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
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SITUATION REPORTS
AFGHANISTAN-USSR
We estimate the number of Soviet troops committed to Afghan- istan now to be about 115,000, of which some 85,000 are stationed inside the country.
Anti-US Propaganda
The new anti-US campaign under way in the Afghan media features a few new themes, some of which presumably were formulated by the Soviets. Kabul accuses senior US officials of lying about Soviet chemical warfare in Afghanistan and about the number of political prisoners. Past US aid to Afghanistan is also criticized. For example, a US-built irrigation project in southern Afghanistan is described as poorly designed, costly,

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and harmful to the soil.

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IRAN

	Pres	ident	Bani-	Sadr	probai	bly	will	not	have	much	succ	ess	in
trying		_		pol	itical	po.	sition	by	takir	ıg a	hard	line	on
the US	and	l Iraq.											

Both Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh have taken a tough position in public this week. Bani-Sadr has stressed support for exporting Iran's revolution to Egypt and other Muslim countries.

there are widespread rumors that Bani-Sadr will resign in frustration--especially if the Islamic Republic Party wins a clear majority in the second round of legislative elections. Bani-Sadr's hopes of reviving his influence are constrained by a number of factors:

- -- He may be blamed for failing to get the economy moving.
- -- He could also become the scapegoat for any military setbacks at Iraqi hands.
- -- He may be weakened by new domestic unrest by the dissident minorities--perhaps backed by Iraq.

Soviet and Japanese Reactions

The Soviets have come closer to endorsing Iran's position on the hostages than at any other time since their capture. A Moscow Radio commentary broadcast in Farsi on Tuesday professed the USSR's support for "Iran's just acts." (U)

Following US demarches last November, blatant expressions of Soviet backing for the seizure of the US Embassy disappeared from Soviet media. The break in US-Iranian relations apparently has prompted the Soviets to attempt to improve the USSR's ties with the Khomeini regime by more openly siding with Iran in its dispute with the US.

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The Japanese Government decided yesterday to hold its exports to Iran at present levels and to keep oil imports at a limit of 620,000 barrels per day. Japan's exports to Iran had been increasing and by February had reached roughly 75 percent of the pre-revolutionary level. Oil imports have been running well ahead of the limit, but Japanese officials stated previously that future deliveries of crude would be tapering off.

The sanctions also call for the pace of construction to slow at the joint petrochemical plant and Japanese commercial banks to refuse new deposits by Iran. Officials said they would monitor moves by US and European countries before taking any further actions. (U)

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

EC-IRAN: Call for Common Policy

The EC Foreign Ministers will use the Council of Europe ministerial meeting in Lisbon today to discuss informally the US request for breaking diplomatic relations with Iran and imposing sanctions.

Although the EC states have expressed sympathy with the US position and generally support the new US actions, they are reluctant to commit themselves to similar steps. In insisting on the need for a common EC stance on further actions against Iran--a position taken by the UK, West Germany, and the smaller EC countries--the Community members may be seeking to avoid being blamed individually if they do not take the actions the US seeks.

EC members in the past have doubted the effectiveness of sanctions, and France, the UK, and Denmark have
questioned their legality. On the issue of severing
diplomatic relations, Belgium has noted that the Nine
would find it easier to withdraw their ambassadors from
Tehran than to effect an actual break. The UK believes
that it would be unwise to cut all Western ties with
Iran, while Bonn fears retaliation against German
nationals there.

The talks today probably will be inconclusive with further discussions taking place at the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting on 21 and 22 April. A formal EC statement is unlikely before the heads of state meet in Brussels, probably at the end of the month.

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YUGOSLAVIA:	Contest	for	Partv	Position

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A heated contest is shaping up over who will become the next chairman of the party presidium.
Backers of Vladimir Bakarica Croat member of the party presidium tapped earlier by President Tito to oversee the successionreportedly are pressing for the early adoption of special procedures that would ensure Bakaric's selection in October as chairman. Petar Stambolic and Milos Minic, Serbs and fellow members of the presidium, apparently are leading the main opposition to this maneuver.
There is no established rotation for filling the vacancy. Tito handpicked the two previous presidium chairmen to serve one-year terms.
The post promises to be one of the key positions in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Party rules specifically assign the presidium chairman several of Tito's responsibilities.
Bakaric appears to be gaining influence and prestige. The Yugoslav media is giving him prominent attention, and he has been singled out for special awards, including honorary citizenship in several Yugoslav towns.

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ECUADOR: Administration Floundering


The confrontation President Roldos is provoking with congressional chief Bucaram is weakening his ability to govern and heightening military concerns about his administration's poor performance.

Roldos last week proposed constitutional reforms that would undercut Bucaram by increasing executive power over the legislature. Threatening to resign if the proposals are rejected in a plebiscite, Roldos scored most political parties for failing to back his program.

The intemperate nature of Roldos' actions has left the President with no better than an even chance of winning and has raised the political cost of defeat. By attacking the parties and trying to enlarge his own powers, Roldos has driven some potential supporters into Bucaram's corner and left himself isolated. His threat to resign will put him in an embarrassing—and perhaps untenable—position if he loses.

Since he assumed power from the armed forces last summer, Roldos' personal power struggle with Bucaram has caused him to neglect the economy and has impeded his efforts to produce a cohesive legislative program. Although military leaders have for the most part supported Roldos, his actions thus far have done little to allay their concerns about the ability of civilians to govern effectively.

The prospects of a government dominated by the military's old foe, Bucaram, are even more disturbing to the high command. Over the short run the chances of a coup are not great, but they will increase if Bucaram defeats Roldos or if the confrontation drags on indefinitely.



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INTERNATIONAL: Law of the Sea Conference

US delegates at the UN Law of the Sea conference that adjourned last week in New York have reported that the Soviets may have been even more forthcoming than in past sessions. On the difficult issue regarding the control of resources on the continental shelf and submarine ridges, Moscow offered a compromise that the US interprets as providing for US jurisdiction over the potentially oilrich Chukchi Plateau, which extends well over 500 nautical miles into the Arctic Ocean. The Soviets also continued to support US demands for liberalized rules to govern scientific research on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Because of objections from Brazil and others, however, this issue probably will require further attention. Another stalemate continues on the criteria to be used for delimiting maritime boundaries between states whose economic zone and continental shelf claims overlap.

A full slate of work still faces the conference next summer in Geneva if a draft treaty is to be produced this year. In addition to resolving the remaining substantive issues, particularly those dealing with control over exploitation of deep-seabed manganese nodules, negotiators must produce the treaty's final clauses on ratification and amendment provisions. They also will have to create a commission to oversee the treaty's entry into force once the required number of ratifications have been secured.



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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Continuing Tension

A small Israeli force equipped with armored personnel carriers established four positions yesterday in or near the UN zone in southern Lebanon. The Israelis maintain that their troops are to help bring their Christian militia allies under control. In the past few days, UN troops have suffered three casualties in trying to dislodge militiamen from a position they established in the UN zone. The militia have again stepped up their harassment of UN observer posts in the Christian enclaves.

The Israeli troop moves may also reflect an interest in improving security in the enclaves to help deter terrorist attacks such as the one on Monday in northern Israel. They do not, however, appear to be in preparation for retaliation for that attack. We expect the Israelis to carry out a more dramatic retaliatory operation, possibly involving air strikes or a commando raid. There are signs that they are planning something, but we have no information on their intended targets and timing.

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MAURITANIA: Opposition to the President

The arrest last week of former Foreign Minister Abdallah could prompt conservative elements in Mauritania's Government and armed forces to challenge President Haidalla's authority. Abdallah's arrest appears to be related primarily to his espousal of pro-Moroccan and pro-Western policies. It may also be directed at his cousin, the armed forces chief of staff, who has clashed with Haidalla over the President's sympathy for the Polisario Front insurgents in Western Sahara. Haidalla's action could provoke the chief of staff into open opposition.

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