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DATE: 31-Jan-2011

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**30 September 1993**

### **CIA DIRECTOR RELEASES TWO MORE COLLECTIONS OF COLD WAR DOCUMENTS -- SCHOLARS GAIN ACCESS TO MORE FORMER SECRETS**

**CIA HEADQUARTERS (LANGLEY, VA)** -- Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey has announced the Intelligence Community is releasing two major collections of Cold War records. The documents will be available to the public beginning October 4, at the National Archives Military Reference Branch.\* Last month the CIA released 125,000 pages from its newly declassified collection of papers relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The first of the two new collections contains approximately 300 declassified intelligence estimates on the Soviet Union and other countries prepared by the Intelligence Community between 1947 and 1961.

The second collection includes 500 articles and 450 book reviews from the CIA's classified quarterly journal, *Studies in Intelligence*. Among these are articles on the Cold War as well as on intelligence history. Most of these 950 items originally were classified.

Readers of the first collection will learn that in 1950 the Intelligence Community was asked by policy makers "the date at which the USSR might be prepared to engage in general war." On November 15, the Community responded: "From the point of view of military forces and economic potential, the Soviet Union is in a position to conduct a general war now ... but intelligence is lacking to present a valid prediction as to whether or when the USSR would actually resort deliberately to a general war."

In a National Intelligence Estimate (or NIE) published November 6, 1956, the Intelligence Community predicted correctly that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Suez Crisis then engaging Britain, France, Israel and Egypt. In a NIE published August 8, 1961, the Community wrote that the trends started by the Sino-Soviet split would, if they persist, "considerably diminish the effectiveness of the communist movement as a whole ... and give the West opportunities for maneuver and influence."

But the Intelligence Community was not accurate on every prediction. An estimate published on June 19, 1950, six days before the start of the Korean conflict, said that the North Koreans "have a capability for attaining limited objectives in short-term military operations against South Korea, including the capture of Seoul," but failed to predict that war was imminent.

The collection of items from *Studies in Intelligence* provides a variety of insights into the practitioners' views of their craft. It includes an article written in 1978 on the use of World War II aerial photography to detect evidence of the Holocaust. Using photographic interpretation techniques that the CIA developed after World War II ended, the authors reinterpret aerial photographs taken in 1944 of the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination complex to show that the clear purpose of the complex was the extermination of large numbers of people.

Two articles published in *Studies in Intelligence* in the summer of 1982 describe the development of the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. One of them was written by Clarence L. Johnson, the brilliant Lockheed engineer who supervised the "Skunkworks" where the SR-71 was built in record time.

Another article, from the winter 1988 edition of *Studies in Intelligence*, provides details on a disinformation campaign started by the USSR in 1983 charging the U.S. with responsibility for creating and spreading the AIDS virus. The article includes pictures showing this Soviet disinformation and describing the U.S. counterattack.

\*(Inquiries for the National Archives at (202) 501-5385)

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