

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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NOTE TO: Doug MacEachin
Larry Gershwin

I am giving a speech on developments in the Soviet Union and implications for US strategy at the Naval War College Thursday. I am using my old standby Soviet speech but I have added something more to it on arms control and strategic developments. I have drawn this primarily from a recent SOVA paper on how the Soviets might look at START.

I would appreciate your looking at these three pages and giving me any corrections or suggestions you might have. I would appreciate hearing back some time this afternoon.

Robert M. Gates

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