Officials Recount Chaotic Document Movements
(U)

 Officials provided first-hand accounts of the confusion and competing orders, and they admitted their roles in the movement, destruction, concealment, and deliberate misrepresentation of the nature of the cache of documents:

Iraq's firmly established "cheat and retreat" pattern made it difficult for UN inspectors and Western analysts to accept new Iraqi assertions at face value, especially when there was evidence at the time that the chicken farm documents were placed there by the regime after the defection.
Baghdad's Threat Perception (U)

Iraqis viewed Iran and Israel, rather than the United States, as the primary threat to the regime. This could explain why Iraq might have continued to give the impression that it was concealing WMD—to instill fear or at least uncertainty in their neighbors:

...emphatically believed in Iran as Iraq's principal enemy—"past, present, and future," asserting the United States was oceans away and did not have long-term designs on Iraq.

Inspections Resume With UNMOVIC 2002-03 (U)

By the summer of 2002, it became apparent that Iraq would be willing to accept another round of inspections, this time under the banner of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Iraq again began preparations for active inspections inside its borders.
Misreading Intentions: Iraq’s Reaction to Inspections Created Picture of Deception
Iraq WMD Retrospective Series

Key Findings (U)

Iraq’s intransigence and deceptive practices during the periods of UN inspections between 1991 and 2003 deepened suspicions among many world governments and intelligence services that Baghdad had ongoing WMD programs. Ironically, even at key junctures when the regime attempted to partially or fully comply with UN resolutions, its suspicious behavior and destruction of authenticating documentation only reinforced the perception that Iraq was being deceptive.

Key events and Iraqi behaviors that shaped Western perceptions include:

- An early established pattern of “cheat and retreat.” Iraq concealed items and activities in the early 1990s, and when detected, attempted to rectify the shortcomings, usually secretly and without documentation. Those coverups were seen to validate analytic assessments that Iraq intended to deny, deceive, and maintain forbidden capabilities.

- Shocked by the unexpected aggressiveness of early UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in 1991, Iraq secretly destroyed or dismantled most undeclared items and records that could have been used to validate the unilateral destruction, leaving Baghdad unable to provide convincing proof when it later tried to demonstrate compliance.

- We now judge that the 1995 defection of Saddam’s son-in-law Husayn Kamal—a critical figure in Iraq’s WMD and denial and deception (D&D) activities—prompted Iraq to change strategic direction and cease efforts to retain WMD programs. Iraqi attempts that year to find face-saving means to disclose previously hidden information, however, reinforced the idea that Baghdad was deceptive and unreliable. Instead of helping to close the books, Iraq’s actions reinvigorated the hunt for concealed WMD, as analysts perceived that Iraq had both the intent and capability to continue WMD efforts during inspections.

- When Iraq’s revelations were met by added UN scrutiny and distrust, frustrated Iraqi leaders deepened their belief that inspections were politically motivated and would not lead to the end of sanctions. As Iraq turned its political focus to illicit economic efforts to end its isolation, eliminate sanctions, and protect its dual-use infrastructure, these actions increased suspicions that Iraq continued to hide WMD.
Overview (U)

Iraqi leadership reactions to UN resolutions on weapons inspections between 1991 and 2003 fostered an atmosphere of distrust with the world community. Analysts interpreted Iraq’s intransigence and ongoing deceptive practices as indicators of continued WMD programs or an intent to preserve WMD capabilities, reinforcing intelligence we were receiving at the time that Saddam Husayn continued to pursue WMD. A combination of poorly and hastily considered Iraqi actions, regime assumptions and beliefs that did not reflect an accurate understanding of the world outside Iraq, and the typical paranoia of a security state led to Baghdad’s inability to extricate itself from what it viewed as oppressive sanctions and outside suspicion. Instead, Iraq continued to exhibit obstructive and inconsistent behaviors that perpetuated the belief by not fully complying with UN resolutions and was concealing ongoing WMD programs.

1991: Initial Approach to Inspections . . . (U)

Iraq initially tried to end sanctions without fully revealing WMD programs as required by UN resolutions, believing that appearing to comply would be sufficient. Iraqi leaders were optimistic that inspections and sanctions would end quickly. Their approach to inspections was to make sure that nothing was found to contradict their initial false declarations while they destroyed contradictory evidence.

Several officials stated after the fall of the regime that Iraq’s original belief was that it would not have to comply with the inspections, which would be cursory and only last a few weeks.

Initially believed that it would not have to follow any UN mandates, because in its view no one had ever followed a UN mandate.

Iraq planned to gather declared items for presentation, hide other materials in place, disperse and conceal nuclear materials, and deny the existence of pre-1991 WMD efforts:

This assessment was prepared by the Office of Iraq Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to


Approved for Release: 2013/11/13
Other Factors Reinforce Deceptive Image

Throughout the 1990s and beyond, other ongoing Iraqi activities, policies, and societal norms reinforced UN and international suspicion that Baghdad continued WMD denial and deception. These internal policies and mindsets—especially the importance of regime security—now appear to be even stronger drivers than earlier assessed, and caused the Iraqi leadership to present an aggressive and unrepentant image.

Security State
The Iraqi regime had an extreme distrust of outsiders combined with a fanatical devotion to security that in many cases led to actions that sabotaged efforts to demonstrate that it wanted cooperation. The presence of SSO minders was interpreted as concealment and evasion activity, when their purpose was to warn Saddam of inspections and to handle “sensitive site” inspections as part of their Presidential protection function.

Internal Self-Deception
Fear of retribution and delivering bad news meant that the highest levels of leadership might not have known the true limits of Iraq’s technical and military capabilities. Iraqi leaders may have made decisions and projected an image of strength on the basis of inaccurate and inflated capabilities:
1994 hid documentation related to the consumption and unilateral destruction of Scud propellant because it would show that Iraq had produced its own oxidizer for its Scud-type ballistic missiles before 1991. This contributed to UNSCOM's and UNMOVIC's inability to account for Iraq's Scud propellant, a gap that suggested Iraq retained a covert Scud-variant SRBM force.

Many high-ranking officials did not want to give the appearance of obstructing the UN, and they tried to ensure smooth cooperation. They ordered working-level Iraqi security officers to cooperate with the UN and not cause problems. Steps were taken to make sure that sites and documentation would endure inspectors' scrutiny, but some of the moves were heavy-handed, and seemed more suspicious to the West. The question of intent is still unclear—senior-level officials insist that their motives were benign, but many of their actions are still ambiguous as to whether cooperation or sanitization was intended.
Scope Note (U)  This is one in a series of intelligence assessments (IAs) in the CIA’s Iraq WMD Retrospective Series that addresses our post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) understanding of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), delivery system, and denial and deception (D&D) programs. These IAs reevaluate past assessments and reporting in light of the investigations carried out by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). (U)  

This assessment addresses how the Iraqis perceived and reacted to the international inspection process and the effect these actions had on analyst perceptions. This IA is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all CIA analysis or the analytical process on Iraqi WMD issues. The conclusions of this IA are generally consistent with ISG’s findings as reflected in the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD issued on 30 September 2004 and other products. This review of historical reporting and assessments helps to provide additional context on the interplay between Iraqi actions and intelligence judgments.

* More comprehensive papers on the individual Iraqi WMD programs, including comparisons of prewar estimates and postwar conclusions, are to be published elsewhere in this Retrospective Series.
had nothing Enough officials recounted this story to suggest that Iraq understood it to be true, and

Saddam Resented Inspections, Distrusted Motives. Available reporting suggests that Saddam resented the inspections and thought they infringed upon Iraq's sovereignty and viability. Saddam personally expressed his dissatisfaction with the inspection process on several occasions:

Many officials expressed the belief that the inspectors wanted to prolong their high UN salaries and did not want to resolve technical issues. Such exchanges support the idea that the Iraqi regime did not understand the West's position on weapons and sanctions, and they sought other reasons to explain continued inspections:

- believed that Iraq would never get a clean bill of health from the UN
- This was one factor that prompted them to cease cooperation with the UN in August 1998.
- After the fall of the regime,
  - expressed surprise when a former US inspector came into the room to try to resolve old material balance issues, because they felt it had been a ruse for US policy goals and not a legitimate concern.
  - told debriefers that certain UN inspectors did not want to solve any problems because they were making salaries "100 times higher" than their families back home.
Overall Pattern of ‘Cheat and Retreat’ (U)

The reactions of both sides to the inspection process formed a pattern: Iraq would start to rectify an uncovered shortcoming, usually in secret. The West viewed the discoveries as validation that Iraq had a continued intent to deny, deceive, and maintain forbidden capabilities, especially because Iraqis usually begrudgingly revealed that they had given up those capabilities after being caught with discrepancies.

International weapons inspectors often detected Iraq’s concealment activities and discrepancies in WMD-related information, triggering investigations that delayed the lifting of sanctions, thus forming a pattern that deepened mutual suspicion:

• In interviews conducted after the fall of the regime, senior officials indicated that Saddam sought to avoid involvement in a drawn-out process with UNSCOM and the IAEA to investigate every new issue.

• In April 1991, for example, Iraq declared that it had neither a nuclear weapons program nor an enrichment program. Inspections in June and September 1991 proved that Iraq had lied on both counts, had explored multiple enrichment paths, and had a well-developed nuclear weapons program. Baghdad destroyed rather than revealed items, attempting to make its inaccurate assertions of no programs correct in a legalistic sense.

March 1992, Iraq decided to declare the unilateral destruction of certain prohibited items to the Security Council, while continuing to conceal its biological warfare (BW) program and important aspects of the nuclear, chemical, and missile programs.

Saddam Husayn ordered Husayn Kamil to hide the weapons in 1991, but gave them up once cornered. He said that Saddam destroyed all WMD in secret after pressure from the UN and inspectors, after initially thinking he could hide weapons also acknowledged the 1991 unilateral destruction.

said that the 1991 order to destroy all documents related to the BW program caused problems later, when Iraq did not have the documentation to support revised declarations in the late 1990s admitting to an offensive program.

wondered why he was ordered to destroy the paperwork for the missile destruction in 1991, forcing Iraqis to rely upon personal recollection in later years when trying to prove that destruction had actually taken place.

Decisions to destroy much of the paperwork that could have verified the destruction exacerbated Iraq’s inability to later extricate itself from being viewed in the “cheat and retreat” paradigm:
... Leads to Decision on Unilateral Destruction (U)

When the inspections proved more intrusive than expected, the Iraqi leadership appears to have panicked and made a fateful decision to secretly destroy much of the remaining nondeclared items, and eliminate the evidence. According to several officials, Iraq decided to surreptitiously destroy many items and hide others, rather than contradict earlier declarations. Many officials described the regime's shock over inspectors' aggressiveness, citing examples like the June 1991 discovery by IAEA inspectors that Iraqis were moving nuclear electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) components away from an inspection:

... even after the IAEA inspectors tracked down EMIS components, the regime did not fully understand the implications of its initial false declarations, and Baghdad decided to unilaterally destroy much of the hidden material rather than declare it.

..., likened this decision to Iraq's fateful 1990 decision to invade Kuwait in terms of having negative consequences for Iraq:

... July 1991, after consulting with Saddam, to destroy items, although some allegedly were hidden without The bulk of the materials were destroyed in this initial period:

... the destruction order for the BW program came in June 1991 recalls getting 48 hours to get rid of everything.

... time, was their primary BW agent production and storage facility prior to the Gulf war. As with the other programs, orders were given to destroy documentation of the destruction and to retain no copies of other documents. WMD-related organizations received orders to turn over key "know-how" documents to the Special Security Organization (SSO) for safekeeping.

... said Iraq retained two Scud-type ballistic missiles after the initial unilateral destruction in the summer of 1991 that were destroyed later that year.

... Iraq unilaterally destroyed 25 biological al-Husayn weapons and approximately 134 biological R-400 aerial bombs in 1991.

... noted the destruction of 20 concealed al-Husayn chemical warfare (CW) warheads in the summer of 1991.

Weapons Deceptions Maintained After 1992 (U)

... at the time Iraq still did not admit to having destroyed biological bombs and warheads and represented BW warheads as being CW warheads.
In November 1993, Iraq accepted UNSCR 715 that allowed for long-term UN monitoring of its weapons programs following two years of Iraqi objections that such monitoring constituted an unacceptable infringement of sovereignty. Baghdad expressed its hope that this step would lead to the immediate lifting of sanctions.

In October 1994, the regime threatened to end cooperation with the UN and moved forces to the Kuwaiti border after dashed expectations of a positive UNSCOM report in September. Baghdad defused the crisis by agreeing to recognize the Kuwaiti border.

By the summer of 1995, international will to sustain sanctions and inspections was dwindling and an emboldened Iraq in June had issued an ultimatum to the UN to lift sanctions.

Diplomacy 1992-95: Iraq Tries To Break Free (U)

Frustration with continued sanctions led Baghdad to alternate between challenging the UN and taking diplomatic steps during this period that the regime thought would alleviate Iraq’s isolation. Saddam’s regime also experienced intense economic and security pressure, with the Iraqi dinar falling to its lowest level ever in November 1995 and several notable security threats, including a 1995 coup plot and associated unrest with the Dulaym tribe.

Baghdad refused to allow a July 1992 inspection of the Ministry of Agriculture, saying it would violate Iraq’s sovereignty and was intended for intelligence collection.

Turning Point—August 1995: Iraq ‘Scared (Mostly) Straight’

Iraq’s reaction to the defection of Husayn Kamil—a former Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Oil, among other positions—in August 1995 appears to be the key turning point in Iraq’s decision to cooperate more with inspections, but it also strengthened the West’s perception of Iraq as a successful and efficient deceiver. Clumsy but genuine Iraqi moves toward transparency—significant alterations in their “cheat and retreat” pattern—not only went undetected but instead seemed to confirm that Iraq could and would conceal evidence of proscribed programs.
Proven Deception Underscores Analytic Mindset

Iraqi revelations after Husayn Kamil’s flight to Jordan led to an irrevocable loss of trust by the West. Iraq was again judged dishonest and deceptive in its dealings with the UN and determined to retain WMD capabilities. The new declarations effectively sidelined previous attempts to accurately account for material balances of CW agent production and weaponization:

- Some of the information revealed in 1995, such as a more extensive weaponization effort for BW aerial bombs, missile warheads, and spray tanks, was not previously suspected and surprised the UN, provoking deep suspicion of future Iraqi behaviors and declarations.

- The defection exposed the previously unknown 1991 crash program to develop nuclear weapons.

Mutual Suspicion Grows: 1996-98 (U)

After the revelations following the defection, UNSCOM began a series of inspections of Iraq’s security apparatus and concealment mechanisms. Iraq viewed this new investigation as proof that WMD was being used as a pretext to bring about regime change.

- Act by the US Congress enhanced Iraqi suspicions. Iraq also accepted UNSCR 986 (Oil-For-Food), which led to growing external trade and decreased international isolation, as well as an increased Iraqi willingness to push back against inspections. A series of standoffs with the UN over inspections culminated in Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and the expulsion of the inspectors.

Concerns About Never-Ending Inspections and US, UN Motives

After 1995, Iraqi leaders solidified their belief that inspections would not end and sanctions would not be lifted, especially when Iraq’s new disclosures did not lead to any relief of restrictions. Iraq’s focus turned to protecting its technological infrastructure and the highest level of Iraqi command believed that the US knew that Iraq’s programs were dormant. It could account for some of Iraq’s subsequent behaviors:

- It is possible that Baghdad decided to pursue a more aggressive strategy toward inspections, convinced that Washington lacked the proof to convince the rest of the world.

Instead of helping close the books on Iraqi WMD programs, Iraq’s actions reinvigorated the hunt for concealed WMD. The turnover of an incomplete set of documents, rather than being viewed as a sign of Iraqi cooperation, opened new issues for UNSCOM and the IAEA to investigate.

believed” that the United States thought that Iraq
We had previously assessed that Iraq used Kamil’s defection as an opportunity to disclose some additional WMD documentation. We now judge that the Iraqis feared that Kamil—a critical figure in Iraq’s WMD and D&D activities—would reveal additional undisclosed information. Iraq decided that further widespread deception and attempts to hold onto extensive WMD programs while under UN sanctions was untenable and changed strategic direction by adopting a policy of disclosure and improved cooperation:

- Iraq’s attempts to find face-saving means to reveal previously concealed information and extricate itself from sanctions appeared deceptive and reinforced the idea that it was still hiding important elements of its programs.

Confusion at the Top
Several high-ranking detained Iraqi officials described the chain of events surrounding the defection and the resulting panic. Even the highest levels of leadership were unsure what Kamil could reveal, what WMD information was still retained, and what actions to take.

- Multiple high-level security and government officials affirmed receiving orders to move WMD documents to Kamil’s farm, where they were presented to the UN, and Kamil received blame for their concealment.

We now believe the movement of documents to Husayn Kamil’s chicken farm and their turnover to the UN represented a genuine attempt to come clean on programs albeit while saving face. Baghdad blamed the previous concealment of aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs and the resulting complications with inspectors on an untrustworthy traitor. Captured documentary evidence and interviews support the idea that major concealment operations ended in 1995. Iraqis publicly continued to attribute all WMD and concealment activity to Husayn Kamil—a trend that continued even after the fall of the regime.
The Analysts' Retrospective (U)

The concept for this paper was generated by analysts who had worked Iraq WMD and D&D for several years, including many with experience going back to Operation Desert Storm.

Several general themes emerged from our investigation:

• Analysts tended to focus on what was most important to us—the hunt for WMD—and less on what would be most important for a paranoid dictatorship to protect. Viewed through an Iraqi prism, their reputation, their security, their overall technological capabilities, and their status needed to be preserved. Deceptions were perpetrated and detected, but the reasons for those deceptions were misread.

• We were surprised to discover just how broken and ineffective the Iraqi regime was.

• Analysts understood that the Iraqis were working with a different logic system, but did not go far enough in accounting for how greatly Iraqi and Western thought differs.
- Other Iraqi actions that fueled the perception of WMD-related deceptions included Special Security Organization (SSO) and other efforts to hide non-WMD secrets to protect Saddam and the regime. Iraq also continued to provide inaccuracies in UN declarations for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was an inability to document these statements.

- Iraq did not accurately interpret US and international policy drivers; in 2003, it assessed that the United States would not invade Iraq.

- Several people claimed that Iraqi officials did not believe that all of Iraq's WMD had been destroyed. These officials may in good faith have conveyed the message to others that Iraq retained WMD.

Early 1990s concealment activity combined with unexpected revelations following Husayn Kamil's defection led analysts to view Iraq as a sophisticated D&D practitioner. Faced with inconclusive or uncertain data, analysts made judgments with conviction that Iraq could successfully conceal damaging data.

We recognize that portions of our data were supplied by the same people who were responsible for the deception campaign and provided insight in captivity. Captured documentary evidence exploited to date so far supports the conclusions of this paper.
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Several people claimed that many Iraqi officials did not believe that they had destroyed all of Iraq's WMD. They may have in good faith conveyed the message to others that Iraq retained WMD:

The example of pre-2003 US analysis on Iraq's WMD programs highlights the problem of how to assess ambiguous data in light of past practices. Given Iraq's extensive history of deception and only small changes in outward behavior, analysts did not spend adequate time examining the premise that the Iraqis had undergone a change in their behavior, and that what Iraq was saying by the end of 1995 was, for the most part, accurate. This was combined with the analysts' knowledge that they had underestimated Iraq's programs prior to Operation Desert Storm. A liability of intelligence analysis is that once a party has been proven to be an effective deceiver, that knowledge becomes a heavy factor in the calculations of the analytical observer. In the Iraqi example, this impression was based on a series of undocumented revelations of unilateral destruction combined with unexpected revelations from a high-level, well-placed defector, leading analysts to be more likely predisposed to interpret similar but unrelated behaviors observed after 1996 as proof of continued forbidden activity.
Leaders Convinced US Would Not Invade
Officials said that the Iraqi leadership in 2002 and 2003 assessed that the United States would not invade Iraq and would at worst institute an air-strike campaign along the lines of Operation Desert Fox.

Saddam still believed that there would be no war, as the United States had achieved its goal of domination in the Gulf and Red Sea area.

and said that the leadership believed the United States did not have the forces to invade Iraq, and press reports said that Washington was not willing to sacrifice US lives.

Iraq's Own Actions Compound Problems
Top regime officials have conceded since Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that past Iraqi deception led to suspicion of Iraq's motives. Iraqi leaders, however, did not understand that they would have had to take specific steps with UNMOVIC to overcome perceptions of dishonesty. Several officials reported that they believed that just presenting the truth would be enough to rectify past problems:

puzzlement at the idea that Iraq needed to do something beyond allowing inspectors access to sites to establish trust with the UN.

felt that if the inspections had only been allowed to continue for seven more months in 2003, all outstanding issues would have been resolved, equating successful inspections with the number of sites visited.

Most senior leaders admitted that the UN and United States could have perceived Iraq's behaviors as suspicious, and offered unprompted examples:


decisions like Iraq's development of missiles with ranges only 20 or 30 km beyond the allowed 150-km range gave the impression that Iraq was defying the UN.

claimed that even though WMD had been destroyed in 1991, not letting inspectors into palaces aroused suspicions.

whether important information had been concealed. He found that people moved "unimportant things," such as furniture, and felt that "what those stupid people did gave the inspectors the right to suspect all kinds of things.

Over-Preparation for Inspections
From many accounts, Iraqis tried hard to make sure the final round of UN inspections went smoothly, conducting their own investigations into potential anomalies.

actions taken by the Iraqi side, however, caused them to continue to give the appearance of deception, especially as Iraq continued to hide some information on lesser points:

official who had hidden missile documents in his house, even though this person had attested to the UN that he had nothing. The investigation concluded that the official had taken the papers to bolster his scientific credentials and to use in a private business.

Iraqi leadership worried that these items would affect the content of its 2002 declaration.
5 January 2006

Misreading Intentions: Iraq’s Reaction to Inspections Created Picture of Deception

Iraq WMD Retrospective Series