

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Iraq: Revisiting Nuclear Assessments
Iraq WMD Retrospective Series

[redacted]

Overturning Our Pre-OIF Nuclear Judgments

[redacted]

We do not believe, based on our review of information gathered before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), that Baghdad resumed work to develop nuclear weapons since 1991. Furthermore, although Saddam Husayn probably harbored some continued interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, we also find there are credible claims to suggest that he abandoned such pursuits. These findings contrast with our prewar view that Saddam remained intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and that Baghdad started reconstituting its nuclear weapons program about the time UN inspectors departed in December 1998.

- Although investigators in the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found Iraq was pursuing several projects that could have supported an infrastructure needed for a future nuclear weapons effort—including some activities that raised concerns for us before the war—we lack evidence to show that these projects were part of a renewed program.
- Postwar investigators also did not uncover renewed fissile material processing or production activities or efforts to design or develop a nuclear weapon—actions that would have clearly shown a weapons program was under way. Prior to OIF, we suspected Iraq would have restarted research on some of these activities if it were renewing its nuclear weapons program.

Our new understanding of the Iraq nuclear issue is based largely on insight gained from postwar access

[redacted] as well as a review of prewar intelligence reporting. Although our new conclusions are based on a thorough review, information gaps and reporting

uncertainties remain. These uncertainties leave open the prospect that we could have missed signs of a renewed nuclear weapons program.

Conflicting Signs of Intent

[redacted]

Prewar Assessment

Although some CIA analyses prior to the war noted there was limited and contradictory reporting on any nuclear weapons work through 1998, our assessments nonetheless maintained that Saddam remained intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and stated that he had not abandoned his program.

Postwar Assessment

We now assess that Saddam probably harbored some continued interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, but find there are credible claims—including some from before OIF—to suggest he abandoned such pursuits. We also now judge that Iraq's interest in nuclear weapons seems to have varied over the years, with program preservation, denial, and deception of nuclear weapons capabilities being a key regime goal up through the 1995 defection of Husayn Kamil—Saddam's former son-in-law and head of the pre-1991 WMD efforts. After 1995, we believe Saddam seemed more interested in ending the UN sanctions regime rather than acquiring nuclear weapons—a condition that may have changed again in 1998 following Operation Desert Fox.

- The prospect that nuclear weapons again became a regime aim is based, in part, on reporting that after the Operation Desert Fox attack, Saddam decided Iraq would no longer be bound by UN resolutions—

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Our postwar review similarly raises doubts about alleged Iraqi interest in uranium from [Redacted] countries flagged as concerns before the wa

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Postwar inspections also failed to uncover signs Iraq sought uranium from abroad. [Redacted] The ISG appears to have found only one document of an alleged offer of uranium to Baghdad since 1991 in this regard—an approach Iraq seems to have turned down. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

Investigators grew suspicious, for example, upon learning that this project involved members of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear weapons effort including some who worked on weapons design [redacted]

[redacted]

• Iraq's rail gun project proved to be a major postwar investigation issue, [redacted]

[redacted]

Sizable Nuclear Cadre. Postwar investigators also confirmed Baghdad retained a sizable cadre of former nuclear program personnel at the MIC and IAEC—another factor that influenced our prewar analyses [redacted] Like the other prewar issues of concern, however, we are not aware of any evidence that could show this staff, which included many key pre-1991 weapons program scientists, was involved in renewed weapons work [redacted]

Our postwar review, however, agrees with the ISG that the IAEC rail gun effort was most likely intended for air defense, rather than renewed nuclear weapons work. [redacted]

[redacted]

Other Activities Found That Were Applicable But Not Linked to Work on a Renewed Weapons Infrastructure [redacted]

Investigators in the ISG also uncovered activities potentially applicable to weapons development that were not known or flagged as issues of concern before the war [redacted] Key postwar discoveries in this regard include a research project under way at the IAEC and efforts by two former Iraqi weapons scientists to conceal proscribed enrichment technology [redacted] We similarly cannot show, however, these activities were part of a renewed nuclear weapons program [redacted]

Work on Rail Guns

A key postwar discovery of a research project under way in the IAEC [redacted] to develop a rail gun raised significant concerns that Baghdad would try to use the device to support renewed nuclear weapons design work [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Postwar statements by Iraqi officials also provide some bureaucratic explanations for the rail gun effort occurring in the IAEC rather than continuing in the MIC.

[redacted] noted that there were many programs under the IAEC that were supported by the Ministry of Defense, adding that such work was a ready means for nuclear staff to gain funding and recognition [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] similarly described the rail gun work as an example of a poorly developed proposal crafted to win Saddam's support and garner funds. [redacted] noted that once such projects start, they were hard to kill. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Efforts by Scientists To Hide Enrichment Technology

Of all the postwar discoveries, the efforts by two former weapons program scientists to conceal enrichment technology since 1991 provide the most concrete findings of proscribed nuclear information being retained in Iraq. [redacted] Although the key documentation and equipment hidden by these

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

including those that prohibited WMD development. [Redacted] Although Saddam reportedly codified this decision through the Republican Command Council, we lack information to clearly show that followthrough occurred on this order. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

that he believed the Iraqi leader intended to reconstitute WMD programs after sanctions were lifted [Redacted]

The ISG also collected views [Redacted] who, apparently lacking direct guidance, presumed weapons program activities would resume [Redacted]

that it was well known among staff from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons effort—codenamed Petrochemical Project 3 (PC-3)—that Iraq would try to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program after sanctions lifted. [Redacted]

many PC-3 personnel thought the regime feared they would tell inspectors that Iraq intended to restart a weapons program once sanctions were lifted—a comment that suggests scientists presumed such work would resume. [Redacted]

... While Others Denied Such Pursuits

Despite these tenuous postwar indicators of continued nuclear weapons interest, the ISG also collected many denials of post-1991 nuclear weapons work or aspirations including comments from [Redacted]

Many Presumed Saddam Remained Interested . . .

[Redacted] Iraqi officials debriefed since the war who presumed the former leader remained interested in resuming a nuclear weapons program [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] denied, for example, that nuclear weapons work had been under way by noting that Saddam had told him on numerous occasions that Iraq would not restart such a program. [Redacted]

[Redacted]


^b Baghdad's pre-1991 centrifuge program transferred from the IAEK to the Iraq's military industries under Husayn Kamil by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]


~~TOP SECRET~~



No Credible Basis Found for Alleging Iraqi Interest in Foreign Uranium

Prewar Assessment

CIA also joined most agencies in the 2002 NIE in assessing that Iraq was vigorously trying to procure uranium from abroad, noting reported contacts with Niger, Somalia, and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC). This assessment was not one of the underpinnings in the NIE key judgments or our prewar assessments on reconstitution, however, as Iraq retained safeguarded enriched and natural uranium supplies that we thought could be diverted to a weapons program.




Postwar Assessment

We are not aware of any reliable information that could show Iraq sought uranium from abroad or renewed indigenous production of such material since 1991. Had these activities been under way, we

believe they would have demonstrated clear intent to renew a nuclear weapons program, because Baghdad could not legitimize such pursuits in the face of the severe UN restrictions imposed on its nuclear program since 1991.

As a result of our postwar review, we also now believe that much of the prewar analysis on alleged Iraqi uranium pursuits from Niger seems to reflect circular reporting of the information.



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Prewar Assessments (U)

Prior to the war, CIA published several assessments in which we judged that Saddam remained intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and that he had never abandoned his program. [REDACTED] We also judged that Baghdad was attempting to reconstitute its gas centrifuge uranium enrichment effort starting about the time inspectors departed in December 1998. [REDACTED]

- Our prewar assessments keyed on Baghdad's persistent attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes—export-controlled items we assessed to be suitable for centrifuge rotors. [REDACTED] Our view that these tubes appeared to be for a centrifuge effort also seemed to be supported by Iraq's attempts to acquire dual-use goods such as magnets, balancing machines, and machine tools [REDACTED]
- In comparison, our view that Baghdad remained intent on pursuing nuclear weapons was based on Iraqi intransigence with the post-1991 intrusive inspections, a variety of intelligence reports since 1991 suggesting continued weapons work or concealment efforts, as well as public exhortations by Saddam to his "nuclear energy mujahidin" in the years just before the war [REDACTED]
- CIA also agreed with the judgments made in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate entitled Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction—the last major Intelligence Community study on the Iraqi nuclear issue before the war. [REDACTED] Notably, we agreed that Baghdad's efforts to reestablish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel further indicated that reconstitution was under way and that Iraq was vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake from abroad. [REDACTED]

* The prewar analyses referenced in this paper are drawn from CIA products such as the 1 August 2002 paper entitled Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, the 30 September 2002 assessment entitled Iraq's Hunt for Aluminum Tubes—Evidence of a Renewed Uranium Enrichment Program [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

- According to our review, we believe that the two scientists hid enrichment technology on their own or in some forgotten regime effort, rather than as part of an ongoing official plan for nuclear reconstitution.

- The prospect that Saddam had a program aimed at preserving technical capabilities for future nuclear weapons work rather than active research, development, or production of fissile material is supported by a handful of postwar reports. Such a program could explain the repeated involvement of a key scientist from Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear weapons program in activities of concern investigated by the ISG.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Contents

	<i>page</i>
Key Findings (U)	iii
Scope Note (U)	vii
Overturning Our Pre-OIF Nuclear Judgments [redacted]	1
Conflicting Signs of Intent [redacted]	1
Prewar Assessment	1
Postwar Assessment	1
Many Presumed Saddam Remained Interested . . .	2
. . . While Others Denied Such Pursuits	2
Aluminum Tubes Best Explained by Rocket Use [redacted]	4
Prewar Assessment	4
Postwar Assessment	5
Infrastructure Improvements Under Way, But Not Clearly Linked to a Nuclear Weapons Program [redacted]	7
Prewar Assessment	7
Postwar Assessment	7
Other Activities Found That Were Applicable But Not Linked to Work on a Renewed Weapons Infrastructure [redacted]	9
Work on Rail Guns	9
Efforts by Scientists To Hide Enrichment Technology	10
No Credible Basis Found for Alleging Iraqi Interest in Foreign Uranium [redacted]	12
Prewar Assessment	12
Postwar Assessment	12
Alternative Analysis: Scenarios for an Undetected Nuclear Weapons Program [redacted]	15
Program of Preservation	15

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

scientists could have contributed to the infrastructure needed for Baghdad to reconstitute its electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and centrifuge uranium enrichment efforts, we currently cannot show, however, that these items were part of a regime plan for nuclear reconstitution. [redacted]

- Prior to OIF, we assessed that Iraq withheld documentation on the technical achievements of its nuclear program, experimentation data, and accounting—items like those hidden by the scientists. We also thought such concealments would have stemmed from official plans for program reconstitution [redacted]

Postwar investigators first learned that some Iraqi scientists were still concealing enrichment technology

[redacted]

In mid-2003, postwar investigators learned of a second instance where significant enrichment technology had been hidden [redacted]

[redacted]

similarly claimed that he had received the authority of senior officials—notably, Saddam [redacted] retain these items for future EMIS work [redacted]

[redacted]

Despite the similar claims from [redacted] that senior officials approved of their actions, we doubt that Baghdad had an ongoing plan prior to the war to use their concealed items for a renewed nuclear weapons effort. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Although postwar investigators found some high-level interest in 81-mm rockets [redacted]

[redacted] cannot confirm a key prewar [redacted]

[redacted] report that alleged Saddam was interested in the aluminum tubes [redacted]. Prior to the war, CIA interpreted reporting on Saddam's interest in the tubes as another sign the items were destined for a program of national importance, such as a renewed centrifuge effort [redacted]

[redacted] claimed Saddam had asked him to make 81-mm rockets, this link between Saddam and the tubes remains unconfirmed [redacted]

Although it is now clear that Iraq was producing 81-mm ground-to-ground rockets using 7075 alloy aluminum, investigators also uncovered information that raises questions about why Iraq continued to produce this munition given other rockets in its inventory. [redacted]

Our postwar review does not alter our opinion, however, that the tubes Iraq sought from abroad are dual-use items covered by nuclear export controls due to their potential use as centrifuge rotors [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~




(b)(1)
(b)(3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY




DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE


Iraq WMD Retrospective Series



CIA WINPAC IA 2006-014HCX




9 January 2006
WINPAC IA 2006-014HCX



~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

Furthermore, we note that the ISG documented many inconsistencies in the details provided by Iraqi officials in explaining the 81-mm rocket program. Such controls and discrepancies, however, are not sufficient for us to show that a nuclear end use was planned for the tubes.



Postwar Assessment

The ISG confirmed Iraq was engaged in several activities that contributed to our prewar concern that Baghdad was renewing its centrifuge program. Postwar investigators showed, for example, that Iraq sought or procured items to modernize some technical and industrial infrastructure and was working to train a younger generation of scientists in nuclear-related topics. Although we find that these activities could have preserved skills inherently useful to weapons work, we find they fall short, however, of showing these efforts were part of a renewed nuclear weapons program.



Infrastructure Improvements Under Way, But Not Clearly Linked to a Nuclear Weapons Program

Prewar Assessment

Beyond the tubes, CIA also was concerned before the war that some of Iraq's procurement activities and concentrations of nuclear scientists represented additional signs Baghdad was renewing its weapons program. In the 2002 NIE, for example, we viewed apparent efforts to reestablish and enhance Iraq's cadre of weapons personnel and an apparent reemergence of the IAEC as further indicators that reconstitution was under way.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Postwar Assessment

We now believe Baghdad's interest in high-strength, high-specification aluminum tubes is best explained by efforts to produce 81-mm barrage-type rockets. No evidence has surfaced since the war began to tie Iraq's pursuit of such tubes to a renewed gas centrifuge effort. Furthermore, debriefing and documentary information collected since the war regularly points to Baghdad's interest in such tubes as part of a rocket effort. This information includes denials by many Iraqi officials of any intended nuclear end use for such tubes.

ISG's investigation into why Iraq sought aluminum tubes with such high specifications also uncovered plausible but not always consistent accounts that link the tubes to 81-mm rockets. Multiple officials involved with the Iraqi rocket program claimed, for example, that the tight specifications on the aluminum tubes were based on a desire to improve the accuracy of its barrage-type weapon. This is one example of questionable engineering practices found by the ISG, however, as it seems Iraq did not take a systematic approach to finding the cause for the alleged inaccuracy in its rocket system.



grown angry when learning that aluminum tubes imported in the late 1980s for the 81-mm rocket program had corroded due to improper storage.




Based on inspector findings, we similarly cannot show that Iraq's interest in acquiring tubes made of 7075 alloy aluminum demonstrates these items most likely were intended for use in centrifuges. Before OIF, we understood, based on consultations with US rocket experts, that ground-to-ground barrage-type rockets normally were made out of steel. The apparent common use of steel

seemed inconsistent with Iraq's claim that they were using 81-mm high-strength 7075 alloy aluminum tubes for ground-to-ground rockets.




According to our review, we also now believe that tube cost is not sufficient to discredit Iraqi claims that these items were intended for rocket use, particularly because Iraqi engineers reportedly were more concerned about acquiring quality tubes to meet production demands than expense. Prior to the war, CIA cited cost as a factor that suggested Iraq most likely intended to use 7075 aluminum tubes for use in centrifuges based on our research that suggested this alloy of aluminum is more expensive than steel used in rockets.



Officials reportedly were not concerned if changes increased the cost, especially if the product was for the military.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

learned of such an effort through postwar exploitation [Redacted]

[Redacted]

- If a preservation effort had resumed since 1998, we also suspect it was in an early stage [Redacted] A more robust preservation effort most likely would have led to many officials being informed and broader knowledge of the intent of the work [Redacted] This would greatly have increased the odds that we would have

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

Iraqi Interest in Test Equipment. The ISG also uncovered new details on Iraq's attempts to procure test equipment—items that similarly contributed to our prewar view that Baghdad was renewing its centrifuge program. [Redacted] The ISG found, for example, that Iraq was attempting to acquire balancing and spin testing equipment through a previously unknown department in the MIC [Redacted]

[Redacted] group—called the Department of Rotating Machinery [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Renewal Efforts in the IAEC. The ISG also found information consistent with prewar concerns that Iraq was renewing its IAEC, but these findings similarly fall short of validating the prewar judgment that the IAEC was regaining preeminence as part of a renewed nuclear weapons program. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Scientists Returning to the IAEC. Our review also confirmed that some former PC-3 scientists in MIC were returning to the IAEC—another trend that was flagged in prewar assessments as a sign that weapons program reconstitution was under way [Redacted]

[Redacted] provides a plausible explanation, however, for these personnel moves [Redacted]

[Redacted] by 1999, many former nuclear weapons scientists working in the MIC were not happy because they felt they were not putting their scientific skills to good use [Redacted]

that former PC-3 scientists were interested in returning to the IAEC, because in 2001 or 2002 that organization increased its employee salaries significantly. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~


[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Scope Note (U)

This paper is part of a series of CIA intelligence assessments that address our post-OIF understanding of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems programs. These papers reevaluate past assessments and reporting in light of investigations by the ISG. This paper goes beyond the ISG's efforts, however, by examining the basis for some of CIA's prewar judgments [redacted]

- Readers should find the conclusions and additional context presented in this assessment are largely consistent with the findings reflected in the *Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD* issued on 30 September 2004. [redacted]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

9 January 2006

Iraq: Revisiting Nuclear Assessments

Iraq WMD Retrospective Series [redacted]

This assessment was prepared by the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Iraq: Revisiting Nuclear Assessments
Iraq WMD Retrospective Series [redacted]

Key Findings (U)

As a result of our postwar review, we do not believe that Iraq resumed work to develop nuclear weapons since 1991.¹ Although Saddam Husayn probably harbored some continued interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, we also find there are credible claims—including some before Operation Iraqi Freedom—to suggest he abandoned such pursuits [redacted]

- These findings contrast with our prewar view that Saddam remained intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and that Baghdad started reconstituting its nuclear weapons program about the time UN inspectors departed in December 1998 [redacted]

Investigators in the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found that Iraq was pursuing several activities flagged as concerns in our prewar assessments, but none that we can show to be part of a renewed nuclear weapons program [redacted]. The ISG confirmed, for example, that Baghdad sought machine tools, magnet production capabilities, and was reestablishing the infrastructure of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC)—dual-use projects that at least could have preserved skills inherently useful to weapons work. [redacted]

- Investigators also confirmed many details reported before the war regarding Baghdad's pursuit of high-strength, high-specification aluminum tubes. [redacted] No evidence was found, however, to link these tubes to a renewed centrifuge enrichment program as we had assessed [redacted]. We now believe, based on our review of information gathered since the war, that Iraq's interest in such tubes is best explained by efforts to produce 81-mm barrage-type rockets. [redacted]
- Investigators did not uncover, however, information to substantiate the prewar judgment that Iraq was vigorously seeking uranium from abroad [redacted]. Our review finds no credible basis to judge that Iraq was seeking foreign uranium—an activity that would have been a clear sign of renewed nuclear weapons interest. [redacted]

Although ISG investigators also uncovered activities potentially applicable to weapons development that were not known or flagged before the war, we cannot show these were part of a renewed program [redacted]. Key postwar discoveries include efforts by two former Iraqi scientists to conceal proscribed enrichment technology and a research project under way at the IAEC that involved Iraqis who had worked on nuclear weapon design prior to 1991. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Prewar Context for Intent Analyses (U) (continued)

[redacted]

• *Saddam, however, makes references in that speech to the need to support air defense, and Iraqi press reported many subsequent meetings between Saddam and IAEC and air defense officials—interactions that could have raised the prospect the exchanges were nonnuclear. [redacted] We now believe that Saddam's exhortations were related to encouraging the IAEC to work on air defense—a view that also seems consistent with information gathered since the war on research projects under way at the IAEC.*

[redacted]

• *More recently, a September 2000 speech by Saddam to his "nuclear energy mujahidin" similarly proved to be a poor basis to support CIA's prewar conclusion that the Iraqi leader remained intent on pursuing nuclear weapons. [redacted] In that speech, Saddam exhorts some nuclear personnel to force the enemy "to return in terror to its bases across the Atlantic. [redacted]*

In his denial that Iraq planned to renew nuclear weapons work [redacted] similarly noted that it was only his personal belief that Saddam would restart a program rather than any explicit statements of intent by the Iraqi leader. [redacted] that conversion of WMD facilities to civilian use since 1991 was not part of any reconstitution plan. [redacted] Prior to OIF, we interpreted Iraq's efforts to convert former nuclear facilities into civil or military centers was a move to preserve the infrastructure needed for a weapons program [redacted]

Aluminum Tubes Best Explained by Rocket Use

[redacted]

Prewar Assessment

Prior to OIF, CIA believed Iraq's pursuit of high-strength, high-specification aluminum tubes provided compelling evidence that Baghdad had renewed work on a centrifuge uranium enrichment effort as part of a weapons program. [redacted] This analysis was based on several factors, including the tube material, dimensions, costs, desired tolerances [redacted] and purported senior interest in their procurement [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]**Iraq-Niger Deal: The Collapsing Story** [REDACTED]

Prior to the war, a variety of intelligence reports pointed to Iraq having brokered a uranium deal with Niger around 1999. [REDACTED] In particular, the [REDACTED] details in 2001 and 2002 that included the alleged verbatim text of an official agreement for Niger to supply uranium to Iraq. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] seemed to corroborate a portion of the information provided [REDACTED]

- A prewar military report also appeared to independently support that Iraq had reached a deal with Niger for uranium [REDACTED] that Nigerian uranium bound for Iraq was being stored in the port of Benin [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] interpreted this request to mean Iraq was interested in uranium yellowcake, Niger's principal export [REDACTED]

CIA analytic efforts that started around January 2003, however, eventually led us to believe that Iraq did not seek uranium from Niger. [REDACTED] In January 2003, we noticed an erroneous date in the alleged verbatim text of the agreement [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] By late January and early February, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also cast doubt on whether uranium had been at the port in Benin or if so, whether it was actually destined for Iraq. [REDACTED] By early March 2003, the IAEA announced the results of its extensive


investigation of documents concerning the alleged Iraq-Niger agreement, noting the papers did not appear to be genuine—a study we independently scrutinized and endorse. [REDACTED]

- The IAEA based its findings in large part on documents the United States passed to it in early February 2003 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The IAEA found numerous problems in the form, format, signatures, and content of these documents that allowed them to conclude the papers were not authentic. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~



Desert Fox in 1998 that Iraq would no longer be bound by the UN resolutions—including those that proscribed WMD development

- Some postwar statements of [redacted] also seem consistent with a scenario in which Iraq may have been pursuing a program aimed at preserving technical capabilities for future nuclear weapons work



- A program of preservation also would be consistent with Iraq's historic practice—at least up through the Husayn Kamil defection in 1995—to retain the skills needed to resume a nuclear weapons effort




Alternative Analysis: Scenarios for an Undetected Nuclear Weapons Program

Although we believe the weight of reporting now argues against the existence of Iraqi nuclear weapons development work after 1991, uncertainties remain in our post-OIF exploitation that leave open the prospect that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program. As a result, we have considered some scenarios in which we might have missed or underestimated Iraq's nuclear efforts

Program of Preservation

Several of the activities found since the war, as well as past Iraqi practice, suggest Baghdad may have been pursuing a program aimed at preserving technical capabilities eventually to be used to produce nuclear weapons, rather than active weapons research, development, and production. We believe such a program could have stemmed from the decision reportedly taken by Saddam in the wake of Operation

If Saddam had ordered a program to preserve Iraq's nuclear weapons technical potential as suggested by postwar reporting, this also could provide a plausible nuclear weapons context for the recurring role [redacted] became the focus of concerns for postwar investigators.



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Prewar Context for Intent Analyses (U)

CIA's longstanding view that Saddam Husayn never abandoned his nuclear weapons program was shaped heavily by events since 1991, in which Baghdad repeatedly was caught lying to inspectors about the existence and scope of its nuclear weapons program. [redacted] Such repeated lies cost Iraq its credibility, leading CIA analysts to doubt Baghdad had given up its nuclear weapons ambitions. [redacted]

- The IAEA and UN caught Baghdad in many significant denial or deception activities in the early years of inspections, for example, including false declarations, attempts to conceal documents or equipment from sites, and standoffs involving seized program records. [redacted]
- The defection of Husayn Kamil in 1995 similarly reinforced the existing analytic paradigm that the regime harbored continued WMD intent, compared to the prospect that Baghdad now was abandoning its programs. [redacted] This view also was bolstered when Iraq revealed significant details to IAEA inspectors concerning its pre-1991 nuclear weapons work as a result of the Kamil defection, including additional documentation and materials that it had kept hidden since 1991. [redacted]

Although by mid-2002, CIA noted there was limited and contradictory reporting on whether Iraq continued nuclear weapons work through 1998, we also continued to state that Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons program. [redacted] At that time, our views continued to be shaped by occasional reports of coordinated concealment efforts in the years following the Kamil defection. [redacted] These included reports through the late 1990s and prior to OIF from sources who claimed Iraq had formed a special high-level Iraqi committee to conceal WMD materials or activities from inspectors. [redacted]

- Although, the ISG confirmed this high-level group existed, it also found that, prior to the Kamil defection, committee members disagreed on the key issue of what to disclose to UN/IAEA inspectors. [redacted]

[redacted]

Despite this prewar context that seemed to indicate Saddam still wanted nuclear weapons, our review also finds there was a body of reporting that was increasing in size and credibility through the 1990s, which suggested no nuclear weapons program was under way. [redacted] We believe that this information could have raised some reasonable questions before the war about how intent Saddam remained on pursuing nuclear weapons. [redacted]

- Prewar reporting that could have raised questions about Saddam's nuclear intent includes credible claims [redacted] who indicated Baghdad was sincere in its desire to disclose past centrifuge enrichment activities. [redacted]

[redacted]

facilities similarly claimed [redacted] that all of Iraq's nuclear sites had been declared to the IAEA,

[redacted]

[redacted] that since the 1995 Kamil defection he was not aware of any remaining equipment or documentation that had been hidden from inspectors. [redacted]

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]