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
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NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW (U) SUPPLEMENT 20 April 1979

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	and the	South Ye	emen, be	eginning etter.	with	Sana	where		*
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ist regimes in	istalled in both	n North and	l South Yen	nen,	
beginning with	n Sana where the	prospects	are bette	er.	
Baghdad has be	een flexible and	l patient i	n pursuing	g this	
end over the v	vears. Iraq has	s quietly s	upported .	local	
Baathists in a	an effort to be	in a posit	ion to exp	oloit	
opportunities.	. Iraq also wou	ıld like to	impede So	oviet	
penetration in	n southwest Arab	oia and to	chip away	at	
Saudi plans to	dominate the A	Arabian Pen	insula.		
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Irag rece	ently tried to d	cool the co	inflict bet	tween	
the two Yemens	s, in part to pr	revent the	controvers	sy from	
upsetting atte	empts to forge a	an Arab con	sensus aga	alnst	_
the Egyptian-I	Israeli treaty.				
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As the mi	ilitary situatio	on worsened	l. Baghdad	with	
help from Dama	ascustook the	initiative	to stop	the con-	
flict Iraq	was more than wi	illing to i	ntervene l	pecause	
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Several prominent North Yemeni Baathists were also

Several prominent North Yemeni Baathists were also named to important military posts on 21 March, including the new Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Ali Qasim Mansur, and the Director of Military Operations, Maj. Abdallah Husayn al-Bashiri. Qasim Salam, a North Yemeni who is a member of the Baghdad-based Baath Party National Command, and who has been identified as a conduit for Iraqi funds into North Yemen, returned to Sana shortly after the war.

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Should the fragile regime in Sana fall, as many expect, the Baathists may be in a position to pick up the pieces, or at least have a major role in a successor government. While the term "Baathist" is generally applied to a number of specific prominent political and military personalities in Sana, it is also used loosely to describe a variety of people with "progressive" notions and should not be taken to indicate any unified political approach or philosophy. Some of those in North Yemen receiving subventions from Iraq are more opportunist than Baathist. Even if the present Sana government is replaced by a Baathist or Baathist-oriented regime, the degree to which Iraq will have real control is thus questionable, although Iraq could expect Sana to pursue a foreign policy more sympathetic to its aims.

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