

"Ops." <sup>110</sup> Each project received a code name in the sequence TH-1, TH-2, and so on. North told the Committees that the projects had not progressed beyond the planning stage and, therefore, he did not seek a Presidential Finding authorizing any of these operations. <sup>111</sup>

North testified that he discussed the Enterprise's role in these projects with Poindexter, but Poindexter said he did not recall such a conversation. <sup>112</sup> The only evidence that the President knew of these sensitive projects appears in a September 15, 1986, memorandum from North to Poindexter. North asked Poindexter to brief the President on certain initiatives, including one of the proposed joint U.S.-Israeli covert operations. An attachment to the memorandum which North suggested should be briefed to Casey stated that "covert funds could be made available" for this operation, but the source of the funds was not disclosed. <sup>113</sup> Poindexter noted on the memorandum that he approved North's recommendation to brief the President on these operations and that it was "done." Poindexter testified that he did not know or tell the President that the covert funds referred to by North were coming from the Enterprise. <sup>114</sup>

### The Lebanese Operation

Another initiative undertaken by North involved the use of DEA and Israeli contacts to fund and equip a force in Lebanon. North described the proposed force as part of a "long term operation" to give the United States some future military leverage on the ground in Lebanon. <sup>115</sup>

North sent Poindexter a PROF note in June 1986 about Secord's progress in working with a Lebanese group on a hostage rescue operation: "After the CIA took so long to organize and then botched the Kilburn effort, Copp [Secord] undertook to see what could be done through one of the earlier DEA developed [Lebanese] contacts. Dick [Secord] has been working with Nir on this, and now has three people in Beirut and a 40-man force working for us. Dick rates the possibility of success on this operation as 30% but that's better than nothing." <sup>116</sup> In closed testimony before the Committees, North indicated that the project was never carried out even though "we spent a fairly significant amount of money on [this additional] DEA operation." <sup>117</sup>

Peter Kilburn, a 60-year-old librarian at the American University in Beirut, was kidnapped on November 30, 1984. U.S. sources believed that, unlike the other hostages, Kilburn was being held by a criminal faction in Lebanon. At one point in the fall of 1985, North had contemplated allocating Enterprise funds to support an operation intended to free him. <sup>118</sup> The plan was terminated when Kilburn was murdered allegedly by agents of Mu'ammarr Qaddafi shortly after the American air raid on Libya in April 1986.

### Other Countries

Other projects contemplated by North involved aiding anticommunist resistance groups around the world. North told the Committees that he and Director Casey "had several discussions about making what he called 'off-the-shelf,' self-generating activities that would be able to do a number of these things. He had mentioned specifically an ongoing operation." In addition, North testified, "I concluded within my own mind the fact that it might require [other ongoing] operations [as well]." <sup>119</sup> In testimony before the Committees, North explained his motivation for assisting resistance groups. "We cannot be seen in the world today as walking away and leaving failure in our wake. We must be able to demonstrate, not only in Nicaragua, but elsewhere where freedom fighters have been told, we will support you, we must be able to continue to do so." <sup>120</sup>

In April 1986, North asked Secord and his partner Albert Hakim to use \$100,000 from the Lake Resources Swiss accounts to purchase conventional radio phone equipment for donation to a political party in a foreign country. On April 29, two representatives of a U.S. manufacturer met in Miami with Secord and one of Secord's associates, and the purchasing agent for the political party. At the meeting, the purchasing agent agreed to buy \$100,000 of the radio equipment, and Secord—upon North's request—arranged for the Enterprise to wire this amount to the manufacturer.

### The Erria

Another of North's projects involved the purchase by the Enterprise of the M/V *Erria*, a small coastal freighter of Danish registry used to transport goods between Europe and the Middle East. The *Erria*, built in 1973, was small, only 163 feet long, and weighed 710 tons. <sup>121</sup> Before its purchase, the *Erria* was owned by its captain, Arne Herup. <sup>122</sup>

In 1984 and 1985, the *Erria* was used to run weapons to the Persian Gulf and then to Nigeria and Central America. Because of its Danish registry, the *Erria*, was able to escape the scrutiny of customs officials. <sup>123</sup> "When we ended up needing a ship to perform a certain task," recalled North, "there was nowhere to get one on short notice, and so this organization [the Enterprise] produced it practically overnight." Poindexter testified that Secord offered the ship because the Department of Defense could not provide a ship suitable for the covert operation. <sup>124</sup> According to North, Casey said "we can't find one anywhere else, get a ship. It didn't cost the taxpayers of the United States a cent." <sup>124</sup> The money came from the Iran arms sales and other Enterprise funds.

The *Erria* first came to the attention of the Enterprise in April 1985, when it carried arms purchased through Secord to the Contras. En route to Central

America, the *Erria* came under surveillance by an unidentified "fishing boat" which Captain Herup assumed was Cuban.<sup>125</sup> Herup took evasive action and brought the cargo successfully to a Central American country.<sup>126</sup> Herup's actions impressed Secord's associate, Thomas Clines, and when North needed a ship in April 1986, for covert operations, Clines suggested to Hakim that the Enterprise purchase the *Erria* from Herup, and keep him as Captain.

Hakim bought the ship for \$312,000 through Dolmy Business, Inc., one of the Panamanian companies owned by the Enterprise, on April 28, 1986.<sup>127</sup> Herup was asked to remain as captain for at least six months, with Danish agent Tom Parlow of SA Chartering continuing as the ship's agent. Hakim and Clines told Herup that they were working for the CIA and that at some future date they might ask him to transport technical equipment for covert operations. They promised that when the project was finished, the ship would be returned to Herup at no cost.

### The Proposed Charter to the CIA for a Covert Operation

The first mission North contemplated for the *Erria* was for an extended covert operation. On April 28, 1986, Secord sent a KL-43 message to North proposing that the CIA charter the vessel for that purpose: "Abe [Hakim] still in Copenhagen with our lawyer finalizing purchase of ship. Deal has been made after three days of negotiation. The Danish captain is up and eager for the mission—he now works for us. We are asking . . . [of the CIA] for firm fixed price contract of \$1.2 million for six months. He will probably balk at this price . . ."<sup>127a</sup>

As Secord predicted, the Agency felt the rate was excessive (several times the prevailing rate for similar assets) and it balked at chartering the ship. In addition, the CIA informed North that it was not interested on technical grounds and that it did not feel that security could be maintained because of the ship's previous use by North's associates to ferry arms to Central America. The Agency indicated that Tom Clines' involvement was a negative factor of major proportions.<sup>128</sup>

North persisted in his efforts to have the CIA lease the ship. He then enlisted Poindexter's help. In a May 14 memorandum, Vincent M. Cannistraro of the SC staff urged Poindexter to take the matter up with Casey:

Status of Ollie's Ship. Ollie has offered the use of a Danish vessel for [a covert operation]. He first offered CIA a six month lease. CIA told me that they thought it was too expensive, and the cost and time involved in refitting the vessel for [the] mission made the alternative option . . . more attractive. Ollie then offered to [perform the mission] using his own resources. [C/NE] has told

me that because of the alleged involvement of one Tom Clines (who was involved with Wilson and Terpil), CIA will have nothing to do with the ship.<sup>129</sup>

In the end, Casey supported Clair George's decision that the ship was not suitable for Agency use.

### The Odyssey of the *Erria*

On May 9, 1986, the *Erria* commenced its operations under its new owners, the Enterprise. The ship was to travel to pick up technical equipment for a covert operation.

On May 16 Herup was ordered to abort the mission and return to Larnaca, Cyprus. The new plan for the ship was to pick up any American hostages released as a result of the DEA initiative. En route to Larnaca, Herup received instructions to take up a position off the coast of Lebanon and to await further directions.<sup>130</sup>

As described earlier in this Chapter, the DEA hostage ransom plan failed. Accordingly, after a 48-hour wait, Hakim ordered the ship to sail on to Larnaca. On June 5, Herup received instructions to head for Gibraltar, but at the last moment the ship was diverted to Cagliari, Sardinia. From there, he was told to take the ship to Setubal, Portugal, to await an arms cargo from Defex. The cargo at Setubal was not ready for loading, and Herup was instructed to return to Copenhagen, where he arrived on July 4.<sup>131</sup>

The *Erria* then was ordered to Szczecin, Poland, where it arrived on July 10. The cargo it picked up was marked "machine parts," but actually consisted of 158 tons of Communist-bloc weapons, including AK-47 assault rifles, hand grenades, mortars, and a variety of ammunition.<sup>132</sup> The shipment was consigned to Energy Resources International, an Enterprise company.

The *Erria's* next stop was Setubal, Portugal, where on July 19, it loaded an additional 222 tons of arms from Defex Portugal in the presence of Parlow and Clines.<sup>133</sup> Herup was told to set his course for a Central American port. According to Hakim, the total cargo, which he called the "stranded shipment," cost \$1.7 million;<sup>134</sup> Secord placed the cost at about \$2.4 million.<sup>135</sup> En route to Central America, Parlow called Herup and told him to stop the ship. Congress was in the process of repealing the Boland Amendment. The vessel sat in the water for 4 days. Captain Herup then was ordered to return to Portugal, where he was met by Clines.<sup>136</sup>

The Enterprise decided to find a buyer for the 380-ton cargo of arms now on board the *Erria*. Defex sold the arms to an intermediary for \$1.2 million. The intermediary, in turn, sold the cargo for \$2,156,000 (including transportation),<sup>137</sup> to the CIA, which did not want to deal with the Enterprise because of Clines' involvement. The arms were transferred from

the *Erria* to another ship on September 20 for delivery to the CIA.<sup>138</sup>

Hakim and Secord continued their efforts. Herup was ordered to take the now-empty *Erria* to Haifa, Israel, where it was to receive a new shipment of arms. So as not to run afoul of the Arab boycott, the name of the ship was altered to read, "*Ria*," and false entries were placed in the Captain's log. On October 13, at Haifa, Herup loaded a crate containing eight tons of Eastern Bloc arms that Nir had promised for the Contras. The captain also had been told he was to pick up pharmaceuticals for Iran. No pharmaceuticals were loaded.

Herup was then ordered to go to Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. The Iranians had promised North two Soviet T-72 tanks, but after the *Erria* waited 6 weeks in the Gulf, the plan failed to materialize. On December 9, Herup was ordered to open the Israeli crate. He found only 600 well-used AK-47 assault rifles and 15 cases of ammunition—valued at approximately \$100,000—a cargo not worth transporting to Central America.<sup>139</sup>

After the revelations of the Iran-Contra covert operations in November 1986, Clines or Hakim ordered the *Erria* on December 14 to return to Eilat, Israel, where the crate of weapons that had been received in Haifa were unloaded.

The *Erria* returned to Denmark later in December. Its missions on behalf of the Enterprise were at an end.

### Conclusion

The *Erria* was in a sense a metaphor for the other operations of the Enterprise—ventures that began with ambitious expectations but accomplished nothing. But the fate of these ventures cannot obscure the danger of privatization of covert operations or the fact that the participants in the Enterprise had audacious plans for covert operations. Had the architects of the other operations been emboldened by success, and not frustrated by failure, the Committees can only conjecture, with apprehension, what other uncontrolled covert activities on behalf of the United States lay in store.

126. The commercial Bill of Lading shows the destination as a Central American port; however, the true destination of the cargo was a different Central American port. The ship arrived at that port on June 2, 1985. ER0001-02.

127. Dolmy Business, Inc., was organized as a corporation under the laws of Panama, on September 11, 1985. ER03-09; ER10-12. See also: the Memorandum of Agreement and Bill of Sale covering the *Erria*. ER13-17; ER18-19.

127a. OLN Ex.-286.

128. C9605. Items for discussion at DCI meeting with Poindexter on 5/15/86.

129. N43472 (Memo from Cannistraro to Poindexter "Agenda for weekly meeting with DCI," 5/14/86.)

130. See summary log of the *Erria*, at ER0021; *Erria* log book, at ER0023-30; and ship's position May 23-29, as reflected on page 14 of the *Erria* log book, at ER0031.

131. At this point, Albert Hakim and Dolmy Corporation owed SA Chartering \$32,000 for fuel and wages, and it was for the purpose of collecting this debt that Tom Parlow directed Captain Herup to return to Copenhagen. Parlow sent a telex to CSF, stating falsely that SA Chartering had the vessel impounded for non-payment of account. CSF

then promptly wired money to SA Chartering which was drawn against Dolmy's Credit Suisse account.

132. Herup, Int., 4/29/87 at 68; Staff memo on Coastal Freighter *Erria*, 3/4/87, at 5; "National Syrian tied to North." B. Sun, 4/20/87, at 1A, 9A.

133. Staff memo on Coastal Freighter *Erria*, 3/4/87, at 5.

134. See Chapter 22.

135. SC4104, Secord letter to Liman and Nields, "Arms Sales Profit Analysis." at 2.

136. Herup Int., 4/29/87, at 6-7.

137. Staff memo on Hakim/Secord ownership of *Erria* arms cargo, 4/30/87, at 2; C4803-C4807, H87. The CIA did not get the whole cargo for that price. Some of the munitions were diverted by the intermediary, for use by North for other covert activities.

138. The transfer of the *Erria's* cargo took place in Cherbourg, France. Five of the ship's containers were destined for one U.S. port, and 22 containers were destined for another U.S. port. See loading diagram at ER34. The relevant shipping documents, including cargo declaration, manifest, identification of crew, etc., at ER35-42, ER43-4.

139. ER32. See also Herup Int., 4/29/87, at 10.

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## Chapter 14

# "Taken to the Cleaners": The Iran Initiative Continues\*

The United States had taken a firm position in Tehran. Although offered two hostages, McFarlane had refused to deliver the remaining HAWK parts unless all the hostages were released first. But this was to be the last show of toughness by the United States: just 2 months later, the United States delivered the same HAWK parts after obtaining the release of only one hostage.

The Iran initiative continued until public reaction following its exposure in November 1986 forced its cancellation. Before then, some of the players had changed: a new channel to Iran (the "Second Channel")<sup>1</sup> with a new Iranian emissary was found; Nir was cut out of the negotiations; and Secord and Hakim took his place. More missiles were sent to Iran, where they went to the radical Revolutionary Guard. But fundamental problems remained, and the Second Channel turned out to represent the same Iranian leaders as did the First Channel. In the end, the United States secured the release of another hostage but three more were seized, at least one allegedly at the instigation of one of the Iranians with whom the U.S. negotiators had dealt earlier. Despite this, however, the U.S. negotiators agreed not only to sequential release of the hostages but also to seeking the freedom of the convicted Da'wa terrorists from prison in Kuwait.

### The Bartering Continues

The deadlock in Tehran did not end Manucher Ghorbanifar's role as an intermediary. A strange interdependence had developed among the parties: Iran still wanted the remaining HAWK parts and other high technology weapons from the United States; the United States wanted the hostages; Israel wanted direct or indirect relations with Iran; and Ghorbanifar wanted to be paid.

Ghorbanifar had borrowed \$15 million from Saudi entrepreneur Adnan Khashoggi to finance the HAWK parts shipment and Khashoggi, in turn, had borrowed the money from his financiers. But only one pallet of HAWK parts had been delivered in

\*"Our guys . . . they got taken to the cleaners." Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, testifying at the public hearings, 7/23/87, at 184.

Tehran and Iran refused to pay. Ghorbanifar could repay his debt to Khashoggi only by inducing the United States to ship the rest of the parts.

Only days after the Tehran mission ended, Ghorbanifar was on the phone with an Israeli official seeking a meeting. Ghorbanifar blamed the failure of the Tehran trip on internal rivalries within the Iranian Government and complained about Robert McFarlane's refusal to accept the offer to release two hostages for the HAWK parts. The Israeli official restated the U.S. position: there could be no further discussions unless all the hostages were released first.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly afterward, CIA consultant George Cave was in communication with the Second Iranian, who also wanted the remaining HAWK parts delivered. The Second Iranian claimed that Iran controlled the hostages and that if all the parts were delivered, two hostages would be released. When the HAWK radars were delivered, the two remaining hostages would be freed.<sup>3</sup> The parts, however, would have to be delivered first and the hostages would follow—the mirror image of the U.S. position. Cave rejected this proposition—all the hostages would have to be released before any of the parts could be delivered.<sup>4</sup> The parties remained far apart.

### Iran Discovers the Overcharge

By the end of June, Iran had raised another reason for refusing to pay Ghorbanifar and release the hostages: The Iranians had obtained a "[m]icrofiche of factory prices" that "does not compare w/ prices charged."<sup>5</sup>

On June 30, Cave spoke by telephone to the Second Iranian who complained that the Iranians had a microfiche price list showing the true price of the HAWK parts and that they had been overcharged by 600 percent.<sup>6</sup> The same day, Ghorbanifar called CIA official Charles Allen and told him that while he was being blamed for the overcharge, his markup was only 41 percent.<sup>7</sup>

The sensitivity of the Iranians to overcharging had been known to the Americans for some time. In a December 4, 1985 PROF note to John Poindexter, Oliver North warned that the Iranians were unlikely to release the hostages in a "single transaction" because they had been "'scammed' so many times in the

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AFTER GREETINGS:

S-HE SENT OUR FRIEND A PRICE LIST FOR THESE 240.

WHEN?

S-LAST THURSDAY.

THURSDAY?

S-RIGHT. IT MUST HAVE ARRIVED.

IS THAT THE SAME PRICE LIST THAT HE GAVE US IN MICHIGAN THE PRICES WERE SIX TIMES HIGHER?

S-NO. THIS IS THE BASIC PRICE FOR THE 240 ITEMS. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION COSTS, INSURANCE, AND A FEW OTHER THINGS. JUST THE SALE PRICE.

HE DIDN'T GIVE US THIS.

S-PERHAPS IT HADN'T REACHED HIM, BUT WE SENT IT LAST THURSDAY.

YOU GAVE HIM PRICES. (INAUDIBLE)

S-YES.

HE GAVE US A PRICE LIST, BUT IT WAS NOT LAST THURSDAY. IT WAS BEFORE THAT AND WHEN WE FIGURED OUT THE PRICES, THEY WERE ABOUT SEVEN TIMES HIGHER. NOW, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THAT LIST OR SOMETHING ELSE.

S-SOMETHING ELSE. THESE PRICES THAT HE GAVE YOU INCLUDED EVERYTHING-- TRANSPORTATION ETC. WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT IS THE PRICE FOR WHICH THE 240 WERE SOLD.

SO IF YOU SENT IT THURSDAY, SHOULDN'T IT HAVE ARRIVED BY NOW?

S-IT SHOULD HAVE.

I'LL GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM TONIGHT. IF I CAN LOCATE HIM?

S-LOOK. MR. GOODIE AND I ARE IN A BAD SITUATION HERE.

WHY?

S-BECAUSE THE HEAD OF OUR COMPANY IS VERY TIRED OF THIS DEAL. HE WANTS TO BREAK IT OFF.

IT'S THE SAME FOR ME HERE.

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S-FINE. THEN BOTH OF US ARE IN THE SAME BOAT.

Q-WHAT?

S-WE ARE BOTH IN THE SAME TRENCH. WE'VE GOT TO BRING THIS THING TO A CONCLUSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

S-((FEW WORDS MISSED)) MY SITUATION IS EVEN WORSE HERE. ((FEW WORDS)) NOW, IF THESE PRICES ARE LOWER, WE CAN PRESENT THIS PROPOSAL OF YOURS.

S-LOOK. THIS IS UP TO OUR FRIEND IN EUROPE.

S-CAN YOU GIVE ME THE PRICES YOURSELF?

S-I DON'T HAVE THEM.

S-WHO HAS THEM?

S-UH, ONE OF THE EMPLOYEES OF MR. GOODE SENT THEM. I HAVE NOT SEEN THEM AT ALL.

S-WHEN WILL THEY GET TO US? ((INAUDIBLE))

S-UH, THEY MUST BE IN OUR FRIEND'S HANDS NOW. YOU WILL HAVE TO ASK HIM.

S-((INAUDIBLE))

S-HE HAS THEM. YOU WILL HAVE TO CONSULT WITH HIM.

S-((FEW WORDS)) WE TALK WITH YOU?

S-FINE. THAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE. THAT'S WHAT WE SAID WHEN WE WERE TALKING WITH YOU IN DUBAI. ((TEHRAN)). HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF HE APPOINTED TWO PERSONS TO BE WITH YOU ALL THE TIME FOR DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS. THEN THESE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WOULD NOT OCCUR. DO YOU REMEMBER WHEN WE SENT YOU THAT VOLKSWAGEN, THIS WAS GOOD. THE PRICE WAS VERY GOOD. THE BEST POSSIBLE PRICE.

S-LOOK. ALL I KNOW IS THAT HE SENT US A PRICE. AND WHEN WE FIGURED IT OUT IT WAS SIX TIMES HIGHER. ((FEW WORDS MISSED))

S-THE PRICES WHICH WE SENT WERE THE BASIC PRICES FOR ALL THE 240. WITHOUT TRANSPORTATION, INSURANCE, AND THINGS LIKE THAT.

S-WITHOUT? TRANSPORTATION AND INSURANCE?

S-AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, AND FOR CLEANING OFF ALL THE CRATES.

S-I COULDN'T HEAR YOU. SPEAK UP.

S-THE PRICE THAT WE SENT DID NOT INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION, INSURANCE, AND OUR FRIEND'S PROFIT.

S-FINE. YOU TELL HIM TO GIVE US THOSE PRICES SO WE CAN SEE HOW MUCH LOWER THEY ARE. IF THE PRICES ARE ACCEPTABLE, I CAN PRESENT YOUR PROPOSAL.

S-VERY GOOD. BUT I'VE GOT NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS. THIS IS BETWEEN YOU AND THAT FRIEND OF OURS.

S-((FEW WORDS)) HE SPOKE THAT HE DIDN'T TALK ON ANYTHING AND THAT THE

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HERE THE PRICES YOU GAVE HIM.

S-FINE. YOU WILL HAVE TO SETTLE THIS WITH OUR FRIEND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. TALK WITH HIM. IT'S GOT NOTHING TO DO WITH US. I JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU THAT THE HEAD OF OUR COMPANY HERE IS POST-UNHAPPY, AND WANTS TO CUT IT OFF.

S-WHO WANTS TO CUT IT OFF?

S-THE HEAD OF OUR COMPANY. HE SAYS, "IF THEY WANT THEM, THEY SHOULD BUY THEM. IF THEY DON'T WANT THEM, THEY SHOULD GET THEM SOMEPLACE ELSE."

S-FOR THE SAME PRICE?

S-THAT'S BETWEEN YOU AND OUR FRIEND. HE'S THE MIDDLEMAN.

S-((INAUDIBLE))

S-THIS LIST WHICH WE SENT CONTAINS THE PRICE FOR WHICH I WOULD HOLD TO THE MIDDLEMAN. THIS FRIEND OF OURS BOUGHT IT FROM THE MIDDLEMAN.

S-((INAUDIBLE))

S-WELL, UNFORTUNATELY, IN THIS INSTANCE, THERE IS NO OTHER SOLUTION. WE MUST THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE.

S-((FEW WORDS MISSED)) YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO GIVE US THE FACTORY PRICES. IF YOU GIVE US THIS PRICE, DON'T YOU KNOW THAT... THIS FELLOW SAYS THAT HE IS NOT TACKLING ON ANYTHING. HE IS NOT USING ANY ((WORD MISSED)). HOW MUCH IS THE TOTAL PRICE?

S- THEY SAID THAT IT WAS ABOUT 45. IS THAT RIGHT?

S-45?

S-RIGHT. ((ONE WORD)) THE 240 AND THE TWO CRATES.

S-WITHOUT THE LOADING AND INSURANCE.

S-I DON'T KNOW. I'M JUST, I MEAN, I MEAN THE TOTAL PRICE. I MEAN THE TRANSPORTATION, AND THE TWO CRATES AND THE 240, AND THE INSURANCE, AND ABOUT 45. I'M REALLY NOT INVOLVED IN THIS. IT'S ABOUT 45. RIGHT?

S-WAS 45 THE PRICE YOU GAVE TO HIM?

S-NO, NO. WE DID NOT GIVE THE PRICE. WE JUST AUTHORIZED THE COMPANIES TO SELL THEM TO SEVERAL MIDDLEMEN. OUR FRIEND BOUGHT THEM FROM MIDDLEMEN.

S-((FEW WORDS)) THE PRICE AS IT NOW IS. DID OUR FRIEND ADD TO IT OR DID YOU ((FEW WORDS))?

S- NO. WE WERE NOT OURSELVES INVOLVED IN THIS DEAL. THIS IS HOW THE TRANSACTION WAS. WE AUTHORIZED THE COMPANIES TO SELL TO SEVERAL MIDDLEMEN THESE MIDDLEMEN SOLD TO OUR FRIEND. THIS PRICE THAT WE SENT TO OUR FRIEND IS THE PRICE THAT THE COMPANIES SOLD TO THE MIDDLEMEN.

S-((FEW WORDS)) DID THEY SELL IT TO OUR FRIEND?

S-NO, NO. OUR FRIEND BOUGHT IT FROM THE MIDDLEMEN.

S-OUR FRIEND BOUGHT IT FROM THE MIDDLEMEN.

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S-YES, AND THE MIDDLEMEN BOUGHT IT FROM THE COMPANIES WE MERELY AUTHORIZED THE SALE OF THESE 240. AND THE PRICE LIST WHICH WE SENT, IS THE PRICE FOR WHICH IT WAS SOLD TO THE MIDDLEMEN.

S-THE PROBLEM IS ((FEW WORDS)). I DON'T THINK THAT.

S-THAT'S WHY WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT IN THE FUTURE WE MUST BE IN DIRECT CONTACT FOR THINGS LIKE THIS. IT'S EASIER AND CHEAPER.

((INAUDIBLE))

S-THIS TIME, IT HAS TO BE THIS WAY. THE HEAD OF OUR COMPANY IS VERY TIRED OF THIS. HE'S ANGRY, HE SAID. "IF THEY DON'T WANT TO DEAL, BREAK IT OFF."

S-LOOK, THE PROBLEM IS THE PRICE. I HAVE NOT YET BROUGHT UP THE MATTER OF YOUR PROPOSAL. THE PRICE IS AN IMPORTANT MATTER FOR US. ABOUT THE PRICE, I SAY THAT YOU GAVE PERMISSION TO THE MIDDLEMEN TO GO THERE AND MAKE THE PURCHASE.

S-RIGHT.

S-WE DIDN'T MAKE THE REQUEST OF ((FEW WORDS)) WE MADE THE REQUEST OF YOU.

S-WELL, WE HAD NO OTHER RECOURSE! IT HAD TO BE THAT WAY--FOR THE PRESENT. IN THE FUTURE WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ARRANGE SOMETHING, BUT NOW THE IMPORTANT THING IS, IS THERE GOING TO BE A DEAL OR NOT.

S-THE IMPORTANT THING FOR US NOW IS THAT THESE PRICES YOU GAVE ARE SIX TIMES THE ORIGINAL PRICES. ~~IT HAS AN EFFECT ON THE~~ IT HAS AN EFFECT ON SIX TIMES THE PRICE.

S-I CAN'T DO ANYTHING ABOUT THAT. WHAT CAN I DO ABOUT IT?

S-WELL, LOOK YOU ARE THE ONE WE WERE NEGOTIATING WITH. YOU KNOW PERKING AND IT IS YOU WE ARE TALKING TO.

S-BUT MY HANDS ARE TIED. THESE 240 HAVE BEEN SOLD TO SOMEONE! HE BOUGHT IT AND RESOLD IT TO OUR FRIEND. WHAT CAN I DO? IT'S BEST THAT YOU BUY THESE GOODS SOMEWHERE ELSE... THESE WERE VERY DIFFICULT...

S-IF WE BUY THESE...

S-CAN YOU ~~BUY~~ THEM SOMEWHERE ELSE?

((INAUDIBLE))

S-NO, NO. IT WAS A VERY DIFFICULT THING TO BUY ALL OF THESE 240, BECAUSE THEY ARE VERY SCARCE. AS YOU KNOW, SOME OF THEM WERE OUT OF STOCK.

S-FINE, I ACCEPT THE FACT THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT, BUT SIX OR SEVEN TIMES THE COST? THIS IS NOT RIGHT. THIS IS HAVING AN EFFECT ON THE DEAL--ON YOUR GOOD WILL THAT YOU WISH TO ESTABLISH AN ADVERSE EFFECT. THEY ARE SAYING "IF THEY WANT US TO DO THIS SERVICE, WHY ARE THEY CHARGING SIX TIMES THE PRICE? WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH OUR FRIEND THAT HE IS ASKING THIS. WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH HIM. WE SEE THIS AS YOUR FAULT. ((FEW WORDS.)) TELL US WHAT THE PRICE IS. WHATEVER IT IS. WE HAVE NO QUARREL WITH A 5 OR 10 PERCENT MARKUP, BUT 600 PERCENT--NO.

S-BUT IT ISN'T 600 PERCENT.

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S-YES IT IS. IT'S MORE THAN THAT. IT AVERAGES OUT TO 4.15 TIMES HIGHER.

S- YOU SAID THAT YOU HAVE A MICROFICHE. HAVE YOU SENT IT TO ME?

S- YOU CAN GET ONE OF THOSE YOURSELF. I'LL SEND IT TO YOU. I'LL SEND IT ON A FLIGHT TO-CORRAL. ((PORTION MISSED.)) WE AREN'T GETTING THESE GOODS FROM HIM. WE'RE GETTING THEM FROM YOU.

S-NO. IN THIS INSTANCE, YOU ARE BUYING FROM OUR FRIEND, NOT FROM US. IT MIGHT BE THIS WAY IN THE FUTURE, BUT NOT NOW. IF THIS DEAL IS TO COME OR IT WILL HAVE TO BE THROUGH OUR FRIEND. AND IF THIS DEAL IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL IT HAS TO BE THROUGH OUR FRIEND. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY.

S-I DON'T THINK THEY WILL AGREE IF THE PRICES ARE SIX TIMES HIGHER.

S- YOU AND I ARE IN THE SAME TRENCH! YOU HAVE A PROBLEM. I HAVE A PROBLEM. THE HEAD OF OUR COMPANY IS VERY DISPLEASED WITH MR. OODDE AND ME. PARTICULAR WITH THE DELEGATION THAT WENT TO DUBAI. THE HEAD OF OUR COMPANY IS VERY DISPLEASED WITH THE TREATMENT THERE, AND HE IS READY TO TERMINATE THE WHOLE DEAL. I HAVE MY OWN OPINION ON THE MATTER, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE OUR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COMPANIES IN THE FUTURE.

S-SPEAK UP, SO I CAN HEAR YOU.

S- I WANT TO SEE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BUT THIS HEAD OF OUR COMPANY IS EXTREMELY UPSET.

S-FINE, IF YOU WANT ((FEW WORDS)) HOW CAN WE DO ANYTHING FOR YOU WITH THESE PRICES? WE SENSE THAT THIS IS ((ONE WORD)).

S-IT IS NOT SIX TIMES HIGHER. IT IS MUCH LESS THAN THAT.

S-NO. BELIEVE ME THAT'S WHAT IT IS. I'M WILLING TO BET WITH YOU ON THAT. S-FINE. BET WITH ME, BUT YOU HAVE TO SEND THIS MICROFICHE FOR US SO THAT ((FEW WORDS)) IT.

S-I'LL SEND IT, BUT ((FEW WORDS)).

S-HO PREPARED THIS MICROFICHE?

S-THIS MICROFICHE THAT WE HAVE NOW, IN THE MARKET... ((STARTS OVER)) THESE PRICES THAT YOU GAVE US ARE BLACK MARKET PRICES. ON THE BLACK MARKET THEY PAY PRICES THAT ARE SEVERAL TIMES HIGHER, AND IF WE BOUGHT THESE THINGS FROM THE BLACK MARKET, WE WOULDN'T HAVE TO PERFORM ANY SERVICES. SO WE WILL BUY FROM THE BLACK MARKET JUST AS WE HAVE UP TO NOW.

S-((FEW WORDS)) BUY FOR LESS ON THE BLACK MARKET?

S-NO. THESE PRICES THAT YOU WERE ASKING ARE BLACK MARKET PRICES, NOT FAIR PRICES. I WANT TO PROVE HERE THAT IF WE DO THIS SERVICE, ((FEW WORDS)) YOU WILL GIVE A POSITIVE ANSWER TO OUR ((FEW WORDS)). MY REPUTATION IS BEING RUINED BY THIS THING. I DON'T HAVE ANY POWER TO DO ANYTHING FOR YOU ANY MORE.

S-SOME OF THIS IS NOT IN MY HANDS. WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT...

S-WE ARE WILLING TO BUY THIS, BUT FOR A REALISTIC PRICE, NOT FOR SEVERAL TIMES HIGHER. WE EXPECT YOU TO SELL AT THE CORRECT PRICE.

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S- FINE. THE PRICE... THAT'S RIGHT. BUT IN THIS DEAL, MONEY IS NOT AN IMPORTANT THING FOR US. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COMPANIES.

S- ((FEN WORDS)) YOU INCREASE IT?  
S- YOU HAVE TALKED WITH OUR FRIEND ABOUT THIS. WHAT DID HE SAY?

S- HE SAID, "THIS IS THE PRICE THEY GAVE ME." ((SENTENCE MISSED)). IS HE TELLING THE TRUTH, OR NOT?

S- THAT'S RIGHT. I MEAN, HE SENT HIM THE PRICE OF THE 240, NOT INCLUDING THE TRANSPORTATION, INSURANCE, ETC, AND HE'LL HAVE TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT IT. IT MUST HAVE REACHED HIM.

S- WHEN DID YOU SEND IT FOR HIM? THURSDAY?

S- RIGHT.

S- DID YOU SEND IT BY MAIL?

S- WE SENT IT BY ONE OF THESE COURIER SERVICES WHICH DELIVERS IN ONE OR TWO DAYS.

S- SO FRIDAY, SATURDAY... I'LL CALL HIM TONIGHT AND SEE WHAT THE PRICE IS YOU HAVE GIVEN HIM.

S- FINE. I DON'T HAVE THE LIST NOW.

S- CALL ME TOMORROW NIGHT, AND I'LL GIVE YOU AN ANSWER. I'LL FIND OUR FRIEND TONIGHT. LOOK, TRY TO KEEP THINGS GOING THERE. WE'VE BROUGHT THIS THING TO THE FINAL STAGES AND ARE ON THE VERGE OF A SOLUTION. DON'T LET THE ISSUE OF PRICE DESTROY WHAT WE'VE DONE. WE DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH ANYONE! NOT WITH OUR FRIEND OR ANYONE ELSE.

S- AND I AM IN THE SAME BIND HERE, BECAUSE I'VE WORKED A LOT ON THIS, AND NOW IT HAS GOTTEN NOWHERE. WE HAVEN'T ATTAINED OUR GOAL.

S- WE MUST TRY TO PURSUE THE RIGHT COURSE? HERE, NOW THIS PRICE THAT YOU WANT TO GIVE, WE EXPECT YOU NOT TO INCREASE IT ANY.

S- WE HAVE NOT INCREASED IT. IF THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE, IT HAS BEEN SOMEWHERE ELSE.

S- IF YOU HAD NOT INCREASED THE PRICE, SEND US THE REAL PRICE.

S- WE'VE SENT IT TO THE FRIEND.

S- VERY GOOD. I'LL CONTACT HIM TONIGHT.

S- FINE. WE MUST NOT LOSE THIS OPPORTUNITY, BECAUSE THE TIME IS VERY SHORT.

S- FINE. I'LL GET THIS PRICE TONIGHT, THEN I WILL BRING UP YOUR PROPOSAL.

S- VERY GOOD.

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Chapter 14 N 2399

Technique 7

Care call [redacted] (Today 14:00)

[redacted] claimed to have microfiche showing 1985 prices

Care: Does not believe this; believes [redacted] + Company have looked at old records and compared prices

- Tehran does not trust the merchant and believes merchant or someone has grossly inflated prices

- Told [redacted] that price list went to 14-7 merchant

- [redacted] extremely stubborn over prices; did not retreat one iota

- [redacted] said he would send microfiche, but Care does not believe

- [redacted] asked Care to call him back tomorrow

Priority Declaration of Confidentiality under Executive Order 12958, 2012-08-25

By: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

- Merchant called me & was screaming that [redacted] was blaming him; merchant claims prices increased only 41% over prices he gave me. [redacted] merchant who call

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of 1986, after a Hakim visit to Forways for a demonstration of the laser sight, the Enterprise wired \$50,000 as "seed money" to Forways for the manufacture of the sights. But the money was not used by Forways. Instead, it was immediately sent to Stanford Technology Trading Group.<sup>203</sup>

### E. Forways

Throughout 1986, Zucker experienced problems with one of his Forways partners, Jacob Farber.<sup>204</sup> According to Hakim, in the fall of 1986, he and Secord made plans to purchase most of Farber's interest in Forways so that they would obtain a one-third interest in the company. At the same time, as negotiations were ongoing with the Second Channel, Hakim gave a set of Forways catalogues to the Second Channel negotiators and told them "once things get going, then we will be able to sell directly from Forways."<sup>205</sup> Hakim denied that he mentioned any specific product.<sup>206</sup> The records of Forways show that from the fall of 1985 through the fall of 1986, the company attempted to buy—and apparently succeeded in some cases—quantities of HAWK spares parts in Europe.<sup>207</sup>

In early October, Farber sold his shares to Zucker for \$750,000. Shortly thereafter, Zucker wrote a memorandum to the officers of Forways stating that Secord and Hakim would probably buy the bulk of the Farber shares, thereby obtaining a one-third interest in Forways. Zucker also stated in the memorandum that he expected Forways to have record-breaking sales and profits in the coming year—at levels inconceivable to the new officers of Forways.<sup>208</sup>

In early November, \$760,000 of Enterprise money was apparently transferred to CSF: on November 5, 1986, \$500,000 moved out of Hakim's fiduciary fund to an unknown location and, on November 10, 1986, \$260,000 moved out of one of the operational companies to an unknown location. The \$500,000 block of funds had been previously earmarked for a joint Hakim/Secord investment. The \$260,000 transfer was recorded in the ledgers with the notation "CSF Invest.—Forways."<sup>209</sup>

Hakim denied that the Secord-Hakim purchase of the Farber shares was ever completed, and in March of 1987, Zucker wrote a note to an officer and director of Forways indicating that after the Iran/Contra story broke, he stopped the Hakim-Secord part of the transaction.<sup>210</sup> However, there is no record of the \$760,000 ever being returned to the Enterprise or any of the fiduciary funds.

### F. The Iranian Market

The amounts distributed to Hakim and Secord do not tell the full story of their ambitions, which Hakim made no effort to hide. Hakim saw the Iranian market as providing spectacular opportunities for wealth. He testified that he hoped to obtain for Secord and him-

self at least a 3 percent share of the annual \$15 billion Iranian market if commercial relations with the United States could be renewed. By using money from the Enterprise, including the reserves to "grease" the way with the Second Channel, and by proposing compromises to North and Iran, Hakim was not only promoting a solution to the impasse over the hostages, but also pursuing his and Secord's own commercial interests. The ultimate goal, as Hakim admitted, was not the millions he actually took from the Enterprise during 1985 and 1986, but the \$15 billion-a-year Iranian market.<sup>211</sup>

### The Reserves

The Enterprise transferred \$4.2 million to CSF to be held in three fiduciary accounts referred to as the "Reserves."<sup>212</sup> A large part of the Reserve monies appear to have come from the proceeds of the Iranian arms sales.

According to the CSF fiduciary agreements, Hakim was the owner of the Reserves; Secord testified, however, that the Enterprise was the beneficial owner of the Reserves and Hakim acknowledged that the Reserves were treated as the Enterprise's money.<sup>213</sup> Table 22-6, Distributions to Reserves, shows the amount of each Reserve, the operational company from which the monies were taken, and the date each Reserve was established.

Table 22-6.—Distributions to Reserves<sup>214</sup>

Reserve	Date	Amount	Source
Reserve 1	3/05/86.....	\$2,000,000	Gulf Marketing
Reserve 2	6/18/86.....	2,000,000	Hyde Park
Reserve 3	6/18/86.....	200,000	Hyde Park

<sup>214</sup> Based upon CSF Ledgers.

Hakim testified that Reserve 2, containing \$2,000,000, was to be used to pay money to persons associated with the Second Channel. According to Hakim, if the Second Channel initiative was successful, the money was to be invested for those persons in the joint Iranian-U.S. venture which was being planned; if the Second Channel was unsuccessful, it would be used as baksheesh.<sup>215</sup> Reserve 1, containing an additional \$2,000,000, was to be used for any purpose, including "operational purposes."<sup>216</sup>

The CSF fiduciary agreement governing Reserve 1—the one for covert operations—provided that should Hakim die, Secord would have direct control over it and should Secord die, North would have direct control. Should North die, the remaining portion of the Reserve would be divided equally among the estates of all three men. The instructions to CSF were irrevocable without the consent of all the beneficiaries.<sup>217</sup> Hakim said that in setting up Reserve 1, he simply followed the structure of the Enterprise

173. Although Secord did not provide an estimate as to the commissions distributed for the stranded shipment, Hakim did do so. Secord Letter, SC04081-105; Hakim Dep., 5/23/87, at 19. The profit estimated by the Committees for these shipments is \$300,000 higher than that estimated by Secord/Hakim.

174. Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, 5/5/87, at 53.

175. See Table 22-4, Markup on Arms Purchased for Contras According to CSF Ledgers.

176. Hakim Dep., 5/22/87, at 88. See Table 22-5, Commissions on Arms Sales to the Contras.

177. Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, 5/7/87, at 171.

178. See Table 22-5, Commissions on Arms Sales to the Contras; Hakim Dep., 5/22/87, at 88-89. Exactly whom Hakim was trying to confuse and what he was trying to accomplish is not clear. On the CSF books, payments to Defex SA (the fake arms account) would appear to depress profits that the Enterprise actually made on the arms sales and thus mislead an uninformed reader.

179. Hakim Test., *Hearings*, 100-5, 6/5/87, at 20-21. Secord claimed that the cost of the weapons was about \$2.4 million. Secord letter, SC04184. Committee accountants could only identify \$2.2 million in weapons costs for the stranded shipment in the CSF ledgers.

180. Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, 5/7/87, at 191; Hakim Dep., 5/22/87, at 156-62; *Id.* at 161.

181. Hakim Dep., 5/23/87, at 19-20; Hakim, 6/5/87, at 52-56.

182. See Table 22-4, Mark-Up on Arms Purchased For the Contras According to CSF Ledgers. Secord testified that commissions were distributed in a 40/40/20 ratio (Secord, Hakim, Clines) and Hakim indicated that on the later arms shipments the ratio was 30/30/30/10 (Secord, Hakim, Clines, and Scitech); Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, at 53; Hakim Dep., 5/22/87, at 147-48.

The ledgers show that the total sum of money distributed to Korel, Hakim, and C. Tea during February 1985 to mid-December 1985 equaled a 32/33/21/14 ratio among Korel, Hakim, C. Tea and Scitech/STTGI, which is equivalent to a 39/40/21 ratio when one splits the STTGI/Scitech distribution among Korel and Hakim. While most of the relevant ledger entries describing the distributions simply stated "transfer," the last distribution in the period contained a notation "Bal. of Act. for Phases I-II-III."

On December 17, 1985, there was a simultaneous distribution, marked in the ledgers as "Profit Distribution Phase IV," to Korel, Hakim, and Clines, in a 40/40/20 ratio; in addition, there were four other simultaneous 1986 distributions: May 20, June 3, June 20, and August 27, all of which fell in the 30/30/30/10 pattern described by Hakim. A February 7, 1986, distribution was made in basically a 50/50 ratio between Korel and Hakim. Hakim indicated that this was a commission payment.

The balance of the distributions shown in the ledgers from December 17, 1985, to the end of the active days of the Enterprise - \$2.1 million - did not fall into any pattern, and, except for some very minor amounts, did not include Clines.

Secord told the Committees the total amount of profit the Enterprise made on each arms shipment and roughly the date of each arms transaction. Using this information, the Committees correlated the commission distribution to each arms shipment.

183. The financial data in this Section are based upon the CSF ledgers and supporting bank documents.

184. Summary of distributions to Secord, Hakim, and Clines, excluding commissions, H6372A-77. The Committees traced \$328,885 of this money to Hakim and \$42,275 to Clines. Secord received \$50,000 which he, in turn, loaned to his attorney, Tom Green. *Id.*

185. See Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, 5/8/87, at 307, Secord Ex. 76.

186. See Staff Memorandum, The Tri-American Arms Venture, 10/5/87.

187. Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, 5/8/87, at 193-94, 331; Ex. RVS-75, *Hearings*, 100-1, at 594; Hakim Test., *Hearings*, 100-5, 6/5/87, at 14-16.

188. Marostica Dep., 5/20/87, at 24-26, 29-30; Royer Dep., 5/21/87, at 79-83.

189. Ex. RVS-76, *Hearings*, 100-1, at 598; Hakim Dep., 5/23/87, at 80; Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, 5/8/87, at 331-36.

190. Hakim Dep., 5/31/87, at 178-80.

191. Marostica Dep., 5/20/87, at 13-20; Royer Dep., 5/21/87, at 28-32.

192. Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, 5/7/87, at 193.

193. Royer Dep., 5/21/87, at 45-53.

194. Hakim Test., *Hearings*, 100-5, 6/5/87, at 16; Royer Dep., 5/21/87, at 58.

195. Summary of CSF ledger entries showing transfers to STTGI, H637-1.

196. Summary of STTGI Bank Records, STG134507-09; Secord Test., *Hearings*, 5/7/87, 100-1, at 168.

197. Scitech ledger entries, H02959-60.

198. Secord Test., *Hearings*, 100-1, 5/7/87, at 166-67.

199. Hakim Dep., 5/23/87, at 143.

200. Hakim Test., *Hearings*, 100-5, 6/3/87, at 217.

201. Scitech ledgers, H02959-60; Summary of CSF Ledgers and Bank Records, prepared by Committee staff accountants, H6372B.

202. Hakim 6/3/87, at 38; Royer Dep., 5/25/87, at 49-50. The payment was wired to the bank which held the property on October 24, 1986. At the same time, an additional \$30,000, also drawn from the Scitech fund, was wired to the trust account of a law firm involved in the transaction; wire transfers, H1520-A, B and C.

203. Farber Dep., 6/1/87, at 4 (Zucker bought his 25% interest personally). Clarke and Zink Dep., 7/6/87, at 14 (CSF held Zucker's 25% interest); at 29-31 (Secord's June visit to Forways); at 26-28 (laser sight); at 37-40 (\$50,000 wire through Forways).

204. Clarke-Zink Dep., 7/6/87, at 26, 36, 54.

205. Hakim Dep., 5/31/87, at 254.

206. *Id.* at 255.

207. Forways Records, EN 0199-358.

208. Clarke and Zink Dep., 7/6/87, at 9-10, 62; Ex. 2.

209. Ledger entry re \$500,000, H02862; ledger entry re \$260,000, H1084; Hakim Dep., 5/24/87, at 144-58 (\$500,000 earmarked for joint Secord/Hakim investment). Hakim stated that the \$260,000 was for a line of credit extended to Forways and that the money should have been returned to the Enterprise. Hakim Dep., 5/23/87, at 171-74.

210. Hakim Dep., 5/31/87, at 255-56; Clarke and Zink Dep., 7/6/87, at 73-76; Ex. 3.

211. Hakim Dep., 5/23/87, at 256, 263-64.

212. Hakim could not identify the purpose of the third fund which totaled \$200,000. Since Hakim created it in a

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ACCOUNT NUMBER [REDACTED] 10/28/66  
 COMPAGNIE DE SERVICES FIDUCIAIRES SA  
 DEBIT 11,200.00  
 VALUE DATE 10/28/66  
 RMB REFERENCE 6A53110040  
 CUST REFERENCE  
 SEND REFERENCE 10/28/66-1110040

SM 88K-74 48 HALL ST TRUST DEPT BNF-TRUSSTEE U/A 4/6/60 FOR M. ME  
 RECEIFS D'DUNHELL 430391 001-ATI MK C YEFNAH

DESCRIPTION CHIPS

11/21/66

907

22-207

DOCUMENT UNAVAILABLE.