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14 May 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

THROUGH : Col. John White, CIA Representative to GMIC

ATTENTION : E. W. Proctor, ORR Guided Missile Coordinator  
 Chief, Services Division, ORR *LWD*  
 Chief, Transportation Branch, Services Division, ORR


FROM : , CIA EO 13526 3.5(c)

SUBJECT : Recommendation in Regard to Detecting the Possible  
 Development and Execution of a Surprise Intercontinental  
 Nuclear Ballistic Missile Attack Against the Continental  
 United States

Summary

1. Intelligence of possible significance to the Soviet develop-  
 ment of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the threat  
 of a possible future ballistic missile attack upon the continental  
 United States is possibly being inadvertently overlooked by the intelligence  
 community. This conclusion has been reached as the result of attempting  
 to do research into the significance of recent Soviet railroad  
 developments in northern Siberia.

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2. Resolution of the problem will require a comprehensive research program to be carried on by an "Ad Hoc Working Group" having available the combined talents of those with scientific, economic, geographic, military, and strategic knowledge. The designated mission of such a group would be to make a complete analysis of all pertinent data pertaining to the possible planning, development, and execution of a decisive Soviet intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile surprise attack upon the continental United States within the next five years. The Group would determine the major Soviet objectives and isolate the major criteria relating to the accomplishment of such objectives. A specific but selective list of indicators would then be codified in conjunction with specialists in all related fields on the basis of the determined criteria and then sanitized, if necessary, and passed on to the analysts. The analytical process from which the indicators were determined would serve as a complete frame of reference into which suspect intelligence might then be fitted for interpretation. Unless the new criteria necessary to evaluate information concerning a possible Soviet surprise attack by the use of this new weapon are determined and passed on to analysts, either in the form of criteria or sanitized indicators, then information which might prove to be of vital significance to such an attack may be overlooked. A more detailed discussion of the problem and the recommendation for its solution follows.

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Justification:

15. If the Soviets are further advanced in the development of the long-range missile than is indicated by present estimates, the system, if effectively developed and applied, may well bring to light intelligence already available within the community, the significance of which has not yet been apparent.

16. Outside of an extensive research program on the part of the group assigned this responsibility, the program would not involve a basic change in the intelligence process, nor an increase in the intelligence burden. The system would provide the community with a new analytical tool to be used to measure the growth of an inevitable threat.

17. It is conceivable that conclusive information on such a Soviet program could be gained by observing activities of a less sensitive Soviet security classification than those directly connected with a long-range guided missile program providing of course, that such information would be fitted into a meaningful frame of reference.

18. Such a system would most certainly prove useful to present U.S. disarmament efforts in regard to setting up an inspection system which would detect all possible means of concealing a possible surprise attack.

19. U.S. operational planning efforts might benefit from the work of such a group, particularly if the group had access to the most current scientific, strategic and industrial thinking in the nation.

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21. The greatest value of such a research effort and the primary reason for developing such a system, however, is to bring to bear on the ICBM problem the efforts of analysts already screening intelligence data for other purposes.

Recommendation:

22. It is therefore recommended that this problem be resolved by formation of a special "Ad Hoc Working Group" composed of scientific,

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economic and strategic personnel.

23. The designated mission of such a group would be to make a complete analysis of all pertinent domestic and foreign data in order to determine the most probable courses of action to be taken by the Soviets in developing a decisive intercontinental ballistic missile attack capability upon the continental United States. The group would determine the major Soviet objectives, which would have to be accomplished to develop such a capability and isolate the major criteria controlling the accomplishment of such objectives. A specific but selective list of indicators, would then be codified in conjunction with specialists in all related fields on the basis of the determined criteria, and then sanitized, if necessary. Once determined the indicators would be incorporated into the present worldwide indication network. The analytical process from which the indicators were determined would then serve as a complete frame of reference into which suspect intelligence might then be fitted for interpretation.



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