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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Department of State

SUBJECT : Communism in Latin America

I would like to invite your attention to the attached CIA study, "A Survey of Communism in Latin America." It is a comprehensive work and, we believe, the best study of its sort available on the question of Communism in the countries south of our border. I think you will find it useful as a reference tool.

[Redacted Signature]

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment
CIA OCI No. 2397/65

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A Survey of Communism in Latin America

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A SURVEY OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

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INTRODUCTION

1. Historical Development

Most of the Latin American Communist parties formally came into being in the decade following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. The Communist Party of Argentina is the oldest party in the hemisphere, having been founded in 1918. Each of the parties has looked to Moscow from the start for its ideology and guidance. None has drawn on Latin America's heritage of communal practices and traditions which have stemmed from the area's great Aztec, Maya, or Inca civilizations.

The activities of Latin American Communist parties have paralleled the international movement from the very beginning, although the Latin Americans frequently have been slow in picking up the latest "line" from Moscow. Ideological schisms in Moscow in the 1920s--especially the splintering off of Trotsky and his followers--were reflected in Latin America.

During the late 1920s and early 1930s Latin American Communist parties followed Moscow's advice in isolating themselves completely from other working class parties. This tactic was later reversed in the mid-1930s in a turn to "popular front" activities when the Communists sought alliances with socialist and left-of-center nationalist parties in Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay. In Cuba and Brazil, Communists made overtures to the early Batista and Vargas regimes.

Latin American Communists followed the Moscow line in at first supporting the Stalin-Nazi pact of 1939, and then switched tactics when the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany in 1941. The Communists basked in the light of their devotion to the anti-Fascist cause in most of Latin America for the duration of World War II, and made particular headway in trade union movements. Their influence was especially strong at this time in the labor movements of Chile,

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Cuba, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, [] Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. The Latin American Workers Confederation (CTAL) was formed in 1944 and affiliated with the Moscow-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. The Communists were at their zenith in 1946 in influence and general public acceptance. Their parties were either legal or at least tolerated in every country. They had members of congress in nine countries; three Communists held cabinet posts in Chile in late 1946 under a popular front government headed by President Gonzalez Videla.

After the war the prestige of the Communists began to wane as they tended to become increasingly isolated from other popular, leftist parties. Only in Guatemala until 1954 and in Cuba have they made great advances. However, the Communists were a powerful influence in the Goulart regime in Brazil before the 30 March - 1 April 1964 revolt. The Communists still hold a fairly strong political position in Chile and serve as the power behind the terrorist forces in Venezuela. They are fully capable of exploiting grievances in every Latin American country to exacerbate smoldering local tensions. The Communists' major appeal of late has been to pose as the champions of social reform, saying that they could better carry out Latin America's social revolution if the workers, peasants, and intellectuals would but give them the power.

External Communist support is largely provided in the form of direct financial subsidies. The money usually is carried by special emissaries from foreign Communist countries. It is believed the Venezuelan Communist Party has received about a million dollars a year in past years. The provision of travel funds for courses of training given to local Communists in European and Asian Communist countries is another important source of aid. Soviet guidance to local Communist leaders is given through a complex system of personal contact and correspondence. Meetings are held in various East European capitals such as Prague. Some regional meetings are held in which Soviet party officials are present. Coordination for these meetings often is arranged through Czechoslovak embassies in Mexico City for Communists from Central America, and in Buenos Aires and Montevideo for South American Communists.

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2. The Impact of Castroism

Fidel Castro's rise to power has greatly benefited the orthodox Communist parties of Latin America, but it has also caused them problems. Castro's adoption of Marxism-Leninism provided a powerful boost for Communism throughout Latin America, particularly until October 1962, but his brand of Communism was a very different one from that adhered to by most orthodox party leaders. The heart of Castro's revolutionary theory is that social justice can be attained by guerrilla warfare--a view which runs directly counter to the teachings of orthodox Marxism-Leninism as propounded by Soviet ideologists and traditionally followed by most Latin American Communist parties. Traditional Communist Party doctrine maintains that to be successful a revolution cannot be launched before the mass of the working class has rallied to the party. The Latin American Communist parties have as a general rule followed the line that "objective conditions" have not been "right" for revolution in this hemisphere. They have followed the "via pacifica" route of collaboration and infiltration, although never rejecting the alternative of "armed revolution."

Castro-Communism runs directly counter to this tactic. Che Guevara, in his famous book on guerrilla warfare (which is still widely circulated in Latin America) states:

"We consider that the Cuban revolution contributed three fundamental lessons to the conduct of revolutionary movements in Latin America. They are:

- (1) Popular forces can win a war against the enemy.
- (2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolutions exist; insurrection can create them.
- (3) In underdeveloped Latin America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting."

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In effect, Castro's revolution and the Castroist "ideology" is a very real challenge to the traditional leaders of the orthodox Communist parties of Latin America. Party leaders can ill afford to antagonize innumerable Castroites inside and on the fringe of their parties; nor do they want to pick an ideological quarrel with the Soviet Union's sole Latin American ally. However, most have done little more than pay lip service to the Castroist tactic of revolution by guerrilla warfare (Guatemala and Venezuela are two notable exceptions). As a result, most party hierarchies are being challenged to some degree by militant dissidents who are inspired by the Cuban model. Many of these are also influenced by the example of Peking.

It may well be that the major impact that Castro's revolution has had on the Latin American Communist movement has been to set in process a radical revolutionary effort led by militants who are considerably younger and more activist than most orthodox Communist leaders, and who represent a sort of Communist "wave of the future." As prospects for meaningful gains under the "via pacifica" strategy grow dimmer, these impatient militants will be even more convinced that "armed struggle" is the only way to achieve power in Latin America. They will continue to receive inspiration and probably some direct assistance from Cuba in this effort. They are not under the control of Castro (or Peking), however, in the sense that the Communist "old guard" leaders are bound by discipline to Moscow. Some of the more radical militants appear to be establishing more formal lines of communication with Peking, feeling that the Cubans have become "revisionist" and moved closer to Soviet ideological positions.

The Cubans and the Latin American "soft-line" Communists are taking steps to remedy some of their friction producing differences. The highly unusual meeting of Latin American Communist party leaders held in Havana in November 1964 had as one of its major purposes the seeking out of means for overcoming the divisive tendencies which have so long hampered the Latin American Communist movement. The meeting also produced a pledge of a joint strengthening of "national liberation movements" in the hemisphere and an agreement to promote

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"solidarity with Cuba." Cuba's agreement to stop meddling with local extremist groups not endorsed by the orthodox Communist parties may be followed up by greater initiatives on the part of the "soft-line" Communists to take a more active part in those revolutionary activities presently well under way in the hemisphere. This trend already seems to be well established in Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama.

3. Current Trends and Outlook

The orthodox Communist parties do not pose the most immediate threat to the existing governmental structure in most Latin American countries. Rather, militant leftist-extremists--in particular those in Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala, and Colombia--who are inspired by the example of Castro and many of whom have had guerrilla training in Cuba constitute the most serious threat. These extremists may have only a vague understanding of Marxism-Leninism, but believe that the road of terrorism and violence is the only workable means for displacing oligarchic social systems and instituting popular reforms. These are the groups--some within but most outside the regular Communist parties--which are putting pressure on the traditional Communist leaders for more activist revolutionary tactics. Thus it seems likely that over the next year or two the local parties might be forced to adopt a somewhat "harder" revolutionary line in the hopes of blunting criticism from the parties' left wing that the leaders are "do nothing" revolutionaries. At the same time, the parties will probably suffer accelerated fractionalization as the militant left-wing extremists become less and less satisfied with the parties' mild approach to revolution. If the Cubans uphold their part of the Havana conference bargain and support only those groups endorsed by the local parties, the left-wing splintering may be confined to small extremist fringe groups.

In addition to taking steps to mollify their critics from the militant left, the local Communist

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
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leaders appear to be trying to stimulate the development of broad "popular front" type organizations called "national liberation fronts" into which they hope to pull elements of the non-Communist left in each country. This two-pronged strategy will enable the Communists to manipulate insurgents with the left hand while at the same time maintaining a respectable "nationalist" pose with the right hand. This would enable them to be on the ground floor and perhaps more subtly control "popular" insurrections such as that which occurred in the Dominican Republic.

It seems likely that Havana increasingly is going to be faced with an intruding competitor in the form of the Chinese Communists in bidding for the loyalty of some of the more militant leftist-extremists. This has already happened in Colombia and Ecuador, and both Havana and Peking are claiming the Peruvian guerrillas as "examples" for other revolutionaries in Latin America to emulate.

For the short-run at least no Communist party in Latin America is likely to challenge seriously the existing governments. However, prevailing political, economic, and social conditions and the widespread demand for revolutionary change throughout most of the continent are ripe for Communist manipulation and exploitation. The greatest danger is apt to come in situations where the traditional society and institutions give way completely in the face of a sharp, spontaneous, and popular revolt against the old order. In the fluid aftermath, Communist elements would be likely to rise quickly to the fore and threaten to dominate the revolution.

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ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL COMMUNIST PARTY

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA

1. Introduction

The Argentine Communist Party (Partido Comunista de la Argentina--FCA) is the oldest and largest in South America. It has never, however, gained a large mass following, due largely to its failure to attract working class support away from the Socialists, and, since the mid-1940s, from the Peronists. The Roman Catholic Church has generally been a factor inhibiting its growth. The PCA remains influential because of its ability to cooperate with other groups and movements, both political and subversive, and its readiness to exploit all signs of dissension and unrest. Though influential in labor unions and ethnic groups, the party's greatest success appears to be its penetration of Argentina's intellectual community, the universities, and other educational and cultural institutions.

In the past the classical ideology of Moscow-based Marxism attracted the intellectuals and students. Recently, however, the more "revolutionary" versions of Chinese and Cuban Communism have demonstrated an ability to draw adherents, particularly PCA members and others impatient with pursuing legal roads to power. The PCA has tried to maintain ties with many leftist extremist groups which support a Castro-Mao line, such as the Peronist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Peronista--MRP) and the leftist-oriented wing of the ultranationalist anti-Semitic Tacuara organization. The growth of these groups, reportedly financed by funds from Cuba and possibly the USSR, recently forced the PCA to assert that all support for Argentine Communists should come through the PCA.

Unaided Communist agitation efforts have not been a serious threat to stability. However, when the Communists allied with the Peronists to exploit economic and political unrest they have caused serious disorder. Such actions in the past led to drastic restrictions on the PCA's activities in 1959 and its eventual banning in 1963. PCA successes have been limited, largely because the PCA has not been able effectively to blunt the strong anti-Communist bias

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of the military or to exploit the strength and weaknesses of the Peronist movement.

Currently the PCA is not under legal restrictions, but the national electoral court denied it recognition to run candidates in the March 1965 election. Party activities have been stepped up, and Communist propaganda is becoming easily and more extensively available. Since early 1964, several pro-Castro "guerrilla" training camps have been discovered in the interior of the country, along with a number of Communist arms caches in the larger cities.

The rise in Communist activity--resulting from the removal of restrictive political party laws--may become a serious issue between the government on the one hand, and the military and opposition parties on the other. The government appears recently to have decided to take repressive measures against terrorist organizations, including the Communist Youth (FJC).

2. History

As a result of upheavals in the international Communist movement after World War I and the Russian Revolution, the 25-year-old Argentine Socialist Party (PSA), in common with most Socialist parties, underwent severe splitting. One dissident faction joined the newly formed, Lenin-oriented Third International in 1918, and in 1920 adopted the name "Argentine Section of the International." The early years of the party were threatened by factional disputes, defections, strong opposition from both rightist and other extreme leftist groups, and public antipathy toward its espousal of violence and terrorism. Throughout the 1920s the major issue behind party divisions was proposed reunification with the Socialists.

After the overthrow of President Irigoyen in 1930, a military dictatorship outlawed the Communist movement, which was periodically repressed and denied electoral privileges until 1938. Acquiring greater freedom, the movement adopted a moderate domestic policy to sustain its status. It also used to advantage the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 which gave "independence" to national Communist parties.

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The Argentine group then organized itself as the Communist Party of Argentina (Partido Comunista de la Argentina--PCA).

Argentine Communist policies and programs throughout this period and up to the end of World War II frequently changed to meet a variety of widely varying situations. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), the party capitalized on anti-Axis sentiment, but became pro-Axis during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact (1939-41). Reversing itself when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the PCA fought against the pro-Axis sympathies of the Argentine Government while the US and USSR were allies. At the end of the war, the PCA returned to attacking any signs of pro-US attitudes.

A new military dictatorship in 1943, however, severely reduced the freedom of operation extended the PCA since 1938. It was in fact repressed and its leaders forced into exile. The new secretary of labor and social welfare, Colonel Juan Peron, began a determined--and successful--effort to attract the Argentine labor movement to his support and to usurp control of organized labor from other union leaders, in particular the Communists and socialists, by organizing rival "official" unions, coercing workers, and jailing recalcitrant union leaders.

In 1946, shortly after Peron was elected president for the first time, the PCA announced at its 11th National Congress a strategy based on a "national and social liberation front." This strategy included support of Peron and eventually even assistance to him in breaking the independent unions and handing over Communist-controlled unions to the state-run labor confederation. The Communists lost ground, however, despite catering to Peron for nearly a decade and sometimes acting as "radical" Peronists. Peron granted the party legal status but carefully restricted its activities. Generally the PCA supported the government's policies, except any evidence of a friendly attitude toward the United States.

After the fall of Peron, many Communists associated themselves directly with the Peronists, particularly in the labor movement. Despite the anti-Communist orientation of the post-Peron provisional

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government, the PCA enjoyed considerable freedom of operation, and was allowed to participate in the 1957 constituent assembly and 1958 national general elections.

Permitted complete freedom in 1958 under the new Frondizi government (1958-1962), the party soon reached its peak strength. In early 1959, however, the Communists--along with the Peronists--were blamed for instigating public disorders. PCA activities were proscribed by decree, although the party and most of its front organizations were not outlawed until May 1963. Then President Guido abolished the party when it attempted to take advantage of Peron's "swing to the left" directive to his followers. The PCA was also seeking to capitalize on growing economic difficulties and unrest after Frondizi's overthrow.

In early 1963, the PCA held its long-postponed 12th National Congress, under the slogan: "For mass action leading to the conquest of power." The PCA was not permitted to enter candidates in the March 1965 national deputy elections, but the party greatly increased its other activities--particularly since repressive political party legislation was annulled by congress in October 1964.

3. Party Membership and Leadership

Until 1957, the membership of PCA was never estimated at more than 10,000. The 1958 estimate rose sharply to 75,000-80,000 members plus another 150,000-175,000 sympathizers. The rapid gain apparently was accounted for by the freedom of action enjoyed under the post-Peron provisional governments and the leniency initially extended by President Frondizi. Despite recurrent recruitment drives, PCA membership diminished to 40,000-45,000 in 1963, but rose again to its current level of 65,000-80,000. Estimates of sympathizers stand at 100,000, considerably lower than the 1958 high. In recent years, the PCA has had difficulty in retaining new dues-paying members. Many who enroll as members in a recruitment campaign frequently fail to renew their membership or pay their dues.

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Another index of Communist strength and support has been the party's voting strength. The peak year of electoral strength was 1957. By then the PCA's strength, although negligible in terms of total national votes, showed a 150 percent increase over 1954. Though figures are not completely reliable in each instance, the PCA voting record from 1948 to 1958 was:

1948	83,518
1951	70,515
1954	90,013
1957	228,821
1958	215,458

Even at the 1957-58 strength levels, support only amounted to about 2.5 percent of the total national vote.

The PCA, like the Socialist and other working class parties, draws its strength largely from the urban industrial workers--two thirds of PCA support is concentrated in the city and environs of Buenos Aires. The remainder is largely in the cities of Rosario, Mendoza, and Cordoba--with little PCA penetration in the rural areas.

PCA leadership has remained largely in the hands of a few party stalwarts since its establishment. The result has been the perpetuation of offices and policies--recently leading to antagonistic reactions from some second- and third-level party leaders. The major point of contention appears to be overemphasis on ideology to the detriment of uncovering other means to reach power. At the 12th National Congress Victor Codovilla (1894-) the party's major figure, was named president of the PCA. This is a newly established post, probably instituted to allow more flexibility on programs and policies by making it possible to broaden the decision-making base of party leadership.

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4. Organization

The PCA is structurally similar to the general character of most Communist parties. The central committee, rather than the party executive committee, is the top decision-making body. The party statutes call for biennial national congresses, but in the last 20 years there have been only two: in 1946 and 1963. The national conference, a meeting of regional officers between sessions of the national congress, has seldom been called--the sixth and last being held in 1960. The present central committee, elected by the 12th National Congress in 1963, consists of 22 voting members and 9 alternates. Tables at the end list the members of the central committee and the major commission heads.

Financial support for the PCA usually comes from annual dues, donations, and campaigns. Reports recently have indicated that the party has been extensively exploiting credit "cooperatives" for funds. There is no information on the size of funds from external sources, although such support is highly probable. It has been estimated that less than one quarter of PCA expenses could be covered by visible resources.

5. Dissident Groups and Ideological Disputes

The PCA has been continually rent by splits since its founding. Various other workers' parties were established, including several of Trotskyite inclination, which still have nominal support. The more important of these groups currently are the orthodox and dissident Trotskyite groups: the Trotskyite Worker Party (Partido Obrero Trotskiista--POT) Worker Word (Palabra Obrera), the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria--MIR) and the Socialist Party of the National Left (Partido Socialista de Izquierda Nacional--PSIN).

Generally the dissident Marxist parties and groups pursue a more revolutionary terrorist line than the PCA and continuously criticize the PCA as nonactivist. Although small in number, their support of the Chinese Communist line in the Sino-Soviet dispute has gained them the allegiance of dissatisfied PCA members and

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other leftist and nationalist extremist groups. The differences among the dissident Marxists themselves concern largely methods to be employed to bring about a socialist revolution, and not objectives.

In the future the PCA may be seriously threatened by the effects of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. Although the party's central committee has frequently reiterated the position supporting the USSR taken at the 12th Congress in February-March 1963, several individuals and groups have defected, or have been expelled. Other groups, including the Communist Youth Federation (Federacion Juvenil Comunista--FJC), have vociferously supported Peking's line. Various provincial committees, as in Ente Rios and Mendoza, have suffered splits and expulsions as a result of internal differences on this issue. Recent losses by Communist labor leaders in union elections are also attributed partly to the dispute.

6. Communist Party and Peronism

Since the advent of Peron in 1943, the PCA's history has been bound up with Peronism. Peronism, in fact, has been the most serious threat to the success of the Communist Party as a working class party. Peronism more readily appealed to the predominant nationalistic and Catholic attitudes of the people. Once in power it succeeded in establishing a strong labor base, usurping traditional Communist and Socialist support. Peron also attracted several Communist leaders out of the party.

The PCA has shown a willingness to cooperate with the Peronists, especially to exploit common antipathies toward the government in power, but alliances have not lasted. Each side has expediently sought its own advantages. There are at present some Peronist union leaders who appear to be associated with the Communists, and, at times, "hard-line" Peronists assert objectives and tactics which differ little from Communist aims. The Communist labor front, the Movement for Trade Union Unity and coordination (Movimiento de Unidad y Coordinacion Sindical--MUCS) has remained in the Peronist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT).

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The major ties between Peronists and Communists, however, remain in the subversive revolutionary groups. Although the relations between the PCA and various extremist groups--including some Communist--is not known, several of the latter project a strong pro-Castro, pro-Chinese line and are linked up with extreme-left Peronist groups such as the MRP. These groups are usually small but have some leaders who were in Cuba and China.

The Communists apparently recognize that alone they could never overthrow the government. In place of that, their main objective has been to form a "united front" which they could later exploit to their own advantage. Since the Peronists apparently have the broadest mass support base--25-35 percent of the electorate--the Communists have made every effort to associate themselves with the Peronists. This tactic will probably continue although the Peronists appear to be very aware of Communist methods of operations.

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TABLE I

LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (PCA)

<u>PARTY POST</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF POLITICAL SECRETARIAT</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE</u>	<u>ENLARGED EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE</u>
President	Victor Codovilla	*	*	*
Sec'y-Gen.	Geronimo Arnedo	*	*	*
	Alvarez	*	*	*
	Rodolfo Ghioldi	*	*	*
	Benito Marianetti	*	*	*
	Victor Larralde	*	*	*
	Vincente Marischi	*	*	*
	Alcira de la Pena			*
	Pedro Tadioli			*
	Florindo Moretti			*
	Angel Araoz			*
	Orestes Ghioldi	*	*	*
	Paulino Gonzalez			*
	Alberdi			*
Gen. Counsel	Tirma Othar			*
	Hector Agosti			*
	Ernesto Guidici			*
	Alberto Ferrari			*
	Jorge Bergstein			*
	Emilio Troise			*
	Fanny Edelman			*
	Alfredo Varela			*
Jose Maria Garcia			*	
Rubens Iscaro			*	

* Member named in Column (1) holds additional office per asterisk.



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TABLE 2


COMMISSION HEADS OF ARGENTINE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCA)

<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>COMMISSION</u>
President	Orestes Ghioldi	National Finance
Secretary	Rubens Iscaro	National Trade Union
Secretary	Fernando Nadra	National Publications
Secretary	Orestes Ghioldi	National Propaganda
President	Orestes Ghioldi	National Electoral
President	Paulino Gonzalez Alberdi	National Economic Studies
Secretary	Rodolfo Araoz Alfaro	National Judiciary
President	Rodolfo Ghioldi	National Education
Secretary	Jose Maria Garcia	National Agrarian


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



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


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



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


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


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


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


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


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



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


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


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


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



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


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


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


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



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


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


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


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



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


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



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


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



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


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


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COMMUNISM IN BRAZIL

1. Introduction

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), now occupied with restrengthening the party apparatus, has long been an active albeit secondary force in Brazil's political life. Although the PCB has enjoyed only two years of legal status (1945-1947) since its founding in 1922, it generally has operated openly and has exerted an influence far beyond that which its relatively small size would indicate. Communist influence has been especially strong within the labor movement and among students, journalists, and intellectuals.

Until the overthrow of the Goulart regime in April 1964 the Communists and their supporters were steadily increasing their power through propaganda, by manipulation of unions and student groups, and by penetration of all levels of government and the armed forces. Adhering to the Moscow-directed line of promoting "peaceful revolution" the PCB concentrated on infiltration and united front tactics.

Since the installation of President Castello Branco's administration, the PCB has been forced to function essentially as an underground party. The government has suppressed most of the PCB front groups and clamped down on party activities in general. Nevertheless, the PCB is reasserting its influence, particularly in organized labor and in the universities.

The setback suffered by the extreme left with the overthrow of Goulart aggravated the deep division that had existed in the Communist movement for several years. Some PCB members now were inclined to support the line of violent revolution promoted by the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which in 1962 had been formed by dissidents who split from the orthodox party after a dispute over basic policy.

2. Brief History of Communism

The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) was founded in 1922 by a handful of intellectuals who were

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unknown in politics. Shortly after its formation the party was outlawed (in mid-1922) along with other subversive movements in the aftermath of an abortive revolt by elements of the armed forces. Operating underground the party gradually gained influence in urban labor, and among students and professional groups. The Communists had little influence on national politics, however, until after the 1930 revolution that brought the dictator Getulio Vargas into power. In 1934 the PCB joined with other opposition groups to form a fairly strong political movement known as the National Liberation Alliance. The following year the head of the Communist party, Luiz Carlos Prestes, led an overthrow attempt which the Vargas government quickly suppressed, with Prestes and most of the other Communist leaders being imprisoned for long terms. For the next ten years the Communist movement in Brazil remained virtually inactive.

During World War II the party gained prestige and in the 1945 elections polled more than half a million votes, fourth highest of the parties participating. The election gave the PCB a total of one federal senator, 16 deputies, and 46 state congressmen. Outlawed again in 1947 after a two-year period of legitimacy, the party's prestige dropped and remained low until the 1955 elections in which the PCB openly supported the winning presidential candidate, Juscelino Kubitschek. From that point on the Communist movement in Brazil continued on the rise.

The Communists benefited from the political success of Kubitschek's vice president, Joao Goulart, who during his ten years as labor minister, vice president, and finally president was generally willing to cooperate with the Communists in return for their support. Communist sympathizers held a number of key positions in Goulart's administration including posts in his immediate office. His top military aide during the last months of his rule, for instance, was strongly pro-Communist. The presidential press secretary was a long-time Communist Party member. From time to time Goulart also relied on his leftist, ultranationalist brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, for counsel. Individuals considered to be Communist sympathizers sat on the powerful National Security Council and the Supreme Court. In the congress some half dozen Communists

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held seats under other party labels. In Pernambuco the governor, a confirmed Marxist, had appointed a number of Communists and pro-Communists to his administration.

In the 1955-64 period the Communists gradually achieved a dominant position in labor, gaining positions of leadership in four of the country's six national labor confederations, including the Industrial Workers Confederation, the most important and wealthiest labor organization in Brazil. With government collaboration the Communists organized a rural workers' confederation which was given official recognition as the spokesman for the country's four or five million agricultural employees.

In student affairs both the leading university students' organization and the major secondary students' association were Communist dominated. Federal funds were funneled for political purposes to such groups as the Marxist-controlled National Students Union. The Communist influence also reached into the armed forces where a number of party sympathizers held command posts and the "Sergeant's Movement" often served the Communist cause.

The Communist movement suffered a severe setback with the overthrow of Goulart and the installation of President Castello Branco as his successor. Communists and fellow travelers lost their posts in the federal government and in the major labor organizations, and Communist influence in the student movement was reduced. National party activities were curtailed and spurious Communist labor entities such as the Workers Command were abolished.

3. Present Status of the Communist Movement

The Communists are renewing their subversive efforts after a year or so of relatively little activity, following the ouster of the Goulart regime and the anti-Communist crackdown that followed. At the same time, the Communist Party (PCB) is rebuilding its organization. PCB membership probably is still well below the estimated 30,000 on its rolls before the March 1964 revolution, and the number of party sympathizers presumably is also

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down from the approximately 200,000 attributed to the PCB during the Goulart period.

A meeting of the PCB central committee in May 1965, the first held since the revolution, produced a number of resolutions that restated the policy guidelines for future party activities. One resolution stressed the leadership's intention to continue the general political line adopted by the 1960 fifth party congress, which emphasized the need for forming a broad united front with leftist and nationalist forces. It was emphasized that although preparations for the use of paramilitary methods were to be encouraged, this was not intended to lead to open and uncontrolled revolution. Further development of the PCB strategy was to be considered at the sixth party congress scheduled for sometime during the next year.

There have been developments in the PCB that suggest that the power of long-time party head Prestes has weakened. Prestes has been removed from the national secretariat, for example, and now has little responsibility or direct supervision over the day-to-day party affairs which that organ manages. Prestes has been under heavy criticism, particularly from the important Sao Paulo faction of the party, for allegedly failing to properly implement the party's policies and for allowing important records to be discovered by the police.

As in the past the PCB seems to be focusing its main effort in the industrial southern and eastern states although party units exist in most regions of the country. The PCB has begun to reassert its influence in the urban areas, particularly in the unions and universities. Recent labor elections in Guanabara and Sao Paulo have resulted in victories by Communist-backed slates. Similarly, the Communists and their allies have demonstrated growing strength in student elections in several states, where extreme leftists now control key university organizations. The PCB has also been active in promoting student and worker demonstrations and manifestos against the government.

The gradual resurgence of Communist influence is reflected in the willingness of some non-Communist

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political leaders to accept PCB support again. Reports indicated that Mayor Faria Lima of Sao Paulo and the 1965 Laborite candidate for governor in Guanabara, Francisco Negro de Lima, were among those who have recently received PCB campaign backing.

Communist efforts to develop a strong following among rural workers have had only moderate success due partly to stiff competition from other Marxist-oriented groups such as the Peasant Leagues, and from the church-sponsored unions. Meager financial resources have limited the party's activities in this area.

4. Schisms

The strains caused by internal friction among top party leaders continue, compounding the effects of the serious split which led to the expulsion in 1961 of a dissident faction and the formation soon thereafter of a new group--the Communist Party of Brazil (CPB). Extremist elements who oppose Prestes' policy of "peaceful revolution," seek to promote a more aggressive line of action.

The smaller CPB, which follows the Peking line, has been an ineffective organization with very limited resources and less than 1,000 members concentrated largely in the states of Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Guanabara. CPB leaders believe that recent events in Brazil have discredited the orthodox party and boosted the CPB's recruitment prospects among disillusioned PCB members and other extreme leftists. In any event, the dissident leaders probably see a new opportunity to promote their line of violent revolution.

Both the PCB and the CPB have collaborated with other leftist groups often by participating in fronts. The degree of Communist control has varied but generally the Communists have acquiesced in the formal leadership of others while exerting a strong influence on front policies. All elements of the extreme left are continuing to seek alliances along the lines of the now defunct Popular Mobilization Front. Continued differences over tactics--for example, the

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PCB regards the exiled Leonel Brizola as too radical--are likely to deter close collaboration among the extremist groups.

5. Foreign Influences


In recent years the PCB has tended to soft-pedal its role as a member of the international Communist movement, fearful that this would tend to jeopardize the party's acceptance within Brazil. Nonetheless, it has cooperated with all major Moscow-directed international front groups such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The presence in Brazil of diplomatic representatives of most European bloc countries has facilitated overseas contact.

Cuba--and to a lesser extent, China--have concentrated their attention on the more activist groups, such as the pro-Peking dissident Communist party (CPB), the now defunct Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao, and the forces of the radically anti-US Leonel Brizola. Havana has furnished funds and training to such groups from time to time. Brazilian Communists also maintain ties with them in regional undertakings. However, the PCB's position among the other parties in the hemisphere has declined relative to past years when the Brazilian party served as something of a model.


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



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


Table 1

Brazilian Communist Party Leadership

Secretary-General

Luiz Carlos Prestes

Secretariat

Giocondo Alves Dias

Mario Dinarco Reis

Orlando Bonfim, Jr.

National Executive Commission

Luiz Carlos Prestes


Giocondo Alves Dias

Mario Dinarco Reis

Carlos Marighella


Orlando Bonfim, Jr.

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Geraldo Rodrigues dos Santos

Jaime Amorim de Miranda

Alternates:

Mario Alves de Sousa Viera

Ivan Ramos Ribeiro

Elson Costa

Antonio Ribeiro Granja

Ramiro Luchesi

Zuleika Alembert

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THE PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF BRITISH GUIANA

1. Introduction

There is no Communist party per se in British Guiana, but the People's Progressive Party (PPP) led by Cheddi Jagan is Communist-oriented and maintains close ties with Cuba, the Communist Party of Great Britain, and other foreign Communist groups and individuals. The PPP was formed in 1950 and won every general election until its defeat in 1964 by a coalition of the two major opposition parties. Since losing power the PPP has developed a moderate-extremist split which has weakened the party. About 50 PPP members have been trained in Cuba and although there is no large-scale insurgent activity at this time the PPP's youth organization and a closely allied terrorist wing, the virtually defunct Guiana Liberation Army (GIA), could conceivably activate an organized force of trained, armed insurgents.

Today the PPP is characterized as a Marxist-Socialist party whose leader, Cheddi Jagan, commands the loyalty, if not the absolute control, of almost the entire East Indian community (50 percent of the population). The East Indian sugar workers, for example, credit Jagan with singlehandedly forcing the plantations to improve their working conditions and they are eternally grateful to him. When in office the party, in its flirtation with the bloc, went quite far in trying to supplant private trading and distributing facilities in order to make the economy ever more dependent on bloc goods. The East Indians, who are essentially petty capitalists, do not necessarily support these policies and without Jagan the PPP would lose much of its appeal.

The PPP is the largest and best organized party in British Guiana. Its extensive network of headquarters, offices, women and youth groups, and staff of paid organizers are the envy and model for every other party in the colony. It is a mass rather than a cadre party and the bulk of its estimated 15,000 members cannot be considered to be indoctrinated Communists. Many of its top leaders, however, can

definitely be so labeled and the party, recognizing its problem, has recently stepped up its political indoctrination classes.

Although the PPP has depended mainly on its numerical superiority to bring it to power through the electoral process it has often used terrorism to keep its members in line. In the past it has used sabotage and passive resistance to harry the British and it is now employing both these tactics against the Burnham government.

2. Brief History of the Party

The PPP was formed in 1950 by Cheddi Jagan and Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham out of the British Guiana Labor Party and a political education group called the Political Affairs Committee which had been started in 1946 by Jagan and his American born wife Janet. Both Cheddi and Janet viewed the British Guiana situation in the Marxist terms of class struggle and it was apparently from its foundation that the PPP drew much of its doctrinal inspiration from Communism. Its aims, openly declared at its first party congress on 1 April 1951, were absolutely clear. These were self-government, economic development and the creation of a socialist society.

The Jagans maintained as many contacts as possible with Communist organizations, especially the British Communist Party from which they received financial aid. The party weekly newspaper, Thunder, often printed articles sent out by the British Daily Worker and the Jagans frequently attended meetings, congresses, and rallies of Communist and left-wing organizations in Europe.

Other PPP members, led by Burnham--himself an aspirant to party leadership--considered these activities as ill-advised because they could be seized upon as a means of proscribing the party and denying the colony its independence. Despite these latent antagonisms the PPP held together, grew in popularity and membership and won the 1953 elections, capturing 51 percent of the vote. Nevertheless, internal dissension was growing and the non-Communist faction,

drawn largely from Negroes in the professions and government service, chafed under the control of the Jagens and their allies.

Meanwhile the PPP was not doing a good job of governing. Its leaders rejected the existing constitution as an improper instrument for achieving independent government and attempted instead to implement their own policies of accelerated progress towards full self-government and the establishment of a socialist state. They had no well-thought-out development program and no capital was forthcoming from the West. Furthermore they had antagonized the unions by pushing through legislation aimed at getting full control of the labor movement. Strikes, in which PPP parliamentary representatives and ministers were involved, bomb outrages and other disturbances broke out. The Jagan government clashed with the colonial administration and the British became fearful lest Jagan attempt a coup against their authority and establish a Communist state. In October 1953, after only five months of PPP rule, the British suspended the constitution.

With the party out of office intraparty dissension continued to grow, culminating in early 1955 when the Burnham faction called a party conference and installed Burnham as party leader, ousting Jagan. The result was an open split in the party and the beginning of racial politics, because Burnham, a Negro, was supported by his fellow Africans. Jagan's East Indians refused to recognize Burnham and until he founded his own party both men claimed to be the head of the PPP--the Burnham faction calling itself the PPP (B) and Jagan's group calling itself the PPP (J). A few Negroes stood by Jagan and a few East Indians followed Burnham but the damage was done.

The constitution was restored in 1957 and in the elections that followed Jagan was returned as premier capturing 9 of the 14 elective seats and carrying 48 percent of the vote. In October, after the election, Burnham's group adopted their present name, People's National Congress (PNC) and the PPP became a mainly East Indian party.

In 1959 the PPP suffered another internal shock when Edward Beharry, a well-to-do Indian businessman,

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who had been minister of natural resources and vice chairman of the party, was forced by Jagan to resign from the cabinet and was expelled from the party. Beharry had openly opposed Jagan on economic issues and on what he asserted was the Communist influence within the PPP. Beharry's ouster probably caused some disaffection in the conservative wing of the party and cost it some financial support but it was not followed by any substantial defections.

A new constitution, granting the colony a larger degree of internal self-government, was promulgated in 1961 and elections were held in August. In this election the PPP got its mass support from the East Indian sugar workers and rice farmers and was also backed by small- and medium-size East Indian businessmen. Jagan was again returned as premier with 43 percent of the vote and 20 of the 35 seats.

In February 1962 a general strike accompanied by racial violence nearly brought down the regime. Government employees struck to obtain better wages and leave conditions and were joined by the largest trade union, whose leadership, encouraged by the opposition parties, had become alarmed by certain anti-free enterprise aspects of the Jagan government's budget. In the rioting which ensued Negro mobs burned the stores of East Indian shopkeepers in Georgetown and as a result the East Indians joined ranks more closely behind Jagan. Although the government survived, the riots showed that a substantial number of people were unwilling to be governed by it.

After the riots, the senior vice chairman of the party, Balram Singh Rai, a religious Hindu with a reputation for non-Communism and independent-mindedness, was ousted from the PPP. Rai's charge that the Jagans were leading British Guiana to Communism--coming from a man respected for his honesty and piety--shook some of Jagan's supporters. Protests were made to the PPP leader but other than that little more came of the Rai affair.

In April 1963 a bill designed to give the PPP government control over the labor movement was blocked

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by means of a 76-day general strike and in February 1964 a record 165-day sugar workers' strike resulted from a government-supported attempt by a pro-Jagan union to unseat the large Man-Power Citizens Association (MPCA) as the recognized bargaining agent for the sugar industry. The PPP's attempt to gain control of the sugar workers showed that while the MPCA's sugar workers voted for the PPP in purely political matters they intended to conduct their union affairs free from party interference.

In the meantime two constitutional conferences, held in October 1962 and 1963 respectively, had been unable to decide on the form of government for an independent "Guyana" and on the means by which such a government should be elected. Rather than see independence talks come again to naught, all three leaders of the main political parties asked the British to impose a solution. The British decided that new elections should be held in December 1964 under a system of proportional representation. The simple majority or "first past the post" voting system was thereby discarded and the way paved for the PPP's fall from power.

In the 1964 elections the PPP gained a plurality (winning 46 percent of the vote and 24 of the 53 legislative seats), but not a majority so the British governor asked Forbes Burnham to form the new government and he was able to do so with the help of the United Force. Burnham then became the new premier.

Out of power for the first time since 1953, the PPP disdained to take its opposition seats in the legislature until May 1965. The party was disorganized and discouraged. Immediately after the elections Jagan had left the colony for a tour of bloc countries and without his leadership dissension broke out again. The inner party council divided over whether to use pacific or violent means against the Burnham government. At the annual party conference held in April an open split in the party over whether to return Brindley Benn, an avowed extremist, to the number two party position or replace him with Ashton Chase, a "moderate," was narrowly avoided by an agreement giving Jagan all party administrative power for

a year. Despite the papering over attempt, however, the moderate-extremist split continued. In July, Moses Bhagwan, the extremist chairman of the PPP's youth group was given a six-month suspension for anti-party activity. He subsequently resigned from the PPP, and is now threatening to form a rival East Indian party.

The PPP is fearful that independence will be granted while Burnham is still in power and Cheddi Jagan is now encouraging his party activists to engage in sabotage activities in order to prevent the convening of a constitutional conference, scheduled for 2 November. Bhagwan and his supporters in the youth wing of the party have stated that they are in favor of independence now, even under Burnham, and unless Jagan can find an acceptable compromise the issue, if rightly exploited, could cost the PPP some of its youthful membership.

3. Strength and Supporting Groups

The PPP is the largest single party in British Guiana and has approximately 15,000 dues-paying members. Of the 238,530 ballots cast in the December 1964 election the PPP captured 109,332 (45.8 percent) and won 24 seats in the 53-member assembly. The PPP's success was based mainly on exploiting the East Indian's fear of the African and an African government. As a result virtually all East Indians voted for the PPP. Furthermore, an analysis of the voting showed that the PPP's support came almost exclusively from the East Indian community. Non-Indian support for the party was only somewhere between 1,120 and 2,380 votes.

Most of the support for the PPP comes from the rural districts where the East Indians have settled. The approximately 60,000 rice farmers and 21,500 sugar workers make up the backbone of Jagan's mass support but a good number of East Indian businessmen in the cities contribute to the PPP coffers out of fear of reprisal. Although these people support the PPP financially they would probably prefer to vote for a less socialistic East Indian party.

The PPP is also supported by its youth organization. Membership figures on the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) range from 1,000 to 5,000 and it is from this sector of the party that Jagan gets his activists. Some PYO members have received guerrilla training in Cuba and almost all have been instructed in sabotage techniques at home.

The Guyana Liberation Army (GLA), a secret military force of the PPP, has from 300 to 400 members. It has been inactive for sometime although it could be reactivated. However, this would require considerable effort.

The ladies support the PPP through the Women's Progressive Organization (WPO), a separate body formed in July 1962 and affiliated with the party. No membership figures are available but in November 1962 numbers were reported to be increasing and the WPO had 33 groups functioning throughout the colony. The WPO is affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation, a Communist front.

There are four major East Indian religious organizations in the colony, two Hindu and two Muslim. Although from time to time a few leaders of all four mass organizations have come out against Jagan, the rank and file have continued to support him. Those who might have tended to break away returned to the security of the PPP Indian community after the February 1962 racial riots shook the colony. Although they are not all of voting age, the PPP can count on the support of some 250,000 Hindus and Muslims.

East Indians also predominate in the small business field, particularly in small shops in the rural districts. This group, however, is essentially a petty capitalist one and leary of the PPP's socialism and communistic leanings. Before the February riots the East Indian businessmen showed signs of defecting from the Jagan camp but after the racial violence they too returned to the fold. Jagan has recently found it necessary to reassure them that his grand design for British Guiana does not include a government take-over of small businessmen.

Trade unions with predominantly East Indian memberships tend to support the PPP at the polls. These

include the Guiana Agricultural Workers' Union (about 3,000 members); the Guiana Public Service Workers' Union (about 450 members); the British Guiana Rice Marketing Board Workers' Union (no longer recognized and has little influence); and, although its leadership is anti-Jagan, the Man-Power Citizens Association (about 21,000 members). The Sawmill and Forest Workers Union (about 200 members), and the Sugar Estates Clerks Association (claimed 1,064 members), the Guiana Air Transport Trade Union (about 138 members) and the British Guiana Seafarers Union (about 237 members) also give the PPP their support.

4. Foreign Influence

Although Cheddi Jagan denies that he is an "international" Communist the PPP has long-established contacts with Communist world front organizations such as the International Union of Students and the Women's International Democratic Federation. Both Jagans are passionate supporters of the World Council of Peace and in May 1965 Janet traveled to Helsinki to take part in the Preparatory Committee for the World Congress for Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament.

Both Jagans know personally leading members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and one of the PPP leaders was an active party member when a student in the United Kingdom. While premier, Jagan limited himself to clandestine meetings with CPGB members but Janet was less discreet and is known to have consulted CPGB officials on questions of political education. The PPP has used a Jamaican Communist, resident in England as a contact man with the CPGB but recently, with the help of a British Communist, the party opened a London office.

On their visits to the United States the Jagans are known to have met with members of the US Communist Party, and both US and Canadian Communists have come to British Guiana to consult with the Jagans and other PPP leaders.

The PPP has close ties with Trinidadian Communists. The latter formed the Friends of Guyana, a

front group, in 1962 and Jagan often addresses its members when he is in Trinidad.

A Soviet trade delegation visited British Guiana in December 1962 at the request of the PPP. As well as discussing trade problems the PPP asked the Russians to provide doctors and also machinery for its printing presses. PPP members have been provided scholarships to study in the Soviet Union and as late as June 1965 Cheddi Jagan was thinking of naming one of these Guianese students as the PPP's official representative to the USSR.

In their efforts to obtain aid from and trade with bloc countries, PPP leaders, most recently Cheddi in March 1965, have toured satellite countries, and trade delegations from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany have been invited by the PPP to visit British Guiana.

The ties between Cuba and the PPP are very close. Fidel Castro is reported to have funded the party to the tune of \$250,000 in April 1965 and at least 50 PPP members have received guerrilla training on the island. When he was premier, Jagan arranged to sell much of Guiana's rice crop to Cuba. Probably on Jagan's orders this trade was not continued when Burnham came to power and its loss continues to present his government with one of its most serious economic problems.

Janet Jagan visited Communist China in August 1962 and had an interview with Mao Tse-tung. Other top PPP leaders have also visited China. In June 1965 it was reported that during a visit to Africa Brindley Benn, leader of the extremist wing of the PPP, was given \$8,000 in Algeria and Tanzania and that an additional \$100,000 was available in Africa. These funds, Benn claimed, actually originated in Communist China (where Benn also visited) but were funneled through African channels. Benn also contends that the Chinese Communists are encouraging him to break with the PPP and establish the Communist Party of British Guiana.

As a result of contacts made by both Jagans by 1963 the number of Guianese students in bloc countries

had increased from a low of 13 in 1961 to 36 in the USSR, 35 in Cuba, 12 in East Germany, ten in Czechoslovakia and one in Rumania. As of June 1965 it was estimated that 78 Guianese were studying in the bloc. The recently stepped-up bloc scholarship program makes a still larger Guianese student representation behind the Iron Curtain a good probability.

5. Dissident Groups



Almost from the beginning there have been marked differences of opinion within the PPP over strategy and tactics. The Jagans' espousal of the Marxist ideal appealed to the poorer elements in the party while the more well-to-do members, led by Burnham and composed mainly of Negroes, have been pragmatic and more apt to compromise their socialist principles in favor of the more immediate goals of independence and economic stability. Although Burnham, Beharry, and Rai can be accused of aspiring to party leadership, they were also opposed to Jagan's radicalism. Only Burnham, because he took the Negroes with him, became a significant political force after the break. Due to their poverty and the charismatic appeal of Jagan, the majority of East Indians found the conservative line of the dissident East Indians unattractive and remained loyal to the PPP.

Jagan's triumph over the conservative wing has proven to be a mixed blessing because it left the party without a significant counterweight to the truly radical element. After his fall from power in December 1964, Jagan proposed that the PPP follow a policy of nonviolent obstructionism. Party extremists, led by Brindley Benn, opposed this tactic and found support for their views among members of the PYO. The extremists were so successful in publicizing their cause that party militants began looking on Jagan as too moderate and eventually Jagan was forced to state that he would direct a sabotage campaign calculated to prevent independence from being granted under the Burnham government.


Although this move may have helped Jagan regain prestige it also caused further dissension within the




party. Moses Bhagwan, East Indian leader of the PYO, felt that the party should push for independence whether a Negro was in office or not. He saw Jagan's stand for independence when he was in power and against independence when he was not as an indication of hypocrisy on Jagan's part. These views, contrary to PPP policy, aroused Jagan's ire and Bhagwan was given a six-month suspension for his anti-party activities. Instead of meekly accepting his suspension, Bhagwan and all of his supporters in the PPP and PYO resigned from the party in early August 1965. In July Bhagwan had been considering starting a new political movement and while it is now too early to see what following he will have, his continued public statements could widen splits within the PPP.



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7. Members of the House of Assembly

1. Cheddi Jagan
2. Fenton Harcourt Wilworth Ramsahoye
3. Brindley Horatio Benn
4. Reepu Daman Persaud
5. Cedric Vernon Nunes
6. Yacoob Ally
7. Ramkarran
8. Joseph Rudolph Spenser Luck
9. Eugene Martin Stoby
10. John Bernard Caldeira (Resigned because of poor health, replaced by Mooneer Khan.)
11. Earl Maxwell Gladstone Wilson
12. Maccie Hamid
13. Ranji Chandi Singh



14. Moses Bhagwan*
15. Lloyd Linde
16. Subhan Ali Ramjohn
17. Charles Ramkissoon Jacob, Jr.
18. Ashton Chase
19. Henry Jocelyn Makepeace Hubbard
20. Mohendernauth Poonai
21. Sheik Mohamed Saffee**
22. George Bowman
23. Derek Chunilall Jagan
24. Harry Lall

8. TABLE I

Trend in size of PPP Assembly representation
elected 1953-1964:


	<u>Assemblymen</u>	<u>Percentage of Vote</u>
1953	18 out of 24	51
1957	9 out of 14	48
1961	20 out of 35	43
1964	24 out of 53	46

Note: The number of seats in the Assembly has varied with the constitutional development of the country.


*Resigned from the PPP in August 1965 but retains his seat as an independent.

**Expelled from the PPP in April but retains his seat as an independent.

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


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


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



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


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE

1. Introduction

The Communist Party of Chile (Partido Comunista de Chile--PCCh) is, in proportion to the country's population, probably the largest and best organized of any Marxist party in Latin America, except that in Cuba. Through skillful use of popular front tactics over the past three decades the PCCh has probably made more progress than any other Latin American CP in obtaining fairly widespread acceptance in Chile as a legitimate leftist party, not viewed by many as linked with international Communism and potentially subversive. PCCh acceptability has also been encouraged by a traditional emphasis in Chile on civil liberties and by a generally apolitical role of the armed forces. Mounting socioeconomic problems and popular dissatisfactions in the last decade have also nurtured the standing of the PCCh and other leftist groups.

The PCCh, in order to preserve the legal status it regained in 1958, has thus far adhered to a policy of the "peaceful way" (via pacifica) and has generally avoided provocative subversive action, in contrast with the view of small dissident Communist and minority Socialist elements favoring the Chinese Communist line of violence (although none of significance has been mounted). The PCCh via pacifica, however, conceivably could be modified in the event that the Christian Democratic administration is able to carry through its ambitious reform program over the direct opposition of the far leftists. There is no hard evidence of a PCCh intention to abandon its via pacifica; however, there are indications that the October congress will bring changes.

Since 1958 the PCCh has strengthened its position and has attempted to to reinforce its image of respectability by becoming a working component of the Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP) a coalition with the Socialist Party. The Na-

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ational Democratic Parties were members of the coalition until the March 1965 elections after which they withdrew their support.

2. Brief history of the party

The PCCh was founded in 1922 as a member of the Communist Third International by Luis Emilio Recabarren, veteran labor organizer, propagandist, and militant, who had formed the Socialist Worker Party in 1912. An outgrowth of the SWP, it did not develop effective strength until the 1930s. Previously it was rent by the appearance of Stalinist and Trotskyite factions; the latter group eventually declined and was forced out of the party, and some of the Trotskyite leaders even entered the Socialist ranks. Moreover, suppression during the Ibanez dictatorship (1927-1931) handicapped the Communists. After the return of political liberties the Communists extended their influence, especially in labor circles and among some intellectuals.

The PCCh congressional delegation grew from 2 deputies in 1932 to a peak of 17 deputies and 3 senators in 1941 before the party was outlawed in 1948. As a proportion of the total legislature this representation was uniquely large in Latin America, but it did not fully reflect the party's gains, especially among labor unions. Even non-Communists concede that the PCCh has excelled both in discipline and in adaptability to circumstances. Like Western European Communist parties it veered to "popular front" tactical cooperation with other leftists--and even middle-class elements (the Radicals)--in the mid and late 1930s. Despite the demise of the front in 1941, the PCCh did not revert to its earlier position of political isolation and uncompromising extremism. The PCCh, adhering closely to shifts in the Soviet party line, has declared itself a domestic movement, and has found it expedient to ally itself with other leftist and even centrist forces for electoral purposes. This policy reached a climax in 1946 when the PCCh gave the margin of victory to the popular front Radical candidate, Gonzalez Videla. In return three PCCh members were appointed to the cabinet as ministers of

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agriculture, lands and colonization, and public works.

The PCCh was soon using its strategic ministerial posts to promote disorder in the coal mining and rural areas. In mid-1947 it was ousted from the cabinet, and in 1948 the party was proscribed by the Law for the Defense of Democracy. The passage of this law also reflected the government's fear that the continued legal existence of the PCCh would prejudice US capital investment and aid. The PCCh functioned mainly underground from 1948 until the law was repealed in 1958, largely as a result of its ineffectiveness and its application to non-Communists. During the proscription period the PCCh regrouped and regained much of its strength. It was represented directly by 2 senators (whose holdover terms were allowed to be completed) and unofficially by extremist fringe groups; it thus remained active and influential.

In 1958 the PCCh contributed significantly to the strong showing of the FRAP presidential candidate Allende (who lost by only 33,000 votes), and in the 1961 congressional election the PCCh won four seats in the Senate and 16 in the Chamber of Deputies. In popular vote strength it was fifth and obtained 11.4 percent. The number of its supporters, 157,572, was more than six times that of its then estimated membership of 25,000. In 1963 municipal elections the PCCh won 12.8 percent (254,000), even though historically it has done less well in local contests which generally tend to be personality contests. Municipal governments traditionally have been mostly controlled by radical and rightist politicians, but the PCCh has made inroads in some areas.

In 1964 Socialist Salvador Allende was again the FRAP presidential candidate. Although decisively beaten by the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, he polled nearly one million votes. In the 1965 congressional elections the FRAP got 532,228 votes with the PCCh holding 12.8 percent of the total vote. This gave the party 18 deputies and five senate seats, a gain of two each, and the PCCh emerged as

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the strongest party in Chile on the basis of percentage of total vote.

3. PCCh Strength and Supporting Groups

The PCCh has an estimated membership of approximately 33,000 card carriers who belong to a cell, attend meetings, and pay dues. The Communist Youth (JC) totals 6,000-7,000. Party sympathizers number probably more than 100,000, including those who do not desire to become card-carrying members but who tend to support the party's program and its candidates in labor union and political elections. The present membership is somewhat smaller than that preceding the party's proscription in 1948. During the first part of the clandestine period (1948-58), membership reportedly declined but in the late 1950s and early 1960s it increased somewhat.

The PCCh began a recruitment drive in early 1963 to convert from a hard-core group to a "mass party" with 100,000 regular and 50,000 JC members. Applicants (aspirantes) were issued provisional cards and could attend open meetings of the party. In the past many aspirantes have been a detriment and dropped out. Secretary General Luis Corvalan, in an article in the Moscow Pravda 12 September 1963, declared that from November 1962 to August 1963 "the ranks of the party have grown by 40 percent while those of our komsomol (youth organization) have increased 145 percent." He did not indicate the numerical base. There is little evidence, however, that the recruitment drive had much success. Less than 10 percent of the aspirantes joined, according to one report. The great gains of the Christian Democrats in the last elections have led the PCCh to initiate a new membership drive and to reinvigorate its organization.

In its composition the PCCh rests on a labor base, although it also has a considerable following among intellectuals and members of the professions, particularly teachers. In recent years it has sought growth in the countryside among farm workers and native Indians, and these efforts have produced some electoral results. The party has labored

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in rural areas against traditional influence exerted by rightist farm owners (declining sharply since 1963); difficulty of communications, requiring considerable expense and manpower for new propaganda campaigns; and the indolent and independent nature of the average farm workers, who have been less susceptible to Marxist propaganda than the urban laborer. In recent years the Christian Democrats have also registered considerable gains in this area.

The PCCh has had relatively little success in attracting women, possibly because of the deterrent influence of the Catholic Church. Not only does the PCCh not draw strong voting support among women, but also few Communist women have filled electoral posts. For example, only nine of the 50 PCCh women candidates were successful in the municipal elections of April 1963 (434 male candidates were presented, of whom 144 were elected). In the 1965 congressional elections, however, two female deputies and one female senator--Chile's first--were elected.

The age composition of the party is not known, but the percentage of young members is believed to be high. The PCCh has long given special emphasis to organizing youth. The PCCh political commission has emphasized that while labor support is most important, backing from youth is also basic. In a plenary session of the JC in June 1963 a rapporteur declared that the membership had tripled in 1962. He admitted, however, that the Christian Democratic Party was attracting the greatest number of youths. In the universities the PCCh has lost control of student organizations to Christian Democrats in all seven of the Chilean universities.

4. Foreign Influence

With regard to foreign policy, Corvalan said that the PCCh stands for Chilean neutralism as between the two military groupings--the Soviet bloc and the NATO powers. This view differs with that of the Chinese Communists, and of Fidel Castro, who has proclaimed Cuba a part of the "socialist camp." Castro has also asserted that armed insurrection is the only way to achieve social reform. Corvalan has paid tribute to Castro's "great contribution" to world

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Communism in demonstrating that such revolution is feasible in Latin America. He has conceded that the Cuban road is the correct one for some Latin American countries but has asserted that the peaceful method has been worked out for Chile. These views were published in the World Marxist Review (December 1962), indicating were suggesting to Latin American Communists they do not necessarily have to follow the Castro road to socialism. Later in October 1963, however, Corvalan implicitly acknowledged the seriousness of the doctrinal dispute by assuring the more doctrinaire Communists that the via pacifica does not preclude street demonstrations and strikes. He declared that the PCCh is engaged in a revolution whether or not arms are used.

The PCCh leaders, however, maintained until the 1964 election a generally deferential attitude toward Castro on the assumption that he and his regime had considerable propaganda value. The PCCh, mainly through the use of front organizations, sought to organize large pro-Castro rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. The most recent attempt in this line is the Cuban Solidarity Conference which was originally slated for Uruguay and is now scheduled for Santiago, although with foreign attendance reduced by government restrictions. Such past efforts have not had great success. The rallies generally have been poorly attended and no general sympathy strikes have been carried out. The party now sees less propaganda value in Castro.

The PCCh has long been troubled by the Sino-Soviet split. For the most part, the PCCh's reaction had been to do nothing and hope that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic would resolve their problems which were described as no more than a family squabble. Party leaders maintained this line in the few public statements they made on the subject and in the limited internal party discussion that was allowed. The gravity of the conflict was brought home to the Chilean CP with the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet talks in July 1963. In that year the PCCh leaders also learned or took cognizance of the widespread sympathy for the Chinese position which existed

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

in the rank and file of the PCCh, especially in the provinces where party estimates had it that as high as 30 to 40 percent of some regional committees had pro-Peking leanings. After a trip to Moscow in late 1963 to obtain reassurances that he was following the correct tactic, Luis Corvalan returned and the party finally began taking punitive action; several members of the PCCh were expelled. The Espartaco group was founded during this period. With the expulsions (which have continued to the present) and a constant reiteration of the necessity for party unity in order to assure the victory of the FRAP presidential candidate, Corvalan was able to maintain party discipline. The PCCh's relatively good showing in the March 1965 congressional elections has also helped silence party critics and "Pekinistas" though the movement is still active and is responsible for the more belligerent line the PCCh has been taking internally and somewhat publicly since March 1965.

There has been a recent change in PCCh tactics as regards its attitude and relations with the Frei government.



5. Dissident Marxists

Several dissident Communist party groups have been formed in Chile. The most important--Espartaco --is a Chinese Communist - oriented group apparently led by Jorge Palacio with Senator Jaime Barros as the most prominent spokesman.



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Although Espartaco has claimed to have 1,000 members, it as yet has negligible political power. It did, however, seem to be directing PCCh student groups who rioted over bus fare increases in early May 1965. Implicitly Espartaco action squads are well trained and are able to exploit an advantageous situation.



As of March 1965 there were approximately 150 Chileans in Peking, China, constituting the largest Latin American nationality group in the city. Most of the men belong to Espartaco and were taking a one-month training course in guerrilla warfare.

The other major splinter groups are the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Marxist Revolutionary Vanguard, (VRM) both were also formed by dissident elements of the PCCh. These groups advocate a hard line, and are opposed to the regular Communists and Socialists as well as the Christian Democrats. Recently, attempts have been made by Espartaco and the VRM to unify the splinter groups. Little success has been noted to date.


The PCCh is also confronted with the problem of preserving unity with the Socialist Party in the FRAP coalition. Socialists have occasionally competed sharply with the PCCh for workers' and intellectuals' support. Influential minority leaders and sectors in the allied Socialist party have opposed the PCCh's pro-Moscow position and its advocacy of via pacifica.

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


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


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


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


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7. Members of Legislature

A. Chamber of Deputies

1. Juan Acevedo (Santiago)
2. Santiago Agurto (Concepcion)
3. Jose Cademartori (Santiago)
4. Manuel Cantero (Valparaiso)
5. Arturo Carvajal (Tarapaca)
6. Victor Galleguillos (Antofagasta)
7. Cesar Godoy (Santiago)
8. Luis Guastavino (Valparaiso)
9. Maria Maluenda (Santiago)
10. Gladys Marin (Santiago)
11. Galvarino Melo (Concepcion)
12. Orlando Millas (Santiago)
13. Jorge Montes (Concepcion)
14. Cipriano Pontigo (Coquimbo)
15. Hugo Robles (Antofagasta)
16. Carlos Rosales (O'Higgins)
17. Luis Tejeda (Bio-Bio)
18. Luis Valente (Tarapaca)

B. Senate

1. Julieta Campusano
2. Victor Contreras
3. Carlos Contreras
4. Luis Corvalan
5. Volodia Teitelboim

TABLE I

8. Trend in size of PCCh congressional representation elected, 1925-1961

	<u>Deputies</u> (147 total)	<u>Senators</u> (45 total)
1925	5	1
1932	2	0
1937	6	1
1941	16	3
1945	15	3
1961	16	4
1965	18	5



TABLE 2

9. Leaders of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh)

<u>PARTY POST</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF SECRETARIAT</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF LABOR COMMITTEE</u>
Sec'y-Gen.	Luis Corvalan Lepez*#	Luis Corvalan Lepez*#	Luis Corvalan Lepez*#	
Asst. Secy-Gen.	Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez#	Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez	Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez	
Charge of Overall Labor Affairs	Oscar Astudillo Gonzalez#		Oscar Astudillo Gonzalez#	
Secy, Org. Comm.	Manuel Cantero P."	Manuel Cantero P."	Manuel Cantero P."	
Admin., Fin.	Americo Zorrilla & Orlando Millas Correa Cesar Godoy Urrutia# Jorge Montes Moraga**# Alejandro Toro# Carlos Contreras Labarca*#	Americo Zorrilla &	Orlando Millas Correa**# Jorge Montes Moraga**# Alejandro Toro#	Alejandro Toro#
Gen. Policy & Research	Volodia Teitelboim Volosky*# Julieta Campusano Chavez*" Jose Cademartori Invernizzi**&		Volodia Teitelboim Volosky*# Julieta Campusano Chavez*" (Alternate)	



TABLE 2 (continued)

<u>PARTY POST</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF SECRE- TARIAT</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF LABOR COMMITTEE</u>
Chief, Natl. Agrarian Comm.	Cesar Domingo Cerdá Cuevas Bernardo Araya Zuleta** Juan Garcia Romero** Santos Medel Basualto** Cipriano Pon- tigo Urrutia** Osvaldo Araya Luis Figueroa Mazuela Roberto Lara Olate	Rafael Cor- tez	Cesar Domingo Cerdá Cuevas (Alternate)	Bernardo Araya Zuleta** Juan Garcia Romero** Osvaldo Araya Luis Figueroa Mazuela Roberto Lara Olate
Head Natl. Control Comm.	Luis Rafael Cortez Enrique Paris Pablo Neruda Jose Balladares Gonzalez Pascual Barraza B. Luis Barria Torres Juan Luis Campos C. Juan Chacon Corona Gaspar Diaz Victor Diaz Emma Gomez de Cuello	Rafael Cor- tez	Pascual Barraza (Alternate)	




TABLE 2 (continued)

<u>PARTY POST</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF SECRE- TARIAT</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE</u>	<u>MEMBERS OF LABOR COMMITTEE</u>
Head Natl. Control Comm.	Virginia Gonzal- lez Jorge Insunza Andres Lazo Maria Maluenda Gladys Marin** Alberto Molina Fernando Navarro José Oyarce Victor Manuel Quijon Alberto Rozas			
Sec. Gen. JC	Mario Zamorano Leopoldo Zuniga		Mario Zamorano	

KEY

*Senator

**Deputy



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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA

1. Introduction

Except for the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, both founded in 1848, the Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista de Colombia--PCC) is the oldest political organization in the country. It is the principal instrumentality for implementing Communist domestic and international policies, and therefore it has the basic responsibility for directing and coordinating Communist efforts to penetrate non-Communist target groups--political, subversive, labor, peasant, student, and intellectual. The party youth auxiliary, the Communist Youth of Colombia (Juventud Comunista de Colombia--JCC), and a number of controlled front organizations supplement the party machinery in carrying out this priority task, which is designed to expand popular support of the PCC and its potential for subversion.

The PCC at present has no independent capability for seizing power by force in Colombia and its prospects for winning control of the government by the electoral process are nil. Communist voting strength has never exceeded about three percent of the total vote cast in any national election.

Communist paramilitary resources are largely concentrated in rural areas and among a few pro-Communist rural bandit leaders and caudillos. Although small in total numbers, these rural forces are disciplined, well trained, well armed, and could be activated promptly. The PCC has demonstrated on frequent occasions throughout its history that it is capable of fomenting serious labor disturbances and sporadic social disorders and student violence, but by itself it cannot sustain protracted, widespread unrest, sabotage, or guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, in combination with other opposition groups, the PCC is potentially capable of promoting all forms of insurgency, of disrupting the National Front, and even of posing a threat to the stability of the government.

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2. Brief History of the Party

The PCC was formally established and admitted as a member of the Communist International in 1930, the year which marked the return of the Liberal Party to power after 45 years of unbroken Conservative Party rule. The origins of the PCC date back to the early 1920s, when a Marxist group composed of intellectuals and labor elements was formed under the aegis of a Soviet emigrant. This movement was organized in 1926 as the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario--PSR) and affiliated with the Comintern as early as September 1928. When the majority Liberal membership of the PSR returned to the Liberal Party after the electoral victory of 1930, the minority elements reorganized as the Communist Party of Colombia.

The major growth of PCC strength in both labor and politics coincided with the period of Liberal rule (1930-1946), when the PCC was allowed considerable freedom to conduct its activities. The Communists supported President Alfonso Lopez and made notable advances during his two reformist administrations (1934-1938 and 1942-1945). The Communist vote increased from about 2,500 in 1935 to about 27,000 in the elections of 1943 and 1945, when the Communists won prestige and several seats in local legislative bodies as well as in the National Congress.

Communist influence declined sharply between 1946 and 1957, when the PCC suffered considerable government suppression under Conservative rule and the Rojas dictatorship. During the final three years of this period, the PCC was outlawed.

After the overthrow of the Rojas dictatorship in 1957, the PCC regained legal status and a tolerant political atmosphere for its activities. The party recovered considerable following among organized labor, advanced its political position through penetration and support of the dissident Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL), and obtained a stronger influence over student and intellectual groups than it had been able to establish before. However, it cannot participate in elections under the National Front system.

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Since the victory of Castro in Cuba, the PCC has been increasingly troubled by divergencies over policy--particularly the question of the timely and effective use of force and violence. Party policy, while endorsing an eventual recourse to armed struggle, rejected the use of violence as "inappropriate" in Colombia. The party stand was based primarily on fear of government countermeasures but also stemmed from the belief that political action (through the MRL) would be more effective in the long run. Furthermore, PCC leaders anticipated an adverse reaction from a public already disgusted with a decade and more of fratricidal violence in the countryside.

Younger and less cautious members of the PCC and its affiliates disagree with the pacific policy, claiming that the "old line" leaders are too passive and lack vigor. Probably egged on by the propaganda of Peking-sponsored groups in Colombia and other countries, a segment of the PCC splintered off late in 1964 to become the Communist Party of Colombia--Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML). In July 1965, the PCC/ML decreed that Gilberto Viera White was expelled from the post of secretary general and from the Communist movement. The regular PCC greeted this decree with sarcastic scorn, but acknowledged that the PCC - PCC/ML split was formalized by it and probably would be a lasting division of forces and effort.

3. Strength and Supporting Groups

From a postwar low of about 2,000, the PCC increased its membership to about 17,000 by mid-1964. Recent reports indicate 15,000 membership cards are outstanding, but only 7,000 to 8,000 members are considered active. The JCC is estimated to have between 3,000 and 5,000 members, but its membership tends to fluctuate widely and rapidly. Communist sympathizers--those who would actively support one or more of the party's policies in appropriate circumstances--number about 30,000. The number of sympathizers also tends to fluctuate frequently and through a wide range.

The Communist central committee is composed of 45 members and 15 alternates. The executive committee is made up of three members and two alternates.

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There are 23 regional committees located throughout Colombia.

Since 1957, the PCC has been prepared to penetrate, manipulate, and cooperate with most leftist-oriented dissidents, but has generally refrained from association with Conservative factions. The party particularly seeks to undermine the National Front and its socioeconomic reforms and to exacerbate the frictions within and between the two traditional parties.

PCC political policy leans heavily on the success of the MRL and seeks the supremacy of pro-Communist elements within this dissident Liberal faction. The party supports MRL candidates in elections and strongly opposed any tendency of rapprochement between this group and the majority or "official" element of the Liberal Party. Because the PCC attempts to undermine the stability of government in Colombia, any re-orientation of the MRL in support of the National Front would be contrary to Communist objectives. The MRL, as recognized tacitly by the PCC, offers the Communists their best opportunity for legally expanding their influence in government at both the local and national level. The National Popular Vanguard (Vanguardia Nacional Popular--VNP) is made up of the remnants of the disbanded United Front for Revolutionary Action (Frente Unido de Accion Popular--FUAR). Weak and ineffective on its own, VNP is at times a useful sounding board of leftist opinion. The Student-Peasant-Worker Movement (Movimiento de Obreros, Estudiantes, y Campesinos--MOEC) is useful in the same way. MOEC is more directly oriented toward violence, but it is opposed to PCC leaders and policies. Approximately 500 people are members of MOEC, but VNP membership is still not known to Colombian or US authorities. The old FUAR had about 6,000 members early in 1964, but only a fraction were active.

The Youth of the Revolutionary Movement (JMRL), not associated with MRL, and the Army of National Liberation (ELN) have made their appearance in 1965. Both groups secured considerable publicity during the year, but neither has accomplished very much in the insurgent movement.

In the labor area, Communist-dominated unions speak for somewhat more than 50,000 loosely organized

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workers, or more than ten percent of the total organized labor force, principally in the nation's major cities--Bogota, Cali, Medellin, and Barranquilla. The Communist-dominated FEDEPETROL union of petroleum workers suffered a severe setback as a result of government action following Communist instigated strikes in mid-1963. The leader of the FEDEPETROL, a prominent Communist, was jailed, its charter was suspended by the government, and a new non-Communist petroleum worker's union was started. The Communists traditionally have held a strong-to-dominant position among petroleum, transport, sugar, and construction workers.

4. Foreign Influence

Foreign aid is provided directly and indirectly to the PCC in the form of cash grants, travel subsidies, propaganda, scholarships, and subversive training and guidance. The annual sums allotted to these categories cannot be estimated accurately; specific sources of aid and the methods of distribution are similarly difficult to identify. Although foreign support of Communist subversive activity is impeded somewhat by the lack of formal diplomatic relations between Colombia and the Sino-Soviet-Cuban bloc, several instrumentalities are available for channeling assistance. These include the Czech Consulate General and the East German Trade Mission; branch offices in Bogota of TASS, the New China News Agency, and Prensa Latina, as well as bloc and Cuban bi-national centers or friendship societies, which are not currently active. In addition, travel between Colombia and the bloc is relatively unrestricted. Hence, Communist or pro-Communist travelers are often used to transmit bloc guidance, money and propaganda.

Bloc countries place their major overt emphasis on promoting subversion indirectly through propaganda, especially subsidized travel and scholarships. The short-wave broadcasts of Radio Moscow and Radio Peking stress news of violence in Colombia and are consistently antigovernment. Bloc cultural delegations are another medium of the bloc propaganda program, although very limited.

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The largest bloc expenditure is apparently for travel of Colombians to international Communist meetings or to bloc countries and for study at universities under the bloc scholarship program. The purpose is primarily to indoctrinate the recipients and to win their support for international Communist objectives. An average of 40 to 50 Colombians annually have been studying at bloc universities in recent years--usually in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the USSR. The level of other travel to the bloc has been relatively high since 1957 and has included professional, artistic, youth, congressional, and labor groups, as well as several leftist politicians.

The bloc also provides training and direction for leaders of the PCC, many of whom have been indoctrinated in labor and political agitation in foreign Communist schools. Secretary General Viera White, for example, has attended a number of congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as the special meetings for Latin American Communist leaders in Moscow and Peking since 1956. Occasional visits of foreign Communists to Colombia are also a means of instructing the PCC on bloc-sponsored international activities. Bloc messages of "fraternal greetings and solidarity" sent to PCC congresses and the timely radiobroadcasts from Moscow and Peking on Colombian political events suggest that communications between the bloc and the PCC are relatively frequent.

The Castro regime in Cuba sponsors the principal foreign subversive program against the Colombian Government. Cuba also serves as a base for bloc support of Colombian subversive elements. Not only is it a staging area for Colombians traveling to bloc countries and Communist international meetings, but bloc diplomatic missions in Havana have access to Colombian subversive groups whose representatives are visiting or studying in Cuba.

The Castro regime apparently considers that the protracted rural unrest in Colombia offers the greatest potential for encouraging insurgency and disaffection in the latter country. A number of Colombians have received training in Cuba in methods of conducting guerrilla warfare.

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Cuban ties with the PCC were firmly established by the Cuban Embassy in Bogota prior to the break in Cuban-Colombian diplomatic relations in 1960. The Communists have been closely associated with the establishment and operation of Cuban binational centers and other pro-Cuban organizations in Colombia, and they have been beneficiaries of considerable Cuban propaganda and possibly financial aid.

Cuba has considerable potential for promoting insurgency in Colombia, particularly through financial aid to dissident political organizations and in training Colombians in guerrilla warfare. However, its propaganda program and related activities have placed the Colombian Government on alert and alienated a majority of the Colombian public, including the traditional political parties, the non-Communist labor movement, and other influential groups. Colombia's break of diplomatic relations, government charges of Cuban intervention in Colombian affairs, the Colombian initiative in convening the meeting of American Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in 1962, and strong Colombian opposition to Cuba's application for membership in the Latin American Free Trade Association demonstrate the strong anti-Castro orientation of the Colombian administration.

In addition to its ties with Cuban Communists, the PCC maintains relations with several Latin American Communist parties, in an apparent effort to exchange information and coordinate activities in the hemisphere. The closest hemisphere liaison, however, is conducted between the PCC and the Communist Party of Venezuela and the Communist Party of Ecuador and dates back to the early 1950s. The PCC has also published considerable propaganda defending Venezuelan Communist subversive activity, but denied allegations in the Colombian press that it was directly cooperating in the revolutionary and guerrilla tactics of its fraternal party in Venezuela.

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5. Dissident Marxists

The most important mass defection from the PCC is that of the Communist Party of Colombia--Marxist-Leninist (Partido Comunista Colombiano Marxista Leninista--PCC/ML). Under the leadership of Pedro Vasquez, a former member of the central committee of the PCC, a group of pro-Chinese members undertook in 1962-63 to criticize the Soviet line of the party and demanded a new, hard line advocating violent revolution. They were dismissed from the PCC--Vasquez in October 1963, others during the following year and a half.

The dissidents naturally banded together, publishing vitriolic criticisms of the leaders of the regular PCC, whom they described on at least one instance as hampered by "old age, inaction, and advanced bourgeoisism." PCC rebuttals accused Vasquez and his followers of "blabbering nonsense" and termed them "infantile terrorists." This intellectual discussion continued with escalating passion on both sides until mid-1964, at which time Vasquez hurled the ultimate insult--he called PCC Secretary General Viera a "capitalist"--and set up his own party, the PCC/ML.

The first plenary session of the PCC/ML was held in September in Medellin--the site was chosen so that Communist power would be "drawn away from Bogota." Vasquez told his fellow members at the plenary session that Communist China had promised financial aid and would recognize them as the voice of Communism in Colombia as soon as the PCC/ML openly declared against Moscow.


There is no reliable evidence that the Chinese have yet supplied significant material aid to the PCC/ML, but the group has grown in strength and vigor. It is now believed to have almost 2,000 adherents, although no reliable figure is available and estimates tend to vary widely. The PCC/ML has assumed major proportions as the political guide of insurgent violence in Colombia.

In mid-1965, at a bogus national congress, the PCC/ML claimed to be the "singular" Communist party

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in Colombia and "dismissed" the leaders of the PCC from their posts. The PCC leaders rejected the PCC/ML claims, but for the first time publicly acknowledged that the party had split and that the split probably would be long lasting.



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7. Members of the Legislature

The following members of the House of Representatives, elected on 15 March 1964, have been cited as Communists or Communist sympathizers:

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Gerardo Bernal Castano | - From the Department of Caldas |
| Hernando Garavito Monoz | - From the Department of Cundiamarca |
| Jaime Velasquez Toro | - From the Department of Antioquia |
| Ciro Rios Nieto | - From the Department of Santander |

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Alvaro Echandia Santofimio - From the Department
of Rolima
Ramiro Andrade - From the Department
of Valle
Virgilio Vargas Pino - From the Department
of Antioquia



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COMMUNISM IN COSTA RICA

1. Introduction

Although now of minor importance, the Communist Party of Costa Rica, the Vanguardia Popular (PVP), is the oldest and most sophisticated in Central America and was at one time very influential in the government. It is well organized but its following is small and it has little control over the domestic political scene. It was declared illegal after the civil war in 1948, but it has been permitted considerable freedom in the democratic political climate of Costa Rica. It has not, as yet, experienced the split between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions that has affected many other Latin American parties, but younger party activists are beginning to grow impatient with the nonviolent policies of the party "old guard." The Communists hope to participate in the 1966 presidential election under the auspices of their political front, the Partido Alianza Popular Socialista (PAPS).

2. History of Communism in Costa Rica

The Communist Party of Costa Rica (PCCR) was founded in 1929 by Manuel Mora Valverde, who is still, in 1965, the party's secretary general. At that time, Mora was a young university student, barely 19 years old. For a decade after it was established, the PCCR was virtually the only spokesman for the rights of workers, the small peasants and the down-trodden among Costa Rica's lower class. Mora and the party captured the support of the intellectually curious and socially conscious university students and succeeded in building a base of support among the artisans of San Jose and the provincial towns. Their labor base was centered among the banana workers of the ubiquitous United Fruit Company, well known for its harsh antilabor policies.

During its formative period, the PCCR began organizing trade unions in San Jose, the first of these being the Carpenters' Union. In 1930, Mora

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was able to set up a central trade union group, the Union General de Trabajadores, but it did not last long. Mora's successes were greatest among the banana workers, Costa Rica's only real proletariat in a nation of small farmers. United Fruit opposed the organization of the workers into a union, and the government was also suspicious of Mora's activities. Rivalry among the workers was keen and spurred by racial and national differences. Most were foreigners, Jamaican Negroes or Nicaraguans, and had little feeling for the country itself or its people. Despite these difficulties, Mora and the PCCR were able to create a Banana Workers' Union.

The first test of union strength came in 1934 when the country's first major strike hit the United Fruit Company, and nearly all the workers--some 15,000 in number--participated in the walkout. The strike was actually led by Mora, who was then a member of the Costa Rican Congress, winning his seat the previous year. As leader of the strikers, Mora met several times with President Jimenez, who finally ordered the company to negotiate with the workers. The strikers named Mora as their representative, and at first the company refused to meet with the nation's leading Communist, but eventually the strike was settled.

At this time, the PCCR was recognized as a "fraternal member" of the Comintern, but was not a full member. The party was one of ten that signed the manifesto supporting the Cuban revolution which overthrew Gerardo Machado. In 1935, the PCCR was accepted as a full member of the Comintern at the Seventh International Congress.

In addition to Mora, one of the leaders of the PCCR was a Venezuelan exile, Romulo Betancourt. Betancourt had been exiled by Juan Vicente Gomez for his activities, and since he was a few years older than Mora, he was able to exert considerable influence on the party. Betancourt urged the withdrawal of the party from the Comintern and its reorganization as a completely national party without ties to the Soviet Union. This heretical stand was finally rejected by the party membership and Betancourt resigned.

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After its very successful role in the banana strike, the party made little progress. The withdrawal of United Fruit from the Atlantic Coast prevented the PCCR from consolidating its gains among the workers. Mora was re-elected to the legislature but it was almost a decade before other party members were able to gain seats.

In the early 1940s, the party again began to make strides. Rafael Calderon Guardia was elected president in 1940, basing his support in part on his reputation among the poor as a doctor. The President began to lose support after a time in office because of charges of corruption, and he began to look for additional political backing. He turned to the Communists, who were already strong supporters of the Calderon regime, because of the Comintern World War II policy of backing governments who were fighting against Facism. (Costa Rica had declared war on the Axis powers before the US). In 1941, Calderon and Mora spoke from the same platform at a war rally soon after Costa Rica had made its war declaration.

Under Calderon, and his successor, Teodoro Picado, the Communists became advisers to the government on political, social, and economic affairs. The PCCR was influential in the propagation of a labor code, establishment of a social security system, enactment of workers compensation and inauguration of an income tax. They not only proposed these measures, but set up and administered the organizations to carry them out. By 1945, there were four Communist members in the legislature, and by 1948, they had seven.

In addition to backing the Calderon regime, the PCCR followed another trend among Latin American parties and changed its name, becoming the Vanguardia Popular (PVP). On 13 June, 1943, the PCCR politburo called a national conference, at which the PCCR was dissolved and the new Vanguard Party announced as its successor. Mora was named secretary general, and most of the PCCR leadership retained their posts in the new party. It was hoped that this change would be more acceptable to non-Communist left-wing and moderate elements in the country. The program of the "new party" was moderate and

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avoided mention of the "class struggle." The party also announced its support for Calderon and for the United States. The party's program stressed agrarian reform, guarantees of agricultural prices, and launching of an economic development plan and a labor code. This new policy won wide acceptance, and the Archbishop of Costa Rica gave the PVP his endorsement. The backing of the church gained the PVP the support of the workers and the party was able to establish a national labor organization, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Costa Rica (CTCR) in October 1943.

The relationship between the PVP and the CTCR was clear, since the secretary general of the CTCR was also the trade union secretary of the PVP. The CTCR claimed that it had 96 unions and the support of 10,000 workers during its prime.

The Communists formed part of the government coalition that elected Picado to succeed Calderon in 1944. The reaction among the opposition was strong, as Otilio Ulate, editor of Diario de Costa Rica, an opposition respected daily, accused the government of being a dictatorial regime in which the Communists shared authority with the elected leaders of the country. This attack on the government was echoed many times during Picado's term of office, and, as the election of 1948 grew closer, tensions increased.

The 1948 election resulted in the surprising victory of opposition candidate Ulate at the polls over Calderon, who was trying for a second term. The Calderonista Congress nullified the vote and civil war broke out. Jose Figueres, a wealthy coffee planter, led the Ulate forces against Calderon, who was backed by Manuel Mora and the Communists. At first Mora fought hard against Figueres forces, and in fact, became the chief defender of the entrenched government. When it became obvious that the government was collapsing, Mora tried to bring the Communists over to the side of the Figueres forces, but the Communists were forced to give up their arms as the rebels moved into San Jose and took over the government.

The junta set up by Figueres quickly took action against the Communists. The PVP was dissolved and the CTCR was broken up by the Supreme Court. A new

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constitution was written which banned the Communist Party as a political organization, and the PVP leadership went into exile.

With the inauguration of Ulate in 1949 and the end of the rule by the junta, the restrictions against the Communists were relaxed. Exiled Communists, including Mora, returned to the country and soon re-established regional trade union organizations. The PVP, itself, however, remained underground. In 1953, the Communists were finally able to organize another national labor body, the Confederacion General de Trabajadores (CGT). Their efforts to form a political front organization for the 1953 presidential election failed. The electoral tribunal denied the participation of the Partido Progresista Independiente, the front group, in the election because it was a Communist organization and thus proscribed by the constitution.

During this period, and especially after the election of Jose Figueres, the appeal of the party began to wane, and the PVP lost much of its popularity. The National Liberation Party (PLN) had developed an ideological platform, socialist in nature, which had captured the imagination of the populace and its support.

The fragmentation of the PLN before the 1958 election led to the victory of Mario Echandi, the opposition candidate, and again the PVP was unable to develop an acceptable front party that could participate in the election. One of the groups that broke from the PLN, that of Marcial Aguiluz, became the vehicle for a Communist-front group that could be politically active and was acceptable under the constitution. This party, the Partido Accion Democratica Popular (PADP), was formed in 1961 and legally inscribed, culminating a 12-year campaign by the Communists to take part in national elections. The PADP leadership, most of them PVP members, expressed a pro-Castro policy and were able to elect one deputy to the Legislative Assembly, Jose Sunol Leal, who claims he is no Communist.

Since the 1962 election, in which the PLN returned to power with Francisco Orlich gaining the presidency, the PADP has faded and been replaced by still another front, again led by Marcial Aguiluz.

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This group, the Partido Alianza Popular Socialista (PAPS), has been inscribed, but party leaders expect it to be challenged and possibly stricken from the rolls by the electoral tribunal before the 1966 election.

3. Present Status of Communism

The PVP has never had a large membership, but has often attracted sympathetic support from non-party leftists. Prior to World War II, party activists probably did not exceed 50-100 people, and even during the party's most active period during the Calderon and Picado administrations (1940-48) actual dues paying members probably amounted to about 400. Party strength declined to about 300 after the party was declared illegal, but a recent upsurge has taken place, and it is believed that there are again about 400 members in the PVP. In August 1965 the party undertook a recruitment program aimed at adding about 100 new militant members to PVP rolls. Estimates of party sympathizers range as high as 8,000-10,000. This figure is derived from membership in front groups and the electoral support received by the PADP in the 1962 election, when it garnered more than 3,000 votes. The PADP was said to have 9,000 inscribed voters prior to the election.

Despite the fact that it is illegal under the 1948 constitution, the PVP is permitted to operate without severe restriction by the government. Party publications are permitted and Secretary General Mora has had a radio program for several years. The PVP concentrates most of its activities among labor and student groups and occasionally attempts to exploit international situations, such as the Dominican crisis. The PVP prints its own paper, Libertad, on presses provided by East Germany. The paper is freely distributed and has a circulation of about 5,000.

The PVP works in labor through two federations, the Confederacion General de Trabajadores Costarricenses (CGTC) in urban areas and FUTRA, a banana workers' federation in rural areas which belongs to the CGTC. CGTC is primarily a vehicle for the distribution of low-level propaganda, Communist agitation

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and the sending of workers to the bloc countries and Cuba for study and training. FUTRA was involved in an embezzlement scandal in 1963 and lost three fourths of its membership. Recent deteriorating conditions in the province of Limon have renewed the interest of the banana workers in improving their lot and the PVP hopes to be able to exploit the situation.

The PVP has been unsuccessful in building any firm base of support among Costa Rica's students. Generally, students at the University of Costa Rica are anti-Communist and in the past have taken great pleasure in harassing the hard-core of 25-30 pro-Communists on the campus.

The Costa Rican Socialist Youth (JSC), youth wing of the PVP, is estimated to have about 400 members. Most of the present leadership has received or is now receiving training in either the USSR or Cuba, and in some cases both countries. Although the JSC has so far followed PVP discipline, there are continuing indications that, if allowed, the organization would take a more militant stand on many issues.

The PVP has had some success in penetrating the National Federation of Progressive Juntas, which is made up of civic improvement groups, but they have made no apparent mark on the group's policies. Other PVP front groups include the Alliance of Costa Rican Women (AMC) and a teachers' front. All these organizations are small and lack any real influence.

The PVP's most significant political activity is centered around the PADP, now clothed in its new title as the PAPS. The leader of this front group is Marcial Aguiluz, who broke from the PLN before the 1958 election. The PAPS has become a focal point for pro - Chinese Communists and hard-line revolutionaries as well as the more traditionally oriented Communists. Aguiluz is probably Costa Rica's most dangerous left-wing revolutionary leader and has been involved in antigovernment plotting at home as well as in Honduras and Panama. The PAPS has officially given its support to neither

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[REDACTED]

the PLN-government presidential candidate, Daniel Oduber, nor the opposition coalition candidate, Professor Jose Joaquin Trejos. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The PAFS will probably concentrate on at least keeping one seat in the Legislative Assembly now held under the PADP banner by Jose Sunol and perhaps gaining one each from San Jose and Puntarenas. The PAFS still faces the danger of being challenged as a Communist-front party and losing its place on the electoral rolls before February 1966.

Despite its small size, the PVP is the most sophisticated and best organized Communist party in Central America and is capable of providing intellectual and logistical support to parties in neighboring countries. Costa Rica has served in recent years as a training ground for Communists from Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Recently, there has been a slowdown in this sort of activity, but it may resume after the 1966 election.

The principal source of funds for the PVP comes from the USSR and salaries for party leaders as well as other expenses have come from Moscow for many years. The present PVP monthly budget runs in the neighborhood of 17,000 colones, of which only 5,000 or less, is raised locally. The top party leadership has received training in Moscow and younger party members have been trained in Cuba. Since 1960 over 160 Costa Rican students have been sent to Communist countries for schooling. Between 1961 and 1964, 350 Costa Ricans traveled to Havana at the expense of the Castro government. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Because of its democratic tradition and the lack of repression of the Communists, Costa Rica has been used as a distribution point for Communist propaganda

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in Central America for many years. Principios, the Spanish-language version of Problems of Peace and Socialism, is printed in San Jose for distribution to Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Recently, party secretary Mora was reportedly experiencing difficulties in selling the 1,500 copies that are printed each month. The party receives \$6,000 yearly for publishing Principios.

Both TASS and Prensa Latina have representatives in Costa Rica, but the New China News Agency (NCNA) office was closed in 1963 after the local representative threw his support behind the pro-Soviet stand of the PVP. The NCNA still maintains a local stringer in San Jose.

Costa Rica maintains diplomatic relations only with Poland, whose ambassador is resident in Mexico City. Trade relations have been meager in the past and in 1963, less than \$16,000 in goods was exported to Poland and none to other Communist countries. The 1963 import figure was somewhat higher, amounting to \$388,210, from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Since April 1965, when several legislative deputies visited the bloc area, pressure on the government to increase trade with Eastern Europe has increased. In August 1965 a trade treaty was signed with Poland. A trade treaty is pending with Yugoslavia, and East Germany has tried twice, both times unsuccessfully, to open a commercial office in San Jose. Czechoslovakia presently has a four-man unofficial trade mission in Costa Rica. The East Germans offered to purchase a significant amount of Costa Rican coffee and in fact did make a private purchase through a commercial dealer. The coffee growers can be expected to put pressure on the government to permit further sales to Eastern Europe if their sales in the West diminish. The recently passed Barter Law will allow trade deals with Communist countries.

The youth of the Costa Rican Party is growing increasingly impatient with the leadership of the party old guard, but the PVP has not split into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions. There is no guerrilla movement in Costa Rica, but some of the hard-line revolutionaries may be found in

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

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the PAPS of Marcial Aguiluz. The Chinese Communists have had little success in Costa Rica but their tactic of training young revolutionaries may eventually create a separate movement that could break away from the PVP. About 34 Costa Ricans have received guerrilla training in Cuba.


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


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


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THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

1. Fidel Castro and the Cuban Communist Party

In the autumn of 1965 Fidel Castro took the first significant steps to establish the authority of Cuba's Communist Party on the national level. By creating a political bureau, a secretariat and five standing committees within a 100-man central committee, Castro made it clear that the party will be entrusted with a wide range of powers. As a result his regime will become even more institutionalized.

Between 28 September and 3 October 1965, Castro announced the formation of the new national party organs, declared that the drafting of Cuba's "socialist" constitution had begun, changed the party's name to the Cuban Communist Party, and also said that its first national congress will be held sometime late in 1966.

The party, which was known for about three years as the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS), is the smallest in the Communist world. Its 50,000 members are drawn from an elite core of Castro's most militant supporters and are therefore intrinsically loyal to him and obediently responsive to the regime's policies. With most of its representation from the Cuban masses, however, the party is grounded more in unsophisticated adulation for Fidel Castro than in a comprehension of Communism.

A. The Central Committee

Fidel and Raul Castro continue as first and second secretaries, and Armando Hart, formerly the minister of education, has moved up to the third slot in the party hierarchy as its secretary of organization. President Dorticos, chairman of the economic committee, is also on both the political bureau and the secretariat. These four will probably control virtually all activities of the party. Their only colleagues on the eight-man political bureau for example are four army majors with scant experience in government who were seemingly included to give a strong representation to the military.

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The six-man party secretariat will apparently assume wide responsibilities for administering policies set by the political bureau. Most of its members are able political technicians with long government experience. Both Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, veteran Communists and able organizers, are members. Raul Castro is the only military representative and also heads the secretariat.

Most of the responsibilities allocated to the five standing committees within the central committee concern matters which were not previously under party control. The most significant policy shift is confirmed in the composition of Dorticos' five-man economic committee, which is made up of four other adherents of "liberal" economic principles. The "dogmatist" views espoused by Ernesto "Che" Guevara have no proponents in the Cuban leadership. Armando Hart heads the education committee which includes the new education minister and the head of the party schools.

The new foreign affairs committee is headed by a young revolutionary with little experience in foreign relations rather than by Foreign Minister Raul Roa, who is only the second member. The inclusion of Manuel Pineiro, the head of Cuba's intelligence and subversion service, is apparently meant to emphasize the regime's interest in encouraging "anti-imperialist" revolutions in Latin America and elsewhere. Although the committee will probably begin a reorganization of the Foreign Ministry and assume some of its powers, the conduct of foreign affairs will remain predominantly under the direct control of Fidel Castro and President Dorticos.

The constitutional studies committee is chaired by Blas Roca and includes the justice minister. The committee is charged with drafting Cuba's "socialist" constitution and with establishing a new court and judiciary system patterned after Soviet bloc examples. It may also study changes in the lower party organization and will probably plan the first Communist Party congress.

The revolutionary armed forces and state security committee is headed by Raul Castro and staffed by the interior minister and army chief of staff. About one fourth of the party ranks and two thirds of the central

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committee members are in the armed forces. By joining the party and military establishments, the regime is ensuring against a polarization between its two most important bulwarks. Moreover, because of the wide representation in the central committee, it appears that factionalism in the Cuban leadership is at its lowest point since Castro came to power.

The central committee comprises nearly the entire top civilian and military leadership of the Castro regime. Inclusion of a number of veterans of the pre-Castro party suggests that the conflict between the regime's "old" and "new" Communists now is a dead issue. In addition to both Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez more than 15 other important "old" Communists have gained added influence as a result of central committee membership. The bitter disputes which characterized the early years of the party's development appear to have given way to a generally united program.

B. Outlook

The accelerated development of the Communist Party in 1965 reflects several important trends in the political evolution of the Castro regime. The party has assumed wide powers and is clearly meant to function as the regime's inner bureaucracy and control most affairs of government. Many responsibilities of government ministries will probably be shifted to the party, but control over the economy, foreign affairs, and education will remain essentially in the hands of the same men. The composition of both party cadres and higher councils indicates that veteran followers of Fidel Castro--many from his 26 July Movement--have a pre-eminent position. The party therefore, can probably be expected to remain indefinitely as the personal political machine of Fidel Castro.

2. History of the Pre-Castro Communist Party

The Cuban Communist Party was founded in 1925 and for a decade pursued a strictly proletarian revolutionary policy. Although outlawed almost from the outset, the party was already an important force in Cuban politics in the early 1930s when Communists achieved power in the labor movement and helped to

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overthrow the Machado dictatorship in 1933. About a year later concerted Communist opposition was a principal factor in the fall of the Grau San Martin government. With unabated vehemence the party opposed Fulgencio Batista, the new Cuban strong man, who ruled through a succession of puppet presidents until he was elected president himself in 1940. It was with Batista's assistance, however, that the party became one of the most important and powerful Communist parties in Latin America.

In 1935 the party began to adopt popular front policies in accord with world-wide Communist policy. Perhaps to emphasize the change in the party's line, Cesar Vilar, who had been secretary general since 1927, was replaced by Blas Roca. The first indication of a modification in Batista's attitude toward the Communists was when he permitted them to organize a "front party"--the United Revolutionary Party (PUR) in 1937. Juan Marinello headed a group of prominent Cuban writers and intellectuals who joined with the Cuban Socialists in the PUR. Although the Communist party was still illegal, Batista allowed it to commence publication of a daily newspaper in May, 1938. Two months later the party completed its turnabout and declared that Batista had become antifascist and "an integral part of the progressive forces." The new amity between Batista and the Communists was sealed when they called the dictator "the defender of democracy."

Batista legalized the party in September 1938 and a year later it merged with the PUR and became the Communist Revolutionary Union Party (PURC). The Communists exercised a strong influence at the constitutional convention which drafted the 1940 constitution. In terms of labor and social provisions, it was one of the most advanced in the hemisphere. In the July 1940 elections, the Communists supported Batista's candidacy for the presidency and joined in his Socialist Democratic Coalition.

As a result of this collaboration with Batista, the Communists elected ten members to the Chamber of Deputies and more than 100 members of city councils throughout the island. Communist mayors were elected in Santiago and Manzanillo.

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The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 put a new strain on the Cuban party, but had little effect on its relationship with the government. The party continued to support Batista and to adopt a moderate policy of domestic reform, but directed its propaganda against the Allies and assisted in the dissemination of Nazi propaganda. This new position led the Socialist group within the PURC to split with the Communists and found an independent Socialist Party. When Germany invaded Russia in 1941, the Communists shifted their position, and throughout the war they pursued the popular front program, avoided all talk of violence, and refrained from criticizing the United States. In 1942 Cuba for the first time established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The party again changed its name in preparation for the 1944 elections and became the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). It supported Batista's candidate who lost to Grau San Martin. The party gained considerable strength during the war years and polled about 122,000 votes in the 1944 elections. Two of its prominent leaders, Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, served at different times as ministers without portfolio in Batista's cabinet. They were the first Latin American Communists to be so honored.

From 1947 until 1952 however, the PSP steadily lost strength. In the 1948 elections 158,000 voters registered as Communists--the highest yet achieved--but actual voting strength was below that of 1944 and 1946 because the party had failed to form a coalition. In addition the administration of Prío Socarras took stronger action against the Communists than had Grau. By 1950 few unions remained under Communist control, and in the congressional elections of that year the PSP registered only 55,000 voters. Although the core of the organization was never broken the PSP remained isolated through 1952.

The party was publicly critical of the military coup which returned Batista to power in 1952, and in October of the following year it was again declared illegal. Batista created a Bureau for the Suppression of Communist Activities within the government and most of the top PSP leaders were arrested or went into exile. The underground organization continued to operate, however, and Batista apparently used some of the less prominent Communists to organize his own labor support.

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The PSP did not actively join in the struggle against Batista even while it was being persecuted. Fidel Castro was scornfully looked upon as a "putschist" and "adventurer" and not until the summer of 1958 when Carlos Rafael Rodriguez traveled to the Sierra Maestra, did the Communists attempt to make official contact with him. Rodriguez was with Castro during the final months before victory, and probably concluded an agreement with him permitting the PSP to re-emerge as a legal party upon Batista's fall. Once the Castro regime was committed to its radical program, the PSP began to quietly urge the "unification of revolutionary forces," in order to maximize its strength and to neutralize other political factions.

3. The Development of Castro's United Party

Since the united party first began to form it has passed through three distinct organizational phases and has twice changed its name. It was buffeted by a tumultuous power play, suffered a pervasive purge, and finally was completely reconstructed. Through all these changes, however, Fidel Castro has uniformly stated that "the role of the party is to govern." As early as December 1961 he promised that the regime would be institutionalized in a proletarian party.

The development of the united party began in the spring of 1961 when the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) was formed as an amalgamation of the three political groups which survived the Batista regime. The 26th of July Movement and the Revolutionary Directorate (a student faction) were merged with the PSP. The ORI, however, was formed without a clear definition of its powers or role in the Cuban regime, and in June 1961 Castro revealed that it was to be only the preliminary step in the formation of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS).

Although various regime officials described the ORI as a Communist party, it pursued a somewhat equivocal course until Fidel Castro publicly espoused Marxism-Leninism in December 1961. During the first year of its organization, therefore, the ORI had no meaningful program or national executive organ, and no effective party organization.

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The "old" Communists of the PSP inevitably dominated the ORI. They were a small and well-organized club of professional politicians--a generation older than the young Castroites. In each of the six provinces and in most of the municipios (municipal districts) "old" Communists controlled the ORI but continued to express primary loyalty to the PSP leadership. In March 1962 the ORI national directorate was announced, and its 25 members included about an equal number of "old" and "new" Communists. Fidel Castro as first secretary headed a six-man secretariat. It appeared, however, that Castro was no longer in control of the regime and that the PSP was freely implementing its own policies. Tensions mounted as "new" Communists in the regime became increasingly critical of the PSP.

Castro struck at the "old" Communists late in March. He sensationally denounced Anibal Escalante, a prominent PSP leader, for "sectarian tyrannies" and accused him of creating "absurd and monstrous" confusion because of his "madness for power." Escalante was purged from his post as organization secretary. Moreover, Castro bitterly railed against the "old guard" Communists for squandering political power and forgetting the masses, and called for a pervasive purge to remove the undesirable elements. Escalante was the only "old" Communist removed from the national directorate, but the purge extended to four of the six provincial party chiefs, to most of the local bosses, and was not completed until all the party cells were completely reconstituted.

The restructuring of the party cells began in May 1962 and continued for about two years while commissions appointed by Castro held nominating assemblies in work centers and state farms throughout the island. A system of popular assemblies, introduced by Castro to generate party cadres among the masses, has been acclaimed by the regime as an important innovation in Communist procedure. At the worker assemblies, "model workers" were selected on the basis of their demonstrated devotion to the regime, and party commissions subsequently selected those suitable for PURS membership. In addition the former ORI members were individually reconsidered but probably at least half of them were purged. By the end of 1962 the Cuban press was beginning to

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refer to the party as the PURS and the transition was effected by early 1963 without official notice.

The PURS national directorate was composed at first of the 24 remaining ORI leaders but by late 1964 was reduced to 21. As the party's main organ, however, it was limited mostly to educational and organizational matters and did not have clearly established responsibilities. The PURS was therefore not a governing party and was important mainly as an intermediary stage in developing a ruling Communist party. For almost three years the PURS slowly augmented its membership and powers as lower party commissions and cells were formed and given a large degree of autonomy. By 1964 the provincial party organizations were granted extensive supervisory and administrative duties. They continue to function as the centers of authority in the six provinces.

4. The Structure and Role of the Cuban Communist Party

A. Provincial and Local Party Structure

In each of the provinces there is a provincial directorate made up of a small secretariat and an executive bureau. The secretary general, the highest provincial officer, is assisted by a secretary of organization who also exercises considerable power. The number of additional members of the provincial secretariats varies, but there are usually secretaries for education, finance, and revolutionary orientation (COR). Other members of the executive bureau include representatives in charge of coordinating activities with the mass organizations and with secondary party organizations.

Regional party directorates were established beginning in 1963 to provide the intermediate structures between the provincial and local levels and to supersede the old municipios. Regional directorates are directly subordinate to the provincial party apparatus and are similarly organized. The creation of the regionals was one of the major administrative reforms of the Castro regime. There are 55 regionals in Cuba with between six and thirteen in each province.

Sectional and municipal committees were established to administer and control a varying number

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of party cells. They generally conform to the organizational pattern of other party committees, but are limited to applying higher party decisions and coordinating cell activities. In late 1964 there were 133 municipal committees and 215 sectional committees. Although municipals generally are in more populous areas, it is not clear why two such similar structures have been retained.

The party cell or NRA (Nucleo de Revolucionaries Activos) is the lowest party organ and is composed of "militants" and candidate members. In mid-1964 there were more than 5,000 cells varying in size from five to as many as 200 members. Probably at least half of the party members are laborers and farm workers who were chosen as "model workers" by assemblies in their work centers and state farms. The cell has no administrative role. Its primary functions are to mobilize workers and maintain an exemplary work standard.

Members and candidates pay dues ranging from one to four percent of their monthly salaries, but they are probably more than compensated through favors and special considerations. Candidates who share all the responsibilities but none of the benefits of full members, serve a one to two year apprenticeship after which they are considered for party membership.

Party committees below the provincial level were "elected" from within their own jurisdiction by sectional and regional assemblies, but from a list of candidates suggested from above. No pattern has been established for provincial assemblies, and provincial party officers continue to be appointed by the national organization.

B. Indoctrination and Education

The committee for revolutionary orientation (COR) is attached to the central committee and apparently supervises and coordinates party indoctrination. It publishes a bulletin at regular intervals and controls the Cuban Institute of Radio Broadcasting which operates all radio and television stations. The COR probably also maintains direct control over the press. Each lower party committee has a COR

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representative, who Fidel Castro insists "is not a commissar" but a "revolutionary instructor." The COR chairman is Raul Garcia Pelaez, previously the Matanzas Province party chief. Isidoro Malmierca, the former COR chief, now is editor of the party daily, Granma, and will apparently function mainly as its political overseer. It is not clear how the COR is related to the new education committee.

The party also maintains an extensive system of more than 250 party schools including the Nico Lopez National Party School, five national schools for the mass organizations, and six provincial centers, as well as day and evening basic schools specifically created to bring revolutionary instruction to peasants and workers. The schools have graduated over 100,000 students and are supervised by the national directorate of the schools of revolutionary instruction which is apparently attached to the party's education committee. Courses attempt to integrate classical Marxism with the Cuban revolution. They include theoretical Communist studies, Cuban history, and the works and speeches of Fidel Castro. Lionel Soto is the head of the schools. The party also stimulates and ensures proper political indoctrination in the nation's regular school system by maintaining delegates on provincial and municipal education boards.

C. The Union of Young Communists

The Union of Young Communists (UJC) is the party's youth organization and its national directorate is guided by the party in grooming the "most exemplary" Cuban youth for party membership. The UJC had its origin in the former Association of Rebel Youth, which changed its name in April 1962 and absorbed five separate youth groups. The UJC claims a membership of about 80,000 and a smaller number of candidates. The regime anticipates a total membership of about 100,000 Cubans between the ages of 14 and 27. The UJC publishes the weekly magazine Mella and a daily newspaper Juventud Rebelde (Rebel Youth). It controls the Federation of University Students (FEU) and supervises two other organizations for younger Cubans.

The Union of Pioneers (UPC), the junior version of the UJC, was established to organize and indoctrinate children between the ages of six and thirteen.

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With 70,000 members in mid-1965, it is designed primarily to prepare young Cubans for the UJC and to organize recreational activities. The Union of Secondary Students (UES), formed in August 1962, now has about 75,000 members.

D. The Party in the Armed Forces

With more than 10,000 members of the Cuban armed forces also members of the party, the military is rapidly developing its own political cadre unswervingly loyal to the regime. Raul Castro has personally supervised the construction of the party in the military by appointing all political instructors and by staffing all party offices with trusted supporters of the regime. In 1964 he said that the military will have the highest percentage of party members in the country, because the "armed forces are the political and military vanguard of the revolution."

According to Castro, fully a third of the military will eventually be admitted as full or candidate members of the party and the Union of Young Communists. As armed forces minister and second secretary of the party, Raul Castro is building the regime's largest unified political force within its strongest and most faithful institution.

The organization of the party in the armed forces was initiated in December 1963 with the formation of the first cells in the Army of the East. In September 1964 the process began in the Central Army and a year later in the Western Army. The navy and air defense forces have also organized party cells.

Military cells are constructed in essentially the same manner as in civilian work centers. That is, the members of a military unit gather in a popular assembly to choose the "model combatants" who are later reviewed by the party commission appointed by Raul Castro. Those accepted form a cell and elect their own officers. There are a few intermediary party structures which coordinate and direct the activities of lower bodies, but the hierarchy is kept weak because military channels maintain the line of command.

Military advisers from the Soviet bloc countries served as consultants and were largely responsible

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for the system that has been created. The central committee directs the military cadres through Raul Castro's military committee. The principal duties of the military cadres are to drum up support for regime policies, to advance the Communist doctrine, and to provide the example for high military and political performance. In so extensively constructing the party in the armed forces the Castro regime has taken another important step in assuring its tight hold on power in imitation of the other countries of the Communist bloc.

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THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

First Secretary - Fidel CASTRO Ruz
Second Secretary - Raul CASTRO Ruz
Secretary of Organization - Armando HART Davalos

POLITICAL BUREAU

Fidel CASTRO Ruz
Raul CASTRO Ruz
Oswaldo DORTICOS Torrado
Juan ALMEIDA Bosques
Ramiro VALDES Menendez
Armando HART Davalos
Guillermo GARCIA Fria
Sergio DEL VALLE Jimenez

SECRETARIAT

Raul CASTRO Ruz
Oswaldo DORTICOS Torrado
Fidel CASTRO Ruz
Blas ROCA Calderio
Faure CHOMON Mediavilla
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ

ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

~~Oswaldo DORTICOS Torrado~~
Oswaldo DORTICOS Torrado
Faure CHOMON Mediavilla
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ
Raul CURBELO Morales
Joel DOMENECH Benitez

EDUCATION COMMITTEE

Armando HART Davalos
Lionel SOTO Prieto
Jose LIANUSA Gobel

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Osmani CIENFUEGOS Gorriaran
Raul ROA Garcia
Manuel PINEIRO Losada

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES
AND STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE

Raul CASTRO Ruz
Ramiro VALDES Menendez
Sergio DELL VALLE Jimenez

CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES
COMMITTEE

Blas ROCA Calderio
Jose NARANJO Morales
Alfredo YABUR Maluf

Capt. Jose ABRANTES Fernandez
Maj. Rogelio ACEVEDO Gonzalez
Maj. Armando ACOSTA Cordero
Maj. Juan V. ACUNA Nunez
Severo AGUIRRE Cristo
Maj. Jose M. ALVAREZ Bravo
Maj. Efigenio AMELJEIRAS Delgado
Capt. Emilio ARAGONES Navarro
Capt. Jose ARTEAGA Hernandez

Maj. Flavio BRAVO Pardo
Ramon CALCINES Gordillo
Maj. Julio E.T. CAMACHO Aguilera
Maj. Lino CARRERAS Rodriguez
Maj. Ernesto CASILLAS Palenzuela
Maj. Belarmino CASTILLA Mas
Maj. Leopoldo CINTRAS Fria
Maj. Abelardo COLOME Ibarra
Maj. Angel Joel CHAVECO Hernandez

Maj. Manuel DIAZ Gonzalez
Maj. Victor E. DRAKE Cruz
Vilma ESPIN Guilloys de Castro
Maj. Manuel E. FAJARDO Sotomayor
Marcelo FERNANDEZ Font
Maj. Oscar FERNANDEZ Mell
Maj. Harold FERRER Martinez
Maj. Calixto GARCIA Martinez
Maj. Julio A. GARCIA Olivera
Maj. Pedro M. GARCIA Pelaez
Raul GARCIA Pelaez
Elena GIL Izquierdo
Fabio GROBART
Maj. Raul GUERRA Bermejo
Maj. Orestes GUERRA Gonzalez
Secundino GUERRA Hidalgo
Maj. Joel IGLESIAS Leyva
Maj. Omar H. ISER Mojena
Maj. Rienerio JIMENEZ Lage
Maj. Rolando KINDELAN Bles
Maj. Antonio E. LUSSON Batile
Manuel LUZARDO Garcia
Maj. Jose R. MACHADO Ventura
Isidoro MALMIERCA Peoli
Juan MARINELLO Vidaurreta
Miguel MARTIN Perez
Jose MATAR Franye
Capt. Joaquin MENENDEZ Cominchas
Maj. Raul MENENDEZ Tomassevich
Arnaldo MILIAN Castro
Maj. Carlos MIR Marrero

Maj. Pedro MIRET Prieto
Maj. Jesus MONTANE Oropesa
Maj. Arnaldo OCHOA Sanchez
Maj. Mario OLIVA Perez
Maj. Filiberto OLVERA Moya
Maj. Ramon PARDO Guerra
Lazaro PENA Gonzales
Maj. Faustino PEREZ Hernandez
Capt. Antonio PEREZ Herrero
Maj. Walfredo PEREZ Rodriguez
Maj. Lizardo PROENZA Sanchez
Jose RAMIREZ Cruz
Capt. Eliseo REYES Rodriguez
Capt. Jorge RISQUET Valdes
Maj. Orlando RODRIGUEZ Puerta
Basilio RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez
Ursinio ROJAS Santiesteban
Maj. Antonio SANCHEZ Diaz
Celia SANCHEZ Mandulay
Maj. Aldo SANTAMARIA Cuadrado
Haydee SANTAMARIA Cuadrado de Hart
Maj. Rene de los SANTOS Ponce
Clementina SERRA Robledo
Maj. Jose R. SILVA Berroa
Maj. Eddy SUNOL Ricardó
Lt. Julio TARRAU Castillo
Maj. Diocles TORRALBAS Gonzalez
Felipe TORRES Trujillo
Capt. VELAZ Suarez
Maj. Roberto VIERA Estrada
Maj. Luis A. ZAYAS Ochoa

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COMMUNISM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1. The Pre-Rebellion Period

The Communist Party of the Dominican Republic originated in the late 1930s and early 1940s with a group of Spanish Communist exiles who came to the country after the end of the Spanish Civil War. In the Dominican Republic, these Spanish Communists established a network of front organizations and publications and began to proselytize. They appealed mainly to anti-Trujillo intellectuals, particularly among the university students. Although Trujillo courted the Soviet Union during World War II, Dominican Communists were jailed or kept under surveillance, and operated underground from 1942 until 1945. In 1945 the Dominican Communist Party was formed under the leadership of such men as Pericles Franco Ornes, Francisco Henriquez, and the Ducoudray brothers-- Juan Bautista and Felix Servio Ducoudray Mansfield. In mid-1945 the police prohibited Communist propaganda activities and leading Dominican Communists sought diplomatic asylum and exile. Most sought refuge in Cuba.

Late in 1946, exiled Communist leaders returned to the Dominican Republic at the invitation of General Trujillo, who was preparing an "election" which would permit him once again to become chief executive. The Communists supposedly were to be allowed freedom of operation while the Trujillo government could take credit for furthering democracy by allowing opposition groups to take part in the life of the nation. The Dominican Popular Socialist Party* (Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano - PSPD)--currently active in the rebellion--was legally established as the official Communist party in the country and began holding public campaign meetings. This recognition scheme, which was to become a favorite Trujillo maneuver, was short-lived. The PSPD was suppressed shortly before the 1947 elections and its principal leaders were put in jail and then exiled.

The Dominican Communist exiles established their headquarters in Guatemala and began publishing Orientacion, which was smuggled back into the Dominican Republic. After the fall of the Arbenz government

*Changed to Dominican Communist Party (PCD) in mid-August 1965.

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in Guatemala in 1954, the Dominicans moved their headquarters first to Mexico and then to Cuba, where it remained until after the death of Trujillo. The PSPD played an important role in the attempted invasion, based from Cuba, which took place on 14 June 1959, during which a number of the top PSPD leaders were killed.

Prior to the assassination of Trujillo in May 1961, the Cuban-based PSPD members were negotiating with him in an effort to re-establish a Communist organization in the Dominican Republic. During the months of negotiations, there were no Cuban propaganda attacks on the Dominican dictator. Immediately after his assassination the Cubans reacted with accusations of US Government complicity in the deed.

With the relaxation of controls that followed the death of Trujillo, exiled Communists began joining the returning Dominican exiles. By early 1962, extremist propaganda leaflets signed by the central committee of the PSPD began appearing in the Republic. The PSPD also beamed a daily radio program to the Dominican Republic from Cuba. Communists became increasingly active in the labor field and suspected Communists headed both the United Workers' Front for Autonomous Trade Unions (FOUPSA) and the National Federation of Public Employees and Autonomous Institutions (FENEPIA). The Communists were also active in organizing or infiltrating women's and professional fronts such as the Dominican Women's Federation (FMD) and the Dominican Lawyers' Association (ADOMA).

Although the central committee of the PSPD in October 1962 declared itself opposed to the Council of State government and the forthcoming December 1962 elections, it cautioned leftist forces in the Dominican Republic against being drawn into armed insurrection in which they would probably be defeated. This stand against violence reflected the PSPD's quarrel over tactics with the more extremist elements of the far left, a disagreement which impeded the unification of leftist forces into a "popular front" movement.

The election of Juan Bosch raised expectations within the party that the new government would be

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initially left of center, followed by a definite swing to the left that would create a political situation favorable to Communist activities. By the time Bosch had been inaugurated as President in February 1963, most Communist Party leaders had returned to the Dominican Republic loudly praising Communist Cuba and expressing conditional support for Bosch. Although still illegal, the PSPD was able to organize clandestinely without much restraint and El Popular, the party newspaper, circulated openly for the first time during the short Bosch administration. Bosch refused to take repressive action against the extreme leftist groups so long as they pursued their ends by peaceful means. He apparently wanted to avoid forcing the extreme left into a position where they would probably resort to violence--as had happened in Venezuela under President Betancourt. The PSPD, for its part, followed a double-faced policy toward the Bosch government. On one side they concentrated most of their propaganda resources on advancing the line that the government was in imminent danger from an ultrareactionary plot, involving elements of the military and the "imperialists." Although the Communists emphasized the desirability of protecting the "democratic forces," they made almost no mention of the Bosch administration. The Communists, along with other extreme leftist groups, hoped to lead the anticoup forces without committing themselves too much to the regime. The other side of their position involved exerting pressure on the government for more "revolutionary" measures, with the intent to exploit for their own benefit Bosch's failure to deliver on his promises.

Shortly after the military coup which ousted the Bosch regime, on 25 September 1963, the triumvirate government declared all Communist organizations and activities illegal, and forced the PSPD under ground once again. During 1964 and 1965 the Communists have intensified their efforts on working with and organizing new labor unions. The nominally PRD-dominated labor confederation FOUPSA-CESITRADO has now been successfully infiltrated by Communists who are clearly attempting to seize complete control. Communists dominate the relatively small Dominican Workers' Union, known as "La Union," and are particularly strong in the cement, paint, and textile industries.

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Communist indoctrinators and recruiters have concentrated their efforts in the schools with marked success. Communist and Cuban propaganda is distributed more or less freely in the schools. The average worker or peasant in the Dominican Republic is semi-illiterate and incapable of absorbing Communist doctrines quickly, while the students are usually avid readers and, as in other Latin American countries, become involved in politics at an early age. Fragua (Forge), the pro-Communist student organization, has, since its founding in February 1962, largely dominated campus politics at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. General student apathy toward campus elections and the militancy of the pro-Communists help Fragua control the Dominican Students' Federation (Federacion de Estudiantes Dominicanos - FED), the official organization of the student body.

2. The MPD

The Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) (Movimiento Popular Dominicano) was organized in 1956 by Dominican exiles in Cuba, where MPD members actively supported Fidel Castro. In June 1960 Trujillo, in hopes of favorably influencing opinion in the Western Hemisphere, allowed MPD leaders to return to the Dominican Republic to form a token opposition. Within two months the Dominican government arrested MPD leaders Maximo Lopez Molina and Andres Marcelino Ramos Peguero and had the party headquarters looted by mobs. Lopez had been expelled from the PSPD in 1956. He was accused of following the "Chinese heresy." Although the MPD operated for only a short time and at Trujillo's pleasure, it gained considerable popularity and established itself as a bonafide anti-Trujillo organization.

Lopez and Ramos were released in March 1961 and the MPD was given new guarantees by Trujillo, who was again making overtures to the OAS. Following the Trujillo assassination at the end of May 1961, Lopez and other party leaders reactivated the MPD amid extremist speeches filled with anti-US and pro-Castro propaganda. Party leaders denied favoring violence or Communism, but the MPD created disorders in Santo Domingo and their public declarations contained an unmistakable note of class warfare. The MPD political banner--a red and black flag with an upraised

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fist--supported the extremist impression. Although mobs organized by the government repeatedly sacked MPD headquarters during the summer of 1961, by September the party had an estimated 7,000 members and sympathizers and was penetrating other opposition groups in the Dominican Republic. During the period the MPD, in cooperation with the PSPD, unsuccessfully attempted to unite all leftist parties into a common political front. In October 1961, as a result of mob violence instigated by the MPD, the government of Joaquin Balaguer declared the MPD illegal.

Until the inauguration of Juan Bosch in February 1963, the MPD was subjected to sporadic harassment by the government and went underground. It lost most of its popular following and increasingly resorted to provoking riots and mob violence led by disgruntled youth drawn largely from the lowest urban classes. When MPD leaders returned from exile in the spring of 1963 the party tried once again to set up a united front of leftist parties. Although the party was still outlawed, Lopez was allowed to travel throughout the country publicizing the ideas of "national liberation" and the popular front, which were echoed in the clandestine party news organ, Libertad.

Shortly after the September 1963 military coup the MPD, along with the PSPD, was declared illegal by the governing triumvirate. Arrests of MPD leaders more or less eliminated the party from the guerrilla campaign of late 1963. Maximo Lopez Molina and nine of his followers with a supply of weapons were arrested near Cotui in October 1963. In early December government forces captured several high-ranking MPD members during an attempted landing from a boat called the Scarlet Woman and discovered an arms cache nearby.

MPD strength is found among members of the poor urban classes. Most of the leaders are lower middle-class university students or professionals with laboring-class family backgrounds. Without close


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family ties, often without employment, they and their largely unlettered followers form a highly combative group of the dispossessed.

The Cuban Government has presumably supported exiled MPD members while they were in Cuba and facilitated their travel to and from Cuba.



3. The Fourteenth of June Political Group

The extreme leftist 14th of June Political Group (Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio--APCJ) is a pro-Castro political organization which came into existence in the late 1950s as a clandestine movement aimed at unseating Trujillo. As an anti-Trujillo organization, the APCJ originally attracted members from a broad political spectrum, many from wealthy and socially prominent families. The name, 14th of June, commemorates an abortive invasion attempt mounted from Cuba in 1959. In January 1960 the APCJ was implicated in a plot to kill Trujillo, with the result that many of its members were imprisoned and tortured. The APCJ was not involved in Trujillo's assassination on 30 May 1961. Shortly after Trujillo's death and apparently at the insistence of the extreme leftist faction of the movement, the APCJ assumed the role of a functioning political party. In late 1961 the APCJ refused to enter the Council of State government proposed by President Joaquin Balaguer. The increasingly pro-Communist orientation of the APCJ caused moderate leaders to resign from the party in January 1962, leaving the APCJ in the hands of extremists. By April 1962 the APCJ was organizing armed groups, and stocking arms caches for future guerrilla activities. The party's public pronouncements became

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increasingly anti-US and pro-Castro, reflecting the dominant position of pro-Communist forces.

The APCJ did not participate as a party in the December 1962 elections, basing their abstention on the accusation that the Council of State was maintaining the repressive machinery--the police and the army--of the Trujillo dictatorship. After the inauguration of the popularly elected Juan Bosch, the APCJ applied for recognition as a legal political party, which was granted in May 1963 by the superior electoral tribunal. The party continued, however, to organize clandestine cells, and party leaders appeared to be in full agreement with Marxist-Leninist solutions to the economic and social problems of the country.

During 1963 extreme leftist groups, especially the MPD, attempted to unite all Dominican leftists into a popular front. Personal rivalries, however, doomed the proposed front.

After the 25 September 1963 coup the APCJ attempted to rally non-Communist opponents--the PRD and the PRSC--into a national front to "struggle for the restoration of constitutionality..." By late October 1963, however, when it became apparent that anticoup forces would not join forces with the pro-Castro APCJ, party leaders decided to commence the much discussed but poorly planned armed insurrection.

The APCJ temporarily joined forces with the extreme leftist MPD under the banner of the Revolutionary Movement 14th of June (Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio--MR-1J4), and in November 1963 a force estimated at about 130 men took to the mountains. Leaders of the MR-1J4 apparently hoped that the uprising would point out the instability of the triumvirate government and make the MR-1J4 the leader for the presumed growing discontent with the government in the Dominican Republic. They failed in both hopes. The MPD guerrilla contingent was quickly captured, and the uprising attracted little sympathy. PSPD leaders, who continued to counsel against violence, withheld their support. On 2 December 1963 the government, using an October 1963 antisubversion decree, declared the APCJ illegal. Campesinos in the zones of operation refused to aid the guerrillas in spite of efforts to win them over. Dominican Army leaders crushed the uprising within a month.

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The death of several leaders and the imprisonment or deportation of others such as Jaime Duran, Fidelio Despradel Roques, Juan Roman Diaz, and Pablo Johnson Ortiz, left the APCJ disorganized and divided. During 1964 some wanted to rehabilitate the APCJ as a legal political party, others wanted to continue as a subversive group aiming at the violent overthrow of the de facto government. By October 1964, however, Cuban-trained APCJ leaders began returning clandestinely to the Dominican Republic and the prospects for a more active APCJ became manifest.

[redacted] the sources of APCJ funds, the party probably supports itself by contributions from members, sympathizers, businessmen hoping to buy protection, the sale of the party newspaper El 1J4, and bonds. Some funds also come from sympathizers in New York.

The most important group in the APCJ is the political bureau, and the organization includes a central executive commission or committee, provincial committees, and cells. Leaders of the APCJ before the recent rebellion appeared to be:

Rafael Baez Perez
Norge Botello Fernandez
Fidelio Arturo Despradel Roque
Jaime Duran Hernando
Roberto Duverge Mejia
Luis Genao Espaillat
Juan B. Mejia
Daniel Ozuna Hernandez
Juan Miguel Roman - (now dead)
Rafael Francisco Taveras Rosario

Since 1961 the aim of the APCJ has been a revolution for national liberation from what they term the domination of the landowners, the oligarchy, the upper bourgeoisie, and US imperialism. The Castro revolution in Cuba is its model.

The APCJ is openly pro-Castro and maintains representatives in Havana, Paris, and Moscow. The Cuban Government is known to have trained APCJ members in guerrilla warfare, sheltered APCJ exiles, and assisted them to infiltrate back into the Dominican Republic. Radio Havana has furnished propaganda support to the APCJ as well as to other extreme leftist groups in the Dominican Republic.

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Beginning last autumn, the Communists and allied extremists who had been deported following the abortive guerrilla effort began filtering back into the Dominican Republic. They came back by a variety of circuitous routes and used various clandestine means of entering. Some were caught by the Dominican authorities. Most were not. Even some of those arrested were not sentenced because Communist lawyers were able to intimidate and influence the judges. A few were released on bail and never appeared for trial. By early April of this year, on the eve of the insurrection, there were nearly 50 Communists or allied extremists back in the country after varying periods in exile.

The returnees who came back during the six months that preceded the outbreak of the insurrection included many who were to take very prominent parts in the fighting. Among the more prominent were Juan Miguel Roman Diaz, top APCJ militant who was killed on 19 May leading an attack on the loyalist-held national palace; Jaime Duran Hernando; Daniel Ozuna Hernandez, an APCJ militant active during the insurrection; Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado, top MPD leader also active during the fighting; Baldemiro Castro Garcia, an MPD leader who was reportedly killed while taking part in the rebel raid on San Francisco de Macoris on 25 June; Tomas Erickson Alvarez, an MPD activist who was captured by loyalist forces during the early stages of the fighting; Felix Servio Ducoudray Mansfield, top PSPD leader who is playing an active political role in the rebel camp; Franklin Franco Pichardo, another ranking PSPD "politician" who has been particularly close to rebel foreign minister Jottin Cury; and the PSPD militant fighter Antonio Isa Conde. Many of the returnees had been active in the abortive guerrilla effort of late 1963.

[redacted] Training, materiel, and intelligence advisers had been provided to the police and security organizations of the Reid government--as they had to the Bosch government before it. [redacted] the Dominican security organization did not develop into a competent service. Capable and educated men could not

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be induced to serve in it and Reid insisted on diverting its few trained men away from their primary task of controlling Communist subversion and instead continually assigned them to investigate smuggling and to collect information on his non-Communist political opponents. Reid never seemed to take the subversive threat as seriously as the facts would seem to have justified.

One factor that made the situation particularly vulnerable in the case of the Reid government was the fact that the Communist parties had found an exploitable issue--one which placed them on the same side as the non-Communist political parties which had the greatest popular support. That issue was the one of "constitutionalism" and antimilitarism, reflecting the public's opposition to the military coup of September 1963 and the unpopular governments that had followed.

4. The Rebellion

In its earliest moments, the rebellion appeared to be a coup by anti-Reid officers, some of whom had old scores to settle with their superiors, and some of whom were intent on returning Bosch from exile in Puerto Rico. Many PRD members who had not been involved in the plotting quickly threw in with the rebels; a provisional government headed by PRD member Rafael Molina Urena was proclaimed and Bosch was asked to return.

It now appears, however, that extremist and Communist groups had advance word of the revolt, not surprising in Santo Domingo where plotting had been endemic and the subject of frequent gossip. Some lower level PRD members are reported, moreover, to have been in contact with some extremist leaders and seeking support for a coup effort.

In any event, once news of the revolt became public on the afternoon of 24 April, these extremist groups moved quickly to participate. Leaders of the three Communist parties began collecting arms, organizing their forces, and establishing strongpoints in Santo Domingo. The PSPD established its principal strongpoint, or garrison, at the house of party leader Buenaventura Johnson Pimentel at #56 Calle

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Espaillet. Crudely fortified machine-gun emplacements were set up on the roof of the house. PSPD activists, including Buenaventura Johnson Pimentel, Nicolas Pichardo Vicioso, Manuel Ortiz Delangres, Ignacio Perez Mencia, and others were observed on 25 April making Molotov cocktails and crude grenades at the house, which continued to serve as an arsenal and as headquarters for the main PSPD paramilitary forces until 27 April. The PSPD moved its headquarters to the house of Rafael Esteves Weber on the night of 27 April, probably for security reasons, but the Johnson house has remained an important stronghold and arsenal.

A building on the corner of Arzobispo Portes Avenue and Sanchez Street also served as a PSPD stronghold during this period. Diomedes Mercedes Batista, Jose Rodriguez Acosta, and other PSPD leaders were observed there and were seen leading a paramilitary force armed with submachine guns and rifles, Molotov cocktails, and hand grenades.

The APCJ is known to have established a strongpoint during this same period on Jose Gabriel Street near the Malecon in the Ciudad Nueva section of the city. A heavily armed paramilitary force was seen using this building as a base. A headquarters and strongpoint of MPD guerrillas was established in the Ciudad Nueva area.

Shortly after the rebellion began the military rebels, fearful that the high command would move rapidly against them, opened the arsenals of Santo Domingo and began passing out weapons to civilians. One such arsenal was at the "27 February" camp on the outskirts of the city. This and similar actions elsewhere provided the leaders of the various Communist and extremist groups with the materiel they needed to supplement their own collection of arms and become a significant factor in the rebellion.

Buenaventura Johnson Pimentel, Juan Ducoudray Mansfield, Jaime Duran Hernando, and Fidelio Despradel Roque were particularly active in acquiring weapons and equipping their followers in both the PSPD and APCJ.



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[redacted] All these men appeared to be responsive to direction from Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez, a Spanish Communist veteran of the Spanish Civil War.

By the afternoon of Sunday, April 25, the situation in Santo Domingo had become chaotic and confused. Violence had begun but there was more feinting and jabbing than significant action. Some of the rebels, particularly among the military, were tempted by offers from the loyalists for the establishment of a new junta which would seek a solution, presumably along traditional compromise lines. The forces of General Elias Wessin y Wessin, apparently taken by surprise, were reacting slowly and not effectively. In this situation the Communists were intent on strengthening popular participation in the revolt. Public address cars manned by identifiable PSPD members prowled the city directing the crowds to tactical positions.

At this point the PRD leaders appeared to share the initiative with rebel officers; the Communists were busying themselves with organizing the distribution of weapons to "reliable" groups and rounding up manpower for civilian militia units. It was in this period that the various Communist parties established their weapons depots and set up disbursing controls.

As they established their organizations to assure the military effectiveness of the civilian rebels, the Communists apparently also began to turn their attention to the political ends of the revolt. On the night of April 25th and the early morning hours of April 26 rebel leaders consulted in the captured National Palace on strategy and on the composition of a provisional government. To these meetings came PSPD leaders Milvio Perez Perez and Silvano Lora Vicente, as well as Antonio Isa Conde.

These conversations in the palace showed for the first time not only that the Communists were intent on winning influence in the rebellion, but that they already had a degree of bargaining power. The government formed by Molina after these consultations included as attorney general Alfredo Conde Pausas, who had two sons in the PSPD. The director of the

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National Department of Investigations--the security service--was to be Luis Homero Lajara Burgos, reported to be involved in intelligence activities for the Trujillo government while in the US as a naval attaché. The subdirector was to be Lajara's son, an APCJ militant.

PSPD leaders, and particularly Diomedes Mercedes Batista, commented during the early days of the insurrection that they were very pleased with the attitude of Captain Mario Pena Taveras, one of the army rebel leaders, whom they described as a "friend of the party." Another rebel leader, the lawyer and retired army officer Rafael E. Saldana Jimenez, was acting as legal adviser to the rebel military officers occupying the National Palace between 24 and 27 April. Saldana is closely connected to the APCJ and is reported to have used his military connections during 1963 to obtain weapons for the APCJ. APCJ and MPD leaders are known to have been in communication with Saldana on 27 April and at other times.

Thus by the night of April 25 the rebellion was undergoing a rapid evolution. The Communist militants among the rebel forces had established their credentials as effective and ruthless leaders. They were recruiting supporters with sound trucks and manufacturing Molotov cocktails for use against Wessin's tanks. This latter task was a specialty of PSPD members. APCJ activists organized in patrols were arresting "political prisoners" and often meting out rough justice on the spot.

Monday, April 26, was the last full day of the short-lived Molina rebel government. The day began with sporadic bombardments of the downtown area of Santo Domingo by loyalist planes and naval guns. While casualties were being sustained in the rebel sectors, ten members of the PSPD were meeting to plan the destruction of the city by fire if Wessin's troops entered. This was apparently characteristic of the Communists' doggedness during this bleakest hour for the rebels. Before the night was over it had become the dominant mood of the workers' quarters embittered by the bombing raids. Some of the military rebels apparently had had enough, but they were relieved of their weapons by rebels before being allowed to defect to the loyalists.

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The principal defections at this stage of the rebellion besides that of Molina were those of Jose Pena Gomez, Colonel Hernando Ramirez, and Antonio Martinez Francisco, the secretary general of the PRD. After he had withdrawn from the rebel camp and taken refuge, Jose Pena Gomez, a prominent PRD leader, informed a US Embassy officer that he considered his movement to have been defeated. He admitted that the Communists who joined the rebel force had infiltrated into positions of importance and that it was very difficult to stop them. Pena Gomez later returned to the rebel zone and played an active part in Caamano's government. Molina, who took asylum in the Colombian Embassy, is reported to have said on 5 May that he wanted to get the truth of Communist infiltration across to the world, but that he could not face further jeopardizing his and his family's safety. He reportedly said that he was already under intense attack by the Communists for opposing them. Also, he was reluctant to make any statement that would force him to give up asylum.

Martinez made his way out of the rebel lines and on April 28th addressed the nation over San Isidro radio, controlled by the forces of General Wessin y Wessin. In that broadcast, Martinez said: "I beg all to lay down their arms; turn them in to the nearest military post, because this is no longer a fight between political parties."

Communists did, in fact, clearly dominate the rebel movement between 28 April and 2 or 3 May. They were in obvious control after having filled the vacuum created when moderate non-Communist political leaders who had been in control lost heart for the fight and abandoned it. The moderate-led rebel government of Rafael Molina Urena collapsed on 27 April and most members of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) went into hiding or took asylum in Latin American embassies. Most of the rebel military officers who had initially sparked the revolt also went into hiding. Even Colonel Caamano was briefly in asylum. The collapse was brought on largely by the movement of loyalist army troops toward the rebel strongholds and recognition on the part of the non-Communist rebel leaders that their forces could not have prevailed over the superior

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military power then moving toward them under General Wessin y Wessin and other loyalist commanders.

The Communists and their extremist allies had no place to hide and they prepared on 27 and 28 April to defend the rebel stronghold to the last ditch. The Communists, in short, upheld rebel resistance when it otherwise would have completely collapsed. This is what they are unlikely to permit the non-Communist rebel leaders to forget. This is an important source of their present strength and their influence in the Caamano government.

Actually, the Communists were not brought to the ultimate test. The expected loyalist onslaught on the city did not come during the crucial days of 27 and 28 April. The "gutless generals" on the loyalist side were unable or unwilling to bring their well-equipped forces into action against the rebel stronghold. The much-vaunted Dominican military establishment was, in fact, on the point of utter disintegration by the evening of 28 April when the first US Marines landed. It was not until 13 May that loyalist forces became sufficiently stiffened to take the military offensive. By that time, US troops were interposed between them and the main rebel stronghold.

Between 28 April and the first two days of May the Communists and their extremist allies were the only effective rebel holdouts--together with the naive youths manning the barricades under Communist leadership. By 3 May, however, various of the moderate PRD leaders had come out of hiding and asylum, returned to rebel headquarters, and began resuming at least nominal control. The presence of US troops and the continuing impotence of the loyalist military gave them at least some confidence that there would be no all-out loyalist onslaught on the city. On 4 May, the non-Communists of the rebel movement formed a government under Colonel Caamano and composed of non-Communists, including some highly respected moderate leftists. Thus, the rebels were able to re-establish the picture of a moderate leftist regime dedicated to the fulfillment of a popular revolution. Communists were not obvious in the rebel camp by the time the bulk of US and other foreign newsmen arrived on the scene. The Caamano government proceeded to try to establish a respectable front and to try to enhance

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its bargaining position for the political discussions and the negotiations with the UN and the OAS that were to follow. This is, in general, the situation as it has prevailed since that date.

There is voluminous testimony as to the Communists' continuing important role in the rebel movement. This was acknowledged even by Antonio Guzman, who was under consideration as a new president of a PRD-weighted government. Guzman repeatedly stressed in his conversations with high-level US officials that he could not afford to act against the Communists in the rebel movement in a precipitous manner. He seemed to be honestly convinced that he would be unable to lead the kind of government that would have the support of a significant portion of the non-Communist rebel movement if he were required first to deport or take other strong action against Communists and other extremists who were with the rebels. Such action, he said, would only have the effect of creating more Communists.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ECUADOR

1. Introduction

The Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) is a small Marxist party, divided into two rival organizations on the basis of the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy. Through popular front tactics over the past three decades the party has at times attained some influence by organization and drive in the political life of a country which has never developed strong and effective political parties. The PCE has always been primarily an intellectual elite which exerts inconsistent influence over the proletariat in part due to frequent dissension and ineptitude. Since 1962, the hard-line party has generally advocated and plotted violent popular revolution, while the Moscow-line regulars have pursued their traditional program of fronts and infiltration. While both PCEs pay lip service to the necessity for adapting the revolution to prevalent "objective conditions," for them as for all Ecuadorean political parties, these depend to a degree upon the nature and course of the junta's transition to constitutional government expected to take place by September 1966.

2. Brief History of the Party

The Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE) emerged from a group of intellectuals who began publishing an avant garde newspaper, La Antorcha, at Quito late in 1924. The editor, Ricardo Paredes, published articles on advanced socialism and provided an intellectual center behind Ecuador's 9 July 1925 socialist revolution. Similar socialist groups sprang up in other cities, and the revolution brought to power briefly as first junta president Luis Napoleon Dillon, a member of the Antorcha group. The Socialist Party (PS) was founded by them 16 May 1926.

Within the party, Paredes led a doctrinaire faction, the "Friends of Lenin," who published Comintern proclamations and those of other internal Communist bodies in a new journal, La Fragua. As Socialist

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Party secretary general, Paredes spent a year in Moscow, 1927-28, and represented both the "Friends of Lenin" and the PS at the VI Congress of the Communist International. The Socialist Party thereafter adjusted its program to conform with international Communism, and as early as 1929 its youth group took the name Juventud Comunista Ecuatoriano (JCE).

The PS split in 1932, the Communist portion joining with a group of Guayaquil radicals--the Grupo Comunista--led by Carlos Guevara Moreno. The following year a new, traditionalist Socialist Party appeared. Initially denounced by the Communist Party (PCE) as "social fascists," the Communists in 1934--adhering to the sinuosities of the Comintern line--attempted to form a popular front with them and the Liberals. This front helped overthrow president Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra. In general Communist-Socialist relations remained friendly thereafter and the PCE acquired a reputation for accomplishing much with little strength through other parties. In coalitions, the Communists have generally been the more aggressive, better organized, and better financed.

In 1944 the PCE participated in a revolutionary front which overthrew a Liberal government and brought back Velasco Ibarra. For a year, they were included in his administration, but he turned against the far left in March, 1946 and removed them from the cabinet. The PCE has never been legally registered with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, a requisite to inclusion on the ballot. It has operated under other labels and its secretary general, Pedro Sadd, was elected to the Senate in 1952 and retained office until 1960.

At the VII Party Congress in March 1962, the division within the ranks of international Communism surfaced in Ecuador. Jorge Rivadeneira Altamirano, a coastal youth leader, sustained the thesis that "cuatro gallos audaces" (four bold roosters) would be sufficient to resolve the problem of revolution. The congress adopted a revolutionary line which Saad's dominant pro-Moscow wing failed to implement. Quito's provincial committee, led by Rafael Echeverria Flores, assumed the lead of the activist group and the split widened in May 1963 when a member of the central committee, Jose Maria Roura Cevallos, was arrested while

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bringing in money provided by Chinese Communists to finance pro-Peking propaganda and guerrilla operations. Roura was expelled from the PCE for having gone to China without permission. The expulsion was arranged by Saad, who has consistently opposed guerrilla activity and favored a more cautious approach. Saad then attempted unsuccessfully to remove Echeverria from the Pichincha Provincial Committee chairmanship.

The Echeverria group increased its strength, however, and was able to establish a national clandestine apparatus of its own. For a time it grew in influence and virtually took over the party while Saad and his fellows languished in prison. In August 1964, Echeverria held a rump party congress, expelled the pro-Saad central committeemen, and formed a national organization to plan and direct a program which included early guerrilla actions in the countryside. The group's capability for such operations rose during late 1964, but declined after Echeverria went to China and Cuba for medical care and training. Echeverria returned in August 1965 and immediately announced his intention to open guerrilla operations, but on 30 October he was arrested and is awaiting trial.

Saad's regular party meanwhile received some impetus when he was released from prison for New Year's 1965. It has continued with some success penetration efforts against student and labor organizations, as well as the government itself.

3. PCE Strength and Supporting Groups

The PCE presently has an estimated membership among its factions of no more than 500 active "card carriers" who take any part in Communist activities. Prior to the 1963 military coup, its strength was believed to be as high as 2,000 during the permissive regime of drunken Carlos Julio Arosemena. At that time the JCE had about 1,000, and associated extreme left groups claimed an additional 1,000; since the coup, these organizations have been relatively inactive.

Party financing was apparently irregular even before it was outlawed in 1963; dues collected were small then, and negligible since. The PCE formerly raised funds by raffles, sale of party publications, and importation of Communist-made products for sale

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through commercial firms organized by Saad, Echeverria, et. al. In mid-1965, the Saad group launched a sale of party bonds.

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Recruiting has largely been on a haphazard basis in Ecuador, and only in 1965 did the hard line set out to form a clandestine inner party to which one could not gain membership merely by self-proclaimed adherence to international Communism. The party has throughout its history influenced associated groups, especially youth and labor, and thereby has had influence far greater than its own small membership would suggest.

Most youth are non-Communist but virtually all their organizations are Communist controlled. The JCE has exploited the extremist intellectual atmosphere which existed in many schools and universities prior to repressive measures taken since mid-1963 by the military government. This success is attributable to the frustrations of increasingly ambitious youth, and to the good organization and discipline of the Communist minority. Communist gains also stem from the naivete and passivity of most non-Communist groups, which have allowed them to pose as the leadership group. The physical poverty of the universities has exacerbated this situation.

Heavy Communist and "fellow traveler" infiltration of the university faculties prior to the junta's reforms certainly made many students receptive to Communism. In many cases, incoming university students already have had six years of Marxist indoctrination in the secondary schools. Furthermore, the majority of these students are from the aspiring middle and lower classes whose impatience influences their attitudes.

The Ecuadorean National Union of Teachers has also been a target of PCE infiltration. The Communists have generally dominated or heavily infiltrated the Federation of University Students (FEUE), composed of local student delegations of the five state

universities. The degree of this penetration has fluctuated, and there have been splits at the annual FEUE congresses between pro-Communist and pro-democratic delegations. The Communists dominated the June 1965 congress, whereupon the delegation from Protoviejo's small university withdrew, but the Communists remained firmly in control of FEUE. A leader of a small terrorist organization, Destacamientos de Organizacion Secreta (DOS), was elected to a national office.

Other youth fronts include the Union Revolucionaria de Juventud Ecuatoriana (URJE), a Cuban-influenced revolutionary group which has lost most of its once-substantial following: the Juventud Socialista Revolucionario (JSR), small youth arm of the fellow-traveling Revolutionary Socialist Party; and the Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarias del Ecuador (FESE), a high school students' organization which is under FEUE influence.

The PCE from its founding has sought to influence Indians. Paredes was an avid student of Indian affairs and in 1944 organized the Federacion de Indios Ecuatorianos (FIE). Campesino work has been erratic, however. In 1958 the PCE attempted to accelerate such efforts, believing the poverty-stricken Indian sierra was fertile ground for infiltration and the development of a Communist-oriented native movement. The Pichincha Provincial Committee--later to become the hard-line PCE--took the position that the revolution would be primarily agrarian and anti-feudal, and that the Indians would ultimately begin it. The direction of Indian affairs early passed to several of the "hard-line" leaders, Jorge Rivadeneira, Jose Maria Roura, Carlos Rodriguez Paredes, Rafael Echeverria, and especially Cesar Munoz, who prepared to mobilize the Indian campesinos against the government.

The Communists sponsored a national campesino conference at Quito in October 1960 attended by some 140 delegates, mainly sierra Indians. After the meeting, violence broke out along the sierra as armed men seized haciendas; in early 1961 there were uprisings over wages and working conditions. The PCE endeavored to exploit grievances, exhort further violence, and direct the operations. [REDACTED]

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Plans were made in December 1961 for a grand mobilization of the Indians for land reform, in connection with the Third National Congress of the FEI

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A few days later, the PCE backed a second congress of the Coastal Federation of Agricultural Workers (FETAL) in Milagro, Guayas Province. The Communists have been active among coastal rural labor mainly to promote violence and agitation over conditions of labor and land tenure. About 3,000 campesinos attended this meeting.

The Communists, however, have encountered real difficulties in their rural program. Indians could be persuaded readily enough to seize lands, but have been unresponsive to revolutionary doctrine. They basically prefer to work their land unmolested by "whites" regardless of orientation. During May 1963, a meeting of Communist peasant leaders was held at Guayaquil to consider the organizational deterioration of the PCE in the countryside. They called for renewed emphasis on Indian affairs, for the creation of a new PCE campesino committee, and organization of cells among Indians. Since the 1963 coup, the hard-line PCE has continued efforts to prepare Indians for revolution, but its success has been limited by the inability of most would-be organizers to adjust to rural life and people.

Communists have been more successful in exploiting their domination of artistic and intellectual activities to influence the entire national society. Moscow-line Communists and their sympathizers virtually control the artistic, literary, and economic fields, in part through the government-supported Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana. Economists tend to support the proposition that government-directed economic expansion, in a manner similar to that of the USSR, is the only answer for Ecuador's problems. These individuals are hostile to US free enterprise and they

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have exerted a pervasive influence over administrations, even of the supposedly anti-Communist military junta. In part this has been carried out through the infamous "Crack Club," a so-called sports organization made up of pro-Communists, which included junta president Admiral Castro Jijon, and which has been engaged in efforts not only to infiltrate but actually to control the operational levels of the government.

The oldest and largest labor confederation in Ecuador, the Confederation de Trabajadores del Ecuador (CTE), was founded in 1944 by Communists and Socialists. Thereafter the Communists quickly took control and have maintained it ever since. The CTE is an affiliate of the Soviet-dominated WFTU, and some of its national affiliates are similarly affiliated to Communist-front international labor organizations. Before the 1963 golpe, the CTE dominated the labor scene with a claimed (but highly doubtful) membership of 60,000. When the military junta took power, the CTE central committee decreed a general strike--which was universally ignored--and then fled into hiding. By mid-1965 these leaders, all but one of whom are members of the PCE or the fellow-traveling Revolutionary Socialist Party, began to emerge and to resume operations with increasing boldness. As of September 1965, their Pichincha and Guayas provincial affiliates were operating openly and the CTE central committee had begun to make demands on the government, mainly for publicity purposes. The central committee, as constituted at that time, consisted entirely of doctrinaire Communists and professional people such as lawyers and teachers, but no workers. The two-year near-quietus (largely self-imposed) from 1963 to 1965 caused rifts in the CTE national organization. The provincial organizations in Manabi and Esmeraldas provinces became inactive and virtually disappeared, while in some other provinces discipline and organizations suffered to lesser degrees. The strongest organizations remained in Pichincha and Guayas provinces. There were reports, as of September 1965, that the PCE had started a general campaign to restore its control and discipline in certain CTE provincial organizations. The government, if aware of these efforts, showed no inclination to prevent their success. In other respects the regime's attitude toward the CTE has been mixed but for the most

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
part benign. From mid-1964 to August 1965 the minister of social security and labor was Luis Jaramillo Perez, a former legal adviser of the CTE and a self-proclaimed "extreme leftist" who exerted efforts both to protect the CTE leaders and to restore the CTE to respectability. He was largely successful. A government subsidy of 60,000 sucres per year has continued to flow into the CTE treasury.

4. Foreign Influence


Cuba, Communist China, the USSR, and some other bloc countries have been in contact with the PCE and other far leftists in and from Ecuador despite the absence of diplomatic relations. Young Ecuadoreans have studied at Friendship University in Moscow. Cuba and Communist China have provided financial support and training, particularly in revolutionary tactics, for hard liners. Both have given safe haven to exiled or escaped Ecuadorean subversives.

Cuban aid to the revolutionary groups mainly has provided training in subversion and guerrilla warfare. Cuba reportedly has supplied small amounts of arms. In late 1962 and early 1963 an estimated 200 men had received subversive training; information since mid-1963 suggests a decrease. Training has been given both in Cuba and in Ecuador; in February 1964 Echeverria reportedly was seeking to locate several Cuban-trained men to further his guerrilla warfare plans, and there have been persistent reports of a few such personnel in coastal Ecuador. Several small groups of trainees--possibly totaling about 30--were sent to Communist China in 1964-1965 for political and guerrilla instruction.

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6. Leaders of the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE)
(hard-line)

Central Committee

Rafael Echeverria Flores, Secretary General and Member of the Secretariat
Hugo Salazar Tamariz,
Franklin Perez Castro
Mario Cardenas Villegas
Bolivar Washington Alvarez Fiallo
Jorge Arellano Gallegos
Luis Napoleon Vargas
Cesar Munoz Mantilla, Member of the Secretariat
Celso Fiallo Fiallo
Moises Robalino
Jose Maria Roura Cevallos, Member of the Secretariat
Celso Atarihuana Carrion
Jose Barriaga Delgado
Carlos Rodriguez Paredes
Byron Alfonso Ordonez Paz, Alternate Member
Jorge Ron Rodriguez, Alternate Member
Jose Efrain Barriaga Delgado, Alternate Member

Executive Committee

Rafael Echeverria Flores, Chairman
Hugo Salazar Tamariz,
Cesar Munoz Mantilla, Secretary of Indian Affairs
Franklin Perez Castro, Secretary of Propaganda
Mario Cardenas Villegas
Luis Napoleon Vargas
Bolivar Alvarez Fiallo
Jose Maria Roura Cevallos, Secretary of the Executive Committee

Pichincha (Quito) Provincial Committee

Miguel Rosero Herrera, Secretary General
Olga Munoz Munoz de Carrera, Secretary of Propaganda
Francisco Vega Avila, Secretary of Political Education
Leonardo Bahamonde Caceres, Treasurer
Carlos Anibal Chiriboga Quijaro

Guayas (Guayaquil) Provincial Committee

Hugo Salazar Tamariz, Secretary General
Moises Robalino
Ney Ernesto Barrionuevo Silva
Colon Elias Ramirez Morejon
Enrique Verduga, Treasurer

Guayas (Guayaquil) Executive Committee

Hugo Salazar Tamariz, Chairman
Mario Cardenas Villegas
Franklin Perez Castro
Bolivar Alvarez Fiallos, Secretary of Organization
Enrique Verduga, Secretary of Youth Affairs

Los Rios Provincial Committee

Jorge Andrade
Julio Marcillo
Patricio Gomez

Carchi Provincial Committee (provisional)

Guillermo Passos Perez

Esmeraldas Provincial Committee

Javier Cardenas, Secretary General
Ciro Aparicio, Secretary of Propaganda
Manelao Jara, Secretary of Organization
Mado Wilson Nieves, Treasurer
Wilson Edmundo Burbano Burbano
Santiago Santillan Jimenez

Azuay Provincial Committee

Jorge Roura Cevallos
Hernan Sarmiento Montesdeoca
Benjamin Cordero Ordonez
Luis Monsalve
Jose Barriaga Delgado
Melquiades Sucre Ortega Rodas

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Loja Provincial Committee

Jorge Castro
Manuel Ruiz
Fausto Maldonado
Celso Atarihuana Carrion
Arturo Silva

Bolivar Provincial Committee (provisional)

Angel Paredes Miranda, Secretary General

7. Leaders of the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE)
(Moscow-line)

Executive Committee

Pedro Saad Niyaim, Chairman
Enrique Gil Gilbert
Rene Alejandro Idrovo Rosales
Milton Jijon Saavedra
Alba Calderon de Gil
Manuel Leon Mora
Victor Nieto
Solon Guerrero Metz

Guayas (Guayaquil) Provincial Committee

Manuel Leon Mora, Secretary General
Juan Pio Narvaez Garcia
Aquiles Valencia
Gonzalo Vizueta Maruri
Guillermo Canarte Canarte
Carlos Basto Castillo
Luis Cardenas Pinto
Antonio Morales Rivas
Luis Solis Castro
Deleg Pacheco
Adolfo Nieto
Solon Guerrero

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Pichincha Provincial Committee

Gonzalo Villalba Coloma, Secretary of Organization
Emmel Alvarez Fiallo, Secretary for Youth Affairs
Mario Isaac Valencia Valencia, Treasurer
Cesar Endara
Laurto Gordillo
Manuel Eduardo Nieto Aviles

Tungurahua (Ambato) Provincial Committee

Alfredo Reynaldo Mino Vaca
Jorge Morales
Fausto Enrique Moreno Neva
Jorge Enrique Calero Ortiz

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR

1. Introduction

Although the Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de El Salvador--PCES) has been illegal for all but a few months of its 40-year history, it was one of the first Central American Communist parties to gain enough influence in politics to give the government cause for concern. It was also one of the few Communist parties in Latin America to seriously undertake an armed revolution. Despite restrictions placed on the Communist Party by most Salvadoran governments, the party has shown remarkable powers of recuperation. Furthermore, it has utilized every opportunity to spread its influence, especially among students and labor.

El Salvador is a country which provides a fertile field for Communist propaganda. The extremes of wealth and poverty are greater in El Salvador than in any other Central American country, although a middle class is emerging at an average pace. The economy is dominated by a small group of coffee planters. There is also a large rural proletariat who have no land of their own and, therefore, work as wage laborers on large plantations.

Since 1962 the picture has improved. Many of the previously landless peasants have been resettled on land of their own, but many more remain landless. New industry has been introduced to absorb a rapidly increasing population. One of the most encouraging signs has been the success of the Rivera government in securing the cooperation of the economic upper class in promoting economic and social reforms. On the whole, the present government has been more energetic in attacking the problems which have given Communism its influence than any of the previous governments. Rivera appears to enjoy enough support to finish out his term and, hopefully, to effect an orderly transfer of power in 1967.

2. History

The Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de El Salvador--PCES) was founded in 1925 as

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a result of a visit by delegates from the Communist party of Guatemala, which had been instructed by Communist leaders in Mexico to extend its activities into neighboring republics. Its first adherents were groups of students and workers from San Salvador.

One of the first steps taken by the small Communist group was to organize an Anti-Imperialist League, which was active throughout the rest of the 1920s and was particularly effective in rallying support among the intellectuals. However, most of the Communist energies were concentrated in the labor movement. The labor activities of all the Central American Communist parties were directed by a Consejo Obrero Centro Americano, with headquarters in Guatemala. To this were affiliated a scattering of unions in the various countries of the isthmus.

Communist activities in the unions were coordinated with their activities in other fields. A Salvadoran section of International Red Aid was organized for the legal defense and financial assistance of Communists who got themselves into difficulties. The name of the Salvadoran section was the League for the Defense of Persecuted Fighters (Liga Pro-Luchadores Perseguidos), and it was through this group that close contact was maintained with the Comitern.

The Communists participated in the presidential election of 1930, backing Dr. Arturo Araujo, the Labor Party (Partido Laborista) candidate. Araujo, however, did not allow himself to fall under the influence of the Communists, and early in 1931 he ordered the arrest of three Communist leaders. As a result the Communists published a violent denunciation of Araujo's government. Subsequent agitation by the Communists coupled with growing discontent within the army caused Araujo's overthrow in December 1931. He was succeeded by first vice president, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez.

At first Hernandez Martinez sought support from the Communists and permitted them to present candidates under their own name in the municipal and congressional elections held in January 1932. The Communists claimed to have won elections in several municipalities and to have been denied victory, but

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General Hernandez Martinez refused even to see their representatives and hear their protest. Having infiltrated the army to a considerable degree, the Communists decided to make use of their influence among the enlisted men and noncommissioned officers to overthrow the government. The central committee of the Communist Party established a revolutionary military committee and set January 22, 1932, as the date for the insurrection. The revolutionary military committee was to function as the general staff of the Salvadoran Red army. "Commanders" were named from among the Communist soldiers, and detailed instructions were sent to them. General Hernandez Martinez found out about their plans and began moving against the plotters. A state of siege was proclaimed, and a number of Communist leaders were arrested. Other leaders attempted to call off the uprising, but not all "commanders" received such notification. Several small but uncoordinated revolts occurred, and the whole insurrection failed miserably.

General Hernandez Martinez was ruthless in suppressing the remnants of the insurrection. Thousands were killed and virtually all Communist leaders were captured, court martialed, and shot. Only three leaders escaped to Guatemala where they were jailed by Ubico. The suppression of this revolt destroyed the Communist party, all its front groups, and the labor movement.

The Communist party did not attempt to reorganize until 1936, and even then members operated at the risk of great personal danger. Little opportunity for activity existed, since Hernandez Martinez permitted nothing resembling a labor movement to function. In 1942 the regime allowed the reactivation of the mutual benefit societies, and the Communists were again able to conduct their underground activities with some degree of success.

Between May and October 1944 the Communists experienced a brief period of feverish activity and temporary success. General Hernandez Martinez was ousted in May by a general strike of students and workers. A presidential election was planned, and the Communists, then in the full bloom of wartime "collaboration" with other left-wing forces, backed a mildly leftist teacher, Arturo Romero of the Democratic Union Party (Partido Union Democratica--PUD). In addition to political activity, trade

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unions were rebuilt almost overnight. The National Union of Workers (Union Nacional de Trabajadores--UNT) was founded and, by October 1944, claimed a membership of 50,000, largely under Communist influence.

Communist activity, as well as other political and trade union activity, was again suppressed in October 1944 when Colonel Osmin Aguirre, who had been chief of police under Hernandez Martinez, seized power and re-established a dictatorship. Most Communist leaders went into exile in Guatemala. Elections were held a few months later, and, although the resulting government under President Castaneda Castro was a milder dictatorship, the labor movement was not allowed to revive.

Castaneda Castro was overthrown in December 1948 by a group of young officers who were somewhat more conscious of the nation's social and economic problems than previous regimes had been. One of these officers was Major Oscar Osorio, who was elected president in early 1949. The Communist party remained illegal throughout the Osorio administration. The labor movement was not allowed to revive on a national scale, but individual local unions were allowed to function. Osorio's chief instrument for suppression of the Communist party was the Law in Defense of Public Order passed in 1952. Unfortunately, the law was also used by Osorio for suppression of all political opposition.

Lieutenant Colonel Jose Maria Lemus was elected president in 1956. As a gesture of national unity, Lemus rescinded the 1952 law shortly after he took office. He also permitted the return of all political exiles and, although the Communist party did not obtain legal status, allowed Communists to participate in a national labor congress in August 1957. It was at this time that the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños--CGTS) was formed and became Communist controlled. During the Lemus administration the Communist party doubled in size--from around 500 members in 1956 to nearly 1,000 members in 1960--and its capability increased as well, probably due to assistance from Cuba after Castro came to power.

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In October 1960 a leftist junta overthrew Lemus; during the brief three months this junta was in power, the Communists operated even more openly. The leftist junta was ousted in January 1961 by a military junta which arrested and exiled most of the Communist leaders. Colonel Julio A. Rivera emerged as the chief of government and was elected president in 1962 for a five-year term. His government has been active, not only in suppressing Communist activity, but in promoting economic development and social reforms designed to weaken the appeal of Communism.

3. Present Posture

In early 1965 the PCES had an estimated 200 to 500 members (active members numbered no more than 200) and maybe as many as 5,000 sympathizers. About half of the party members, most of the militants within the front organizations, and the majority of the party's sympathizers are located in the San Salvador area. The PCES has little influence over other political parties but cooperates with some of them from time to time on specific issues. Since the PCES has been illegal during most of its existence, its potential voting strength is unknown but it is believed to be very small. There are no known Communists in high government positions; the rector of the National University, Dr. Fabio Castillo Figueroa, is a leftist, however, who frequently furthers Communist efforts, especially at the university.

The PCES conducts its overt political activity through its political front, the Revolutionary Party of April and May (Partido Revolucionario Abril y Mayo--PRAM). The PRAM originally was organized 30 May 1959 as the Movimiento Civico Abril y Mayo with a membership of about 250 persons. In early 1960 it adopted the name now being used. PRAM currently has a nominal membership of approximately 1,000, but is largely inactive, and only its directorate meets on a regular basis. It has been unable to date to achieve legality as a political party and is unlikely to be granted legality in the foreseeable future. The PRAM is currently exploring the possibility of forming an alliance with one of the non-Communist leftist parties being formed in preparation for the 1966 municipal and legislative elections. Raul Castellanos Figueroa, Gabriel Gallegos Valdes, and Raul Padilla Vela, all Communists, are the principal leaders of the PRAM.

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The labor front of the PCES is the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (Confederacion General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños--CGTS), which was formed in 1957 and has been under Communist domination since its beginning. It comprises nine labor unions with a total membership of approximately 4,500. In 1963 the CGTS affiliates joined with independent labor unions to form the Labor Union Unity Committee (Comite Unitario Sindical--CUS). Dominated by Communist leaders from the nine-union CGTS bloc, the CUS comprises 22 labor unions with a total membership of approximately 11,000. (By contrast, the democratically oriented General Confederation of Trade Unions (Confederacion General de Sindicatos--CGS) has 45 unions with a total membership of approximately 18,500.) The CUS and CGTS are planning to merge into a single labor federation in October 1965.

There is no general student front at the National University although the General Association of Salvadoran University Students (Asociacion General de Estudiantes Universitarios Salvadoreños--AGEUS) is occasionally dominated by Communist students. The leftist but non-Communist students presently have a voting majority in the AGEUS. However, in the three most politically active colleges--law, economics, and humanities--the Communists traditionally dominate a particular student group. At present they dominate the University Student Action (Accion Estudiantil Universitaria--AEU) in the law school, the Student Revolutionary Front of Humanities (Frente Revolucionario Estudiantil de Humanidades--FREH) in the college of humanities, and the Revolutionary University Front of Economics (Frente Universitario Revolucionario de Economica--FURE), in the college of economics. The latter two are the strongest student groups in their respective colleges.

The organization which most nearly resembles a youth front is the Vanguard of Salvadoran Youth (Vanguardia de la Juventud Salvadoreña--VJS). Its activities are not, however, confined to the university. The VJS has approximately 170 members divided into 32 cells. It is an adjunct of the FUAR (see below).

The militant action front through which the PCES operates is the United Front for Revolutionary

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Action (Frente Unida de Accion Revolucionaria--FUAR), which was organized in 1961. The FUAR has a political division and a military division. The political organization consists of ten specialized groups called columns (columnas), with each having a directive commission subordinated to the national directorate. The groups or columns include those of the VJS, intellectuals, workers, students, peasants, women, bank employees, primary school teachers, plus the MR-2-4 (Revolutionary Movement of 2 April) and the 9th of May columns. The total membership of the FUAR is probably 500, although many are presently inactive. Since 1962 the FUAR overtly has confined itself to disseminating propaganda and participating in peaceful demonstrations with other Communist fronts. Concurrently, the military commission of the FUAR has been selecting specially qualified FUAR members and organizing them into clandestine, paramilitary cells capable of carrying out terrorist activities. As of August 1965, 22 of these cells have been organized in various areas of El Salvador, with a total membership of approximately 100. Under the tutelage of the five-man national military commission--all of whom have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba--and departmental military commissions, the cell members are receiving intensive political indoctrination and military training. The members of the military organization are continuing their affiliations with one of the regular FUAR columns and have been adjured to keep their nonmilitary FUAR colleagues unwitting of their military role. The PCES timetable for activating these units is unknown, but it will undoubtedly wait for what it considers a propitious political climate; under present political conditions active insurgency would be suicidal.

4. Foreign Communist Influences and Assistance

The PCES in general is Moscow, rather than Peking, oriented. There is, however, a strong tendency toward violence in the revolutionary approach of younger members. This is particularly noticeable in such organizations as the VJS and the FUAR. This may be the result of training many have received in Cuba. The number of Salvadorans who were trained

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
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in Cuba during 1962 is unknown; there were 75 Salvadorans given guerrilla training in Cuba between April 1963 and April 1964. Despite this there has been no terrorist activity in El Salvador as yet, although as previously indicated the PCES is organizing a terrorist apparatus under FUAR, its militant action front.

Most Communist groups in El Salvador appear to be usually short of funds, and are apparently not receiving any sizable financial assistance from Cuba or other Communist countries. The only large sum of money reportedly given to Salvadoran Communists was around \$50,000 sent from Cuba in 1963,

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
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
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
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
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A HISTORY OF COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA

1. Introduction

A forerunner of the Guatemalan Communist Party was first organized soon after World War I, following the overthrow of the 20-year dictatorship of President Estrada Cabrera. At first called the United Workers (Unificacion Obrera - UO) and then the United Socialist Workers (Unificacion Obrera Socialista - UOS), this group became a Communist Party with the guidance and instruction of the Mexican Communists in 1923 and joined the Communist International at the Comintern's Fifth Congress in 1924. In spite of constant government persecution, the party maintained contact with and participated in international activities of the Comintern. The Communists concentrated much of their energy on work among trade unions, and throughout the 1920s that small portion of the labor force that was organized was heavily influenced by the Communists. The regime of General Ubico (1932-44), however, put a temporary end to Communist activity in Guatemala. In 1935, the Communist International reported that the Guatemalan party had collapsed.

For all practical purposes, Communism in Guatemala was born with the revolution of 1944, which ousted the dictator Ubico. The handful of Communists who survived the firing squads and years in prison under Ubico played no important part in the revolution and a minor role in subsequent events.

Among the many Guatemalans returning from exile in 1944 were a few who had become associated with the Communist movements in their country of exile. They were joined by a sizable group of Communists from other Central American countries who found a haven in "revolutionary" Guatemala. President Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-51), tolerant toward Communist activity in the labor movement, forbade the open organization of the Communist Party; but his successor, President Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54) permitted the party to participate openly in national politics. Under Arbenz, Communists were able to

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move into positions of leadership in labor organizations and gain influential posts in the government agencies which shaped public opinion and administered social welfare programs.

During the early years of the revolution the fact that one could be a "Communist" without having to meet the demands of party membership facilitated the indoctrination of young revolutionary leaders. On 28 September 1947 a small group of confirmed Communists, which included most of the future leaders of the party, founded a clandestine organization called the Guatemalan Democratic Vanguard (Vanguardia Democratica Guatemalteca - VDG). During the next two years a number of front groups were established and functioned openly as a means of drawing other leftists into the work of the Communist movement, but the existence of VDG remained a well-kept secret.

At the March convention of the administration's Revolutionary Action Party (Partido Accion Revolucionaria - PAR), the Communists received a setback as their slate, headed by incumbent Secretary General Jose Fortuny, was defeated by a coalition of socialist leaders. After the assassination in July 1949 of the anti-Communist Col. Francisco Arana, the leading moderate candidate for the presidency, by Arbenz henchmen, the election of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman became almost certain. The Communists then began considering ways for coming at least partially into the open. At a secret meeting of the VDG in September 1949 the Communists adopted the name Communist Party of Guatemala (Partido Comunista de Guatemala - PCG) for use among themselves. This meeting, later referred to as the First Congress of the Communist Party of Guatemala, marked a turning point in the development of Communism in the country. At this meeting a dispute broke out between the "political" and "labor" factions over a demand by Victor Manuel Gutierrez that the PCG come fully into the open, actively champion the interests of the masses, and become essentially a workers' party. A number of labor leaders broke away from the PCG and early in the following year founded the overt but not legally registered Revolutionary Workers' Party of Guatemala (Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala - PROG). During 1950 and 1951, PROG

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served as a school for the training and indoctrination of the most militant and active sector of the working class.

On 20 May 1950, during the electoral campaign, the majority Communist group (the clandestine PCG) headed by Fortuny broke with the pro-administration PAR which it felt was not sufficiently militant. The following month the PCG began publication of a weekly newspaper, Octubre, from which its sponsors received the nickname Octubristas. The PCG participated actively in the campaign of Jacobo Arbenz and after his election began to operate more openly. In April 1951, a month after Arbenz' inauguration, the Octubre group publicly assumed the name of the Communist Party of Guatemala (PCG). On 21 June 1951, the first anniversary of the founding of Octubre, PCG held a public rally attended by high government officials and leaders of the revolutionary parties.

Under Arbenz Communism in Guatemala came of age. Although their position was far from secure and a great deal depended upon the continued good will of the President, the Communists were able to operate freely and were part of the government coalition. During 1951 the Communists completed the task of forging a unified labor federation which would be under their control and healed the split in their ranks which had existed since 1949. Cooperation between the unregistered Communist parties, the PROG and PCG increased throughout 1951, and in December Gutierrez wrote from Moscow that he considered the need for unity to override any personal or tactical differences with the PCG leaders. Upon his return to Guatemala in January 1952 the PROG was dissolved, and most of its members swelled the ranks of the PCG. As part of the merger, the line of the PCG was adjusted toward closer links with the masses and full support for agrarian reform.

By the end of 1952 the Communists were able to set their sights upon becoming a mass party. At its second congress in December 1952, the party adopted a new name, new statutes, and a new program, all designed to facilitate the transition to full

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legality and rapid growth. On 18 December 1952, the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo - PGT) was granted full legal status despite the existence of a constitutional prohibition against "political organizations of a foreign or international character" and the public statement by top PGT leaders that the work of the congress was inspired and shaped by the decisions of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Guatemalan Communists made their greatest gains during 1953. Two of their most prominent leaders, Fortuny and Carlos Manuel Pellecer, were included on the government's coalition ticket for congressional elections in January. This acceptance of the PGT as a full partner in the regime was institutionalized in the National Democratic Front (Frente Democratico Nacional - FDN) made up of representatives of the four government parties, organized labor, and the peasants' confederation. The General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala - CGTG) was completely controlled by the Communists, and the National Peasants' Confederation (Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala - CNCG) was subject to increasing Communist influence. The PAR, the largest government party, was weakened by constant dissension and leaned upon the Communists for support against the pretensions of the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (Partido de la Revolucion Guatemalteca - PRG). The PRG itself contained an influential group of Communists and sympathizers who prevented it from developing into a serious rival of the PGT. The final member of the FDN, the National Renovation Party (Partido Renovacion Nacional - PRN) was so weakened by opportunism corruption, and dissension that it was no longer a significant force. Its secretary general, Jaime Diaz Rozzotto, was secretly a Communist. Under these conditions the Communists came to exert an increasing and often decisive influence over the policies of the Arbenz government.

The most distinctive characteristic of the Arbenz regime was the close relationship existing

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between the Communists and the President. They brought Arbenz readily mobilized popular support, furnished badly needed organizational and administrative talent, and provided ideological underpinning for his program. Arbenz in turn accepted them as the spokesmen of the masses, considered them his most trustworthy and honest collaborators, and entrusted them with the administration of certain key patronage-dispensing agencies and programs. His endorsement of the Communists effectively prevented the other parties from attempting to isolate the PGT. Competition of the PAR and PRG over the spoils of office enabled the Communists to assume a strategic balance of power position. At a time when these parties were divided and hesitant, the Communists had the advantage of a systematic doctrine and approach to political action, discipline, cohesiveness, and organization which the others lacked. Combined with control of organized labor and the favor of the President, this was sufficient to enable the Communists to seize leadership of the national social revolution and turn it to their ends.

By the end of 1953 they were able to shape government policy and influence the course of national affairs to an extent unknown at that time to any other Communist party outside the Soviet orbit. Largely through its control of the administration of agrarian reform the PGT had built up a mass base in a half dozen of Guatemala's 22 departments, and elected mayors in four towns.

With the successful anti-Communist revolution in June 1954, the Communists, whose future had been bound to that of the Arbenz regime, found themselves faced with an entirely new and difficult situation. They were suddenly confronted with the problem of survival under a hostile regime--that of Carlos Castillo Armas (1954-57)--whose leaders were pledged to eradicate Communist influence and destroy the party. Throughout the Castillo administration, PGT remained a relatively ineffective clandestine organization. Most of the Communist leaders left the country for exile in other Latin American countries. Membership fell from nearly 4,000 to less

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than 400. During the Castillo regime slow but steady progress was made in rebuilding the party, but it was kept well in check by the government.

After the assassination of Castillo in 1957 the Communists had an opportunity to improve materially their capabilities. However, they were not able to exercise any significant effect upon the elections of either October 1957 or January 1958.

Under President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes (1958-63), the Communists, their front groups, and other leftist elements steadily became more active, particularly following congressional failure to enact a strong anti-Communist law after the lapse in 1961 of a transitory constitutional article which had permitted the President to refuse admission into the country of certain Guatemalan Communists. A new compromise law enacted in deference to leftist pressure repealed the Castillo legislation that had established severe penalties for Communist activity. With the weakening of institutional controls, the party began to reorganize under the direction of returned exiles including most of PGT's principal leaders. Emboldened by relative indifference on the part of the government and by Fidel Castro's success in Cuba and the Bay of Pigs disaster, the party and its front groups began operating more openly. The party was successful in infiltrating government institutions, securing increased funding and arms shipments from Cuba, and sending PGT members to Cuba for training.

The resurgence of leftism was at its height in 1963 as political parties prepared for November elections. However, while the leftists were numerous and vociferous, their potential was lessened by their lack of unity. The prospect of Arevalo's candidacy loomed as a threat to both conservative elements and to the Communists. The Communists felt Arevalo had made too many concessions to the "imperialists" in recent years, and would be counter-revolutionary if elected. With the March 1963 coup, events overtook the party's quarrel over which

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candidate to support and confirmed for many PGT members the futility of pacific struggle.

Since March 1963, PGT has been in a continual state of reorganization. The military regime has administered the government for the most part under state of siege, with stringent controls to counter subversive activity. Raids, armed battle, and general harassment directed against PGT had practically ruined the party's hierarchic structure formed during the Ydigoras years.

Forced inactivity in PGT's usual spheres of operation has seriously affected the party but has by no means destroyed it. Instead, the party has turned its attention increasingly to violence. A growing demand for a PGT commitment to armed struggle was inspired by the survival of a guerrilla movement begun in 1961 in northeastern Guatemala and led by army defector Lt. Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. This group, the 13 November Revolutionary Movement, at first committed only to the overthrow of Ydigoras, has since evolved into a guerrilla and terrorist organization supported by and politically aligned with Cuban and Mexican Communists described by the PGT as espousing the Peking line. The PGT has since 1962 tried to control the 13 November group and in the process became itself heavily committed to violent tactics. During 1964 relations between the PGT and Yon Sosa fluctuated between extremes of cordiality and hostility, and in early 1965 the guerrilla movement split. The PGT in its most recent reorganization has given priority to military work in the form of the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes - FAR), now the guerrilla arm of the PGT.

Guatemalan security forces effected several significant raids against Communist safehouses during the summer of 1965. Many PGT members, including two high-level officers, have been jailed. These actions curtailed most PGT plans for terrorist action in July and August. Isolated incidents--assassinations and robberies--continued in the capital and in the northeast, but whether they are attributable to the PGT or to Yon Sosa is uncertain. PGT has been damaged not only by the government's anti-Communist action, but also by a split within its

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own ranks. A central committee member, Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, disenchanted with PGT's adherence to the Moscow line, defected from PGT in early 1965 with the intention of organizing a rival party espousing a harder line.

2. Position of the PGT

The swift and effective government action taken against the Communists following Guatemala's "Liberation" in 1954 by Castillo Armas and the relatively minimal Communist influence in the country since 1954 indicate that Communism did not take deep roots during the revolution. Political gains reaped by the party under President Ydigoras were lost with the imposition of a military regime in March 1963. The incumbent administration, not bound by constitutional guarantees of civil liberties, and operating under its own anti-Communist decree-laws which provide for rapid action against and stiff penalties for subversives, has been fairly successful in its repression of the PGT.

Although the party's organization has been severely damaged, it has been characteristic of the Guatemalan Communists that they have been able to survive under very adverse conditions. Their program of violence, particularly terrorist activity in the capital, has been maintained through most of Chief of Government Peralta's tenure and continues at present.

In 1965, the PGT experienced the defection of some low-level members who were unable to cope with their fear of police repression, of some youthful members who joined Yon Sosa's 13 November group in the northeastern mountains, and of several high-level members who objected to continued PGT adherence to Moscow. The numerical loss to PGT is unknown. Over the past few years, PGT membership had been fairly static at around 1,200, so that its current membership is estimated at about 1,000.

The reluctance of certain central committee and other high-level members to commit the PGT wholeheartedly to violent struggle has caused increasing internal dissension and criticism of the

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old guard leadership. Available information suggests that the party's main strength has recently shifted from the revolutionary era leaders to a hard-core middle level which has displayed its dynamism and willingness to employ its paramilitary training in guerrilla and terrorist activity.

In addition to its regular members, PGT can count on the willing collaboration of about 2,000 sympathizers, chiefly found among workers, students, teachers, and white-collar employees.

Many PGT leaders and members are in exile, mainly in Mexico and Cuba, but they continue to contribute to the direction of the party and participate in the making of policy. Some of the exiles clandestinely travel back and forth from Mexico to Guatemala to take part in meetings, to conduct training classes, or to fill temporary vacancies occasioned by the arrest or other indisposition of a key leader. Border-crossing for purposes of moving both men and arms appears not to be difficult from a security point of view; the border is not effectively patrolled.

A split is known to have occurred in the party in early 1965, but there is little information available on which to judge the seriousness of the break.

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3. PGT Influence in National Affairs

The PGT has been unable to participate openly in Guatemalan political affairs since the ouster of the Arbenz regime in 1954. Communist organizations have been illegal since that time. PGT's main political effort since 1963 has been to coordinate and control (in the guise of support) the activity of the non-Communist revolutionary groups. It has attempted to form a united resistance front composed

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of all parties opposed to the regime, emphasizing the need to overthrow the repressive government of the armed forces and working at convincing potential collaborators that Peralta will not permit honest elections. Essentially, the party can do little more than capitalize on unpopular actions of the government, exploit nationalist and anti-Yankee sentiment, and strive to infiltrate non-Communist leftist organizations. Because the military government has tightly controlled political activity since 1963, there is no open evidence providing insight on the effectiveness of PGT's appeal.

The party has had its greatest successes in the field of labor. Its ability to seize the leadership of the labor movement during Arevalo's presidency served as the foundation for its rise to political importance and influence under Arbenz. Although its control of organized labor was upset by the fall of Arbenz, the PGT has retained a proportionately greater influence among the urban workers than over any other sector of Guatemalan society, with the possible exception of the middle-class intellectuals. The working class was more adversely affected by the liberation of 1954 than any other group. After having been favored by the government for a decade, the workers suddenly found themselves the object of official mistrust and suspicion. Because the liberation occurred before most workers had begun to doubt the sincerity of Communist promises, there has been a tendency for labor to look upon the Arbenz era as a period when it enjoyed just recognition. Good prospects for a favorable labor response to Communism are somewhat offset by recent gains made in the trade union sphere by democratic organizers. However, only about 25,000 out of a total work force of about 1.5 million are organized, and the continued slow pace of democratic trade unionism could work for the Communists.

The tendency of many Guatemalan students to take an ultranationalist and radical position, combined with memories of the "glorious" role of the university students in the 1944 revolution, makes them receptive to the proposals of the

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Communist minority. Communist influence among the students at San Carlos University continues to be significant. Although moderates have been gaining ground in student organizations, the over-all student organization AEU is still dominated by extremists.



The party has low-level penetrations of the government who provide warning of government moves. There have been unconfirmed reports of some high-level official collaboration with the PGT and guerrillas.

The clandestine nature of PGT activities and the tendency on the part of the government and conservatives to use the label "Communist" indiscriminately against any opponent from the left make it difficult to judge the extent of true Communist influence. An important source of Communist influence is the unwitting aid to the PGT given by extremely conservative military officials, businessmen, and landowners who tend to equate trade unions, peasant organizations, and cooperatives with Communist organizations. The proximity of Cuba is another asset for the party. Transistor radios, readily available to illiterate campesinos, receive Radio Havana with ease. Cuban propaganda serves to reinforce their impression that only Communists are interested in their problems.

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The Communist Parties of Haiti

1. Introduction

Haiti has two Communist parties, the Party of Popular Accord (Parti d'Entente Populaire--PEP) and the Popular Party of National Liberation (Parti Populaire de Liberation Nationale--PPLN). Both are illegal, small, and relatively poorly organized. They engage in very little activity for fear of government reprisals, since Duvalier tolerates their continued existence only so long as they are not overtly antiregime. The Haitian Government does little to counter their limited clandestine anti-Duvalier activity and propaganda. Barring a complete breakdown of law and order, their capability of causing the regime any significant trouble is limited.

The main strength of the PEP and the PPLN lies in the fact that they constitute the only internal opposition with any degree of organization. Opposition political parties are banned; the only party permitted to exist is Duvalier's own Party of National Unity (Parti de l'Unite Nationale--PUN). Similar situations have existed throughout such a large portion of Haiti's history that non-Communist political forces have never been able to align themselves on a permanent basis. The Communist movement, on the other hand, has had the ideological incentive to survive underground for long periods of time and reappear under various names and complexions.

2. History

The Haitian Communist movement was begun in 1930 by two intellectuals, Max Hudicourt and Jacques Roumain. Illegal in the beginning, it remained an illegal underground party for the first sixteen years of its existence. Roumain, one of the country's leading poets and novelists, was deported to Mexico, where he died. Hudicourt, also exiled, spent much of his time in the United States.

With the overthrow of the dictatorship of Elie Lescot in January 1946, the country entered a short period of relatively democratic government under

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the presidency of Dumarsias Estime. Estime's administration allowed a degree of political freedom which had previously been unknown in Haiti. It launched ambitious programs in the fields of education and economic development and allowed the development of a trade union movement for the first time. Political parties were permitted to form, among which were the Communist Party of Haiti, (Parti Comuniste d'Haiti--PCH) and the Popular Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Populaire --PSP).

The PSP grew out of the movement founded by Hudicourt and Roumain; this was apparent when Hudicourt arrived from New York soon after the fall of Lescot to take over its leadership. Its nature was also revealed by the position it took on international issues, and by the way it was viewed by international Communist authorities. The PSP began an intensive propaganda campaign against the Marshall Plan, dwelt incessantly on the dangers of "American imperialism," and attacked the Estime government for being subservient to the Americans. The Cuban Communist newspaper, Hoy, on 22 February 1946, stated that the PSP was based on the principles of Marxism with an immediate program which was conscious of the pressing needs of the Haitian people. Hoy criticized the PCH as "filled with infantile concepts." The PCH supported the Estime regime, including its cooperation with the United States, and was not openly accepted as a part of the international Communist movement.

There are two possible reasons for the development of two Communist parties in Haiti. The basic reason is perhaps the traditional inability of the Haitian Negro and mulatto to work together--the PCH was mostly a Negro party, while the PSP was formed by mulatto intellectuals. The second reason is believed to have been a tactical consideration on the part of the international Communist movement. Dual parties have been encouraged in several countries, one supporting the incumbent government and one in opposition to it. In this way no matter what direction domestic politics should take, one party would be in a position to

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work with, and perhaps control, the government.

In the election of 1946, PSP founder, Max Hudicourt, was elected to the Senate, and another party member was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. Even though Hudicourt was assassinated a few months after his election, the PSP survived until 1950 when President Paul Magloire declared it illegal. The PCH had become inactive in 1947, and many of the leading Communists of both parties began leaving the country around 1948. Most of them remained in exile until around 1958. During that decade, those Communists who remained in Haiti worked largely through labor and student groups, attempting to dominate them or influence their direction.

Around 1954 the group of PSP members who remained in Haiti split into two factions, one of which was the predecessor of the PPLN, the name which they adopted in 1960. The PEP was formed by a group of Communist intellectuals who were permitted, and in some cases invited, by Duvalier to return to Haiti in 1958. Recent efforts to unite the two parties have been unsuccessful. The main obstacle to unity has been personality conflicts between the leaders of the two groups, with ideological differences playing a minor role. Racial differences are no longer a factor, since both parties have Negro and mulatto members.

3. Present Posture

A. Popular Party of National Liberation--(PPLN)

The exact size of the PPLN is not known. The most recent, and probably the most accurate, information on membership was published in the PPLN internal bulletin, Bulletin-Liberation, in March 1964. At that time the PPLN claimed to have 500 members organized into 150 cells. The PPLN also has an estimated 500 to 1,000 sympathizers, most of whom have at one time or another been members of PPLN study groups or fronts. The PPLN's major front activity has been concentrated in a succession of short-lived youth fronts. One of the most

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recent, taking its name from a type of peasant attire, was called the Caracoa Bleu. It was organized around the end of 1962, and within a year, [redacted]

[redacted] The main activity of the Caracoa Bleu was that of sponsoring lectures, concerts, and art exhibits through which those attending received considerable Communist indoctrination. Members of the Caracoa Bleu were organized into brigades of 8 members each (the use of the word "cell" was consciously avoided). Those members who showed promise and interest were recruited into the PPLN. This front became increasingly inactive toward the end of 1964 and in early 1965 was believed to have been reorganized, taking the name Popular Youth League (Ligue de Jeunesse Populaire--LJP). This group continues to sponsor much of the same type activity carried on by the Caracoa Bleu.

The PPLN has no members presently participating in the Haitian Government. The party publishes no newspaper; the most recent effort of this nature was a publication called Haiti-Demain (Haiti Tomorrow) which appeared during 1962 and 1963 somewhat irregularly, but approximately on a monthly basis. The segments of the population which this paper attempted to influence were chiefly the urban workers, peasants, and the small middle class. The PPLN's propaganda line has for several years been much more activist than that of the PEP. The PPLN has concentrated heavily on indoctrination of the illiterate lower classes using such emotional themes as anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism. Since late 1963 the PPLN has advocated armed struggle against the government, but it is not believed to be capable of mounting a successful revolt at this time. Leaders of the PPLN include Max Chancy, Yves Barbot, and Roger Gaillard.

B. Party of Popular Accord--(PEP)

There is no precise information available concerning the number of PEP members and sympathizers. Most estimates of the membership are around 200, while estimates of the number of sympathizers range from 300 to 1,000. The PEP manifesto plays down

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the theme of class warfare, does not mention collectivization, and emphasizes that Haiti's major problems are caused by foreign ownership of capital, i.e., US "capitalists." The leader of the PEP was believed to be Edris Saint-Amand, about whom nothing has been heard since 1964. The exact identities of current leaders are not known.

The major front activity of the PEP was concentrated in the Intersyndical Union of Haiti (Union Intersyndicale d'Haiti--UIH), a now dormant labor federation over which the PEP exercised considerable control. The UIH was affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)--the international Communist labor front--and with its regional component, the Confederation of Latin American Workers (Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina--CTAL). The UIH was banned in 1963 and is believed to have been replaced by a clandestine front group.

In addition to trade union members, PEP propaganda and influence is directed toward a small group of leftist intellectuals. The PEP publication, Voix du Peuple, appeared between 1962 and 1964 clandestinely on a monthly basis; it now appears irregularly.

C. Communist infiltration of the government

There are no members of either party known to be participating in the Haitian Government. There are, however, several government officials who, while not affiliated with either party, have been members of an earlier Communist party or are considered Communist sympathizers. The most prominent of these are Herve Boyer and the Blanchet brothers, Paul and Jules, each of whom has held several cabinet posts. The minister of labor, Max Antoine, is not believed to be a Communist, but he is a personal friend of some of the leading Communists in the UIH.

4. International contacts and assistance

The PEP is the party recognized by international Communist authorities as the Haitian Communist Party. It is Moscow oriented; the amount of financial assistance it receives from Moscow, if any, is unknown,

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but it is believed to be receiving Soviet guidance which is passed via Mexico through a Haitian Communist exile, Gerard Pierre-Charles. The PPLN is not known to have any direct contact with Moscow; it is more Cuban-oriented and receives its guidance over Radio Havana which beams two programs daily to Haiti, one in French and one in Creole, to which PPLN members are instructed to listen. Recent Radio Havana broadcasts have been admonishing Haitians to overthrow Duvalier and have been assisting their preparation by reading excerpts from Che Guevara's guerrilla warfare handbook.

Most exiled Communists are located either in Europe or Mexico. The largest group is in France where they have formed an organization of approximately 150 students (most of whom are Communists or Communist sympathizers) called the Association of Haitian Students in Paris (Groupement des Haitiens Etudiants a Paris--GHEP) or the Federation of Haitian Students in Europe (Federation des Etudiants Haitiens en Europe--FEHE). Very little is known about this organization; it may actually be two separate organizations. The next largest group of Communist exiles is located in Mexico. This group is believed to number around 40; the name of their association is not known, but they reportedly publish a bulletin called Ralliement which is also circulated in Europe. In addition, there are probably around 40-50 Communist exiles studying in bloc countries.

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Appendix I - Leaders of the Haitian Communist movement through the years

A. The early days, 1930-1946

Jacques Roumain
Max Hudicourt
Pierre Hudicourt
Anthony Lespes
Max Sam
Felix D'Orleans Juste Constant
Antonio Vieux
Albert Mangones
Jean Brierre
Jules Blanchet
Leon Sahous
Roussan Camille

B. The Popular Socialist Party (PSP), 1946,
1st political bureau

Etienne D. Charlier
Jules Blanchet
Max Sam
Regnord Bernard
Anthony Lespes
Fritz Basquiat
Max Hudicourt

C. The Communist Party of Haiti (PCH), 1946,
1st political bureau

Felix D'Orleans Juste Constant
Roger Mercier
Edris Saint-Amand
Max Menard
Jacques Alexis
Andre Bistoury
Odel David

D. The Popular Party of National Liberation
(PPLN), 1954 to present

Yves Barbot
Antony Benoit - in exile in Africa
Max Chancy - in exile

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Yves Flavien - in exile
Roger Gaillard
Marcel Gilbert - in exile
Michel Hector - in exile
Claude Innocent - in exile
Frantz Loffuial
Alexandre Lavaud - in exile
Rodelin Charles
Guy Lominy

E. The Party of Popular Accord (PEP), 1958 to present

Jacques Alexis (executed ?) :
Joseph Verna - in exile :
Edris St. Amand - location unknown : FOUNDERS
Rodolphe Moise (may have joined PPLN):

F. The Intersyndical Union of Haiti (UIH)


Ulrich Joly
Andre Leroy

G. Caracoa Bleu and Popular Youth League


Albert Frederick
Claude Pierre-Antoine



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



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


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



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


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


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


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HONDURAS

1. Introduction

The Communist Party of Honduras is illegal. Its present strength is estimated to be approximately 1,500 to 2,000 members and around 3,000 sympathizers. The central committee of the PCH was located in San Pedro Sula until the October 1963 coup when most of the Communist leadership as well as many leaders of the non-Communist opposition went into exile. The PCH became so disorganized that, by the end of 1964, only two of the ten municipal committees and a few cells were functioning. In November 1964 an amnesty decree permitted the return of all exiles except ten of the Communist leaders whom the government considered dangerous. While the list of ten is still formally maintained, the present lenient policy of the government toward political exiles suggests that no attempt would be made to prevent any of these ten Communists from entering the country. Recent reports indicate that two and possibly three of the ten are presently in Honduras.

The PCH was founded on 10 April 1954. While the PCH is not a well-indoctrinated party it is a fairly well-disciplined organization. It has been retarded in its development by internal dissension, particularly among the top leadership, and has been criticized by the Communist parties of Guatemala and El Salvador for its lack of militancy and revolutionary zeal. On the other hand, the constant political instability and general underdevelopment of Honduras provides the PCH with a climate relatively favorable to the expansion of its influence. Furthermore, since 1960 its capabilities have been strengthened to some extent by assistance from Cuba.

2. History of Communism

Like most Central American countries, Honduras has suffered from an almost interminable series of dictatorships. Little opportunity for the development of political parties, Communist or any other

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kind, has taken place. After a period of relative freedom in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the 16-year-long dictatorship of General Tiburcio Carias Andino virtually stopped all political activity. When Juan Manuel Galvez was installed as president in 1948, the political atmosphere began to clear and political activity of all kinds became possible once again.

In such an atmosphere, the Communist Party of Honduras was not able to achieve the size or influence of its fellow parties in neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador, though for a few years in the 1920s and 1930s it made some progress, and under Galvez the Communists again became active.

Communism in Honduras began in the late 1920s, and the first labor organization in which the Communists were reported to have gained some influence was the Railroad Workers Union, established and recognized by the government in 1926. In this period the Communists were also active among the banana workers in the north coast area.

The most picturesque leader of these early Honduran Communists was Juan Pablo Wainwright, the foot-loose son of an English father and a Honduran mother. As a young man he had gone to the United States, where various misadventures had landed him in jail. Some time later he enlisted in the Canadian Army during World War I and fought in France. After his discharge he wandered widely in Europe, Africa, and the Far East, returning home in 1924.

The misfortunes of Honduran politics, however, soon had him on the move, this time visiting neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador. In the latter country he became a Communist, and in 1928 he returned home to organize the banana workers. After leading a violent strike among them in 1930 he was jailed, but succeeded in escaping to Guatemala.

Throughout this period he was a principal figure in Communist activities in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. He was implicated in the Communists' revolutionary attempt in El Salvador in January 1932, but succeeded in making good his escape to Guatemala.

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However, there he was captured once again, and was finally executed by the orders of General Ubico.

During the 1920s the most important labor organization in Honduras was the Honduran Workers Federation (FOH), the local affiliate of the Workers Federation of Central America (COCA). The Communists at first worked inside this group, but unlike their comrades in Guatemala and El Salvador they were unable to gain control of the organization. The Workers Federation refused to join the Communist-dominated continental labor group, the CSLA, and as a result, in 1929, the Communists in conformity with the Comintern's Third Period policy organized their own national labor group, the Honduran Sindical Federation (FSH).

The Sindical Federation was established by a congress held on May Day 1929 in Tela on the north coast. It claimed to have all the important unions in the country "among them the embattled Railroad Workers Union" (UFH) within its ranks. The headquarters were established in Tegucigalpa although most of its affiliates were on the north coast. The chief officials of the Communist union group were Abraham Ramirez, secretary general, and F. Armando Amava, secretary of internal affairs.

A second congress of the Honduran Sindical Federation met on May Day 1930 and resolved to concentrate activities in the banana fields, where "action committees" would be established, since full-scale trade unions were impossible because of "persecution." The congress also resolved to send a delegate to the "world congress in Moscow."

Soon afterward the Communists made a serious attempt to carry out the decisions of their trade union group. They called a general strike in the banana fields for 4 July. But on 18 June the government cracked down on them, and most of the leaders of the Federation were jailed or exiled to desolate or isolated parts of the country. In spite of this temporary setback, the Communists continued their work. They coordinated their activities closely with the Communist parties in neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador.

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Whether in conjunction with the Salvadoran movement, or not, the Communists launched a second general strike among the banana workers of the north coast of Honduras early in January 1932. President Colindres declared martial law and rushed troops to the area. The troops and the United Fruit Company's police rounded up the strike leaders and deported them to El Salvador, from where they never returned.

In 1932 President Tiburcio Carias Andino ascended to power. His regime ruthlessly crushed not only the Communists but all dissident political activities, and completely destroyed the trade union movement. For more than 16 years the Communist movement in Honduras was driven so far underground as virtually to cease to exist.

It was not until the inauguration of President Juan Manuel Galvez in late 1948 that the political situation in Honduras began to change once more. Moving slowly, Galvez took steps to allow the reorganization of the political parties. The opposition Liberal Party returned to lusty life, and a new party, the Honduran Revolutionary Democratic Party (PDRH), reappeared on the political horizon.

In the beginning many left-wing Liberals joined this new group, but it soon came under the control of the Communists. Although it was not an avowedly Communist party, the PDRH became the front behind which the Communists worked to rebuild their forces. As usual, they were active in the labor movement. Although President Galvez did not allow the reorganization of trade unions until the summer of 1954, numerous mutual benefit societies did appear. One of these mutualist groups, the Society of Graphic Arts, was organized in Tegucigalpa in 1949 and began publishing a periodical, Voz Obrera (Voice of the Worker). Early in 1950 Voz Obrera undertook to establish a labor-organizing committee under the name of Workers Committee for Organization (CCO). It included in its ranks the printing-trades workers, the shoemakers, the tailors, and other groups.

Voz Obrera, meanwhile, became increasingly pro-Communist in its orientation. Articles by Vicente Lombardo Toledano appeared, and in various issues the

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paper announced its adherence to the Communist continental trade union group, the CTAL, and the World Federation of Trade Unions. It also gave publicity to events in neighboring Guatemala.

In September 1953, President Galvez moved against Voz Obrera and the PDRH. The newspaper was suppressed; its principal editors took refuge in the Guatemalan Embassy and left the country, while the party was outlawed.

Meanwhile the Communists had once again been exceedingly active among the banana workers. There is no doubt that many Hondurans crossed the loosely guarded frontier between Honduras and Guatemala, and received training in the Communist schools in Guatemala City. There they were taught the basic principles of trade union organization, were coached in public speaking, and were indoctrinated with Communist ideas and ideology.

The Honduran Communists got what seemed like their great opportunity in the strike which broke out in the banana fields along the north coast in May 1954. It is a subject of controversy whether or not the Communists were responsible for organizing this walkout. President Galvez asserted that he had proof that the banana strike was originally intended as an attempt to overthrow his government. He claimed that Guatemalan Communist leaders Jose Manuel Fortuny, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, and Carlos Manuel Pellecer were in Livingston, near the Honduran frontier, from where they directed the movement. While President Galvez and the officials of the United Fruit Company maintained that the spark was lit by the Communists, the strike leaders, Communists and non-Communists alike, maintained that the movement was spontaneous.

Whether or not they began it, there is little doubt that pro-Communist elements became the first leaders of the walkout. However, after the strike had been in progress for about a month, these leaders were deposed from the central strike committee, and thereafter the leaders of the strike, and the negotiators of the final settlement early in July, were strongly opposed to the influence of the Communists and the PDRH.

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After the strike was over, the struggle for control of the newly organized banana workers continued. The Central Trade Union Committee (the old central strike committee), firmly in the hands of the non-Communists, summoned a conference in order formally to organize a union among the United Fruit Company's employees. Its efforts were opposed by the PDRH faction.

The PDRH leaders controlled the workers' groups in the principal company towns scattered throughout the United Fruit Company (UFCO) holdings. The representation at the union convention was so arranged that the plantation workers, who make up the great majority of the company's employees, were adequately represented.

The founding conference of the new banana workers' union met on 28 August 1954. Most of the PDRH elements boycotted the meeting, and it was completely in the hands of the non-Communists. The PDRH elements, meanwhile, had set about the organization of what would amount to a rival union among the United Fruit workers. The control of the banana workers of the Standard Fruit Company remained firmly in the hands of the non-Communists.

In October 1954, another threat to the nation's political stability arose as a result of the presidential elections to choose a successor to President Juan Manuel Galvez. There were three candidates: ex-dictator General Tiburcio Carias Andino of the Nationalist Party; Abraham Williams of the Reformist Party; and Jose Ramon Villeda Morales of the Liberal Party.

The election campaign took place in a tense atmosphere. Threats of civil war if they lost emanated from all three parties. It seemed almost certain that the election would deteriorate into armed conflict. Although the Liberal Party received more votes than either of its opponents, and many observers felt that it had really elected its candidate, no nominee was recognized as having received the majority of 51 percent of the popular vote which was

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required by the nation's constitution. The election was then thrown into congress, but no party had the two-thirds majority of the house which was necessary for election.

A deadlock occurred. President Galvez took "leave" and went to Panama, leaving the presidency in the hands of the vice president, Julio Lozano. When the constitutional time limit for the election of the president was reached, Lozano declared a "constitutional dictatorship." Announcing that no new chief executive had been elected, he declared that the newly elected congress was dissolved and that he would continue in office for two years after which he would call new elections for both the presidency and congress. The solution of the crisis was accepted by all parties. Lozano was able to form a three-party cabinet in which the key posts were held by members of the majority Liberal Party. A national consultative assembly, also composed of members of the three parties, was set up as a substitute for congress.

With the inauguration in October 1954 of the Julio Lozano regime (1954-56), the Communists were subjected to the same political suppression which affected all opposition to the government.

A new crisis, however, occurred in October 1956. President Lozano had decided to stay in power, in spite of his promises not to do so when he originally took over two years previously. He presided over elections for a constituent assembly, which were unanimously won by Lozano's supporters who had announced in advance that they intended to name the provisional president as constitutional chief executive.

After a few days of protest by the forces opposed to Lozano--the Liberals and the Nationalist followers of General Carias--the President was overthrown by a military coup. The members of the new junta announced that they had seized power because of the fraudulent nature of the elections presided over by Lozano and the fact that the majority of the people were opposed to his regime.

The Communists played no part in this political crisis. The peaceful resolution of the situation

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prevented them from capitalizing on a civil war, which might well have given them a chance to offer "support" to one faction or another, thus enabling them for the first time to become a significant factor in the nation's political life. Membership in the PCH at the end of the Lozano regime was estimated to be no more than 600 plus an equal number of sympathizers.

3. Communism at Present

A Liberal Party administration, under the leadership of Dr. Jose Ramon Villeda Morales, took office in December 1957. During the six years Villeda held office, opposition groups, including the Communists, were permitted considerably more freedom of action than in the past. The PCH made significant gains, not only in expanding its influence among students and labor groups, but also in infiltrating the government, especially the Ministry of Public Education. Villeda, while admitting his concern over the possible danger of Communism to Honduras, continued to display what many observers considered a "soft" attitude toward the PCH. He maintained that Communism could not be destroyed by negative suppression, but rather by constructive governmental action which would rob Communism of its appeal. Villeda sought the support of as much of the leftist element as possible, apparently in the belief that he could control and use the PCH for his own purposes. He reportedly held occasional meetings with PCH leaders in order to inform them just what degree of opposition his government would tolerate.

The 3 October 1963 coup brought to power a military government supported by the Nationalist Party, the more conservative of the two major Honduran parties. Since that time the government has pursued a more restrictive policy toward Communist activity, including the expulsion from Honduras of most of the party leaders. Most of these exiles, including party first secretary Dionisio Bejarano Ramos, went to Mexico, where they were able to establish international Communist contacts with greater facility than had been possible in Honduras. Since the amnesty decree of November 1964, most Communists who had not already returned to Honduras clandestinely have been readmitted to the country and are attempting to rebuild the PCH organization.

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The Communist Youth of Honduras (JCH) was created by the PCH in 1961 as part of its policy of emphasizing the recruitment of youth.

The JCH is the youth section of the Communist movement but its members are not under party discipline or control. The leading members of the JCH are Jorge Arturo Reina Idiaquez, Carlos Falk, Oscar Melera, Rodil Rivera Rodil, and Ismael Matute Gutierrez. The JCH is not organized on a solid cell basis as is the PCH. It is composed of young workers as well as students, and has followers in labor unions, schools, and in the National University of Honduras. The JCH may have as many as 600 activists and sympathizers. Through these followers it exercises some control over student and youth groups. Prior to the October 1963 coup, Reina reportedly had formed the JCH groups into assault brigades and was conducting classes in military and paramilitary tactics at his ranch near Tegucigalpa. Reportedly the JCH has received considerable assistance from Cuba, especially in the form of scholarships.

The principal youth front is the University Reform Front (FRU) formed in 1958 by Reina. The FRU has controlled the Federation of Honduran University Students (FEUH) during only one school year, 1958-59, but it has lost other elections by a small margin of votes; it consistently shows strength in such important faculties as law and economics. Factionalism among the non-Communist student groups at the university during 1963 and 1964 has also contributed to the strength of the FRU. One such group, the Democratic Integrated University Front (FIDU), supposedly affiliated with the Liberal Party, is believed to be heavily infiltrated by JCH members. The principal strength of the FRU is in the school of economy in the university, whose student body organization has been controlled by the FRU for several years. The dean of the school of economy is Cecilio Zelaya Lozano, who is a Communist and belongs to perhaps the outstanding Communist family in Honduras.

The concentration by the PCH on recruitment of youth starts at the secondary school level. The emphasis at this level, however, appears to be placing Communists in teaching positions rather than on creating active front groups among the students. The Communist line and Marxist theory were taught in many secondary schools during the Liberal Party administration

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of Villeda Morales. The most notable success of the PCH on the secondary school level was the establishment of a Marxist high school, the Alfonso Guillen Zelaya High School in Tegucigalpa. This school is named for a leftist Honduran poet and is largely staffed by teachers of Communist persuasion. The application for its establishment was approved by the pro-Communist Director of Secondary Education, Manuel Antonio Santos y Santos, before his dismissal from that post in late January 1962. Since the coup in October 1963, some effort has been made to correct this situation. The minister of public education from October 1963 to June 1965, Dr. Eugenio Matute Canizales began dismissing some Communists from teaching positions before the end of 1963. Matute devoted most of his dismissals to members of the Liberal Party in order to provide more jobs for Nationalists.

FECESITLIH, the Central Labor Federation in Tegucigalpa, is Communist controlled. However, the elections for a new directorate of FECESITLIH in October 1965 resulted in the election of an anti-Communist and a pro-Communist slate. Both factions have presented their slates to the Labor Ministry for approval and the indications are that the anti-Communist slate will be approved as the new directorate. Should this take place the Communist control of FECESITLIH will have been eliminated. Its total membership of roughly 2,500 represents less than ten percent of organized labor. Formerly the PCH's most valuable labor asset was SITRASFRUCO, the Standard Fruit Company labor union in La Ceiba. The Communist control of SITRASFRUCO was eliminated at the union elections in early 1963. The union, now called SUTRASFCO, has now over 2,000 members and is affiliated with FESITRANH, the large north coast labor union.

The PCH has had a notable lack of success in organizing peasants and women. In the case of the small farmers this lack of success was due to the organization of the National Association of Honduran Campesinos (ANACH). This organization was founded after a training program held in June 1962 sponsored by the FESITRANH, in which a total of 150 peasant leaders were given orientation courses in agrarian reform, community development, and cooperative movement and related subjects. ANACH later

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received legal recognition from the government and eventually was admitted to the North Coast Labor Federation, FESITRANH. The original effort of the PCH to organize a front through which they could control the farmers began in 1961 with the formation of the Central Committee for the Unification of Subsistence Farmers, Comitè Central de Unificacion Campesina (CCUC). In 1962 the name of the organization was changed to the National Federation of Honduran Subsistence Farmers, Federacion Nacional de Campesinos Hondurenos (FENACH), in an attempt to take advantage of the organizational name of ANACH by confusing the peasants into believing that FENACH and ANACH were the same. FENACH leaders failed in this maneuver and then made overtures to ANACH to consolidate their efforts under the banner of ANACH, the legally recognized union. When the ANACH leaders refused even to talk to FENACH leaders, the latter organization eventually ceased to exist.

Women, except for the female members of the PCH, have manifested even less interest than the subsistence farmers in joining PCH front groups. Since around 1959 the PCH has attempted on an average of once a year to organize a women's front, each one of which was dissolved after a few meetings because of lack of interest. The main reason for this lack of success is that Honduran women traditionally do not like to appear in public as rabble rousers. Only the most dedicated Communist would allow herself to assume such a role; therefore, the nucleus around which each of these short-lived organizations was formed appears to have been the same handful of female PCH members. Because of this, a new approach was tried in 1963 with the formation of the Liberationist Women's Confederation (COFELI). Membership in this group was intended to be drawn predominantly from those women who were already members of the PCH. Nothing further has been heard of COFELI, and it is, therefore, assumed to have gone the way of its predecessors.

The government of Villeda Morales had taken steps to control the inflow of Communist propaganda through the mails and customs and with some success. It was less effective in the restriction of subversive travel because resources for border and coastal patrol were inadequate. After the successful coup of

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October 1963, the Lopez military regime cracked down hard on the PCH, which resulted in many of its leaders going into exile. However, since the amnesty decree of 24 November 1964, with the exception of sporadic arresting of Communist Party members and sympathizers, the Lopez government has, to a large extent, left the Communists alone. Lopez has continued the policy of the Villeda Morales government in restricting and controlling the flow of Communist propaganda through the mails and customs. It is estimated that 75 percent of the propaganda entering through the postal system is intercepted by Honduran authorities, but border and coastal surveillance facilities still appear inadequate. Semana Popular has been considered to be the official PCH publication for some time. It is a mimeographed paper which appears infrequently and is clandestinely distributed. In mid-1965, Unidad, a new clandestine publication of the PCH, appeared. In October 1965 Pedro Brizuela informed the Municipal Committee in San Pedro Sula that the PCH would again publish a newspaper in Honduras and that this periodical would be ready for distribution in mid-October 1965. The FAP began publishing Avance, its official paper, in June 1965. Avance is considered an official party publication and is openly distributed. El Cronista, the left-wing Tegucigalpa daily, which formerly slanted its news coverage to show the United States Government in the most unfavorable light possible, has toned down its anti-US position considerably. However, its Sunday edition has a much more violent anti-US position and maintains its status as it did previously. While there are no bookstores in Honduras dealing exclusively in Communist literature, several are noted for their ability to provide such literature on request and are operated by Communist party members or sympathizers. There are the Libreria Mexico in Tegucigalpa, the Libreria Navarro in Comayaguela, and the Libreria Atenea in San Pedro Sula, with a branch in Tegucigalpa. Other bookstores which deal in Communist literature are La Idea in Tegucigalpa, El Faro in Comayaguela, and Books in America in San Pedro Sula. The Libreria Ramon Rosa in Tegucigalpa deals exclusively in Marxist and Communist literature, but it is a reading room rather than a bookstore.

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Radiobroadcasts originating in Honduras are not closely regulated by the government, but there are no Communist-oriented broadcasting stations in Honduras. Reception of broadcasts from Cuba on medium wave is poor except on the north coast; Radio Havana reception is excellent, however, in short wave in most areas of Honduras. Radio Havana content is slanted toward the subsistence farmers, plantation workers, and unskilled laborers, using such themes as "Yankee imperialism," the need for revolution in Latin America, how the Cuban revolution has benefited the Cuban people, and attacks on the Alliance for Progress. Radio Peking is received only on the more expensive and powerful short-wave sets. However, Radio Moscow is received on any moderately priced radio with the proper short-wave bands of which many Japanese models are readily available in Honduras.

During the period from 1964 to 1965, some 24 Hondurans were in attendance at the Marxist/Leninist Cadre School in Moscow. In 1965, about 70 Hondurans were attending the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow. Another 100 or more Hondurans are presently studying in schools in Cuba, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

The potential for terrorism, sabotage, and other violence rests with three revolutionary organizations: the pro-Castro Francisco Morazan Movement (MFM), the Popular Action Front (FAP), the revolutionary front of the PCH, and the United Front of Liberal Unity and Action (FUAL). The MFM was formed in Cuba in 1963 by the more militant members of the group of JCH members who had received scholarships to study in Cuba. Upon the return of Oscar Simeon Martinez and Mariano Aguilar Ouyela, the MFM began to recruit members in the late summer of 1964. Since the abortive attack on the Rio Lindo Hydroelectric Plant in March 1965, the MFM has not pursued any militant activity. The arrest and detention of Martinez and Aguilar

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

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along with other Cuban-trained MFM members has had a denigrating effect on the MFM and its present activities do not include overt acts of violence. The MFM claims a membership of 100 in the Tegucigalpa Central District with an additional 200 members and/or sympathizers in the Department of Francisco Morazan which encompasses the capital. The estimated strength of members and supporters in San Pedro Sula and the north coast area is claimed to be 500, which appears somewhat excessive. The MFM believes that their greatest potential for support lies in the Department of Olancho. Concentrated attempts to organize the MFM in Olancho have not been very successful, however. The MFM is not controlled by the PCH and its leaders are not under Communist Party discipline. The FAP, on the other hand, is entirely a PCH organization. The party wants this organization to be its united front of national liberation. Most of its leaders and activists are members of the military command (commando militar) of the party and have received training in Cuba and the USSR. They are now training Honduran cadres in sabotage, street fighting, tactics, demolition, bomb making, guerrilla warfare, and other methods of violence. The FUAL is comprised of an unknown number of leftist members of the Liberal Party of Honduras, and is led by Dr. Rodolfo Pastor Zelaya, a successful doctor in San Pedro Sula. FUAL support is localized in the north coast. The organization is small but vocal and has published leaflets advocating revolutionary acts against the Lopez government.


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THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT OF JAMAICA

1. Introduction

There is no Communist party in Jamaica, but rather several Communist front groups. These groups have been unable to unite into an effective coalition despite having received considerable outside urging and having made a number of abortive attempts. Should they be able to unite, however, an inviting area exists for them to exploit among the large body of unemployed and underemployed, particularly in the slums of Kingston.

Jamaica has long been free of the instability which has troubled other Caribbean countries. A strong tradition of parliamentary rule exists, based on a working two-party system. The ruling Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and the opposition People's National Party (PNP) both are essentially conservative parties with broad popular support based primarily on their respective labor unions. The large rural population is not a separate political force, but finds representation, along with other well-defined interest groups, in the two major parties.

Jamaica's long-term prospects for continuing stability are not all bright, however. The rapid economic growth of the 1950s, which was based primarily on bauxite development, has leveled off. Unemployment is estimated to be between 18 and 25 percent and is coupled with a rapid population expansion. Extremely bad living conditions exist for many Jamaicans who present a prime target for Communist agitators and organizers.

2. A Brief History of Jamaican Communism

For many years the Communists in Jamaica worked inside the PNP and its associated trade union group, the Trade Union Council (TUC). The leaders of the TUC were from the beginning the left wing of the PNP. The TUC joined the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) at its founding congress, and remained in that body long after its democratic membership had withdrawn. By 1952, Norman Manley, head of the PNP, and other party leaders were highly concerned

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with the possible influence of the pro-Communist element on the PNP's chances for winning the coming election and for conducting an effective government after the election. Party leaders became convinced that the left-wing group was trying to organize a party within a party. Charges of disloyalty to the PNP and its principles and of trying to organize a Communist group within the party were made by the PNP executive, and the left-wing group was expelled following a public trial.

Those expelled from the PNP split into two factions, one headed by solicitor and intellectual Communist Richard Hart who founded the Jamaican Federation of Trade Unions (JFTU), and the other led by Ken and Frank Hill which retained the TUC name. The PNP established another trade union which quickly attracted most of the following of the dissension-torn TUC. The TUC sponsored the formation of the National Labor Party which, however, became defunct following its failure to elect any candidates in the 1955 elections. The TUC joined the Federation of Christian Trade Unions, but in March 1964 merged back into the PNP's labor organization.

Ferdinand Smith, a well-known Communist in the international labor movement and an officer of the WFTU, returned to his native Jamaica in 1952. He teamed up with JFTU leader Richard Hart, and became president of the union, which subsequently affiliated with the WFTU. Hart and Smith formed the People's Educational Organization (PEO) in 1952, which they later reorganized and renamed the People's Freedom Movement (PFM) in 1954. The PFM failed to elect any of its candidates to the House of Representatives in January 1955 or to municipal office in March 1956, but maintained its overt operations. However, police raids during 1954 effectively disrupted the PFM's activities. The party attempted to organize groups in both Kingston and rural areas but had little success in attracting members. Party leaders tried to form a sugar workers' union and a factory workers' union to affiliate with the JFTU. The WFTU recognized the JFTU, but both the government and employers ignored it completely. Its scant membership quickly evaporated when it became apparent that the union could not help them.

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The Jamaican Youth Movement, originally formed by the government during the early years of World War II, was taken over by Hart, but it, too, failed to produce any appreciable results. Smith became ill, and the PFM suffered from a debilitating lack of leadership. Membership lagged and funds were almost invariably insufficient to undertake any major projects. In 1956 a new party chairman was as unsuccessful as his predecessors in spurring recruitment. Smith continued to receive some funds from the WFTU and tried to take some credit for the 1959 sugar strikes, but his failing health progressively restricted his activities.

In mid-1961 the PFM seemed to be benefiting from the impact of the Cuban revolution, and some members were thought to be receiving funds and guidance from Cuba. Activity picked up and members attempted to exploit the Rastafarian movement, a black supremacist, back-to-Africa cult which, however, proved to be too internally disorganized and individualistic to lend itself to Communist discipline.

In 1962 the PFM split into two factions. The original and more moderate group, headed by Hart, took the name of the Socialist Party of Jamaica (SPJ). The other faction contains more radical members who retain the PFM name but prefer to operate through a front, the Unemployed Workers Council (UWC). Winston Monroe heads the UWC and the PFM. The UWC has participated with members of major party trade union organizations in demonstrations, usually exploiting such economic issues as unemployment. In addition they have organized a few small pro-Castro, anti-US demonstrations which have never been able to attract more than a few onlookers. The UWC continues in its role as the militant arm of the PFM and reportedly hopes to send some members to Cuba for guerrilla training. In 1965, some UWC members evidently did not find its policies sufficiently revolutionary, and they broke away to establish the embryonic Youth Force for National Liberation (YFNL). The YFNL has become practically defunct since its leader, Keith Miles, returned to England.

The SPJ also apparently suffers from considerable intraparty dissension. In 1964 Richard Hart moved

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to British Guiana to assist his close friend Cheddi Jagan and to serve as editor of the Mirror, the organ of Jagan's People's Progressive Party. Shortly after Jagan's failure to win the 1964 elections, Hart moved to Great Britain. He appears more interested in British Guianese affairs than in returning to Jamaica. Purcel Lawson who currently heads the SPJ has borne the brunt of considerable criticism from fellow SPJ members. The SPJ has been inactive in recent months and the party seems likely to remain in its present state of disarray for the immediate future.

Both the PFM/UWC and the SPJ openly espouse Communist doctrine. They have jointly supported and publicly shared in the activities of such organizations as the Friends for Cuba Committee, which is now virtually inactive. Both British and Cuban Communists have exerted considerable pressure on the two groups to unite into a representative leftist front. They have been promised assistance if they can combine with the left-wing of the PNP and the militant youth organization of the PNP known as the Young Socialist League (YSL).

Although the YSL was created by the PNP in 1962, it is no longer responsive to the moderate leaders of the party. YSL President Hugh Small has led the group's drive to organize followers and to spread Marxist teachings into rural areas. The YSL has been quite effective in attracting members. It is not fully Communist controlled, but many of its leading members are known Communists. Leroy Taylor, one of the party's leading figures has been to Cuba and is actively fostering a pro-Castro party orientation.

Because of the YSL's espousal of extreme leftist doctrines, it may soon be expelled from the PNP. YSL leaders attempted to take over the PNP during the party's 1965 congress. Although they were not successful in getting the PNP to accept extreme socialist measures in the party platform, their strength and organization were surprising, and the YSL is a distinct threat to party moderates. The YSL willingly lends itself to Communist purposes and probably justifiably deserves its characterization as the best hope of the far left for eventually taking power in Jamaica.

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3. Strength and Supporting Groups

There are probably not more than thirty or forty hard-core Communists in Jamaica, and approximately 700 sympathizers. The membership and sympathizers are divided fairly evenly between the PFM/UWC and the SPJ. In addition, the YSL has a following estimated to be between 700 and 1,000, and although most of these persons could not be considered Communists, they are certainly sympathizers with extreme leftist causes and responsive to the direction of extremists.

Lack of funds has been a chronic problem for Jamaican Communists, and when combined with their internal disorganization and lack of effective leadership, has made it almost impossible for the party to produce significant political action either alone or in concert with other groups. The various fronts have attempted to exploit the 20,000 or so members of the Rastafarian sect, but so far have had little, or no, success. At the present time the YSL seems the most likely source of support for the goals of Communism in Jamaica, particularly if the YSL includes prominent members of the left-wing of the PNP in its ranks.

In addition to the supporters of Communist causes mentioned above, there are a few self-styled "independent" Communists, such as J.H.R. (Rolly) Simms, Vincent Green, and H.G. Sinclair. Sinclair has been identified with the SPJ and has been in and out of the PNP as well.

The Communists appear to have few adherents among either trade union or student groups, but they continue their efforts to penetrate such organizations and to exploit dissatisfaction with the government's conservative policies.

4. Foreign Influence

The various Communist fronts have no established international ties and receive neither direction nor important financial or materiel support from abroad. They do, however, remain in close contact with Cuban, British, and British Guianese Communists who take a considerable interest in Jamaica and its strategic location. All of them continuously exhort the

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Jamaicans to form a united front; the Cubans reportedly have promised substantial financial assistance should a front be formed which includes representatives of the SPJ, UWC/PFM, YSL, YFNL, and the left-wing of the PNP.

After the initial impact of the Cuban revolution, little direct benefit appears to have accrued to Jamaica's Communists from Fidel Castro's neighboring regime. There are approximately 30,000 Jamaicans resident in Cuba, and the government has found it prudent to maintain cool, but correct, relations with Castro. Social, cultural, and athletic exchanges have been limited, and the government has generally followed a policy of restricting and carefully controlling travel to and from Cuba.

No Communist bloc country other than Cuba has been allowed to establish a diplomatic presence in Jamaica and trade relations are negligible. The Sino-Soviet split appears to have had little effect on Jamaican Communists who are not really responsive to either party. There is a fairly sizable Chinese community in Kingston, and in August 1965 it was the object of mob violence by envious members of the economically hard-pressed Negro community. Although some propaganda from Red China is circulated and some citizens have apparently visited the mainland, there is little to tie the island's Chinese to Communist China.

5. Dissident groups

Because there is no official Communist Party in Jamaica, it is impossible to name any of the fronts

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
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as more dissident than any other. There does not seem to be any question of the Communist orientation of any of these groups, it is only a matter of the choice of leaders under whose direction Communist activities shall be conducted. Should a sufficiently important issue or a charismatic leader with real popular appeal arise, there seems nothing to preclude the unification of the splinter groups into a cohesive party.


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7. Members of Legislature

None

8. Trend in Size of Congressional Representation

None

9. Leaders of Communist Party


Socialist Party of Jamaica
Peoples Freedom Movement/
Unemployed Workers Council

Richard Hart


Winston Monroe

10. Organization of the Communist Party

No official party exists, and the front groups do not have formal organizational structures.



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



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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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COMMUNISM IN NICARAGUA

1. Introduction

Communism has never been a major force in Nicaragua, but assistance from the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba has enabled the party to maintain itself as a possible, if weak, threat to stability. The party is small and operates effectively only through front groups. Its appeal is limited and the recent boom in the Nicaraguan economy has reduced its attractiveness to Nicaragua's growing middle class. The Communists have sought for many years to establish a broad-based political front to oppose the dominant Liberal Party, but has met with almost no success. However, the political ambitions of General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, son of the late dictator, soon may produce unrest in the country and provide the Communists their long-sought opportunity.

2. A History of Communism in Nicaragua

In the middle 1920s, the leaders of the international Communist movement began to take more interest in Latin American affairs and found in Nicaragua a man that they could consider as an excellent example of "anti-imperialism." This man, General Augusto Cesar Sandino, was fighting the occupation of his country by US Marines and had undertaken a guerrilla campaign to force them out of the country. The Comintern set out to "capture" Sandino for their cause and at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow in 1928, a resolution was adopted which called on the proletariat of all countries to support Sandino, and a "Hands Off Nicaragua Committee" (MAFUENIC) was founded. The Comintern tried, rather unsuccessfully, to raise funds to back Sandino and, at the same time, discredit Sandino's agent in Mexico, since the general had little interest in the Communists' offer. Finally, the Communists kidnaped Sandino's brother to pressure the general into accepting assistance, and Sandino would have nothing further to do with the Reds. In 1934, Sandino agreed to meet with the government and end his guerrilla campaign, as the US occupation was ending. The Comintern then

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branded Sandino a traitor and a betrayer of Nicaraguan independence. When Sandino surrendered, President Sacasa also had a number of the nation's few Communists arrested.

Throughout the 1930s, the Communists operated within the Partido de Trabajadores de Nicaragua (PTN), which maintained friendly relations with the Comintern. In 1937, the PTN split over the presidential candidacy of General Anastasio Somoza Garcia and the Communists withdrew, forming their own party, the Partido Socialista (PS). The party's leaders at that time, including Juan Lorio and Manuel Perez Estrada, are still the policy makers within the party today.

In 1939, President Somoza closed down the PS and many of its leaders fled into exile. Armando Amador, a party founder, became active in the Communist Party of neighboring Costa Rica.

A rapprochement between Somoza and the PS took place during World War II, as the party took the international Communist line of supporting regimes who supported the United Nations. Somoza agreed to give the PS more freedom of action and supported the founding of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Nicaragua (CTN), which the Communists eventually came to control. Somoza built a number of "Workers' Houses" to serve as union meeting places and it is ironic that he was assassinated in the Casa Obrera in Leon in 1956.

After the conclusion of the war, Somoza sought to continue to deal with the PS to gain support against the liberal reaction to his dictatorship. He even went so far as to permit public meetings of the PS in 1946. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The PS claimed a strength of 1,500 members in December, 1946, and support of 25 percent of the electorate--an inflated figure. Despite his efforts to retain Communist support, Somoza resisted party pressure for legislative seats and government jobs.

During the campaign for the 1947 election, the opposition Conservatives sought the support of the

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PS against Somoza, but were unsuccessful. Somoza's candidate, Leonardo Arguello, was elected in a fixed vote, but Arguello turned against him and tried to follow an anti-Somoza and independent policy. The PS quickly supported Arguello, but Somoza removed the President and relations between the PS and the ruling Liberal Party declined rapidly.

During a meeting of the PS executive committee in 1948, in Managua, Somoza henchmen moved in and arrested almost the entire PS leadership. At the same time, the CTN was dissolved by the government and its leaders arrested. The party was thus forced to go underground, and has continued to operate in a semiclandestine fashion ever since.

In 1948 the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was formed to replace the CTN; the Communists soon dominated the new labor group, as they had its predecessor. In 1950 a revolt against Communist influence in CGT ranks succeeded in ending their control of the organization. In 1953 the Confederation of Nicaraguan Workers (CNT) was formed from non-Communist elements of the CGT and this organization still exists as the Nationalist Confederation of Democratic Workers (CNTD). The Communists formed their own trade union central organization, the General Union of Workers (UGT) which, however, was unable to get legal recognition and was the smallest of the country's central labor groups. After 1950, the Communists concentrated most of their efforts on the labor movement, since the party was numerically small and weak. It was estimated that at the time the Communists lost control of the CGT, the party had only 50 activists, a total membership of 200, and perhaps 1,000 sympathizers in a country of 1.5 million people.

The assassination of General Somoza in 1956 further restricted party activities as a state of siege was imposed on the country by the new President, the general's son, Luis. Since 1956, the party has become slightly more active, but the strong anti-Communist stand of the Somozas and President Rene Schick (1963-) has limited its effectiveness.

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In 1958, the Movilizacion Republicana (MR) was formed as a political front for the PS, since the PS--now known as the PSN--was legally proscribed. It has had little success in attracting anti-Somoza political elements or in forming a broad-based political opposition. The Communists have also founded a youth group, the Juventud Socialista Nicaraguense (JSN), which is very active among Nicaraguan students.


The rise of Castroism, caused the creation of an activist exile guerrilla group called the National Liberation Front (FLN) and later the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National (Sandinist Liberation Front, in memory of the old anti-US general). This group tried four times to invade Nicaragua--much the way Castro started his Sierra Maestre campaign. All four attempts were poorly organized and poorly led, and easily wiped out by the National Guard. Despite these setbacks, the FSLN has managed to establish a small cadre for a future guerrilla effort within the country.

3. Present Status of Communism

A. Strength and Supporting Groups

The party itself is outlawed. Its influence is strongest in labor and important among the youth and students. Its role in politics is negligible. The PSN now has about 200-250 members and counts some 1,000 sympathizers. There has been little increase in party membership in the post - World War II period. The party publishes a weekly paper, called Orientacion Popular, which has a circulation of about 5,000.

Politically, the PSN operates through the MR, formed in 1958. With an estimated 1,000 members, the MR enjoys a reputation of importance it has never merited. The MR strongly influenced the platform of the united coalition Nicaraguan Opposition Front formed in 1962 to oppose the candidacy of Rene Schick, but this effort collapsed before the election. The MR capitalizes on its reputation by door-to-door recruitment and registration and in 1964 it was estimated that the MR could mobilize some 15,000 votes in an election. A party propaganda sheet, "MR," is



published weekly. Recently, the MR has been trying to unite the FSLN, PSN, and the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) to oppose the candidacy of General Somoza for the presidency in 1967, but with little success.

Although the labor movement in Nicaragua has little strength, it is growing very rapidly in size and importance. The principal operational goal of the PSN continues to be the development of a Communist-controlled labor movement of such strength that it would be a threat to the stability of the government. The Communist-controlled faction of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), which is not recognized by the government, has been until recently the strongest organization in Nicaragua in terms of leadership, organization, and financing. It is led by dedicated Communists, at least two of whom have studied in the USSR. The known strength of the illegal CGT with its strongest component, the Managua Workers Federation (FTM), is between 2,500 and 3,000. The illegal CGT appears to have lost ground during 1964 and has not been able to match the rapid growth of the Social Christian Autonomous Trade Union Movement (MOSAN); nevertheless it still possesses considerable potential for disruptive activities.

Communists have long been a dominant force among Nicaraguan students, but, as in the labor movement, are being challenged by the Social Christians. The Juventud Socialista Nicarguense (JSN) is the official youth arm of the PSN and is the most active youth group in the country. The pro-Castro Revolutionary Student Front (FER) was formed in December 1962 and provides support for the Communist line. The FER lost considerable ground at the National University in the elections of August 1965 to an "independent" backed by the Christian Democratic Federation (FDC).

The Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth, (JPN), once an important group, ceased to function in 1963 and there are no known attempts to revive it. The Communists are active in the Student Center of the National University (CUUN) but are not known to have members on the executive board.

While PSN leaders profess a belief in eventual revolution against the Nicaraguan Government, the

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party has traditionally opposed violence as a tactic and has no paramilitary organization. Militant elements among the PSN-supported youth and labor organizations advocate immediate revolution, but the split between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions that has developed in other countries has not yet affected the PSN.

The FSLN, while directed from Cuba in its abortive efforts to invade Nicaragua, has now become a cadre for a paramilitary organization in Nicaragua. The FSLN failed completely to develop an internal subversion and terrorist guerrilla front at the time of the armed incursions from Honduras in July 1963. It is now attempting to work within the organizational structure of the PSN and MR. Communists are dominant in the movement, which also includes university extremists, self-seekers, and revolutionaries of little philosophical bent. While weak, the FSLN is believed capable of organizing sporadic acts of terrorism. Up to 100 Nicaraguans have been trained in Cuba, a number in guerrilla warfare.

B. Foreign Influence

Nicaragua maintains diplomatic relations with only one Communist country, Poland, whose ambassador is resident in Mexico City. Diplomatic relations with Cuba were broken in 1960. Trade with the bloc is negligible and total imports from Communist countries in 1964 amounted to only 0.2 percent of the year's total. The Communist countries have made no effort to try to gain a foothold in trade relations with Nicaragua, since the anti-Communist view of the government is well known.

In April 1965, a polio outbreak attracted a Soviet offer of vaccine and technicians. President Schick accepted the vaccine, but declined the technicians, despite pressure from the left to do so. The USSR has not made any further effort to exploit conditions in Nicaragua.

In general, the government under the Somozas and Schick has been outspokenly in favor of US foreign policy in regard to world Communism. The opposition Conservatives, who strongly oppose the candidacy of

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
Anastasio Somoza are also pro-US in orientation and would undoubtedly follow a similar foreign policy if they ever came to power.

Nicaraguan Communists have had many ties with international Communism. PSN members have attended numerous Communist-front congresses and have traveled extensively to the USSR and the eastern European countries for orders and training. Students selected by the party attend the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow, and other bloc schools. FSLN members and JSN hard-core followers receive training in Cuba in one of Castro's guerrilla training camps.


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D. Communists in Government

Nicaraguan Communists have been able to infiltrate a number of government entities, such as the ministries of economy, agriculture and education, the Social Security Institute, and the National Sports Commission. Very few have reached positions of prominence. The Nicaraguan Office of National Security estimated in 1962 that 70 Communists or sympathizers were holding government positions. Several leading Communists are personal friends of the Somozas and it has been reported that some of these people hold top jobs, although there is no confirmed evidence to prove these statements. President Schick's right-hand man, Pedro Jose Quintanilla Jarquin, the minister of the presidency, is thought by some to be a Communist or sympathizer, and it is known that he was a party member from 1948 to 1950. He denies his membership in the party, but it is suspected that some Communist job-holders got their positions through Quintanilla's influence.

The vice minister of education was also thought to be a Communist sympathizer, but he was removed during a minor cabinet crisis in June 1965. Some professors at the university are known to be sympathetic to the Communist cause, but their influence over the students is not believed to have led to a significant upsurge in support for the party youth arm, the JSN.



COMMUNISM IN PANAMA

I. Introduction

Communism has never found fertile soil in Panama despite the opportunities afforded it by the presence of the US-administered Canal Zone and a government and economy controlled by one of the hemisphere's most degenerate oligarchies. Three factors might explain this paradox: the small size of the Panamanian urban working class; the importance of workers of the zone, who are reluctant to imperil their jobs by becoming involved in Communist activities; and finally, the inclination of most Panamanians to support the country's traditional non-Communist movements which promise most of the things the Communists offer.

2. History

The first Communist group in Panama, the Labor Party (Partido Laborista--PL), was organized in 1925 after a number of labor disputes and demonstrations occurred in Panama City and Colon. It entered candidates in the national elections of 1928 and received 1,000 votes in the city of Colon. Although the Communists claimed that they received enough votes to elect two members to the National Assembly, no Labor Party candidates were certified as having been victorious. In 1929 the Communist Party took the lead in organizing a new labor group, the Sindical Confederation of Workers and Peasants of Panama (Confederacion Sindical de Obreros y Campesinos de Panama--CSOCP) and most of the country's small unions joined the new organization.

The Communists used the trade unions under their control to give more of an appearance of solidity to their political activities. Thus in June 1930, the CSOCP joined with the Communists and a few independent unions to form a Workers and Peasants bloc, for political purposes. During the same period the Communist Party (Partido Comunista--PC) of Panama was officially organized and one of its leaders, Eliseo Echevez, was sent to Moscow to confer with the leaders of the Comintern.

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In 1933 the Socialist Party of Panama was formed and immediately began to challenge Communist control of the country's small trade union movement. Sometimes both sides resorted to violence. In the late 1930s still another political group appeared on the scene to steal much of the Communist's thunder. Arnulfo Arias' Panamanist Party (Partido Panamenista--PP) gained widespread support with a stridently nationalistic program closely akin to fascism. In 1940 Arias was elected president and for a short while the Communists cooperated with him because of his anti-US attitudes and his sympathy for the Axis powers--the policy adopted by international Communism during the Stalin-Nazi Pact days.

During World War II the Panamanian Communists followed Moscow's line of cooperating with regimes who supported the United Nations. In 1943 the party was disbanded upon the dissolution of the Third International. The party then had an estimated membership of 100. The next year it was reorganized and followed the lead of brother parties of the hemisphere in changing its name to the Party of the People (Partido del Pueblo--PDP).

The last two years of World War II saw the Communists gain considerable ground in Panama, especially in the trade union movement. In October 1944 a national labor congress was held in Panama City under the auspices of the Communists. During the congress the party's labor arm, the Syndical Federation of Workers of the Republic of Panama (FSTRP) was formed and Efraim Morel, a PDP labor leader, was elected secretary general.

For the first time Communists also made substantial headway among the workers of the Canal Zone. This penetration was not achieved by the PDP itself, but rather by the United Federal Workers (UFW), a Communist-controlled US union, at that time affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). In 1946 the UFW's Union of Workers of the Canal Zone claimed to represent 10,000 members. For three years this union remained in the CIO and represented about one half of the 14,000 Panamanian workers employed by the Canal Zone administration. In 1949, after the UFW was expelled from the CIO as being under Communist control, the Communists lost their hold on Canal Zone workers.

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During this period the party operated as a municipal rather than as a national party because it was unable to secure the large number of signatures required to permit it to function on a nationwide basis. The party managed to elect candidates to municipal councils in some instances, but could never name candidates for the National Assembly. "Fellow travelers" did win seats in the Assembly from time to time and through its control of various front and infiltrated organizations and its close ties with leftist and nationalist groups, the PDP was able to bring considerable pressure to bear on the Panamanian Government.

Conforming to the strongly anti-US policies of the USSR after World War II, the Panamanian Communists used their influence over workers and students to encourage and support anti-US demonstrations. The PDP attained its most effective point in December 1947 when it joined forces with nationalistic elements to defeat renewal of the US-Panama Defense Sites Agreement.

With the return of Arnulfo Arias to power in 1948, the Communists found rougher sledding. In April 1950, Arias and his cabinet signed a resolution outlawing the PDP. However, the decision was later declared unconstitutional by the attorney general and it was suspended. By the mid-1950s the Communists had lost most of their support in the trade unions. The FSTRP was split several times after World War II, and by 1954 it was virtually reduced to three officially recognized trade unions.

The decline of the Communists' support in the unions was matched by the general decline of their popularity. First Arnulfo Arias and then Jose Remon, who became president at the end of 1952, captured the support of many who might otherwise have been subject to Communist influence. Remon's administration appealed to local nationalism by seeking a revision of the 1903 treaty.

In December 1953 the Remon administration passed Law 43, prohibiting the Communist Party and all Communist activities. This move marked the culmination of an anti-Communist campaign conducted throughout

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the year by Remon even before passage of the law. Law 43 accelerated the disintegration of the PDP. Official harassment caused fear and distrust among party members, limited attendance at PDP meetings, and resulted in disorganized performance and general ineffectiveness.

The over-all strength of the PDP declined after 1953. This decline was not noticeably reflected, however, among hard-core, militant members who numbered somewhat under 50 throughout this period. It appears that party membership declined from a peak of 500 to 700 to perhaps 200 to 300 in 1957.

The party's weak position rarely permitted it to seize the initiative in fomenting unrest. Instead, it tended to move cautiously after disturbances or other developments had been set in motion by other groups. The party played a minor role in the anti-US student rioting of 3-4 November 1959. Communist involvement in the anti-US demonstrations of 28 November 1959, while still limited, occurred on a considerably larger scale than the riots earlier in the month and bore evidence of calculated planning.

The events of 1959 demonstrated, as they did again in January 1964, the PDP's capability for exerting influence far out of proportion to its membership by making common cause with ultranationalists and other anti-US groups. Although the party was afforded an excellent opportunity to exploit nationalism aroused over the Canal issue, it registered only small membership gains. By 1960 membership had dropped to about 200 and in February of that year ten individuals were said to be filling some 27 posts in the party and its labor federation, the FSTRP.

Communists or extreme leftists have controlled the leadership of Panamanian student groups much of the time during the past 25 years by capitalizing on the apathy of the majority of the students. The PDP's influence among student organizations and the country's educational system represents perhaps its most significant accomplishment.

In 1960 moderate student leaders united to break a long period of leftist and Communist domination of the Union of University Students (UEU) and,

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by extension of UEU influence, of its parent organization the Federation of Panamanian Students (FEP). The non-Communist leaders did nothing, however, to develop a strong following. Resentment over the serious deficiencies throughout the educational system came to a head in student riots in August 1962. Quickly offering a sound and popular reform program, the Communists attracted the great majority of the university students to their newly organized University Reform (FRU). The FRU swept student elections throughout the University of Panama, including the UEU, in the fall of 1962 with the help of then Education Minister Alfredo Ramirez. Ramirez wanted student support in his drive to become president in 1964. This FRU triumph was followed in December 1962 by the election of PDP militant Victor Avila to head the FEP and the selection of other Communists for key posts.

With student affairs the most active field of Communist influence, leaders at the university became the key figures in a division of Communist forces which started in the early 1960s. The advent of Castro, and later the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, split the Panamanian Communist movement. The PDP's doctrinaire leadership has consistently looked for guidance and financing to Moscow and supports the Soviet position of transition to Socialism by peaceful means. In 1961 pro-Castro elements --Communists and non-Communists alike--organized the Vanguard of National Action (VAN), an organization which advocated immediate and violent revolution in Panama. Its leaders, who included some former and present PDP members, were trained in Cuba and maintained contact with Havana through frequent travel and members resident in Cuba.

Despite unity agreements, the PDP and the VAN were continually at odds. PDP leaders were deeply concerned over the VAN's influence in Cuba to the detriment of the PDP and resented the fact that Castroites rather than PDP members were the chief recipients of training in Cuba.

In late 1962 and early 1963 the PDP began to show increased sophistication in its efforts, probably a reflection of training of PDP members in Communist schools in the USSR and China. In addition, the party may have been spurred by competition from



the VAN. The result of training began to show in many PDP activities, particularly insofar as organization and sustained effort were concerned. Leadership of party work in all fields, provided in the past only by National Executive Committee (CEN) members, was delegated to a large extent to mid-level members. Security was increased markedly with effective compartmentation of party cells in all areas.

Party finances improved to the extent that even key mid-level party leaders became paid functionaries who devoted all of their time to PDP affairs. The PDP in October 1962 changed its political line from peaceful co-existence to violence. This line was kept flexible and subject to tactical changes, however, as evidenced in the elections of 1964 when the PDP inserted or supported candidates in the Socialist Party.

The nationalistic upsurge in January 1964 gave considerable impetus to the extreme left and the PDP may have regained its preillegalization strength of some 500 members. The membership revival resulted largely from its ability to foment and prolong the serious anti-US riots. In so doing, the PDP once again demonstrated its capability for exerting influence far out of proportion to its membership. During January 1964 the PDP virtually came out into the open and the leftist extremists blatantly boasted of their control over student organizations and their consequent influence on President Chiari and the government in general.

In spite of their rivalry and quarrels, the PDP and VAN collaborated effectively throughout the riots and exhibited shrewdness in recognizing the sudden wave of nationalism as a long-sought opportunity for exploitation. Success in exploiting the crisis considerably boosted morale on all levels in the PDP. Following the riots, the party began the training of special "action brigades" designed to effect acts of violence and sabotage.

After the events of January 1964 fewer Panamanians looked upon the Communists as a dangerous element, and more saw them as useful allies. Among groups where they were already active--students, intellectuals, labor and peasants--the Communists expanded

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their influence. Extremists and pro-Communists who had influential positions in government and in news media became an invaluable asset.

President Johnson's announcement on 18 December 1964 that the US intended to replace the Canal treaty with a new one encompassing Panama's major demands robbed the PDP and extremist groups of their most useful issue. The statement cut away most of the common ground between the extremists and the more moderate Panamanian nationalists.

Communist student leaders at the university again became the key figures in the struggle between "hard-line" pro-Castro activist revolutionaries who favored violence and the "soft-line" PDP members who preferred to discredit the oligarchy by political action. The divisions between the two groups prevented unanimity and President Robles' determined use of the national guard prevented extremist-sponsored agitation from getting out of hand.

The widely publicized arrest in February 1965 of 12 members of the PDP central committee temporarily checked party activities even though the men were held only one week. Fearing widespread government repressive measures the Communists for several months remained in the background and carried on their activities under extreme security precautions.

3. Current Status of Communist Party

The Panamanian Communist movement is small and badly splintered. There are estimated to be about 500 active members with perhaps 500 to 1,000 active supporters. The movement suffers from an ideological split between the Moscow-oriented PDP and a small activist group known as the United Revolutionary Movement (MUR) which, like its precursor the VAN, favors immediate terrorist action against the Robles government and the US presence in the Canal Zone.

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In June 1965 PDP secretary general Ruben Dario Souza returned from a visit to Moscow where he is believed to have sought more funds and help against the growing threat of the pro-Chinese MUR. He returned with plans to inject new vigor into the party. A new recruitment drive was initiated and Souza threatened to remove inept party bureaucrats. Very little in this direction has been accomplished, however, and in August the party was described as going through the throes of a severe organizational crisis.

There are indications that a clandestine national congress will be called soon to revise party leadership and programs. Souza is said to feel that emphasis should be placed on the creation of popular mass organizations which the party can later exploit rather than try to penetrate and direct existing movements. In addition, Souza believes that too much time and effort is expended in working with student groups whose activities are sometimes hard to channel in the right direction. Instead, Souza favors concentrating on the creation of new labor unions.

The PDP still controls just one labor federation, the FSTRP, and it has almost no strength and exists primarily on paper. The FSTRP leaders are vocal in pursuing the Communist line, but have little support and no real control over most labor unions. The large and well financed labor union of the Chiriqui Land Company (CLC), a United Fruit subsidiary, is independent but often influenced by its labor adviser, radical Socialist Carlos Ivan Zuniga, a deputy to the National Assembly.

The PDP continues to try in fits and starts to proselytize the peasants and Indians with little or no success. Endeavors to form peasant leagues have been met with distrust or apathy. Recent reporting indicates the PDP-dominated Union of University Students (UEU) is planning to assist in organizing peasant leagues in Panama Province.

Although PDP strength is not great, it is well placed to obtain maximum effectiveness. The Communists and their allies hold key positions in student movements, on the university faculty, in some government ministries, in press and radio and in the professional field as lawyers.

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
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The PDP's greatest current asset comes from its ability to incite national emotions over the Canal Zone. In this regard there is a coincidence of interest between Communists and non-Communists; and in fact many so-called Communists may be motivated only by extreme nationalism and the call to action over the Zone issue.


PDP NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

President	:	Hugo Alejandro Victor Escala
Vice President	:	Carlos Francisco Chang Marin
Secretary General	:	Ruben Dario Souza Batista
Secretary for Organization	:	Miguel Antonio Porcell Pena
Secretary for Finance	:	Jorge Armando Ferrera
Secretary for Education	:	Eugenio Barrera
Secretary for Press and Propaganda	:	Ruperto Luther Thomas Trotman
Secretary for Labor Affairs:	:	Jose del Carmen Tunon
Secretary for Youth Affairs:	:	Cleto Manuel Souza Batista

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


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


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PARAGUAY

1. Introduction

The Communist Party of Paraguay (Partido Comunista Paraguayo--PCP) has never been a major element in national politics. Approximately 90 percent of its members and sympathizers live in exile. They have had little success in persuading other exiles to join them in a united front, despite repeated attempts. Those who remain in Paraguay are severely repressed by the efficient government security forces. They are largely ineffective and have no serious capability for overthrowing the government of President Alfredo Stroessner.

After a long history of dictatorship and bloody strife, Paraguay has found stability under the authoritarian rule of Stroessner. The three traditional bases of power in the country have been the strong, partisan military establishment, the police, with a well-defined security function, and the political organization of the ruling party. The only real source of political leadership in the country is found among the small number of leading families, who have strong partisan ties. The President has maintained his regime in power for ten years by carefully balancing Colorado Party, police, and military interests. Political and press freedom have gradually increased, but Stroessner still firmly holds the reins.

In the highly conservative and isolated Paraguayan society, it has been extremely difficult for Communism to find a fertile field for growth. Paraguay has essentially a peasant society and its internal economy is based on subsistence farming. Most of the people, however, are economically independent; there is no hacienda or plantation system to exploit the peasants, most of whom have access to more land than they can cultivate. In addition, Paraguay has only a few light industries and consequently there is no large mass of industrial workers to become dissatisfied and who might respond to the appeals of the PCP.

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2. Brief history of the party

Founded in 1928 and admitted to the Comintern later that year, the PCP originally comprised a few former anarchists active in the small labor movement in Asuncion and a small group of young intellectuals. The PCP opposed the Chaco War, a stand which offended the patriotism of most Paraguayans and cost the party considerable popularity. During World War II it was implacably pursued by the government. In January 1945 it attempted to lead a general strike; many Communists were jailed and deported after the strike failed. In August 1946 the PCP was allowed freedom of operation, although it was not fully recognized as a legal political party. It held public meetings and published a newspaper, but the excesses of Communist propaganda provoked a rising tide of opposition, and in January 1947 the PCP was again outlawed.

When dissatisfied military elements and members of the opposition Febrerista and Liberal parties revolted against the government in March 1947, the Communists, while never dominant, were able to exercise considerable influence in the ensuing civil war. Several hundred Communists joined the rebel forces at Concepcion, where they controlled the radio, and they were responsible for some propaganda and sabotage in Asuncion. With the collapse of the revolt in August 1947, PCP leaders went into hiding and exile.

During the early 1950s, the ruling Colorado Party was preoccupied with the opposition Liberal and Febrerista parties. As a result the Communists achieved considerable success in penetrating many governmental, political, university, and labor institutions, especially the police and one faction of the Febrerista Party. Since Stroessner took power in 1954, PCP activities within Paraguay have been severely curtailed. The Communists have attempted to lead several guerrilla invasions which have been easily routed.

In 1963 the PCP received a setback when pro-Chinese members who had been expelled from the party decided to form a rival organization, the Paraguayan Leninist Communist Party (PCLP). Another serious reverse came in mid-1965 when a police crackdown

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resulted in the arrest of numerous low-level party members, primarily in rural areas. It was reported that they were attempting to organize cadres for the creation of new guerrilla groups. The government immediately initiated investigations to determine whether or not there were links between the PCP and other exile groups and whether any army officers were involved in subversive activities.

In August 1965 another rebellion split PCP ranks as many of the party's leaders, headed by Obdulio Barthe, formed a "Committee for the Defense and Reorganization of the PCP," and denounced the leadership of Secretary General Oscar Creydt. Party members, many of whom have chafed at his autocratic methods and his failure to support insurgent activities, may find that their attempt to remove him will result in an even further reduction of the party's already limited capabilities.

Government harassment and repression of the PCP has successfully seen to it that the PCP's influence as a political party is practically nil.

3. Stength and Supporting Groups

Approximately 4,500 of the estimated 5,000 Paraguayan Communists live in exile, most of them in the neighboring countries of Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. There is little formal party organization outside Asuncion, and much of the organization of the PCP exists mainly on paper. Within the country, most of the party members are peasants or laborers, though some are students, intellectuals, and professional people. As a result of frequent exhortation by the exiled Secretary General Oscar Creydt, there is a constant drive to recruit new members. Most of these withdraw subsequently, discouraged by the continuing government harassment.

The party has been in poor financial condition since at least 1962. Income from dues is modest and the party receives little, if any, support from wealthy sympathizers. The PCP receives funds from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries, but the amounts are not known.

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The principal effort of the PCP outside Paraguay has been the maintenance of a front, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), designed to coordinate the activities of all opposition elements in an effort to overthrow the Stroessner regime. This is the primary objective of the PCP. It hopes to establish a "democratic government" over which it can gradually achieve control. FULNA grew out of the non-Communist exile organization United Front for Liberation, which was taken over by the Communists in 1958. FULNA headquarters are in Montevideo where it controls a collateral front, the Paraguayan Circle, a social club. In addition, FULNA has established regional committees in several Brazilian towns and probably in several Argentine cities.

FULNA has almost completely failed in attempts to secure the cooperation of other exile groups, except for the extreme left wing of the Febrerista Party, whose propaganda line is now almost indistinguishable from that of the PCP. FULNA has tried to organize invasion forces to overthrow Stroessner, but with very limited success. Between December 1959 and April 1961 exile groups made six armed incursions into Paraguay from Argentina. These were all small-scale, the largest involving only approximately 250 men. FULNA, however, played a leading role in only three operations. Fifty-four (54) FULNA guerrillas who crossed the upper Parana River in June 1960 were almost all killed, and very small FULNA bands raided two police stations in February and April 1961.

At the present time there are no effective guerrilla operations within Paraguay. Small groups of from four to eight men have been reported in central Paraguay, but have won little popular support. The recent government arrests probably effectively wiped out the nuclei of the guerrilla groups which were trying to build cadres to form new columns.

Front activity within Paraguay is weak. A women's commission, a lawyers' front, and a national propeace commission are virtually defunct and ineffective. The Democratic Revolutionary Students' Front (FEDRE) has engaged in sporadic wall painting and occasionally has attempted to stir up the

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university students. It is not an effective group, and has suffered from continuing government surveillance and repression.

4. Foreign Influence

There is no official mission from any Communist country in Paraguay. PCP leaders in Montevideo, however, maintain contact with the Soviet and other Communist embassies. PCP delegations frequently visit the USSR, whose leadership the party diligently follows. Members also occasionally visit other Communist countries for training, meetings, or other purposes. Cuba and Czechoslovakia have given guerilla training to a number of Paraguayans. Cuba has additionally furnished propaganda material and funds, and may have furnished some arms. Reportedly some labor leaders have also received training in Cuba. Radio Havana shortwave broadcasts in Spanish and Guarani are regularly directed toward Paraguay. As previously mentioned, the USSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and other bloc nations provide some funds for PCP activities and travels.

PCP leaders in Montevideo work closely with the Uruguayan Communist Party, which is also predominantly pro-Soviet. Paraguayan Communists in Argentina and Brazil have received some cooperation from those parties, and there is evidence to suggest that Brazilian Communists have assisted in training Paraguayan guerillas. The Brazilian and Argentine governments have become increasingly cooperative with the Stroessner government, however, in preventing assistance to the PCP.

5. Dissident groups

The PCP suffered a severe setback in 1963 when the rival PCLP made its appearance. In February 1963 the PCP expelled thirty-four (34) members for challenging the authority of Secretary General Creydt and his pro-Soviet position and for supporting the Chinese Communist line. Further expulsions have brought the total to about 60. In May 1963 some of the expelled members proclaimed themselves a separate party. At a meeting in Montevideo in 1964 they formally nullified all Creydt's decrees and declared that henceforth the PCLP would compete with the PCP in Paraguay.

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Not all of the expelled PCP members joined the PCLP, which probably only has about 50 members and has not gained any substantial number of adherents since the original split. The PCLP is reportedly controlled by Alfonso Guerra, Marcos Zeida, and Sevastian Querey, who is secretary general. Obdulio Barthe, the number two man in the PCP hierarchy, was reported to be associated with the PCLP in 1963, but he has since recanted his pro-Chinese views and returned to PCP activities. PCLP representatives have reportedly been promised financial assistance by Chinese Communists whom they met in Montevideo, but there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that such help has been forthcoming. The PCLP reportedly is attempting to increase its operations within Paraguay but has so far been relatively inactive.

In August 1965 a new group made an appearance, and the PCP appears to have been torn even further asunder. A "Committee for the Defense and Reorganization of the PCP" published a declaration in the Argentine Communist Party weekly magazine rejecting the leadership of Oscar Creydt and calling for armed insurrection to overthrow the Paraguayan Government. The declaration, signed by many of Paraguay's leading Communists, including Obdulio Barthe and Augusto Canete, accuses Creydt of denouncing party members to the police and of plotting to establish a party based only on those who serve him unconditionally. This further division within the PCP seems likely only to decrease its already slim resources and effectiveness.


The same factors which have prevented the PCP from achieving a major role in Paraguayan politics, however, will also operate against the PCLP and the new party grouping. The principal effect of the creation of rivals has been to spread distrust within the PCP. The extent of this disruption is evidenced by the continued postponement of the third PCP congress, originally scheduled for August 1963. The widespread dislike of Creydt and his autocratic methods and the existence of some pro-Chinese Communist sentiment within the PCP are likely to prevent a reconciliation.

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
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9. Leaders of the Communist Party of Paraguay

PARTY POST	MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE*
Secretary General	Oscar Creydt Corazon <u>Aquilar</u> Enciso Celso <u>Avalos</u> Ocampo Obdulio Barthe Calixto Bogado Augusto Canete Carlos Luis Casabianca Emilio Gomez Hipolito Gonzalez Efrain Ibanez Apolonio Lezcano Arturo Lopez Ricardo <u>Menendez</u> Torres Ortigoza Juan Mora# Efrain Morel Olazar (fnu) (Higinio?)## Quiroz (fnu) (Dario?) Justo Ramirez Teodulo Riveros Carmen Soler de Casabianca Dalila Soler de Quevedo

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
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
PARTY POST

MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Miguel Angel Soler
Derliz Villagra Arzamendia
Alfredo Alcorta**
Severo Acosta Aranda**
Ignacio Benigno Fernandez**
Livio Enrique Gonzalez Santander**
Ireneo Eliodoro Averiro Insfran**
Ananias Maidana**
Antonio Maidana**
Julio Rojas**



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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU

1. Introduction

In recent years, Communism has displaced the Peruvian military and oligarchy as the primary threat to government stability. This threat does not now involve the possibility of a Communist takeover in Peru. It does include the potential of Communist and extreme leftist groups to prevent the Belaunde government from achieving much-needed economic and social reforms by peaceful and constitutional means. The Communist strategy, therefore, is to sow popular distrust of or opposition to the government and its policies, to create discord within the government itself, and to disrupt the economy. From this point on, each Communist organization proceeds differently and separately toward the common long-range objective --power.

It is this fragmented character of the far left in Peru which cripples it most. The Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) is split into two factions or groups, one of which follows the Moscow line of peaceful coexistence and the other, Communist China's thesis of violent revolution. Each group claims to be the only Peruvian Communist party. This split has lowered the prestige and influence of the PCP almost to the level of the other numerous small parties of the far left which are also split into two, even three, competing factions. A prominent exception to all these parties is the pro-Castro, Chinese Communist - leaning Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The MIR has not experienced the same degree of internal dissension and is now actively engaged in guerrilla warfare aimed at revolution.

In addition to the internal dissension rampant within far-leftist parties, the far left has been unable or unwilling to find any general basis for cooperation or unity. Personal rivalries are a major factor here, but differing interpretations of Communist doctrine also play a large part. United, the Communist left could seriously challenge government stability.

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Article 53 of the Peruvian 1933 Constitution reads "The State does not recognize the legal existence of political parties of international organization. Persons who belong to such may not fulfill any political function." This article, originally intended to outlaw the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), would seem to make the Communist Party illegal also. However, the PCP has been allowed to participate in most elections under various cover names even though the letter of the article has been periodically invoked by Peruvian governments.

The attitude of the present government toward the PCP and other Communist groups has varied. President Fernando Belaunde Terry tacitly accepted Communist support for his candidacy and party during the 1963 pre-electoral period. As a result, two senators and twelve deputies who are avowed Communists or Communist sympathizers were elected to Congress. All but two of these congressmen were elected on the Popular Action - Christian Democrat Party ticket.

In its first few months, the Belaunde administration was quite tolerant of the Communists, using their support to undermine Aprista strength in the labor, student, and peasant fields. This policy, however, only encouraged the Communists and thus Communist-inspired strikes and land invasions increased in numbers and intensity. After a series of several very serious incidents, conservative elements and the military pressured the administration into adopting a firmer line. A roundup of known agitators, coupled with passage of the agrarian reform law in May 1964, temporarily ended Communist disturbances. With the outbreak of guerrilla activity directed by the MIR in June 1965, the government took even stronger measures. A state of siege was decreed, the armed forces have been committed to the counterinsurgency effort, suspected Communists are under arrest, and Belaunde has been provoked into condemning Communist intervention in Peru.

2. Brief history of the party

The history of organized Communism in Peru begins with the Peruvian Socialist Party (PSP), founded by a group of Marxist intellectuals and labor leaders

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in 1928. Less than a year later, PSP members differed over the issue of dropping the socialist label in favor of a Communist title. Unable to reconcile the dispute, a dissenting minority continued to function as socialists while the majority chose to become the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP).

Early PCP activity centered around the organization of labor unions, at first in cooperation with the Marxist-oriented American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) but soon contending with APRA for domination of the labor movement. The PCP-APRA labor struggle reached its climax in 1934 when all cooperation between the two parties ended. An effort to renew general cooperation with APRA was made by the Communists in 1935, as they attempted to comply with the Comintern's line of the popular front, but APRA rejected all PCP proposals and the two parties continued to compete with each other to the extent that their illegal status permitted.

During the period from the fall of the Leguia dictatorship in 1930 until 1934, the PCP enjoyed a certain degree of toleration. Successive Peruvian governments generally regarded APRA as the chief subversive threat and seldom interfered directly with PCP activities. In 1934, however, following an APRA-inspired general strike, both Communist and Aprista leaders were imprisoned and their trade union organizations suppressed. PCP fortunes revived during the national electoral campaign of 1939 when the party was able to exploit the government's desire to attract labor support for its candidate, Manuel Prado. The Communists won from the government recognition of the Chauffeurs Federation and elected Juan P. Luna, Communist leader of the federation, to the Chamber of Deputies. Following Prado's election, the PCP was permitted considerable freedom, playing a major role in the revival of an active labor movement in Peru. The party was strong enough, in fact, to elect Luna as the first secretary general of the new Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP) although APRA, the PSP, and a number of independents were also active and controlled a significant number of member unions.

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In the elections of 1945, the PCP supported the administration's candidate for the presidency in coalition with APRA and independents. The Communists, running under the name Socialist Vanguard of Peru, won four seats in the Chamber of Deputies; three Communist-supported senators were also elected. Nevertheless, the real victor was APRA, which elected a majority to each house of Congress. Despite an increasing membership during the 1945-48 period, PCP fortunes were adversely affected by the unprecedented and overwhelming growth of APRA. Aprista captured control of the CTP as well as a number of other labor organizations run by the PCP.

The anti-APRA military revolution of 1948 was only of temporary benefit to the Communists who in turn were suppressed by the junta government. A major split was also developing in the party, between Luna and the central committee, over policy vis-a-vis APRA. Luna broke away from the party and managed to secure a measure of cooperation with the Odria regime (1950-56), but the official wing of the PCP was outlawed and persecuted. The hostile attitude of the government toward the regular PCP, plus increasing factionalism, was primarily responsible for the collapse of its national organization and the appearance by 1950 of no less than six independent Communist groups throughout Peru. Many old guard PCP leaders were imprisoned or exiled, party membership dwindled, and nationwide contacts and communications were severed.

Preparations for the 1956 national election brought a more open political climate and as repressive measures against the PCP lessened, the party was able to rejuvenate its organization and bring a degree of order from the chaos which had developed. Following the re-establishment of central committee authority, the PCP decided to support the candidacy of Fernando Belaunde Terry who was running as an independent. Although Belaunde was unsuccessful in the election, the PCP continued to work closely with the Popular Action (AP) party established by the candidate shortly after elections. The PCP enjoyed great freedom during the early years of President Prado's second administration (1956-62) until in November 1960 anti-Castro Cubans raided the Cuban Embassy in Lima and seized documents dealing

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with Communist infiltration into Peru and Cuban subsidization for antigovernment elements. As a result, diplomatic relations with Cuba were broken off and the Peruvian Government, prodded by the military, took forceful measures against the Communists, imprisoning many leaders.

Again in 1962, impending elections resulted in a letup of anti-Communist activity; in response the PCP organized the National Liberation Front (FLN) as a vehicle for Communists and other leftists to participate in the elections. The FLN candidate for president drew only two percent of the total votes cast. The election was annulled by the armed forces, however, and the new military junta proceeded to devote its attention to repression of its traditional foe, APRA. Communist activity increased alarmingly as the party prepared to hold its Fourth National Congress (August 1962), the first in 14 years without government harassment. A rising number of Communist and leftist-inspired peasant land invasions, however, caused the junta to reverse its policy of toleration and in January 1963 it ordered a police roundup of suspected subversives.

New national elections were scheduled for June 1963 and the PCP decided to back Fernando Belaunde as it had in 1956. During the campaign, Belaunde neither renounced nor acknowledged his Communist supporters, but following his election he evidently tried to repay the Communists by adopting a very lenient attitude toward certain Communist-led labor unions and peasant federations. Again Communist-inspired strikes and land invasions began to increase in numbers and intensity until military and congressional pressure forced the Belaunde government to take stricter measures. Constitutional guarantees were suspended and the Civil Guard conducted a large-scale roundup of subversives. Combined with passage of an agrarian reform law in May 1964, these steps resulted in a reduction in the number of land invasions and inaugurated a period of relative tranquility.

A more important factor in the decline of Communist agitation, however, has been the division of the PCP into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. The split, as it developed, came out in the open at

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the party's National Congress in August 1962, was exacerbated by the Cuban missile crisis in October, and became more pronounced in the following months as each faction struggled for control of the party's various committees. In October 1963 the twice-postponed 18th central committee plenum met ostensibly to discuss party differences. The old guard pro-Soviet leadership managed to recapture control of the central committee from the pro-Chinese leaders, and during the plenum issued a declaration supporting Moscow's peaceful coexistence line. Pro-Chinese members of the central committee and the important Lima regional committee denounced the declaration and refused to recognize the newly elected pro-Soviet political commission. The split was finally formalized in January 1964 when the rival factions held separate conferences in which each faction expelled the leaders of the other, and members of the pro-China faction raided the offices of their rivals. Each faction now claims to be the only Communist party in Peru.

3. PCP strength and supporting groups

PCP membership, estimated at about 10,000 divided almost equally between the two factions, has fluctuated markedly over the years since the party's founding. Fluctuation in the past has been related closely to the degree of tolerance toward Communist activities of the government in power. Since the inauguration of President Belaunde, the PCP has lost strength due in part to the appeal of his leftist-reformist government, and in part to disillusionment caused by the schism within the party. Between 50 percent and 60 percent of PCP strength is believed to be located in southern Peru, principally in Apurimac, Arequipa, Cuzco, and Puno. National party control has consistently been centered in Lima. Northern and eastern Peru, where the PCP is relatively weak, contain no more than 15 percent of the membership, most of it very poorly organized.

The majority of PCP members come from urban labor, student, professional, and intellectual circles. In Lima the centers of party strength are in the labor movement and among the students at San Marcos University. Although Communism has made some progress among the Indians of the Sierra in southern Peru, it is

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still relatively weak in this segment of the population, as is the national party among agrarian elements throughout the country. Other small leftist-extremist activist groups have made more inroads among the Indian peasants.

Although information on the financial condition of both factions of the PCP is limited, it is apparent that neither is well financed. This situation has evidently been chronic since the party was founded. Party dues, calculated proportionately according to each member's salary and place of residence, are believed to be the major source of funds available to the PCP for use within Peru. Many party members, however, do not pay regularly or in the amounts required. A chronic problem faced by the party is misappropriation and theft of funds by members entrusted with financial responsibilities. Communists elected to congress are said to be required to contribute their entire salary to the party, receiving a wage from the PCP in return. Other devices for raising funds have included: semi-public raffles and dances, the sale of bonds and "coupons" to party sympathizers, and book and periodical sales. The party is also reported to have received a portion of the proceeds of some Soviet and Communist bloc cultural activities held in Peru.

Given its poor domestic financial support, the PCP could not operate even at its present level of expenditure without significant outside assistance. Absence of Communist diplomatic representation in Peru, however, makes transfer of foreign funds extremely difficult. The major portion of bloc-supplied funds is believed to be brought in by travelers returning from visits abroad. The pro-Chinese faction of the PCP appears to be in worse financial straits than the orthodox faction despite its claims that Communist China and Cuba are supplying funds. Returnees from Cuban and Chinese training courses have probably smuggled a limited amount of money into Peru.

PCP front activity has generally been limited to the establishment of a number of small general-purpose organizations, although a few groups intended to appeal to specific elements of the Peruvian population have also been created. None of these organizations has been particularly successful in generating

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any large-scale support, and most tend to be short-lived. One of the most successful front groups organized by the Communists in recent years was the National Revolutionary Front (FLN), founded in 1962 as a vehicle for Communist and extreme leftists to participate in the national elections. Since that time the FLN has fallen into disarray, now constituting little more than a paper organization.

The PCP controls only two front organizations of any importance. One, the "Patriotic Front for the Recovery of La Brea y Parinas," was formed in early 1965 by the pro-Soviet faction of the party. The purpose of the group is to carry out agitation and propaganda against the US-owned International Petroleum Corporation (IPC) in favor of the nationalization of the company's assets in Peru. The other front organization, the Jose Carlos Mariategui Cultural Institute, was founded in November 1959 ostensibly as a cultural organization, but in fact has been the front for the national headquarters of the PCP in Lima. Genaro Ledesma Izquieta, Communist deputy for the Department of Pasco, currently heads the institute.

The revolutionary left in Peru, which includes both PCP factions and numerous other Communist and extreme leftist groups, is presently seeking to unite students, workers, peasants, and disaffected members of APRA and AP into one mass organization. The purpose of such a united front would be to promote revolutionary objectives and to rally support for Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) guerrillas. The MIR initiated limited guerrilla activities in June 1965. Unity themes center on popular issues such as nationalization of the IPC and radical land reform. No general agreement on this proposed front is yet in sight, however, primarily because of competition among the leftist groups for a controlling voice in any unity organization. Thus, the front is being promoted under various names, the most common of which are the Single Anti-Imperialist Front and the Patriotic Front of National Liberation.

Despite the pro-Soviet PCP's decision to support the MIR openly, its slowness to act has created a rebellion among pro-Soviet youth. Pro-China youth are similarly disenchanted with their parent organization. Both youth groups have adopted new names--

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the pro-China group is known as the Armed Forces of National Liberation and the pro-Soviets are the Radical Revolutionary Movement. These two, along with the Revolutionary Vanguard which claims to represent socialist youth, joined the MIR in issuing an October manifesto. Calling for armed struggle, the paper also proclaims the formation of a Single National Anti-Oligarchical and Anti-Imperialist Front of Political Youth. APRA, AP, and Christian Democrat youth are invited to join.

Youth: the Communists have considerable strength among youth and are the strongest single political force among university students. It is estimated that 20 to 40 percent of Peruvian youth in universities and secondary schools support the Communist cause, due primarily to the system of university autonomy and the natural middle-class radicalism of most students. Enthusiasm for Communism, however, is not based in intellectual response to Marxist-Leninist theory but to an uneducated desire to cure personal and national troubles in a radical fashion. While many students eventually lose their radicalism, or even retain their extreme views but drop ties with Communism, a small, hard-core element nevertheless remains.

For more than three decades, APRA dominated university student organizations in Peru. In 1956, however, Aprista dominance began to weaken as party collaboration with the elite Prado government reduced its appeal to student radicals. The waning of APRA's appeal coincided with the rise of Castroism in Cuba and with the founding in Peru of the reformist, popular-based Popular Action (AP) and Christian Democrat (PDC) parties, both of which opposed the Apristas. By 1959, anti-Aprista coalitions of Communist, AP and PDC students, often dominated by Communists, succeeded in gaining control of all public university student federations and the national student organization, the Federation of Peruvian Students (FEP).

Aprista students regained control of their traditional stronghold, the University of Trujillo, in 1963, but their narrow victory at San Marcos in Lima in 1964 was won only because of President Belaunde's personal intervention. At the last moment, Belaunde

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ordered AP students to withdraw their support for the Communist-backed candidate. The June 1965 elections, however, saw a return to the tactic of cooperation with the Communists to defeat APRA. Thus, Communist-backed candidates captured the federations in the universities of San Marcos, Cuzco, Cajamarca, and Huacho plus the vice-presidency at Trujillo.

The Peruvian Communist Youth (JCP), which is theoretically responsible for PCP youth activities, has probably never been much more than a paper organization. Between 1948 and 1950 there were indications of slight JCP activity, but it appears that from the latter year until 1959 the group was completely inactive. During the early 1960s, PCP efforts to revitalize the JCP apparently met with some success (draft statutes for the organization were drawn up in 1962, for example), but activity was limited. The split in the PCP damaged the JCP as well and eventually caused it to split into pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese factions.

Labor; Capture and control of the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP) has been the goal of both Communists and Apristas since the labor confederation was founded in 1944. The Communists were able to name Juan Luna as the first CTP secretary general. One year later, however, Apra won the top office and continued to hold undisputed sway over the majority of Peruvian unions and labor federations from 1945 through 1948. When General Odria attained power in 1948 he imprisoned or exiled the principal Aprista labor leaders, and during the 1948-56 period the vacuum created by the absence of these leaders permitted the PCP to recapture many labor organizations. The CTP was abolished and the separate national federations became the centers of trade union organization. Juan Luna again became a power in the labor movement. In 1956, Odria decided to permit the reorganization of the CTP in the mistaken belief that he could use the new organization to mobilize labor support for his chosen candidate in the 1956 elections. Contrary to his plans, the Apristas rallied to regain control of the re-established CTP, and have held on to it ever since.

Communist influence in the labor movement increased significantly during the tolerant second Prado administration (1956-62) and was strengthened

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further by the military takeover in 1962. Until the series of Communist-inspired strikes and violent labor clashes which precipitated the January 1963 roundup of all known Communists, military attention was fixed on weakening the traditional APRA foe. The roundup ended Communist hopes of control over Peruvian labor.

PCP inability to capture the CTP since its reorganization in 1956 has generated attempts to establish an independent national labor federation under Communist control to compete with the Aprista national organization. In October 1962 representatives of the Bank Clerks Federation, Civil Construction Federation, and Chauffeurs Federation met in a congress they characterized as the National Trade Union Conference in an effort to take over the democratic unions. The effort failed and so the Communist unions formed an executive committee for the unification and reorganization of the CTP. Over 62 percent of the officers elected by the reorganization committee were Communists. The committee reportedly received some governmental support both from the military junta and at least during the early months of the Belaunde administration, probably reaching its peak of power and importance in late 1963 or early 1964. The three principal bulwarks of the committee were the metal workers, construction workers, and bank workers, all Communist led. During the first half of 1964, however, the Communists lost control of the bank workers and ten of the major metal workers unions broke away from their Communist federation and affiliated with the CTP. By June 1964 Communist influence in the urban labor movement had probably reached its lowest level in years and prospects for a recovery are not good.

4. Foreign Influence

The PCP has relied heavily upon its contacts with international Communism for guidance. Before World War II its principal contact was with the South American Bureau of the Comintern; then, during the war, contact was kept by means of Cominform publications and personal meetings mainly with members of other Latin American Communist parties. Following World War II the Legation of Czechoslovakia in Lima was a main source of international communication.

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It provided funds for and arranged many of the trips made by party leaders to the Soviet Union and other bloc countries, and is presumed to have served as a focal point for the issuance of directives to the PCP. Peru broke diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia in 1957, creating a gap in international communications with the PCP until it was satisfactorily filled by the Cuban Embassy. This outlet was also denied by the break in relations between Cuba and Peru in late 1960 and since then it has been difficult for Peruvian Communists to maintain close international ties. Travelers to and from Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc now account for the bulk of propaganda and funds brought into the country.

Some members of the PCP, most of them top-ranking members of the pro-Soviet wing, have received political and labor organizational training in the Soviet Union. The FLN and the pro-China PCP have members trained in guerrilla warfare or political indoctrination in Cuba and a few in Communist China. Several hundred more Peruvians, belonging to various leftist extremist groups, have also received guerrilla warfare or other types of training in Communist countries, primarily in Cuba, but also in Communist China and North Korea.

5. Other Communist Subversive Groups

In addition to the two factions of the Peruvian Communist Party, there are numerous other Communist or crypto-Communist parties. All have varying capabilities for militant action, but none yet individually possesses the broad popular base essential for successful national revolution. Most are badly fragmented and, at least until mid-1965, had not succeeded in uniting into a single revolutionary organization.

The best organized and best trained of any revolutionary group in Peru is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The MIR has about 1,000 members, at least 150 of whom have received extensive guerrilla training in Cuba, Communist China, and North Korea. The MIR has the potential to become a very serious insurgent threat. In June 1965 it began its long-planned guerrilla activity in the remote regions of east-central Peru, with plans to initiate similar activity in other parts of the

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country. Support for the MIR by the peasants, while not overwhelming, has exceeded expectations. MIR guerrilla activities suffered a severe setback in October 1965 when Peruvian Army troops succeeded in killing national MIR leader Luis de la Puente Uceda and four other hard-core guerrilla leaders.


Apart from the MIR, the other extreme leftist groups are very small and their lack of ideological convictions causes members to drift rather freely from one group to another. It is estimated that the total strength of all these groups is not more than 2,000. There are three separate Trotskyite groups in Peru, all of which appear to be quite loosely organized. The Revolutionary Workers Party (POR/T) is the official Trotskyite party in Peru and is affiliated with the Fourth International. A minuscule splinter group of the POR/T, the Revolutionary Party of Workers and Campesinos (PROC), has been trying to organize a guerrilla group, but lack of funds has hampered this effort. PROC leader Ismael Frias Torrico, however, has merged his forces with the MIR guerrillas. The third group is the revolutionary Workers' Party (POR) with strength in the south, particularly in the Cuzco and Puno areas. From 1961 to 1963, the POR had a guerrilla arm operating in Cuzco Department, called the Front of the Revolutionary Left (FIR). FIR also included the Peruvian-Leninist-Communist Party (PCLP), a small pro-Castro group.

In mid-1964, the PCLP pulled out of the FIR in a disagreement with remaining Trotskyites over revolutionary strategy. The FIR has since been abolished. Later in 1964, the PCLP began an attempt to organize guerrilla groups with the assistance of the National Army of Liberation (ELN), a band of some 40 guerrillas who were trained in Cuba in 1962. This combined group which calls itself the Fifteenth of May Movement (M-15-M) claims to have one guerrilla band and to have received funds from Cuba and Communist China. ELN leader Alain Elias Caso committed this band to the MIR in September 1965. Both the PROC and ELN guerrillas are operating from base camps in the vicinity of Andahuaylas, Apurimac Department.


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



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


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



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


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7. Members of Legislature


SENATORS

Lino Martinez Chavez

(Arequipa, elected on AP
ticket, Communist)

Jorge Dieguez Napuri

(Junin, elected on AP ticket,
Communist)



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8. Communist Party Leaders

Because of the PCP split and the disorganization of both factions which has ensued, a complete listing of prominent party officials is unavailable. The following is a list of PCP leaders by faction with official position if known.

Pro-Soviet PCP

Victor Raul Acosta Salas	Secretary General
Jorge Del Prado Chavez	Central Committee (?)
Edgar Ruben Molleapaza Bilbao	Central Committee (?)
Enrique Gamarra Contreas	National Financial Secretary, Central Committee (?)
Alfredo Abarca Abarca	Central Committee (?)
Juan Barrios de Mendoza	Central Committee (?)
Augusto Chavez Bedoya	Central Committee (?), Secre- tary General, Arequipa Re- gional Committee
Sixto Miguel	Central Committee (?)
Betty Abarca de Guerra	Central Committee (?), Lima Regional Committee
Manuel Diaz Salazar	Central Committee
Carlos Vega	Central Committee
Gustavo Espinoza Monte- sinos	JCP representative on Central Committee
Gustavo Valcarcel Velasco	Central Committee alternate; editor of Unidad
Cesar Levano La Rosa	Secretary General (?), Lima Regional Committee
Jose Ismael Reccio Gutier- rez	Lima Regional Committee
Raquel Bocangel	Lima Regional Committee
Cesar Augusto Jimenez Ubillus	Lima Regional Committee
Violeta Hoke de Valcarcel	Lima Regional Committee
Roberto Villajuan Asageles	Lima Regional Committee

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Cesar L. Mendoza Yactayo	Huancayo Regional Committee
Moises Perez Medina	Huancayo Regional Committee
Cesar Alva	Huancayo Regional Committee
Jose Asuncion Suarez Ter- rones	Huancayo Regional Committee
Felix Antialon Espinoza	Huancayo Regional Committee
Victor M. Salas Rodriguez	Arequipa Regional Committee
Ventura Zegarra Arana	Arequipa Regional Committee
Teodoro Aspilcueta Car- rasco	Front group activist
Maruja Roque de Carnero	Front group activist and wife of Genaro Carnero Checa
Ernesto More Barrionuevo	Head of peace movement, senior adviser to Political Commis- sion
Maria Salazar Moscoso	Active in peace movement
Edmundo Cruz Vilchez	JCP leader, editor of <u>Joven Guardia</u>
Oscar Jara Salcedo	JCP leader, member of National Executive Bureau
Jorge Carlos Vega	JCP leader, member of National Executive Bureau
Mario Anibal Ugarte Hurtado	Youth leader being trained in Moscow, possibly involved in illegal support activity.

Pro-China PCP

Saturnino Paredes Macedo	Secretary General
Danti Cunti Aviles	Central Committee
Jorge Barreto Rodriguez	Central Committee, Ancash Re- gional Committee
Edwin Bastos Giron	Organizational Secretary, Po- litical Commission, Central Committee
Jorge Valdez Salas	Central Committee
Jose Elias Sotomayor Perez	Central Committee
Juan Ubaldo Soria Alarcon	National Secretary on Central Committee
Manuel J. Chambi Lopez	Central Committee alternate from Cuzco, importer of prop- aganda films from China

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Wilfredo Alvarez	Lima Regional Committee
Miguel E. Carrillo Natteri	Lima Regional Committee
Enrique Zapater Ballon	Secretary General, Arequipa Regional Committee
Alberto Delgado Bejar	Arequipa Regional Committee
Hector Ballon Lozada	Arequipa Regional Committee
Victro Julio Ortecho Vil- lena	La Libertad Regional Commit- tee
Estuardo Coronado Zelada	JCP leader
Brumilda Quesada (viuda) de Atala	Front group activist and cell leader
Luis Andres Ferrer Reano	
Alejandro Romualdo Valle Palomino	
Alfonso Barrantes Lingan	
Vicente Mendoza Diaz	
Juan Bautista Sotomayor Perez	
Filomeno Rodriguez	Secretary General, Huancayo Regional Committee
Hugo E. Caceres Guzman	Organizational Secretary, Huancayo Regional Committee
Rodas, (FNU)	Financial Secretary, Huancayo Regional Committee
Noe Gallo	Peasant Secretary, Huancayo Regional Committee
Francisco Hanguy Kyo	Education Secretary, Huancayo Regional Committee
Augusto Cespedes	Press and Propaganda Secre- tary, Huancayo Regional Com- mittee
Donato Alberto Izarra Palonino	Secretary of Press and Propa- ganda for the Confederation of Peruvian Peasants.

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9. Organization

Little is known about the organizational structure of the pro-Chinese faction of the PCP, but it is believed to parallel closely that of the orthodox party. (See party organization chart.) There is a central committee headed by Secretary General Saturnino Paredes Macedo, but the total membership of the committee is unknown. At the Fourth National Conference of the pro-Chinese faction, held in January 1964, it was decided that those members who had previously served on the Lima Regional Committee would make up the new political commission, while cell leaders in Lima constituted the Lima Regional Committee. It was also reported at the conference that 13 regional committees have been formed, some of which include two or three departments.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

1. Introduction

There is no organized Communist party in Trinidad and Tobago, but the so-called West Indian Independence Party (WIIP) is Marxist oriented and probably maintains ties with international Communism. Although the WIIP itself is virtually defunct, many of its former members are in positions of influence, particularly in the important trade union field, and they represent a potential threat to the island's stability.

Trinidadian politics have long been dominated by the People's National Movement (PNM) led by Prime Minister Eric Williams. The opposition Democratic Labor Party (DLP) is badly fragmented and in considerable disarray. The two parties have tended to polarize on ethnic lines, with the PNM being predominantly Negro and the DLP predominantly East Indian. At the present rate of population increase, the more prolific East Indians will become the majority in 10 to 15 years, and the tensions inherent in this reversal may well upset the island's traditional calm. Meanwhile, the PNM can be expected to intensify its efforts toward the inclusion of Grenada into the nation state of Trinidad and Tobago, to offset the Indian population increase and maintain a predominantly Negro majority.

So far Communism has not found a toehold in Trinidad, but all of the elements for trouble exist, waiting to be exploited. Racial tension, high unemployment, a rapidly growing population, and limited possibilities for economic expansion could easily combine to produce an explosive political climate and provide opportunities for Communist agitators and organizers.

2. A Brief History of Communism in Trinidad and Tobago

In 1937 and 1938 a series of strikes, often violent in nature, swept through the British colonies in the West Indies. In Trinidad these strikes centered in the oil fields and were led by Uriah Butler who struck out violently against the abuse of laborers and the evils of the colonial system. Butler's

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prestige declined rapidly, however, and a vacuum developed in Trinidadian politics which was only partially filled by a plethora of small parties which were quite unable to provide meaningful leadership. Had the Communists been able to take advantage of this situation, they might well have been as successful in Trinidad as they were in British Guiana during the early 1950s. It was not until 1956, when Dr. Williams founded the PNM and presented a well-defined political program, that any party received widespread enthusiastic support.

At least five organizations existed in 1950 which could be termed left wing. These included the West Indian National Party (WINP), the San Fernando Study Group, the Point Fortin Study Group, the Workers' Freedom Movement (WFM), and the West Indian Proletariat Group. The WINP was evidently the parent body and membership in the groups was often overlapping. None of these organizations had much success despite the holding of numerous meetings and many attempts to expand their membership. The WFM, which was established in 1950, was probably the most active and influential of these groups.

In October 1952 a fusion of the WFM with the Trinidad and Tobago Labour and Socialist Party created the West Indian Independence Party (WIIP). Most prominent Trinidadian leftists were associated with this new organization which was headed by solicitor Lennox Pierre, and included other pro-Communists such as John LaRose, Jack Kelshall, George Weekes, John Poon, and labor leaders John Rojas and Quintin O'Connor.

The birth of the WIIP also marked the joining of the nonunion based WFM and the left wing of the Trinidad and Tobago Trades Union Congress (TTUC). O'Connor and Rojas were among the first of Trinidad's trade unionists and were active in establishing strong unions among government employees and oil workers respectively. On this base they built the TTUC which was affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions and remained in this body until 1953, long after the withdrawal of the democratic membership. The decision of Rojas and O'Connor to accept membership in the WIIP was their first overt association with a Marxist organization. Rank and file union members, however, soon brought pressure to bear, and forced them to withdraw from the WIIP in 1953.

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This proved to be only the first of the many setbacks which the WIIP has suffered. Membership has consistently decreased, and the publication of a monthly magazine "Freedom" had to be quickly discontinued. In 1955 a serious rift developed when John Poon led a dissident faction out of the WIIP. The break was formalized in 1957 when he founded the Youth's National Congress (YNC) (also known as the Progressive Youth's Organization). For the next five years the WIIP struggled along making little headway despite a continuing series of executive committee organizational meetings and sporadic study classes. In 1958 WIIP Secretary John LaRose moved to Venezuela, and party activity dwindled to practically nothing. In 1960 an attempt was made to heal the breach between Poon and party leader Pierre. However, the YNC retains considerable autonomy and continues its separate but ineffective approaches to the youth of Trinidad. The WIIP tried to infiltrate the ranks of the governing PNM and the opposition DLP during the early 1960s, but met with little success. After Trinidad achieved independence in 1962--with no thanks to the WIIP--members decided that the party's announced raison d'etre no longer existed and official activities ceased almost entirely. In 1965 party activity is mainly confined to running a study group which meets in Port of Spain.

It would nonetheless be a mistake to discount the effectiveness of individual members of the WIIP. In mid-1965, C. L. R. James, a well-known extreme leftist, returned to Trinidad from Great Britain and immediately began maneuvering to take over the DLP. Acting DLP leader Stephen Maharaj led the move aimed at ousting party moderates who had voted with the government to pass the controversial Industrial Stabilization Act. Maharaj received enthusiastic support and coaching from James, Kelshall, and George Weekes, president of the Oilfield Workers' Trade Union (OWTU). The bid to assume control of the DLP failed and Maharaj was read out of the party.

Undismayed, the group began talking of forming a new socialist party which would include elements from the left wing of the DLP and the trade union movement. Such a party has been discussed before,

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but the possibility of its establishment in the near future seems likely. A steering committee, including James, Weekes, Pierre, and Kelshall, has been chosen to organize the new group which, to avoid a leftist stigma at least for the time being, has been named the Workers and Farmers Party, with Maharaj as provisional chairman.

The leftists obviously hope to base this new party on the quasi-urban Negro members of the OWTU and the rural East Indian sugar workers. If they are able to put such a coalition together, it would be a major break in Trinidad's de facto racialism in politics and could pose a real challenge to the government of Prime Minister Eric Williams.

3. Strength and Supporting Groups

The WIIP reached a membership high of 151 in 1953. Since that time membership has declined steadily, particularly after the defection of union leaders Rojas and O'Connor. In 1965 the membership is estimated to be between 15 and 20. Members have not displayed any interest in beginning a recruiting drive, being content to lie dormant and to exercise their influence from within other organizations. Should the new socialist party be established, former WIIP members could be expected to push for positions of influence and to seek to increase party membership.

The WIIP does not hold elections, and there is no officer except Lennox Pierre, who continues to be known as the party chairman. No secretary general has ever been appointed to replace John LaRose who moved to Venezuela in 1958. The party does not collect dues, and no membership cards are issued.

Despite the lack of popular support for the WIIP itself, organized labor has long been a stronghold of support for its Marxist views. Prior to 1957 Trinidad had two trade unions which federated in that year to form the Trinidad and Tobago National Trades Union Congress (TUC). John Rojas, president of the OWTU, became the first president of the TUC. Internal power struggles plagued the unions, and when Rojas decided to support the ruling PNM in the general elections, a rebel group, headed by WIIP member George Weekes, forced him out

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[REDACTED]

of office. Weekes became president of the OWTU and served as acting president of the TUC. Labor-management relations began to deteriorate as workers resorted to frequent strike action rather than using the well-established negotiation machinery. In March 1965 Weekes encouraged and abetted sugar workers to rebel against their long-time leader, and in effect attempted to take over the important sugar workers union, to which many of the island's East Indian workers belong. Weekes' unauthorized foray into the sugar unions resulted in the withdrawal of several large unions from the TUC and led to the creation of a new progovernment National Federation of Labor. The sugar strikes and accompanying labor unrest caused the government to demand passage of a tough Industrial Stabilization Act. Weekes resigned as president of the TUC, but retains his presidency of the OWTU and has used the power of his office to obtain an appropriation of \$15,000 from OWTU funds to test the constitutionality of the act and its strict antistrike provisions. Of this amount, \$5,000 is being paid to John Platts Mills, British Queen's Counsel, who has arrived from England to plead the OWTU case before the highest court of Trinidad. If necessary he will appeal the case before the Privy Council in London. In addition, Weekes is continuing to lend his support to the newly formed Sugar Workers Trade Union (SWTU) created mainly to provide a base for C. L. R. James and other political extremists. Should the SWTU succeed in pushing out the established sugar union, James and others plan to utilize both the SWTU and the OWTU to create a bi-racial base for their proposed political grouping.

The Youth's National Congress, which has previously been discussed, is probably the only organization which could qualify as a front group. Caribbean Women's National Assembly (CWNA),

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4. Foreign Influences

The WIIP and YNC have no established international ties and receive neither direction nor finance from

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abroad. WIIP leaders have always had a very close relationship with Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) in British Guiana and also maintain contacts with the Communist Party of Great Britain and some Venezuelan Communists. The Friends of Guyana (FOG), formed in 1964, has attempted to drum up support for Jagan and the PPP in Trinidad, but has not had notable success.

Trinidad does not maintain diplomatic relations with any Communist country. Should the current courtship between Prime Minister Williams and the Soviets result in the establishment of a Russian presence in Trinidad, members of the WIIP and their supporters would prove willing assistants for any Soviet plans.

The Sino-Soviet rift has had little, if any, effect on Communists in Trinidad, most of whom would probably support the Soviet line. There has been little contact with the Castro regime, which does not appear to exercise significant influence in Trinidad. There have been occasional visits to Communist China by members of the Trinidadian Chinese community, but most of their activity seems concentrated in distributing propaganda.


5. Dissident groups

There is no dissident group among Trinidadian Communists and extreme leftists. The breach between Poon of the YNC and Pierre of the WIIP has been at least papered over, and the two groups appear to work together.


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



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


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


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7. Members of Legislature
None
8. Trend in Size of Congressional Representation
None
9. Leaders of West Indian Independence Party
Party Chairman Lennox Pierre
10. Organization of the West Indian Independence Party
No formal organization exists.



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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF URUGUAY

1. Introduction

The Uruguayan Communist Party (Partido Comunista del Uruguay--PCU) is legal, vociferous, and relatively large. The party has never been forced to operate underground, and as a result has a well-developed organizational structure. The party enjoys full democratic freedom and participates in elections through its front organization, the Leftist Liberation Front (FIDEL). The PCU has substantial influence among students and teachers organizations, and controls or influences much of organized labor. In addition, PCU members hold positions in most levels and branches of the government. The party is well placed to exploit the increasing malaise and public discontent as more and more Uruguayans feel forced to look beyond the traditional parties for a solution to their burgeoning problems.

Uruguay, once the model democracy of Latin America, has become increasingly unstable mainly because of inept leadership by a cumbersome nine-man executive and an extended period of economic deterioration. There is little prospect for stronger national direction; the administration tends to drift along the path of least resistance as determined by political pressure groups. The probable inability of the government to halt the economic deterioration and take significant austerity measures will provide further opportunities for leftist exploitation of the labor force and will also increase dissatisfaction in Uruguay's large middle class.

Although public disillusionment with the plural executive system is increasing, progress toward constitutional reform of the system has stalled as party factions are unable to agree on the form change should take. Under Uruguayan electoral law, political parties--particularly the two large traditional parties, the ruling Blancos and the opposition Colorados--have become severely factionalized. This results in complex inter-and

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intraparty maneuvering, and patronage and individual self-interest have proved more the rule than concern for the national welfare.

As progress toward legal change slows down, pressures for extralegal change increase. Military officers have been increasingly willing to speak out in political matters. Business and commercial leaders, long staunch defenders of democratic processes, are increasingly reluctant to support the current system. Crippling strikes or a breakdown in public order could precipitate a coup before the forces working for reform are able to produce an acceptable alternative.

The heavy cost of Uruguay's overextended social welfare system together with inefficient government enterprises has produced an excessive burden on an economy characterized by industrial recession, rising unemployment (now estimated between 12 and 20 percent), a spiraling cost of living (which is expected to rise about 60 percent in 1965), and growing budget deficits. Fluctuating world market prices and loss of markets for the principal exports, wool and meat, have contributed to the decline. Most of the population is now feeling the economic pinch, and the PCU is correspondingly optimistic that many more Uruguayans will be susceptible to their approaches.

2. A Brief History of the Uruguayan Communist Party

The PCU had its origin in a large-scale defection of members of the Socialist Party, an affiliate of the Second International, founded in 1910. At the Eighth Congress of the Socialist Party in September 1920, three quarters of the 1,700-odd members voted to affiliate with the Communist Third International. In April 1921, this majority group, led by Eugenio Gomez Carreno, was formally reorganized as the Uruguayan Communist Party.

From its inception, the PCU had to contend not only with the splintered Socialist Party, but also with the dominant social democratic Colorado Party which went far toward establishing a semi-socialist system in Uruguay during its 93 years of

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uninterrupted rule--(the Blancos have governed since 1958). The new Communist Party organization appealed for the support of labor, intellectuals, and youth groups, but its success in the 1920s was largely limited to elements among the foreign-born sector of the population.

It achieved a somewhat wider audience in the 1930s, capitalizing on depression conditions and the popularity of antifacism among all groups, especially intellectuals. In 1939 the Uruguayan Communists helped to organize the Latin American Trade Union Confederation which was headquartered in Montevideo and was the forerunner of the now nearly defunct Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL) as the Latin American sector of the international Communist labor front. The PCU founded a succession of labor fronts during the 1930s, but with little success. The party was equally unsuccessful in its efforts to form ties with non-Communist political organizations during the popular-front period of the late 1930s.

PCU efforts to extend its influence first achieved significant results during World War II. In this period the Communists emerged from their position as a negligible splinter party to gain a more important position and a stronger representation in the national congress, although still remaining a marginal factor in the country's political and social life. There was a severe crisis in the party and its leadership during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact (1939-41). In the climate of the wartime alliance between the United States and the USSR, the PCU made a remarkable recovery which was also based on their appeal to labor groups suffering from the economic effects of wartime maladjustments.

The PCU reached a peak just after World War II, and its labor front, the General Union of Workers (UGT), became the leading national labor federation. The party won five percent of the national vote in the 1946 elections, seating one senator and five deputies in the legislature. The Communists successfully exploited mass discontent with rising prices and led a series of strikes for higher wages.

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In Congress, party deputies joined with anti-US nationalists in condemning the government's policy of cooperation with the US.

The combination of factors which strengthened the Communists in 1946-47 was short-lived. As the party more and more obviously revealed itself to be the creature of international Communism, its supporters among the workers and the middle classes began to drift away. The party followed all the twists and turns of Soviet policy, and the stubborn pursuit by party leaders of the militant international party line led to a steady deterioration in both the PCU and its front organizations.

The PCU again started on the upgrade following the death of Stalin and the subsequent change to a policy in favor of exploiting domestic issues appealing to organized labor and other mass groups. A thorough revision of the party program and strategy was undertaken in 1955, and long-time Secretary General Gomez was charged with treasonable deviations and expelled from the party. An indication of successful internal PCU discipline is the fact that he was able to take only a handful of sympathizers out of the party with him. Since 1955, the party has followed the policy of trying to form a united leftist political front which it could dominate and especially has sought the cooperation of the Socialist Party. In July 1962, the Communists were successful in attracting some smaller revolutionary leftist groups into a Communist-dominated front called the Leftist Liberation Front, popularly known by its Spanish acronym, FIDEL. The Socialist Party has agreed to cooperate with the PCU and present a single slate of candidates in the 1966 elections because it found to its dismay that all of FIDEL's electoral gains in 1962 were made at the Socialist's expense. However, the PSU and PCU are still having trouble in using FIDEL as a common political instrument and will probably continue to have difficulty in resolving this problem so long as the present electoral laws remain unchanged. FIDEL activity in the legislature is characterized by slavish following of the party line and the use of delaying tactics to sidetrack any legislation which does not suit party purposes.

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The PCU has successfully exploited domestic economic issues, particularly in the labor field, although it has generally been unable to get sizable numbers of workers to turn out for political demonstrations. Although the party has the ability of calling crippling strikes, in recent years it has exercised considerable caution in keeping strikes and demonstrations within acceptable bounds. PCU leaders do not wish to provide any right-wing group with an excuse for a coup which they probably rightly believe would result in a reduction of their present considerable freedom of operation. For defensive purposes, the PCU has prepared plans to go underground and has also organized paramilitary units of some 300 to 400 people to serve as cadres should a coup force the party to call its supporters into the streets.

The Communists conduct extensive propaganda activity in Uruguay. The party newspaper, El Popular, (formerly known as Justicia) has a circulation of approximately 5,000 and apparently receives considerable outside financial support. Estudios, another PCU publication, does not have a large circulation, but does reach a number of students and intellectuals. A so-called "third positionist" but blatantly pro-Castro and pro-Communist newspaper, Epoca, has about 8,000 circulation, and also appears to receive considerable outside help from bloc sources. In addition, a weekly magazine, Marcha, frequently presents the Communist viewpoint, although it is owned and operated by a non-Communist. Marcha has a wide circulation and influence among students, professionals, and intellectuals. Oiga, a monthly publication of FIDEL, appeared for the first time in July 1964. Soviet and other Communist bloc publications reach Uruguay in large numbers, both for local and continent-wide distribution. In addition, at least one local publishing house specializes in Communist literature, and a substantial number of local bookstores distribute this material. The PCU and FIDEL use Radio Nacional extensively to present programs aimed at workers, with particular emphasis on the party's newest target group, the rural workers.

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3. Strength and Supporting Groups

In early 1965 almost 10,000 PCU carnets were issued in Montevideo and another 4,000 to 5,000 throughout the rest of the country. This membership of roughly 15,000 includes only about 2,000 activists who spend the major portion of their time and energy in party work. In addition, the Communist Youth Organization (UJC) has an estimated 1,000 members and is probably experiencing a continuing rise in membership.

The PCU is constantly pressed for funds, according to its own statements, and it has heavy deficits and chronic indebtedness. Revenues raised in Uruguay come from a multitude of sources including financial campaigns, party dues, El Popular sales, kickback of salaries by PCU deputies, and through raffles, dances, etc. The party also receives money from the government to reimburse it for certain national election expenses in proportion to the number of votes polled. In view of the magnitude and variety of party operations, however, it is evident that it receives substantial support from the USSR and other Communist countries.

One of the major sources of party strength has been its remarkably stable leadership. Following the overthrow of Gomez, who founded the party and led it until 1955, Rodney Arismendi emerged as its principal leader, and he remains first secretary in 1965. Many of the top party offices are filled by the same people who filled them ten, and in some cases twenty, years ago. Party organization is highly centralized with most of the power concentrated in the hands of a few leaders in the executive committee.

The PCU has campaigned in national elections under its own name since it broke away from the Socialists in 1920, but has never enjoyed great success. The high-water mark was in 1946 when the Communists won 5.03 percent of the vote; in the most recent elections in 1962, they won only 3.49 percent of the vote. Communist ability to gain a following has improved whenever Uruguay's economic

position has tended to deteriorate, but at the same time their appeal has been conditioned by the requirements of world Communist policy. The increasing severity of the economic decline which has been going on since the end of 1957 has made party leaders highly optimistic about their chances to increase their electoral strength and congressional representation. FIDEL has begun another house-to-house campaign in Montevideo, and members are encouraged with the early results, particularly among people formerly affiliated with the Blanco and Colorado parties. They hope that at least ten percent of all householders will agree to sign cards pledging them to support FIDEL. Although this estimate seems overly optimistic, there is some reason to believe that the party will improve its showing in the 1966 elections. In addition, the PCU plans to expand its organizational efforts in the interior of the country and hopes to create a confederation of salaried rural workers to affiliate with the party-dominated Central of Uruguayan Workers (CTU). PCU leaders apparently believe that the time is now ripe to broaden their base in rural areas that have traditionally favored the Blancos.

In the past, the PCU has been based almost entirely in urban areas, with a heavy concentration in Montevideo. The party finds its main membership among workers, and exerts its major efforts in the field of labor. The PCU operates through the CTU--an organization which replaced the UGT during 1960 and 61--and which has about 70,000 members. The CTU has made progress among workers in important government-owned enterprises, such as public utilities, banking, and petroleum. Rural labor is a new target group, and the PCU has had some success among workers in western and northwestern areas, although the generally well-off Uruguayan agricultural worker is not traditionally responsive to Communist appeals.

In 1964 the PCU organized the National Convention of Workers (CNT), hoping to attract affiliates who would not respond to the openly pro-Communist CTU. The CNT, with the support of the CTU, conducted a successful "Congress of the

People" in August 1965 which attracted delegates from a number of non-Communist organizations. These people gave their support to a platform which included the oft-repeated Communist demands for nationalization of private banks, expropriation and redistribution of land, expropriation of foreign commercial and industrial enterprises, and expansion of trade relations to include all countries.

The many Uruguayans who belong to independent unions (approximately 110,000 out of the organized labor force of 200,000) frequently cooperate with the CTU and the CNT in pressing economic demands on government and industry which are no longer in a position to grant large, or sometimes even moderate, wage and social benefit increases. CTU-led or -supported strikes have been effective in getting employers to meet their demands, and as a result independent unions have found cooperation with the Communists beneficial for their membership. The Communists have not, however, been able to exploit this cooperation in economic issues by turning it to political support. In addition to the independent unions, a democratically oriented labor federation has about 20,000 members. Its long-time leadership has been corrupt and has lacked militancy, although a recent change of leaders may provide a spur to its lagging efforts.

The PCU has also been successful in penetrating professional teacher organizations, dominating the major primary school teachers' union, and leading the most active secondary teachers' union. The Communists have devoted great energy to the student movement in Uruguay's only university and in secondary schools. Although Communist youth organizations exist in most high schools, they have not been especially successful. The University of the Republic, however, has a well-organized Communist youth movement with cells in all faculties. The secretary general of the federation of Uruguayan University Students is a Communist. Despite their limited numbers, the Communists dominate student policy through the use of classic Communist parliamentary maneuvers, through their militancy and superior organization, and by virtue of the fact that most Uruguayan students are inclined toward Marxism and poorly informed about democracy.

There are undoubtedly Communists, as well as many sympathizers, in the vast wasteland of Uruguayan bureaucracy, but to date they have not exerted great leadership. There are no identified Communists in the police, navy, or air force. There are, however, a few army officers, including one general, who are certainly Communist sympathizers, if not outright party members.

The PCU utilizes other front groups whenever it serves their purposes. Professional organizations, peace fronts, women's fronts, press groups, and binational centers with Communist countries have all played varying roles in the party's activities. These groups are reactivated or phased out as party line and current interest demands.

4. Foreign Influence

The PCU long ago proved itself to be a devoted servant of the Soviet Communist Party line. It remains so today. Party leaders have repeatedly stated their support for the Soviet Union and criticized the Chinese Communist position in the Sino-Soviet rift. PCU leaders and other party members make frequent trips to the USSR and other bloc countries and maintain close liaison with Communist diplomatic missions in Montevideo. The USSR and all other Eastern European countries maintain embassies in Montevideo, except East Germany which has only a trade mission. The PCU receives guidance and undoubtedly considerable financial and materiel support from the Soviets and other bloc nations, and in return provide foreign Communists with an ideal base of operations for activities in much of South America. In addition, Montevideo is used as a staging point to facilitate travel to and from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the bloc for Communists and sympathizers from many Latin nations. The PCU has hosted international congresses and front-group meetings; high-level Soviet officials have attended PCU anniversaries and congresses, and PCU representatives are in attendance at most important international Communist meetings.

The present leadership of the PCU has shown no inclination to shift to a more militant stand,

fearing it might trigger a rightist take-over and subsequent crack-down on party activities. They have no illusions about their present ability to bring down the government by themselves, and probably have little desire to do so if they could. The Uruguayan atmosphere simply is not conducive to violence; Uruguayans are by temperament talkers, rather than fighters, and militancy has practically no appeal to the ordinary Uruguayan. Instead, the PCU seeks to present itself as a respectable political party, attract other groups into fronts, infiltrate key organizations, but avoids violence.

As a result of this policy, the Chinese Communist line has found few adherents, but pro-Chinese splinter groups do exist and are discussed below. The Chinese have not been able to establish a diplomatic presence in Uruguay, but they frequently press the government for permission to open a trade office. The North Koreans do have a semiofficial trade office in Montevideo, but lead a rather precarious existence since their visas must be renewed every 90 days.

Uruguay reluctantly broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in September 1964. The removal of the Cuban Embassy cut the PCU off from one of its sources of support, but the departure was probably more harmful to Cuban interests than to those of the PCU. Party leaders continue to visit Cuba, but the PCU generally follows the line of praising Castro as a nationalist rather than a Communist hero without endorsing his wanderings from the party line.

Geography has inevitably made Uruguay sensitive to pressure from its two large neighbors, Argentina and Brazil. The PCU is no less susceptible to such pressure, and it maintains close relations with both the Argentine and Brazilian parties. In addition, the PCU provides some assistance to exiled Brazilian leftists who have been in Uruguay since the fall of the Goulart regime in April 1964, and to exiled Paraguayan Communists.

5. Dissident Groups

The divisive effects of the Sino-Soviet split have taken some toll of PCU ranks. There are several

pro-Chinese Communist political groups in Uruguay, the largest being the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), composed mainly of former PCU and UJC members. It has perhaps 200 members, although many could not be considered party activists. The MIR was originally formed in 1963--under the name Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR)--by PCU members who had been expelled because of their pro-Chinese activity. A portion of the MAR came under the domination of pro-Cubans who had broken away from the Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement (MRO) headed by FIDEL Deputy Ariel Collazo. In December 1963 the MAR and MIR both gained considerable notoriety and generated internal group conflicts by conducting robberies to obtain food and clothing to distribute to the poor. Other FIDEL components also split over the Sino-Soviet rift, with pro-Chinese groups operating sometimes alone and sometimes in cooperation with the MIR.

One thing about which all of these groups could agree was the need for violent revolution as opposed to the PCU's continued emphasis on peaceful coexistence. In March 1965 a series of meetings took place in which the groups agreed to form a unified Marxist-Leninist Communist party, which subsequently agreed to use the MIR name. They further agreed to coordinate attacks against the PCU and the Uruguayan Socialist Party (PSU), to attack the principles and practices of the Soviet Communist Party and support those of the Chinese, and to support any rural organization which showed potential of becoming a peasant militia. The new MIR has reportedly sought Chinese Communist assistance, and members who had been in China have returned to Montevideo to guide party activities. The MIR is planning to publish an eight-page tabloid twice monthly.

The pro-Chinese segment of the PSU has connections with the MIR, although its leader, Raul Sendic, has come under fire from MIR leaders because of his endorsement by the PCU and PSU. Sendic is a militant socialist whose revolutionary ardor usually puts him far to the left of the PCU. He has been active primarily in the northern sugar cane growing province of Artigas, where he has led


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rural workers in annual "marches" on Montevideo, seeking to dramatize their poor working conditions. The marches have attracted some attention, but the Sendic-supported union has not made significant strides in overtaking the democratically oriented union in the area. The August 1965 arson in cane fields in Artigas Province is attributed to Sendic's followers and has resulted in public opinion turning strongly against this group. Sendic himself is in hiding because of his earlier involvement in armed robberies, and the active leader of his group is Washington Rodriguez.

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


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


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7. Members of Legislature

A. Chamber of Deputies


1. Rodney Arismendi
2. Jose Luis Massera
3. Ariel Collazo


B. Senate

1. Enrique Rodriguez

8. Trend in Size of Congressional Representation


	<u>Deputies</u> (99 total)	<u>Senators</u> (31 total)
1922	1	
1925	2	
1928	1	
1931	2	
1934	1	
1938	1	
1942	2	
1946	5	1
1950	2	
1954	2	
1958	2	
1962	3	1






9. Leaders of the Uruguayan Communist Party

<u>Party Post</u>	<u>Members of Central Committee</u>	<u>Members of Secretariat</u>	<u>Members of Executive Committee</u>
First Secretary	Rodney Arismendi*	Rodney Arismendi*	Rodney Arismendi*
	Enrique Pastorino	Enrique Pastorino	Enrique Pastorino
	Jaime Gerchuni Perez	Jaime Gerchuni Perez	Jaime Gerchuni Perez
	Rosario Pietrarroia	Rosario Pietrarroia	Rosario Pietrarroia
	Enrique Rodriguez**	Enrique Rodriguez**	Enrique Rodriguez**
	Alberto Suarez Vignolo	Alberto Suarez Vignolo	Alberto Suarez Vignolo
	<u>Julia Arevalo de Roche</u>		<u>Julia Arevalo de Roche</u>
Charge of paramilitary affairs	Alberto Altesor Mezquita		Alberto Altesor Mezquita
	Jose Blanco Mendez		Jose Blanco Mendez
Relations with Cuba	Leopoldo Bruera		Leopoldo Bruera
	Felix Diaz Clavijo		Felix Diaz Clavijo
	Jose Luis Massera*		Jose Luis Massera*
	Cesar Reyes Daglio		Cesar Reyes Daglio
	Gregorio Sapin		Gregorio Sapin
	Eduardo Viera		Eduardo Viera
	Ricardo Mario Acosta Baladon		
	Juan Acuna		
	Hector Betancurt		
	Gerardo Cuesta Vila		





Party
Post

Members of
Central
Committee

Members of
Secretariat

Members of
Executive
Committee

UJC Sec'y
General

Edison DePascua

Hermes Gadda

Armando Gonzalez

Juan Mujica

Omar Oldan

Irene Perez de Acuna

Raul Rezzano

Raul Tealdi

Jose Tomasich

Samuel Wainstein

Esteban Fernandez
Ruggiero

Eduardo Bleier
Horovitz

Walter Sanseviero#

Salomon Schvartz
Alexandrowitch#

Luis Silva Rehermann#


Simon Krausov#

Severino Alonso#


Henerson Cardoso#

Luis Fernandez#

Godofredo Fernandez#



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Party
Post

Members of
Central
Committee

Members of
Secretariat

Members of
Executive
Committee


Hector Franco#

Juan Jesus#

Francisco R. Pintos#


KEY: * Deputy
** Senator
Alternate Central Committee member, non-voting

V-18




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


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


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


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


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


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



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


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



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


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



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



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


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


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


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


W-10



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W-11



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


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


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


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


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



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