

FIRST DI PAPER TO USE ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

The attached paper, **"The Angolan Leadership: Current Perspectives and Prospects After Neto"** was the first Intelligence Assessment to employ alternative scenarios. It was published by the DI (then NFAC) in December 1978. Documenting this fact is a note from Bill Christison, D/ORPA to Bob Bowie, D/NFAC recommending this new approach to analysis and a response from John Hicks, DD/NFAC to Dick Kerr, Acting D/ORPA endorsing the concept. The "boldness" of this departure from traditional analytic techniques required that a special Epilogue appear at the end of the paper noting that the three scenarios discussed in the paper "did not exhaust all possibilities."

Any additional questions can be addressed to the author, Randy Pherson, NIO/LA on

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2005

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert R. Bowie, D/NFAC
[redacted] HQS

I draw your attention to the attached report on the Angolan leadership by Randy Pherson of ORPA's [redacted]. [redacted] would be interested in your views of Randy's "three scenario" approach to the post-Neto period (pages 3-5). It is an approach that carefully avoids predicting the future by choosing among the scenarios, but seems to me to be more illuminating to the reader precisely because it does not make a choice.

[redacted]

William A. Christison
Director
Regional & Political Analysis

Date 29 December 1978 ✓

1/15/79

Dick Kerr -

D/ORPA-79-55

- I found Pherson's report interesting. The scenario approach is very helpful in such a case.

- I suggest that in like papers you consider revealing what intelligence tells us about the points being made. For example, a footnote here & a footnote there stating

[redacted]

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P.S. I do not believe that each and every one of those paragraphs is, in fact,


[redacted]



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
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
Randy Pherson




Randy P. _____

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The Angolan Leadership: Current Perspectives and Prospects After Neto



An Intelligence Assessment

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**National Security
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is unclassified.

The Angolan Leadership: Current Perspectives and Prospects After Neto

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by the [redacted] of
the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and
coordinated within CIA. Questions and comments
may be addressed to the author, Randy Pherson,
[redacted]

The Angolan Leadership: Current Perspectives and Prospects After Neto

An Intelligence Assessment

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**The Angolan Leadership:
Current Perspectives
and Prospects After NETO**

Key Judgments

Angolan President Neto appears firmly in control despite serious economic, political, and military pressures on his regime:


- Neto has increasingly consolidated power in his office. Most decisions are made by him and a small group of trusted advisers:
- While Neto's inner circle has traditionally been dominated by mulattoes, those advocating a stronger role for blacks are gaining influence.

If Neto left office, the manner in which he departed would greatly influence who and what type of regime succeeded him:

- The more gradual and predictable the transition, the better the chances of a mulatto-influenced faction retaining power and governing in much the same way as Neto. Efforts to improve relations with Angola's neighbors and the West would continue.
- If Neto left office suddenly, the trend toward a black-dominated, more nationalist, and possibly more leftist state would be accelerated—perhaps dramatically. Such a regime probably would be directed, if not controlled, by the military

Although there are occasional, unconfirmed reports of plotting against the government in the military, the party, and the urban slums, Neto so far has kept dissident activity in check:

- If a coup were attempted, the most likely perpetrators would be members of a black-power faction that is gaining support in the party and possibly within some military circles.
- Neto appears to have this group well under control, but it could pose a serious threat to the regime if it gained the support of key people in the military and the internal security service.



MPLA-Labor Party ¹ Political Bureau

	Nom de guerre	Position	Race	Origin/Tribe ²
MEMBER				
NETO, Agostinho		President	Black	Kimbundu (?) from Catete
LOPES, Rodrigues Joao	"Ludy"	Director of Internal Security Service	Black	Kimbundu (?) from Ambrizete
LARA, Lucio	"Tchiweka"	Party Sec. for Organization	Mulatto	Ovimbundu from Huambo
LUVUALU, Pascual	"Kiavuwa"	Party Sec. for Foreign Relations	Black	Kongo from the north
SANTOS, Jose Eduardo dos		Party Sec. for Natl. Reconstruction	Black	Kimbundu from Luanda
CARREIRA, Henrique Teles	"Iko"	Minister of Defense	Mulatto	Kimbundu (?) from Luanda
NETO, Joao Luis	"Xietu"	Dep. Min. of Defense Chief of Staff of Armed Forces	Black	Kimbundu (?) from Catete
FRANCA, Antonia dos Santos	"N'Dalu"	Cmdr. of 9th Brigade	Mulatto	Ovimbundu (?) from Benguela
TONHA, Pedro Maria	"Pedale"	Provincial Commissioner of Huambo	Black	Kongo (?) from Cabinda
LUKOKI, Ambrosio	"Nzakinwona"	Min. of Education and Culture	Black	Kongo from the north
DOMINGOS, Evaristo	"Kimba"	Provincial Commissioner of Cabinda	Black	Kongo (?) from Cabinda
ALTERNATES				
SANTOS, Henrique de Carvalho	"Onambwe"	Dep. Director of Internal Security Service	Mulatto	Ovimbundu (?) from Benguela
RODRIGUES, Manuel Alexandre	"Kito"	Inspector General of Armed Forces	Black	Kimbundu (?) from Luanda
DINO, Juliao Mateus Paulo	"Matrosse"	National Political Commissar, Armed Forces	Black	Kimbundu (?) from Catete


¹ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—Labor Party.

² Very little information is available on the tribal affiliations of most Angolan leaders.


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



The Angolan Leadership: Current Perspectives and Prospects After Neto




Angolan President Agostinho Neto appears to be firmly in control of his party and government. Since the aborted attempt to overthrow the government in May 1977, Neto has eliminated or detained thousands of dissidents in the party, the government, and the military. He has increasingly consolidated power in his own hands at the expense of other top government officials. All important decisions are now made by him or by a small group of trusted advisers. Nevertheless, Neto's overall position could be undermined at any time given Angola's serious economic and social problems, his possible ill health, and the government's dependence on a substantial Cuban military presence to maintain internal security and to cope with the political and military threat posed by three separate guerrilla insurgencies. 


The Inner Circle

Most decisions in Luanda are made by Neto, a black, and a small group of close advisers, including MPLA-Labor Party leader Lucio Lara, the director of the internal security service Rodriques Joao Lopes ("Ludy"),¹ and, until his dismissal this month, former Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento. Lara, a doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist and a mulatto, is widely regarded as the party's leading theoretician. While generally considered sympathetic to the Soviets, he has taken an independent stand on occasion. Lara's style is to manipulate events from behind the scenes; he has never held an important government post. Ludy, a black, derives much of his power from his position as director of the internal security service. Although it was rumored earlier this year that the deputy director in effect ran the service, more recent reporting indicates that Ludy is firmly in control and possibly gaining influence with Neto. 

¹ During the liberation struggle, many Angolan leaders took "noms de guerre" which most of them retained after coming to power in Luanda. 


Nascimento, a black who had long been considered the second most important man in Angola, was dismissed as Prime Minister and dropped from the Political Bureau in early December. Nascimento lacked an independent power base and recent reporting had suggested that Neto no longer trusted him. His dismissal was part of a major party and government reorganization that involved the abolition of the prime ministerial post and all three deputy prime ministerial positions. Neto reportedly may move Nascimento to a new and less influential post as "Minister of the Presidency" as part of a more general effort to consolidate power in his office. 

Party foreign affairs spokesman Pascual Luvualu, former First Deputy Prime Minister Jose Eduardo dos Santos,² and Defense Minister Henrique Teles Carreira ("Iko") are also part of, or at least close to, Neto's inner circle. Luvualu, a black, has gained considerable responsibility and exposure as Neto's "roving ambassador," particularly since his election a year ago as an alternate member of the Political Bureau. Luvualu was made a full member of the Political Bureau early this month when Nascimento and former Second Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rocha—a mulatto and a militant Marxist-Leninist—lost their government and party positions. Dos Santos, a black, is considered strongly pro-Soviet, in part because he has a Soviet wife. He has received extensive training in Moscow and has been cited—along with Rocha—as one of the Soviets' favorite candidates to succeed Neto. Carreira, a mulatto, enjoys a close personal relationship with Neto,   He may be forced to step down as Defense Minister because of allegations that surfaced during a recent investigation of corruption in the Angolan Government. 


² Dos Santos presumably will retain his position as a full member of the Political Bureau. 




Agostinho Neto



Lucio Lara




Rodrigues Joao Lopes ("Ludy")



Pascual Luvualu ("Kiavuwa")



Jose Eduardo dos Santos



Henrique Teles Carreira ("Iko")




Lopo do Nascimento



The apparent decline in the fortunes of many high-ranking mulattoes can be attributed in part to growing black nationalist sentiment in the party. Many younger party members contend that blacks are inadequately represented at the top levels of the party and government and that the mulattoes enjoy a disproportionate share of power and of the sweeter fruits of the revolution. The blacks made their first major inroads into mulatto control over the party at the December party congress a year ago, when a substantial number of black civilians and military officers were elected to the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. Although the mulattoes seem to have retained a dominant position so far, those that espouse black nationalism probably can count on growing support at the grass-roots level of the party, and possibly within some military circles.

After Neto: Three Scenarios



If Neto left office, the manner in which he departed the presidency would greatly influence who and what type of regime succeeded him. Generally speaking, the more gradual and predictable the transition, the better the chances of a mulatto-influenced faction retaining power and governing in much the same way as Neto. If Neto left office suddenly for health or other reasons, those who advocate a more radical, black nationalist, and pro-Soviet line would be in a stronger position. Such a regime would be directed, if not controlled, by the military.

The Cabinet

NETO, Agostinho	President
*NASCIMENTO, Lopo do	Prime Minister
*SANTOS, Jose Eduardo dos	1st Dep. Prime Minister
*ROCHA, Carlos	2nd Dep. Prime Minister
*VAN DUNEN, Pedro de Castro dos Santos	3rd Dep. Prime Minister
PACAVIRA, Manuel Pedro	Min. of Agriculture
OLIVEIRA, Manuel Rezende de	Min. of Construction & Housing
CARREIRA, Henrique Teles	Min. of Defense
LUKOKI, Ambrosio	Min. of Education & Culture
MARTINS, Ismael Gaspar	Min. of Finance
CAMARA, Antonio da Costa Lopes da	Min. of Fisheries
JORGE, Paulo Teixeira	Min. of Foreign Affairs
ALMEIDA, Roberto Antonio de	Min. of Foreign Trade
CRUZ, Domingos Coelho da	Min. of Health
JOAO, Paulino Pinto	Min. of Home Trade
RIBEIRO, Alberto do Carmo Bento	Min. of Industry and Power
BOAVIDA, Diogenes de Assis	Min. of Justice
SAUDE, Noe de Silva	Min. of Labor and Social Security
MUTEKA, Fernando Faustino	Min. of Transport

*These posts were abolished in early December as part of a government reorganization designed to consolidate more power in the office of the presidency.

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This paper will explore three possible scenarios that could develop:

- Neto's health problems become debilitating and he arranges for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.
- Neto dies suddenly and a major power struggle breaks out within the top leadership.
- The regime is brought down by a coup or popular uprising and a new government is established.

Peaceful Transition

It is highly unlikely Neto would ever relinquish power voluntarily. Most members of the inner circle would want him to remain in office as long as possible because they owe their positions to him and would lose influence if he stepped down. Nevertheless, it is possible Neto might become seriously handicapped by a heart attack, drinking, or other health problems. In such a circumstance, those closest to Neto probably would strongly urge him to name a successor, presumably in the hope that a member of the inner circle would be chosen. []

Although the mulattoes' position would be weakened if Neto relinquished the presidency, they probably would retain some influence. Should Neto ignore strong pressures in the party and military to name a black and instead choose a mulatto as his successor, it is unlikely the new president could maintain his position for long unless a compromise was reached allocating some of the powers of the presidency to other offices under the control of blacks. If the mulattoes believed there was little chance for one of them to gain the top spot, they might propose the establishment of a collegial form to government—if only as a transitional arrangement—until agreement was reached on a successor to Neto. This could be accomplished by shifting responsibility for governing from the presidency to the party Political Bureau, where the mulattoes now control about one-third of the seats. Another possibility would be to name several vice presidents to share responsibility for governing with the president. Under such a scheme, a black could be established as president, while operational control of the government remained in the hand of his mulatto deputies. []

If Neto opted for a black successor, likely candidates would be the director of the internal security service Lopes or former First Deputy Prime Minister Dos Santos. Dos Santos is close to the inner circle and still appears to be on good terms with Neto. Lopes probably is in a better position to draw on the support of blacks in the party and military. []

Sudden Departure

If Neto died or were assassinated, a major power struggle would almost certainly break out. The outcome would be dictated in large part by the extent to which the military and the party's rank and file emerged as factors in the struggle. []

At the 1977 December party congress, a concerted effort was made to involve the military more directly in the political process. In an effort to broaden the party's base, over 40 percent of the seats in the Central Committee went to the military. About a third of the Political Bureau was also drawn from military ranks. By bringing the military into the system, Neto probably hoped he would be able to keep a closer watch over its activities. []

[]

[]

The infusion of large numbers of young blacks, many with military backgrounds, at the December party congress last year should have had a radicalizing effect, but so far there has been no direct reflection of this at the top levels of the party. []

Neto's sudden departure doubtless would place many high-ranking mulattoes in highly vulnerable positions.

[]


Many, if not most, mulattoes, however, would probably opt to stay. Some, including Lara, most likely possess the necessary ideological credentials to retain some influence. []

Others, like Political Bureau member Antonio dos Santos Franca ("N'Dalu") and alternate member Henrique de Carvalho Santos ("Onambwe"), might




*Antonio dos Santos Franca
("N'Dalu")*

even emerge in stronger positions, primarily because of their stronger ties with the military. Franca, an outstanding military commander from the Benguela region who is believed close to the Cubans, has served on the party's Central Committee since the civil war. Henrique de Carvalho Santos, also from Benguela, was added to the Political Bureau as an alternate member a year ago, in part to improve its geographic balance. Santos was educated in Havana and at one time was said to be the Cubans' candidate to replace Neto. In recent months, however, he appears to have fallen into Havana's disfavor.



*Henrique de Carvalho Santos
("Onambwe")*

If the party emerges as a dominant factor in the succession struggle, the chances of Lopes or Jose Eduardo dos Santos coming out on top would be strengthened. Attention doubtless would also be focused on the other black Political Bureau members, but some of these would have major obstacles to overcome in order to emerge as Neto's successor. Black Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Joao Luis Neto ("Xietu") is very popular with younger blacks in the party and the military, and he has long been considered a prime contender for Neto's position.



*Ambrosio Lukoki
("Nzakinwona")*

The party might hesitate entrusting the top position to party foreign affairs spokesman Luvualu because he is a Bakongo from the region of northern Angola from which guerrillas of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola draw their support.³

Minister of Education Ambrosio Lukoki is also a Bakongo. He was elevated to the Political Bureau a year ago, primarily to improve the racial and geographical balance of that body, and lacks a strong personal power base. Both Luvualu and Lukoki spent several years in Yugoslavia as students and are considered by some to support a move to a more nonaligned style of government similar to that found in Yugoslavia.

Unclassified

³ The MPLA traditionally has drawn most of its support from the Kimbundu tribe which is centered on the Luanda/Malanje axis. (A map showing the location of the various ethnic groups in Angola appears at the end of this memorandum.)

Another black in the Political Bureau, Huambo Provincial Commissioner Pedro Maria Tohna ("Pedale"), has good rapport with the military, but probably is not a serious candidate for the presidency because he is a Cabindan. While he is considered a rising star within party circles, Tonha reportedly lacks a strong popular base of support. [redacted]

[redacted] Paiva Domingas de Silva, the commander of the People's Defense Organization is also worth watching, although he is not in the Political Bureau. He comes from Neto's hometown of Catete and reportedly is being groomed by Neto as Joao Luis Neto's replacement. [redacted]

Violent Overthrow

Although there are occasional, unconfirmed reports of plotting against the government in the party, the military, and the urban slums, Neto appears to have kept dissident activity in check. Popular discontent will be a continuing problem, however, so long as the country remains plagued by critical shortages of food and consumer goods. The decision early this year to shut down the Roman Catholic radio station evoked a strong public reaction, and the Church could emerge as a major channel for dissident expression. [redacted]

If a coup were attempted, the most likely perpetrators would be members of a radical black-power faction that enjoys some support within the party and military. While this faction succeeded in preventing some mulattoes from being elected to the Political Bureau and the Central Committee at last December's party congress, its efforts generally were not well received. The purported leader of the faction—now Minister of Agriculture Manuel Pedro Pacavira—almost failed to be elected to the Central Committee himself. [redacted]

[redacted] Pacavira, [redacted] seems to enjoy some popular support, particularly among young blacks. Pacavira has long been out front in criticizing the regime for its dependence on mulattoes, whites, and foreign advisers. [redacted]



Manuel Pedro Pacavira

[redacted]

Party officials suspect that Pacavira is involved with a group of black radicals from Catete that may be plotting to overthrow the government. Included in this group are Party Commissioner for Luanda Mendes de Carvalho, Minister of Foreign Trade Roberto Antonio de Almeida, and Provincial Commissioner for Cuanza Norte Lorenzo Ferreira ("Diandengue"). Mendes de Carvalho, like Pacavira, is ambitious and quite popular with black Angolans. Some observers have even described him as the next Nito Alves of Angola.⁴ [redacted]

Neto apparently has long suspected many of these individuals and probably is aware of their activities. [redacted]

Almeida would be dismissed on grounds of corruption and that Carvalho might be named as ambassador to an East European country. [redacted]

The "Catete group" would pose a serious threat to the current regime if it succeeded in winning the support of key people in the military or the internal security service. Although there have been sporadic and fragmentary reports of possible dissident activity in the

⁴ Alves was one of the principal organizers of the May 1977 uprising against Neto; much of his support came from unemployed blacks in the urban slums and from radicals in the military. [redacted]

armed forces and the security service, [redacted]

efforts because they believe Western economic aid will decrease the costs of their own involvement and possibly even alleviate growing anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban sentiment. Even so, the regime would become increasingly selective in choosing companies and countries with which it agreed to do business. [redacted]

Resentment of the Cuban presence in Angola could serve as a rallying point in bringing these dissidents together. Angolan soldiers have been critical of the Cubans because they have refused to engage guerrilla forces in the field. The Cubans are also resented for their involvement in the black market and for stealing Angolan property. Some radicals in the party are also strongly opposed to the dominant role Cuban and Soviet advisers have assumed in some government ministries. [redacted]

Policy Directions in the Post-Neto Period

If Neto is succeeded by some member of the inner circle, domestic and foreign policies, at least initially, would be little changed. Efforts to transform Angola into a Marxist-Leninist state doubtless would continue, but with no greater intensity than has been the case so far. The campaign to improve relations with the West and to reach a rapprochement with Zaire might lose some momentum, but it certainly would not be reversed. [redacted]

Over time, pressure from militants in the party and military might force a shift to a more nationalistic, and possibly more leftist, policy. There would be increasing calls to rid the government and party of corrupt, incompetent, and ideologically "impure" leaders. While some mulattoes in key posts could easily fall victims of such a campaign, most probably would retain their positions. The trend, however, would be to move the mulattoes into less visible advisory posts. [redacted]

Angola would maintain its close relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Although growing criticism of the substantial Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola might lead to some reduction in the number of civilian advisers, this could be offset in part by an increased East European involvement. [redacted]

Economic needs plus the desire to establish the political legitimacy of the new regime would argue for continued efforts to improve relations with the West. Moscow and Havana would probably not oppose such

If Neto died suddenly, the trend toward a black-dominated, more nationalist, and possibly more leftist state would be accelerated—perhaps dramatically. The new regime most likely would seek stronger ties with the USSR, Cuba, and other socialist states. Although Portuguese interests in Angola doubtless would suffer greatly, the West probably would still be allowed to play some role in Angola, particularly with regard to economic development. Such a regime probably would also be much more enthusiastic in its support of the various southern African liberation groups staging operations from and receiving training within Angola. [redacted]


If Neto were deposed by a radical black-power faction, the mulattoes would be in a highly vulnerable position. The Portuguese would be a major target. It is possible the new rulers might also insist that other nonblack advisers, such as the Soviets, leave the country. Although such a regime probably would still be dependent on the Cuban presence for internal security, it might insist that Cuba remove all its nonblack advisers. [redacted]

The call for the expulsion of Cuban and Soviet advisers from Angola has long been a major demand of Jonas Savimbi's guerrilla forces, which also espouse a strong black nationalist line. Chances that a radical black regime in Luanda would seek a political reconciliation with Savimbi are remote, however, given major ideological differences. Savimbi, in fact, probably would shun negotiations with any group that seized power from the Neto regime in the expectation that he might be in a position to seize control of the country militarily. His chances of success would depend almost entirely on how willing the Cubans, and to a lesser extent the Soviets, would be to support the new regime. [redacted]

Epilogue

These three distinct scenarios should Neto leave office do not exhaust all possibilities. Neto's demise could be followed by a period of political chaos and disorder, sparking a bewildering succession of unstable regimes or a quick assertion of military control. Given the degree of racial and tribal factionalism in ruling circles, it is also possible that one scenario might follow the other in rapid succession, or that all three scenarios might play themselves out simultaneously.

Cuba and the USSR doubtless are in a strong position to influence the play of events.



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