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- **The Insurgency.** Strategy, capabilities, strength, combat effectiveness, morale, and vulnerabilities of the FMLN. Plans and capabilities for terrorist actions, particularly targeted against US personnel/facilities. Possible fissures within the FMLN's military leadership and divisions between the political and military arms of the FMLN. Influence and composition of the FMLN's political infrastructure. FMLN strategy and objectives regarding dialogue with the Government of El Salvador (GOES). Cuban and Sandinista roles in supporting and advising the insurgents. Extent of foreign materiel and personnel support and methods and routes of entry into El Salvador. Guerrilla propaganda and disinformation campaigns.
- **The Armed Forces.** Capabilities, combat effectiveness, morale, and vulnerabilities. Attitudes toward negotiations with the FMLN. Acceptance of civilian control. Strategy and effectiveness in reducing guerrilla-controlled areas. Improvements in ESAF's intelligence capability and its impact on battlefield performance. Efforts to interdict munitions and supplies to the FMLN. Success of civic action programs. State of civil defense program. Internal military politics and views of younger officers in particular.
- **Human Rights.** Willingness and capability of the GOES, the right and the left to observe human rights, GOES dedication to the pursuit and prosecution of offenders in the armed forces and on the extreme right. Evidence of higher involvement or an attempted coverup in the Jesuit murder cases. Nature of links between sectors of the ESAF and the extreme right in sponsoring and abetting death squads; role of Roberto D'Aubuisson in fostering such activities. Who are the persons authorizing and participating in raids on nongovernmental organizations and how can they be controlled? Perceptions by the outside world of human rights situation in El Salvador. Possibilities for reform of the judicial system.
- **The Economy.** Impact of the insurgency on the economic infrastructure. Impact of the war on GOES efforts to push its privatization and economic reform program. Popular reaction to the government's reform program and delays in its implementation. Nature and extent of foreign assistance, and sources other than the US. Economic trends. Relations with the multinational financial institutions; efforts to contain/reverse flight of capital. Roles, influence, and prospects for democratic labor and economic interest groups.

ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTION EFFORTS

The ongoing civil war in El Salvador inhibits in varying degree the movement of Mission officers about the country. Nevertheless, the Community feels that Mission coverage across the board has been excellent, particularly in view of the burden imposed on the Mission by heavy tasking and the constant stream of visitors.

The Community considers overall Embassy reporting on internal political matters to be very good. The Community noted that the timeliness of spot reporting in general has improved and encouraged this trend. Embassy access

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
Director of
Central
Intelligence

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NATIONAL HUMINT COLLECTION PLAN

EL SALVADOR 

Prepared for
The Director of
Central Intelligence
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HUMINT Committee

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