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12 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator
SUBJECT : SLOC Interdiction


1. Your note in your forward to [redacted] SLOC Interdiction paper that a joint CIA-Navy study would be nice. This issue may well come up in the NFIB meeting this afternoon.

2. The sequence of events was roughly:

- NFAC Assessment issued.
- RADM Shapiro criticizes it and calls for joint effort (memo attached).
- [redacted] responds that NIE 11-14-78 & NIE 11-10-78 will cover the SLOC subject and that we should wait until they're done to decide. In the meantime the Navy might do its own study. (Memo attached.)
- NIE 11-10-78 drafts, in fact, say little about SLOC Interdiction so focus was on NIE 11-14-78 which says a good deal (pp. II-110-121, IV-101-125 & VI-25-29).
- Issues remain unresolved ([redacted] summary attached).
- RADM Shapiro will probably say there still needs to be an interagency SLOC Interdiction study at the NFIB meeting this afternoon.
- You will meet with SECNAV and Undersecretary Woolsey Thursday, 14 September, to discuss SLOC Interdiction among other things.

Attachments

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

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IN REPLY REFER TO

[Redacted]

JUN 23 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT

Subj: Intelligence Community Assessment of the Soviet Navy's SLOC Interdiction Mission [Redacted]

Ref: (a) NFAC Monograph: The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Strategy and Operations

1. [Redacted] Assessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities for interdicting the West's sea lines of communication (SLOC) is a complex subject that impacts heavily upon present and future US strategy and force planning. The continuing divergence of opinion of views on the SLOC interdiction issue being encountered in the development of NIE 11-14-78, Warsaw Pact Forces Facing NATO, and in ongoing intelligence community informal discussions on the subject has demonstrated the need for a thorough and fully coordinated interagency study to develop a reliable assessment of the Soviet approach to SLOC interdiction.

2. [Redacted] Reference (a) represents a unilateral attempt by NFAC's Office of Strategic Research to resolve this complex and controversial issue. Although the NFAC monograph is a useful and revealing addition to the dialogue on this issue, we are concerned with its analytical techniques and several of its key judgments. These include:

--the judgments, drawn from Soviet writings, that the Soviets assign rigid priorities to their naval missions and that SLOC interdiction, regardless of scenario, is secondary. Our interpretation of these and similar Soviet writings does not support these judgments.

--the conclusion [Redacted] that the Soviets rarely practice SLOC interdiction.

--the judgment, derived in part from the use of the [Redacted] model, that the Soviet Navy has only a limited capability for open ocean interdiction. A review by the Navy Systems Analysis Division (OP-96) concluded that

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the [] model was too simplistic to properly describe the Atlantic anti-SLOC campaign. ONI's review of the monograph supports OP-96's conclusion.

--the use of an unsubstantiated figure for the likely amount of NATO shipping which would be available during the early stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. JCS and NATO planning studies indicate that the number of NATO flag ships suitable for military lift would probably be far fewer than the number assumed in the study.

3. [] It now appears unlikely that NIE 11-14-78 will address the SLOC interdiction issue in sufficient detail to either resolve the differences that exist within the community or to fully clarify areas of continuing disagreement. The NFAC monograph thoroughly presents one line of analysis, but fails to present contrasting views that are held elsewhere in the community. In light of the limitations of the NIE and Navy concerns about the NFAC monograph, it is requested that an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet intentions and capabilities for SLOC interdiction be produced as soon as practicable. The Office of Naval Intelligence is prepared to assist fully in the development of such an interagency study.

[]

S. SHAFER
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Copy to:
DIR, DIA

NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Director

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

MEMORANDUM FOR: S. Shapiro
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

SUBJECT : Soviet Navy's SLOC Interdiction Mission

REFERENCE : Your memorandum Ser 009F215/S673696 dated 23 June 1978

1. I share your view that an objective assessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities for interdicting the West's sea lines of communications (SLOC) is of major importance to US policymakers and military planners. For that reason, we have given a great deal of time and attention to those sections of NIE 11-14-78 which deal with this subject, and we have included an examination of SLOC interdiction both in peacetime and during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in NIE 11-10-78. With respect to NIE 11-14, we have requested the respective agencies to develop the SLOC issue even more fully than in the current draft; I call your attention to the note in Chapter II, page II-92.

2. These two NIEs should cover the SLOC interdiction issue in sufficient detail to satisfy the needs of US policymakers and planners. I recommend that we await the completion of these Estimates before considering whether an IIM on the SLOC interdiction issue is warranted. Meanwhile, the NFAC monograph, which presents a detailed, exhaustive treatment of this subject, provides a basis for a rejoinder by your Office. I suggest that you consider producing such a monograph, which might then aid in the preparation of a subsequent IIM.



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BRIEFING NOTE: SLOC INTERDICTION

Issue: Soviet intentions and capabilities to interdict NATO Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) during a conventional war, and the number of submarines deployed south of Iceland.

All agree that:

(1) The Soviets would attempt some interdiction of the NATO SLOC, the extent of the commitment dependent upon: II-110

-- their emphasis on operations against aircraft carriers, amphibious forces and SSBNs.

-- course of the conflict and Soviet expectations as to the degree and pace of escalation.

(2) There are 175 cruise missiles and torpedo attack submarines in the three Soviet western fleets. Success would be dependent upon the availability and capability of these submarines for the SLOC interdiction mission. II-111

(3) Concurrent operations would limit the number of submarines available for interdiction.

Table, p. IV-106 shows forces available.

(SLOC Interdiction)

Positions and Rationale

CIA/State/NSA: The Soviets would be unlikely to commit large portions of their attack submarine fleet to SLOC interdiction unless they had earlier defeated NATO's carrier and amphibious forces without the loss of submarines. About 10 submarines would be deployed for this purpose. *IV-10*

(1) Presence of NATO carriers in or near the Norwegian or Mediterranean Seas almost certainly would cause the Soviets to commit large forces in reaction.

(2) The Soviets lack sufficient submarines to simultaneously engage in strong anti-shipping and anti-fleet operations, and Soviet submarine losses would be great in either case.

CIA/State:

(3) Soviet capabilities to engage in interdiction would be significantly constrained by the following factors: *II-114*

(a) Insufficient torpedo loads, and submarines with no or few reloads or with mixed loads of mines, torpedoes, anti-submarine and anti-ship missiles. *IV 116 Table*

(b) Lack of replenishment opportunities outside Soviet-controlled waters and excessive transit times required to reach southward approaches to the UK and France: 22 days for nuclear and 54 days for diesel submarines, round trip.

(c) Long turnaround time in ports between patrols.

(d) High anticipated attrition resulting from need to transit the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and vulnerability of submarines on station to land-based ASW forces.

(e) Difficulty in identifying high-value targets at sea.

(SLOC Interdiction)

DIA/Navy: The timing and extent of the interdiction campaign would be more dependent upon the disposition and tactics of NATO naval forces and upon Soviet intentions and expectations as to the course of the conflict, than upon the prior achievement of other naval tasks. About 20 submarines would be deployed for this purpose. *II 109*

(1) Events in Central Europe leading to a stalemate on the ground or a NATO decision not to deploy aircraft carriers to the Norwegian Sea could lead the Soviets to mount a substantial interdiction effort.

(2) The Soviets would regard interdiction of NATO supplies and reinforcements sufficiently important that they would be willing to commit large forces to the effort.

(3) The planning factors and constraints listed in the previous position would not be so formidable as to preclude a serious effort:

(a) Those submarines likely to participate clearly carry sufficient torpedoes to conduct a significant number of attacks on Western shipping.

(b) Soviet long-range attack submarines can operate for sufficiently long periods of time to attack their targets before returning to base, thereby also cutting down on the effect of long transit distances.

(c) Turnaround times can be compressed in periods of intense conflict.

(d) Soviet attacks on NATO ASW forces (and aircraft, bases, SOSUS and SIGINT) would greatly impact on the degree of threat posed.

(e) Target information could be obtained through clandestine reporting and technical collection techniques, offering especially good opportunities for detecting high-value convoys.

Summary:

The two positions differ primarily in their assessment of Soviet mission priorities between anti-shipping and anti-fleet operations, and in their assessment of the actual capabilities and mission flexibility of Soviet attack submarines.

Redistribution of attack submarines between North Atlantic and G-I-UK Seas and Norwegian Sea

[Redacted]

