal.....	1st Chief.....	Major.....	1,176
Rais.....	Chief.....	Captain.....	1,008
Mulazim Awwal.....	1st Follower.....	1st Lieutenant..	840
Mulazim Thani.....	2d Follower.....	2d Lieutenant..	672
Naib Dabit.....	Deputy Officer..	Warrant Officer.	605
Imam.....	Chaplain.....	No U.S. Equivalent	
		(GR. I).....	504
		(GR. II).....	403
		(GR. III).....	336
		(GR. IV).....	268
Rais Urafa Wihda.	Chief Unit Sgt..	1st or Master Sgt	538
Rais Urafa.....	Chief Sgt.....	Sgt 1 Cl.....	504
Arif.....	Sgt.....	Sgt.....	470
Naib Arif.....	Deputy Sgt.....	Cpl.....	302
Jundi Awwal.....	First Soldier.....	Pfc.....	200
Jundi.....	Soldier.....	Pvt.....	151

NOTE Commissioned officers receive a cost of living allowance, a servants allowance, and a uniform allowance. These allowances equal approximately one-third to one-half base pay.

Warrant officers and enlisted personnel are entitled to "Trades Pay" averaging approximately 5 Dinars (\$14.00) per month if they are serving in a technical capacity such as mechanic, driver, or signalman and a cost of living allowance of 2 Dinars (\$5.60) to 5 Dinars (\$14.00) per month. The pay as shown is for volunteers. A conscript receives 1.5 Dinars (\$4.20) per month or 33% of base pay of a volunteer private. 1 Dinar=US\$2.80.

including conscripts. These allowances have brought about a reasonably adequate adjustment.

In general, Iraqi officers, as educated career personnel, are paid considerably more than the relatively untutored enlisted men. Officer incomes when augmented by cost-of-living allowances and other perquisites compare favorably with the incomes of civilians of equivalent bureaucratic rank.

On the enlisted level, volunteers receive considerably more than do conscripts. They also receive proficiency and specialist bonuses not applicable to conscripts. Armor personnel have a slightly higher rate of pay than dismounted personnel. Conscripts lose much of their pay in charges for barracks maintenance costs.

Chaplains (*Imams*) have a special pay scale which is inferior to that of commissioned officers and more nearly resembles the pay of senior enlisted ranks.

Officers are subject to placement on the half-pay list for sickness, bad conduct, inefficiency, or because they are surplus to the Army's organization. Officers may be carried on the half-pay list for one year and then retired.

b. ALLOWANCES — All personnel of the Iraqi Army receive allowances which have increased their monthly pay by one-third to one-half. In addition to the cost-of-living allowance, officers receive an allowance for servants and another for uniforms. Officers serving in a T/O position calling for an officer of higher rank receive a supplementary allowance at the rate of one-fifth the pay of the position. Recent legislation provides that officers passed over on promotion lists shall receive pay of the next higher grade for which they are eligible in terms of service. Army doctors and dentists receive a special allowance in addition to those regularly received by officers. Also, officers who pass a proficiency test in a foreign language receive a rating for ability and a lump-sum gratuity of 30 Iraqi dinars.

Imams, although classed with officer personnel, are eligible for cost-of-living allowances, equivalent to those of senior NCO's.

Cost-of-living allowances for enlisted men are small, ranging from approximately one dinar for the conscript to five dinars per month for senior NCO's. Conscripts are not eligible for other allowances, but volunteers serving in technical capacities, such as drivers, signalmen and artillery surveyors, receive a special allowance or "trades pay" designed to correct the basic pay scale. This specialist pay or trades pay ranges from one dinar per month to eight dinars per month.

3. Procurement and terms of service

a. OFFICERS — Procurement and service of officers are governed by the Army Officers Service Law of 1937, as amended.

(1) *Procurement* — Officers for the Iraqi Army can be commissioned from four sources: the graduating classes of the Royal Iraqi Military College, foreign military colleges recognized by the Ministry of Defense, from the ranks (for noncombatant duty as quartermasters or paymasters only), and from civilian life, if qualified in technical or professional skills required by the Army. In practice, most officers are graduates of the Military College and receive permanent commissions; as the exception, medical and pharmacist officers generally are drafted from civilian life, under existing regulations providing for temporary appointment under

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special circumstances, as defined by the Minister of Defense.

(2) *Terms of service* — Officers are commissioned to serve 15 years, at the end of which they are eligible to retire. There are provisions in the Officers Service Law whereby an officer may purchase his discharge before he completes 15 years service, but this means is seldom used.

(3) *Promotion* — Officers are eligible for promotion to the next higher grade upon fulfillment of the following specified minimum terms of service; the lower figure indicates years in grade for combatant officers, and the higher figure applies to noncombatant officers:

Second lieutenant	3	4
First lieutenant	3	4
Captain	4	5
Major	4	5
Lieutenant colonel	4	5
Colonel	4	4
Brigadier	4	4

In theory, eligible company-grade officers are promoted according to seniority and military proficiency as demonstrated by written and practical examinations. Field-grade officers are promoted according to seniority and efficiency, subject to existence of a T/O vacancy. Promotion to the rank of general officer is selective and based on existence of a vacancy. In practice, all promotions are selective, but regulations permit granting of seniority and exceptional promotion for distinguished service during military operations or in wartime.

Promotions are controlled by a board composed of representatives of the three Divisions and the Minister of Defense, meeting semiannually. The decisions of the board are reached after some political bargaining; in the past, announcement was delayed subject to the approval of the Regent. All promotions are by Royal Decree.

(4) *Assignment and transfer* — There is no organized rotation system or career-management program for Iraqi officers. Officers who have completed staff college and are serving in the Ministry of Defense or on divisional staffs are required, at prescribed intervals, to serve in field commands. In the past, there has been a marked tendency to assign incompetent field commanders to administrative posts and senior artillery officers to choice staff positions.

(5) *Leave policies* — Officers accrue leave-of-absence eligibility at the rate of 36 days per year and are allowed a maximum accrued leave of 4 months, or 120 days. Personnel taking leave continue on full pay status, but allowances for rations are forfeited.

(6) *Hospitalization* — For illness, disease, or infirmity acquired in line of duty, officers are al-

lowed an indefinite term of hospitalization and additional sick leave not exceeding one year on full pay. For sickness not in line of duty, the maximum period of hospitalization on full pay is two months, with additional sick leave on full pay for three months and on half pay another three months. If, after taking maximum sick leave, the officer is not physically fit for duty, he is put on half pay or is pensioned. Officers in Iraq are treated in hospitals at government expense and outside Iraq are so treated subject to approval of a medical board and resolution by the Council of Ministers.

(7) *Discharge* — Officers who have completed the full term of service (15 years) are eligible to retire on pension. Prior to that time, an officer may purchase his discharge by reimbursing the Government for all expenses incurred in his formal education or training. Such education and training include cadet training at the Royal Military College and any course which the officer has attended at government expense either in Iraq or abroad. Very few officers avail themselves of this provision of the law.

Officers also may be discharged in the interest of the service.

Officers are automatically pensioned upon reaching the following maximum age limits; the lower age figures apply to combatant officers, and the higher figures to noncombatant officers.

First and Second Lieutenant	40	43
Captain	47	49
Major	49	52
Lieutenant Colonel	51	54
Colonel	54	56
Brigadier	56	56
Major General	58	58
Lieutenant General	60	60

In the interest of the service, an officer's active duty may, by Cabinet resolution, be extended beyond these limits three years.

Upon discharge or resignation, an officer who has served less than 15 years receives a gratuity of one month's pay in his current rank for every year of service. Pensions are calculated according to the following formula: the product of average monthly pay during last 12 months multiplied by number of months of service completed, divided by 480. Discharged officers become members of the reserve and are liable to recall up to specified age limits, as follows; the lower age limits are for combatant officers, the noncombatant officers are liable for a longer period.

Company grade	50	55
Field grade	58	60
General	60	60

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b. CHAPLAINS — Appointment and promotion of *Imams* (religious leaders not comparable to U.S. Chaplains) are by order of the Minister of Defense, according to qualifications and eligibility established by special regulation. The *Imams* are eligible for promotion after a minimum period of three years in grade and are promoted one grade at a time, subject to the existence of a T/O vacancy. They are free to resign at any time and are eligible for pension according to the formula applied for officers. Maximum age for service as an *Imam* is 60.

c. ENLISTED PERSONNEL

(1) *Procurement and terms of service* — Procurement of enlisted personnel is governed by the National Defense Law of 1938, as amended, which provides for conscription of every physically fit male person at the age of 19 years. Under this law, all conscripts are required to undergo three months in a training unit; those assigned to an infantry unit serve a further 18 months Color Service; those assigned to any of the other branches serve an additional 19 months Color Service. This is the first stage of 20 years liability to military service; the second and third stages are phases of reserve duty. Certain personnel are exempted from such liability because of dependents or special occupations; for example, religious leaders, police, and teachers. The service of students is postponed until completion of their program of study or their 28th year of age, whichever is earlier. College and secondary-school graduates are liable for call up for a reserve officer's training course. The calling up of conscripts takes place by class (i.e., year of birth) in theory, on the 1st of January of each year. The estimated maximum number of conscripts called each year is 10,000. If the class of a certain year exceeds quotas of army space, the group to be conscripted immediately is chosen by a drawing of lots and the surplus is placed on a waiting list. Employment of a system of proportionate conscription in tribal areas is attempted with varying success.

Recruiting and conscription are directed by a central recruiting bureau in Baghdad, headed by the Director of Recruiting, a brigadier. For recruiting purposes, the country is divided into 14 areas, corresponding to the *Liwas*, each of which controls from 3 to 12 regional recruiting offices. The duties of these offices are to maintain, through contact with local civilian administrative authorities, registers of all personnel liable for service by classes. These offices are also charged with the task of conducting exemption tribunals, serving call-up notices, and arranging medical examinations.

Any physically fit civilian or conscript at any stage in his duty may volunteer for service in the Army; however, two percent or less of each class volunteers in this fashion. A volunteer may extend his service by two-year renewals for infantry and renewals varying from 3 to 10 years each in branches where considerable technical work and training are required. A volunteer may serve until the age of 45, when he is discharged with no further military liability.

(2) *Promotion* — Enlisted promotions in the Iraqi Army are on the basis of T/O vacancy.

(3) *Leave policy* — Enlisted personnel are eligible for a flat 30 days' leave per fiscal year, which must be taken within the year during which it accrues. Commanders are encouraged to grant leave of absence, especially to enlisted personnel, for the sake of the savings in rations expenditures.

(4) *Discharge* — Discharge procedures are administered by the Director of Recruiting.

Under the present law, a conscript may purchase a discharge upon completion of 3 months' basic training at the cost of 50 dinars (US\$140.00). About 80% of conscripts have done so, but they are not absolved from service in the reserve and are liable to be called to active duty at any time. The government is considering a proposal to increase the discharge purchase fee to 150 dinars and in this way retain more conscripts for a full tour. Conscripts are discharged from active duty into the second stage of military service, the first class reserve. Another method of *de facto* "discharge" that has grown up is desertion. Desertions are numerous. If the deserter can avoid apprehension for five years, he can expect to be included in a general amnesty issued approximately every five years by the government for such offenses. Discharge by desertion, with subsequent purchase of a pardon, is now more prevalent than discharge by purchase, since the cost of the pardon is less than the price of a discharge. Conscripts are discharged from active duty into the second stage of military service, the first class reserve.

Volunteer enlisted men and noncommissioned officers are eligible for discharge with bonus or pension, depending on length of service; maximum age for enlisted service in the Army is 45. Volunteers who complete 15 years' active duty receive pensions calculated on the same basis as those of officers: the product of the multiplication of average monthly pay for past 12 months by number of months of completed service, divided by 480. If a soldier on volunteer duty fails to complete 15 years' service, he receives a gratuity, also calculated on the same basis as that of an officer. All volunteer personnel discharged or pensioned belong to the Reserve and are liable to recall up to the age of 45.



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4. Quality factors

The composition of the Iraqi Army parallels that of the population as a whole and is subject to similar internal schisms and conflicts, intensified by the needs of discipline and command. The Army takes in, on both enlisted and commissioned levels, the mutually antagonistic Sunni and Shiah Arab groups, as well as Sunni Kurds and Assyrian Christians. These groups are further split into nomads, sedentary tribesmen, and city-dwellers, none of whom displays any liking for the others. Beyond this difficulty with ethnic conflict, the Iraqi Army as a military force faces the basic difficulty of attempting to adapt the Middle Eastern tribal warrior to methods and techniques of modern Western warfare.

Enlisted men and NCO's of the Iraqi Army are drawn almost entirely from the Arab and Kurdish groups, the Shiahs among the Arabs outnumbering the Sunnis significantly. Small numbers of Turkomans and Assyrians are also represented, but one distinct group, the Yezidi (members of a cult usually classified as pagan), is specifically exempted from conscription because of its resistance against service with certain other sects. The contribution of migratory tribes to Army ranks, although considerable, is mostly dependent on what the chieftain of the tribe hopes to obtain as a reward for cooperation; quite often, his contribution has consisted of the tribe's least valuable men. Most conscripts are illiterate and in poor physical condition; although official sources claim that 90% of each annual class is accepted for service, this figure must be accepted with reserve. Attainment of an adequate basic training level usually requires much longer than the three months allotted for the purpose, not only because of illiteracy and poor health standards, but also because of limitations in numbers of literate NCO instructors.

The Iraqi enlisted man generally reflects the friendliness and natural curiosity of the peasant poor. Although training requires a long period of time, soldiers retain what they have learned and demonstrate a natural understanding of terrain, as well as a goatlike ability to move rapidly over rugged country. Arab troops display their tribal heritage of mobility and endurance; however, they also reveal the traditional Arab romantic craving for glory, resistance to discipline, and reluctance to join a cause that is not readily seen to be a winner. The Kurds, who are considered better soldiers than the Arabs because of their superior energy and determination, make up the backbone of Iraqi mountain troops. They are usually taller than the Arabs, exceed them in physical strength, and do not despise manual labor as Arabs in general do. On the enlisted level, Kurdish troops are more likely to remain loyal, even against their own

people, subject to the continuing loyalty of Kurdish officers. Puritanical Shiah Arabs in the enlisted ranks are regarded as potential sources of trouble because of their fierce religious conviction. Army practices do nothing to alleviate this condition, inasmuch as they subject the Shiah Arabs to contact with other beliefs, and to continuous irritation in religious matters - for instance, it is impossible for Shiah soldiers to follow their dietary customs while serving in the Army.

The volunteer soldier in the Iraqi Army is attracted primarily by the security which military life offers, with adequate food and an income comparable to that of the average peasant. For the ordinary conscript, however, this security is offset by separation from his own family and tribal ties and by association with people whom he distrusts. The large number of discharges purchased and the high rate of desertions with subsequent amnesty and pardon are a good index to the Iraqi attitude toward military service.

Iraqi Army officers are drawn from the growing middle class and directly reflect its preoccupations, loyalties, and deficiencies. Although better educated and more intelligent than the enlisted men, the officers are by no means free of the typical limitations of temperament which make adaptation to modern warfare difficult for the Iraqi. All background and tradition encourages the Iraqi officer in his thirst for personal renown, his fierce pride, and reluctance to admit any deficiency in his knowledge or abilities. In the past, this attitude has led to insufficient delegation of authority and little reliance on staff work; in the case of incompetent personnel holding positions of power the result has been too often the adoption of mistaken decisions, plans, and policies which could not be corrected at a lower level without insulting the superior officer. It has led also to a loss of contact between officers and men, since many officers consider certain types of military training and knowledge beneath their dignity: for example, that of motor transport and maintenance.

Personnel and pay administration of Iraqi officers has been a continuing morale issue. Outstanding officers of certain branches have been taken from field commands and assigned to choice staff positions in the Ministry of Defense, while officers who show little promise have been transferred into the administrative services. Inadequate pay and slow promotions influenced by political favor have been sources of complaint and have encouraged officers to indulge in the long-standing practice of padding their salaries with supplements from unit ration funds. The pay system also has functioned with some inequity; for example, Assyrian officers who served in the Palestine War were not given the ordinary servant and

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family allowances received by Arabs and Kurds and finally were discharged from the Army prematurely, in 1949, without the gratuities prescribed by the Defense Law of 1938.

At present, the Iraqi Army has an Acting Chief of the General Staff. This officer is not considered capable or popular; however, the Chiefs of the various Directorates of the Army for the most part are considered capable, loyal, and popular with their subordinate commands and officers.

H. Reserve and mobilization system

1. Reserve system

No reserve units are known to exist in Iraq; persons assigned to reserve are in a pool. The reserve program based on the Army Reserve Law and the National Defense Law (both of 1938) has not been implemented to furnish reserve units for the Iraqi Army. It is administered by the Ministry of Defense, although in practice machinery for the administration of reserve affairs is virtually nonexistent. The established period of military service for an Iraqi male, volunteer or conscript, is 20 years, starting with his 19th year or enrollment in the service and is divided into 3 stages.

The first stage, known as the Color Service, is the period of active duty which consists of a total of 21 months service for infantry conscripts and a total of 22 months for the other branches of the Army. This period of service includes a three-month basic training period.

For the volunteer, the length of service varies by branch. The volunteer of infantry must serve 2 years, but other branches requiring technical training and capacities vary from 3 to 10 years' service.

The second period, known as First Class Reserve service, is reserve status for the time necessary to bring the man's accrued service up to 10 years.

The final stage, Second Class Reserve service, is reserve status for 10 years for all branches. Both classes of Iraqi reserve service constitute the Reserve. Conscripts who have avoided Color Service by purchasing discharge at the end of their basic training period are not exempt from service in the reserve.

Reserve officers are drawn from three sources and are classed accordingly: Class I - Officers previously placed on pension but still physically fit; Class II - Professional, technical, and other educated men; Class III - Warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. Retired officers are seldom called back except in case of mobilization.

College and technical school graduates are subject to a special training course of six months similar to United States officer candidate schools.

Those who pass the course are commissioned second lieutenants in the reserve and must serve three months on active duty before returning to civilian life. All men who fail to pass the six months' training course are offered positions as warrant officers and must serve three months before reverting to the Reserve. This brief period of active duty is known as Short Service and in no case exceeds one year. Selection is on a quota basis, and any vacancies left after the college graduates are selected may be assigned to secondary school graduates. Graduates of secondary school (high school equivalent) in practice are seldom called for either reserve-officer training or conscript training. They are considered to be a pool or a source of manpower for commissioning as second lieutenants in the event of mobilization. Upon reaching the age of 50 or 60, the exact age depending upon rank and branch of service, officers are exempted from further reserve service. Whenever it is deemed necessary, men of the First and Second Class Reserve can be called up for maneuvers or refresher training for a period of not over six weeks per year. Men of the First Class Reserve, however, cannot be called up for exercises until they have completed one year in the Reserve. Medical and technical specialists who hold reserve commissions are generally called back only in case of mobilization. Iraq has an estimated total of 50,000 available reservists, of whom no more than approximately 15,000 could be called effective reserves. The only trained reserves would be the few thousand who had received basic training or had been discharged from the Army within the previous two years.

2. Mobilization system

Iraq's two operational infantry divisions are roughly comparable in strength to United States infantry divisions, less one regiment. Deficient in firepower and armor, their combat readiness now is only fair. The cadre division is equal in strength to a United States regiment, but its sole combat-ready unit is a small mechanized force about the size of a United States battalion combat team. In case of a general mobilization, expansion of the two infantry divisions from their present respective strengths of 10,500 and 12,000 to about 17,000 or 18,000 probably would be attempted. The 15,000 effective reservists most probably would be used for this purpose. The cadre division would be bolstered with conscripts and untrained reserves and would be used either as a replacement center for the other two divisions or to form the nucleus for a mechanized or light armored division. All three divisions, however, would still rate no better than fair in combat readiness.



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Only a few new supporting units could be activated with mobilization because of two factors seriously limiting the mobilization potential of Iraq: 1) Critical shortages of trained officers and NCO's would definitely retard the development of the mobilization. Iraq, like all Arab States, is hampered by a low level of general and technical education throughout all ranks. Thus it would require a prohibitive length of time adequately to train new conscripts called up during a general mobilization. 2) The supply of arms and equipment is inadequate, by Western standards, even for the Army today, and the materiel available is in only fair condition. Consequently, any expansion of existing units or activation of new ones would be contingent upon extensive financial and military aid from outside Iraq.

3. Mobilization potential

The Iraqi Army's mobilization potential (excluding paramilitary forces) is estimated to be: 57,000 personnel in 2 infantry divisions and one cadre division on M Day; 62,000 in 3 infantry divisions on M+30; 65,000 on M+90, 70,000 on M+180, and 75,000 on M+360, with no additional organizational units.

I. Training

1. General

The quality of training in the Iraqi Army ranges between poor and fair. It has shown some improvement since a general overhaul of the High Command in 1951, with the creation of a Training Section directly responsible to the Chief of the General Staff and coordinated with a new War Plans Section created at the same time. During his service as Prime Minister and Defense Minister in late 1952, Nureddin Mahmud continued to carry out Army training programs he had instituted earlier as Chief of the General Staff.*

Basic deficiencies in personnel and materiel, however, make effective training difficult even under optimum conditions; meagerness of facilities combined with lack of interest in both officers and recruits have often resulted in uninspired and inadequate execution of over-ambitious plans.

* Vigorous action was taken by General Mahmud while Chief of the General Staff to correct morale and efficiency weaknesses on all Army levels by a policy of retiring incapable and over-age senior officers, seeking raises of pay and allowances from the Council of Ministers, and stiffening the requirements of training and maneuvers. Differences of loyalty among various groups of officers were reduced with the partial elimination of Assyrian and Jewish officers. The leadership of General Mahmud, a Kurd, affected all ranks, causing a general improvement of morale and offering junior officers an incentive for better performance in their commands.

The high rate of illiteracy in Iraq makes it difficult to train specialists, such as engineers, signalmen, and artillerymen. In the past, training groups have been criticized for teaching soldiers by rote, leaving them unable to respond appropriately to particular situations; and programs have failed to take advantage of the soldiers' natural ability for guerrilla tactics, scouting, and patrolling.

Current trends appear to be toward combat training for mountain operations and motorized desert defense, specifically along lines of repelling or delaying attack from the Soviet Union. Emphasis is being placed on combined operations of infantry, artillery, armor, and air, on the level of small units.

Iraq has always suffered from a shortage of qualified instructors, both for enlisted ranks and for branch and staff schools. Training was supervised by the British Advisory Military Mission (BAMM) until May 1948, at which time the Mission was felt to be no longer required and was withdrawn by mutual consent. However, since 1951, Iraq has accepted a series of Middle East Land Forces teams as training instructors for new tank and artillery units, and for repair, maintenance, and signals instruction. The operations of these teams appear to have been enlightened and effective, with consequent improvement in the units and schools affected.

Training doctrine of the Iraqi Army is, in theory, entirely British. However, some interest in United States tactics and organization has been evident recently.

2. Preinduction

There is no system of government-sponsored military training for potential Army personnel, except for university students who hold commissions in the Reserve.

3. Individual

Individual and school training throughout the Army is the general responsibility of the Director of Military Operations, who discharges this responsibility through a training staff distinct from the Training Plans Section responsible to the Chief of the General Staff.

Recruit training is conducted in seven special training battalions, organized into two brigades, one under each field division, and two independent battalions under the 3d (Training) Division. The normal basic training period of three months is devoted to indoctrination, use of the .303 rifle, and drill. Instruction in Arabic in reading, writing, and arithmetic is given to the majority of conscripts, inasmuch as most are illiterate and lack any basic education. Following training-unit serv-

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ice (the minimum term of service under Iraqi law), the recruit is eligible to purchase a discharge. Recruits who intend to buy their discharges usually are lackadaisical about training, and their attitudes infect the other recruits and the instructors.

If the recruit elects to remain in the Army, he is assigned to an arm or service and transferred to either an active unit in the field or to a training regiment or depot for more advanced training in his branch. The advanced training units (Artillery, Armor, Engineer, Signals, and Transport) are grouped for administrative purposes under the 3d Division. The courses given by these training organizations vary in length according to branch.

Upon joining active field units, all enlisted men are, in principle, subject to a continuation of training organized on an annual basis, with individual training emphasized during winter and early spring, followed by platoon and company training in April and May, and brigade and divisional exercises during the fall.

Volunteer personnel assigned to certain branches requiring specialization and technical knowledge are considered to be in training status for much longer than the normal period for infantrymen; for example, the "training period" of technical school graduates is four years. Training of such volunteers and courses for noncommissioned officers are conducted by the depots and branch training schools.

The quality of individual training varies with the quality of the unit and its commander; it ranges from poor to fair by United States standards and, in general, takes much longer. Individual training in the specialist battalions and depots is of a higher quality, due to the assignment of a better selection of personnel, than in the infantry battalions.

Officer candidates are trained at the Royal Military College, near Baghdad, where they follow a three-year course. During the first year, the cadet receives training in small arms, drill, small-unit tactics, physical education, equitation, and ordinary freshman-year college subjects. The second-year curriculum is a continuation of first-year subjects, plus tactical instruction to include company level. During the first six months of the third year, cadets continue advanced general instruction. At the end of that time they are allowed to select their branch of service, within the limits of available vacancies, and for their last six months' schooling attend specialized courses at their respective branch schools. The College, modeled on Sandhurst, sets a high standard, by Middle East standards.

Advanced specialized training for officers is administered in the various branch schools. Staff

training is carried out at the Iraqi Staff College and, to a limited extent, at the British Staff College in Camberley, England. The course at the Iraqi Staff College, which lasts two years, includes military history and strategy, military geography, armaments and organization, tactics, staff work, English, and equitation; all courses are modeled on British lines. In the past, teaching at the Staff College has often been in advance of the capabilities of the Army and the thinking of the General Staff.

Officers are also sent to attend courses in various service schools in the United Kingdom; attendance at schools in the United States and elsewhere is subject to approval by the British War Office, according to the terms of the 1930 alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq.

4. Unit, combined, and maneuvers

Unit and combined training and maneuvers in the Iraqi Army are under the supervision of the new Training Plans Section directly responsible to the Chief of the General Staff and in coordination with the War Plans Section.

Field maneuvers were the basis of Iraqi Army unit training under the supervision of the British Advisory Military Mission. These maneuvers were held on the three main types of terrain in Iraq and emphasized the two missions of the Iraqi Army, defensive action in repelling or delaying an invader, and offensive action in putting down tribal and other disturbances. The new Training Plans Section is continuing to stress annual maneuvers, especially of brigade-group strength, with exercises in combined operations on a lower level. Extensive exercises took place in 1951 and 1952; those held during the fall of 1952 involved two mountain operations in defense of the Rawanduz and Panjwim areas and a defense of the desert approaches south of Basra by a completely motorized force. The maneuvers, taken as a whole, constituted a preliminary test of defensive plans for both divisions and showed progress in staff and command training.

Emphasis was placed upon organization and training of a medium tank squadron and a 25-pounder artillery regiment under British instructors during 1952, with satisfactory results. Some training in air-ground cooperation was carried out independently and during maneuvers.

5. Reserve

Legal provisions for the periodic refresher training of reserves are not carried out, due to insufficiency of funds.

The 1938 Reserve Law provides for six months' training at the Royal Military College for all secondary school and college graduates selected for commissions in the Reserve. This training, al-

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though provided for in the law, has been neglected. Plans for the summer of 1953 include the setting up of a summer camp at Shaglāwah (formerly Shaqlāwa), under the direction of the Military College, to provide four months' reserve officers' training to college students.

6. Schools and installations

a. SYSTEM — The educational system of the Iraqi Army owes its achievements in great part to the British Military Mission. Most of the schools are modeled after those of the British Army, as

many senior Iraqi officers have been trained in British schools, either in the United Kingdom or in India.

The schools are under the direction of the Director of Military Operations in the Ministry of Defense. The most important installations are the Royal Military College, the Staff College, the Minor Tactical School, and the Mountain Warfare School.

b. LOCATION AND CHARACTER OF SCHOOLS — Details of installations are shown in FIGURE 81-13.

FIGURE 81-13. ARMY SCHOOLS

NAME	LOCATION	CHARACTER
Staff College (<i>Kulliya al Arkan</i>)	Ar Rustamiyah (Baghdad)	Trains selected officers who have served at least 5 years with rank of 1st Lt to Lt Col; 2-year course in advanced staff work.
Royal Military College (<i>Al Kulliya al Askariya al Malakiya</i>)	Ar Rustamiyah (Baghdad)	2 divisions, combatant and noncombatant. Officer candidate courses modeled on Sandhurst. Special "Tough Tactics," Intelligence, and Reserve Officers' courses given at the school.
Minor Tactics School (<i>Madrasat al Ta'bia al Sughra</i>)	Mosul	Company officers and noncoms are taught modern infantry tactics. Courses last 7 weeks and are prerequisite for promotion.
Mountain Warfare School (<i>Madrasat al Hurub al Jabaliya</i>)	Sawrah Tukā (near Al'Amadiyah, formerly 'Amadiya).	Summer branch of Minor Tactics School. Replaces mountain warfare courses in India.
Small Arms School (<i>Madrasat al Asliha al Khafja</i>)	Baghdad	Training in all infantry weapons.
Armored Fighting Vehicle School (<i>Madrasat al Ajjalat al Mudarra'a</i>)	Abu Ghurayb	Armored courses, including training in driving and maintenance, signals, gunnery, and heavy recovery involving tanks, armored cars, carriers, trucks.
Engineer School (<i>Madrasat al Handasa</i>)	Baghdad	<i>n a</i>
Royal Artillery School (<i>Madrasat al Madfa'iya al Malakiya</i>)	Baghdad	Trains battery commanders, executive officers, and noncoms.
Mechanical Transport School (<i>Madrasat al Naqliyat al Aliya</i>)	Baghdad	Drivers and automotive maintenance men are trained by this school as needed.
Signal School (<i>Madrasat al Mukhabara</i>)	Baghdad	Signal and regimental officers' training and refresher courses. Superintendents' and repairmen's noncom courses.
Military Technical School (<i>Madrasat al Sanaa' al Askariya</i>)	Baghdad	Technicians, electricians, and other specialized noncoms are trained by this school as needed.
Artillery Training Regiment (<i>Katiba al Tadrīb al Madfa'iya</i>)	Jalūla'	Artillery fundamentals for picked recruits.
Engineer Training Depot (<i>Mustawda' Tadrīb al Handasa</i>)	Baghdad	Engineer fundamentals for picked recruits.
Signals Training Depot (<i>Mustawda' Tadrīb al Mukhabara</i>)	Baghdad	Signals fundamentals for cablemen and wireless operator recruits.
Farriers School (<i>Madrasat al Na'alīn</i>)	Baghdad	Provides expert farriers and trains senior noncoms in special courses.
Technical courses		Various technical courses are operated as needed from time to time; musicians, artificers, carpenters, saddlers, tailors, cobblers, etc., are trained.

NOTE The schools' names in Arabic follow the English titles. The student personnel capacities are known only for 5 of the schools listed: Staff College, 50; Royal Military College, 450; Minor Tactics School, 90; Armored Fighting Vehicle School, 56; and Signal School, 400.

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J. Logistics

1. Procurement

a. FOREIGN — Most of the equipment used by the Iraqi Army must be imported. Since British T/O&E's are followed, the United Kingdom has been Iraq's chief source of weapons and equipment, although an increasing amount of engineer and signal equipment and general-purpose truck transport is being purchased from the United States. Procurement procedures followed by the Iraqi Army are quite involved. Although funds are made available to the Ministry of Defense through the annual budget, additional approval must be obtained from the Council of Ministers for all purchases involving expenditures in excess of 1,000 dinars (US\$2,800). After this permission has been granted, the Director of Contracts will request bids and place the order. Next, the Director General of Imports issues an import license. The Military Accountant General then requests a foreign-exchange allocation from the National Bank of Iraq, a government-owned bank, and arranges for the letter of credit. The Ministry of Defense, like all other Government departments, is subject to the same foreign-exchange and import-licensing procedures as those prescribed for private individuals. The Army must also pay customs duties and taxes to the Collector of Customs and Excise. The Ministry of Defense makes every effort to deal directly with manufacturers, bypassing local agents on all but routine purchases of spare parts. The procedure for purchases of a value less than 1,000 dinars is identical to that prescribed for the larger purchases, except that permission from the Council of Ministers is not required. These steps are followed in most instances. An outstanding exception was the acquisition in late 1951 of 29 Churchill tanks. Because of its great importance, this purchase was arranged almost exclusively on the highest level.

b. LOCAL — The Iraqi Army has no significant facilities for the development, design, manufacture, or testing of major items of materiel; in recent years, however, the Army has been attempting to lessen dependence upon foreign procurement by increasing local production. An Army sock factory, only recently established in Baghdad, is now producing 35,000 socks per month for the Army and Police. Another new Army factory in Baghdad is making 4,500 blankets per month. Iraqi wool is used for both operations. A third Army factory, also located in Baghdad, is producing field shoes for the Iraqi Army; these shoes reportedly are of poor quality and do not meet Army requirements. Iraq has two small government-owned arsenals capable of manufacturing a very limited quantity of rifles and small arms ammunition. A third plant is projected for the manufacture of mortar and artillery ammunition. The necessary equipment

for this plant is reported to be on hand, but funds for the installation and construction of the manufacturing facility have not yet been made available. Practically all raw materials must be imported. In the case of rations, the Army relies upon local contractors to supply the various units with rations at the times and places specified; such places, however, do not usually go beyond the forward maintenance area of the division. If contractors fail to supply the various units with rations, or if the Army needs extra rations, local purchasing committees are selected to purchase needed rations.

c. TECHNICAL SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES — The Ordnance Service of the Iraqi Army is charged with providing clothing, equipage (ordinary United States Quartermaster equipment), weapons, and with issuing ammunition. The Ordnance Service does not control the arsenals of the Iraqi Army; the arsenals are directly controlled by the Office of the Director of Military Operations. The Ordnance Service's responsibility is restricted to storage and issue of ammunition.

The Engineers are charged with the provision of demolition and engineer vehicles and equipment. The Signal Service has a similar responsibility for signal equipment.

The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) and the Mechanical Transport Service jointly share the responsibility for the procurement of vehicles other than special-purpose vehicles used by the Engineers and the Signal Service. REME has the responsibility for technical inspections, acceptance of purchased vehicles, and all repairs. Mechanical Transport issues the vehicles according to the allocations established by the office of the Director of Military Operations. The Mechanical Transport Service is further charged with the provision of all liquid fuels and lubricants for transportation purposes.

2. Peacetime storage and issue

a. SYSTEM — Storage and supply reserves in the Iraqi Army are virtually nonexistent, except for the storage of ammunition, which is the only item of supply requiring storage for any length of time. The shortages and the demand for all other items of supply are so great that issues are made immediately upon procurement to using units. The officer in command of a divisional supply center is charged with organizing and supervising the division supply program. This officer is known as the Supplies Officer or Q Officer. As supplies are heeded by brigades they are usually issued against a daily strength sheet showing the number of men, animals, and vehicles that depend on the divisional Q Branch; Q Branch then issues these supplies to the brigades 24 hours before the date assigned for consumption.



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b. INSTALLATIONS

(1) *The Engineer Base Store Depot* — From this Depot, located in Baghdad, are issued, as necessary, equipment and stores to the engineer units, all of which may draw directly on the Depot. Because of the simplicity of the equipment used, this system works fairly well. If more complex equipment were to be used, however, the present system would break down completely.

(2) *The Signal Supply Depot* — Located adjacent to the buildings housing the Ministry of Defense, in Baghdad, this depot is the central storage point for all signal supplies and is distinct from the Signal School Depot Wing, where signal supplies are kept for training purposes.

(3) *The Central Ordnance Depot* — This installation is located in Baghdad, but there are also Divisional Ordnance Depots located at the divisional headquarters towns. Requests for stores by all units are made directly to Division headquarters, without being passed through Brigade headquarters. Divisional Ordnance Depots in turn replenish their stocks from the Central Ordnance Depot.

(4) *Rations and forage depots* — These installations are located in all garrison towns and, during field operations, mobile depots are used. Rations are supplied through local contractors who make delivery either to supply depots or directly to the units.

(5) *REME Base Workshops* — These two Workshops are located in Baghdad and provide the highest echelon of maintenance for all items of equipment in the Iraqi Army. The major effort is devoted to vehicles and armaments.

3. War supply and movement

The supply services of the Iraqi Army are modeled on the British system; owing to the lack of equipment and skilled technicians, however, the resultant supply system bears little resemblance to the model. During the Palestine War, supply was a major bottleneck for the Iraqi Army. Except for a small amount of rations purchased on the scene, all fuel, motor vehicles and parts, ammunition, weapons, and other supplies had to be moved 600 miles over the desert from Baghdad to the front. Existing motor transport was far from adequate to meet demands, so many civilian vehicles were pressed into service. The resulting hodgepodge more nearly resembled a gypsy caravan than a supply column. Since the Palestine War, Iraq has been trying to improve the capabilities of her military transport with purchases of recent British and American trucks. There are now 4 motor transport companies in the Iraqi Army, each with about 70 cargo-type trucks. Three of these companies

are located in the Baghdad and Plains Division area. The mountain Division has one motor transport company and two animal transport companies; the two animal transport companies each have 480 mules. Rail transportation is limited in scope to north-south movements in the river valleys. Air transportation is of insignificant value, owing to the lack of both large personnel-carrying aircraft and suitable airfields. The supply and movement problem remains acute. Any large-scale movement or operation would still require extensive use of civilian vehicles and pack animals.

4. Maintenance

The system of recovery and repair of vehicles and equipment is patterned after that of the British Army. First echelon or organizational maintenance is performed by the men handling the equipment in the course of their duties, with the assistance of REME Light Aid detachments. As in the British Army, these Light Aid detachments are part of the unit establishment (T/O&E). Field maintenance is performed by larger REME Light Aid detachments which are located with each division. Heavier repairs are made in the REME base shops located in Baghdad. The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers are charged with the repair and service of all equipment in the Army, such as repair of tentage, furniture, vehicles, and weapons. This service has recently been introduced in the Iraqi Army by a qualified British Army officer. The efficiency of the Recovery and Repair System in the Iraqi Army is limited by the Iraqi lack of technical aptitude and ability. A further limitation is the large number of different types and often poor condition of vehicles and equipment. Spare parts are in short supply and proper service and overhauling of vehicles are too often neglected. The system, however, is gradually improving owing to the efforts of the British officer sponsoring REME.

5. Evacuation

Evacuation of equipment is handled by the Recovery and Repair System.

Personnel evacuation is handled by the Medical Corps. In time of war, it is expected that a Regimental Medical Officer and two Medical Orderlies would be attached to units in the field. Casualties would be evacuated by stretcher bearers from the ranks. Field ambulances then would take the wounded back to a casualty clearing station, usually located at a road head a good distance in the rear. No hospital ships, trains, or planes are known to exist, although improvisations could be made. Duty in the Medical Service is unpopular with both Iraqi officers and men, and consequently the efficiency of the Service is impaired.

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K. Materiel

1. Ordnance

Ordnance materiel in the Iraqi Army is predominantly of British origin. Except in motor transportation (where it is planned to standardize on United States vehicles) and, to a limited extent, in armored combat vehicles (where some United States World War II vehicles in poor condition are on hand), weapons and equipment are British. Maintenance of combat and transportation vehicles is considered poor, except that given to the recently acquired Churchill tanks; this maintenance appears to be adequate. Iraq has no guided missiles or self-propelled artillery.

Iraq receives no materiel under MDAP.

a. INFANTRY WEAPONS

(1) *Revolvers* — Two British revolvers, the caliber .38 Enfield and caliber .455 Webley, are found in the Iraqi Army (FIGURE 81-14). Supplies of these weapons appear to be adequate for normal requirements.

(2) *Submachine gun* — The British 9-mm. Sten is the submachine gun used in the Iraqi Army. Reliability and ease of handling and maintaining render this a desirable weapon. Only a small number of these submachine guns is held by the Army.

(3) *Rifle* — The caliber .303 Lee-Enfield rifle is the standard infantry weapon (FIGURE 81-14). Several different marks of this rifle have been issued to troops. This weapon is considered a satisfactory bolt-action rifle.

(4) *Machine guns* — Three different British weapons are classified as standard machine guns: caliber .303 Bren light machine guns; a small number of Lewis caliber .303 light machine guns; and Vickers caliber .303 medium machine guns (FIGURE 81-14). The Army is fairly well equipped with these effective World War II weapons. Nonstandard weapons on hand include some French Hotchkiss heavy machine guns and some Italian machine guns of unknown caliber. Information on the condition of these machine guns is not available.

(5) *Infantry antitank weapon* — Antitank defense is provided by the Projector, Infantry, Antitank. This British weapon is obsolete in the British Army and of doubtful value owing to cumbersome, danger to operating personnel, relative inaccuracy, and short range.

(6) *Grenade* — The British No. 36 hand and rifle grenade is the standard weapon in this category, but no information concerning adequacy of supply is available. This fragmentation grenade, similar to the United States Mark II grenade, has an effective radius of 20 yards.

(7) *Mortars* — Iraqi equipment in this category is comprised of three standard British mortars: the 2-inch, the 3-inch, and the 4.2-inch (FIGURE 81-15). Holdings of these effective World War II weapons are deemed adequate for normal requirements.

b. ARTILLERY — Iraqi Army artillery is entirely of British origin (FIGURE 81-16). Recent acquisitions of artillery pieces have rendered the Iraqis relatively well equipped in this category. Iraq has no coast artillery or field rocket launchers.

(1) *Antitank artillery* — Antitank artillery defense is provided by a few dozen British 6-pounder (57-mm) and 17-pounder (76.2-mm) AT guns. Both are effective against World War II-type armor.

(2) *Antiaircraft artillery* — In this category the Army is equipped with a limited number of 40-mm. AA guns and a few 3.7-inch guns. Neither is considered effective against modern high-altitude, fast-flying aircraft.

(3) *Field artillery* — The Iraqi Army has British 18-pounder (83.8-mm.) guns, 25-pounder (87.6-mm.) gun howitzers, 3.7-inch pack howitzers, 4.5-inch guns, 5.5-inch gun-howitzers, and 6-inch howitzers. With the exception of the 25-pounder and the 3.7-inch pack howitzer, these artillery pieces are available in only very limited numbers. The 6-inch howitzer is considered obsolete and eventually will be replaced with 5.5-inch gun-howitzers. Owing primarily to assistance given by British Army officers, the Iraqi Army may be considered fairly proficient in the use and maintenance of these weapons.

(4) *Combat vehicle artillery* — The Churchill Mark VII tanks of the Iraqi Army each carry a 75-mm. gun as their principal armament. Humber armored cars and Daimler armored cars are both armed with 2-pounder (40-mm.) pieces.

c. FIRE CONTROL DEVICES — Only the standard fire control devices used on British weapons are utilized by the Iraqi Army. It is not known to hold any radar equipment.

d. ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES

(1) *Tanks* — Tank support in the Iraqi Army is provided by a small number of Churchill medium tanks armed with 75-mm. guns (FIGURE 81-17). This World War II tank may be considered adequate for infantry support roles.

(2) *Armored and scout cars* — A small number of British and United States vehicles in this category are held by the Iraqi Army (FIGURE 81-17). Included are Daimler scout cars in good condition; Humber armored cars, Mark IV, with 2-pounder (40-mm.) guns in good condition; Daimler armored cars, each with one 2-pounder (40-mm.) gun and



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one 7.9-mm. Besa machine gun; Humber armored cars with one 15-mm. Besa and one 7.9-mm. Besa machine gun; Universal Bren gun carriers; and pre-World War II Chevrolet armored cars in poor condition armed with Vickers caliber .303 machine guns.

e. **TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES** — Transportation vehicles in the Iraqi Army are extremely heterogeneous both in make and type. In all, 45 different makes from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada provide motor transportation for the Army, creating great problems in maintenance and spare parts. A program of standardization on United States vehicles has been undertaken, and the sale of all vehicles currently held by the Army, except Ford, Chevrolet, Dodge, and Willys, has been authorized. Eventually, transportation will be limited to Dodges and Willys. Of the vehicles on hand and in use, the United States vehicles are of most recent acquisition and are considered to be in good condition. Serviceability of the older British and Canadian vehicles ranges from poor to fair.

In addition to conventional trucks, the Iraqi Army has a small number of tank transporter trailers, and some tractors which are used to tow the heavier artillery pieces.

Animal transportation is used to a considerable extent; mules are used as pack animals, particularly in the mountainous regions.

2. Signal

a. **GENERAL** — The Iraqi Army possesses ample quantities of signal equipment, most of it obsolete types from British surplus stocks.

Wire telephony is the principal medium of communication in the Army, but radio is assuming an increasing importance as more personnel are trained and more radio nets are established.

b. **TELEPHONE** — The Type F, Mark I and II, and the Type D, Mark V, are the two most commonly used telephones in the Army. Both are portable sets designed for operation forward of division headquarters.

c. **TELEGRAPH** — The most widely used telegraph instrument, the British Fullerphone, is a portable instrument of high sensitivity for use in forward areas. For all practical purposes, it is immune from interception.

d. **WIRE** — The Iraqi Signal Corps depends largely on the British D-3 and D-8 cables, available as single-conductor or twisted-pair cables.

e. **RADIO** — The principal radio equipments in use by the Iraqi Signal Corps are the British Nos. 12, 18, 19, 22, and 38 Radio Sets (FIGURE 81-5). Recent purchases of the No. 19 set have been made and the equipment stored at the Signal Supply

Depot. Complete technical information may be obtained from various British signal equipment handbooks.

3. Quartermaster

a. **UNIFORMS** — Iraqi Army uniforms are principally of British style and manufacture. Recently, the Iraqi Army has built several small factories to produce its own shoes, socks, sweaters, and blankets.

(1) Officers

(a) **SERVICE DRESS** — The winter service dress uniform consists of an olive drab, single-breasted coat with turned-down collar and patch pockets with squared flaps which are fastened with gilt buttons embossed with a crown. The coat is buttoned by four gilt buttons. Wide cloth belts are worn fastened by a slide-style buckle with a double-pointed tongue. Trousers are usually cuffless and have a hip pocket on the right side. Khaki shirts and ties are worn. The British-type garrison cap is worn, usually with piping, and with the branch insignia displayed on a patch on the front of the cap. Mounted officers may wear breeches and boots or leg wraps. Armored officers may wear a beret.

The summer service dress uniform is of a style similar to that of the winter uniform, but is made of light grey cotton. The coat has scalloped breast pockets and gilt buttons. Long trousers or shorts and knee-length socks are worn with low quarter shoes. A light colored cotton shirt and tie are worn with the coat. A cloth or Sam Browne belt is worn with the uniform.

(b) **FIELD UNIFORM** — The winter field uniform is the British-type olive drab battle dress. The jacket is of waist length, single breasted, with a fly front, and has a buckle at the right side at the waist. It has two patch pockets with V-shaped flaps. Pockets may or may not be pleated, and may or may not be secured with visible buttons. The collar of the jacket is high and is worn open, with a shirt and tie beneath. The trousers have slit pockets at the side and two different types of patch pockets in front. One of the patch pockets is pleated and one has a buttoned flap. Socks and shoes are also worn. The web belt is sometimes worn over the jacket.

The summer field coat is similar to the summer dress uniform, except that it has an open-type high collar, and a shirt and tie may be worn with it. The pith helmet may be substituted for the garrison cap.

(2) **Enlisted personnel** — The winter uniform is a battle jacket or coat, worn without a shirt and tie, and trousers and shoes similar to those worn by officers. The headdress is a garrison cap

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or regulation British steel helmet. A leather or web belt is worn with the uniform.

The summer uniform is composed of a light-weight cotton short-sleeved shirt with two V-shaped flapped breast pockets secured by an ordinary button, cotton trousers or shorts, wrapped leggings, and shoes. Pith helmets with neck shields or steel helmets are worn as headdress.

(3) *Special uniforms* - Iraqi tribal levies wear two typically Arabic items of clothing: the *aba* or *mashlah*, a loose, sleeved cloak resembling the academic robe, and the *keffiya* or headcloth.

River Force personnel wear regular Army uniforms, but each officer has a naval-type cap and shoulder insignia for ceremonial use.

(4) *Quasi-military* - Officers of the Iraqi Police wear uniforms similar to those of the Army, except that the garrison cap has a dark crown and a dark-colored patch at the front upon which the police insignie is pinned. Ties are dark-colored and the trousers have cuffs. The uniform coats have two gilt buttons on each sleeve, and the breast pockets are scalloped. Officers' grade insignia are similar to those of the Army. Enlisted grades wear V-shaped chevrons. High-buttoned, upright-collared coats, with grade insignia on patches on the front of the collar, are also worn. A Sam Browne belt is worn with this uniform. Policemen on duty in the desert wear light-colored headcloths with the high-buttoned, high-collared coats with Arabic-lettered metallic insignia affixed to shoulder loops, and ankle-length skirts slit about one-third of the way up the side. Wide leather belts, supported by crossed leather shoulder straps, are considered standard.

b. INSIGNIA

(1) *Grade* - Grade of officers is indicated by metallic insignia, usually gilt, placed on the shoulder loops of the coat. The insignia, which follow somewhat the British style, are composed of three elements: a seven pointed star, a crown, and crossed swords. The shoulder loop buttons are gilt.

Enlisted men wear black strips which extend diagonally across the outer half of the sleeve midway between the shoulder and the elbow. The unit sergeant major wears a crown with crossed laurel branches just above the cuff of the sleeve.

Officer and enlisted personnel grades with United States equivalents and their respective grade insignia are:

- Mushir, Field Marshal - Crossed swords surmounted by two stars and a crown.
- Amid, General - Crossed swords surmounted by one star and a crown.
- Fariq, Lieutenant General - Crossed swords surmounted by a crown.

- Amir al-Liwa, Major General - Crossed swords surmounted by a star.
- Zaim, Brigadier - Three stars arranged in a triangle surmounted by a crown.
- Aqid, Colonel - Two stars surmounted by a crown.
- Muqaddam, Lieutenant Colonel - One star surmounted by a crown.
- Rais-Awwal, Major - Crown.
- Rais, Captain - Three stars.
- Mulazim-Awwal, First Lieutenant - Two Stars.
- Mulazim Thani, Second Lieutenant - One star.
- Naib Dabit, Warrant Officer - Unknown.
- Rail Urafa-Wihdah, Unit Sergeant Major - Crown and crossed laurel branches.
- Rais Urafa, Sergeant Major - Four diagonal stripes
- Arif, Sergeant - Three diagonal stripes.
- Naib Arif, Corporal - Two diagonal stripes.
- Jundi Awwal, Private First Class - One diagonal stripe.

(2) *Branch* - Branches of service are indicated by gilt metallic devices of distinctive design which are worn by officers on the lapels of the dress uniform and on the front of the garrison cap. They are as follows:

- Infantry - Plain upright bullet.
- Artillery - A circle surmounted by a flame.
- Tanks - Side view of a tank.
- Royal Bodyguard (Cavalry) - Crossed flags.
- Cavalry - Crossed swords.
- Headquarters - Crossed draped flags, crossed rifle and sword, and artillery insignia.
- Major Generals and above - Headquarters insignia encircled by crossed laurel branches.
- Labor Company - Crossed pick and shovel.
- Fire Brigade - Crossed pikes, crossed pick and shovel, and hose nozzle with Arabic inscription on scroll below.
- Pharmacy - Crossed laurel branches.
- Medical and Veterinary - Crossed laurel branches, crutch, and spiral snake.
- Ordnance - Circle with shield inside inscribed with crossed rifle and sword, and a cannon. Circle is topped with the artillery insignia and is partially encircled at the bottom by crossed laurel branches, with Arabic inscription on a scroll below.
- Mechanical Transport - Wheel, wing, and Arabic inscription on a scroll.
- Signal Corps - Circle with horizontal lightning symbol tipped by arrow heads.
- Engineers - Artillery insignia with crossed pick and shovel.
- Military Technical School - Calipers, square, wood rasp, and micrometer calipers surmounted by a crown and an Arabic inscription on a scroll.
- Royal Military College - Crown and ribbon with an Arabic inscription.
- Band - Harp bordered by a ribbon and surmounted by a crown.

In addition to the metallic devices, officers of field and staff grade wear colored collar patches to indicate branch. Piping on the garrison cap is widely used at all grades to indicate branch. Red indicates Staff; grey, Cavalry; deep blue, Artillery; dark green, Infantry; light blue, Engineers and Signal Corps; light green, Ordnance; brown,

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Motor Transport; maroon, Medical and Pharmacy; and black Veterinary.

Military Police wear a black arm band with a red Arabic inscription. An Army Provost Marshal wears a black arm band with white Arabic inscription.

(3) *Specialists' insignia* — Enlisted specialists wear gilt insignia symbolic of their trade or specialty on the upper sleeve in the same general location as the grade stripes, as follows:

Fitter - Pliers, hammer and wood rasp crossed, and French curve
 Carpenter - Pliers, crossed hammer and saw
 Armorer - Crossed hammer and wood rasp with pliers and rifle at the side
 Saddler - Horse's bit
 Blacksmith - Horseshoe
 Drummer - Drum
 Trumpeter - Bugle

(4) *Other insignia* — Officers who are graduates of the Staff College at Baghdad wear a one-half inch red band below the grade insignia on the shoulder loops.

Brigadiers wear red lapel patches with a gilt-tipped red cord placed vertically upon it. Major generals and above have a gilt laurel branch placed vertically on the red lapel patches.

c. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS — There are six awards and medals: 1) King Faisal the First Order, a civil order occasionally awarded to military personnel (three classes); 2) Al-Rafidian Order, a military order (five classes); 3) Gallantry Medal, awarded to officers and enlisted personnel; 4) Active service medal, granted to officers and men who have participated in active military operations; 5) War medal, given to officers who served in the Army during the time Iraq was at war with the Axis Powers (1943 to 1945); 6) Victory Medal, granted to officers who were in the Iraqi Army when Germany surrendered in 1945.

d. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT — Individual equipment is generally of British origin and manufacture. It consists of a rifle and bayonet (pistol and holster for officers), one or two cartridge bandoleers, canteen, steel helmet, pack, kit bag, and gas mask. Items carried which may be of local manufacture are a sweater and blanket.

e. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT — Little information is available on cooking equipment, bakeries, laundry and bath units, and tentage.

f. REMOUNT — Each infantry battalion has approximately 125 mules and 50 horses, a mountain artillery regiment has about 400 mules, and the one remaining cavalry regiment, which is attached to the Royal Bodyguard Brigade, has about 400 horses. Remounts for the Army are purchased

throughout the country. A stud farm is operated by the Army near Baghdad. Forage for animals is obtained locally.

Cavalry troops are equipped with a saddle similar to the United States McClellan saddle except that it has no split at the top. Other equipment includes bridle, bit, cinches, saddle blanket, straight sword, rifle pouch, and low boots fastened by several straps. The pack saddle, which is similar to the United States item, consists of a metal frame covered with padding and secured by cinches and breeching.

4. Engineer

a. GENERAL — The Iraqi Army Engineers are organized on the basis of British tables of organization and equipment. Most engineer materiel is of British origin, some is of United States origin, but one model of antitank mine is of domestic manufacture. The quantities of equipment available are sufficient for only training purposes.

b. EXPLOSIVES AND DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT — A stock of plastic explosives is held available for use in demolishing strategic points, particularly mountain defiles and bridges.

c. MINE WARFARE EQUIPMENT — The Iraqi engineers use an antitank mine of their own manufacture, similar to the obsolete United States mine AT, HE, M-1. They also use the British Mark V antitank mine. Unidentified types of antipersonnel mines apparently are also in use. Information is not available on quantities of either antitank or antipersonnel mines.

d. BRIDGES AND STREAM-CROSSING EQUIPMENT — This type of equipment is limited to 30 assault boats, 12 sets of folding-boat equipment, two 18-foot powerboats, 300 feet of ponton bridge, and 300 feet of Bailey bridge. The folding-boat equipment and the Bailey bridging include transportation.

e. HEAVY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT — This type of equipment assigned to the engineers includes tractors, bulldozers, rollers, and concrete mixers. The quantity and operating condition of this equipment in general are unknown. The Army recently received the following tractors from the United States: four D-2, four D-4, and two D-6, all equipped with bulldozer blades. The Iraqi Public Works Department also has similar types of construction equipment purchased from the United States which probably would be available if required by the Army.

f. MISCELLANEOUS ENGINEER EQUIPMENT — In the category of mechanical equipment, the engineers have limited numbers of air compressors, mobile workshops, and power saws. Available water supply and purification equipment includes pumps and fabric storage tanks, but there is no informa-

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tion regarding any equipment or materiel for the purification of water. In camouflage equipment, nets of British origin are available in sufficient quantities for artillery and antitank weapons and some vehicles. Electrical equipment consists of five generator sets, each estimated to be of 1.5-kilowatt capacity. In the category of firefighting equipment, the Army Fire Brigade in Baghdad has pump-type fire trucks in serviceable condition. Information on other firefighting equipment is unavailable.

Topographic and infrared equipment probably is lacking to the Iraqi engineers.

5. Chemical

a. GENERAL — Stocks of chemical materiel of the Iraqi Army are limited in both type and number. This situation may be attributed to the fact that the Iraqis probably contemplate neither offensive employment of chemical agents nor necessity for chemical defensive preparations. This conclusion is based upon two facts: 1) There is no evidence of efforts to produce or to stockpile large quantities of offensive or defensive chemical materiel; and 2) instruction in the offensive and defensive aspects of chemical warfare is not included in current training programs.

The only items of chemical materiel in stock or contemplated for purchase by the Iraqi War Office

consist of a variety of British weapons and munitions.

b. DEFENSIVE MATERIEL — Individual protective equipment consists of an unknown quantity of civilian-type gas masks with canisters (now unserviceable) which were purchased from the British during World War II. No other defensive materiel is known to be in stock.

c. OFFENSIVE MATERIEL — This materiel consists of a number of weapons and munitions for smoke dissemination.

Weapons are the 2-inch bomb thrower and the 4-inch smoke discharger. These are tank-mounted mortars designed to satisfy a requirement by armored units to produce local smoke. They are used to provide instantaneous cover for individual armored vehicles from enemy antitank fire and to produce minor tactical screens in support of infantry or other tanks.

The 4-inch smoke discharger projects a smoke pot — a No. 8 generator, filled with hexachlorethane (HCE) — a distance of 170 to 200 yards. One discharger (in some cases two) is mounted on either side of the tank. This weapon is loaded from the outside and is slow in forming a screen.

The 2-inch bomb thrower is a breech-loaded 2-inch mortar, which can be loaded from inside the

FIGURE 81-14. IRAQI

NOMENCLATURE AND CALIBER	AMMUNITION	SYSTEM OF OPERATION	WEIGHT LOADED
<i>lbs.</i>			
REVOLVERS: British cal. .455 No. 1, Mk. VI Webley.	British cal. .455 Webley revolver.	Manually operated; double action or single.	2.75.....
British cal. .38 No. 2, Mk. I and Mk. I*.	British cal. .38 revolver.....	Manually operated; double action.	Approx. 2.....
RIFLE: British cal. .303, No. 1, Mk. III (SMLE).	British cal. .303 service ammo....	Manually operated; bolt-action magazine rifle.	Approx. 9-10.....
SUBMACHINE GUN: British Sten 9-mm. Mk. III.....	British or other 9-mm. parabolism pistol-smg ammunition.	Blowback-operated; selective auto and semiauto fire.	Approx. 8.5.....
MACHINE GUNS: British cal. .303 Bren, Light.....	British cal. .303.....	Air-cooled; gas-operated; selective auto or semiauto fire.	Approx. 23 w/bipod.
British cal. .303 Lewis, Light.....	British cal. .303.....	Air-cooled; gas-operated; auto fire only.	Approx. 30 w/bipod.
British cal. .303 Mk. I, Vickers, Heavy.	British cal. .303 Mk. VIII Ball..	Water-cooled; recoil-operated w/gas assist; auto fire only.	Approx. 100.....



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vehicle and has a range of 150 yards with a normal propellant cartridge, and up to 500 yards with a 55-grain cartridge. It fires either an instantaneous smoke-emission-type shell filled with HCE or a bursting-type white phosphorus-filled shell. It cannot be traversed or elevated independently of the turret, due to the type of mounting. Thus rapidity and accuracy with which a screen can be placed are limited; even with the white phosphorus shell the mortar can set up an immediate screen only on a small arc of front.

Munitions for use by the infantry, either in stock or on order from the British sources, are smoke shells for the 2-inch and the 3-inch mortars.

The 2-inch mortar smoke shell is an emission-type filled with HCE which may or may not be fitted with a time delay to eliminate the smoke trail. The delay element is ignited by the propellant-cartridge. The shell is considered a generally effective smoke munition, but the delay igniter itself leaves a faint smoketrail. Late models have been designed to eliminate this deficiency.

Two types of shells have been provided for the 3-inch infantry mortar. The first is the cast-iron cylindrical shell of the airburst-base-ejection type, filled with HCE. The second is a pear-shaped white phosphorus round fitted with an impact fuze and burster container. Because of the low melt-

ing point of white phosphorus, it sometimes gives trouble in tropical climates by liquefying, exuding from the shell, and igniting itself.

Chemical rounds for artillery pieces planned for use by the Iraqis consist of airburst-base-ejection-type shells filled with HCE and instantaneous-burst-type shells filled with white phosphorus. Either or both types are in stock or on order for the 25-pounder and 5.5-inch guns, the 3.7-inch and 6-inch howitzers, and the 4.2-inch Mortar Mk I. These are considered adequate in performance for artillery smoke needs.

6. Medical

Medical supplies in the Iraqi Army are stored centrally and issued from the Base Medical Stores depot. Information is not available concerning types and quantities of equipment and supplies for use by medical service units. Four-litter ambulances of British make and new four-litter American jeep ambulances are employed by the hospitals and field ambulance units. There are no hospital trains, ships, or aircraft in the Iraqi Army.


7. Tabular data on materiel

The following Figures, showing characteristics of materiel, include information on small arms, mortars, artillery, combat vehicle artillery, and armored combat vehicles.

SMALL ARMS

CAPACITY OF FEED DEVICE	MAXIMUM RANGE	EFFECTIVE RANGE	PRACTICAL RATE OF FIRE	REMARKS
	<i>yds.</i>	<i>yds.</i>	<i>rpm</i>	
6 rounds in cylinder....	1,500	50	12.....	Obsolete in British Army.
6 rounds in cylinder....	1,100	50	12.....	Standard in the British Army. Mk. I* can be fired double action only.
10-rd. magazine fed by 5-rd. clip.	...	approx. 400	10-15.....	Several marks have been issued. Differences between marks slight.
32 rounds in box magazine.	...	200	100.....	Equipped with bayonet.
30-rd. magazine.....	3,500	800	Auto, 120; semi-auto, 60.	British manufacture. Equivalent to U.S. BAR.
47-rd. and 97-rd. pan magazine.	3,500	800	120.....	British made.
250-rd. fabric belt.....	4,500	1,100 (direct)	250.....	British made.

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FIGURE 81-15. IRAQI MORTARS

NOMENCLATURE AND CALIBER	WEIGHT IN FIRING POSITION	WEIGHT IN TRAVELING POSITION	MAXIMUM RANGE	RATE OF FIRE	WEIGHT OF ROUND	EFFECTIVE RADIUS OF FRAGMENTATION	REMARKS
British, 2-inch.....	lbs. 21	lbs. 21	yds. 500	rpm. 8 (aimed)	lbs. HE: 2 lbs. 4 oz.	yds. 8	Obtained from U.K. Standard.
British, 3-inch.....	133	133	2,800	10 (aimed)	HE: 10....	est. 35	Do.
British, 4.2 inch Mks. I and II.....	271	271	4,100	8 to 10 (aimed)	HE: 20....	est. 50-60	Do.

FIGURE 81-16.

CALIBER	NOMENCLATURE	HORIZ. RANGE	MAX. VERT. RANGE	ARMOR PENETRATION	WEIGHT OF PROJ.	RATE OF FIRE
<i>mm.</i>		<i>yds.</i>	<i>ft.</i>	<i>mm. x yds. x deg.</i>	<i>lbs.</i>	<i>rpm.</i>
ANTITANK:						
57	6-pdr. AT gun.....	5,500	68 x 1,000 x 30.....	AP: 6 lbs. 4 oz.....	20
76.2	17-pdr. AT gun.....	10,000	118 x 1,000 x 30.....	17.....	20
ANTI-AIRCRAFT:						
40	40-mm. AA Bofors.....	10,800	10,000	44 x 1,000 x 0.....	2.06.....	120
94	3.7-in. AA.....	20,600	41,000	28.....	20
FIELD:						
83.8	18-pdr.....	9,400	18.5.....	6
88	25 pdr.....	12,500	AP: 20..... HE: 25	4
93.97	3.7 in. Pack How.....	6,000	20.....
114.29	4.5-in. Gun.....	20,500	55.....	2
139.70	5.5-in. Gun/How.....	16,000	100.....	2
152.39	6-in. How.....	11,400	100.....	2
ARMORED VEHICLE:						
40	2-pdr.....	HE: 5,200 AP: 8,000	55 x 400 x 0.....	AP: 2.37.....
75	75-mm.....	17,000	75 x 500 x 0.....	HE: 14.6..... AP: 14.9	20

FIGURE 81-17. IRAQI

NOMENCLATURE	WEIGHT	CREW	ARMOR THICKNESS (in.)		ARMAMENT
			Hull	Turret	
Tank, Medium Churchill, Mark VII.....	U.S. tons 44.8	5	0.8 to 6.0.....	0.8 to 6.0...	1 75-mm. gun; 2 7.92-mm. MG's....
Armored Car, Humber, Mark IV.....	8	3	0.2 to 0.6.....	0.3 to 0.5...	1 2-pdr. gun; or 1 15-mm. Besa MG and 1 7.9-mm. Besa MG.
Armored Car, Daimler.....	8.4	3	0.3 to 0.6.....	0.3 to 0.8...	1 2-pdr. gun; 1 7.9-mm. Besa MG...
Universal Carrier, T16.....	4.75	4	0.22 to 0.28.....	1 .303-in. Bren LMG, 1 2-in. mortar, 1 Boys' AT rifle.
Scout and Reconnaissance Car, Daimler.	3.1	2	0.15 to 1.18.....	1 .303-in. Bren LMG.....

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IRAQI ARTILLERY

MUZZLE VELOCITY	TRAVERSE TOTAL	ELEVATION LIMITS	WEIGHT	ESTIMATED STATUS	COUNTRY OF MANUFACTURE	REMARKS
<i>ft. per sec.</i>	<i>deg.</i>	<i>deg.</i>	<i>lbs.</i>			
2,700	90	-5 to +15...	2,471	Standard.....	U.K....	
2,900	60	-5 to +16.5..	6,700	Standard.....	U.K....	
2,800	360	-6 to +90...	4,368	Standard.....	U.K....	
2,600	360	-5 to +80...	20,500	Standard.....	U.K....	
1,615	50	-5 to +38...	3,450	Obsolete in British Army...	U.K....	
1,747	8	-9 to +40...	3,968	Standard British Army Field Gun.	U.K....	
	360 on firing platform					
971	40	42.5.....	1,860	Standard.....	U.K....	
2,265	60	-5 to +45...	16,048	Standard.....	U.K....	
1,235	60	-5 to +45...	12,768	Standard.....	U.K....	
to 1,340						
1,235	8	0 to +45...	10,088	Considered obsolete; to be replaced with 5.5-inch gun-howitzers.	U.K....	
to 1,352						
HE: 2,600	360	-15 to +25..	287 w/breech mechanism. n a	U.K....	Armament on Humber and Daimler armored cars.
AP: 2,800						
HE: 1,516	360	-8 to +19...	893 breech and tube.	Standard.....	U.K....	Chambered to fire U.S. 75-mm. ammunition. Armament on Churchill tanks.
AP: 2,030						

ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES

ENGINE	MAXIMUM SPEED	RANGE OF ACTION	MAXIMUM TRENCH	MAXIMUM STEP	MAXIMUM FORD	MAXIMUM GRADIENT	REMARKS
	<i>mph</i>	<i>miles</i>	<i>ft.</i>	<i>ft.</i>	<i>ft.</i>	<i>deg.</i>	
Twin 6-cyl.; gas, 350 hp. at 2,200 r.p.m.	13.5	142	6.8	4.0	3	34	British World War II tank.
6-cyl.; gas, 90 hp. at 3,400 r.p.m.	45	250	3.5	3	26	British World War II Armored car.
6-cyl.; gas, 95 hp. at 3,600 r.p.m.	45	200	3.5	4.0	20	British World War II Armored car.
V-8, gas, 99 hp. at 3,300 r.p.m.	30	100-150	3	1.5	Floats	31	Made for British in the U.S.
Daimler, OHV, 6 cyl.; gas, 70 hp. at 4,200 r.p.m.	59	215	3.8	20	British; Standard in World War II.

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
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
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


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by a staff equivalent to a military general staff, consisting of three Assistant Directors General for operations, administration, and logistics. Included within the organization is a group of officers who constitute the inspectorate or inspector general corps of the police. The function of the inspectorate is inspection of all police activities by areas and by activities. The departments, known as Directorates, of the Police are organized to supervise and execute special police functions as indicated in Figure 81-18. Each of the 14 provinces (*Liwas*) in the nation has police forces of various types. These forces are directed operationally by the Governor (*Mutasarif*) of the *Liwa*, who is responsible for security. The *Liwa* police forces are controlled administratively by the Director General of Police in Baghdad. Owing to better pay scales, police enlisted personnel are considered to be of somewhat higher quality than their counterpart in the Army; police officers, however, have been of poorer quality than the Army officers.* Recruiting for the police force is on a volunteer basis.

The normal training period for a recruit lasts six months and includes rifle marksmanship, close-order drill, military courtesy, and other basic military subjects. The Police School in Baghdad is divided into a secondary, an intermediate,** and a high-college section. The normal course of instruction for an aspirant for commission as a second lieutenant of Police is three years, followed by one year of practical work with a Police unit, the last year being a probationary period. Two other regular courses are conducted, one for sergeants who aspire to become inspectors (a secondary course of one year's duration) and the other for inspectors who desire to become officers (a high-college course of one year's duration). Special courses are also given in the Police School in the technical phases of police work. There are no foreign students currently attending the school, although Syrians and Jordanians have been admitted to this phase of police schooling in past years.

No definite figures are available as to the quantities of weapons available to the garrison and traffic police. Individual policemen are sometimes armed with British rifles or revolvers. Traffic policemen occasionally carry revolvers. There are some tear gas supplies in cities throughout Iraq but most antidemonstration equipment is in Baghdad.

* However, corruption and bribery affect all levels in the police force, whereas in the Army only officers are in a position to enjoy such profits.
 ** No information is available concerning the courses of instruction given by the intermediate section of the Police School.

M. Quasi-military and other ground forces

1. General

The principal quasi-military organization in Iraq and, in effect, the only group worthy of consideration in this category, is the Iraqi Police Force. This organization contains traffic, as well as garrison and mobile, forces. The Police are under the Minister of Interior and number approximately 13,500 officers and men. This total includes all types of police. The Force as a whole is not considered an effective military instrument.

2. The Iraqi Police Force

The role of the Iraqi Police Force is to maintain law and order and internal security. The responsibility of the Police Force is vested in the Director General of Police, who is answerable directly to the Minister of Interior. The Director General is aided



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


FIGURE 81-18. IRAQI POLICE FORCES

3. The Mobile Police Force

The Mobile Police Force is the tactical arm of the Iraqi Police Force. Its mission is to maintain internal security by suppressing riots and revolts, both in the capital and in the provinces when local police are incapable of handling the situation. The riots in Baghdad during November 1952 demonstrated, however, that this force was not effective. In that instance, police forces were superseded by the Army. Unofficially the Mobile Police Force also serves as a counterbalance to possible disloyalty by Army leaders. Its present size is estimated at 3,500 to 4,000 officers and men.

The Mobile Police Force reportedly is organized into nine infantry-type battalions, two of them motorized; estimated strength of a battalion is 400. The Mobile Force has an unknown number of vehicles, none of which is armored. British weapons are used, the Lee Enfield .303 rifle, the Bren and Lewis light machine gun, and the Vickers machine gun. There are no mortars or artillery in the Mobile Police Force. Transport consists of motorcycles, jeeps, half-ton trucks, 1½-ton trucks, and a few ambulances. The Mobile Police Force is lacking in transportation, and redeployment of elements to cope with any disorder would be difficult.

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
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