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## TURKEY

- I. The military regime which took over in Turkey five weeks ago (27 May) remains in firm control; however, personality and policy conflicts within the controlling National Unity Committee constitute a potential threat to the provisional government and to domestic stability.
  - A. The first major schism appeared in mid-June when twelve members of the Committee's original 50 either withdrew or were dropped when they disagreed on the question of a public oath pledging the return of government to a duly elected parliament.

    Remaining members of the Committee have since taken such a public oath.
    - Some participants in the coup have charged that recent publication of the names of the Committee members was a breach of faith, in that by oath it had been agreed all would remain anonymous.
  - B. There are also suggestions of personal jealousy among prominent officers on the Committee and the possible development of an internal struggle for power.
- II. Leaders of the regime still insist they will hold early elections and restore civil authority as soon as possible. It does not appear likely, however, that national elections will be possible before early 1961.
  - A. To delay elections beyond early 1961 might generate another explosive situation.

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- B. The military regime, having discredited the Democratic party leaderships now faces the problem of encouraging a balanced political situation by promoting the growth of another effective second party.
- C. At the same time the leadership of the Republican Peoples'
  Party of Ismet Inonu, now the strongest party and probably the
  winner in any early election, is worried over its deteriorating
  relations with the Military Committee.
  - Some leaders of the Committee strongly oppose Inonu's return to power and they may foster a new political movement.
  - 2. Elections under a system of proportional representation, as currently planned, could result in a weak coalition type government marked by friction and increasing dissension.
- III. Meanwhile the interim government is trying to find early solutions to the many political, economic, and administrative problems. It is somewhat unsure of itself and regards even minor criticism as opposition. It is apparently uneasy over possible popular and military disaffection.
  - A. Accordingly its speeches, demonstrations, and press interviews are designed to justify the coup d'etat, to make the new regime acceptable to the Turkish people, and to arouse resentment against the former government.
  - B. Like all revolutionary regimes, the new government now realizes that it must liquidate or nullify the leaders of the former regime.
- IV. While we do not view the current situation in Turkey as being more confused than is to be expected, we see several potential hazards inherent in the current situation.

## SECRET

- A. Dissension within the Military Committee, and between senior officers and the Committee could lead to a struggle for power.
- B. Prosecution and punishment of leaders of the former regime, which still has strong support in the countryside, could result in popular disaffection.
- C. A resurgence of the strong leadership pattern of the early days of the Turkish Republic under Ataturk could lead to an extended period of repression and violence.
- D. The present regime, while clearly Western in orientation, has given some indication that it will probably not be as enthusiastically pro-West as the Menderes government.
  - 1. Unfortunately, US representatives have not yet been able to establish the same close relationship with the leaders of the current regime as was possible with the Menderes government.
  - 2. Although our information is incomplete, we have established that at least 8 of the 38 members of the Military Committee have been in the US, attending army schools.
- E. At the same time Moscow is likely to increase efforts to develop better relations with Ankara.