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# BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT

Carl

Thank you — I will now account the full report.

Access to this document will be restricted to those persons cleared for the specific projects;

Please include the Comint stuff in the report.

### WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE and Communications Intelligence Controls. No action is to be taken on any communications intelligence which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source, unless such action is first approved by the appropriate authority.

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EO 12958 6.2(c)

31 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT : OXCART Operations on 27, 28, 29  
October (local time)

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. Since deployment of the OXCART aircraft to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, we have flown 18 photographic missions over North Viet Nam. Of these, 7 were flown during the month of October, 3 of which were on successive days over last weekend.
3. Beginning with the third mission the Chinese and later North Vietnamese Air Defense Radar networks have tracked the aircraft and have steadily improved their tracking capability. In the past several attempts to launch a SA-2 missile at the aircraft have been made but the first actual launches occurred over last weekend. One such attempt occurred on Friday night (local time) and there were probably at least 5 missiles launched against Sunday night's mission. One from the Kep Air Field area and 4 from the Hanoi. It will be several days before we complete our detailed analysis of this activity but the following preliminary facts have been established:
  - a. During the period when SA-2 missiles were being launched the aircraft

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was flying in excess of mock 3.1 and at altitudes varying from about 83,000 to 85,000 feet.


b. Our jammer systems aboard the aircraft appeared to function normally and may have played a key role in preventing a shoot down.

c. The pilot actually observed 4 missiles of which 3 appeared to burst behind but fairly close to the aircraft.

d. After landing an inspection revealed a small hole in the bottom of the aircraft which penetrated three layers of titanium metal and the metal object was actually found inside one of the fuel tanks. The fragment is being returned to the US for analysis but we would presume at this point it is in fact a fragment of a SA-2 warhead.

e. COMINT confirms the launches as observed by the pilot and indicates that the launch crews thought that 3 of the missiles performed properly.

4. We are obviously concerned about the safety of the aircraft and will thoroughly review all the information before making final recommendations. For the moment, however, we do not believe that there is sufficient concern to warrant a stand-down and would propose that if the weather clears that we should continue to operate with a number of precautions such as maintaining very high altitude and some adjustment of our flight routes. We will make further recommendations concerning any other adjustments in the program that may be required when our analysis is complete.

  
CARL E. DUCKETT  
Deputy Director  
for  
Science and Technology

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OX CART

31 October 1967

NOTE FOR: The Director

1. I just got a look at some of the COMINT traffic relating to Friday night's mission and thought a few quotes might be used if a light conversation on this subject develops.

2. Apparently most of the communications between the Regimental Controller at Phuc Yen airfield and the Battalion Commander of one of the SA-2 sites was intercepted. The Battalion Commander had been ordered to fire when the aircraft was at 32.5 n.m. from the site. The two argued about whether that was beyond the capability of the SA-2 system. He did actually fire when the aircraft was 25.2 miles away. The Battalion Commander said that firing at a distance of 32.5 miles and at an altitude of 78,744 feet was "unrealistic and too far and high for a successful launch." The Controller complained that "One missile was not enough." The conversation then turned to a more congenial mood, and the Controller congratulated the Battalion on their being the "first unit to be able to pick it up and launch." The Battalion Commander replied, "There is the matter of my having experience already. If it continues and comes in again, I'll intercept it." The Regimental Controller then left. The Battalion Commander continued, "Perhaps if we launch at it it will leave, but our missiles are too slow."

  
CART E. DUCKETT

OX CART

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