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
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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

THE SOVIET VISIT TO BRITAIN

The Soviet View

Moscow evidently recognizes that Bulganin and Khrushchev failed to make a favorable impression on British public opinion or to stimulate Labor Party interest in contacts with the Soviet Communist Party. The Soviet leaders presumably did not expect agreement with British leaders on substantive issues, but probably feel that the realistic exchange of views was useful. Khrushchev's determination to continue the present Soviet diplomatic tactics, including high-level exchanges, is evident in his statement that the Soviet leaders would be interested in visiting the United States.

Bulganin and Khrushchev must be acutely conscious of the striking contrast between the small, cool, and sometimes hostile crowds which greeted them in the streets of British cities and the cheering throngs they met in India. Khrushchev's angry reaction to this reception contributed to the failure of the visit from a public relations point of view.

In his speech at the Moscow airport on his return, Khrushchev vigorously attacked "reactionary elements" among the British Labor leaders. He is evidently aware that the heated discussions at the Labor Party dinner on 23 April set back the Soviet campaign to draw the Laborites toward collaboration with the Communist Party of the USSR and may prove to be a serious

handicap to the Soviet effort to establish closer relations with Socialists throughout Western Europe.

Khrushchev, in his Moscow speech, charged that the Labor leaders did not reflect rank-and-file opinion in the party, and Soviet propaganda has claimed that they are being strongly criticized for their behavior by party members. This line may indicate that future tactics to win over the Socialists will give greater attention to the mass membership rather than the leaders, although at a second meeting with Labor leaders, Khrushchev suggested in general terms the possibility that they might visit Moscow.

The Communists' effort to bridge the wide gap between them and Democratic Socialists has thus far been rebuffed throughout Western Europe as well as in Britain, but it remains a major aim of the USSR.

The Soviet offer to purchase some \$2.8 billion worth of British goods in the next five years if strategic controls were lifted was made on the last day of the talks, and thus was clearly designed to impress British businessmen rather than serve as a basis for negotiating. The Russians did not make it clear how many of the orders might be placed if controls were not lifted, or whether this was an all-or-nothing offer. They do not expect to break the British government's adherence to controls

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at once, but are counting on long-term results.

The Soviet leaders probably arrived in London with no expectation that significant progress could be made in negotiating major outstanding issues. The results of the substantive discussion bore this out, representing neither a gain nor a loss from Moscow's viewpoint. The Soviet leaders may have been impressed by the firmness of the British-American alliance. In any case, they made few obvious attempts to create a division.

In general Bulganin and Khrushchev seemed content with making a forceful presentation of their views, in some cases expressed even more rigidly than in the past. They went through the motions of seeking the re-convocation of the Geneva conference on Indochina, but appeared to be making only the minimum effort necessary to satisfy their allies in Peiping.

The joint statement on the Middle East added little to the Soviet position as expressed in the Soviet declaration issued on the eve of the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev. The Soviet decision to subscribe to the joint statement's call for a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute "on a basis mutually acceptable to both sides" has caused disillusionment in some Arab circles. However, the loss to the USSR of some Arab confidence probably will not be permanent since Moscow can still support the Arabs in any future negotiations, especially with regard to the Arab refugees and Arab territorial claims against Israel.

Khrushchev's declaration to the press that the USSR would be willing to join in a UN ban of arms shipments anywhere in the world served notice to the West that Moscow's price for curtailing arms shipments to the Arabs would be a commitment from the West to curtail such shipments to Baghdad pact members. Furthermore, by implying an intention to use greater restraint in "sponsoring" the Arabs against Israel--possibly a reflection of Soviet fears that further deterioration of the situation might involve great-power intervention and the risk of all-out war--the USSR has placed itself in a better position to avoid taking the blame for existing or future tensions in the area.

The British View

British government leaders feel that they were successful in their handling of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit. British Socialists saw confirmation of the wide gulf that exists between Socialism and Communism.

The many hours of private talks gave Whitehall the opportunity it desired to explore the wide range of Anglo-Soviet and world-wide problems, as much to clarify differences as to approach agreement. British officials received dramatic proof of their expectation of prolonged trouble from the Soviet intrusion in the Middle East by the visitors' bluntly expressed intention to harass Britain there as long as the Baghdad pact is maintained. They believe they nevertheless scored a tactical point by getting the USSR to join them in urging support of UN measures to maintain the peace in the Middle East.

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Foreign Secretary Lloyd apparently believes he so succeeded in impressing the Russian guests with Britain's intention to protect its interests in the Middle East that they realized the seriousness of the situation for the first time.

Khrushchev's treatment of the disarmament problem has led the British to anticipate unilateral Soviet reduction of conventional forces. The Western position of "no disarmament without German reunification" no longer exerts appreciable leverage on Moscow, according to a senior Foreign Office official who states that Britain is considering informing West Germany that Britain might match any Soviet reduction.

Of all the developments, Khrushchev's clash with the Labor Party may have the most lasting effect in Britain. His abrupt dismissal of demands for release of Social Democrats brought a rare degree of unity to the opposition. A resolution criticizing party leader Gaitskell's conduct toward the Soviet visitors received only ten votes at a 26 April meeting of the parliamentary Labor Party. Gaitskell told Khrushchev it was impossible for the Labor Party to accept an invitation from the Communist Party, but left the door open to any later bid from the government of the Soviet Union.

In general, Britain's hopes for early improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations rest mainly in the sphere of cultural relations. London took heart from

the USSR's announced curtailment of its jamming of BBC broadcasts during the visit. To encourage Moscow in this respect, BBC on 26 April cut down its own broadcasts to the Soviet Union, since Moscow had previously justified its jamming by referring to the excessive number of frequencies used by Western broadcasts. The British also hope that travel to the Soviet Union may be expanded despite the vagueness of the statement the Russians were willing to put in the final communiqué.

Prime Minister Eden's optimistic public statement on the USSR's conditional \$2.8 billion five-year trade offer is likely to encourage public expectations for a substantial rise in trade, despite Britain's stated unwillingness to relax restrictions on strategic exports and the USSR's unwillingness to promise larger purchases of British goods without an easing of such restrictions.

The British public appears well satisfied with the government's conduct of the visit, and, as measured by press comment, generally approves Eden's acceptance of the invitation to visit the USSR. Khrushchev's confident performance, particularly in handling the 27 April press conference, fostered the general belief that he was not, in the words of the influential Manchester Guardian, "the kind of Caesar who would willingly risk war."

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