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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505**

24 February 1975

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** The Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT :** **WARSAW PACT JOURNAL:** Certain Problems in the  
Coordination of Large Units and Units of Allied Navies in  
Combined Tactical Exercises

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a **SECRET** Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article concerns coordination of combined naval forces in minesweeping efforts and in antisubmarine, air and antimissile defense during combat operations in a 1972 tactical exercise. Although generally successful, the exercise showed a need for more emphasis on underwater sabotage and communications problems in future combined training operations. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 5, which was published in 1973.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the [redacted] Codeword [redacted].

[redacted]  
William E. Nelson  
Deputy Director for Operations

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# Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT



DATE OF INFO. September 1972

DATE 24 February 1975

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Certain Problems in the Coordination of Large Units and Units of Allied Navies in Combined Tactical Exercises

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a ~~SECRET~~ Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by Rear Admiral V. Saakyan, who reviews problems of coordinating combined naval forces in minesweeping efforts and in antisubmarine, air and antimissile defense during combat operations in a 1972 tactical exercise. Although generally successful, the exercise showed a need for more emphasis on underwater sabotage and communications problems in future combined training operations. This article appeared in Issue No. 5 which was published in 1973.

End of Summary

Comment:

There is no information in available reference materials which can be firmly associated with the author. The names of authors are given in Russian transliteration.

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Certain Problems in the Coordination of Large Units and  
Units of Allied Navies in Combined Tactical Exercises

by  
Rear Admiral V. Saakyan  
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red  
Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR

The unity of goals of the allied navies, their combat capabilities, as well as the geographic conditions of the Black Sea naval theater, require close coordination in the carrying out of certain tasks.

As is known, the essence of tactical coordination is the coordination of the operations of large units and units of navies according to goal (objective), place, time, and methods, and the directing of their efforts toward the achievement of the common goal. It depends to a considerable extent on uninterrupted communications, warning, identification, and exchange of information, as well as personal contact between commanders and chiefs of staff of coordinating large units (units). Close tactical coordination is especially important in the delivery of combined missile and torpedo strikes against enemy ship groupings, in mutual support of the passage of ships by sea in operational zones of allied navies, and in the combat support of operations of groupings of forces.

Combat against enemy submarines will be successful only through coordination between ship hunter-killer groups of the allied navies and antisubmarine aviation, and through wide use of all means of observing the underwater environment.

Antimissile defense of ships during passage by sea and at mobile basing points should also be organized on the basis of combined operations by allied naval forces.

Covering ships from the air, especially in remote areas of the sea, is one of the most complex types of combat support of combined operations by allied navies. Experience gained from training exercises shows that successful air defense of ship large units can be achieved only through efficient coordination of the operations of the air defense forces and means of the allied countries and navies.

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As the exercises show, when organizing the defense and protection of ships in roadsteads and at mobile basing points, serious attention must be given to combatting enemy underwater sabotage forces and means. Without reliable protection against them, a ship anchorage cannot be considered secure.

A serious threat to ships in shallow areas of a theater is posed by mines. In organizing anti-mine defense of ships at sea and at mobile basing points, it is very important to plan a system of measures, including anti-mine observation, search and destruction of mines, convoying of ships behind minesweepers, destruction of minelayers, and timely warning of allied naval forces concerning the danger of mines.

All these matters were given attention at the combined tactical exercise (training cruise) of ships of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, the Navy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and the Navy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, held in September 1972.

In the exercise the tactical coordination of forces was worked out for the performance of the following tasks:

- search and destruction of strike groupings of enemy surface ships and submarines;
- air defense of ships during passage by sea and at mobile basing points;
- convoying of ships behind minesweepers, control minesweeping of anchorages and channels, and other types of defense and protection of ships during passage by sea and at mobile basing points.

It should be noted that the weather in the area of the exercise was unfavorable. The ships had to operate under fairly adverse conditions, but in accomplishing their tasks the commanders of allied naval tactical groups and ships displayed strong will, creative initiative, and an effort to conduct persistent and aggressive combat operations. Their decisions were specific in nature, corresponded to the assigned tasks, and were coordinated and backed up by calculations. Of great value was the effort by commanders of large units to find the optimum methods of utilizing their forces for carrying out their assigned tasks. Measures were considered and planned for comprehensive support of combat operations by allied naval forces. At the same time, it seems to us, the areas could have been assessed in greater detail than was done in the tactical exercise, from the point of view of the currents, the nature of the depths, and the effect of these factors on the organization of antisubmarine and anti-mine defense and on combat against underwater sabotage forces and means.

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The exercise showed that in future combined operations, it is obviously necessary that a more extensive study be made of methods to combat underwater sabotage forces and means, and that the plans of naval base (large unit) commanders include more specific assignment of tasks to subordinate forces with regard to repelling possible sabotage.

During the tactical exercise all planned measures were taken for working out naval offensive operations and all types of defense. One group of missile patrol boats and two groups of motor torpedo boats, using data obtained by tactical reconnaissance and guidance data from a brigade command post, delivered a successful strike against a detachment of combat ships during passage by sea. The strike was delivered simultaneously from various directions and from the furthestmost ranges of fire. The personnel of these boats acted decisively and with aggressiveness and speed.

During the exercise, air defense problems were worked out. Taking part in them were aviation from the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR and aircraft from air defense aviation and the air forces of the Bulgarian People's Army. The elements of coordination were worked out between ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Navy of the Bulgarian People's Republic on the one hand, and forces and means from the air defense and the air forces of the Bulgarian People's Army on the other, during combined repelling of enemy strikes from the air. In all, there were nine instances of guiding fighter planes from shipboard control posts and eighteen from onshore guidance posts of air defense units of the Bulgarian People's Republic. It should be noted that the crews of the ships and the flight personnel performed with boldness and confidence, displaying a high level of combat training. It will clearly be useful in 1973 to move on to the study of the problems of air defense of ships in a more complex situation and to begin working out the covering of ship forces by fighter aviation over the full tactical radius, with rebasing of fighters to airfields located near the areas of operations of naval forces.

In the exercise a high level of combat training was noted among submarine personnel.

The exercise confirmed that the use of all-arms antisubmarine forces considerably enhances the effectiveness of submarine search. In our opinion, it would be advisable in the future to improve coordination among ships, patrol boats, aircraft, and helicopters of antisubmarine defense, to work out a monitoring system for submarine search, and to develop combined antisubmarine protection for detachments of combat ships by multinational forces from allied navies.

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The combined exercise for submarine search conducted by ships of the Navy of the Bulgarian People's Republic and the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet helped to further raise the level of tactical training of staff officers and ship commanders, to improve mutual understanding, and to improve coordination and teamwork among ships.

Another instructive feature of the exercise was the development of several ways of defending a detachment of combat ships of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet in the zone of the Navy of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Specifically, in order to ensure the anti-mine defense of a large unit, a number of measures were taken, including even diving exploration of ship anchorages for the purpose of seeking out bottom mines.

Contributing to the success of the combined operations was the party-political activity carried out by the commanders and political organizations of the allied navies during the exercise, which helped to increase the combat readiness of ships and large units and to further strengthen the fraternal ties and friendship among the peoples and servicemen of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Socialist Republic of Romania, and the Soviet Union.

Based on the experience of the tactical exercise, it would be advisable, in our opinion, to continue the combined working out of problems involving seeking out, tracking, and destroying submarines, with the participation of antisubmarine forces from the navies of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania, and from the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the Soviet Union. When taking measures to provide combat training for the forces of allied navies, more attention should be given to working out problems of coordination communications at the tactical level, using the YUG-2 set of documents.

It has obviously become necessary to have shortwave radio antenna systems aboard ships, with a microphone system of operation, and to complete the equipping of command posts of senior air defense commanders with more powerful transmitters, which will make it possible to reduce the time needed to transmit commands to one or two minutes.


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It would be advisable also to study in greater depth the methods of conducting combined combat operations and to conduct more frequent cruises in combined formations and combat dispositions, controlling the forces from the command posts of the commanders of large units of the navies of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania, and of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR.



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