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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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Office of General Counsel

20 November 1987

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Honorable William F. Weld  
Assistant Attorney General  
Criminal Division  
Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530

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DATE 6-8-01 BY SP4 BJA/DFW  
II 940790

Attention: Mark Richard, Esq.  
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Dear Mr. Weld:

The Director of Central Intelligence has asked that I bring to your immediate attention the enclosed unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence information. He also has requested that the FBI be authorized and instructed to conduct an investigation on a priority basis. This report is being made pursuant to sections 1.7(a) and (b) of Executive Order 12333. (U)

The enclosed articles from The Washington Times and The Washington Post of 18 November 1987 contain unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence information classified at the Top Secret codeword level. The material has been verified as being derived from the final report by a joint CIA/DOD working group, the "DCI Mobile Missile Task Force Intelligence Requirements and Analysis Working Group." The publication of these articles constitutes an extremely serious compromise of classified information. Eighty copies of the working group report were produced, but only 50 of them bore the 11 December 1986 date cited in the news stories. The report was disseminated only within CIA and DOD elements. (S)

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The CIA Office of Security is conducting an internal investigation and is prepared to discuss its efforts with representatives of the FBI. For reference purposes, this case has been designated Case No. 87-63. (U)

Sincerely,

David P. Doherty  
General Counsel

  
Associate Deputy General Counsel

Enclosures

cc: John L. Martin, Esq.  
Internal Security Section  
Criminal Division

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# U.S. said to be unable to verify missile ban

By Gregory A. Fossedal  
COPLEY NEWS SERVICE

U.S. intelligence services will lack the ability to verify a comprehensive ban of mobile missiles "for many years," whether or not the Soviets agree to on-site inspection, according to an analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The study -- "DCI Mobile Missile Task Force Intelligence Requirements and Analysis Working Group Final Report" -- was filed on Dec. 11, 1986, to then-CIA director William Casey.

The paper makes few direct references to proposals now being debated for a treaty that would require the Soviets to destroy all its SS-20 intermediate range nuclear missiles now in Europe. But its pessimistic conclusions about U.S. ability to monitor any mobile missiles -- including the SS-20 -- are likely to harm administration efforts to win Senate ratification of an emerging pact on Euromissiles.

Excerpts from the paper, which carries top-secret code words "Ruff Zarf Umbra" and an index number "TCS-60115186," were provided to Copley News Service by a source in the U.S. government.

The report speaks to "identify shortfalls" in current funding levels and identifies areas where "more resources will be needed" to meet requirements for identifying Soviet mobile missiles, either for targeting or verification purposes.

It concludes: "Our current capability to meet adequately the demands placed upon our limited resources, to address effectively the

mobile missile problem, is limited."

Indeed, at one point, the report identifies the number of mobile Soviet SS-24 missiles as "probably" between 100 and 200, but perhaps higher, with 150 cited as a "best estimate."

Intelligence experts such as William Van Cleave, a scholar at the Hoover Institution, confirm that "that's about the level of uncertainty we face" in estimating the number of Soviet mobile missiles.

The Soviets have told U.S. negotiators they have one missile per mobile missile launcher, but some experts, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, say there could be as many as five.

The issue is important to a treaty on mobile missiles in Europe, experts say, because it will be easy to verify how many missiles the Soviets actually destroy. The problem, officials say, is that the United States has little knowledge of how many mobile missiles have been produced and are now deployed.

"We can know whether the Soviets have destroyed, say, 450 missiles," said a Pentagon official. "But did they start with 450, or with 2,450? That we won't know, and the revolutionary kinds of inspections that would have to take place before we would know -- well, these aren't even under discussion in the current negotiations."

Mr. Van Cleave agreed that "the general CIA estimates of how much you can verify in an INF agreement is between 2 and 4 on a scale of 10."

Adding to the problem, officials say, is the fact that the Soviets have built at least eight bases for the road-

mobile SS-25. The SS-25 would be virtually indistinguishable from the SS-20 to U.S. intelligence for verification purposes. Yet it would be allowed under an INF treaty because the SS-25 is an intercontinental, not an intermediate-range, missile.

Thus, the Soviets could simply move large numbers of SS-20 missiles to SS-25 bases in the Ukraine, where they could still reach much of Europe but presumably would be off-limits to the United States even under on-site inspection.

Indeed, the CIA report tacitly concedes that the United States does not yet understand "the concept of operations for mobile missile units that are deployed to the field ... A true capability to locate, identify, and track mobile missiles ... will require significant enhancement of our present capabilities."

Intelligence experts say the paper, which calls for "radical changes" in the U.S. approach to intelligence gathering in the coming decade, was a follow-up to a similar 1985 study also performed by the CIA. That study, also still classified, carries the same code words and reaches even more pessimistic conclusions.

"For approximately the rest of this century," it concludes, "there will be uncertainties associated with any arms control treaty limiting mobile missiles. Even with [on-site inspection], only very modest improvements in counting deployed mobile missiles seem likely."

Angelo Codevilla, an intelligence expert and co-author of "Arms Control Delusion," a book that argues the United States cannot verify meaningful weapons reductions with the Soviets, says of the latest CIA study: "With that paper on file, it's going to be hard for [CIA Director] Bill Webster or anyone else at the agency to testify for an INF treaty."

CIA officials declined to comment on the new study.

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

## What About the Hidden SS-20s?

Despite President Reagan's pledge that the pending INF treaty will be based on "the most stringent verification regime" in history, an authoritative CIA study rules out any way to prevent Soviet cheating, at least during the first few years of the treaty.

The intelligence study was completed a year ago and has been held under tight secrecy since. Senior officials at the State and Defense Departments and on the National Security Council staff who support the president's drive for the INF treaty have read the study—and wept. It flatly rejects the possibility of verifying compliance with any treaty that commits the Soviets to limit or destroy mobile missiles such as the SS-20, as the INF treaty nearing final agreement in Geneva will do.

Rather than heed this warning and modify his expansive guarantee of strict verification, Reagan has been persuaded by architects of the now détente to embellish his claim. But instead of repetition chasing away the verification nightmare, it promises to confront him on the Senate floor after the treaty is signed at next month's summit.

On Dec. 11, 1986, a high-level interagency "working group" reported to then CIA director William J. Casey in the careful words of the intelligence bureaucracy: "our current capability to meet adequately the demands placed upon our resources is limited."

Those words highlight the final report of Casey's supersensitive Intelligence Requirements and Analysis Working Group. Set up to scrutinize verification in monitoring mobile missiles in the Soviet Union, the group struck at the heart of next year's INF ratification fight in the Senate. "Future requirements" for verifying compliance with a mobile-missile agreement such as the INF treaty, it warns, "are likely to be stringent and may involve accounting for nondeployed SS-20s. After the estimated 441 missiles in launchers are destroyed, senators and administration officials who endorse the INF treaty estimate that 145 and 530 "nondeployed" SS-20s left. But defense hard-liners estimate there could be as many as 2,000. However many there are, the missiles are stashed out of sight, absolutely beyond discovery—unless the Kremlin chooses to uncover them.

A high administration official, worried about the effect on treaty-savvy senators of inability to verify, warns privately that Reagan's blanket statements will be self-defeating when all verification shambles become known. "The president is saying ironclad and outright verification, but that's dangerous to say because it's impossible," he told us.

The "data base" of SS-20 missiles is supposed to answer these questions: How many SS-20s do you have? Where are they located? Can U.S. inspectors see them? With Mikhail Gorbachev due here in less than three weeks, the administration does not have the answers.

Instead, compliance cannot be ensured for from five to seven years, when the hidden SS-20s not destroyed will begin to "with away" as unreliable—and hence useless—for lack of testing. But even that surmise depends on Soviet compliance with a proviso in the INF treaty forbidding future SS-20 testing. Intelligence officials believe the Soviets might beat this by testing their unacknowledged SS-20 stockpile on launchers of long-range SS-25s, a new missile with similar characteristics but which is permitted under the treaty.

According to the CIA study, the United States is "hampered" by the lack of a "uniform data base of information" on mobile missiles, raising an ominous question about Soviet exploitation of hidden mobile missiles for possible surprise attack. "A true capability to locate, identify and track mobile missiles for the purpose of targeting is evolutionary," says the study, requiring "significant enhancement over present capabilities." That rules out any way today to knock out mobile missiles because their movement on the ground cannot be tracked.

The president's verification promise puts a weapon into the hands of anti-INF senators. No longer do they have to prove the dubious thesis that Gorbachev is secretly plotting a surprise nuclear strike with hidden SS-20s. Whether or not the vote is even close, those senators can embarrass the president by challenging him to prove the CIA wrong when it reported "stringent" verification procedures are impossible.

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